2025-04-09 - 2026-04-09
Overview
28 Pull requests merged by 2 users
Merged
#82 refactor(hashing): introduce Hashable derive macro and migrate server types
Merged
#80 Post-quantum crypto and better useragent security
Merged
#78 feat(server): add integrity verification for client keys
Merged
#77 fix(server): replaced postcard-based integrity fingerprint with custom trait providing order-independent hashing
Merged
#76 fix(server): added chain_id check and covered check_shared_constraints with unit tests
Merged
#51 feat(server): integrity envelope engine for EVM grants with HMAC verification
Merged
#46 doc: multi-operator rules
Merged
#43 feat(auth): add seal-key-derived pubkey integrity tags with auth enforcement and unseal backfill
Merged
#47 refactor(server): removed miette out of server
Merged
#49 fix(client): evm-feature's code for new proto
Merged
#50 ci(server-test): ensure that all features are compiling
Merged
#45 refactor(protocol): split into domain-based nesting
Merged
#38 feat(evm): implement EVM sign transaction handling in client and user agent
Merged
#42 fix-security
Merged
#41 chore: bump mise deps
Merged
#34 SDK-client-UA-registration
Merged
#36 refactor: netcode across server and useragent
Merged
#35 Grant management and vault UI
Merged
#30 fix(clippy): forbidden methods
Merged
#31 security: audit some crates
Merged
#29 feat(user-agent-auth): add RSA and ECDSA auth key types
Merged
#27 fix: my having come back
Merged
#25 feat: EVM Engine
Merged
#26 refactor(server::client::auth): Approval flow for first-time connections and simplified to keep state on stack
Merged
#24 refactor(server::{user_agent, client}): move auth part to separate function to not to pollute actor session with one-time concerns
Merged
#23 refactor: consolidate auth messages into client and user_agent packages
Merged
#22 refactor(transport): implemented Bi stream based abstraction for actor communication with next loop override
Merged
#17 Vault initial implementation
4 Pull requests proposed by 1 user
Proposed
#44 refactor(server): extract shared runtime and implement service install/run in arbiter-server.exe
Proposed
#53 feat(server): implement useragent_delete_grant hard delete cleanup
Proposed
#81 feat(server): unify integrity API and propagate verified IDs through auth/EVM flows
Proposed
#83 security(server): bind grant revocation state (revoked_at) to integrity hash
21 Issues closed from 2 users
Closed
#58 Client key is not integrity-protected
Closed
#72 Bootstrap token comparison is not constant-time
Closed
#61 User-agent auth accepts integrity-unavailable state while sealed
Closed
#55 Client identity rebinding
Closed
#69 Integrity MAC depends on unordered SQLite row ordering
Closed
#57 Chain id is not verified
Closed
#11 Implement User Agent client library
Closed
#40 Client key replacement attack
Closed
#3 Implement SDK client registration via User Agent
Closed
#10 Implement Rust SDK client library
Closed
#12 Implement Flutter desktop app
Closed
#32 feat: migrate error handling to terrors for precise error types
Closed
#6 Implement memory protection for root key
Closed
#7 Implement EVM permission engine
Closed
#9 Implement transaction nonce management
Closed
#13 Implement connection string for peer setup
Closed
#15 Implement encryption scheme versioning and auto-migration
Closed
#14 Fix compilation errors in auth flow
Closed
#5 Implement key hierarchy and encryption at rest
Closed
#4 Implement vault seal/unseal lifecycle
Closed
#2 Complete challenge-response authentication flow
48 Issues created by 2 users
Opened
#1 TLS: Implement cert rotation in TlsManager
Opened
#2 Complete challenge-response authentication flow
Opened
#3 Implement SDK client registration via User Agent
Opened
#4 Implement vault seal/unseal lifecycle
Opened
#5 Implement key hierarchy and encryption at rest
Opened
#6 Implement memory protection for root key
Opened
#7 Implement EVM permission engine
Opened
#11 Implement User Agent client library
Opened
#9 Implement transaction nonce management
Opened
#8 Implement contract ABI database
Opened
#10 Implement Rust SDK client library
Opened
#14 Fix compilation errors in auth flow
Opened
#12 Implement Flutter desktop app
Opened
#13 Implement connection string for peer setup
Opened
#15 Implement encryption scheme versioning and auto-migration
Opened
#16 Finish cargo-vet audits
Opened
#20 Verifying server authenticity on local setup
Opened
#28 Bug: MemSafe::new panics under concurrent load due to VirtualLock quota exhaustion (Windows)
Opened
#32 feat: migrate error handling to terrors for precise error types
Opened
#37 Useragent doesn't check server certificate
Opened
#40 Client key replacement attack
Opened
#52 Come up with mechanism for enforcing integrity protection usage
Opened
#54 Encrypted key material not bound to wallet address — cross-wallet signing possible
Opened
#55 Client identity rebinding
Opened
#56 revoked_at is not included in signature
Opened
#57 Chain id is not verified
Opened
#58 Client key is not integrity-protected
Opened
#59 Bootstrap token persists on disk with weak file permissions
Opened
#60 Unseal and bootstrap handshake lack brute-force protection
Opened
#62 Bootstrap token registration lacks proof of possession
Opened
#61 User-agent auth accepts integrity-unavailable state while sealed
Opened
#63 SDK client metadata is silently rewritten on reconnect
Opened
#64 User-agent signing endpoint accepts arbitrary client_id
Opened
#66 Transaction logs can be tampered with to reset rate limits
Opened
#65 Integrity envelopes do not survive root key rotation
Opened
#67 Bootstrap token RNG seeding should be made explicit
Opened
#68 RequestTracker allows arbitrary gaps across request flows
Opened
#69 Integrity MAC depends on unordered SQLite row ordering
Opened
#70 Client approval quorum differs from documented consensus model
Opened
#71 Wallet-access revocation deletes by wallet_id instead of entry id
Opened
#72 Bootstrap token comparison is not constant-time
Opened
#73 Consumed bootstrap token is not zeroized in memory
Opened
#74 Zombie user-agent sessions can block all new client approvals
Opened
#75 Mutation Testing: Missing Test Coverage (~184 genuine gaps from 225 mutations)
Opened
#79 Not using quantum-resistant schemes
Opened
#84 The apocalypse due to casting i64 timestamp to sql Integer(i32)
Opened
#85 push_len_prefixed casts usize to u32 that may truncate on 64-bit targets
Opened
#86 suspicious as keywords