Not using quantum-resistant schemes #79

New Issue

Skipper · 2026-04-07T08:09:46Z

Skipper commented

2026-04-07 08:09:46 +00:00

Recent papers, hypes and development of quantum computing render Schorr's attack of ed25519, RSA and ECDSA more feasiable and feasible day-to-day.
However, we have advantage of greenfield project, so there is nothing to migrate yet.

My proposal is to replace our core asymmetric cryptography with post-quantum schemes.

Concrete steps

Evaluating rust crates for PQ cryptography
Replacing AuthPublicKey with ML-DSA scheme
Figuring out how to connect secure element (Secure Enclave, TPM2) key protection to all of that

Relevant articles

Recent papers, hypes and development of quantum computing render Schorr's attack of ed25519, RSA and ECDSA more feasiable and feasible day-to-day. However, we have advantage of greenfield project, so there is nothing to migrate yet. My proposal is to replace our core asymmetric cryptography with post-quantum schemes. # Concrete steps 1. Evaluating rust crates for PQ cryptography 2. Replacing `AuthPublicKey` with ML-DSA scheme 3. Figuring out how to connect secure element (Secure Enclave, TPM2) key protection to all of that # Relevant articles - https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28627 - https://research.google/blog/safeguarding-cryptocurrency-by-disclosing-quantum-vulnerabilities-responsibly/ - https://words.filippo.io/crqc-timeline/

Skipper added the

labels 2026-04-07 08:09:59 +00:00

Skipper self-assigned this 2026-04-07 13:39:54 +00:00

CleverWild commented

2026-04-08 09:57:20 +00:00