Block a user
feat(server): integrity envelope engine for EVM grants with HMAC verification
feat(server): implement useragent_delete_grant hard delete cleanup
Well, after some chill I though of another idea: we could just use shared_grant_id (id of evm_basic_grant) instead of grant specific id.
In this way, we would avoid writing generic invocation…
Zombie user-agent sessions can block all new client approvals
Consumed bootstrap token is not zeroized in memory
Bootstrap token comparison is not constant-time
Wallet-access revocation deletes by wallet_id instead of entry id
Client approval quorum differs from documented consensus model
Integrity MAC depends on unordered SQLite row ordering
RequestTracker allows arbitrary gaps across request flows
Bootstrap token RNG seeding should be made explicit
Transaction logs can be tampered with to reset rate limits
Integrity envelopes do not survive root key rotation
User-agent signing endpoint accepts arbitrary client_id
SDK client metadata is silently rewritten on reconnect
User-agent auth accepts integrity-unavailable state while sealed
Bootstrap token registration lacks proof of possession
Bootstrap token persists on disk with weak file permissions
Unseal and bootstrap handshake lack brute-force protection
Client key is not integrity-protected