test(client-auth): update metadata test to reflect frozen-metadata behavior

Three independent failures allowed an offline attacker with DB write access
to sign transactions using a different wallet's private key:
1. evm_wallet had no HMAC envelope — aead_encrypted_id could be swapped silently.
2. AEAD used a static tag as AAD — any valid ciphertext decrypted as any wallet key.
3. No post-decryption check that the derived address matched the requested wallet.

Fix: sign_entity covers (address, aead_encrypted_id) in a single transaction;
CreateNew/Decrypt take caller-provided AAD (wallet address bytes); after decryption
signer.address() is verified against the requested wallet address.

.gitattributes

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-* text=auto eol=lf

app/.dart_tool/extension_discovery/README.md

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+Extension Discovery Cache
+=========================
+
+This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
+packages that contains extensions for other packages.
+
+DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
+----------------------
+
+ * Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
+ * Do write to this folder.
+
+If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
+API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
+
+If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
+contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
+
+Use package `extension_discovery`
+---------------------------------
+
+If you want to access information from this folder.
+
+Feel free to delete this folder
+-------------------------------
+
+Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
+are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
+
+Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
+need to do please file a bug.

app/.dart_tool/extension_discovery/vs_code.json

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+{"version":2,"entries":[{"package":"app","rootUri":"../","packageUri":"lib/"}]}

app/.dart_tool/package_config.json

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+{
+  "configVersion": 2,
+  "packages": [
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+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/async-2.13.0",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "boolean_selector",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/boolean_selector-2.1.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
+    {
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+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/characters-1.4.0",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
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+    },
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+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/clock-1.1.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
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+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/collection-1.19.1",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
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+    {
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+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+    },
+    {
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+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/flutter_lints-6.0.0",
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+      "packageUri": "lib/",
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+      "packageUri": "lib/",
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+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/bin/cache/pkg/sky_engine",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "source_span",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/source_span-1.10.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "stack_trace",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stack_trace-1.12.1",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "stream_channel",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stream_channel-2.1.4",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.3"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "string_scanner",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/string_scanner-1.4.1",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
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+      "name": "term_glyph",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/term_glyph-1.2.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_api",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/test_api-0.7.7",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.5"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "vector_math",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vector_math-2.2.0",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "vm_service",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vm_service-15.0.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.5"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "app",
+      "rootUri": "../",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.10"
+    }
+  ],
+  "generator": "pub",
+  "generatorVersion": "3.10.8",
+  "flutterRoot": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable",
+  "flutterVersion": "3.38.9",
+  "pubCache": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache"
+}

app/.dart_tool/package_graph.json

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+{
+  "roots": [
+    "app"
+  ],
+  "packages": [
+    {
+      "name": "app",
+      "version": "1.0.0+1",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "cupertino_icons",
+        "flutter"
+      ],
+      "devDependencies": [
+        "flutter_lints",
+        "flutter_test"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "flutter_lints",
+      "version": "6.0.0",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "lints"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "flutter_test",
+      "version": "0.0.0",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "clock",
+        "collection",
+        "fake_async",
+        "flutter",
+        "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
+        "matcher",
+        "meta",
+        "path",
+        "stack_trace",
+        "stream_channel",
+        "test_api",
+        "vector_math"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "cupertino_icons",
+      "version": "1.0.8",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "flutter",
+      "version": "0.0.0",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "characters",
+        "collection",
+        "material_color_utilities",
+        "meta",
+        "sky_engine",
+        "vector_math"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "lints",
+      "version": "6.1.0",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "stream_channel",
+      "version": "2.1.4",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "async"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "meta",
+      "version": "1.17.0",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "collection",
+      "version": "1.19.1",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
+      "version": "3.0.10",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "flutter",
+        "leak_tracker",
+        "leak_tracker_testing",
+        "matcher",
+        "meta"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "vector_math",
+      "version": "2.2.0",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "stack_trace",
+      "version": "1.12.1",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "path"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "clock",
+      "version": "1.1.2",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "fake_async",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "clock",
+        "collection"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "path",
+      "version": "1.9.1",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "matcher",
+      "version": "0.12.17",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "async",
+        "meta",
+        "stack_trace",
+        "term_glyph",
+        "test_api"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_api",
+      "version": "0.7.7",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "async",
+        "boolean_selector",
+        "collection",
+        "meta",
+        "source_span",
+        "stack_trace",
+        "stream_channel",
+        "string_scanner",
+        "term_glyph"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "sky_engine",
+      "version": "0.0.0",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "material_color_utilities",
+      "version": "0.11.1",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "collection"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "characters",
+      "version": "1.4.0",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "async",
+      "version": "2.13.0",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "collection",
+        "meta"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "leak_tracker_testing",
+      "version": "3.0.2",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "leak_tracker",
+        "matcher",
+        "meta"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "leak_tracker",
+      "version": "11.0.2",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "clock",
+        "collection",
+        "meta",
+        "path",
+        "vm_service"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "term_glyph",
+      "version": "1.2.2",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "string_scanner",
+      "version": "1.4.1",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "source_span"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "source_span",
+      "version": "1.10.2",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "collection",
+        "path",
+        "term_glyph"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "boolean_selector",
+      "version": "2.1.2",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "source_span",
+        "string_scanner"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "vm_service",
+      "version": "15.0.2",
+      "dependencies": []
+    }
+  ],
+  "configVersion": 1
+}

app/.dart_tool/version

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+3.38.9

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-03-28-grant-grid-view.md

@@ -0,0 +1,821 @@
+# Grant Grid View Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Add an "EVM Grants" dashboard tab that displays all grants as enriched cards (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with per-card revoke support.
+
+**Architecture:** A new `walletAccessListProvider` fetches wallet accesses with their DB row IDs. The screen (`grants.dart`) watches only `evmGrantsProvider` for top-level state. Each `GrantCard` widget (its own file) watches enrichment providers (`walletAccessListProvider`, `evmProvider`, `sdkClientsProvider`) and the revoke mutation directly — keeping rebuilds scoped to the card. The screen is registered as a dashboard tab in `AdaptiveScaffold`.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Flutter, Riverpod (`riverpod_annotation` + `build_runner` codegen), `sizer` (adaptive sizing), `auto_route`, Protocol Buffers (Dart), `Palette` design tokens.
+
+---
+
+## File Map
+
+| File | Action | Responsibility |
+|---|---|---|
+| `operator/lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify | Add `Palette.token` (indigo accent for token-transfer cards) |
+| `operator/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart` | Modify | Add `listAllWalletAccesses()` function |
+| `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create | `WalletAccessListProvider` — fetches full wallet access list with IDs |
+| `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart` | Create | `GrantCard` widget — watches enrichment providers + revoke mutation; one card per grant |
+| `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create | `EvmGrantsScreen` — watches `evmGrantsProvider`; handles loading/error/empty/data states; renders `GrantCard` list |
+| `operator/lib/router.dart` | Modify | Register `EvmGrantsRoute` in dashboard children |
+| `operator/lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify | Add Grants entry to `routes` list and `NavigationDestination` list |
+
+---
+
+## Task 1: Add `Palette.token`
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `operator/lib/theme/palette.dart`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Add the color**
+
+Replace the contents of `operator/lib/theme/palette.dart` with:
+
+```dart
+import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
+
+class Palette {
+  static const ink = Color(0xFF15263C);
+  static const coral = Color(0xFFE26254);
+  static const cream = Color(0xFFFFFAF4);
+  static const line = Color(0x1A15263C);
+  static const token = Color(0xFF5C6BC0);
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
+
+```sh
+cd operator && flutter analyze lib/theme/palette.dart
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(theme): add Palette.token for token-transfer grant cards"
+jj new
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 2: Add `listAllWalletAccesses` feature function
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `operator/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart`
+
+`readClientWalletAccess` (existing) filters the list to one client's wallet IDs and returns `Set<int>`. This new function returns the complete unfiltered list with row IDs so the grant cards can resolve wallet_access_id → wallet + client.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Append function**
+
+Add at the bottom of `operator/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart`:
+
+```dart
+Future<List<SdkClientWalletAccess>> listAllWalletAccesses(
+  Connection connection,
+) async {
+  final response = await connection.ask(
+    OperatorRequest(listWalletAccess: Empty()),
+  );
+  if (!response.hasListWalletAccessResponse()) {
+    throw Exception(
+      'Expected list wallet access response, got ${response.whichPayload()}',
+    );
+  }
+  return response.listWalletAccessResponse.accesses.toList(growable: false);
+}
+```
+
+Each returned `SdkClientWalletAccess` has:
+- `.id` — the `evm_wallet_access` row ID (same value as `wallet_access_id` in a `GrantEntry`)
+- `.access.walletId` — the EVM wallet DB ID
+- `.access.sdkClientId` — the SDK client DB ID
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
+
+```sh
+cd operator && flutter analyze lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(evm): add listAllWalletAccesses feature function"
+jj new
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 3: Create `WalletAccessListProvider`
+
+**Files:**
+- Create: `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
+- Generated: `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.g.dart`
+
+Mirrors the structure of `EvmGrants` in `providers/evm/evm_grants.dart` — class-based `@riverpod` with a `refresh()` method.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the provider**
+
+Create `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`:
+
+```dart
+import 'package:arbiter/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/proto/operator.pb.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/connection/connection_manager.dart';
+import 'package:mtcore/markettakers.dart';
+import 'package:riverpod_annotation/riverpod_annotation.dart';
+
+part 'wallet_access_list.g.dart';
+
+@riverpod
+class WalletAccessList extends _$WalletAccessList {
+  @override
+  Future<List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?> build() async {
+    final connection = await ref.watch(connectionManagerProvider.future);
+    if (connection == null) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    try {
+      return await listAllWalletAccesses(connection);
+    } catch (e, st) {
+      talker.handle(e, st);
+      rethrow;
+    }
+  }
+
+  Future<void> refresh() async {
+    final connection = await ref.read(connectionManagerProvider.future);
+    if (connection == null) {
+      state = const AsyncData(null);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    state = const AsyncLoading();
+    state = await AsyncValue.guard(() => listAllWalletAccesses(connection));
+  }
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run code generation**
+
+```sh
+cd operator && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
+```
+
+Expected: `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.g.dart` created. No errors.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Verify**
+
+```sh
+cd operator && flutter analyze lib/providers/sdk_clients/
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(providers): add WalletAccessListProvider"
+jj new
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 4: Create `GrantCard` widget
+
+**Files:**
+- Create: `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart`
+
+This widget owns all per-card logic: enrichment lookups, revoke action, and rebuild scope. The screen only passes it a `GrantEntry` — the card fetches everything else itself.
+
+**Key types:**
+- `GrantEntry` (from `proto/evm.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.shared.walletAccessId`, `.shared.chainId`, `.specific.whichGrant()`
+- `SpecificGrant_Grant.etherTransfer` / `.tokenTransfer` — enum values for the oneof
+- `SdkClientWalletAccess` (from `proto/operator.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
+- `WalletEntry` (from `proto/evm.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.address` (List<int>)
+- `SdkClientEntry` (from `proto/operator.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.info.name`
+- `revokeEvmGrantMutation` — `Mutation<void>` (global; all revoke buttons disable together while any revoke is in flight)
+- `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: int)` — `Future<void>`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the widget**
+
+Create `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart`:
+
+```dart
+import 'package:arbiter/proto/evm.pb.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/proto/operator.pb.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm_grants.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/list.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/theme/palette.dart';
+import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
+import 'package:hooks_riverpod/experimental/mutation.dart';
+import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
+import 'package:sizer/sizer.dart';
+
+String _shortAddress(List<int> bytes) {
+  final hex = bytes.map((b) => b.toRadixString(16).padLeft(2, '0')).join();
+  return '0x${hex.substring(0, 6)}...${hex.substring(hex.length - 4)}';
+}
+
+String _formatError(Object error) {
+  final message = error.toString();
+  if (message.startsWith('Exception: ')) {
+    return message.substring('Exception: '.length);
+  }
+  return message;
+}
+
+class GrantCard extends ConsumerWidget {
+  const GrantCard({super.key, required this.grant});
+
+  final GrantEntry grant;
+
+  @override
+  Widget build(BuildContext context, WidgetRef ref) {
+    // Enrichment lookups — each watch scopes rebuilds to this card only
+    final walletAccesses =
+        ref.watch(walletAccessListProvider).asData?.value ?? const [];
+    final wallets = ref.watch(evmProvider).asData?.value ?? const [];
+    final clients = ref.watch(sdkClientsProvider).asData?.value ?? const [];
+    final revoking = ref.watch(revokeEvmGrantMutation) is MutationPending;
+
+    final isEther =
+        grant.specific.whichGrant() == SpecificGrant_Grant.etherTransfer;
+    final accent = isEther ? Palette.coral : Palette.token;
+    final typeLabel = isEther ? 'Ether' : 'Token';
+    final theme = Theme.of(context);
+    final muted = Palette.ink.withValues(alpha: 0.62);
+
+    // Resolve wallet_access_id → wallet address + client name
+    final accessById = <int, SdkClientWalletAccess>{
+      for (final a in walletAccesses) a.id: a,
+    };
+    final walletById = <int, WalletEntry>{
+      for (final w in wallets) w.id: w,
+    };
+    final clientNameById = <int, String>{
+      for (final c in clients) c.id: c.info.name,
+    };
+
+    final accessId = grant.shared.walletAccessId;
+    final access = accessById[accessId];
+    final wallet = access != null ? walletById[access.access.walletId] : null;
+
+    final walletLabel = wallet != null
+        ? _shortAddress(wallet.address)
+        : 'Access #$accessId';
+
+    final clientLabel = () {
+      if (access == null) return '';
+      final name = clientNameById[access.access.sdkClientId] ?? '';
+      return name.isEmpty ? 'Client #${access.access.sdkClientId}' : name;
+    }();
+
+    void showError(String message) {
+      if (!context.mounted) return;
+      ScaffoldMessenger.of(context).showSnackBar(
+        SnackBar(content: Text(message), behavior: SnackBarBehavior.floating),
+      );
+    }
+
+    Future<void> revoke() async {
+      try {
+        await executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: grant.id);
+      } catch (e) {
+        showError(_formatError(e));
+      }
+    }
+
+    return Container(
+      decoration: BoxDecoration(
+        borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(24),
+        color: Palette.cream.withValues(alpha: 0.92),
+        border: Border.all(color: Palette.line),
+      ),
+      child: IntrinsicHeight(
+        child: Row(
+          crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.stretch,
+          children: [
+            // Accent strip
+            Container(
+              width: 0.8.w,
+              decoration: BoxDecoration(
+                color: accent,
+                borderRadius: const BorderRadius.horizontal(
+                  left: Radius.circular(24),
+                ),
+              ),
+            ),
+            // Card body
+            Expanded(
+              child: Padding(
+                padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
+                  horizontal: 1.6.w,
+                  vertical: 1.4.h,
+                ),
+                child: Column(
+                  crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.start,
+                  children: [
+                    // Row 1: type badge · chain · spacer · revoke button
+                    Row(
+                      children: [
+                        Container(
+                          padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
+                            horizontal: 1.w,
+                            vertical: 0.4.h,
+                          ),
+                          decoration: BoxDecoration(
+                            color: accent.withValues(alpha: 0.15),
+                            borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(8),
+                          ),
+                          child: Text(
+                            typeLabel,
+                            style: theme.textTheme.labelSmall?.copyWith(
+                              color: accent,
+                              fontWeight: FontWeight.w800,
+                            ),
+                          ),
+                        ),
+                        SizedBox(width: 1.w),
+                        Container(
+                          padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
+                            horizontal: 1.w,
+                            vertical: 0.4.h,
+                          ),
+                          decoration: BoxDecoration(
+                            color: Palette.ink.withValues(alpha: 0.06),
+                            borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(8),
+                          ),
+                          child: Text(
+                            'Chain ${grant.shared.chainId}',
+                            style: theme.textTheme.labelSmall?.copyWith(
+                              color: muted,
+                              fontWeight: FontWeight.w700,
+                            ),
+                          ),
+                        ),
+                        const Spacer(),
+                        if (revoking)
+                          SizedBox(
+                            width: 1.8.h,
+                            height: 1.8.h,
+                            child: CircularProgressIndicator(
+                              strokeWidth: 2,
+                              color: Palette.coral,
+                            ),
+                          )
+                        else
+                          OutlinedButton.icon(
+                            onPressed: revoke,
+                            style: OutlinedButton.styleFrom(
+                              foregroundColor: Palette.coral,
+                              side: BorderSide(
+                                color: Palette.coral.withValues(alpha: 0.4),
+                              ),
+                              padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
+                                horizontal: 1.w,
+                                vertical: 0.6.h,
+                              ),
+                              shape: RoundedRectangleBorder(
+                                borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(10),
+                              ),
+                            ),
+                            icon: const Icon(Icons.block_rounded, size: 16),
+                            label: const Text('Revoke'),
+                          ),
+                      ],
+                    ),
+                    SizedBox(height: 0.8.h),
+                    // Row 2: wallet address · client name
+                    Row(
+                      children: [
+                        Text(
+                          walletLabel,
+                          style: theme.textTheme.bodySmall?.copyWith(
+                            color: Palette.ink,
+                            fontFamily: 'monospace',
+                          ),
+                        ),
+                        Padding(
+                          padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(horizontal: 0.8.w),
+                          child: Text(
+                            '·',
+                            style: theme.textTheme.bodySmall
+                                ?.copyWith(color: muted),
+                          ),
+                        ),
+                        Expanded(
+                          child: Text(
+                            clientLabel,
+                            maxLines: 1,
+                            overflow: TextOverflow.ellipsis,
+                            style: theme.textTheme.bodySmall
+                                ?.copyWith(color: muted),
+                          ),
+                        ),
+                      ],
+                    ),
+                  ],
+                ),
+              ),
+            ),
+          ],
+        ),
+      ),
+    );
+  }
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
+
+```sh
+cd operator && flutter analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(grants): add GrantCard widget with self-contained enrichment"
+jj new
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 5: Create `EvmGrantsScreen`
+
+**Files:**
+- Create: `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
+
+The screen watches only `evmGrantsProvider` for top-level state (loading / error / no connection / empty / data). When there is data it renders a list of `GrantCard` widgets — each card manages its own enrichment subscriptions.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the screen**
+
+Create `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`:
+
+```dart
+import 'package:arbiter/proto/evm.pb.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm_grants.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/router.gr.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/theme/palette.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/widgets/page_header.dart';
+import 'package:auto_route/auto_route.dart';
+import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
+import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
+import 'package:sizer/sizer.dart';
+
+String _formatError(Object error) {
+  final message = error.toString();
+  if (message.startsWith('Exception: ')) {
+    return message.substring('Exception: '.length);
+  }
+  return message;
+}
+
+// ─── State panel ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class _StatePanel extends StatelessWidget {
+  const _StatePanel({
+    required this.icon,
+    required this.title,
+    required this.body,
+    this.actionLabel,
+    this.onAction,
+    this.busy = false,
+  });
+
+  final IconData icon;
+  final String title;
+  final String body;
+  final String? actionLabel;
+  final Future<void> Function()? onAction;
+  final bool busy;
+
+  @override
+  Widget build(BuildContext context) {
+    final theme = Theme.of(context);
+
+    return Container(
+      decoration: BoxDecoration(
+        borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(24),
+        color: Palette.cream.withValues(alpha: 0.92),
+        border: Border.all(color: Palette.line),
+      ),
+      child: Padding(
+        padding: EdgeInsets.all(2.8.h),
+        child: Column(
+          crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.start,
+          children: [
+            if (busy)
+              SizedBox(
+                width: 2.8.h,
+                height: 2.8.h,
+                child: const CircularProgressIndicator(strokeWidth: 2.5),
+              )
+            else
+              Icon(icon, size: 34, color: Palette.coral),
+            SizedBox(height: 1.8.h),
+            Text(
+              title,
+              style: theme.textTheme.headlineSmall?.copyWith(
+                color: Palette.ink,
+                fontWeight: FontWeight.w800,
+              ),
+            ),
+            SizedBox(height: 1.h),
+            Text(
+              body,
+              style: theme.textTheme.bodyLarge?.copyWith(
+                color: Palette.ink.withValues(alpha: 0.72),
+                height: 1.5,
+              ),
+            ),
+            if (actionLabel != null && onAction != null) ...[
+              SizedBox(height: 2.h),
+              OutlinedButton.icon(
+                onPressed: () => onAction!(),
+                icon: const Icon(Icons.refresh),
+                label: Text(actionLabel!),
+              ),
+            ],
+          ],
+        ),
+      ),
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+// ─── Grant list ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class _GrantList extends StatelessWidget {
+  const _GrantList({required this.grants});
+
+  final List<GrantEntry> grants;
+
+  @override
+  Widget build(BuildContext context) {
+    return Column(
+      children: [
+        for (var i = 0; i < grants.length; i++)
+          Padding(
+            padding: EdgeInsets.only(
+              bottom: i == grants.length - 1 ? 0 : 1.8.h,
+            ),
+            child: GrantCard(grant: grants[i]),
+          ),
+      ],
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+// ─── Screen ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@RoutePage()
+class EvmGrantsScreen extends ConsumerWidget {
+  const EvmGrantsScreen({super.key});
+
+  @override
+  Widget build(BuildContext context, WidgetRef ref) {
+    // Screen watches only the grant list for top-level state decisions
+    final grantsAsync = ref.watch(evmGrantsProvider);
+
+    Future<void> refresh() async {
+      await Future.wait([
+        ref.read(evmGrantsProvider.notifier).refresh(),
+        ref.read(walletAccessListProvider.notifier).refresh(),
+      ]);
+    }
+
+    void showMessage(String message) {
+      if (!context.mounted) return;
+      ScaffoldMessenger.of(context).showSnackBar(
+        SnackBar(content: Text(message), behavior: SnackBarBehavior.floating),
+      );
+    }
+
+    Future<void> safeRefresh() async {
+      try {
+        await refresh();
+      } catch (e) {
+        showMessage(_formatError(e));
+      }
+    }
+
+    final grantsState = grantsAsync.asData?.value;
+    final grants = grantsState?.grants;
+
+    final content = switch (grantsAsync) {
+      AsyncLoading() when grantsState == null => const _StatePanel(
+        icon: Icons.hourglass_top,
+        title: 'Loading grants',
+        body: 'Pulling grant registry from Arbiter.',
+        busy: true,
+      ),
+      AsyncError(:final error) => _StatePanel(
+        icon: Icons.sync_problem,
+        title: 'Grant registry unavailable',
+        body: _formatError(error),
+        actionLabel: 'Retry',
+        onAction: safeRefresh,
+      ),
+      AsyncData(:final value) when value == null => _StatePanel(
+        icon: Icons.portable_wifi_off,
+        title: 'No active server connection',
+        body: 'Reconnect to Arbiter to list EVM grants.',
+        actionLabel: 'Refresh',
+        onAction: safeRefresh,
+      ),
+      _ when grants != null && grants.isEmpty => _StatePanel(
+        icon: Icons.policy_outlined,
+        title: 'No grants yet',
+        body: 'Create a grant to allow SDK clients to sign transactions.',
+        actionLabel: 'Create grant',
+        onAction: () => context.router.push(const CreateEvmGrantRoute()),
+      ),
+      _ => _GrantList(grants: grants ?? const []),
+    };
+
+    return Scaffold(
+      body: SafeArea(
+        child: RefreshIndicator.adaptive(
+          color: Palette.ink,
+          backgroundColor: Colors.white,
+          onRefresh: safeRefresh,
+          child: ListView(
+            physics: const BouncingScrollPhysics(
+              parent: AlwaysScrollableScrollPhysics(),
+            ),
+            padding: EdgeInsets.fromLTRB(2.4.w, 2.4.h, 2.4.w, 3.2.h),
+            children: [
+              PageHeader(
+                title: 'EVM Grants',
+                isBusy: grantsAsync.isLoading,
+                actions: [
+                  FilledButton.icon(
+                    onPressed: () =>
+                        context.router.push(const CreateEvmGrantRoute()),
+                    icon: const Icon(Icons.add_rounded),
+                    label: const Text('Create grant'),
+                  ),
+                  SizedBox(width: 1.w),
+                  OutlinedButton.icon(
+                    onPressed: safeRefresh,
+                    style: OutlinedButton.styleFrom(
+                      foregroundColor: Palette.ink,
+                      side: BorderSide(color: Palette.line),
+                      padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
+                        horizontal: 1.4.w,
+                        vertical: 1.2.h,
+                      ),
+                      shape: RoundedRectangleBorder(
+                        borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(14),
+                      ),
+                    ),
+                    icon: const Icon(Icons.refresh, size: 18),
+                    label: const Text('Refresh'),
+                  ),
+                ],
+              ),
+              SizedBox(height: 1.8.h),
+              content,
+            ],
+          ),
+        ),
+      ),
+    );
+  }
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
+
+```sh
+cd operator && flutter analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(grants): add EvmGrantsScreen"
+jj new
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 6: Wire router and dashboard tab
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `operator/lib/router.dart`
+- Modify: `operator/lib/screens/dashboard.dart`
+- Regenerated: `operator/lib/router.gr.dart`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Add route to `router.dart`**
+
+Replace the contents of `operator/lib/router.dart` with:
+
+```dart
+import 'package:auto_route/auto_route.dart';
+
+import 'router.gr.dart';
+
+@AutoRouterConfig(generateForDir: ['lib/screens'])
+class Router extends RootStackRouter {
+  @override
+  List<AutoRoute> get routes => [
+    AutoRoute(page: Bootstrap.page, path: '/bootstrap', initial: true),
+    AutoRoute(page: ServerInfoSetupRoute.page, path: '/server-info'),
+    AutoRoute(page: ServerConnectionRoute.page, path: '/server-connection'),
+    AutoRoute(page: VaultSetupRoute.page, path: '/vault'),
+    AutoRoute(page: ClientDetailsRoute.page, path: '/clients/:clientId'),
+    AutoRoute(page: CreateEvmGrantRoute.page, path: '/evm-grants/create'),
+
+    AutoRoute(
+      page: DashboardRouter.page,
+      path: '/dashboard',
+      children: [
+        AutoRoute(page: EvmRoute.page, path: 'evm'),
+        AutoRoute(page: ClientsRoute.page, path: 'clients'),
+        AutoRoute(page: EvmGrantsRoute.page, path: 'grants'),
+        AutoRoute(page: AboutRoute.page, path: 'about'),
+      ],
+    ),
+  ];
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Update `dashboard.dart`**
+
+In `operator/lib/screens/dashboard.dart`, replace the `routes` constant:
+
+```dart
+final routes = [
+  const EvmRoute(),
+  const ClientsRoute(),
+  const EvmGrantsRoute(),
+  const AboutRoute(),
+];
+```
+
+And replace the `destinations` list inside `AdaptiveScaffold`:
+
+```dart
+destinations: const [
+  NavigationDestination(
+    icon: Icon(Icons.account_balance_wallet_outlined),
+    selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.account_balance_wallet),
+    label: 'Wallets',
+  ),
+  NavigationDestination(
+    icon: Icon(Icons.devices_other_outlined),
+    selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.devices_other),
+    label: 'Clients',
+  ),
+  NavigationDestination(
+    icon: Icon(Icons.policy_outlined),
+    selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.policy),
+    label: 'Grants',
+  ),
+  NavigationDestination(
+    icon: Icon(Icons.info_outline),
+    selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.info),
+    label: 'About',
+  ),
+],
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Regenerate router**
+
+```sh
+cd operator && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
+```
+
+Expected: `lib/router.gr.dart` updated, `EvmGrantsRoute` now available, no errors.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Full project verify**
+
+```sh
+cd operator && flutter analyze
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(nav): add Grants dashboard tab"
+jj new
+```

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-03-28-grant-grid-view-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+# Grant Grid View — Design Spec
+
+**Date:** 2026-03-28
+
+## Overview
+
+Add a "Grants" dashboard tab to the Flutter operator app that displays all EVM grants as a card-based grid. Each card shows a compact summary (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with a revoke action. The tab integrates into the existing `AdaptiveScaffold` navigation alongside Wallets, Clients, and About.
+
+## Scope
+
+- New `walletAccessListProvider` for fetching wallet access entries with their DB row IDs
+- New `EvmGrantsScreen` as a dashboard tab
+- Grant card widget with enriched display (type, chain, wallet, client)
+- Revoke action wired to existing `executeRevokeEvmGrant` mutation
+- Dashboard tab bar and router updated
+- New token-transfer accent color added to `Palette`
+
+**Out of scope:** Fixing grant creation (separate task).
+
+---
+
+## Data Layer
+
+### `walletAccessListProvider`
+
+**File:** `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
+
+- `@riverpod` class, watches `connectionManagerProvider.future`
+- Returns `List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?` (null when not connected)
+- Each entry: `.id` (wallet_access_id), `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
+- Exposes a `refresh()` method following the same pattern as `EvmGrants.refresh()`
+
+### Enrichment at render time (Approach A)
+
+The `EvmGrantsScreen` watches four providers:
+1. `evmGrantsProvider` — the grant list
+2. `walletAccessListProvider` — to resolve wallet_access_id → (wallet_id, sdk_client_id)
+3. `evmProvider` — to resolve wallet_id → wallet address
+4. `sdkClientsProvider` — to resolve sdk_client_id → client name
+
+All lookups are in-memory Maps built inside the build method; no extra model class needed.
+
+Fallbacks:
+- Wallet address not found → `"Access #N"` where N is the wallet_access_id
+- Client name not found → `"Client #N"` where N is the sdk_client_id
+
+---
+
+## Route Structure
+
+```
+/dashboard
+  /evm          ← existing (Wallets tab)
+  /clients      ← existing (Clients tab)
+  /grants       ← NEW (Grants tab)
+  /about        ← existing
+
+/evm-grants/create  ← existing push route (unchanged)
+```
+
+### Changes to `router.dart`
+
+Add inside dashboard children:
+```dart
+AutoRoute(page: EvmGrantsRoute.page, path: 'grants'),
+```
+
+### Changes to `dashboard.dart`
+
+Add to `routes` list:
+```dart
+const EvmGrantsRoute()
+```
+
+Add `NavigationDestination`:
+```dart
+NavigationDestination(
+  icon: Icon(Icons.policy_outlined),
+  selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.policy),
+  label: 'Grants',
+),
+```
+
+---
+
+## Screen: `EvmGrantsScreen`
+
+**File:** `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
+
+```
+Scaffold
+└─ SafeArea
+   └─ RefreshIndicator.adaptive (refreshes evmGrantsProvider + walletAccessListProvider)
+      └─ ListView (BouncingScrollPhysics + AlwaysScrollableScrollPhysics)
+         ├─ PageHeader
+         │    title: 'EVM Grants'
+         │    isBusy: evmGrantsProvider.isLoading
+         │    actions: [CreateGrantButton, RefreshButton]
+         ├─ SizedBox(height: 1.8.h)
+         └─ <content>
+```
+
+### State handling
+
+Matches the pattern from `EvmScreen` and `ClientsScreen`:
+
+| State | Display |
+|---|---|
+| Loading (no data yet) | `_StatePanel` with spinner, "Loading grants" |
+| Error | `_StatePanel` with coral icon, error message, Retry button |
+| No connection | `_StatePanel`, "No active server connection" |
+| Empty list | `_StatePanel`, "No grants yet", with Create Grant shortcut |
+| Data | Column of `_GrantCard` widgets |
+
+### Header actions
+
+**CreateGrantButton:** `FilledButton.icon` with `Icons.add_rounded`, pushes `CreateEvmGrantRoute()` via `context.router.push(...)`.
+
+**RefreshButton:** `OutlinedButton.icon` with `Icons.refresh`, calls `ref.read(evmGrantsProvider.notifier).refresh()`.
+
+---
+
+## Grant Card: `_GrantCard`
+
+**Layout:**
+
+```
+Container (rounded 24, Palette.cream bg, Palette.line border)
+└─ IntrinsicHeight > Row
+   ├─ Accent strip (0.8.w wide, full height, rounded left)
+   └─ Padding > Column
+        ├─ Row 1: TypeBadge + ChainChip + Spacer + RevokeButton
+        └─ Row 2: WalletText + "·" + ClientText
+```
+
+**Accent color by grant type:**
+- Ether transfer → `Palette.coral`
+- Token transfer → `Palette.token` (new entry in `Palette` — indigo, e.g. `Color(0xFF5C6BC0)`)
+
+**TypeBadge:** Small pill container with accent color background at 15% opacity, accent-colored text. Label: `'Ether'` or `'Token'`.
+
+**ChainChip:** Small container: `'Chain ${grant.shared.chainId}'`, muted ink color.
+
+**WalletText:** Short hex address (`0xabc...def`) from wallet lookup, `bodySmall`, monospace font family.
+
+**ClientText:** Client name from `sdkClientsProvider` lookup, or fallback string. `bodySmall`, muted ink.
+
+**RevokeButton:**
+- `OutlinedButton` with `Icons.block_rounded` icon, label `'Revoke'`
+- `foregroundColor: Palette.coral`, `side: BorderSide(color: Palette.coral.withValues(alpha: 0.4))`
+- Disabled (replaced with `CircularProgressIndicator`) while `revokeEvmGrantMutation` is pending — note: this is a single global mutation, so all revoke buttons disable while any revoke is in flight
+- On press: calls `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: grant.id)`; shows `SnackBar` on error
+
+---
+
+## Adaptive Sizing
+
+All sizing uses `sizer` units (`1.h`, `1.w`, etc.). No hardcoded pixel values.
+
+---
+
+## Files to Create / Modify
+
+| File | Action |
+|---|---|
+| `lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify — add `Palette.token` color |
+| `lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create |
+| `lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create |
+| `lib/router.dart` | Modify — add grants route to dashboard children |
+| `lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify — add tab to routes list and NavigationDestinations |

mise.lock

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ backend = "aqua:ast-grep/ast-grep"
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64"]
 checksum = "sha256:3ba383839044cf9817929435f5ce0027f91d06931e8efb32d942e58d73d92be5"
 url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/assets/388772218"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
 checksum = "sha256:3ba383839044cf9817929435f5ce0027f91d06931e8efb32d942e58d73d92be5"
@@ -16,7 +15,6 @@ url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64"]
 checksum = "sha256:5de8b87cba67fc8dc3e239d54b6484802ad745a7ae3de76be4fe89661dc52657"
 url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/assets/388771275"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
 checksum = "sha256:5de8b87cba67fc8dc3e239d54b6484802ad745a7ae3de76be4fe89661dc52657"
@@ -25,17 +23,14 @@ url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-arm64"]
 checksum = "sha256:c3961d8e8a4ee0ce2d0d98c7beeb168bb331cdc766b53630118a7b6c4fd39015"
 url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64-apple-darwin.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/assets/388770234"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-x64"]
 checksum = "sha256:a038965bfd7fe44257c771cdf8918dc3467dd8ec0eef673b8b14f639b144cdbd"
 url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-apple-darwin.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/assets/388770498"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.windows-x64"]
 checksum = "sha256:fe34f631bb24c08ad146f92ca2a92971a53d179461b509fd8d32dc863bff9f83"
 url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/assets/388771363"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-audit"]]
 version = "0.22.1"
@@ -62,7 +57,7 @@ version = "0.9.133"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-shear"]]
-version = "1.13.4"
+version = "1.11.2"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-shear"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-vet"]]
@@ -83,27 +78,7 @@ backend = "cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"
 
 [[tools.flutter]]
 version = "3.41.7-stable"
-backend = "http:flutter"
-
-[tools.flutter."platforms.linux-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:f344d5057db52abc2a63cd3a7c7370957b7685d1fca5e5fbe2ce4dfe74657a79"
-url = "https://storage.googleapis.com/flutter_infra_release/releases/stable/linux/flutter_linux_3.41.7-stable.tar.xz"
-
-[tools.flutter."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
-checksum = "sha256:f344d5057db52abc2a63cd3a7c7370957b7685d1fca5e5fbe2ce4dfe74657a79"
-url = "https://storage.googleapis.com/flutter_infra_release/releases/stable/linux/flutter_linux_3.41.7-stable.tar.xz"
-
-[tools.flutter."platforms.macos-arm64"]
-checksum = "sha256:2e3e6af44d1adccf695deff52e5e4c8beb10e5625066b27ad082b38b83ef805e"
-url = "https://storage.googleapis.com/flutter_infra_release/releases/stable/macos/flutter_macos_arm64_3.41.7-stable.zip"
-
-[tools.flutter."platforms.macos-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:a0b9af49e6e1a6800f31a408b98c1d7bd51e98650a8b9ebcd77168b48c916ff0"
-url = "https://storage.googleapis.com/flutter_infra_release/releases/stable/macos/flutter_macos_3.41.7-stable.zip"
-
-[tools.flutter."platforms.windows-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:de17b513b740a931c5dbc3f96b5a659c1612dfe6b5e1f910c5ad954a8bac17ee"
-url = "https://storage.googleapis.com/flutter_infra_release/releases/stable/windows/flutter_windows_3.41.7-stable.zip"
+backend = "asdf:flutter"
 
 [[tools.protoc]]
 version = "29.6"
@@ -112,37 +87,30 @@ backend = "aqua:protocolbuffers/protobuf/protoc"
 [tools.protoc."platforms.linux-arm64"]
 checksum = "sha256:2594ff4fcae8cb57310d394d0961b236190ad9c5efbfdf1f597ea471d424fe79"
 url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-aarch_64.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795076"
 
 [tools.protoc."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
 checksum = "sha256:2594ff4fcae8cb57310d394d0961b236190ad9c5efbfdf1f597ea471d424fe79"
 url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-aarch_64.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795076"
 
 [tools.protoc."platforms.linux-x64"]
 checksum = "sha256:48785a926e73ffa3f68e2f22b14e7b849620c7a1d36809ac9249a5495e280323"
 url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-x86_64.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795083"
 
 [tools.protoc."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
 checksum = "sha256:48785a926e73ffa3f68e2f22b14e7b849620c7a1d36809ac9249a5495e280323"
 url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-x86_64.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795083"
 
 [tools.protoc."platforms.macos-arm64"]
 checksum = "sha256:b9576b5fa1a1ef3fe13a8c91d9d8204b46545759bea5ae155cd6ba2ea4cdaeed"
 url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-aarch_64.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795082"
 
 [tools.protoc."platforms.macos-x64"]
 checksum = "sha256:312f04713946921cc0187ef34df80241ddca1bab6f564c636885fd2cc90d3f88"
 url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-x86_64.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795085"
 
 [tools.protoc."platforms.windows-x64"]
 checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f6f7"
 url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"
-url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795088"
 
 [[tools.python]]
 version = "3.14.4"
@@ -154,8 +122,8 @@ url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
-checksum = "sha256:a10687b226e0941632569836bc1d8fa6353a8e3e8424316467ca9cdf220b983d"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-musl-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+checksum = "sha256:b8b597fdb2f8dccdc502c11947b60a4b65eb6bce79cfa60c7ccf9b6e8352c60a"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
@@ -164,12 +132,12 @@ url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
-checksum = "sha256:d6005226cd24e780630626232c7a63243d4885fdf975dcf930a0758a0759ce14"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+checksum = "sha256:fe9a9c32d13870af632cbac3dfc7528ae53597e94472aa4c7d6a42e8166136cd"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
-checksum = "sha256:6f304f4ec30854611f23316578302235fb517cd970519ecdd11a8c4db87fd843"
+checksum = "blake3:0314ec66e0f33ec04959583b5900bc8edae371a396aa96b8874e750d1fe936e6"
 url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
@@ -186,6 +154,3 @@ provenance = "github-attestations"
 [[tools.rust]]
 version = "1.95.0"
 backend = "core:rust"
-
-[tools.rust.options]
-components = "clippy,rust-analyzer"

mise.toml

@@ -22,5 +22,3 @@ run = '''
 dart pub global activate protoc_plugin && \
 protoc --dart_out=grpc:useragent/lib/proto --proto_path=protobufs/ $(find protobufs -name '*.proto' | sort)
 '''
-
-[tasks.generate_schema]

protobufs/operator.proto

@@ -4,28 +4,25 @@ package arbiter.operator;
 
 import "operator/auth.proto";
 import "operator/evm.proto";
-import "operator/governance.proto";
 import "operator/sdk_client.proto";
 import "operator/vault/vault.proto";
 
 message OperatorRequest {
   int32 id = 16;
   oneof payload {
-    auth.Request            auth        = 1;
-    vault.Request           vault       = 2;
-    evm.Request             evm         = 3;
-    sdk_client.Request      sdk_client  = 4;
-    governance.Request      governance  = 5;
+    auth.Request auth = 1;
+    vault.Request vault = 2;
+    evm.Request evm = 3;
+    sdk_client.Request sdk_client = 4;
   }
 }
 
 message OperatorResponse {
   optional int32 id = 16;
   oneof payload {
-    auth.Response           auth        = 1;
-    vault.Response          vault       = 2;
-    evm.Response            evm         = 3;
-    sdk_client.Response     sdk_client  = 4;
-    governance.Response     governance  = 5;
+    auth.Response auth = 1;
+    vault.Response vault = 2;
+    evm.Response evm = 3;
+    sdk_client.Response sdk_client = 4;
   }
 }

protobufs/operator/governance.proto

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package arbiter.operator.governance;
-
-import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
-
-message Request {
-  oneof payload {
-    CreateProposalRequest create = 1;
-    CastVoteRequest       vote   = 2;
-    QueryPendingRequest   query  = 3;
-  }
-}
-
-message CreateProposalRequest {
-  oneof kind {
-    ApproveSdkClientPayload         approve_sdk_client          = 1;
-    GrantWalletAccessPayload        grant_wallet_access         = 2;
-    ReplaceOperatorPayload          replace_operator            = 3;
-    google.protobuf.Empty           trigger_rekey               = 4;
-    ApprovePersistentGrantPayload   approve_persistent_grant    = 5;
-    ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload approve_one_off_transaction = 6;
-  }
-  optional uint32 ttl_secs = 7;
-}
-
-message ReplaceOperatorPayload {
-  int32 old_operator_id = 1;
-  bytes new_pubkey      = 2;
-}
-
-message ApproveSdkClientPayload {
-  int32 client_id = 1;
-}
-
-message GrantWalletAccessPayload {
-  int32 wallet_id = 1;
-  int32 client_id = 2;
-}
-
-message CastVoteRequest {
-  int32 proposal_id = 1;
-  bool  approve     = 2;
-  bytes signature   = 3;
-}
-
-message QueryPendingRequest {}
-
-message Response {
-  oneof payload {
-    CreateProposalResponse created = 1;
-    VoteResponse           voted   = 2;
-    QueryPendingResponse   pending = 3;
-  }
-}
-
-message CreateProposalResponse {
-  int32 proposal_id = 1;
-}
-
-message VoteResponse {
-  VoteOutcome outcome = 1;
-}
-
-enum VoteOutcome {
-  VOTE_OUTCOME_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
-  VOTE_OUTCOME_PENDING     = 1;
-  VOTE_OUTCOME_APPROVED    = 2;
-  VOTE_OUTCOME_REJECTED    = 3;
-}
-
-message ProposalSummary {
-  int32  id            = 1;
-  string kind          = 2;
-  int32  initiator_id  = 3;
-  int64  expires_at    = 4;
-  int64  approve_count = 5;
-  int64  reject_count  = 6;
-}
-
-message QueryPendingResponse {
-  repeated ProposalSummary proposals = 1;
-}
-
-message TransactionRateLimitProto {
-  uint32 count       = 1;
-  int64  window_secs = 2;
-}
-
-message VolumeLimitProto {
-  bytes max_volume  = 1;
-  int64 window_secs = 2;
-}
-
-message EtherTransferSpecProto {
-  repeated bytes   targets = 1;
-  VolumeLimitProto limit   = 2;
-}
-
-message TokenTransferSpecProto {
-  bytes                     token_contract = 1;
-  optional bytes            target         = 2;
-  repeated VolumeLimitProto volume_limits  = 3;
-}
-
-message ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload {
-  int32  client_id                = 1;
-  bytes  wallet_address           = 2;
-  uint64 chain_id                 = 3;
-  uint64 nonce                    = 4;
-  uint64 gas_limit                = 5;
-  bytes  max_fee_per_gas          = 6;
-  bytes  max_priority_fee_per_gas = 7;
-  bytes  to                       = 8;
-  bytes  value                    = 9;
-  bytes  input                    = 10;
-}
-
-message ApprovePersistentGrantPayload {
-  int32                              wallet_access_id         = 1;
-  uint64                             chain_id                 = 2;
-  optional int64                     valid_from_secs          = 3;
-  optional int64                     valid_until_secs         = 4;
-  optional bytes                     max_gas_fee_per_gas      = 5;
-  optional bytes                     max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6;
-  optional TransactionRateLimitProto rate_limit               = 7;
-  oneof specific {
-    EtherTransferSpecProto ether_transfer = 8;
-    TokenTransferSpecProto token_transfer = 9;
-  }
-}

protobufs/operator/vault/bootstrap.proto

@@ -8,34 +8,15 @@ message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
   bytes associated_data = 3;
 }
 
-message DeclareCommittee {
-  uint32 count          = 1;
-  uint32 recovery_count = 2;
-}
-
-message ContributePassphrase {
-  bytes passphrase = 1;
-}
-
-message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
-  bytes passphrase = 1;
-}
-
 enum BootstrapResult {
   BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
   BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
   BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2;
   BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3;
-  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_AWAITING_CONTRIBUTIONS = 4;
 }
 
 message Request {
-  oneof payload {
-    BootstrapEncryptedKey        encrypted_key                    = 2;
-    DeclareCommittee             declare_committee                = 3;
-    ContributePassphrase         contribute_passphrase            = 4;
-    ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase   = 5;
-  }
+  BootstrapEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
 }
 
 message Response {

protobufs/operator/vault/rekey.proto

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package arbiter.operator.vault.rekey;
-
-message ContributePassphrase {
-  bytes passphrase = 1;
-}
-
-message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
-  bytes passphrase = 1;
-}
-
-enum RekeyResult {
-  REKEY_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED            = 0;
-  REKEY_RESULT_SUCCESS                = 1;
-  REKEY_RESULT_AWAITING_CONTRIBUTIONS = 2;
-  REKEY_RESULT_NOT_IN_PROGRESS        = 3;
-}
-
-message Request {
-  oneof payload {
-    ContributePassphrase         contribute_passphrase          = 1;
-    ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase = 2;
-  }
-}
-
-message Response {
-  RekeyResult result = 1;
-}

protobufs/operator/vault/unseal.proto

@@ -15,28 +15,18 @@ message UnsealEncryptedKey {
   bytes associated_data = 3;
 }
 
-message ContributePassphrase {
-  bytes passphrase = 1;
-}
-
-message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
-  bytes passphrase = 1;
-}
-
 enum UnsealResult {
   UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
   UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
   UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
   UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
-  UNSEAL_RESULT_AWAITING_CONTRIBUTIONS = 4;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_LOCKED_OUT = 4;
 }
 
 message Request {
   oneof payload {
-    UnsealStart                  start                          = 1;
-    UnsealEncryptedKey           encrypted_key                  = 2;
-    ContributePassphrase         contribute_passphrase          = 3;
-    ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase = 4;
+    UnsealStart start = 1;
+    UnsealEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
   }
 }
 

protobufs/operator/vault/vault.proto

@@ -5,23 +5,20 @@ package arbiter.operator.vault;
 import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
 import "shared/vault.proto";
 import "operator/vault/bootstrap.proto";
-import "operator/vault/rekey.proto";
 import "operator/vault/unseal.proto";
 
 message Request {
   oneof payload {
     google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
-    unseal.Request        unseal      = 2;
-    bootstrap.Request     bootstrap   = 3;
-    rekey.Request         rekey       = 4;
+    unseal.Request unseal = 2;
+    bootstrap.Request bootstrap = 3;
   }
 }
 
 message Response {
   oneof payload {
-    arbiter.shared.VaultState state     = 1;
-    unseal.Response           unseal    = 2;
-    bootstrap.Response        bootstrap = 3;
-    rekey.Response            rekey     = 4;
+    arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
+    unseal.Response unseal = 2;
+    bootstrap.Response bootstrap = 3;
   }
 }

protobufs/shared/vault.proto

@@ -5,8 +5,7 @@ package arbiter.shared;
 enum VaultState {
   VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
   VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
-  VAULT_STATE_BOOSTRAPPING = 2;
-  VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 3;
-  VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 4;
-  VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 5;
+  VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
+  VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
+  VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
 }

server/Cargo.lock

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d122413f284cf2d62fb1b7db97e02edb8cda96d769b16e443a4f6195e35662b0"
 dependencies = [
  "crypto-common 0.1.7",
- "generic-array 0.14.7",
+ "generic-array",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -674,12 +674,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "libc",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "anstyle"
-version = "1.0.14"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "940b3a0ca603d1eade50a4846a2afffd5ef57a9feac2c0e2ec2e14f9ead76000"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "anyhow"
 version = "1.0.102"
@@ -713,7 +707,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "memsafe",
  "ml-dsa",
  "rand 0.10.1",
- "strum 0.28.0",
  "thiserror",
  "x-wing",
 ]
@@ -773,14 +766,12 @@ dependencies = [
  "kameo",
  "kameo_actors",
  "ml-dsa",
- "mockall",
  "mutants",
  "pem",
  "proptest",
- "prost",
  "prost-types",
  "rand 0.10.1",
- "rand_core 0.6.4",
+ "rand_core 0.10.1",
  "rcgen",
  "restructed",
  "rstest",
@@ -789,7 +780,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "smlang",
  "strum 0.28.0",
  "subtle",
- "tempfile",
  "test-log",
  "thiserror",
  "tokio",
@@ -797,7 +787,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "tonic",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
- "vsss-rs",
  "x25519-dalek 2.0.1",
 ]
 
@@ -1295,7 +1284,7 @@ version = "0.10.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "3078c7629b62d3f0439517fa394996acacc5cbc91c5a20d8c658e77abd503a71"
 dependencies = [
- "generic-array 0.14.7",
+ "generic-array",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1624,22 +1613,8 @@ version = "0.5.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "0dc92fb57ca44df6db8059111ab3af99a63d5d0f8375d9972e319a379c6bab76"
 dependencies = [
- "generic-array 0.14.7",
+ "generic-array",
  "rand_core 0.6.4",
- "serdect 0.2.0",
- "subtle",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "crypto-bigint"
-version = "0.6.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "96272c2ff28b807e09250b180ad1fb7889a3258f7455759b5c3c58b719467130"
-dependencies = [
- "num-traits",
- "rand_core 0.6.4",
- "serdect 0.3.0",
  "subtle",
  "zeroize",
 ]
@@ -1650,7 +1625,7 @@ version = "0.1.7"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "78c8292055d1c1df0cce5d180393dc8cce0abec0a7102adb6c7b1eef6016d60a"
 dependencies = [
- "generic-array 0.14.7",
+ "generic-array",
  "rand_core 0.6.4",
  "typenum",
 ]
@@ -1953,7 +1928,7 @@ version = "0.9.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d3dd60d1080a57a05ab032377049e0591415d2b31afd7028356dbf3cc6dcb066"
 dependencies = [
- "generic-array 0.14.7",
+ "generic-array",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1991,12 +1966,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "downcast"
-version = "0.11.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1435fa1053d8b2fbbe9be7e97eca7f33d37b28409959813daefc1446a14247f1"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "downcast-rs"
 version = "2.0.2"
@@ -2039,7 +2008,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "digest 0.10.7",
  "elliptic-curve",
  "rfc6979",
- "serdect 0.2.0",
+ "serdect",
  "signature 2.2.0",
  "spki 0.7.3",
 ]
@@ -2072,32 +2041,16 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b5e6043086bf7973472e0c7dff2142ea0b680d30e18d9cc40f267efbf222bd47"
 dependencies = [
  "base16ct",
- "crypto-bigint 0.5.5",
+ "crypto-bigint",
  "digest 0.10.7",
  "ff",
- "generic-array 0.14.7",
+ "generic-array",
  "group",
- "hkdf",
  "pkcs8 0.10.2",
  "rand_core 0.6.4",
  "sec1",
- "serdect 0.2.0",
+ "serdect",
  "subtle",
- "tap",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "elliptic-curve-tools"
-version = "0.2.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1de2b6fae800f08032a6ea32995b52925b1d451bff9d445c8ab2932323277faf"
-dependencies = [
- "elliptic-curve",
- "heapless",
- "hex",
- "multiexp",
- "serde",
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
@@ -2171,7 +2124,6 @@ version = "0.13.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "c0b50bfb653653f9ca9095b427bed08ab8d75a137839d9ad64eb11810d5b6393"
 dependencies = [
- "bitvec",
  "rand_core 0.6.4",
  "subtle",
 ]
@@ -2249,15 +2201,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "percent-encoding",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "fragile"
-version = "2.1.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8878864ba14bb86e818a412bfd6f18f9eabd4ec0f008a28e8f7eb61db532fcf9"
-dependencies = [
- "futures-core",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "fs_extra"
 version = "1.3.0"
@@ -2381,17 +2324,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "generic-array"
-version = "1.4.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "dab9e9188e97a93276e1fe7b56401b851e2b45a46d045ca658100c1303ada649"
-dependencies = [
- "rustversion",
- "serde_core",
- "typenum",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "getrandom"
 version = "0.2.17"
@@ -2475,15 +2407,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "tracing",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "hash32"
-version = "0.3.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "47d60b12902ba28e2730cd37e95b8c9223af2808df9e902d4df49588d1470606"
-dependencies = [
- "byteorder",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "hashbrown"
 version = "0.12.3"
@@ -2524,16 +2447,6 @@ version = "0.17.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "4f467dd6dccf739c208452f8014c75c18bb8301b050ad1cfb27153803edb0f51"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "heapless"
-version = "0.8.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0bfb9eb618601c89945a70e254898da93b13be0388091d42117462b265bb3fad"
-dependencies = [
- "hash32",
- "stable_deref_trait",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "heck"
 version = "0.5.0"
@@ -2561,15 +2474,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "arrayvec",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "hkdf"
-version = "0.12.4"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7b5f8eb2ad728638ea2c7d47a21db23b7b58a72ed6a38256b8a1849f15fbbdf7"
-dependencies = [
- "hmac 0.12.1",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "hmac"
 version = "0.12.1"
@@ -2640,7 +2544,6 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "08d46837a0ed51fe95bd3b05de33cd64a1ee88fc797477ca48446872504507c5"
 dependencies = [
  "ctutils",
- "serde",
  "typenum",
  "zeroize",
 ]
@@ -2906,7 +2809,7 @@ version = "0.1.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "879f10e63c20629ecabbb64a8010319738c66a5cd0c29b02d63d272b03751d01"
 dependencies = [
- "generic-array 0.14.7",
+ "generic-array",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3045,15 +2948,15 @@ dependencies = [
  "ecdsa",
  "elliptic-curve",
  "once_cell",
- "serdect 0.2.0",
+ "serdect",
  "sha2 0.10.9",
  "signature 2.2.0",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "kameo"
-version = "0.22.2"
-source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=17af90e3#17af90e3ae95fc6f89fa31a2f1b9506ac127f0b7"
+version = "0.20.0"
+source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=805b417#805b41783fe90b54827ecad142b422c7a9b69b9a"
 dependencies = [
  "downcast-rs",
  "dyn-clone",
@@ -3066,8 +2969,8 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "kameo_actors"
-version = "0.8.1"
-source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=17af90e3#17af90e3ae95fc6f89fa31a2f1b9506ac127f0b7"
+version = "0.5.0"
+source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=805b417#805b41783fe90b54827ecad142b422c7a9b69b9a"
 dependencies = [
  "futures",
  "glob",
@@ -3078,13 +2981,14 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "kameo_macros"
-version = "0.21.1"
-source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=17af90e3#17af90e3ae95fc6f89fa31a2f1b9506ac127f0b7"
+version = "0.20.0"
+source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=805b417#805b41783fe90b54827ecad142b422c7a9b69b9a"
 dependencies = [
+ "darling 0.23.0",
  "heck",
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 3.0.4",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3375,32 +3279,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "mockall"
-version = "0.15.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1a6ceddfe3ce334925e96bf420fdb2dcee5bed6c632a168ece622676dadeaf8a"
-dependencies = [
- "cfg-if",
- "downcast",
- "fragile",
- "mockall_derive",
- "predicates",
- "predicates-tree",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "mockall_derive"
-version = "0.15.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9cfe16fbe8a314aeec0b861ac24e60b1e123e97634bab045475b9d6a18416fd8"
-dependencies = [
- "cfg-if",
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn 2.0.117",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "module-lattice"
 version = "0.2.2"
@@ -3413,20 +3291,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "multiexp"
-version = "0.4.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7ec2ce93a6f06ac6cae04c1da3f2a6a24fcfc1f0eb0b4e0f3d302f0df45326cb"
-dependencies = [
- "ff",
- "group",
- "rand_core 0.6.4",
- "rustversion",
- "std-shims",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "multimap"
 version = "0.10.1"
@@ -3458,20 +3322,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "num"
-version = "0.4.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "35bd024e8b2ff75562e5f34e7f4905839deb4b22955ef5e73d2fea1b9813cb23"
-dependencies = [
- "num-bigint",
- "num-complex",
- "num-integer",
- "num-iter",
- "num-rational",
- "num-traits",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "num-bigint"
 version = "0.4.6"
@@ -3480,19 +3330,6 @@ checksum = "a5e44f723f1133c9deac646763579fdb3ac745e418f2a7af9cd0c431da1f20b9"
 dependencies = [
  "num-integer",
  "num-traits",
- "rand 0.8.6",
- "serde",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "num-complex"
-version = "0.4.6"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "73f88a1307638156682bada9d7604135552957b7818057dcef22705b4d509495"
-dependencies = [
- "num-traits",
- "rand 0.8.6",
- "serde",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3510,29 +3347,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "num-traits",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "num-iter"
-version = "0.1.45"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1429034a0490724d0075ebb2bc9e875d6503c3cf69e235a8941aa757d83ef5bf"
-dependencies = [
- "autocfg",
- "num-integer",
- "num-traits",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "num-rational"
-version = "0.4.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f83d14da390562dca69fc84082e73e548e1ad308d24accdedd2720017cb37824"
-dependencies = [
- "num-bigint",
- "num-integer",
- "num-traits",
- "serde",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "num-traits"
 version = "0.2.19"
@@ -3834,32 +3648,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "zerocopy",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "predicates"
-version = "3.1.4"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ada8f2932f28a27ee7b70dd6c1c39ea0675c55a36879ab92f3a715eaa1e63cfe"
-dependencies = [
- "anstyle",
- "predicates-core",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "predicates-core"
-version = "1.0.10"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "cad38746f3166b4031b1a0d39ad9f954dd291e7854fcc0eed52ee41a0b50d144"
-
-[[package]]
-name = "predicates-tree"
-version = "1.0.13"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d0de1b847b39c8131db0467e9df1ff60e6d0562ab8e9a16e568ad0fdb372e2f2"
-dependencies = [
- "predicates-core",
- "termtree",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "prettyplease"
 version = "0.2.37"
@@ -4667,9 +4455,9 @@ checksum = "d3e97a565f76233a6003f9f5c54be1d9c5bdfa3eccfb189469f11ec4901c47dc"
 dependencies = [
  "base16ct",
  "der 0.7.10",
- "generic-array 0.14.7",
+ "generic-array",
  "pkcs8 0.10.2",
- "serdect 0.2.0",
+ "serdect",
  "subtle",
  "zeroize",
 ]
@@ -4835,16 +4623,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "serde",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "serdect"
-version = "0.3.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f42f67da2385b51a5f9652db9c93d78aeaf7610bf5ec366080b6de810604af53"
-dependencies = [
- "base16ct",
- "serde",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "sha2"
 version = "0.10.9"
@@ -5010,12 +4788,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "spin"
-version = "0.10.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d5fe4ccb98d9c292d56fec89a5e07da7fc4cf0dc11e156b41793132775d3e591"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "spki"
 version = "0.7.3"
@@ -5060,17 +4832,6 @@ version = "1.1.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "a2eb9349b6444b326872e140eb1cf5e7c522154d69e7a0ffb0fb81c06b37543f"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "std-shims"
-version = "0.1.5"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "227c4f8561598188d0df96dbe749824576174bba278b5b6bb2eacff1066067d0"
-dependencies = [
- "hashbrown 0.16.1",
- "rustversion",
- "spin",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "string_morph"
 version = "0.1.0"
@@ -5174,17 +4935,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "unicode-ident",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "syn"
-version = "3.0.4"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e6275cddf4610d1775e6d1fe9469b2e77d0f39fd98fb7450901b821e0c53649f"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "unicode-ident",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "syn-solidity"
 version = "1.5.7"
@@ -5246,12 +4996,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "termtree"
-version = "0.5.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8f50febec83f5ee1df3015341d8bd429f2d1cc62bcba7ea2076759d315084683"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "test-log"
 version = "0.2.20"
@@ -5831,27 +5575,6 @@ version = "0.9.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "0b928f33d975fc6ad9f86c8f283853ad26bdd5b10b7f1542aa2fa15e2289105a"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "vsss-rs"
-version = "5.4.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "6ec751bdcc8bda099e269b24cc6b4ad14f9ce8b0490c1599174070e792ecd70c"
-dependencies = [
- "crypto-bigint 0.5.5",
- "crypto-bigint 0.6.1",
- "elliptic-curve",
- "elliptic-curve-tools",
- "generic-array 1.4.1",
- "hex",
- "hybrid-array",
- "num",
- "rand_core 0.6.4",
- "serde",
- "sha3 0.10.9",
- "subtle",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "wait-timeout"
 version = "0.2.1"
@@ -6539,18 +6262,18 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "zeroize"
-version = "1.8.2"
+version = "1.9.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b97154e67e32c85465826e8bcc1c59429aaaf107c1e4a9e53c8d8ccd5eff88d0"
+checksum = "e13c156562582aa81c60cb29407084cdb54c4164760106ab78e6c5b0858cf64e"
 dependencies = [
  "zeroize_derive",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "zeroize_derive"
-version = "1.4.3"
+version = "1.5.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "85a5b4158499876c763cb03bc4e49185d3cccbabb15b33c627f7884f43db852e"
+checksum = "3c50655cbb0fe3fc43170059e702f1ce5e19b84cec58dc87b037a09935c2f328"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",

server/Cargo.toml

@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ base64 = "0.22.1"
 chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
 futures = "0.3.32"
 k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
-kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "17af90e3"}
-kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "17af90e3"}
+kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
+kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
 hmac = "0.13.0"
 miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
 ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.9", features = ["zeroize"] }
@@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ mutants = "0.0.4"
 prost = "0.14.3"
 prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
 rand = "0.10.1"
+rand_core = "0.10.1"
 rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs",  "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false }
 rstest = "0.26.1"
 rustls = { version = "0.23.40", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
 rustls-pki-types = "1.14.1"
 sha2 = "0.11"
 smlang = "0.8.0"
-strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
 thiserror = "2.0.18"
 tokio = { version = "1.52.1", features = ["full"] }
 tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ needless_pass_by_ref_mut = "allow"
 pub_underscore_fields = "allow"
 redundant_pub_crate = "allow" 
 uninhabited_references = "allow" # safe with unsafe_code = "forbid" and standard uninhabited pattern (match *self {})
+too-many-lines = "allow" # this is a very common pattern in server code, and it's not always possible to break it down into smaller modules without hurting readability
 
 # restriction lints
 alloc_instead_of_core = "warn"
@@ -107,6 +108,7 @@ indexing_slicing = "warn"
 infinite_loop = "warn"
 inline_asm_x86_att_syntax = "warn"
 inline_asm_x86_intel_syntax = "warn"
+integer_division = "warn"
 large_include_file = "warn"
 lossy_float_literal = "warn"
 map_with_unused_argument_over_ranges = "warn"
@@ -168,4 +170,3 @@ nursery = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
 pedantic = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
 
 type_repetition_in_bounds = "allow"   # sometimes, it's better for readability this way
-unused_async_trait_impl = "allow"

server/clippy.toml

@@ -26,5 +26,3 @@ trait-assoc-item-kinds-order = [
     "type",
     "fn",
 ] # community tested standard
-
-too-many-lines-threshold = 150

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/auth.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use crate::{
     storage::StorageError,
     transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
 };
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, SigningContext, SigningKey};
+use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey};
 use arbiter_proto::{
     ClientMetadata,
     proto::{
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
     key: &SigningKey,
     challenge: AuthChallenge,
 ) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
-    let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos as i64);
+    let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos.cast_signed());
     let challenge = authn::AuthChallenge {
         nonce: *challenge
             .random
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
     };
     let challenge_payload: Vec<u8> = challenge.format();
     let signature = key
-        .sign_message(&challenge_payload, SigningContext::Client)
+        .sign_message(&challenge_payload, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
         .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?
         .to_bytes();
 

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/Cargo.toml

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ edition = "2024"
 ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true }
 rand = {workspace = true, optional = true}
 memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true}
-strum = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 hmac.workspace = true
 alloy.workspace = true
 x-wing = { version = "0.1.0-rc.0", features = ["zeroize"] }
@@ -19,7 +18,7 @@ workspace = true
 
 [features]
 default = ["authn", "safecell"]
-authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand", "dep:strum"]
+authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand"]
 safecell = ["dep:memsafe"]
 
 [lib]

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/authn/v1.rs

@@ -5,25 +5,9 @@ use ml_dsa::{
     SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _,
 };
 use rand::RngExt;
-use strum::IntoStaticStr;
 
-/// Domain separation tag mixed into every ML-DSA signature.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, IntoStaticStr)]
-pub enum SigningContext {
-    #[strum(serialize = "arbiter_client")]
-    Client,
-    #[strum(serialize = "arbiter_operator")]
-    Operator,
-    #[strum(serialize = "arbiter_governance_vote")]
-    GovernanceVote,
-}
-
-impl SigningContext {
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn as_bytes(self) -> &'static [u8] {
-        <&'static str>::from(self).as_bytes()
-    }
-}
+pub static CLIENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_client";
+pub static OPERATOR_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_operator";
 
 const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 32;
 
@@ -101,26 +85,10 @@ impl PublicKey {
     }
 
     #[must_use]
-    pub fn verify(
-        &self,
-        challenge: &AuthChallenge,
-        context: SigningContext,
-        signature: &Signature,
-    ) -> bool {
+    pub fn verify(&self, challenge: &AuthChallenge, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
         let challenge = challenge.format();
         self.0
-            .verify_with_context(&challenge, context.as_bytes(), &signature.0)
-    }
-
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn verify_message(
-        &self,
-        message: &[u8],
-        context: SigningContext,
-        signature: &Signature,
-    ) -> bool {
-        self.0
-            .verify_with_context(message, context.as_bytes(), &signature.0)
+            .verify_with_context(&challenge, context, &signature.0)
     }
 }
 
@@ -147,21 +115,17 @@ impl SigningKey {
         self.0.verifying_key().into()
     }
 
-    pub fn sign_message(
-        &self,
-        message: &[u8],
-        context: SigningContext,
-    ) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
+    pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
         self.0
             .signing_key()
-            .sign_deterministic(message, context.as_bytes())
+            .sign_deterministic(message, context)
             .map(Into::into)
     }
 
     pub fn sign_challenge(
         &self,
         challenge: &AuthChallenge,
-        context: SigningContext,
+        context: &[u8],
     ) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
         let challenge = challenge.format();
 
@@ -228,7 +192,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     use crate::authn::AuthChallenge;
 
-    use super::{PublicKey, Signature, SigningContext, SigningKey};
+    use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, OPERATOR_CONTEXT};
 
     #[test]
     fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() {
@@ -244,7 +208,7 @@ mod tests {
     fn signature_round_trip_decodes() {
         let key = SigningKey::generate();
         let signature = key
-            .sign_message(b"challenge", SigningContext::Client)
+            .sign_message(b"challenge", CLIENT_CONTEXT)
             .expect("signature should be created");
 
         let decoded =
@@ -259,11 +223,11 @@ mod tests {
         let public_key = key.public_key();
         let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
         let signature = key
-            .sign_challenge(&challenge, SigningContext::Client)
+            .sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
             .expect("signature should be created");
 
-        assert!(public_key.verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Client, &signature));
-        assert!(!public_key.verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Operator, &signature));
+        assert!(public_key.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
+        assert!(!public_key.verify(&challenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT, &signature));
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -276,13 +240,13 @@ mod tests {
         let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
 
         let signature = restored
-            .sign_challenge(&challenge, SigningContext::Client)
+            .sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
             .expect("signature should be created");
 
         assert!(
             restored
                 .public_key()
-                .verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Client, &signature)
+                .verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature)
         );
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/safecell.rs

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
     fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_>;
     fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_>;
 
-    fn new_inline_default<F>(f: F) -> Self
+    fn new_inline<F>(f: F) -> Self
     where
         Self: Sized,
         T: Default,
@@ -36,14 +36,6 @@ pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
         cell
     }
 
-    fn new_inline<F>(f: Box<F>) -> Self
-    where
-        Self: Sized,
-        F: for<'a> FnOnce() -> T,
-    {
-        Self::new(f())
-    }
-
     #[inline(always)]
     fn read_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
     where

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/lib.rs

@@ -23,10 +23,6 @@ pub mod proto {
             tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.evm");
         }
 
-        pub mod governance {
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.governance");
-        }
-
         pub mod sdk_client {
             tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.sdk_client");
         }
@@ -38,10 +34,6 @@ pub mod proto {
                 tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap");
             }
 
-            pub mod rekey {
-                tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.rekey");
-            }
-
             pub mod unseal {
                 tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.unseal");
             }

server/crates/arbiter-server/Cargo.toml

@@ -31,18 +31,18 @@ diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.2", features = ["sqlite"] }
 async-trait.workspace = true
 tokio-stream.workspace = true
 rand.workspace = true
+rand_core.workspace = true
 rcgen.workspace = true
 chrono.workspace = true
 kameo.workspace = true
 chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
 argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
 restructed = "0.2.2"
-strum.workspace = true
+strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
 pem = "3.0.6"
 sha2.workspace = true
 hmac.workspace = true
 alloy.workspace = true
-prost.workspace = true
 prost-types.workspace = true
 arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
 anyhow = "1.0.102"
@@ -51,16 +51,12 @@ subtle = "2.6.1"
 x25519-dalek.workspace = true
 k256.workspace = true
 kameo_actors.workspace = true
-vsss-rs = "5.4.0"
-rand_core = "0.6"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 proptest = "1.11.0"
 rstest.workspace = true
 test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }
 ml-dsa.workspace = true
-mockall = "0.15.0"
-tempfile = "3.27.0"
 
 [lib]
 doctest = false

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-14-171124-0000_init/up.sql

@@ -37,35 +37,19 @@ create table if not exists tls_history (
 create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
     id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1
     root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
-    tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT,
-    -- Shamir threshold of the split that produced the stored shares. Null before bootstrap.
-    -- Recorded rather than recomputed: an aborted operator replacement leaves fewer share
-    -- rows than the split has shares, and a recomputed threshold would then be wrong.
-    shamir_threshold integer
+    tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT
 ) STRICT;
 
 insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
 -- ensure singleton row exists
 
-create table if not exists operator_identity (
+create table if not exists operator_client (
     id integer not null primary key,
     public_key blob not null,
     created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
     updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
 ) STRICT;
-create unique index if not exists uniq_operator_identity_public_key on operator_identity (public_key);
-
-create table if not exists operator (
-    id integer primary key references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict, -- same id as operator_identity
-
-    share blob not null,
-    share_nonce blob not null,
-    share_salt blob not null,
-
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
-    updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-
-) STRICT;
+create unique index if not exists uniq_operator_client_public_key on operator_client (public_key);
 
 create table if not exists client_metadata (
     id integer not null primary key,
@@ -113,7 +97,6 @@ create table if not exists evm_wallet_access (
     id integer not null primary key,
     wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet (id) on delete cascade,
     client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
-    revoked_at integer, -- unix timestamp when revoked, null = still active
     created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
 ) STRICT;
 
@@ -221,156 +204,3 @@ create table if not exists integrity_envelope (
 ) STRICT;
 
 create unique index if not exists uniq_integrity_envelope_entity on integrity_envelope (entity_kind, entity_id);
-
-create table if not exists proposal (
-    id           integer not null primary key,
-    kind         text    not null,
-    initiator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    created_at   integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    expires_at   integer not null,
-    status       text    not null default 'pending'
-        check (status in ('pending', 'approved', 'rejected'))
-) STRICT;
-
--- Parameters of an approved-or-pending proposal
-create table if not exists proposal_approve_sdk_client (
-    proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    client_id   integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists proposal_grant_wallet_access (
-    proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    wallet_id   integer not null references evm_wallet(id) on delete restrict,
-    client_id   integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists proposal_replace_operator (
-    proposal_id     integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    old_operator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    new_pubkey      blob    not null
-) STRICT;
-
--- The transaction an operator votes to sign.
-create table if not exists proposal_one_off_transaction (
-    proposal_id              integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    client_id                integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict,
-    wallet_address           blob    not null check (length(wallet_address) = 20),
-    chain_id                 integer not null,
-    nonce                    integer not null,
-    gas_limit                integer not null,
-    max_fee_per_gas          blob    not null check (length(max_fee_per_gas) = 16),
-    max_priority_fee_per_gas blob    not null check (length(max_priority_fee_per_gas) = 16),
-    to_address               blob    not null check (length(to_address) = 20),
-    value                    blob    not null check (length(value) = 32),
-    input                    blob    not null
-) STRICT;
-
--- The grant an operator votes to creat
-create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant (
-    proposal_id              integer not null primary key references proposal (id) on delete cascade,
-    wallet_access_id         integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
-    chain_id                 integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
-    valid_from               integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no lower bound
-    valid_until              integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no upper bound
-    max_gas_fee_per_gas      blob check (max_gas_fee_per_gas is null or length(max_gas_fee_per_gas) = 32),
-    max_priority_fee_per_gas blob check (max_priority_fee_per_gas is null or length(max_priority_fee_per_gas) = 32),
-    rate_limit_count         integer, -- max transactions in window, null = unlimited
-    rate_limit_window_secs   integer, -- window duration in seconds, null = unlimited
-    check ((rate_limit_count is null) = (rate_limit_window_secs is null))
-) STRICT;
-
--- `specific = ether_transfer`
-create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_ether (
-    proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
-    window_secs integer not null,
-    max_volume  blob    not null check (length(max_volume) = 32)
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target (
-    id          integer not null primary key,
-    proposal_id integer not null references proposal_persistent_grant_ether (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
-    address     blob    not null check (length(address) = 20)
-) STRICT;
-
-create unique index if not exists uniq_proposal_ether_target on proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target (proposal_id, address);
-
--- `specific = token_transfer`
-create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_token (
-    proposal_id    integer not null primary key references proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
-    token_contract blob    not null check (length(token_contract) = 20),
-    receiver       blob check (receiver is null or length(receiver) = 20)
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit (
-    id          integer not null primary key,
-    proposal_id integer not null references proposal_persistent_grant_token (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
-    window_secs integer not null,
-    max_volume  blob    not null check (length(max_volume) = 32)
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists proposal_vote (
-    id          integer not null primary key,
-    proposal_id integer not null references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    operator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    approve     integer not null check (approve in (0, 1)),
-    signature   blob    not null,
-    voted_at    integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    unique (proposal_id, operator_id)
-) STRICT;
-
-
--- The signature the vault produced for an approved transaction, by component.
---
--- secp256k1 signatures have three common encodings (Electrum v=27/28, raw parity,
--- ERC-2098 compact); a single blob would not say which one it holds. `y_parity` is
--- the raw bit -- add 27 to rebuild the Electrum form `Signature::as_bytes` emits.
-create table if not exists proposal_one_off_transaction_result (
-    proposal_id integer not null primary key
-        references proposal_one_off_transaction (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
-    r           blob    not null check (length(r) = 32),
-    s           blob    not null check (length(s) = 32),
-    y_parity    integer not null check (y_parity in (0, 1)),
-    created_at  integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
-) STRICT;
-
--- ===============================
--- Recovery Operators (§3.4/§3.5/§3.6)
--- ===============================
-
--- Encrypted Shamir shares for recovery operators (mirrors the `operator` table).
-create table if not exists recovery_operator (
-    id          integer not null primary key references recovery_operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    share       blob    not null,
-    share_nonce blob    not null,
-    share_salt  blob    not null,
-    created_at  integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    updated_at  integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists recovery_operator_identity (
-    id         integer not null primary key,
-    public_key blob    not null unique,
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
-) STRICT;
-
--- One active wakeup request at a time. A request is pending when cancelled_at IS NULL
--- and requested_at + 14 days > now. It becomes active (recovery live) after 14 days.
-create table if not exists recovery_wakeup_request (
-    id           integer not null primary key,
-    requested_by integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    requested_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    cancelled_by integer references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    cancelled_at integer
-) STRICT;
-
--- Votes cast by recovery operators; only allowed on replace_operator proposals.
-create table if not exists recovery_proposal_vote (
-    id                   integer not null primary key,
-    proposal_id          integer not null references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    recovery_operator_id integer not null references recovery_operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    approve              integer not null check (approve in (0, 1)),
-    signature            blob    not null,
-    voted_at             integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    unique (proposal_id, recovery_operator_id)
-) STRICT;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/bootstrap.rs

@@ -1,44 +1,48 @@
 use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
+use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
 
 use diesel::QueryDsl;
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 use kameo::{Actor, messages};
-use rand::{
-    distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _},
-    make_rng,
-    rngs::StdRng,
-};
-use std::path::Path;
+use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, rngs::SysRng};
+use rand_core::UnwrapErr;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
 use thiserror::Error;
+use tracing::warn;
 
 const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
 
-pub async fn generate_token(home: &Path) -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
-    let mut rng: StdRng = make_rng();
+async fn write_token_file(path: &Path, content: &str) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
+    tokio::fs::write(path, content.as_bytes()).await?;
 
-    // `Alphanumeric` samples raw `u8` ASCII codes, not `char`s -- `SampleString::sample_string`
-    // is `rand`'s own documented way to turn that into an actual TOKEN_LENGTH-character string
-    // (see the "Passwords" example on `Alphanumeric`'s docs). A prior version of this function
-    // called `.to_string()` on the sampled `u8` directly, which stringifies the numeric byte
-    // value (e.g. `65` instead of `'A'`) rather than the character it represents, silently
-    // producing a variable-length, all-decimal-digit string instead of a real token.
-    let token = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rng, TOKEN_LENGTH);
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
+        tokio::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).await?;
+    }
 
-    tokio::fs::write(home.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
-
-    Ok(token)
+    Ok(())
 }
 
-/// A token file is only trustworthy if it looks like something `generate_token` could have
-/// produced. Anything else -- empty (a crash between the file's truncate and write), foreign
-/// content, or a trailing newline added by an editor -- must not be adopted as a live
-/// credential: an empty file would make every empty-string token verify, and mismatched
-/// content would silently lock out every operator holding the real, already-printed token.
-#[must_use]
-fn is_valid_token(candidate: &str) -> bool {
-    candidate.len() == TOKEN_LENGTH && candidate.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
+async fn generate_token(path: &Path) -> Result<SafeCell<[u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]>, std::io::Error> {
+    let mut cell = SafeCell::new([0u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]);
+    {
+        let mut buf = cell.write();
+        for (slot, b) in buf
+            .iter_mut()
+            .zip(UnwrapErr(SysRng).sample_iter(Alphanumeric))
+        {
+            *slot = b;
+        }
+    }
+
+    let token_str = cell.read_inline(|buf| String::from_utf8_lossy(buf.as_ref()).into_owned());
+
+    write_token_file(path, &token_str).await?;
+
+    Ok(cell)
 }
 
 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
@@ -55,265 +59,65 @@ pub enum Error {
 
 #[derive(Actor)]
 pub struct Bootstrapper {
-    token: Option<String>,
+    token: Option<SafeCell<[u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]>>,
+    token_path: Option<PathBuf>,
 }
 
 impl Bootstrapper {
-    /// Production constructor: resolves the real `~/.arbiter` directory and delegates.
     pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
-        let home = home_path()?;
-        Self::new_in(db, &home).await
-    }
+        let row_count: i64 = {
+            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
 
-    /// Carries all of `new`'s logic, parameterized on the directory the token file lives in.
-    /// `new` resolves the real home directory and calls this; tests call it directly with a
-    /// throwaway temp directory so they never touch the real `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token`.
-    pub async fn new_in(db: &DatabasePool, home: &Path) -> Result<Self, Error> {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-
-        let bootstrapped: bool = schema::arbiter_settings::table
-            .select(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
-            .first::<Option<i32>>(&mut conn)
-            .await?
-            .is_some();
-
-        if bootstrapped {
-            return Ok(Self { token: None });
-        }
-
-        let any_operator_registered: bool = schema::operator_identity::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
-            .await?
-            > 0;
-
-        if !any_operator_registered {
-            // Nobody has used the current token yet, so there is nothing to preserve across a
-            // restart: generate a fresh one, exactly as on a first run. Reusing an old file
-            // here would let a token survive a database reset, silently reviving trust in
-            // whoever still held it.
-            return Ok(Self {
-                token: Some(generate_token(home).await?),
-            });
-        }
-
-        // At least one operator has already registered with the current token: every other
-        // declared operator still needs that same token, including across a restart, so an
-        // existing file is reused rather than replaced -- but only if it still looks like a
-        // real token. A truncated, foreign, or corrupted file must not become a live
-        // credential (see `is_valid_token`).
-        let path = home.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH);
-        let token = match tokio::fs::read_to_string(&path).await {
-            Ok(existing) if is_valid_token(&existing) => existing,
-            Ok(_) => {
-                // Replacing the file invalidates whatever token the already-registered
-                // operators were handed, so it must not happen quietly. The content itself is
-                // a credential and stays out of the log; the path is enough to act on.
-                tracing::warn!(
-                    ?path,
-                    "Bootstrap token file is not a well-formed token; replacing it"
-                );
-                generate_token(home).await?
-            }
-            Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => generate_token(home).await?,
-            Err(err) => return Err(Error::Io(err)),
+            schema::operator_client::table
+                .count()
+                .get_result(&mut conn)
+                .await?
         };
 
-        Ok(Self { token: Some(token) })
+        let (token, token_path) = if row_count == 0 {
+            let path = home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH);
+            let token = generate_token(&path).await?;
+            (Some(token), Some(path))
+        } else {
+            (None, None)
+        };
+
+        Ok(Self { token, token_path })
     }
+}
 
-    /// Drops the token from memory. Called once the vault is bootstrapped: from then on,
-    /// operators are added through governance rather than through the token.
-    pub(crate) fn forget_token(&mut self) {
-        self.token = None;
-    }
-
-    #[must_use]
-    fn is_correct_token(&self, token: &str) -> bool {
-        self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| {
-            let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
-            let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
-
-            let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
-            bool::from(choice)
+impl Bootstrapper {
+    fn is_correct_token(&mut self, token: &[u8]) -> bool {
+        self.token.as_mut().is_some_and(|expected| {
+            expected.read_inline(|exp| bool::from(exp.as_ref().ct_eq(token)))
         })
     }
 }
 
 #[messages]
 impl Bootstrapper {
-    /// Checks the token without retiring it: every operator in a declared committee
-    /// authenticates with the same token during bootstrap.
     #[message]
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn verify_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
-        self.is_correct_token(&token)
-    }
-}
-
-impl kameo::prelude::Message<crate::actors::vault::events::Bootstrapped> for Bootstrapper {
-    type Reply = ();
-
-    async fn handle(
-        &mut self,
-        _msg: crate::actors::vault::events::Bootstrapped,
-        _ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
-    ) -> Self::Reply {
-        self.forget_token();
+    pub async fn consume_token(&mut self, token: Vec<u8>) -> bool {
+        if self.is_correct_token(&token) {
+            self.token = None;
+            if let Some(path) = self.token_path.take()
+                && let Err(e) = tokio::fs::remove_file(&path).await
+            {
+                warn!(error = ?e, path = ?path, "Failed to delete bootstrap token file after consumption");
+            }
+            true
+        } else {
+            false
+        }
     }
 }
 
 #[messages]
 impl Bootstrapper {
     #[message]
-    pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
-        self.token.clone()
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, insert_into, update};
-
-    /// A multi-operator committee registers every member with the same token, so verifying it
-    /// must not consume it. Only a completed bootstrap retires the token.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn token_verifies_repeatedly_until_bootstrap_completes() {
-        let mut bootstrapper = Bootstrapper {
-            token: Some("test-token".to_owned()),
-        };
-
-        assert!(bootstrapper.verify_token("test-token".to_owned()));
-        assert!(bootstrapper.verify_token("test-token".to_owned()));
-        assert!(!bootstrapper.verify_token("wrong-token".to_owned()));
-
-        bootstrapper.forget_token();
-
-        assert!(!bootstrapper.verify_token("test-token".to_owned()));
-        assert!(bootstrapper.get_token().is_none());
-    }
-
-    /// Once the vault is bootstrapped, `Bootstrapper::new_in` must return with no token -- and
-    /// it must do so from `arbiter_settings.root_key_id` alone, taking the early return before
-    /// `home` is ever consulted. Uses `new_in` with a throwaway temp directory (never the
-    /// production `new`, which unconditionally resolves the real home directory before this
-    /// method even runs) so this test cannot touch the real filesystem regardless of outcome.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn new_returns_no_token_once_the_vault_is_bootstrapped() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
-            .values(&db::models::NewRootKeyHistory {
-                ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-                tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-                root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                schema_version: 1,
-                salt: vec![0u8; 16],
-            })
-            .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
-            .set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        drop(conn);
-
-        let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home.path()).await.unwrap();
-
-        assert!(bootstrapper.get_token().is_none());
-    }
-
-    /// The file-reuse path (an operator has already registered, so bootstrap is unfinished)
-    /// must not adopt a corrupted token file as a live credential: it must reject it and
-    /// generate a fresh one instead. This is the Critical from the review, now reachable
-    /// safely because `new_in` takes a throwaway temp directory instead of the real home.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn new_in_rejects_and_replaces_a_corrupted_token_file() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        // At least one operator must have registered, or `new_in` would regenerate
-        // unconditionally regardless of the file (Important 2) and never exercise validation.
-        insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        drop(conn);
-
-        let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        tokio::fs::write(home.path().join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), "")
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home.path()).await.unwrap();
-
-        let token = bootstrapper
-            .get_token()
-            .expect("a fresh token must be generated");
-        assert!(is_valid_token(&token));
-
-        // The replacement must also have landed on disk, not just in memory, so a restart
-        // reads back the same (now valid) token rather than the corrupted one again.
-        let on_disk = tokio::fs::read_to_string(home.path().join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(on_disk, token);
-    }
-
-    /// The second defect the task exists to fix: a restart between the first registration and
-    /// the completed bootstrap must not invalidate the token the other declared operators were
-    /// already given. With an operator registered and a well-formed file on disk, `new_in` has
-    /// to hand back exactly what it read instead of generating a replacement.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn new_in_reuses_a_valid_token_file_across_a_restart() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        // Without a registered operator, `new_in` regenerates unconditionally (Important 2 of
-        // the round-2 review) and never reaches the reuse path this test is about.
-        insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        drop(conn);
-
-        let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
-        // Stands in for the token a previous run wrote and printed to the console.
-        let handed_out = "Zq7Z2rXaB90kLmNpQwErTyUiOpAsDfGhJkLzXcVbNmQwErTyUiOpAsDfGhJkLzXc";
-        assert!(is_valid_token(handed_out));
-        tokio::fs::write(home.path().join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), handed_out)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home.path()).await.unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(bootstrapper.get_token().as_deref(), Some(handed_out));
-    }
-
-    /// An empty file must not be adopted as a live credential: `is_correct_token`'s
-    /// `is_some_and` would enter its closure for `Some(String::new())`, and comparing two empty
-    /// byte slices is true, so an unauthenticated `Some("")` from the wire would otherwise
-    /// verify. Also pins the other corrupted-content shapes `is_valid_token` must reject.
-    #[test]
-    fn is_valid_token_rejects_anything_that_is_not_a_real_token() {
-        assert!(!is_valid_token(""));
-        assert!(!is_valid_token("too-short"));
-        assert!(!is_valid_token(&"a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH - 1)));
-        assert!(!is_valid_token(&"a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH + 1)));
-        // A trailing newline (e.g. from an editor) must not be silently accepted either.
-        assert!(!is_valid_token(&format!("{}\n", "a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH))));
-        assert!(!is_valid_token(&"!".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH)));
-
-        assert!(is_valid_token(&"a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH)));
+    pub fn get_token(&mut self) -> Option<String> {
+        self.token
+            .as_mut()
+            .map(|cell| cell.read_inline(|buf| String::from_utf8_lossy(buf.as_ref()).into_owned()))
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/evm/mod.rs

@@ -1,13 +1,9 @@
 use crate::{
-    actors::{
-        proposal_manager::events::ProposalApproved,
-        vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
-    },
-    crypto::integrity,
+    actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
+    crypto::integrity::{self, Integrable},
     db::{
         DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
-        models::{self, EvmWalletId, ProposalId},
-        proposal::{ProposalKind, grant_wallet_access, one_off_transaction, persistent_grant},
+        models::{self},
         schema,
     },
     evm::{
@@ -27,17 +23,37 @@ use diesel::{
     ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
 };
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages, prelude::Message};
+use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
 use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
 use tracing::error;
 
 pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
 
+/// Integrity guard that binds a wallet's encrypted key ID to its Ethereum address.
+/// Both fields are included in the HMAC — swapping `aead_encrypted_id` in the DB
+/// invalidates the envelope MAC, and the AEAD ciphertext is also bound to `address`
+/// as AAD, so decryption fails too.
+#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
+struct EvmWalletIntegrity {
+    aead_encrypted_id: i32,
+    address: Address,
+}
+
+impl Integrable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
+    const KIND: &'static str = "evm_wallet";
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum SignTransactionError {
     #[error("Wallet not found")]
     WalletNotFound,
 
+    #[error("Decrypted key does not match requested wallet address")]
+    KeyAddressMismatch,
+
+    #[error("Internal signing error")]
+    Internal,
+
     #[error("Database error: {0}")]
     Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
 
@@ -67,54 +83,11 @@ pub enum Error {
 
     #[error("Integrity violation: {0}")]
     Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
-
-    #[error("Signing error: {0}")]
-    Sign(#[from] SignTransactionError),
-
-    #[error(
-        "Grant timestamp {0} is outside the i32 range a grant boundary column can store \
-         (Unix seconds, so no later than 2038-01-19T03:14:07Z)"
-    )]
-    InvalidTimestamp(i64),
-
-    #[error("Wallet access {0} is revoked or does not exist")]
-    AccessNotActive(i32),
 }
 
-/// Converts a grant boundary from Unix seconds. `None` in means "unbounded"; a value the
-/// boundary column cannot store is an error, never a silently different window.
-///
-/// The range is `i32`, not `i64`, because that is what actually reaches the database:
-/// `SqliteTimestamp::to_sql` narrows to `i32` (`fixme! #84`), so `3_000_000_000` -- a
-/// `valid_from` in 2065 -- would wrap to 1902 and open the grant immediately instead of in
-/// forty years. Accepting only what round-trips keeps the grant that gets written the grant
-/// that was voted on.
-fn grant_timestamp(secs: Option<i64>) -> Result<Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>, Error> {
-    secs.map(|s| {
-        let storable = i32::try_from(s).map_err(|_| Error::InvalidTimestamp(s))?;
-        chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(i64::from(storable), 0).ok_or(Error::InvalidTimestamp(s))
-    })
-    .transpose()
-}
-
-/// Refuses an access id that is revoked or absent, so nothing hangs a grant off it.
-async fn ensure_access_active(
-    conn: &mut crate::db::DatabaseConnection,
-    access_id: i32,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let active: bool = diesel::select(diesel::dsl::exists(
-        schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::id.eq(access_id))
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null()),
-    ))
-    .get_result(conn)
-    .await
-    .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-    if active {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(Error::AccessNotActive(access_id))
+impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
+    fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
+        Self::Database(DatabaseError::from(e))
     }
 }
 
@@ -151,26 +124,45 @@ impl EvmActor {
 
         let aead_id: i32 = self
             .vault
-            .ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
+            .ask(CreateNew {
+                plaintext,
+                aad: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
+            })
             .await
             .map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
 
         let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
-            .values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
-                address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
-                aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
+        let wallet_id = conn
+            .exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
+                let wallet_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
+                    .values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
+                        address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
+                        aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
+                    })
+                    .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
+                    .get_result(conn)
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(DatabaseError::from)
+                    .map_err(Error::Database)?;
+
+                integrity::sign_entity(
+                    conn,
+                    &self.vault,
+                    &EvmWalletIntegrity { address, aead_encrypted_id: aead_id },
+                    wallet_id,
+                )
+                .await
+                .map_err(Error::Integrity)?;
+
+                Ok::<i32, Error>(wallet_id)
             })
-            .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+            .await?;
 
         Ok((wallet_id, address))
     }
 
     #[message]
-    pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(EvmWalletId, Address)>, Error> {
+    pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
         let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
         let rows: Vec<models::EvmWallet> = schema::evm_wallet::table
             .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
@@ -214,23 +206,14 @@ impl EvmActor {
     }
 
     #[message]
-    pub async fn operator_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-        let affected = diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
-            .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
-            .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
+    pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(
+        &mut self,
+        grant_id: i32,
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        self.engine
+            .revoke_grant(grant_id)
             .await
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-        if affected == 0 {
-            return Err(Error::Database(DatabaseError::from(
-                diesel::result::Error::NotFound,
-            )));
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
+            .map_err(Error::from)
     }
 
     #[message]
@@ -262,7 +245,6 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
             .first(&mut conn)
             .await
             .optional()
@@ -298,7 +280,6 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
             .first(&mut conn)
             .await
             .optional()
@@ -306,16 +287,51 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
         drop(conn);
 
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+        let attestation = integrity::verify_entity(
+            &mut conn,
+            &self.vault,
+            &EvmWalletIntegrity {
+                address: wallet_address,
+                aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
+            },
+            wallet.id,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            error!(?e, wallet_id = wallet.id, "EVM wallet integrity check failed");
+            SignTransactionError::Internal
+        })?;
+        drop(conn);
+
+        if attestation != integrity::AttestationStatus::Attested {
+            error!(
+                wallet_id = wallet.id,
+                "EVM wallet integrity unavailable; refusing to sign"
+            );
+            return Err(SignTransactionError::Internal);
+        }
+
         let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
             .vault
             .ask(Decrypt {
                 aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
+                aad: wallet.address.clone(),
             })
             .await
             .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
 
         let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
 
+        if signer.address() != wallet_address {
+            error!(
+                expected = %wallet_address,
+                actual = %signer.address(),
+                "Decrypted private key address does not match requested wallet"
+            );
+            return Err(SignTransactionError::KeyAddressMismatch);
+        }
+
         self.engine
             .evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
             .await?;
@@ -323,372 +339,3 @@ impl EvmActor {
         Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
     }
 }
-
-impl Message<ProposalApproved> for EvmActor {
-    type Reply = ();
-
-    /// Every subscriber sees every approval and acts only on the kinds it owns.
-    async fn handle(
-        &mut self,
-        msg: ProposalApproved,
-        _ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
-    ) -> Self::Reply {
-        let result = match msg.kind {
-            ProposalKind::GrantWalletAccess(settings) => self.grant_wallet_access(&settings).await,
-            ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(settings) => {
-                self.create_persistent_grant(*settings).await
-            }
-            ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(settings) => {
-                self.sign_one_off_transaction(msg.id, *settings).await
-            }
-            _ => return,
-        };
-
-        if let Err(error) = result {
-            error!(
-                ?error,
-                proposal_id = msg.id.to_raw(),
-                "Failed to execute an approved proposal"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl EvmActor {
-    async fn grant_wallet_access(
-        &mut self,
-        settings: &grant_wallet_access::Settings,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-        // Revives a previously revoked row instead of conflicting on it forever:
-        // `uniq_wallet_access` is a unique index on `(wallet_id, client_id)`. Visibility is
-        // all this restores -- revocation closes the grants that hung off the access, so a
-        // persistent grant needs its own vote again (§3.2). See
-        // `peers::operator::session::handlers::revoke_wallet_access`.
-        insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(EvmWalletId::from_raw(settings.wallet_id)),
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(settings.client_id),
-            ))
-            .on_conflict((
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id,
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id,
-            ))
-            .do_update()
-            .set(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(None::<models::SqliteTimestamp>))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn create_persistent_grant(
-        &mut self,
-        grant: persistent_grant::Settings,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        use crate::evm::policies::{
-            TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit, ether_transfer, token_transfers,
-        };
-        use alloy::primitives::U256;
-        use chrono::Duration;
-
-        // A persistent grant is only as good as the visibility it hangs off (§3.2, two
-        // separate votes). The proposal names the access id when it is created and can be
-        // approved much later, so the access may have been revoked in between; a grant
-        // against a revoked access would sit dormant and go live the moment anyone re-grants.
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        ensure_access_active(&mut conn, grant.wallet_access_id).await?;
-        drop(conn);
-
-        let volume = |limit: persistent_grant::VolumeLimit| VolumeRateLimit {
-            max_volume: U256::from_be_bytes(limit.max_volume),
-            window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs),
-        };
-
-        let basic = SharedGrantSettings {
-            wallet_access_id: grant.wallet_access_id,
-            chain: grant.chain_id,
-            valid_from: grant_timestamp(grant.valid_from_secs)?,
-            valid_until: grant_timestamp(grant.valid_until_secs)?,
-            max_gas_fee_per_gas: grant.max_gas_fee_per_gas.map(U256::from_be_bytes),
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: grant.max_priority_fee_per_gas.map(U256::from_be_bytes),
-            rate_limit: grant.rate_limit.map(|r| TransactionRateLimit {
-                count: r.count,
-                window: Duration::seconds(r.window_secs),
-            }),
-        };
-
-        let specific = match grant.specific {
-            persistent_grant::Specific::EtherTransfer { targets, limit } => {
-                SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Settings {
-                    target: targets.into_iter().map(Address::from).collect(),
-                    limit: volume(limit),
-                })
-            }
-            persistent_grant::Specific::TokenTransfer {
-                token_contract,
-                receiver,
-                volume_limits,
-            } => SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings {
-                token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
-                target: receiver.map(Address::from),
-                volume_limits: volume_limits.into_iter().map(volume).collect(),
-            }),
-        };
-
-        self.operator_create_grant(basic, specific).await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn sign_one_off_transaction(
-        &mut self,
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        tx: one_off_transaction::Settings,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        use alloy::{
-            eips::eip2930::AccessList,
-            primitives::{Bytes, TxKind, U256},
-        };
-
-        let transaction = TxEip1559 {
-            chain_id: tx.chain_id,
-            nonce: tx.nonce,
-            gas_limit: tx.gas_limit,
-            max_fee_per_gas: tx.max_fee_per_gas,
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: tx.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
-            to: TxKind::Call(Address::from(tx.to)),
-            value: U256::from_be_bytes(tx.value),
-            input: Bytes::from(tx.input),
-            access_list: AccessList::default(),
-        };
-
-        let signature = self
-            .client_sign_transaction(tx.client_id, Address::from(tx.wallet_address), transaction)
-            .await?;
-
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        one_off_transaction::store_signature(proposal_id, &signature, &mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::{Error, EvmActor, ensure_access_active, grant_timestamp};
-    use crate::db::{self, models, schema};
-
-    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, dsl::insert_into};
-    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn absent_timestamp_stays_absent() {
-        assert!(grant_timestamp(None).unwrap().is_none());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn in_range_timestamp_is_converted() {
-        let converted = grant_timestamp(Some(1_800_000_000)).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(converted.unwrap().timestamp(), 1_800_000_000);
-    }
-
-    /// An unrepresentable expiry must not silently become "no expiry": that would widen the
-    /// grant beyond what was voted on.
-    #[test]
-    fn out_of_range_timestamp_is_an_error() {
-        let err = grant_timestamp(Some(i64::MAX)).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidTimestamp(i64::MAX)));
-    }
-
-    /// A `valid_from` past 2038 is representable as a `DateTime` but not as the `i32` the
-    /// boundary column stores: `3_000_000_000` (2065) wraps to a negative, which reads back as
-    /// 1902 and makes the grant active immediately. Refusing it is the only way the grant
-    /// that lands can match the window that was voted on.
-    #[test]
-    fn a_timestamp_past_2038_is_an_error() {
-        let past_2038 = 3_000_000_000_i64;
-        assert!(
-            chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(past_2038, 0).is_some(),
-            "the fixture must be a date chrono accepts, or it proves nothing about storage"
-        );
-
-        let err = grant_timestamp(Some(past_2038)).unwrap_err();
-        assert!(
-            matches!(err, Error::InvalidTimestamp(got) if got == past_2038),
-            "expected an out-of-range error, got {err:?}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// The last second the boundary column can hold must still be accepted: the range check
-    /// has to stop at what storage can take, not short of it.
-    #[test]
-    fn the_last_storable_timestamp_is_accepted() {
-        let converted = grant_timestamp(Some(i64::from(i32::MAX))).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(converted.unwrap().timestamp(), i64::from(i32::MAX));
-    }
-
-    /// Seeds a wallet, a client and one access row between them, and returns the access id.
-    async fn seed_access(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
-        let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
-            .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
-                ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-                tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-                root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                schema_version: 1,
-                salt: vec![0u8; 16],
-            })
-            .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
-            .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
-                ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-                tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-                current_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                schema_version: 1,
-                associated_root_key_id: root_key_id,
-                created_at: chrono::Utc::now().into(),
-            })
-            .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let wallet_id: models::EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec()),
-                schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
-            .values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
-            .returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let client_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
-                schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::program_client::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    /// Both directions, so a guard that refused everything could not pass: a live access is
-    /// let through, a revoked one is not.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn only_a_live_access_passes_the_grant_guard() {
-        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let access_id = seed_access(&mut conn).await;
-        ensure_access_active(&mut conn, access_id)
-            .await
-            .expect("a live access must pass");
-
-        diesel::update(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::id.eq(access_id))
-            .set(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let err = ensure_access_active(&mut conn, access_id)
-            .await
-            .expect_err("a revoked access must be refused");
-        assert!(
-            matches!(err, Error::AccessNotActive(got) if got == access_id),
-            "expected AccessNotActive, got {err:?}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// The guard has to be wired into the executor, not just exist: an approved persistent
-    /// grant whose access was revoked between proposal and approval must not create a grant
-    /// that would go live again the moment anyone re-grants that access (§3.2).
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn an_approved_persistent_grant_refuses_a_revoked_access() {
-        use crate::actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Vault};
-        use crate::db::proposal::persistent_grant;
-        use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
-
-        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let access_id = seed_access(&mut conn).await;
-        diesel::update(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::id.eq(access_id))
-            .set(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        drop(conn);
-
-        let vault = Vault::spawn(
-            Vault::new(pool.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
-                .await
-                .unwrap(),
-        );
-        let mut evm_actor = EvmActor::new(vault, pool.clone());
-
-        let err = evm_actor
-            .create_persistent_grant(persistent_grant::Settings {
-                wallet_access_id: access_id,
-                chain_id: 1,
-                valid_from_secs: None,
-                valid_until_secs: None,
-                max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
-                max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
-                rate_limit: None,
-                specific: persistent_grant::Specific::EtherTransfer {
-                    targets: vec![[0u8; 20]],
-                    limit: persistent_grant::VolumeLimit {
-                        max_volume: [0u8; 32],
-                        window_secs: 3600,
-                    },
-                },
-            })
-            .await
-            .expect_err("a grant against a revoked access must be refused");
-        assert!(
-            matches!(err, Error::AccessNotActive(got) if got == access_id),
-            "expected AccessNotActive, got {err:?}"
-        );
-
-        let grants: i64 = schema::evm_basic_grant::table
-            .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::wallet_access_id.eq(access_id))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut pool.get().await.unwrap())
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            grants, 0,
-            "no grant row may be written for a revoked access"
-        );
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/flow_coordinator/client_connect_approval.rs

@@ -11,7 +11,9 @@ use kameo::{
     prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
     reply::ReplySender,
 };
-use std::ops::ControlFlow;
+use std::{ops::ControlFlow, time::Duration};
+
+const APPROVAL_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
 
 pub struct Args {
     pub client: ClientProfile,
@@ -64,6 +66,14 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
                 .await;
         }
 
+        let weak = actor_ref.downgrade();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            tokio::time::sleep(APPROVAL_TIMEOUT).await;
+            if let Some(r) = weak.upgrade() {
+                let _ = r.tell(OnApprovalTimeout {}).await;
+            }
+        });
+
         Ok(this)
     }
 
@@ -104,4 +114,14 @@ impl ClientApprovalController {
             ctx.stop();
         }
     }
+
+    /// Fired after `APPROVAL_TIMEOUT` elapses. Any operator that hasn't responded
+    /// by then is treated as a denial to prevent zombie sessions from blocking the flow.
+    #[message(ctx)]
+    pub fn on_approval_timeout(&mut self, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
+        if self.pending > 0 {
+            self.send_reply(Ok(false));
+            ctx.stop();
+        }
+    }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/flow_coordinator/mod.rs

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ pub mod client_connect_approval;
 
 pub struct FlowCoordinator {
     pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
+    /// Maps DB `client_id` → `ActorId` for fast connected-client lookup.
+    client_ids: HashMap<i32, ActorId>,
     operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
 }
 
@@ -27,6 +29,7 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
     pub fn new(operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>) -> Self {
         Self {
             clients: HashMap::default(),
+            client_ids: HashMap::default(),
             operator_registry,
         }
     }
@@ -48,6 +51,7 @@ impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
         _: ActorStopReason,
     ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
         if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
+            self.client_ids.retain(|_, actor_id| *actor_id != id);
             info!(
                 ?id,
                 actor = "FlowCoordinator",
@@ -75,14 +79,28 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
     #[message(ctx)]
     pub async fn register_client(
         &mut self,
+        client_id: i32,
         actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
         ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
     ) {
-        info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
+        info!(id = %actor.id(), client_id, actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
         ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
+        self.client_ids.insert(client_id, actor.id());
         self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor);
     }
 
+    #[message]
+    pub fn is_client_connected(&self, client_id: i32) -> bool {
+        self.client_ids.contains_key(&client_id)
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the DB `client_ids` of all currently connected SDK clients.
+    /// Used by operator sessions on startup to seed their approved-client set.
+    #[message]
+    pub fn get_connected_client_ids(&self) -> Vec<i32> {
+        self.client_ids.keys().copied().collect()
+    }
+
     #[message(ctx)]
     pub async fn request_client_approval(
         &mut self,

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/mod.rs

@@ -1,31 +1,20 @@
 use crate::{
     actors::{
-        bootstrap::Bootstrapper,
-        evm::EvmActor,
-        flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
-        operator_registry::OperatorRegistry,
-        proposal_manager::{ProposalManager, events::ProposalApproved},
-        vault::{Vault, events},
-        vault_coordinator::VaultCoordinator,
+        bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
+        operator_registry::OperatorRegistry, vault::Vault,
     },
     db,
 };
 
 use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
-use kameo_actors::{
-    DeliveryStrategy,
-    message_bus::{MessageBus, Register},
-};
+use kameo_actors::{DeliveryStrategy, message_bus::MessageBus};
 use thiserror::Error;
-use tracing::error;
 
 pub mod bootstrap;
 pub mod evm;
 pub mod flow_coordinator;
 pub mod operator_registry;
-pub mod proposal_manager;
 pub mod vault;
-pub mod vault_coordinator;
 
 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
 pub enum SpawnError {
@@ -41,11 +30,9 @@ pub enum SpawnError {
 pub struct GlobalActors {
     pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
     pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
-    pub vault_coordinator: ActorRef<VaultCoordinator>,
     pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
     pub operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
     pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
-    pub proposal_manager: ActorRef<ProposalManager>,
     pub events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
 }
 
@@ -55,69 +42,18 @@ impl GlobalActors {
     }
 
     pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
-        let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?;
-        Self::spawn_with_bootstrapper(db, bootstrapper).await
-    }
-
-    /// Test-facing: threads an explicit directory through to `Bootstrapper` instead of letting
-    /// it resolve the real home directory, so a test spawning a full `GlobalActors` can never
-    /// reach (let alone write to) the real `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token`. Mirrors `spawn`
-    /// exactly, aside from where the token file lives.
-    pub async fn spawn_in(
-        db: db::DatabasePool,
-        home: &std::path::Path,
-    ) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
-        let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home).await?;
-        Self::spawn_with_bootstrapper(db, bootstrapper).await
-    }
-
-    async fn spawn_with_bootstrapper(
-        db: db::DatabasePool,
-        bootstrapper: Bootstrapper,
-    ) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
         let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
         let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
         let operator_registry = OperatorRegistry::spawn(OperatorRegistry::default());
-        let evm = EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db.clone()));
-        let vault_coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(
-            db.clone(),
-            key_holder.clone(),
-        ));
-        let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::spawn(bootstrapper);
-        // Approved proposals are executed by whoever owns the kind, not by ProposalManager.
-        for recipient in [
-            evm.clone().recipient::<ProposalApproved>(),
-            vault_coordinator.clone().recipient::<ProposalApproved>(),
-            key_holder.clone().recipient::<ProposalApproved>(),
-        ] {
-            let _ = message_bus.tell(Register(recipient)).await;
-        }
-        // The token guards bootstrap only: once the vault reports success, it must be retired.
-        // A dropped registration would leave the token valid forever with nothing else to
-        // notice, so a failure here is logged rather than silently discarded.
-        if let Err(err) = message_bus
-            .tell(Register(
-                bootstrapper.clone().recipient::<events::Bootstrapped>(),
-            ))
-            .await
-        {
-            error!(
-                ?err,
-                "Failed to register Bootstrapper for the Bootstrapped event"
-            );
-        }
-
         Ok(Self {
-            bootstrapper,
-            proposal_manager: ProposalManager::spawn(ProposalManager::new(db, message_bus.clone())),
+            bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
+            evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
             vault: key_holder,
-            vault_coordinator,
             flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::new(
                 operator_registry.clone(),
             )),
             operator_registry,
             events: message_bus,
-            evm,
         })
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager.rs

@@ -1,355 +0,0 @@
-use crate::{
-    actors::proposal_manager::{
-        events::ProposalApproved,
-        store::{DieselProposalStore, ProposalStore, Tally},
-    },
-    crypto::governance,
-    db::{
-        self,
-        models::{
-            NewProposalVote, NewRecoveryProposalVote, OperatorIdentityId, Proposal, ProposalId,
-            ProposalStatus, RecoveryOperatorIdentityId, SqliteTimestamp,
-        },
-        proposal::{ProposalKind, ProposalKindTag},
-    },
-};
-use chrono::Utc;
-use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
-use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use tracing::warn;
-
-pub mod events;
-pub mod store;
-
-pub const DEFAULT_TTL_SECS: u32 = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 7 days
-pub const MAX_TTL_SECS: u32 = DEFAULT_TTL_SECS;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum VoteOutcome {
-    Pending,
-    Approved,
-    Rejected,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum Error {
-    #[error("Proposal not found")]
-    ProposalNotFound,
-    #[error("Proposal is not pending")]
-    ProposalNotPending,
-    #[error("Proposal has expired")]
-    ProposalExpired,
-    #[error("Requested TTL exceeds the maximum of {} seconds", MAX_TTL_SECS)]
-    TtlTooLong,
-    #[error("Operator already voted on this proposal")]
-    AlreadyVoted,
-    #[error("Invalid vote signature")]
-    InvalidSignature,
-    #[error("Operator not found")]
-    OperatorNotFound,
-    #[error("Database connection error: {0}")]
-    DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
-    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
-    DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-    #[error("Proposal manager is unavailable")]
-    Unavailable,
-    #[error("Recovery operators are sleeping")]
-    RecoveryNotActive,
-    #[error("Recovery operators may only vote on operator replacement")]
-    NotAllowedForRecoveryOperator,
-    #[error("A recovery wake-up is already pending or active")]
-    WakeupAlreadyPending,
-    #[error("No active recovery wake-up to cancel")]
-    NoActiveWakeup,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct ProposalSummary {
-    pub id: ProposalId,
-    pub kind: ProposalKindTag,
-    pub initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    pub approve_count: i64,
-    pub reject_count: i64,
-}
-
-#[derive(Actor)]
-pub struct ProposalManager {
-    pub(crate) store: Arc<dyn ProposalStore>,
-    pub(crate) events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
-}
-
-impl ProposalManager {
-    pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Self {
-        Self::with_store(Arc::new(DieselProposalStore::new(db)), events)
-    }
-
-    /// Builds the actor over an arbitrary store, so tests can supply a mock.
-    pub(crate) const fn with_store(
-        store: Arc<dyn ProposalStore>,
-        events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
-    ) -> Self {
-        Self { store, events }
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl ProposalManager {
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn create_proposal(
-        &mut self,
-        kind: ProposalKind,
-        initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-        ttl_secs: Option<u32>,
-    ) -> Result<ProposalId, Error> {
-        let ttl = ttl_secs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_TTL_SECS);
-        if ttl > MAX_TTL_SECS {
-            return Err(Error::TtlTooLong);
-        }
-        let expires_at =
-            SqliteTimestamp::from(Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::seconds(i64::from(ttl)));
-
-        self.store.create(kind, initiator_id, expires_at).await
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn query_pending(&mut self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Vec<ProposalSummary> {
-        self.store
-            .pending_for(operator_id)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
-                warn!(?e, "query_pending failed");
-                vec![]
-            })
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn cast_vote(
-        &mut self,
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-        approve: bool,
-        signature: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<VoteOutcome, Error> {
-        let proposal = self.store.load(proposal_id).await?;
-
-        // Checked before the status check so AlreadyVoted takes priority.
-        if self.store.has_voted(proposal_id, operator_id).await? {
-            return Err(Error::AlreadyVoted);
-        }
-
-        Self::check_votable(&proposal)?;
-
-        let public_key = self.store.operator_public_key(operator_id).await?;
-        governance::verify_vote(&public_key, proposal_id, approve, &signature)
-            .map_err(|_| Error::InvalidSignature)?;
-
-        self.store
-            .record_vote(NewProposalVote {
-                proposal_id,
-                operator_id,
-                approve,
-                signature,
-            })
-            .await?;
-
-        let mut tally = self.store.tally(proposal_id).await?;
-        self.narrow_electorate(&proposal, &mut tally).await?;
-
-        self.settle(&proposal, &tally).await
-    }
-
-    /// §3.6: Any ordinary operator may request recovery wake-up.
-    /// Fails if a wake-up is already pending or active.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn request_recovery_wakeup(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if self.store.has_uncancelled_wakeup().await? {
-            return Err(Error::WakeupAlreadyPending);
-        }
-        self.store.request_wakeup(operator_id).await
-    }
-
-    /// §3.6: Any ordinary operator may cancel a pending wake-up request.
-    /// Fails if there is no uncancelled request.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn cancel_recovery_wakeup(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if self.store.cancel_wakeup(operator_id).await? {
-            Ok(())
-        } else {
-            Err(Error::NoActiveWakeup)
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// §3.5: Recovery operators may only vote on operator replacement proposals.
-    /// §3.6: Voting is gated behind recovery being active (14-day window elapsed).
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn cast_recovery_vote(
-        &mut self,
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-        approve: bool,
-        signature: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<VoteOutcome, Error> {
-        let proposal = self.store.load(proposal_id).await?;
-
-        if proposal.kind != ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator {
-            return Err(Error::NotAllowedForRecoveryOperator);
-        }
-
-        if !self.store.is_recovery_active().await? {
-            return Err(Error::RecoveryNotActive);
-        }
-
-        if self
-            .store
-            .has_recovery_voted(proposal_id, recovery_operator_id)
-            .await?
-        {
-            return Err(Error::AlreadyVoted);
-        }
-
-        Self::check_votable(&proposal)?;
-
-        let public_key = self
-            .store
-            .recovery_operator_public_key(recovery_operator_id)
-            .await?;
-        governance::verify_vote(&public_key, proposal_id, approve, &signature)
-            .map_err(|_| Error::InvalidSignature)?;
-
-        self.store
-            .record_recovery_vote(NewRecoveryProposalVote {
-                proposal_id,
-                recovery_operator_id,
-                approve,
-                signature,
-            })
-            .await?;
-
-        let mut tally = self.store.tally(proposal_id).await?;
-        self.narrow_electorate(&proposal, &mut tally).await?;
-
-        self.settle(&proposal, &tally).await
-    }
-}
-
-impl ProposalManager {
-    /// A vote only counts while the proposal is still open.
-    fn check_votable(proposal: &Proposal) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if proposal.status != ProposalStatus::Pending {
-            return Err(Error::ProposalNotPending);
-        }
-        if proposal.expires_at.0 <= Utc::now() {
-            return Err(Error::ProposalExpired);
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// §3.5/§3.6: recovery operators join the electorate only for the kinds they may vote on,
-    /// and only once the wake-up window has elapsed. Counting them anywhere else makes the
-    /// rejection threshold unreachable and, for full-quorum kinds, approval unreachable too.
-    ///
-    /// The votes go out with the voters. A wake-up can be cancelled after recovery operators
-    /// have already voted (`cancel_wakeup` cancels any uncancelled request, elapsed or not),
-    /// so a `ReplaceOperator` tally can hold recovery approvals at the moment the committee
-    /// stops being eligible. Keeping those while zeroing only the electorate size would let
-    /// them cover ordinary votes that were never cast.
-    async fn narrow_electorate(&self, proposal: &Proposal, tally: &mut Tally) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if !proposal.kind.recovery_may_vote() || !self.store.is_recovery_active().await? {
-            tally.drop_recovery();
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Pure quorum arithmetic — no I/O, so the rules can be tested directly (§3.3).
-    ///
-    /// A proposal is rejected once approval has become unreachable: even if every voter
-    /// who has not spoken yet approved, the threshold could not be met.
-    #[must_use]
-    pub(crate) const fn evaluate_quorum(tally: &Tally, requires_full_quorum: bool) -> VoteOutcome {
-        let total_eligible = tally.total_ordinary + tally.total_recovery;
-
-        // No electorate, nothing to settle. Guarded before the branch rather than inside it:
-        // the full-quorum arm would otherwise set `threshold` to 0 and read an empty tally as
-        // unanimous approval.
-        if total_eligible <= 0 {
-            return VoteOutcome::Pending;
-        }
-
-        #[expect(
-            clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
-            clippy::cast_sign_loss,
-            clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
-            clippy::as_conversions,
-            reason = "operator counts are always small positive integers"
-        )]
-        // §3.3: key-rotation proposals require every eligible voter to approve.
-        // §3.5: when recovery is active, recovery operators are eligible too.
-        let threshold: i64 = if requires_full_quorum {
-            total_eligible
-        } else {
-            match crate::crypto::shamir::shamir_threshold(tally.total_ordinary as usize) {
-                Some(threshold) => threshold as i64,
-                // No ordinary operators means no electorate: nothing can settle.
-                None => return VoteOutcome::Pending,
-            }
-        };
-
-        if tally.approve() >= threshold {
-            VoteOutcome::Approved
-        } else if tally.reject() > total_eligible - threshold {
-            VoteOutcome::Rejected
-        } else {
-            VoteOutcome::Pending
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Applies the quorum rules to a fresh tally and records whatever they decide.
-    async fn settle(&self, proposal: &Proposal, tally: &Tally) -> Result<VoteOutcome, Error> {
-        let outcome = Self::evaluate_quorum(tally, proposal.kind.requires_full_quorum());
-
-        match outcome {
-            VoteOutcome::Approved => self.announce_approval(proposal).await?,
-            VoteOutcome::Rejected => {
-                self.store
-                    .set_status(proposal.id, ProposalStatus::Rejected)
-                    .await?;
-            }
-            VoteOutcome::Pending => {}
-        }
-
-        Ok(outcome)
-    }
-
-    /// Marks the proposal approved and hands the outcome to whoever owns that kind.
-    ///
-    /// The outcome is published, not executed: this actor coordinates voting and nothing
-    /// else. Executors subscribe on the bus, so a vote is answered once the quorum is
-    /// recorded rather than once the effect has landed.
-    async fn announce_approval(&self, proposal: &Proposal) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        self.store
-            .set_status(proposal.id, ProposalStatus::Approved)
-            .await?;
-
-        let kind = self.store.load_kind(proposal.id, proposal.kind).await?;
-        let _ = self
-            .events
-            .tell(Publish(ProposalApproved {
-                id: proposal.id,
-                kind,
-            }))
-            .await;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager/events.rs

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-use crate::db::{models::ProposalId, proposal::ProposalKind};
-
-/// Published once a proposal reaches its approval threshold.
-///
-/// Executors subscribe on the global `MessageBus` and act on the kinds they own;
-/// `ProposalManager` does not know who acts on an outcome, or whether anyone does.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct ProposalApproved {
-    pub id: ProposalId,
-    pub kind: ProposalKind,
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager/store.rs

@@ -1,431 +0,0 @@
-//! Database access for [`super::ProposalManager`], behind a trait.
-//!
-//! The actor holds a `dyn ProposalStore` rather than a connection pool, so the quorum
-//! rules can be exercised against a mock instead of a live SQLite file.
-
-use super::{Error, ProposalSummary};
-use crate::db::{
-    self,
-    models::{
-        NewProposal, NewProposalVote, NewRecoveryProposalVote, NewRecoveryWakeupRequest,
-        OperatorIdentityId, Proposal, ProposalId, ProposalStatus, RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-        SqliteTimestamp,
-    },
-    proposal::{ProposalKind, ProposalKindTag},
-    schema,
-};
-
-use async_trait::async_trait;
-use chrono::Utc;
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl,
-    dsl::{exists, select},
-};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection as _, RunQueryDsl};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use strum::IntoDiscriminant as _;
-
-/// Everything the quorum rules need to know about one proposal's votes.
-///
-/// Votes are kept per electorate rather than pre-summed: an electorate can stop counting
-/// between the vote and the tally (§3.6 -- recovery goes back to sleep the moment a wake-up
-/// is cancelled), and the votes it already cast have to leave with it. A single `approve`
-/// field would carry them past [`Tally::drop_recovery`] into a threshold computed for the
-/// ordinary committee alone.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct Tally {
-    pub ordinary_approve: i64,
-    pub ordinary_reject: i64,
-    pub recovery_approve: i64,
-    pub recovery_reject: i64,
-    pub total_ordinary: i64,
-    pub total_recovery: i64,
-}
-
-impl Tally {
-    /// Approvals from every electorate that still counts.
-    pub const fn approve(&self) -> i64 {
-        self.ordinary_approve + self.recovery_approve
-    }
-
-    /// Rejections from every electorate that still counts.
-    pub const fn reject(&self) -> i64 {
-        self.ordinary_reject + self.recovery_reject
-    }
-
-    /// Takes the recovery committee out of the electorate, votes and all. The three numbers
-    /// go together: leaving the votes behind counts them against a threshold derived from an
-    /// electorate they are no longer part of.
-    pub const fn drop_recovery(&mut self) {
-        self.recovery_approve = 0;
-        self.recovery_reject = 0;
-        self.total_recovery = 0;
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg_attr(test, mockall::automock)]
-#[async_trait]
-pub trait ProposalStore: Send + Sync + 'static {
-    /// Writes the proposal and its kind-specific rows in one transaction.
-    async fn create(
-        &self,
-        kind: ProposalKind,
-        initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-        expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    ) -> Result<ProposalId, Error>;
-
-    async fn load(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Proposal, Error>;
-
-    async fn load_kind(&self, id: ProposalId, tag: ProposalKindTag) -> Result<ProposalKind, Error>;
-
-    async fn has_voted(
-        &self,
-        id: ProposalId,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error>;
-
-    async fn has_recovery_voted(
-        &self,
-        id: ProposalId,
-        recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error>;
-
-    async fn operator_public_key(&self, id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error>;
-
-    async fn recovery_operator_public_key(
-        &self,
-        id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error>;
-
-    async fn record_vote(&self, vote: NewProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error>;
-
-    async fn record_recovery_vote(&self, vote: NewRecoveryProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error>;
-
-    /// Vote counts for one proposal, alongside the size of each electorate.
-    async fn tally(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Tally, Error>;
-
-    async fn set_status(&self, id: ProposalId, status: ProposalStatus) -> Result<(), Error>;
-
-    /// Pending, unexpired proposals this operator has not voted on yet.
-    async fn pending_for(
-        &self,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<ProposalSummary>, Error>;
-
-    /// True once an uncancelled wake-up request has outlived the dispute window.
-    async fn is_recovery_active(&self) -> Result<bool, Error>;
-
-    /// True while any wake-up request stands, whether or not the window has elapsed.
-    async fn has_uncancelled_wakeup(&self) -> Result<bool, Error>;
-
-    async fn request_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<(), Error>;
-
-    /// Returns false when there was no uncancelled request to cancel.
-    async fn cancel_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<bool, Error>;
-}
-
-pub struct DieselProposalStore {
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-}
-
-impl DieselProposalStore {
-    pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Self {
-        Self { db }
-    }
-}
-
-/// `NotFound` means the row is absent, which every caller reports as its own error.
-fn missing(absent: Error) -> impl FnOnce(diesel::result::Error) -> Error {
-    move |e| match e {
-        diesel::result::Error::NotFound => absent,
-        other => Error::DatabaseQuery(other),
-    }
-}
-
-#[async_trait]
-impl ProposalStore for DieselProposalStore {
-    async fn create(
-        &self,
-        kind: ProposalKind,
-        initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-        expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    ) -> Result<ProposalId, Error> {
-        let id = self
-            .db
-            .get()
-            .await?
-            .transaction(async |conn| {
-                let id: ProposalId = diesel::insert_into(schema::proposal::table)
-                    .values(&NewProposal {
-                        kind: kind.discriminant(),
-                        initiator_id,
-                        expires_at,
-                    })
-                    .returning(schema::proposal::id)
-                    .get_result(conn)
-                    .await?;
-                db::proposal::insert_kind(conn, id, &kind).await?;
-                Ok::<_, diesel::result::Error>(id)
-            })
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(id)
-    }
-
-    async fn load(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Proposal, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        schema::proposal::table
-            .find(id)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(missing(Error::ProposalNotFound))
-    }
-
-    async fn load_kind(&self, id: ProposalId, tag: ProposalKindTag) -> Result<ProposalKind, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        db::proposal::load_kind(&mut conn, id, tag)
-            .await
-            .map_err(Error::from)
-    }
-
-    async fn has_voted(
-        &self,
-        id: ProposalId,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        select(exists(
-            schema::proposal_vote::table
-                .filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-                .filter(schema::proposal_vote::operator_id.eq(operator_id)),
-        ))
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .map_err(Error::from)
-    }
-
-    async fn has_recovery_voted(
-        &self,
-        id: ProposalId,
-        recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        select(exists(
-            schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table
-                .filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-                .filter(
-                    schema::recovery_proposal_vote::recovery_operator_id.eq(recovery_operator_id),
-                ),
-        ))
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .map_err(Error::from)
-    }
-
-    async fn operator_public_key(&self, id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        schema::operator_identity::table
-            .find(id)
-            .select(schema::operator_identity::public_key)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(missing(Error::OperatorNotFound))
-    }
-
-    async fn recovery_operator_public_key(
-        &self,
-        id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
-            .find(id)
-            .select(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(missing(Error::OperatorNotFound))
-    }
-
-    async fn record_vote(&self, vote: NewProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        diesel::insert_into(schema::proposal_vote::table)
-            .values(&vote)
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn record_recovery_vote(&self, vote: NewRecoveryProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        diesel::insert_into(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table)
-            .values(&vote)
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn tally(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Tally, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
-        let ordinary_approve: i64 = schema::proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::approve.eq(true))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        let recovery_approve: i64 = schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-            .filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::approve.eq(true))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let ordinary_reject: i64 = schema::proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::approve.eq(false))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        let recovery_reject: i64 = schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-            .filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::approve.eq(false))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let total_ordinary: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        let total_recovery: i64 = schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(Tally {
-            ordinary_approve,
-            ordinary_reject,
-            recovery_approve,
-            recovery_reject,
-            total_ordinary,
-            total_recovery,
-        })
-    }
-
-    async fn set_status(&self, id: ProposalId, status: ProposalStatus) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        diesel::update(schema::proposal::table.find(id))
-            .set(schema::proposal::status.eq(status))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn pending_for(
-        &self,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<ProposalSummary>, Error> {
-        #[expect(
-            clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
-            clippy::as_conversions,
-            reason = "fixme! #84; this will break in 2038"
-        )]
-        let now_ts = Utc::now().timestamp() as i32;
-
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
-        let voted_ids: Vec<ProposalId> = schema::proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::operator_id.eq(operator_id))
-            .select(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id)
-            .load(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let proposals: Vec<Proposal> = schema::proposal::table
-            .filter(schema::proposal::status.eq(ProposalStatus::Pending))
-            .filter(schema::proposal::expires_at.gt(now_ts))
-            .filter(diesel::dsl::not(schema::proposal::id.eq_any(&voted_ids)))
-            .load(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let ids: Vec<ProposalId> = proposals.iter().map(|p| p.id).collect();
-        let tallies: Vec<(ProposalId, bool, i64)> = schema::proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq_any(&ids))
-            .group_by((
-                schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id,
-                schema::proposal_vote::approve,
-            ))
-            .select((
-                schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id,
-                schema::proposal_vote::approve,
-                diesel::dsl::count_star(),
-            ))
-            .load(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let mut by_proposal: HashMap<ProposalId, (i64, i64)> = HashMap::new();
-        for (proposal_id, approve, count) in tallies {
-            let entry = by_proposal.entry(proposal_id).or_insert((0, 0));
-            if approve {
-                entry.0 += count;
-            } else {
-                entry.1 += count;
-            }
-        }
-
-        Ok(proposals
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|p| {
-                let (approve_count, reject_count) =
-                    by_proposal.get(&p.id).copied().unwrap_or((0, 0));
-                ProposalSummary {
-                    id: p.id,
-                    kind: p.kind,
-                    initiator_id: p.initiator_id,
-                    expires_at: p.expires_at,
-                    approve_count,
-                    reject_count,
-                }
-            })
-            .collect())
-    }
-
-    async fn is_recovery_active(&self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        db::recovery::is_active(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(Error::from)
-    }
-
-    async fn has_uncancelled_wakeup(&self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        select(exists(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table.filter(
-            schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.is_null(),
-        )))
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .map_err(Error::from)
-    }
-
-    async fn request_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        diesel::insert_into(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table)
-            .values(&NewRecoveryWakeupRequest {
-                requested_by: operator_id,
-            })
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn cancel_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        let rows = diesel::update(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table)
-            .filter(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.is_null())
-            .set((
-                schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_by.eq(Some(operator_id)),
-                schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.eq(Some(SqliteTimestamp::now())),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(rows > 0)
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager/tests.rs

@@ -1,395 +0,0 @@
-//! The quorum rules, exercised without a database.
-//!
-//! These assertions are the point of [`super::store::ProposalStore`]: until the actor took
-//! its data through a trait, checking that two of three operators carry an ordinary
-//! proposal meant opening SQLite and registering operators first.
-
-use super::{
-    ProposalManager, VoteOutcome,
-    store::{MockProposalStore, Tally},
-};
-use crate::{
-    actors::GlobalActors,
-    crypto::governance::vote_message,
-    db::{
-        models::{OperatorIdentityId, Proposal, ProposalId, ProposalStatus, SqliteTimestamp},
-        proposal::ProposalKindTag,
-    },
-};
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{SigningContext, SigningKey};
-use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-/// A tally where every vote came from the ordinary committee.
-const fn tally(approve: i64, reject: i64, ordinary: i64, recovery: i64) -> Tally {
-    Tally {
-        ordinary_approve: approve,
-        ordinary_reject: reject,
-        recovery_approve: 0,
-        recovery_reject: 0,
-        total_ordinary: ordinary,
-        total_recovery: recovery,
-    }
-}
-
-/// A tally with votes from both committees, in the order approve/reject per committee.
-const fn mixed_tally(
-    ordinary_approve: i64,
-    ordinary_reject: i64,
-    recovery_approve: i64,
-    recovery_reject: i64,
-    total_ordinary: i64,
-    total_recovery: i64,
-) -> Tally {
-    Tally {
-        ordinary_approve,
-        ordinary_reject,
-        recovery_approve,
-        recovery_reject,
-        total_ordinary,
-        total_recovery,
-    }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn simple_majority_approves_at_two_of_three() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(2, 0, 3, 0), false),
-        VoteOutcome::Approved
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn one_of_three_is_not_yet_a_majority() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(1, 0, 3, 0), false),
-        VoteOutcome::Pending
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn full_quorum_kind_needs_every_voter() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(2, 0, 3, 0), true),
-        VoteOutcome::Pending,
-        "two of three must not carry a key-rotation proposal"
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn recovery_voters_count_towards_full_quorum() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&mixed_tally(2, 0, 1, 0, 2, 1), true),
-        VoteOutcome::Approved
-    );
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&mixed_tally(2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1), true),
-        VoteOutcome::Pending,
-        "the sleeping recovery operator still owes a vote"
-    );
-}
-
-/// An empty committee cannot approve anything. Both arms have to say so: the full-quorum arm
-/// derives its threshold from the electorate, so with nobody eligible it would compare 0
-/// approvals against a threshold of 0 and call that unanimous.
-#[test]
-fn an_empty_electorate_settles_nothing() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(0, 0, 0, 0), true),
-        VoteOutcome::Pending,
-        "a full-quorum proposal must not pass with no eligible voters"
-    );
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(0, 0, 0, 0), false),
-        VoteOutcome::Pending
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn rejection_is_decided_once_approval_is_unreachable() {
-    // Threshold is 2 of 3, so two rejections leave at most one approval available.
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(0, 2, 3, 0), false),
-        VoteOutcome::Rejected
-    );
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(0, 1, 3, 0), false),
-        VoteOutcome::Pending,
-        "one rejection still leaves two approvals reachable"
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn a_single_rejection_sinks_a_full_quorum_proposal() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(2, 1, 3, 0), true),
-        VoteOutcome::Rejected
-    );
-}
-
-fn pending_proposal(id: ProposalId, kind: ProposalKindTag) -> Proposal {
-    let now = Utc::now();
-    Proposal {
-        id,
-        kind,
-        initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(1),
-        created_at: SqliteTimestamp::from(now),
-        expires_at: SqliteTimestamp::from(now + Duration::days(1)),
-        status: ProposalStatus::Pending,
-    }
-}
-
-/// The mock earns its keep here: reaching quorum must flip the stored status to
-/// `Approved` exactly once. Signature verification stays real -- only the database is
-/// stubbed out.
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn reaching_quorum_marks_the_proposal_approved() {
-    let id = ProposalId::from_raw(1);
-    let voter = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(1);
-    let key = SigningKey::generate();
-    let signature = key
-        .sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
-        .expect("signing a vote must succeed");
-    let public_key = key.public_key().to_bytes();
-
-    let mut store = MockProposalStore::new();
-    store
-        .expect_load()
-        .returning(move |id| Ok(pending_proposal(id, ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey)));
-    store.expect_has_voted().returning(|_, _| Ok(false));
-    store
-        .expect_operator_public_key()
-        .returning(move |_| Ok(public_key.clone()));
-    store.expect_record_vote().returning(|_| Ok(()));
-    store.expect_is_recovery_active().returning(|| Ok(false));
-    store.expect_tally().returning(|_| Ok(tally(1, 0, 1, 0)));
-    store
-        .expect_set_status()
-        .withf(move |got, status| *got == id && *status == ProposalStatus::Approved)
-        .times(1)
-        .returning(|_, _| Ok(()));
-    store
-        .expect_load_kind()
-        .returning(|_, _| Ok(crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind::TriggerRekey));
-
-    let mut manager =
-        ProposalManager::with_store(Arc::new(store), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus());
-
-    let outcome = manager
-        .cast_vote(id, voter, true, signature.to_bytes())
-        .await
-        .expect("a valid vote must be accepted");
-
-    assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Approved);
-}
-
-/// A vote that does not reach the threshold must leave the stored status alone.
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn a_vote_short_of_quorum_does_not_touch_the_status() {
-    let id = ProposalId::from_raw(7);
-    let voter = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(2);
-    let key = SigningKey::generate();
-    let signature = key
-        .sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
-        .expect("signing a vote must succeed");
-    let public_key = key.public_key().to_bytes();
-
-    let mut store = MockProposalStore::new();
-    store
-        .expect_load()
-        .returning(move |id| Ok(pending_proposal(id, ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient)));
-    store.expect_has_voted().returning(|_, _| Ok(false));
-    store
-        .expect_operator_public_key()
-        .returning(move |_| Ok(public_key.clone()));
-    store.expect_record_vote().returning(|_| Ok(()));
-    store.expect_is_recovery_active().returning(|| Ok(false));
-    store.expect_tally().returning(|_| Ok(tally(1, 0, 3, 0)));
-    store.expect_set_status().never();
-
-    let mut manager =
-        ProposalManager::with_store(Arc::new(store), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus());
-
-    let outcome = manager
-        .cast_vote(id, voter, true, signature.to_bytes())
-        .await
-        .expect("a valid vote must be accepted");
-
-    assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Pending);
-}
-
-/// Drives one `cast_vote` on a proposal of the given `kind` through a mocked store and
-/// returns the outcome. `recovery_active` decides what `is_recovery_active` reports;
-/// `expected_status` is the status a settled outcome must be persisted under, or `None` for
-/// a caller that expects the vote to leave the proposal pending.
-///
-/// `set_status` carries an argument matcher but no `.times()`, and `None` relaxes even the
-/// matcher: the caller's own `assert_eq!` on the outcome is what pins the behaviour, so a
-/// regression fails on a readable diff rather than on a mockall cardinality panic that hides
-/// what the actor actually computed.
-async fn settle_vote_with(
-    kind: ProposalKindTag,
-    tally: Tally,
-    recovery_active: bool,
-    expected_status: Option<ProposalStatus>,
-) -> VoteOutcome {
-    let id = ProposalId::from_raw(11);
-    let voter = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(1);
-    let key = SigningKey::generate();
-    let signature = key
-        .sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
-        .expect("signing a vote must succeed");
-    let public_key = key.public_key().to_bytes();
-
-    let mut store = MockProposalStore::new();
-    store
-        .expect_load()
-        .returning(move |id| Ok(pending_proposal(id, kind)));
-    store.expect_has_voted().returning(|_, _| Ok(false));
-    store
-        .expect_operator_public_key()
-        .returning(move |_| Ok(public_key.clone()));
-    store.expect_record_vote().returning(|_| Ok(()));
-    store
-        .expect_is_recovery_active()
-        .returning(move || Ok(recovery_active));
-    store.expect_tally().returning(move |_| Ok(tally));
-    store
-        .expect_set_status()
-        .withf(move |_, status| {
-            expected_status
-                .as_ref()
-                .is_none_or(|expected| status == expected)
-        })
-        .returning(|_, _| Ok(()));
-    store.expect_load_kind().returning(move |_, _| {
-        Ok(match kind {
-            ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey => crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind::TriggerRekey,
-            ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient => {
-                crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(
-                    crate::db::proposal::approve_sdk_client::Settings { client_id: 1 },
-                )
-            }
-            ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator => crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(
-                crate::db::proposal::replace_operator::Settings {
-                    old_operator_id: OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(1),
-                    new_pubkey: vec![0u8; 32],
-                },
-            ),
-            other => unreachable!("settle_vote_with has no load_kind fixture for {other:?}"),
-        })
-    });
-
-    let mut manager =
-        ProposalManager::with_store(Arc::new(store), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus());
-
-    manager
-        .cast_vote(id, voter, true, signature.to_bytes())
-        .await
-        .expect("a valid vote must be accepted")
-}
-
-/// The full-quorum rejection path is insensitive to electorate size by construction:
-/// `threshold == total_eligible` there, so `total_eligible - threshold` is always 0 and any
-/// single rejection settles the proposal, whether or not recovery operators are (wrongly)
-/// counted. This does not exercise the electorate-narrowing fix -- see
-/// `unanimous_ordinary_rejection_rejects_a_non_full_quorum_proposal_while_recovery_is_awake`
-/// below for the test that does -- it just pins that `cast_vote` still writes `Rejected`
-/// through `settle` for a full-quorum kind.
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn unanimous_rejection_settles_a_full_quorum_rekey_via_cast_vote() {
-    let outcome = settle_vote_with(
-        ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey,
-        tally(0, 3, 3, 2),
-        /* recovery_active */ true,
-        Some(ProposalStatus::Rejected),
-    )
-    .await;
-
-    assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Rejected);
-}
-
-/// §3.3 full quorum for a rekey means every *ordinary* operator, not every identity on file.
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn unanimous_ordinary_approval_approves_a_rekey_while_recovery_is_awake() {
-    let outcome = settle_vote_with(
-        ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey,
-        tally(3, 0, 3, 2),
-        /* recovery_active */ true,
-        Some(ProposalStatus::Approved),
-    )
-    .await;
-
-    assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Approved);
-}
-
-/// §3.5: recovery operators do not vote on `ApproveSdkClient`, so they must not inflate its
-/// electorate. Before the fix, `total_eligible` counted them anyway (5, not 3), so the
-/// rejection test `reject > total_eligible - threshold` became `3 > 5 - 2 = 3`, which is
-/// false -- three unanimous rejections left the proposal `Pending` forever, since a fourth
-/// vote could never arrive. After the fix, `total_eligible` is 3 and the same test becomes
-/// `3 > 3 - 2 = 1`, which settles it.
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn unanimous_ordinary_rejection_rejects_a_non_full_quorum_proposal_while_recovery_is_awake() {
-    let outcome = settle_vote_with(
-        ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient,
-        tally(0, 3, 3, 2),
-        /* recovery_active */ true,
-        Some(ProposalStatus::Rejected),
-    )
-    .await;
-
-    assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Rejected);
-}
-
-/// §3.5/§3.6: `ReplaceOperator` is the one kind recovery may vote on, so it is the only kind
-/// where whether recovery is awake is observable at all -- for every other kind
-/// `narrow_electorate` zeroes `total_recovery` regardless of `is_recovery_active`, short-
-/// circuiting before that call. A sleeping recovery electorate must not raise the bar here:
-/// with 1 ordinary operator and 2 (asleep) recovery operators, the lone ordinary approval
-/// must already reach full quorum.
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn sleeping_recovery_operators_do_not_count_towards_quorum() {
-    let outcome = settle_vote_with(
-        ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator,
-        tally(1, 0, 1, 2),
-        /* recovery_active */ false,
-        Some(ProposalStatus::Approved),
-    )
-    .await;
-
-    assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Approved);
-}
-
-/// The sequence the whole-branch review worked through, on a `ReplaceOperator` with 3
-/// ordinary and 2 recovery operators (§3.3: full quorum). Both recovery operators approve
-/// while awake; one ordinary operator approves; another ordinary operator then cancels the
-/// wake-up -- `cancel_wakeup` cancels an uncancelled request whether or not its window has
-/// elapsed, so the committee goes straight back to sleep with its votes on the record; a
-/// second ordinary operator approves.
-///
-/// The store now reports 4 approvals, 2 of them from a committee that is no longer eligible.
-/// Narrowing the electorate has to drop those votes along with the voters: what is left is 2
-/// of 3 ordinary approvals, and a full quorum needs all three. Counting the electorate down
-/// to 3 while keeping all 4 votes would replace an operator on two ordinary approvals.
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn recovery_votes_leave_with_the_committee_that_cast_them() {
-    let outcome = settle_vote_with(
-        ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator,
-        mixed_tally(
-            /* ordinary_approve */ 2, /* ordinary_reject */ 0,
-            /* recovery_approve */ 2, /* recovery_reject */ 0,
-            /* total_ordinary */ 3, /* total_recovery */ 2,
-        ),
-        /* recovery_active */ false,
-        None,
-    )
-    .await;
-
-    assert_eq!(
-        outcome,
-        VoteOutcome::Pending,
-        "two of three ordinary approvals must not carry a full-quorum proposal, whatever a \
-         sleeping recovery committee voted earlier"
-    );
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/vault/mod.rs

@@ -1,15 +1,13 @@
 use crate::{
-    actors::proposal_manager::events::ProposalApproved,
     crypto::{
-        KeyCell,
+        KeyCell, derive_key,
         encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
-        integrity::{self, v1::HmacSha256},
+        integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
     },
     db::{
         self,
-        models::{self, RootKeyHistory, RootKeyHistoryId},
-        proposal::ProposalKind,
-        schema,
+        models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
+        schema::{self},
     },
 };
 use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
@@ -21,12 +19,13 @@ use diesel::{
 };
 use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
 use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
-use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages, prelude::Message};
+use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
 use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
 use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
-use tracing::{error, info};
+use tracing::{error, info, warn};
 
 pub mod events {
+
     #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
     pub struct Bootstrapped;
 
@@ -47,6 +46,8 @@ pub enum Error {
     Sealed,
     #[error("Invalid key provided")]
     InvalidKey,
+    #[error("Vault locked: too many failed unseal attempts")]
+    LockedOut,
 
     #[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
     NotFound,
@@ -62,10 +63,13 @@ pub enum Error {
 
     #[error("Broken database")]
     BrokenDatabase,
+
+    #[error("Integrity key version mismatch: envelope uses key {envelope}, current key is {current}")]
+    KeyVersionMismatch { envelope: i32, current: i32 },
 }
 
 struct Unsealed {
-    root_key_history_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
+    root_key_history_id: i32,
     root_key: KeyCell,
 }
 
@@ -74,13 +78,14 @@ struct Unsealed {
 enum State {
     #[default]
     Unbootstrapped,
-
     Sealed {
-        root_key_history_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
+        root_key_history_id: i32,
     },
     Unsealed(Unsealed),
 }
 
+const MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 5;
+
 /// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
 ///
 /// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
@@ -90,8 +95,10 @@ pub struct Vault {
     db: db::DatabasePool,
     state: State,
     events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
+    unseal_failures: u32,
 }
 
+#[messages]
 impl Vault {
     pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
         let state = {
@@ -111,15 +118,12 @@ impl Vault {
             }
         };
 
-        Ok(Self { db, state, events })
+        Ok(Self { db, state, events, unseal_failures: 0 })
     }
 
-    // Exclusive transaction to avoid race conditions if multiple vaults write
+    // Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write
     // additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
-    async fn get_new_nonce(
-        pool: &db::DatabasePool,
-        root_key_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
-    ) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
+    async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
         let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
 
         let nonce = conn
@@ -132,7 +136,7 @@ impl Vault {
 
                 let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
                     error!(
-                        "Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={:#?}",
+                        "Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
                         root_key_id
                     );
                     Error::BrokenDatabase
@@ -159,47 +163,43 @@ impl Vault {
             State::Sealed { .. } => Err(Error::Sealed),
         }
     }
-}
 
-#[messages]
-impl Vault {
     #[message]
-    pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, mut seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if !matches!(&self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
+    pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
             return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
         }
-
+        let salt = v1::generate_salt();
+        let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
         let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
 
         // Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
         let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default();
         let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
 
-        // Generate salt (kept for schema compat)
-        let root_key_salt = v1::generate_salt();
-
-        let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|rk| {
+        let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| {
+            let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice();
             seal_key
-                .encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, rk.as_slice())
+                .encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
                 .map_err(|err| {
                     error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
                     Error::Encryption(err)
                 })
         })?;
 
-        let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
         let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
 
+        let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
         let root_key_history_id = conn
             .transaction(async |conn| {
-                let root_key_history_id = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
                     .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
                         ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext.clone(),
                         tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
                         root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
                         data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes.clone(),
                         schema_version: 1,
-                        salt: root_key_salt.to_vec(),
+                        salt: salt.to_vec(),
                     })
                     .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
                     .get_result(&mut *conn)
@@ -210,9 +210,7 @@ impl Vault {
                     .execute(&mut *conn)
                     .await?;
 
-                Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(RootKeyHistoryId::from_raw(
-                    root_key_history_id,
-                ))
+                Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id)
             })
             .await?;
 
@@ -222,55 +220,76 @@ impl Vault {
         });
 
         info!("Vault bootstrapped successfully");
-        if let Err(err) = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await {
-            error!(?err, "Failed to publish Bootstrapped event");
-        }
+        let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await;
 
         Ok(())
     }
 
     #[message]
-    pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, mut seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        if self.unseal_failures >= MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS {
+            return Err(Error::LockedOut);
+        }
+
         let State::Sealed {
             root_key_history_id,
         } = &self.state
         else {
             return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
         };
-        let root_key_history_id = *root_key_history_id;
 
-        // We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive work
+        // We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
         let current_key = {
             let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
             schema::root_key_history::table
-                .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
+                .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
                 .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
                 .first(&mut conn)
                 .await?
         };
 
+        let salt = &current_key.salt;
+        let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+            error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
+            Error::BrokenDatabase
+        })?;
+        let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
+
+        let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
+
         let nonce =
             Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
                 error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
                 Error::BrokenDatabase
             })?;
 
-        let mut root_key_bytes = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
-        seal_key
-            .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key_bytes)
-            .map_err(|err| {
-                error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
-                Error::InvalidKey
-            })?;
-
-        let root_key = KeyCell::try_from(root_key_bytes).map_err(|()| {
-            error!("Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
-            Error::BrokenDatabase
-        })?;
+        if seal_key
+            .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
+            .is_err()
+        {
+            self.unseal_failures += 1;
+            if self.unseal_failures >= MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS {
+                error!(
+                    attempts = self.unseal_failures,
+                    "Vault locked: maximum failed unseal attempts reached"
+                );
+            } else {
+                warn!(
+                    attempts = self.unseal_failures,
+                    remaining = MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS - self.unseal_failures,
+                    "Failed unseal attempt"
+                );
+            }
+            return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
+        }
 
+        self.unseal_failures = 0;
         self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
             root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
-            root_key,
+            root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
+                error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
+                Error::BrokenDatabase
+            })?,
         });
 
         info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
@@ -279,78 +298,10 @@ impl Vault {
         Ok(())
     }
 
-    /// Re-encrypts the root key with `new_seal_key`, updating its `root_key_history` row in
-    /// place. Called after a Shamir re-key, so the old seal key is no longer sufficient to
-    /// unseal. The root key itself does not change, so its row identity (and the nonce counter
-    /// and integrity envelopes bound to it) must not change either.
+    /// Decrypts an AEAD entry. The `aad` must match the value used at encryption time;
+    /// a mismatch causes authentication failure, preventing cross-wallet key swaps.
     #[message]
-    pub async fn rekey_root_key(&mut self, mut new_seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let Unsealed {
-            root_key,
-            root_key_history_id,
-        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-
-        let new_nonce = Nonce::default();
-        let new_salt = v1::generate_salt();
-
-        let new_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|rk| {
-            new_seal_key
-                .encrypt(&new_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, rk.as_slice())
-                .map_err(|err| {
-                    error!(?err, "Fatal rekey error");
-                    Error::Encryption(err)
-                })
-        })?;
-
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
-        // The root key is unchanged, so its row keeps its identity: `data_encryption_nonce`
-        // keeps counting up, and every integrity envelope stays bound to the same key version.
-        // Only the seal-key material is replaced, retiring the previous one. `tag` and
-        // `schema_version` are deliberately left untouched: the seal-key encryption scheme
-        // itself is unchanged by a re-key, so there is nothing new for them to describe.
-        let rows_updated = update(schema::root_key_history::table)
-            .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
-            .set((
-                schema::root_key_history::ciphertext.eq(new_ciphertext),
-                schema::root_key_history::root_key_encryption_nonce.eq(new_nonce.to_vec()),
-                schema::root_key_history::salt.eq(new_salt.to_vec()),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        if rows_updated == 0 {
-            error!(
-                "Broken database: rekey matched no root_key_history row id={:#?}",
-                root_key_history_id
-            );
-            return Err(Error::BrokenDatabase);
-        }
-
-        info!("Vault root key rekeyed successfully");
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let Unsealed {
-            root_key_history_id,
-            ..
-        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-
-        self.state = State::Sealed {
-            root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
-        };
-        let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-// Server-side cryptographic operations
-#[messages]
-impl Vault {
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
+    pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32, aad: Vec<u8>) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
         let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
 
         let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
@@ -372,13 +323,15 @@ impl Vault {
             Error::BrokenDatabase
         })?;
         let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
-        root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
+        root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut output)?;
         Ok(output)
     }
 
+    /// Creates a new `aead_encrypted` entry and returns its ID.
+    /// The `aad` is bound into the ciphertext and must be reproduced exactly at decryption time.
     // Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
     #[message]
-    pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+    pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, aad: Vec<u8>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
         let Unsealed {
             root_key,
             root_key_history_id,
@@ -390,7 +343,7 @@ impl Vault {
 
         let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
         let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
-        root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
+        root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
 
         let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
 
@@ -417,10 +370,7 @@ impl Vault {
     }
 
     #[message]
-    pub fn sign_integrity(
-        &mut self,
-        mac_input: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<(RootKeyHistoryId, Vec<u8>), Error> {
+    pub fn sign_integrity(&mut self, mac_input: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(i32, Vec<u8>), Error> {
         let Unsealed {
             root_key,
             root_key_history_id,
@@ -430,7 +380,7 @@ impl Vault {
             HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
                 .unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
         });
-        hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_raw().to_be_bytes());
+        hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes());
         hmac.update(&mac_input);
 
         let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
@@ -442,7 +392,7 @@ impl Vault {
         &mut self,
         mac_input: Vec<u8>,
         expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
-        key_version: RootKeyHistoryId,
+        key_version: i32,
     ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
         let Unsealed {
             root_key,
@@ -450,72 +400,33 @@ impl Vault {
         } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
 
         if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
-            return Ok(false);
+            return Err(Error::KeyVersionMismatch {
+                envelope: key_version,
+                current: *root_key_history_id,
+            });
         }
 
         let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
             HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
                 .unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
         });
-        hmac.update(&key_version.to_raw().to_be_bytes());
+        hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes());
         hmac.update(&mac_input);
 
         Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
     }
-}
 
-impl Message<ProposalApproved> for Vault {
-    type Reply = ();
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let Unsealed {
+            root_key_history_id,
+            ..
+        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
 
-    /// Every subscriber sees every approval and acts only on the kinds it owns.
-    async fn handle(
-        &mut self,
-        msg: ProposalApproved,
-        _ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
-    ) -> Self::Reply {
-        let ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(settings) = msg.kind else {
-            return;
+        self.state = State::Sealed {
+            root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
         };
-
-        if let Err(error) = self.approve_sdk_client(settings.client_id).await {
-            error!(
-                ?error,
-                proposal_id = msg.id.to_raw(),
-                "Failed to execute an approved proposal"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl Vault {
-    /// Attests an approved SDK client with the root key.
-    ///
-    /// Builds the envelope from its parts rather than calling `integrity::sign_entity`,
-    /// which would have this actor ask itself for a signature and deadlock.
-    async fn approve_sdk_client(&mut self, client_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        use crate::peers::client::ClientCredentials;
-        use arbiter_crypto::authn;
-
-        // Cloned so the connection does not hold a borrow of `self` across `sign_integrity`.
-        let db = self.db.clone();
-        let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-
-        let pubkey_bytes: Vec<u8> = schema::program_client::table
-            .find(client_id)
-            .select(schema::program_client::public_key)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let pubkey =
-            authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey_bytes.as_slice()).map_err(|()| Error::InvalidKey)?;
-        let credentials = ClientCredentials { pubkey };
-
-        let (entity_id, mac_input) = integrity::envelope_input(&credentials, client_id);
-        let (key_version, mac) = self.sign_integrity(mac_input)?;
-
-        integrity::store_envelope::<ClientCredentials>(&mut conn, entity_id, key_version, mac)
-            .await?;
-
+        let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
         Ok(())
     }
 }
@@ -523,6 +434,7 @@ impl Vault {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use crate::actors::GlobalActors;
+    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::SafeCellHandle as _;
 
     use super::*;
 
@@ -530,7 +442,8 @@ mod tests {
         let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
             .await
             .unwrap();
-        actor.bootstrap(KeyCell::from([0u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
+        let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
+        actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
         actor
     }
 
@@ -539,12 +452,13 @@ mod tests {
     async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
         let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
         let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
+
         let State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
             root_key_history_id,
             ..
         }) = actor.state
         else {
-            panic!("expected unsealed state");
+            panic!("expected unsealed state")
         };
 
         let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
@@ -564,7 +478,7 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
 
         let id = actor
-            .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
+            .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()), b"test-aad".to_vec())
             .await
             .unwrap();
         let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
@@ -578,96 +492,4 @@ mod tests {
             "next write must advance nonce"
         );
     }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    #[test_log::test]
-    async fn rekey_does_not_restart_the_data_nonce_counter() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
-
-        let before = actor
-            .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"before-rekey".to_vec()))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        actor.rekey_root_key(KeyCell::from([7u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
-
-        let after = actor
-            .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"after-rekey".to_vec()))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        // One root key, one row: the root key never changed, so its history did not fork.
-        let rows: i64 = schema::root_key_history::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(rows, 1, "a seal-key re-key must not append a root key row");
-
-        // Fetch each nonce by its own id, rather than `eq_any` (whose row order is
-        // unspecified), and assert the counter strictly advanced. A weaker `assert_ne!` would
-        // still pass if the counter reset, as long as the two nonces happened to differ.
-        let before_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
-            .find(before)
-            .select(schema::aead_encrypted::current_nonce)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let after_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
-            .find(after)
-            .select(schema::aead_encrypted::current_nonce)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            after_nonce > before_nonce,
-            "nonce counter must keep advancing across a rekey, not reset"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    #[test_log::test]
-    async fn rekey_invalidates_the_old_seal_key() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
-
-        actor.rekey_root_key(KeyCell::from([7u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
-        actor.seal().await.unwrap();
-
-        // A no-op rekey would leave the old seal key working; it must not.
-        let err = actor
-            .try_unseal(KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]))
-            .await
-            .unwrap_err();
-        assert!(
-            matches!(err, Error::InvalidKey),
-            "old seal key must no longer unseal after a rekey, got {err:?}"
-        );
-
-        // A failed unseal must leave the sealed state intact: the new seal key must still be
-        // able to unseal on the next attempt.
-        actor.try_unseal(KeyCell::from([7u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    #[test_log::test]
-    async fn integrity_envelopes_survive_a_rekey() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
-
-        let mac_input = b"operator_credentials/1".to_vec();
-        let (key_version, mac) = actor.sign_integrity(mac_input.clone()).unwrap();
-
-        actor.rekey_root_key(KeyCell::from([9u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
-
-        assert!(
-            actor
-                .verify_integrity(mac_input, mac, key_version)
-                .unwrap(),
-            "a seal-key re-key must not invalidate existing attestations"
-        );
-    }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/vault_coordinator/mod.rs

@@ -1,923 +0,0 @@
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages, prelude::Message};
-use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore as _};
-use tracing::error;
-
-use crate::{
-    actors::{
-        proposal_manager::events::ProposalApproved,
-        vault::{Bootstrap, RekeyRootKey, TryUnseal, Vault},
-    },
-    crypto::{KeyCell, derive_key, encryption::v1::Nonce, shamir, shamir::shamir_threshold},
-    db::{
-        self, models,
-        proposal::{ProposalKind, replace_operator},
-        schema,
-    },
-};
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum Error {
-    #[error("Already coordinating a bootstrap")]
-    AlreadyBootstrapping,
-    #[error("Already coordinating an unseal")]
-    AlreadyUnsealing,
-    #[error("Rekey not in progress")]
-    NotRekeying,
-    #[error("Bootstrap not in progress")]
-    NotBootstrapping,
-    #[error("Unseal not in progress")]
-    NotUnsealing,
-    #[error("Operator already contributed")]
-    DuplicateContribution,
-    #[error("Operator not found in database")]
-    OperatorNotFound,
-    #[error("Invalid passphrase (decryption failed)")]
-    InvalidPassphrase,
-    #[error("Shamir error: {0}")]
-    Shamir(String),
-    #[error("Database connection error: {0}")]
-    DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
-    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
-    DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-    #[error("Encryption error")]
-    Encryption,
-    #[error("Vault error")]
-    VaultError,
-    #[error("Two-operator vaults require at least one recovery share")]
-    TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery,
-    #[error("Broken database")]
-    BrokenDatabase,
-    #[error("A committee must have at least one ordinary operator")]
-    EmptyCommittee,
-    #[error("Recovery operators are sleeping")]
-    RecoveryNotActive,
-}
-
-// Passphrases stored as plain Vec<u8> (not SafeCell) so CoordinatorState is Sync.
-// They are ephemeral and dropped immediately after use.
-enum CoordinatorState {
-    Idle,
-    Bootstrapping {
-        declared_count: usize,
-        recovery_count: usize,
-        passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-        recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    },
-    Unsealing {
-        threshold: usize,
-        ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-        recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    },
-    /// Shamir re-key after `replace_operator` or `trigger_rekey` is approved (§3.3).
-    /// Collects new passphrases from all current operators, then generates a fresh seal key,
-    /// re-splits it, and re-encrypts the vault root key.
-    Rekeying {
-        ordinary_count: usize,
-        recovery_count: usize,
-        passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-        recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    },
-}
-
-#[derive(Actor)]
-pub struct VaultCoordinator {
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-    vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
-    state: CoordinatorState,
-}
-
-impl VaultCoordinator {
-    pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, vault: ActorRef<Vault>) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            db,
-            vault,
-            state: CoordinatorState::Idle,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-const SHARE_AAD: &[u8] = b"arbiter/shamir-share/v1";
-
-fn encrypt_share(
-    passphrase_bytes: Vec<u8>,
-    share: &[u8],
-) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>), Error> {
-    let mut share_salt = vec![0u8; 32];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut share_salt);
-
-    let mut passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase_bytes);
-    let mut share_seal_key = derive_key(&mut passphrase_cell, &share_salt);
-
-    let nonce = Nonce::default();
-    let encrypted_share = share_seal_key
-        .encrypt(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, share)
-        .map_err(|_| Error::Encryption)?;
-
-    Ok((encrypted_share, nonce.to_vec(), share_salt))
-}
-
-fn decrypt_share(
-    passphrase_bytes: Vec<u8>,
-    encrypted_share: Vec<u8>,
-    share_nonce_bytes: &[u8],
-    share_salt: &[u8],
-    operator_id: i32,
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
-    let nonce = Nonce::try_from(share_nonce_bytes).map_err(|()| {
-        error!(operator_id, "Invalid nonce in DB");
-        Error::BrokenDatabase
-    })?;
-
-    let mut passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase_bytes);
-    let mut share_seal_key = derive_key(&mut passphrase_cell, share_salt);
-
-    let mut share_buffer = SafeCell::new(encrypted_share);
-    share_seal_key
-        .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, &mut share_buffer)
-        .map_err(|_| Error::InvalidPassphrase)?;
-
-    Ok(share_buffer.read().clone())
-}
-
-/// Records the threshold of the split that produced the stored shares.
-async fn store_threshold(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection, threshold: usize) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    // A threshold that doesn't fit in the column is a bug, not a real empty-committee refusal.
-    let threshold = i32::try_from(threshold).map_err(|_| Error::BrokenDatabase)?;
-    let rows_updated = diesel::update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
-        .set(schema::arbiter_settings::shamir_threshold.eq(Some(threshold)))
-        .execute(conn)
-        .await?;
-    // The singleton row always exists (up.sql seeds it), so anything else means the update did
-    // not land -- bootstrap would then report success while the threshold stays NULL forever.
-    if rows_updated != 1 {
-        return Err(Error::BrokenDatabase);
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// Reads back the threshold recorded at bootstrap or re-key time.
-async fn load_threshold(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection) -> Result<usize, Error> {
-    let stored: Option<i32> = schema::arbiter_settings::table
-        .select(schema::arbiter_settings::shamir_threshold)
-        .first(conn)
-        .await?;
-
-    // A missing or out-of-range value here means the recorded threshold is corrupt, not that the
-    // committee is genuinely empty -- `EmptyCommittee` is reserved for the real domain refusal.
-    stored
-        .and_then(|threshold| usize::try_from(threshold).ok())
-        .ok_or(Error::BrokenDatabase)
-}
-
-/// §3.4: Split the seal key across ordinary + recovery operators.
-/// Threshold = `shamir_threshold(ordinary_count)`; total shares = ordinary + recovery.
-/// When `ordinary_count` == 1 (threshold = 1), vsss-rs does not support a proper split,
-/// so each share is the seal key itself — any single participant can reconstruct.
-async fn finalize_bootstrap(
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-    vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
-    ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let ordinary_count = ordinary_passphrases.len();
-    let recovery_count = recovery_passphrases.len();
-    let total = ordinary_count + recovery_count;
-    let threshold = shamir_threshold(ordinary_count).ok_or(Error::EmptyCommittee)?;
-
-    let mut seal_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut seal_key_bytes);
-
-    // threshold == 1 means any single share reconstructs the key (degenerate split).
-    // vsss-rs requires threshold >= 2, so we store the key directly in this case.
-    let shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = if threshold >= 2 {
-        shamir::split_key(threshold, total, &seal_key_bytes, OsRng)
-            .map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
-    } else {
-        std::iter::repeat_with(|| seal_key_bytes.to_vec()).take(total).collect()
-    };
-
-    let seal_key = KeyCell::from(seal_key_bytes);
-
-    let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-    let mut shares_iter = shares.into_iter();
-
-    for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
-        let share = shares_iter
-            .next()
-            .expect("split_key returned enough shares");
-        let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
-
-        diesel::replace_into(schema::operator::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)),
-                schema::operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
-                schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
-                schema::operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
-                schema::operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-                schema::operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-    }
-
-    for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
-        let share = shares_iter
-            .next()
-            .expect("split_key returned enough shares");
-        let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
-
-        diesel::replace_into(schema::recovery_operator::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::recovery_operator::id.eq(recovery_id_raw),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
-                schema::recovery_operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-                schema::recovery_operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-    }
-
-    store_threshold(&mut conn, threshold).await?;
-
-    vault.ask(Bootstrap { seal_key }).await.map_err(|err| {
-        error!(?err, "Vault bootstrap failed");
-        Error::VaultError
-    })?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// §3.5: Unseal using any threshold-sized mix of ordinary + recovery shares.
-async fn finalize_unseal(
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-    vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
-    ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-
-    // Determine whether shares were stored as raw keys (threshold=1) or vsss-rs splits (threshold>=2).
-    let threshold = load_threshold(&mut conn).await?;
-
-    let mut shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
-
-    for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
-        let (encrypted_share, share_nonce_bytes, share_salt): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) =
-            schema::operator::table
-                .filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)))
-                .select((
-                    schema::operator::share,
-                    schema::operator::share_nonce,
-                    schema::operator::share_salt,
-                ))
-                .first(&mut conn)
-                .await
-                .map_err(|_| Error::OperatorNotFound)?;
-
-        shares.push(decrypt_share(
-            passphrase_bytes,
-            encrypted_share,
-            &share_nonce_bytes,
-            &share_salt,
-            operator_id_raw,
-        )?);
-    }
-
-    for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
-        let (encrypted_share, share_nonce_bytes, share_salt): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) =
-            schema::recovery_operator::table
-                .find(recovery_id_raw)
-                .select((
-                    schema::recovery_operator::share,
-                    schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce,
-                    schema::recovery_operator::share_salt,
-                ))
-                .first(&mut conn)
-                .await
-                .map_err(|_| Error::OperatorNotFound)?;
-
-        shares.push(decrypt_share(
-            passphrase_bytes,
-            encrypted_share,
-            &share_nonce_bytes,
-            &share_salt,
-            recovery_id_raw,
-        )?);
-    }
-
-    // When threshold==1, shares are raw 32-byte seal keys (vsss-rs cannot split 1-of-N).
-    // Any single decrypted share is the key itself.
-    let seal_key_bytes: [u8; 32] = if threshold <= 1 {
-        let raw = shares
-            .into_iter()
-            .next()
-            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Shamir("No shares available".into()))?;
-        raw.try_into()
-            .map_err(|_| Error::Shamir("Invalid share length".into()))?
-    } else {
-        shamir::combine_shares(&shares).map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
-    };
-
-    let seal_key = KeyCell::from(seal_key_bytes);
-
-    vault.ask(TryUnseal { seal_key }).await.map_err(|err| {
-        error!(?err, "Vault unseal failed");
-        Error::VaultError
-    })?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// §3.3: Generate a fresh seal key, split across current operators, re-encrypt the vault root key.
-/// Called after `replace_operator` or `trigger_rekey` is approved and all contributors submit.
-async fn finalize_rekey(
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-    vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
-    ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let ordinary_count = ordinary_passphrases.len();
-    let recovery_count = recovery_passphrases.len();
-    let total = ordinary_count + recovery_count;
-    let threshold = shamir_threshold(ordinary_count).ok_or(Error::EmptyCommittee)?;
-
-    let mut new_seal_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut new_seal_key_bytes);
-
-    let shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = if threshold >= 2 {
-        shamir::split_key(threshold, total, &new_seal_key_bytes, OsRng)
-            .map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
-    } else {
-        std::iter::repeat_with(|| new_seal_key_bytes.to_vec())
-            .take(total)
-            .collect()
-    };
-
-    let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-    let mut shares_iter = shares.into_iter();
-
-    for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
-        let share = shares_iter
-            .next()
-            .expect("split_key returned enough shares");
-        let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
-
-        diesel::replace_into(schema::operator::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)),
-                schema::operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
-                schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
-                schema::operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
-                schema::operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-                schema::operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-    }
-
-    for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
-        let share = shares_iter
-            .next()
-            .expect("split_key returned enough shares");
-        let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
-
-        diesel::replace_into(schema::recovery_operator::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::recovery_operator::id.eq(recovery_id_raw),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
-                schema::recovery_operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-                schema::recovery_operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-    }
-
-    store_threshold(&mut conn, threshold).await?;
-
-    drop(conn);
-
-    let new_seal_key = KeyCell::from(new_seal_key_bytes);
-    vault
-        .ask(RekeyRootKey { new_seal_key })
-        .await
-        .map_err(|err| {
-            error!(?err, "Vault rekey failed");
-            Error::VaultError
-        })?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl VaultCoordinator {
-    /// Phase 1 of multi-operator bootstrap: declare the committee size.
-    #[message]
-    #[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "kameo requires messages to be async")]
-    pub async fn start_bootstrap(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: i32,
-        declared_count: usize,
-        recovery_count: usize,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let _ = operator_id; // fixme!: any authenticated operator may announce the committee size. the first call wins
-        if !matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
-            return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping);
-        }
-        if declared_count == 0 {
-            return Err(Error::EmptyCommittee);
-        }
-        if declared_count == 2 && recovery_count == 0 {
-            return Err(Error::TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery);
-        }
-        self.state = CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
-            declared_count,
-            recovery_count,
-            passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-            recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-        };
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Phase 2 of multi-operator bootstrap: ordinary operator contributes a passphrase.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when all ordinary + recovery operators contributed and bootstrap finalized.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_bootstrap(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
-            declared_count,
-            recovery_count,
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapping);
-        };
-
-        if passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
-        passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
-
-        if passphrases.len() < *declared_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-            ..
-        } = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
-        else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-
-        finalize_bootstrap(
-            self.db.clone(),
-            self.vault.clone(),
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(true)
-    }
-
-    /// Phase 2 of multi-operator bootstrap: recovery operator contributes a passphrase.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors are in and bootstrap finalized.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_recovery_bootstrap(
-        &mut self,
-        recovery_operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
-            declared_count,
-            recovery_count,
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapping);
-        };
-
-        if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
-        recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
-
-        if passphrases.len() < *declared_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-            ..
-        } = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
-        else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-
-        finalize_bootstrap(
-            self.db.clone(),
-            self.vault.clone(),
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(true)
-    }
-
-    /// Contribute a passphrase for vault unseal (ordinary operator).
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when threshold reached and vault is unsealed.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_unseal(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        self.ensure_unsealing_state().await?;
-
-        let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
-            threshold,
-            ordinary_passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotUnsealing);
-        };
-
-        if ordinary_passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
-        ordinary_passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
-
-        if ordinary_passphrases.len() + recovery_passphrases.len() < *threshold {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        self.do_finalize_unseal().await
-    }
-
-    /// Contribute a passphrase for vault unseal (recovery operator, §3.5).
-    /// Recovery operators may contribute during unseal when recovery is active.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when threshold reached and vault is unsealed.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_recovery_unseal(
-        &mut self,
-        recovery_operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        {
-            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-            if !db::recovery::is_active(&mut conn).await? {
-                return Err(Error::RecoveryNotActive);
-            }
-        }
-
-        self.ensure_unsealing_state().await?;
-
-        let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
-            threshold,
-            ordinary_passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotUnsealing);
-        };
-
-        if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
-        recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
-
-        if ordinary_passphrases.len() + recovery_passphrases.len() < *threshold {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        self.do_finalize_unseal().await
-    }
-}
-
-impl VaultCoordinator {
-    /// Initializes `CoordinatorState::Unsealing` on first call if still `Idle`.
-    /// Threshold comes from the recorded split parameters (§3.4), not from a live row count.
-    async fn ensure_unsealing_state(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
-            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-            let threshold = load_threshold(&mut conn).await?;
-            drop(conn);
-            self.state = CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
-                threshold,
-                ordinary_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-                recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-            };
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Moves state back to Idle and calls finalize_unseal.
-    async fn do_finalize_unseal(&mut self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
-            ordinary_passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-            ..
-        } = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
-        else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-
-        finalize_unseal(
-            self.db.clone(),
-            self.vault.clone(),
-            ordinary_passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(true)
-    }
-
-    async fn do_finalize_rekey(&mut self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-            ..
-        } = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
-        else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-
-        finalize_rekey(
-            self.db.clone(),
-            self.vault.clone(),
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(true)
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl VaultCoordinator {
-    /// Begin Shamir re-key after a key-rotation proposal is approved (§3.3).
-    /// Queries the current operator and recovery operator counts from the DB,
-    /// then transitions to Rekeying state awaiting contributions from all of them.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn start_rekey(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        self.ensure_idle()?;
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        let ordinary_count: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        let recovery_count: i64 = schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        self.state = CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
-            ordinary_count: ordinary_count as usize,
-            recovery_count: recovery_count as usize,
-            passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-            recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-        };
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Contribute an ordinary operator passphrase for the re-key.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors have submitted and the re-key is complete.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_rekey(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
-            ordinary_count,
-            recovery_count,
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotRekeying);
-        };
-
-        if passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase.read().to_vec());
-
-        if passphrases.len() < *ordinary_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        self.do_finalize_rekey().await
-    }
-
-    /// Contribute a recovery operator passphrase for the re-key.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors have submitted and the re-key is complete.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_recovery_rekey(
-        &mut self,
-        recovery_operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
-            ordinary_count,
-            recovery_count,
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotRekeying);
-        };
-
-        if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase.read().to_vec());
-
-        if passphrases.len() < *ordinary_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        self.do_finalize_rekey().await
-    }
-}
-
-impl Message<ProposalApproved> for VaultCoordinator {
-    type Reply = ();
-
-    /// Every subscriber sees every approval and acts only on the kinds it owns.
-    async fn handle(
-        &mut self,
-        msg: ProposalApproved,
-        _ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
-    ) -> Self::Reply {
-        let result = match msg.kind {
-            ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(settings) => self.replace_operator(&settings).await,
-            ProposalKind::TriggerRekey => self.start_rekey().await,
-            _ => return,
-        };
-
-        if let Err(error) = result {
-            error!(
-                ?error,
-                proposal_id = msg.id.to_raw(),
-                "Failed to execute an approved proposal"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl VaultCoordinator {
-    /// The coordinator runs one ceremony at a time; anything that starts a new one has to say
-    /// so before it changes any state the ceremony depends on.
-    const fn ensure_idle(&self) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
-            Ok(())
-        } else {
-            Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping)
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Replaces the operator's public key in place, keeping their id and history, drops the
-    /// share that key no longer matches, then begins a coordinated re-key (§3.3).
-    async fn replace_operator(
-        &mut self,
-        settings: &replace_operator::Settings,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        // Checked before anything is written. The re-key is what gives the replaced operator
-        // a share they can use; if the coordinator is mid-ceremony, `start_rekey` refuses, and
-        // swapping the key and destroying the share first would leave that operator locked
-        // out with no re-key running and nothing to undo it -- the caller only logs the error.
-        self.ensure_idle()?;
-
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
-        diesel::update(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .filter(schema::operator_identity::id.eq(settings.old_operator_id))
-            .set(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(&settings.new_pubkey))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        // Drop the stale Shamir share; finalize_rekey stores a fresh one.
-        diesel::delete(schema::operator::table)
-            .filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(settings.old_operator_id)))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        drop(conn);
-
-        self.start_rekey().await
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::{CoordinatorState, Error, VaultCoordinator};
-    use crate::{
-        actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Vault},
-        db::{self, models::OperatorIdentityId, proposal::replace_operator, schema},
-    };
-
-    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, dsl::insert_into};
-    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-    use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
-    use std::collections::HashMap;
-
-    /// An approved `ReplaceOperator` that arrives while another ceremony is running must
-    /// change nothing. Swapping the public key and deleting the share are only safe because a
-    /// re-key follows and hands the operator a share for the new key; when `start_rekey`
-    /// refuses, the operator would otherwise be left holding a key with no share, and the
-    /// caller does nothing with the error but log it.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn a_refused_rekey_leaves_the_operator_untouched() {
-        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let old_key = rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec();
-        let operator_id: OperatorIdentityId = insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(&old_key))
-            .returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::operator::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id)),
-                schema::operator::share.eq(vec![1u8; 32]),
-                schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(vec![2u8; 24]),
-                schema::operator::share_salt.eq(vec![3u8; 32]),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        drop(conn);
-
-        let vault = Vault::spawn(
-            Vault::new(pool.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
-                .await
-                .unwrap(),
-        );
-        let mut coordinator = VaultCoordinator::new(pool.clone(), vault);
-        coordinator.state = CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
-            ordinary_count: 2,
-            recovery_count: 0,
-            passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-            recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-        };
-
-        let result = coordinator
-            .replace_operator(&replace_operator::Settings {
-                old_operator_id: operator_id,
-                new_pubkey: vec![9u8; 32],
-            })
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            matches!(result, Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping)),
-            "a busy coordinator must refuse the replacement, got {result:?}"
-        );
-
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-        let stored_key: Vec<u8> = schema::operator_identity::table
-            .find(operator_id)
-            .select(schema::operator_identity::public_key)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            stored_key, old_key,
-            "the public key must not be swapped when no re-key can follow"
-        );
-
-        let shares: i64 = schema::operator::table
-            .filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id)))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(shares, 1, "the operator's share must not be destroyed");
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/encryption/v1.rs

@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
         static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
-        let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
-        let mut password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
         let salt = generate_salt();
 
-        let mut key1 = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
-        let mut key2 = derive_key(&mut password2, &salt);
+        let mut key1 = derive_key(password, &salt);
+        let mut key2 = derive_key(password2, &salt);
 
         let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
         let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
@@ -77,10 +77,10 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn successful_derive() {
         static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
-        let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
         let salt = generate_salt();
 
-        let mut key = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
+        let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
         let key_reader = key.0.read();
 
         assert_ne!(key_reader.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/governance.rs

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-//! Canonical encoding and verification of governance vote signatures (§3.3).
-
-use crate::db::models::ProposalId;
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, SigningContext};
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum VerifyError {
-    #[error("Malformed operator public key")]
-    PublicKey,
-    #[error("Malformed vote signature")]
-    Signature,
-    #[error("Signature does not match this vote")]
-    Mismatch,
-}
-
-/// Canonical bytes an operator signs when voting: `proposal_id` as i64 big-endian,
-/// followed by the approve flag as one byte.
-///
-/// The flag is part of the message on purpose: without it an approval could be
-/// replayed as a rejection of the same proposal.
-#[must_use]
-pub fn vote_message(proposal_id: ProposalId, approve: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut message = Vec::with_capacity(9);
-    message.extend_from_slice(&i64::from(proposal_id.to_raw()).to_be_bytes());
-    message.push(u8::from(approve));
-    message
-}
-
-/// Verifies a vote signature against an operator's stored public key.
-pub fn verify_vote(
-    public_key: &[u8],
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    approve: bool,
-    signature: &[u8],
-) -> Result<(), VerifyError> {
-    let public_key = authn::PublicKey::try_from(public_key).map_err(|()| VerifyError::PublicKey)?;
-    let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(signature).map_err(|()| VerifyError::Signature)?;
-
-    if public_key.verify_message(
-        &vote_message(proposal_id, approve),
-        SigningContext::GovernanceVote,
-        &signature,
-    ) {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(VerifyError::Mismatch)
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::{VerifyError, verify_vote, vote_message};
-    use crate::db::models::ProposalId;
-    use arbiter_crypto::authn::{SigningContext, SigningKey};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn vote_message_is_the_id_then_the_approve_flag() {
-        let message = vote_message(ProposalId::from_raw(0x0102), true);
-        assert_eq!(message, vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 1]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_vote_accepts_a_matching_signature() {
-        let key = SigningKey::generate();
-        let id = ProposalId::from_raw(42);
-        let signature = key
-            .sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        verify_vote(
-            &key.public_key().to_bytes(),
-            id,
-            true,
-            &signature.to_bytes(),
-        )
-        .expect("a signature over this exact vote must verify");
-    }
-
-    /// The decisive one: an approval must not verify as a rejection of the same
-    /// proposal, or a captured vote could be replayed with its meaning flipped.
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_vote_rejects_a_flipped_approve_flag() {
-        let key = SigningKey::generate();
-        let id = ProposalId::from_raw(42);
-        let signature = key
-            .sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(matches!(
-            verify_vote(
-                &key.public_key().to_bytes(),
-                id,
-                false,
-                &signature.to_bytes()
-            ),
-            Err(VerifyError::Mismatch)
-        ));
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use crate::{
     actors::vault::{self, GetState, SignIntegrity, Vault, VerifyIntegrity},
     db::{
         self,
-        models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope, RootKeyHistoryId},
+        models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
         schema::integrity_envelope,
     },
 };
@@ -109,7 +109,11 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
     entity: &E,
     entity_id: impl IntoId,
 ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let (entity_id, mac_input) = envelope_input::<E>(entity, entity_id);
+    let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
+
+    let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
+
+    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
 
     let (key_version, mac) =
         vault
@@ -120,31 +124,6 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
                 _ => Error::VaultSend,
             })?;
 
-    store_envelope::<E>(conn, entity_id, key_version, mac)
-        .await
-        .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// The entity id and the bytes the root key covers, as a pair.
-///
-/// Split out of [`sign_entity`] so the `Vault` actor can build an envelope from inside a
-/// message handler, where asking itself for a signature would deadlock.
-pub fn envelope_input<E: Integrable>(entity: &E, entity_id: impl IntoId) -> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) {
-    let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
-    let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
-    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
-    (entity_id, mac_input)
-}
-
-/// Stores the integrity envelope for one entity, replacing any envelope it already has.
-pub async fn store_envelope<E: Integrable>(
-    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    entity_id: Vec<u8>,
-    key_version: RootKeyHistoryId,
-    mac: Vec<u8>,
-) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
     insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
         .values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
             entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
@@ -164,7 +143,8 @@ pub async fn store_envelope<E: Integrable>(
             integrity_envelope::mac.eq(mac),
         ))
         .execute(conn)
-        .await?;
+        .await
+        .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
 
     Ok(())
 }
@@ -212,7 +192,9 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
         Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
             entity_kind: E::KIND,
         }),
-        Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
+        Err(SendError::HandlerError(
+            vault::Error::Sealed | vault::Error::KeyVersionMismatch { .. },
+        )) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
         Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
     }
 }
@@ -235,6 +217,8 @@ mod tests {
         },
         db::{self, schema},
     };
+    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+
     use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
     #[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
     struct DummyEntity {
@@ -253,7 +237,7 @@ mod tests {
         );
         actor
             .ask(Bootstrap {
-                seal_key: crate::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
+                seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
             })
             .await
             .unwrap();
@@ -349,4 +333,47 @@ mod tests {
             .unwrap_err();
         assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn key_version_mismatch_returns_unavailable_not_mac_mismatch() {
+        use crate::db::schema::integrity_envelope;
+        use super::AttestationStatus;
+
+        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-rotation-test";
+
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+        let entity = DummyEntity {
+            payload_version: 1,
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+        };
+
+        sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Simulate key rotation: update the stored key_version to a stale value.
+        // After real rotation the vault's root_key_history_id would advance, but
+        // here we achieve the same mismatch by back-dating the envelope's key_version.
+        diesel::update(integrity_envelope::table)
+            .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
+            .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
+            .set(integrity_envelope::key_version.eq(0))
+            .execute(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Must NOT error — version mismatch is Unavailable, not tampered.
+        let status = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+            .await
+            .expect("key version mismatch must not be treated as an error");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            status,
+            AttestationStatus::Unavailable,
+            "stale key_version must yield Unavailable, not MacMismatch"
+        );
+    }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-use encryption::v1::Nonce;
+use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
 
 use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
 use chacha20poly1305::{
@@ -12,9 +12,7 @@ use rand::{
 };
 
 pub mod encryption;
-pub mod governance;
 pub mod integrity;
-pub mod shamir;
 
 pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
 impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
@@ -22,15 +20,6 @@ impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
         Self(value)
     }
 }
-impl From<[u8; 32]> for KeyCell {
-    fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
-        let cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|key: &mut Key| {
-            key.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
-        });
-        Self(cell)
-    }
-}
-
 impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
     type Error = ();
 
@@ -39,7 +28,7 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
         if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
             return Err(());
         }
-        let cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
+        let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
             cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
         });
         Ok(Self(cell))
@@ -48,7 +37,7 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
 
 impl KeyCell {
     pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
-        let key = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
+        let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
             let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng)
                 .expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
             rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
@@ -105,7 +94,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
 }
 
 /// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
-pub fn derive_key(password: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &[u8]) -> KeyCell {
+pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
     let params = {
         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
         {
@@ -143,10 +132,10 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn encrypt_decrypt() {
         static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
-        let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
         let salt = generate_salt();
 
-        let mut key = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
+        let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
         let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
         let associated_data = b"associated data";
         let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/shamir.rs

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-use vsss_rs::Gf256;
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum ShamirError {
-    #[error("Failed to split key: {0}")]
-    Split(String),
-    #[error("Failed to combine shares: {0}")]
-    Combine(String),
-}
-
-/// Split `key` into `total` shares where any `threshold` shares can reconstruct it.
-/// Each returned Vec<u8> is a share with format [`identifier_byte`, `value_bytes`...].
-pub fn split_key(
-    threshold: usize,
-    total: usize,
-    key: &[u8; 32],
-    rng: impl rand_core::RngCore + rand_core::CryptoRng,
-) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, ShamirError> {
-    Gf256::split_array(threshold, total, key.as_slice(), rng)
-        .map_err(|e| ShamirError::Split(format!("{e:?}")))
-}
-
-/// Returns the minimum number of shares required to reconstruct the secret
-/// for a committee of `n` operators, or `None` for an empty committee.
-#[must_use]
-pub const fn shamir_threshold(n: usize) -> Option<usize> {
-    match n {
-        0 => None,
-        1 => Some(1),
-        2 => Some(2),
-        n => Some(n / 2 + 1),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Reconstruct the secret from `threshold` or more shares.
-pub fn combine_shares(shares: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ShamirError> {
-    let bytes = Gf256::combine_array(shares)
-        .map_err(|e| ShamirError::Combine(format!("{e:?}")))?;
-    <[u8; 32]>::try_from(bytes.as_slice())
-        .map_err(|_| ShamirError::Combine("unexpected reconstructed key length".to_owned()))
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::shamir_threshold;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn empty_committee_has_no_threshold() {
-        assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(0), None);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn threshold_follows_the_ordinary_quorum() {
-        // ARCHITECTURE.md §3.1/§3.4: 1 decides alone, 2 need consensus, N needs N/2 + 1.
-        assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(1), Some(1));
-        assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(2), Some(2));
-        assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(3), Some(2));
-        assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(4), Some(3));
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/functions.rs

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-//! Typed bindings for the SQLite scalar functions used in Diesel expressions.
-
-use diesel::sql_types::Text;
-
-diesel::define_sql_function! {
-    /// SQLite `unixepoch(modifier)` -- seconds since the Unix epoch.
-    ///
-    /// Declared so timestamp comparisons are built by the query DSL instead of by
-    /// `format!`-ing a SQL fragment: the argument becomes a bind parameter and the
-    /// result type is checked against the column it is compared with.
-    fn unixepoch(modifier: Text) -> Integer;
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/mod.rs

@@ -8,10 +8,7 @@ use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
 use thiserror::Error;
 use tracing::info;
 
-pub mod functions;
 pub mod models;
-pub mod proposal;
-pub mod recovery;
 pub mod schema;
 
 pub type DatabaseConnection = SyncConnectionWrapper<SqliteConnection>;
@@ -59,39 +56,25 @@ fn database_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, DatabaseSetupError> {
     Ok(db_path)
 }
 
-/// The pragmas `SQLite` scopes to one connection. They are defined once and run on every
-/// connection that reaches the database -- the migration connection below and each pooled
-/// connection in `create_pool` -- because a value set on one connection is invisible to the
-/// next, and every real write happens on a pooled one.
-const CONNECTION_PRAGMAS: &str = "
-    -- sleep if the database is busy; this corresponds to up to 9 seconds sleeping time.
-    -- see https://fractaledmind.github.io/2023/09/07/enhancing-rails-sqlite-fine-tuning/
-    PRAGMA busy_timeout = 9000;
-    -- fsync only in critical moments
-    PRAGMA synchronous = NORMAL;
-    -- write WAL changes back every 1000 pages, for an in average 1MB WAL file.
-    -- May affect readers if number is increased
-    PRAGMA wal_autocheckpoint = 1000;
-    -- sqlite foreign keys are disabled by default, enable them for safety
-    PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
-    -- overwrite freed pages instead of leaving encrypted shares, nonces and salts
-    -- readable in the file
-    PRAGMA secure_delete = ON;
-";
-
 #[tracing::instrument(level = "info", skip(conn))]
 fn db_config(conn: &mut SqliteConnection) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
-    conn.batch_execute(CONNECTION_PRAGMAS)?;
-
-    // The rest belong to the database file rather than the connection, so the one-shot
-    // migration connection is the right and only place for them.
-
+    // fsync only in critical moments
+    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA synchronous = NORMAL;")?;
+    // write WAL changes back every 1000 pages, for an in average 1MB WAL file.
+    // May affect readers if number is increased
+    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_autocheckpoint = 1000;")?;
     // free some space by truncating possibly massive WAL files from the last run
     conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE);")?;
 
+    // sqlite foreign keys are disabled by default, enable them for safety
+    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;")?;
+
     // better space reclamation
     conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA auto_vacuum = FULL;")?;
 
+    // secure delete, overwrite deleted content with zeros to prevent recovery
+    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA secure_delete = ON;")?;
+
     Ok(())
 }
 
@@ -115,17 +98,12 @@ fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
 /// # Panics
 /// Panics if the database path is not valid UTF-8.
 pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
-    // Matched rather than `unwrap_or`, whose argument is evaluated even when `url` is `Some`:
-    // `database_path` resolves the real home directory and creates `~/.arbiter` as a side
-    // effect, so an eager call reaches the developer's home from every test that passes an
-    // explicit temp path, and fails outright wherever no home directory is writable.
-    let database_url = match url {
-        Some(url) => url.to_owned(),
-        None => database_path()?
+    let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
+        database_path()?
             .to_str()
             .expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
             .to_owned(),
-    };
+    );
 
     initialize_database(&database_url)?;
 
@@ -134,13 +112,13 @@ pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetu
         Box::pin(async move {
             let mut conn = DatabaseConnection::establish(url).await?;
 
-            // better write-concurrency; a property of the file, but harmless to reassert
-            conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;")
+            // see https://fractaledmind.github.io/2023/09/07/enhancing-rails-sqlite-fine-tuning/
+            // sleep if the database is busy, this corresponds to up to 9 seconds sleeping time.
+            conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout = 9000;")
                 .await
                 .map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?;
-            // The migration connection setting these is not enough: SQLite scopes them to
-            // one connection, and every real query runs on a pooled one.
-            conn.batch_execute(CONNECTION_PRAGMAS)
+            // better write-concurrency
+            conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;")
                 .await
                 .map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?;
 
@@ -176,83 +154,3 @@ pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
         .await
         .expect("Failed to create test database pool")
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use diesel::{
-        ExpressionMethods as _,
-        dsl::insert_into,
-        result::{DatabaseErrorKind, Error as DieselError},
-    };
-    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-
-    /// `operator.id` references `operator_identity(id)`. Without `PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON`
-    /// on the pooled connection, SQLite accepts a share row for an operator that does not exist.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn pooled_connections_enforce_foreign_keys() {
-        let pool = create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let result = insert_into(schema::operator::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::operator::id.eq(4242),
-                schema::operator::share.eq(vec![0u8; 32]),
-                schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(vec![0u8; 24]),
-                schema::operator::share_salt.eq(vec![0u8; 32]),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await;
-
-        // Specifically a foreign-key violation, not any error: a `NOT NULL` failure or a
-        // renamed column would also make `result.is_err()` true without proving the pragma
-        // is what rejected the insert.
-        assert!(
-            matches!(
-                result,
-                Err(DieselError::DatabaseError(
-                    DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation,
-                    _
-                ))
-            ),
-            "expected a foreign-key violation for a dangling operator_identity reference, got {result:?}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[derive(diesel::QueryableByName)]
-    struct PragmaValue {
-        #[diesel(sql_type = diesel::sql_types::Integer)]
-        value: i32,
-    }
-
-    async fn pragma(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, name: &str) -> i32 {
-        diesel::sql_query(format!("select {name} as value from pragma_{name}()"))
-            .get_result::<PragmaValue>(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-            .value
-    }
-
-    /// `foreign_keys` had to be repeated on the pooled connection because `SQLite` scopes it
-    /// there; its siblings in `CONNECTION_PRAGMAS` are scoped the same way and were being
-    /// left behind on the migration connection. `secure_delete` is the one that matters in a
-    /// key-custody database: off by default, it leaves freed pages holding encrypted shares,
-    /// nonces and salts readable in the file.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn pooled_connections_carry_the_shared_pragmas() {
-        let pool = create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            pragma(&mut conn, "secure_delete").await,
-            1,
-            "freed pages must be overwritten on the connection that does the writing"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            pragma(&mut conn, "synchronous").await,
-            1,
-            "synchronous must be NORMAL (1), not the default FULL (2)"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(pragma(&mut conn, "foreign_keys").await, 1);
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/models.rs

@@ -9,18 +9,16 @@ use crate::db::schema::{
     integrity_envelope, root_key_history, tls_history,
 };
 
-use crate::db::proposal::ProposalKindTag;
 use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
 use restructed::Models;
 
 pub mod types {
     use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
     use diesel::{
-        backend::Backend,
         deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow},
         expression::AsExpression,
         serialize::{IsNull, ToSql},
-        sql_types::{Integer, Text},
+        sql_types::Integer,
         sqlite::{Sqlite, SqliteType},
     };
 
@@ -63,7 +61,7 @@ pub mod types {
 
     impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
         fn from_sql(
-            mut bytes: <Sqlite as Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
+            mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
         ) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
             let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
                 return Err(format!(
@@ -81,41 +79,10 @@ pub mod types {
         }
     }
 
-    macro_rules! declare_id {
-        ($name:ident) => {
-            #[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone, Hash, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-            #[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
-            #[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
-            pub struct $name(i32);
-
-            impl $name {
-                pub const fn to_raw(self) -> i32 {
-                    self.0
-                }
-                pub const fn from_raw(raw: i32) -> Self {
-                    Self(raw)
-                }
-            }
-
-            impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for $name {
-                fn from_sql(
-                    bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
-                ) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
-                    FromSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::from_sql(bytes).map(Self)
-                }
-            }
-            impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for $name {
-                fn to_sql<'b>(
-                    &'b self,
-                    out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
-                ) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
-                    ToSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::to_sql(&self.0, out)
-                }
-            }
-        };
-    }
-
-    declare_id!(ChainId);
+    #[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone)]
+    #[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
+    #[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
+    pub struct ChainId(pub i32);
 
     #[expect(
         clippy::cast_sign_loss,
@@ -136,47 +103,19 @@ pub mod types {
         }
     };
 
-    declare_id!(OperatorId);
-    declare_id!(OperatorIdentityId);
-    declare_id!(AeadEncryptedId);
-    declare_id!(RootKeyHistoryId);
-    declare_id!(TlsHistoryId);
-    declare_id!(EvmWalletId);
-    declare_id!(ClientId);
-    declare_id!(ProposalId);
-    declare_id!(RecoveryOperatorIdentityId);
-
-    #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, AsExpression, FromSqlRow)]
-    #[diesel(sql_type = Text)]
-    pub enum ProposalStatus {
-        Pending,
-        Approved,
-        Rejected,
+    impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for ChainId {
+        fn from_sql(
+            bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
+        ) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
+            FromSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::from_sql(bytes).map(Self)
+        }
     }
-
-    impl ToSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalStatus {
+    impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for ChainId {
         fn to_sql<'b>(
             &'b self,
             out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
         ) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
-            let s: &str = match self {
-                Self::Pending => "pending",
-                Self::Approved => "approved",
-                Self::Rejected => "rejected",
-            };
-            <str as ToSql<Text, Sqlite>>::to_sql(s, out)
-        }
-    }
-
-    impl FromSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalStatus {
-        fn from_sql(bytes: <Sqlite as Backend>::RawValue<'_>) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
-            let s = <String as FromSql<Text, Sqlite>>::from_sql(bytes)?;
-            match s.as_str() {
-                "pending" => Ok(Self::Pending),
-                "approved" => Ok(Self::Approved),
-                "rejected" => Ok(Self::Rejected),
-                other => Err(format!("Unknown proposal status: {other}").into()),
-            }
+            ToSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::to_sql(&self.0, out)
         }
     }
 }
@@ -191,12 +130,12 @@ pub use types::*;
 )]
 #[diesel(table_name = aead_encrypted, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
 pub struct AeadEncrypted {
-    pub id: AeadEncryptedId,
+    pub id: i32,
     pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
     pub tag: Vec<u8>,
     pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>,
     pub schema_version: i32,
-    pub associated_root_key_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
+    pub associated_root_key_id: i32, // references root_key_history.id
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
 }
 
@@ -209,7 +148,7 @@ pub struct AeadEncrypted {
     attributes_with = "deriveless"
 )]
 pub struct RootKeyHistory {
-    pub id: RootKeyHistoryId,
+    pub id: i32,
     pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
     pub tag: Vec<u8>,
     pub root_key_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
@@ -227,7 +166,7 @@ pub struct RootKeyHistory {
     attributes_with = "deriveless"
 )]
 pub struct TlsHistory {
-    pub id: TlsHistoryId,
+    pub id: i32,
     pub cert: String,
     pub cert_key: String, // PEM Encoded private key
     pub ca_cert: String,  // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing
@@ -252,7 +191,7 @@ pub struct ArbiterSettings {
     attributes_with = "deriveless"
 )]
 pub struct EvmWallet {
-    pub id: EvmWalletId,
+    pub id: i32,
     pub address: Vec<u8>,
     pub aead_encrypted_id: i32,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
@@ -263,22 +202,19 @@ pub struct EvmWallet {
 #[view(
     NewEvmWalletAccess,
     derive(Insertable),
-    omit(id, created_at, revoked_at),
+    omit(id, created_at),
     attributes_with = "deriveless"
 )]
 #[view(
     CoreEvmWalletAccess,
     derive(Insertable),
-    omit(created_at, revoked_at),
+    omit(created_at),
     attributes_with = "deriveless"
 )]
 pub struct EvmWalletAccess {
     pub id: i32,
-    pub wallet_id: EvmWalletId,
+    pub wallet_id: i32,
     pub client_id: i32,
-    // Grants, transaction logs, and persistent-grant proposals reference this row
-    // `on delete restrict`, so revocation cannot delete it -- it marks it revoked instead.
-    pub revoked_at: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
 }
 
@@ -304,7 +240,7 @@ pub struct ProgramClientMetadataHistory {
 #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
 #[diesel(table_name = schema::program_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
 pub struct ProgramClient {
-    pub id: ClientId,
+    pub id: i32,
     pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
     pub metadata_id: i32,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
@@ -314,23 +250,12 @@ pub struct ProgramClient {
 #[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
 #[diesel(table_name = schema::operator_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
 pub struct OperatorClient {
-    pub id: OperatorIdentityId,
+    pub id: i32,
     pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
     pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
 }
 
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::operator, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct Operator {
-    pub id: OperatorId,
-    pub share: Vec<u8>,
-    pub share_nonce: Vec<u8>,
-    pub share_salt: Vec<u8>,
-    pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-}
-
 #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
 #[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
 #[view(
@@ -474,63 +399,8 @@ pub struct IntegrityEnvelope {
     pub entity_kind: String,
     pub entity_id: Vec<u8>,
     pub payload_version: i32,
-    pub key_version: RootKeyHistoryId,
+    pub key_version: i32,
     pub mac: Vec<u8>,
     pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
 }
-
-#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Identifiable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct Proposal {
-    pub id: ProposalId,
-    pub kind: ProposalKindTag,
-    pub initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    pub status: ProposalStatus,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct NewProposal {
-    pub kind: ProposalKindTag,
-    pub initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    // status defaults to 'pending' at the DB layer
-    pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Identifiable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct ProposalVote {
-    pub id: i32,
-    pub proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    pub operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    pub approve: bool,
-    pub signature: Vec<u8>,
-    pub voted_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct NewProposalVote {
-    pub proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    pub operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    pub approve: bool,
-    pub signature: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::recovery_proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct NewRecoveryProposalVote {
-    pub proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    pub recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-    pub approve: bool,
-    pub signature: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::recovery_wakeup_request, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct NewRecoveryWakeupRequest {
-    pub requested_by: OperatorIdentityId,
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/approve_sdk_client.rs

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-//! Approving an SDK client so it may authenticate against the vault.
-
-use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag};
-use crate::db::{
-    DatabaseConnection, models::ProposalId, schema::proposal_approve_sdk_client as table,
-};
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, Insertable, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, Queryable, Selectable,
-    SelectableHelper as _, sqlite::Sqlite,
-};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = table, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct Settings {
-    pub client_id: i32,
-}
-
-pub struct ApproveSdkClient;
-
-impl Proposal for ApproveSdkClient {
-    const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient;
-
-    type Settings = Settings;
-
-    async fn insert(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        settings: &Self::Settings,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<()> {
-        diesel::insert_into(table::table)
-            .values((table::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id), settings))
-            .execute(conn)
-            .await
-            .map(drop)
-    }
-
-    async fn load(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
-        table::table
-            .find(proposal_id)
-            .select(Settings::as_select())
-            .first(conn)
-            .await
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/grant_wallet_access.rs

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-//! Granting an SDK client visibility of a wallet.
-
-use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag};
-use crate::db::{
-    DatabaseConnection, models::ProposalId, schema::proposal_grant_wallet_access as table,
-};
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, Insertable, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, Queryable, Selectable,
-    SelectableHelper as _, sqlite::Sqlite,
-};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = table, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct Settings {
-    pub wallet_id: i32,
-    pub client_id: i32,
-}
-
-pub struct GrantWalletAccess;
-
-impl Proposal for GrantWalletAccess {
-    const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::GrantWalletAccess;
-
-    type Settings = Settings;
-
-    async fn insert(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        settings: &Self::Settings,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<()> {
-        diesel::insert_into(table::table)
-            .values((table::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id), settings))
-            .execute(conn)
-            .await
-            .map(drop)
-    }
-
-    async fn load(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
-        table::table
-            .find(proposal_id)
-            .select(Settings::as_select())
-            .first(conn)
-            .await
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/mod.rs

@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
-//! Governed actions and the parameters they carry.
-//!
-//! Laid out the way [`crate::evm::policies::Policy`] is: a unit type per kind, its
-//! parameters as an associated `Settings`, and the persistence for those parameters
-//! implemented next to them. Everything downstream is generic over [`Proposal`], so a
-//! new kind is a new module plus one arm in each dispatcher -- nothing else in the
-//! codebase has to learn about it.
-
-use crate::db::{DatabaseConnection, models::ProposalId};
-use diesel::{
-    QueryResult,
-    backend::Backend,
-    deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow},
-    expression::AsExpression,
-    serialize::ToSql,
-    sql_types::Text,
-    sqlite::Sqlite,
-};
-use strum::{Display, EnumDiscriminants, EnumString, IntoStaticStr};
-
-pub mod approve_sdk_client;
-pub mod grant_wallet_access;
-pub mod one_off_transaction;
-pub mod persistent_grant;
-pub mod replace_operator;
-pub mod trigger_rekey;
-
-pub use approve_sdk_client::ApproveSdkClient;
-pub use grant_wallet_access::GrantWalletAccess;
-pub use one_off_transaction::OneOffTransaction;
-pub use persistent_grant::PersistentGrant;
-pub use replace_operator::ReplaceOperator;
-pub use trigger_rekey::TriggerRekey;
-
-/// A governed action that owns the child table holding its parameters.
-pub trait Proposal: Sized {
-    /// The value stored in `proposal.kind` for this action.
-    const KIND: ProposalKindTag;
-
-    /// Parameters the action is voted on with.
-    type Settings: Send + Sync + 'static;
-
-    /// Writes the child row carrying `settings`.
-    fn insert(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        settings: &Self::Settings,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<()>> + Send;
-
-    /// Reads the child row back. A missing row surfaces as [`diesel::result::Error::NotFound`],
-    /// which is what a proposal without its parameters is.
-    fn load(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Self::Settings>> + Send;
-}
-
-/// Parameters of a proposal, in the one shape that can cross the actor boundary.
-///
-/// Every variant holds the `Settings` of the matching [`Proposal`] implementation, so
-/// the two cannot drift.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, EnumDiscriminants)]
-#[strum_discriminants(
-    name(ProposalKindTag),
-    vis(pub),
-    derive(Display, EnumString, IntoStaticStr, AsExpression, FromSqlRow),
-    diesel(sql_type = Text),
-    strum(serialize_all = "snake_case")
-)]
-pub enum ProposalKind {
-    ApproveSdkClient(approve_sdk_client::Settings),
-    GrantWalletAccess(grant_wallet_access::Settings),
-    ReplaceOperator(replace_operator::Settings),
-    TriggerRekey,
-    ApprovePersistentGrant(Box<persistent_grant::Settings>),
-    ApproveOneOffTransaction(Box<one_off_transaction::Settings>),
-}
-
-impl ProposalKindTag {
-    /// Key-rotation proposals require every operator to approve (§3.3).
-    #[must_use]
-    pub const fn requires_full_quorum(self) -> bool {
-        matches!(self, Self::ReplaceOperator | Self::TriggerRekey)
-    }
-
-    /// §3.5: recovery operators weigh in on operator replacement and nothing else.
-    #[must_use]
-    pub const fn recovery_may_vote(self) -> bool {
-        matches!(self, Self::ReplaceOperator)
-    }
-}
-
-/// Pins every implementation to the variant it is dispatched from. Without this a
-/// mistyped `KIND` would compile and only show up as a proposal stored under the
-/// wrong `proposal.kind`.
-const _: () = {
-    assert!(
-        matches!(ApproveSdkClient::KIND, ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient),
-        "ApproveSdkClient::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient"
-    );
-    assert!(
-        matches!(GrantWalletAccess::KIND, ProposalKindTag::GrantWalletAccess),
-        "GrantWalletAccess::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::GrantWalletAccess"
-    );
-    assert!(
-        matches!(ReplaceOperator::KIND, ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator),
-        "ReplaceOperator::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator"
-    );
-    assert!(
-        matches!(TriggerRekey::KIND, ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey),
-        "TriggerRekey::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey"
-    );
-    assert!(
-        matches!(
-            PersistentGrant::KIND,
-            ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant
-        ),
-        "PersistentGrant::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant"
-    );
-    assert!(
-        matches!(
-            OneOffTransaction::KIND,
-            ProposalKindTag::ApproveOneOffTransaction
-        ),
-        "OneOffTransaction::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::ApproveOneOffTransaction"
-    );
-};
-
-/// Writes the child row carrying this proposal's parameters.
-///
-/// The only place the create path has to know every kind; each arm hands straight off
-/// to the implementation that owns the table.
-pub async fn insert_kind(
-    conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    kind: &ProposalKind,
-) -> QueryResult<()> {
-    match kind {
-        ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(s) => ApproveSdkClient::insert(proposal_id, s, conn).await,
-        ProposalKind::GrantWalletAccess(s) => GrantWalletAccess::insert(proposal_id, s, conn).await,
-        ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(s) => ReplaceOperator::insert(proposal_id, s, conn).await,
-        ProposalKind::TriggerRekey => TriggerRekey::insert(proposal_id, &(), conn).await,
-        ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(s) => {
-            PersistentGrant::insert(proposal_id, s, conn).await
-        }
-        ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(s) => {
-            OneOffTransaction::insert(proposal_id, s, conn).await
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Reads the parameters back for a `proposal.kind` that is only known at runtime.
-pub async fn load_kind(
-    conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    tag: ProposalKindTag,
-) -> QueryResult<ProposalKind> {
-    Ok(match tag {
-        ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient => {
-            ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(ApproveSdkClient::load(proposal_id, conn).await?)
-        }
-        ProposalKindTag::GrantWalletAccess => {
-            ProposalKind::GrantWalletAccess(GrantWalletAccess::load(proposal_id, conn).await?)
-        }
-        ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator => {
-            ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(ReplaceOperator::load(proposal_id, conn).await?)
-        }
-        ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey => {
-            TriggerRekey::load(proposal_id, conn).await?;
-            ProposalKind::TriggerRekey
-        }
-        ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant => ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(Box::new(
-            PersistentGrant::load(proposal_id, conn).await?,
-        )),
-        ProposalKindTag::ApproveOneOffTransaction => ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(
-            Box::new(OneOffTransaction::load(proposal_id, conn).await?),
-        ),
-    })
-}
-
-impl ToSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalKindTag {
-    fn to_sql<'b>(
-        &'b self,
-        out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
-    ) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
-        <str as ToSql<Text, Sqlite>>::to_sql(<&'static str>::from(*self), out)
-    }
-}
-
-impl FromSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalKindTag {
-    fn from_sql(bytes: <Sqlite as Backend>::RawValue<'_>) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
-        let s = <String as FromSql<Text, Sqlite>>::from_sql(bytes)?;
-        s.parse()
-            .map_err(|_| format!("Unknown proposal kind: {s}").into())
-    }
-}
-
-/// SQLite has no unsigned integers; the column is `BigInt`, so a value that does not
-/// round-trip is a corrupt row rather than something to silently wrap.
-pub(crate) fn as_i64(value: u64) -> QueryResult<i64> {
-    i64::try_from(value).map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::SerializationError(Box::new(Overflow)))
-}
-
-pub(crate) fn as_u64(value: i64) -> QueryResult<u64> {
-    u64::try_from(value)
-        .map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(Overflow)))
-}
-
-pub(crate) fn fixed_bytes<const N: usize>(
-    bytes: &[u8],
-    column: &'static str,
-) -> QueryResult<[u8; N]> {
-    <[u8; N]>::try_from(bytes)
-        .map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(WrongLength(column))))
-}
-
-/// Reads a fixed-width column into an array, labelling failures with the column it came
-/// from.
-///
-/// The label is taken from the field itself, so renaming a column cannot leave a stale
-/// name behind in the error -- which is the whole reason this is a macro and not a
-/// second argument.
-///
-/// - `fixed!(row.column)` for a `Vec<u8>` field
-/// - `fixed!(opt row.column)` for a `Option<Vec<u8>>` one
-/// - `fixed!(binding)` for a local
-macro_rules! fixed {
-    (opt $src:ident.$field:ident) => {
-        $src.$field
-            .as_deref()
-            .map(|value| $crate::db::proposal::fixed_bytes(value, stringify!($field)))
-            .transpose()
-    };
-    ($src:ident.$field:ident) => {
-        $crate::db::proposal::fixed_bytes(&$src.$field, stringify!($field))
-    };
-    ($binding:ident) => {
-        $crate::db::proposal::fixed_bytes(&$binding, stringify!($binding))
-    };
-}
-pub(crate) use fixed;
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-#[error("value does not fit a SQLite integer")]
-struct Overflow;
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-#[error("column {0} has the wrong byte length")]
-struct WrongLength(&'static str);

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/one_off_transaction.rs

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-//! Signing a single EIP-1559 transaction.
-
-use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag, as_i64, as_u64, fixed};
-use crate::db::{
-    DatabaseConnection,
-    models::ProposalId,
-    schema::{proposal_one_off_transaction, proposal_one_off_transaction_result},
-};
-use diesel::{
-    Insertable, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, Queryable, Selectable, SelectableHelper as _,
-    sqlite::Sqlite,
-};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct Settings {
-    pub client_id: i32,
-    pub wallet_address: [u8; 20],
-    pub chain_id: u64,
-    pub nonce: u64,
-    pub gas_limit: u64,
-    pub max_fee_per_gas: u128,
-    pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128,
-    pub to: [u8; 20],
-    pub value: [u8; 32],
-    pub input: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = proposal_one_off_transaction, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-struct Row {
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    client_id: i32,
-    wallet_address: Vec<u8>,
-    chain_id: i64,
-    nonce: i64,
-    gas_limit: i64,
-    max_fee_per_gas: Vec<u8>,
-    max_priority_fee_per_gas: Vec<u8>,
-    to_address: Vec<u8>,
-    value: Vec<u8>,
-    input: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-impl Row {
-    fn new(proposal_id: ProposalId, settings: &Settings) -> QueryResult<Self> {
-        Ok(Self {
-            proposal_id,
-            client_id: settings.client_id,
-            wallet_address: settings.wallet_address.to_vec(),
-            chain_id: as_i64(settings.chain_id)?,
-            nonce: as_i64(settings.nonce)?,
-            gas_limit: as_i64(settings.gas_limit)?,
-            max_fee_per_gas: settings.max_fee_per_gas.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: settings.max_priority_fee_per_gas.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
-            to_address: settings.to.to_vec(),
-            value: settings.value.to_vec(),
-            input: settings.input.clone(),
-        })
-    }
-
-    fn into_settings(self) -> QueryResult<Settings> {
-        Ok(Settings {
-            client_id: self.client_id,
-            wallet_address: fixed!(self.wallet_address)?,
-            chain_id: as_u64(self.chain_id)?,
-            nonce: as_u64(self.nonce)?,
-            gas_limit: as_u64(self.gas_limit)?,
-            max_fee_per_gas: u128::from_be_bytes(fixed!(self.max_fee_per_gas)?),
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128::from_be_bytes(fixed!(self.max_priority_fee_per_gas)?),
-            to: fixed!(self.to_address)?,
-            value: fixed!(self.value)?,
-            input: self.input,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-pub struct OneOffTransaction;
-
-impl Proposal for OneOffTransaction {
-    const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::ApproveOneOffTransaction;
-
-    type Settings = Settings;
-
-    async fn insert(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        settings: &Self::Settings,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<()> {
-        diesel::insert_into(proposal_one_off_transaction::table)
-            .values(&Row::new(proposal_id, settings)?)
-            .execute(conn)
-            .await
-            .map(drop)
-    }
-
-    async fn load(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
-        let row: Row = proposal_one_off_transaction::table
-            .find(proposal_id)
-            .select(Row::as_select())
-            .first(conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        row.into_settings()
-    }
-}
-
-/// The signature the vault produced for an approved transaction.
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = proposal_one_off_transaction_result, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-struct SignatureRow {
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    r: Vec<u8>,
-    s: Vec<u8>,
-    y_parity: i32,
-}
-
-/// Records the signature produced for an approved transaction, by component, so what
-/// came back is as readable as what was signed.
-pub async fn store_signature(
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    signature: &alloy::signers::Signature,
-    conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-) -> QueryResult<()> {
-    diesel::insert_into(proposal_one_off_transaction_result::table)
-        .values(&SignatureRow {
-            proposal_id,
-            r: signature.r().to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec(),
-            s: signature.s().to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec(),
-            y_parity: i32::from(signature.v()),
-        })
-        .execute(conn)
-        .await
-        .map(drop)
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/persistent_grant.rs

@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
-//! Creating a standing EVM grant.
-use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag, as_i64, as_u64, fixed};
-use crate::db::{
-    DatabaseConnection,
-    models::ProposalId,
-    schema::{
-        proposal_persistent_grant, proposal_persistent_grant_ether,
-        proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target, proposal_persistent_grant_token,
-        proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit,
-    },
-};
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, Insertable, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult,
-    Queryable, Selectable, SelectableHelper as _, sqlite::Sqlite,
-};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct Settings {
-    pub wallet_access_id: i32,
-    pub chain_id: u64,
-    pub valid_from_secs: Option<i64>,
-    pub valid_until_secs: Option<i64>,
-    pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<[u8; 32]>,
-    pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<[u8; 32]>,
-    pub rate_limit: Option<RateLimit>,
-    pub specific: Specific,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct RateLimit {
-    pub count: u32,
-    pub window_secs: i64,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct VolumeLimit {
-    pub max_volume: [u8; 32],
-    pub window_secs: i64,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum Specific {
-    EtherTransfer {
-        targets: Vec<[u8; 20]>,
-        limit: VolumeLimit,
-    },
-    TokenTransfer {
-        token_contract: [u8; 20],
-        receiver: Option<[u8; 20]>,
-        volume_limits: Vec<VolumeLimit>,
-    },
-}
-
-/// Shared settings, mirroring `evm_basic_grant`.
-#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = proposal_persistent_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-struct BaseRow {
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    wallet_access_id: i32,
-    chain_id: i64,
-    valid_from: Option<i64>,
-    valid_until: Option<i64>,
-    max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
-    max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
-    rate_limit_count: Option<i32>,
-    rate_limit_window_secs: Option<i64>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = proposal_persistent_grant_ether, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-struct EtherRow {
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    window_secs: i64,
-    max_volume: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-struct NewEtherTarget {
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    address: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = proposal_persistent_grant_token, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-struct TokenRow {
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    token_contract: Vec<u8>,
-    receiver: Option<Vec<u8>>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-struct NewTokenLimit {
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    window_secs: i64,
-    max_volume: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-impl BaseRow {
-    fn new(proposal_id: ProposalId, settings: &Settings) -> QueryResult<Self> {
-        Ok(Self {
-            proposal_id,
-            wallet_access_id: settings.wallet_access_id,
-            chain_id: as_i64(settings.chain_id)?,
-            valid_from: settings.valid_from_secs,
-            valid_until: settings.valid_until_secs,
-            max_gas_fee_per_gas: settings.max_gas_fee_per_gas.map(|v| v.to_vec()),
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: settings.max_priority_fee_per_gas.map(|v| v.to_vec()),
-            // SQLite stores integers signed; a rate-limit count is a `u32`, so it
-            // round-trips through the bit pattern rather than a fallible range check.
-            rate_limit_count: settings.rate_limit.map(|r| r.count.cast_signed()),
-            rate_limit_window_secs: settings.rate_limit.map(|r| r.window_secs),
-        })
-    }
-
-    fn into_settings(self, specific: Specific) -> QueryResult<Settings> {
-        Ok(Settings {
-            wallet_access_id: self.wallet_access_id,
-            chain_id: as_u64(self.chain_id)?,
-            valid_from_secs: self.valid_from,
-            valid_until_secs: self.valid_until,
-            max_gas_fee_per_gas: fixed!(opt self.max_gas_fee_per_gas)?,
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: fixed!(opt self.max_priority_fee_per_gas)?,
-            rate_limit: self.rate_limit_count.zip(self.rate_limit_window_secs).map(
-                |(count, window_secs)| RateLimit {
-                    count: count.cast_unsigned(),
-                    window_secs,
-                },
-            ),
-            specific,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-pub struct PersistentGrant;
-
-impl Proposal for PersistentGrant {
-    const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant;
-
-    type Settings = Settings;
-
-    async fn insert(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        settings: &Self::Settings,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<()> {
-        diesel::insert_into(proposal_persistent_grant::table)
-            .values(&BaseRow::new(proposal_id, settings)?)
-            .execute(conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        match &settings.specific {
-            Specific::EtherTransfer { targets, limit } => {
-                diesel::insert_into(proposal_persistent_grant_ether::table)
-                    .values(&EtherRow {
-                        proposal_id,
-                        window_secs: limit.window_secs,
-                        max_volume: limit.max_volume.to_vec(),
-                    })
-                    .execute(conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-                // Row at a time: SQLite has no multi-row VALUES clause in diesel-async.
-                for address in targets {
-                    diesel::insert_into(proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target::table)
-                        .values(&NewEtherTarget {
-                            proposal_id,
-                            address: address.to_vec(),
-                        })
-                        .execute(conn)
-                        .await?;
-                }
-            }
-            Specific::TokenTransfer {
-                token_contract,
-                receiver,
-                volume_limits,
-            } => {
-                diesel::insert_into(proposal_persistent_grant_token::table)
-                    .values(&TokenRow {
-                        proposal_id,
-                        token_contract: token_contract.to_vec(),
-                        receiver: receiver.map(|r| r.to_vec()),
-                    })
-                    .execute(conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-                for limit in volume_limits {
-                    diesel::insert_into(proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit::table)
-                        .values(&NewTokenLimit {
-                            proposal_id,
-                            window_secs: limit.window_secs,
-                            max_volume: limit.max_volume.to_vec(),
-                        })
-                        .execute(conn)
-                        .await?;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn load(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
-        let base: BaseRow = proposal_persistent_grant::table
-            .find(proposal_id)
-            .select(BaseRow::as_select())
-            .first(conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let ether: Option<EtherRow> = proposal_persistent_grant_ether::table
-            .find(proposal_id)
-            .select(EtherRow::as_select())
-            .first(conn)
-            .await
-            .optional()?;
-
-        let specific = if let Some(ether) = ether {
-            let addresses: Vec<Vec<u8>> = proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target::table
-                .filter(proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id))
-                .select(proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target::address)
-                .load(conn)
-                .await?;
-            let targets = addresses
-                .iter()
-                .map(|address| fixed!(address))
-                .collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
-            Specific::EtherTransfer {
-                targets,
-                limit: VolumeLimit {
-                    max_volume: fixed!(ether.max_volume)?,
-                    window_secs: ether.window_secs,
-                },
-            }
-        } else {
-            let token: TokenRow = proposal_persistent_grant_token::table
-                .find(proposal_id)
-                .select(TokenRow::as_select())
-                .first(conn)
-                .await?;
-            let rows: Vec<(i64, Vec<u8>)> = proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit::table
-                .filter(proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id))
-                .select((
-                    proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit::window_secs,
-                    proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit::max_volume,
-                ))
-                .load(conn)
-                .await?;
-            let volume_limits = rows
-                .into_iter()
-                .map(|(window_secs, max_volume)| {
-                    Ok(VolumeLimit {
-                        max_volume: fixed!(max_volume)?,
-                        window_secs,
-                    })
-                })
-                .collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
-            Specific::TokenTransfer {
-                token_contract: fixed!(token.token_contract)?,
-                receiver: fixed!(opt token.receiver)?,
-                volume_limits,
-            }
-        };
-
-        base.into_settings(specific)
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/replace_operator.rs

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-//! Replacing an operator's key, which also triggers a Shamir re-key (§3.3).
-
-use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag};
-use crate::db::{
-    DatabaseConnection,
-    models::{OperatorIdentityId, ProposalId},
-    schema::proposal_replace_operator as table,
-};
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, Insertable, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, Queryable, Selectable,
-    SelectableHelper as _, sqlite::Sqlite,
-};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = table, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct Settings {
-    pub old_operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    pub new_pubkey: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-pub struct ReplaceOperator;
-
-impl Proposal for ReplaceOperator {
-    const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator;
-
-    type Settings = Settings;
-
-    async fn insert(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        settings: &Self::Settings,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<()> {
-        diesel::insert_into(table::table)
-            .values((table::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id), settings))
-            .execute(conn)
-            .await
-            .map(drop)
-    }
-
-    async fn load(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
-        table::table
-            .find(proposal_id)
-            .select(Settings::as_select())
-            .first(conn)
-            .await
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/trigger_rekey.rs

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-//! A Shamir re-key over the current operator set (§3.3).
-
-use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag};
-use crate::db::{DatabaseConnection, models::ProposalId};
-use diesel::QueryResult;
-
-pub struct TriggerRekey;
-
-impl Proposal for TriggerRekey {
-    const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey;
-
-    type Settings = ();
-
-    async fn insert(
-        _proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        _settings: &Self::Settings,
-        _conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<()> {
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn load(
-        _proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        _conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/recovery.rs

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-//! Whether the recovery committee is awake.
-//!
-//! §3.6: a wake-up request opens a dispute window; recovery powers only become active once
-//! that window has elapsed without cancellation. Both the proposal manager (for voting) and
-//! the vault coordinator (for unsealing) gate on this, so the rule lives in one place.
-
-use crate::db::{functions::unixepoch, schema};
-
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _,
-    dsl::{exists, select},
-};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-
-/// Recovery operators stay asleep for this long after a wake-up is requested, so the other
-/// operators have time to dispute it (§3.6).
-pub const WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS: i32 = 14 * 24 * 60 * 60;
-
-/// True when an uncancelled wake-up request is older than the dispute window.
-pub async fn is_active(
-    conn: &mut crate::db::DatabaseConnection,
-) -> Result<bool, diesel::result::Error> {
-    select(exists(
-        schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table
-            .filter(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.is_null())
-            .filter(
-                schema::recovery_wakeup_request::requested_at
-                    .le(unixepoch("now") - WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS),
-            ),
-    ))
-    .get_result(conn)
-    .await
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::{WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS, is_active};
-    use crate::db::{self, schema};
-
-    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, insert_into};
-    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-
-    /// `recovery_wakeup_request.requested_by` references `operator_identity(id)`, and pooled
-    /// connections enforce foreign keys, so every wake-up row needs a real identity behind it.
-    async fn insert_operator(pool: &db::DatabasePool) -> i32 {
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![7u8; 32]))
-            .returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    /// Pins `.filter(requested_at.le(...))`: a wake-up requested moments ago must not be
-    /// active yet, even though nothing has cancelled it. Deleting that filter turns this
-    /// assertion false without touching any other test in the suite.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn a_recent_wakeup_is_not_yet_active() {
-        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let operator_id = insert_operator(&pool).await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        diesel::sql_query(format!(
-            "INSERT INTO recovery_wakeup_request (requested_by, requested_at) \
-             VALUES ({operator_id}, unixepoch('now'))"
-        ))
-        .execute(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(
-            !is_active(&mut conn).await.unwrap(),
-            "a wake-up requested moments ago must still be asleep"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Pins `.filter(cancelled_at.is_null())`: a cancelled wake-up must not count towards
-    /// activity even once its original request has outlived the dispute window. Deleting
-    /// that filter turns this assertion false without touching any other test in the suite.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn a_cancelled_wakeup_is_not_active_even_past_the_window() {
-        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let operator_id = insert_operator(&pool).await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        diesel::sql_query(format!(
-            "INSERT INTO recovery_wakeup_request \
-             (requested_by, requested_at, cancelled_by, cancelled_at) \
-             VALUES ({operator_id}, unixepoch('now') - {WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS} - 1, \
-             {operator_id}, unixepoch('now'))"
-        ))
-        .execute(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(
-            !is_active(&mut conn).await.unwrap(),
-            "a cancelled wake-up must not activate recovery even past the window"
-        );
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/schema.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ diesel::table! {
         id -> Integer,
         root_key_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
         tls_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
-        shamir_threshold -> Nullable<Integer>,
     }
 }
 
@@ -136,7 +135,6 @@ diesel::table! {
         id -> Integer,
         wallet_id -> Integer,
         client_id -> Integer,
-        revoked_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
         created_at -> Integer,
     }
 }
@@ -154,185 +152,6 @@ diesel::table! {
     }
 }
 
-diesel::table! {
-    operator (id) {
-        id -> Nullable<Integer>,
-        share -> Binary,
-        share_nonce -> Binary,
-        share_salt -> Binary,
-        created_at -> Integer,
-        updated_at -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    operator_identity (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        public_key -> Binary,
-        created_at -> Integer,
-        updated_at -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        kind -> Text,
-        initiator_id -> Integer,
-        created_at -> Integer,
-        expires_at -> Integer,
-        status -> Text,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_approve_sdk_client (proposal_id) {
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        client_id -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_grant_wallet_access (proposal_id) {
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        wallet_id -> Integer,
-        client_id -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_replace_operator (proposal_id) {
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        old_operator_id -> Integer,
-        new_pubkey -> Binary,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_one_off_transaction (proposal_id) {
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        client_id -> Integer,
-        wallet_address -> Binary,
-        chain_id -> BigInt,
-        nonce -> BigInt,
-        gas_limit -> BigInt,
-        max_fee_per_gas -> Binary,
-        max_priority_fee_per_gas -> Binary,
-        to_address -> Binary,
-        value -> Binary,
-        input -> Binary,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id) {
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        wallet_access_id -> Integer,
-        chain_id -> BigInt,
-        valid_from -> Nullable<BigInt>,
-        valid_until -> Nullable<BigInt>,
-        max_gas_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
-        max_priority_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
-        rate_limit_count -> Nullable<Integer>,
-        rate_limit_window_secs -> Nullable<BigInt>,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_persistent_grant_ether (proposal_id) {
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        window_secs -> BigInt,
-        max_volume -> Binary,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        address -> Binary,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_persistent_grant_token (proposal_id) {
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        token_contract -> Binary,
-        receiver -> Nullable<Binary>,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        window_secs -> BigInt,
-        max_volume -> Binary,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_one_off_transaction_result (proposal_id) {
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        r -> Binary,
-        s -> Binary,
-        y_parity -> Integer,
-        created_at -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    recovery_operator (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        share -> Binary,
-        share_nonce -> Binary,
-        share_salt -> Binary,
-        created_at -> Integer,
-        updated_at -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    recovery_operator_identity (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        public_key -> Binary,
-        created_at -> Integer,
-        updated_at -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    recovery_wakeup_request (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        requested_by -> Integer,
-        requested_at -> Integer,
-        cancelled_by -> Nullable<Integer>,
-        cancelled_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    recovery_proposal_vote (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        recovery_operator_id -> Integer,
-        approve -> Bool,
-        signature -> Binary,
-        voted_at -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    proposal_vote (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        proposal_id -> Integer,
-        operator_id -> Integer,
-        approve -> Bool,
-        signature -> Binary,
-        voted_at -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
 diesel::table! {
     program_client (id) {
         id -> Integer,
@@ -366,6 +185,15 @@ diesel::table! {
     }
 }
 
+diesel::table! {
+    operator_client (id) {
+        id -> Integer,
+        public_key -> Binary,
+        created_at -> Integer,
+        updated_at -> Integer,
+    }
+}
+
 diesel::joinable!(aead_encrypted -> root_key_history (associated_root_key_id));
 diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> root_key_history (root_key_id));
 diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_history (tls_id));
@@ -384,40 +212,10 @@ diesel::joinable!(evm_transaction_log -> evm_wallet_access (wallet_access_id));
 diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet -> aead_encrypted (aead_encrypted_id));
 diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> evm_wallet (wallet_id));
 diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> program_client (client_id));
-diesel::joinable!(operator -> operator_identity (id));
 diesel::joinable!(program_client -> client_metadata (metadata_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal -> operator_identity (initiator_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal_one_off_transaction_result -> proposal_one_off_transaction (proposal_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal_approve_sdk_client -> proposal (proposal_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal_grant_wallet_access -> proposal (proposal_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal_replace_operator -> proposal (proposal_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal_one_off_transaction -> proposal (proposal_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal_persistent_grant -> proposal (proposal_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal_persistent_grant_ether -> proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal_persistent_grant_token -> proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal_vote -> proposal (proposal_id));
-diesel::joinable!(proposal_vote -> operator_identity (operator_id));
-diesel::joinable!(recovery_operator -> recovery_operator_identity (id));
-diesel::joinable!(recovery_proposal_vote -> proposal (proposal_id));
-diesel::joinable!(recovery_proposal_vote -> recovery_operator_identity (recovery_operator_id));
-diesel::joinable!(recovery_wakeup_request -> operator_identity (requested_by));
 
 diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
     aead_encrypted,
-    proposal_one_off_transaction_result,
-    proposal_approve_sdk_client,
-    proposal_grant_wallet_access,
-    proposal_replace_operator,
-    proposal_one_off_transaction,
-    proposal_persistent_grant,
-    proposal_persistent_grant_ether,
-    proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target,
-    proposal_persistent_grant_token,
-    proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit,
-    recovery_operator,
-    recovery_operator_identity,
-    recovery_wakeup_request,
-    recovery_proposal_vote,
     arbiter_settings,
     client_metadata,
     client_metadata_history,
@@ -432,11 +230,8 @@ diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
     evm_wallet,
     evm_wallet_access,
     integrity_envelope,
-    operator,
-    operator_identity,
     program_client,
-    proposal,
-    proposal_vote,
     root_key_history,
     tls_history,
+    operator_client,
 );

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/mod.rs

@@ -1,28 +1,34 @@
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
+
 use crate::{
     actors::vault::Vault,
     crypto::integrity,
     db::{
         self, DatabaseError,
         models::{
-            EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
+            EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget,
+            EvmEtherTransferLimit, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
+            EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
         },
         schema::{self, evm_transaction_log},
     },
     evm::policies::{
         CombinedSettings, DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy,
-        SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
-        token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
+        SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
+        ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
     },
 };
 
 use alloy::{
     consensus::TxEip1559,
-    primitives::{TxKind, U256},
+    primitives::{Address, TxKind, U256},
 };
 use chrono::Utc;
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
+use diesel::{
+    ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, SelectableHelper,
+    insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite, update,
+};
 
 pub mod abi;
 pub mod safe_signer;
@@ -272,6 +278,151 @@ impl Engine {
         Ok(id)
     }
 
+    pub async fn revoke_grant(
+        &self,
+        basic_grant_id: i32,
+    ) -> Result<(), DatabaseError> {
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+        let vault = self.vault.clone();
+
+        conn.transaction(async move |conn| {
+            use crate::db::schema::{
+                evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target,
+                evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
+                evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
+            };
+
+            update(evm_basic_grant::table)
+                .filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(basic_grant_id))
+                .set(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())))
+                .execute(&mut *conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = evm_basic_grant::table
+                .filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(basic_grant_id))
+                .select(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
+                .first(&mut *conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            let shared = SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?;
+
+            if let Some(ether_grant) = evm_ether_transfer_grant::table
+                .filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(basic_grant_id))
+                .select(EvmEtherTransferGrant::as_select())
+                .first(&mut *conn)
+                .await
+                .optional()?
+            {
+                let target_rows: Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget> =
+                    evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
+                        .filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq(ether_grant.id))
+                        .select(EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget::as_select())
+                        .load(&mut *conn)
+                        .await?;
+                let targets: Vec<Address> = target_rows
+                    .into_iter()
+                    .filter_map(|target| {
+                        let arr: [u8; 20] = target.address.try_into().ok()?;
+                        Some(Address::from(arr))
+                    })
+                    .collect();
+
+                let limit: EvmEtherTransferLimit = evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
+                    .filter(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq(ether_grant.limit_id))
+                    .select(EvmEtherTransferLimit::as_select())
+                    .first(&mut *conn)
+                    .await?;
+
+                let settings = CombinedSettings {
+                    shared: shared.clone(),
+                    specific: policies::ether_transfer::Settings {
+                        target: targets,
+                        limit: VolumeRateLimit {
+                            max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(
+                                |err| {
+                                    diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
+                                },
+                            )?,
+                            window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs.into()),
+                        },
+                    },
+                };
+
+                integrity::sign_entity(&mut *conn, &vault, &settings, basic_grant_id)
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
+
+                return QueryResult::Ok(());
+            }
+
+            if let Some(token_grant) = evm_token_transfer_grant::table
+                .filter(evm_token_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(basic_grant_id))
+                .select(EvmTokenTransferGrant::as_select())
+                .first(&mut *conn)
+                .await
+                .optional()?
+            {
+                let volume_limit_rows: Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit> =
+                    evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
+                        .filter(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq(token_grant.id))
+                        .select(EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit::as_select())
+                        .load(&mut *conn)
+                        .await?;
+                let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = volume_limit_rows
+                    .into_iter()
+                    .map(|row| {
+                        Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
+                            max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(
+                                |err| {
+                                    diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
+                                },
+                            )?,
+                            window: chrono::Duration::seconds(row.window_secs.into()),
+                        })
+                    })
+                    .collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
+
+                let target: Option<Address> = match token_grant.receiver {
+                    None => None,
+                    Some(bytes) => {
+                        let arr: [u8; 20] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
+                            diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
+                                "Invalid receiver address length".into(),
+                            )
+                        })?;
+                        Some(Address::from(arr))
+                    }
+                };
+
+                let token_contract: [u8; 20] =
+                    token_grant.token_contract.clone().try_into().map_err(|_| {
+                        diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
+                            "Invalid token contract address length".into(),
+                        )
+                    })?;
+
+                let settings = CombinedSettings {
+                    shared,
+                    specific: policies::token_transfers::Settings {
+                        token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
+                        target,
+                        volume_limits,
+                    },
+                };
+
+                integrity::sign_entity(&mut *conn, &vault, &settings, basic_grant_id)
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
+
+                return QueryResult::Ok(());
+            }
+
+            Err(diesel::result::Error::NotFound)
+        })
+        .await
+        .map_err(DatabaseError::from)
+    }
+
     async fn list_one_kind<Kind: Policy, Y>(
         &self,
         conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
@@ -351,22 +502,26 @@ impl Engine {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
+    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
     use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
-    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, SelectableHelper, insert_into};
+    use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
     use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+    use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
     use rstest::rstest;
 
+    use crate::actors::{GlobalActors, vault::{Bootstrap, Vault}};
+    use crate::crypto::integrity;
     use crate::db::{
-        self, DatabaseConnection, models,
+        self, DatabaseConnection,
         models::{
-            EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog,
-            SqliteTimestamp,
+            EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
         },
-        schema,
         schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
     };
+    use crate::evm::policies::ether_transfer::EtherTransfer;
     use crate::evm::policies::{
-        EvalContext, EvalViolation, SharedGrantSettings, TransactionRateLimit,
+        CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
+        TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit,
     };
 
     use super::check_shared_constraints;
@@ -379,9 +534,8 @@ mod tests {
         EvalContext {
             target: EvmWalletAccess {
                 id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
-                wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(5),
+                wallet_id: 10,
                 client_id: 20,
-                revoked_at: None,
                 created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
             },
             chain: CHAIN_ID,
@@ -399,91 +553,17 @@ mod tests {
             chain: CHAIN_ID,
             valid_from: None,
             valid_until: None,
+            revoked_at: None,
             max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
             max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
             rate_limit: None,
         }
     }
 
-    /// Creates the parent chain a fresh `evm_wallet_access` row needs under foreign-key
-    /// enforcement (a root key, an aead-encrypted secret, a wallet, and a client) and
-    /// returns the new access row's id.
-    async fn seed_wallet_access(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
-        let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
-            .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
-                ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-                tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-                root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                schema_version: 1,
-                salt: vec![0u8; 16],
-            })
-            .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
-            .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
-                ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-                tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-                current_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                schema_version: 1,
-                associated_root_key_id: root_key_id,
-                created_at: Utc::now().into(),
-            })
-            .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let wallet_id: EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec()),
-                schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
-            .values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
-            .returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let client_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
-                schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::program_client::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    }
-
     async fn insert_basic_grant(
         conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
         shared: &SharedGrantSettings,
     ) -> EvmBasicGrant {
-        // The seeded id deliberately wins over `shared.wallet_access_id`: every other field
-        // below is read from `shared`, but a caller-supplied access id would almost never
-        // reference a row that actually exists under foreign-key enforcement.
-        let wallet_access_id = seed_wallet_access(conn).await;
-
         #[expect(
             clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
             clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
@@ -492,7 +572,7 @@ mod tests {
         )]
         insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
             .values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
-                wallet_access_id,
+                wallet_access_id: shared.wallet_access_id,
                 chain_id: shared.chain.into(),
                 valid_from: shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
                 valid_until: shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
@@ -656,7 +736,7 @@ mod tests {
         insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
             .values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
                 grant_id: basic_grant.id,
-                wallet_access_id: basic_grant.wallet_access_id,
+                wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
                 chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
                 eth_value: super::utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::ZERO).to_vec(),
                 signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
@@ -682,4 +762,115 @@ mod tests {
             assert!(violations.is_empty());
         }
     }
+
+    async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
+        let actor = Vault::spawn(
+            Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+        );
+        actor
+            .ask(Bootstrap {
+                seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        actor
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn revoke_grant_preserves_revoked_integrity() {
+        use crate::db::schema::evm_basic_grant;
+        use diesel::ExpressionMethods as _;
+
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
+        let engine = super::Engine::new(db.clone(), vault.clone());
+
+        let full_grant = CombinedSettings {
+            shared: SharedGrantSettings {
+                wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
+                chain: CHAIN_ID,
+                valid_from: None,
+                valid_until: None,
+                revoked_at: None,
+                max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
+                max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
+                rate_limit: None,
+            },
+            specific: super::policies::ether_transfer::Settings {
+                target: vec![RECIPIENT],
+                limit: VolumeRateLimit {
+                    max_volume: U256::from(100u64),
+                    window: Duration::hours(1),
+                },
+            },
+        };
+
+        let grant_id = engine
+            .create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(full_grant)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        engine.revoke_grant(grant_id).await.unwrap();
+
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+        diesel::update(evm_basic_grant::table)
+            .filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
+            .set(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq::<Option<SqliteTimestamp>>(None))
+            .execute(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let wallet_access = EvmWalletAccess {
+            id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
+            wallet_id: 10,
+            client_id: 20,
+            created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
+        };
+        let context = EvalContext {
+            target: wallet_access,
+            chain: CHAIN_ID,
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: U256::ONE,
+            calldata: Bytes::new(),
+            max_fee_per_gas: 1,
+            max_priority_fee_per_gas: 1,
+        };
+
+        let grant = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(
+            &context, &mut conn,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let result =
+            integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await;
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            result,
+            Err(integrity::Error::MacMismatch { .. })
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn shared_settings_hash_changes_when_revoked_at_changes() {
+        use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
+        use sha2::Digest;
+
+        let active = shared_settings();
+        let revoked = SharedGrantSettings {
+            revoked_at: Some(Utc::now()),
+            ..shared_settings()
+        };
+
+        let mut active_hash = sha2::Sha256::new();
+        active.hash(&mut active_hash);
+
+        let mut revoked_hash = sha2::Sha256::new();
+        revoked.hash(&mut revoked_hash);
+
+        assert_ne!(active_hash.finalize(), revoked_hash.finalize());
+    }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies.rs

@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
 
     pub valid_from: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
     pub valid_until: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+    pub revoked_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
 
     pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
     pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ impl SharedGrantSettings {
             chain: model.chain_id.into(),
             valid_from: model.valid_from.map(Into::into),
             valid_until: model.valid_until.map(Into::into),
+            revoked_at: model.revoked_at.map(Into::into),
             max_gas_fee_per_gas: model
                 .max_gas_fee_per_gas
                 .map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/ether_transfer/tests.rs

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
 use crate::{
     db::{
-        self, DatabaseConnection, models,
+        self, DatabaseConnection,
         models::{
-            EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog,
-            SqliteTimestamp,
+            EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
         },
-        schema,
         schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
     },
     evm::{
@@ -20,7 +18,7 @@ use crate::{
 
 use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
 use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, SelectableHelper, insert_into};
+use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 
 const WALLET_ACCESS_ID: i32 = 1;
@@ -33,9 +31,8 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, value: U256) -> EvalContext {
     EvalContext {
         target: EvmWalletAccess {
             id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
-            wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(10),
+            wallet_id: 10,
             client_id: 20,
-            revoked_at: None,
             created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
         },
         chain: CHAIN_ID,
@@ -47,82 +44,10 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, value: U256) -> EvalContext {
     }
 }
 
-/// Creates the parent chain a fresh `evm_wallet_access` row needs under foreign-key
-/// enforcement (a root key, an aead-encrypted secret, a wallet, and a client) and returns
-/// the new access row's id.
-async fn seed_wallet_access(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
-    let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
-        .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
-            ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-            tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-            root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-            data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-            schema_version: 1,
-            salt: vec![0u8; 16],
-        })
-        .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
-        .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
-            ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-            tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-            current_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-            schema_version: 1,
-            associated_root_key_id: root_key_id,
-            created_at: Utc::now().into(),
-        })
-        .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let wallet_id: EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
-        .values((
-            schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec()),
-            schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
-        ))
-        .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
-        .values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
-        .returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let client_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
-        .values((
-            schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
-            schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-        ))
-        .returning(schema::program_client::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
-        .values((
-            schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
-            schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
-        ))
-        .returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-}
-
 async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicGrant {
-    let wallet_access_id = seed_wallet_access(conn).await;
-
     insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
         .values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
-            wallet_access_id,
+            wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
             chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
             valid_from: None,
             valid_until: None,
@@ -154,6 +79,7 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
         chain: CHAIN_ID,
         valid_from: None,
         valid_until: None,
+        revoked_at: None,
         max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
         max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
         rate_limit: None,
@@ -235,7 +161,7 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_when_volume_within_limit() {
     insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
         .values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
             grant_id,
-            wallet_access_id: basic.wallet_access_id,
+            wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
             chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
             eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(500u64)).to_vec(),
             signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
@@ -277,7 +203,7 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
     insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
         .values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
             grant_id,
-            wallet_access_id: basic.wallet_access_id,
+            wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
             chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
             eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_000u64)).to_vec(),
             signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
@@ -320,7 +246,7 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
     insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
         .values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
             grant_id,
-            wallet_access_id: basic.wallet_access_id,
+            wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
             chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
             eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(900u64)).to_vec(),
             signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/token_transfers/tests.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
 use crate::{
     db::{
-        self, DatabaseConnection, models,
-        models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
-        schema,
+        self, DatabaseConnection,
+        models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
         schema::evm_basic_grant,
     },
     evm::{
@@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ use alloy::{
     sol_types::SolCall,
 };
 use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, SelectableHelper, insert_into};
+use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 
 // DAI on Ethereum mainnet — present in the static token registry
@@ -46,9 +45,8 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, calldata: Bytes) -> EvalContext {
     EvalContext {
         target: EvmWalletAccess {
             id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
-            wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(10),
+            wallet_id: 10,
             client_id: 20,
-            revoked_at: None,
             created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
         },
         chain: CHAIN_ID,
@@ -60,82 +58,10 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, calldata: Bytes) -> EvalContext {
     }
 }
 
-/// Creates the parent chain a fresh `evm_wallet_access` row needs under foreign-key
-/// enforcement (a root key, an aead-encrypted secret, a wallet, and a client) and returns
-/// the new access row's id.
-async fn seed_wallet_access(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
-    let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
-        .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
-            ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-            tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-            root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-            data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-            schema_version: 1,
-            salt: vec![0u8; 16],
-        })
-        .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
-        .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
-            ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-            tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-            current_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-            schema_version: 1,
-            associated_root_key_id: root_key_id,
-            created_at: Utc::now().into(),
-        })
-        .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let wallet_id: EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
-        .values((
-            schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec()),
-            schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
-        ))
-        .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
-        .values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
-        .returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let client_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
-        .values((
-            schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
-            schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-        ))
-        .returning(schema::program_client::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
-        .values((
-            schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
-            schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
-        ))
-        .returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-}
-
 async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicGrant {
-    let wallet_access_id = seed_wallet_access(conn).await;
-
     insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
         .values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
-            wallet_access_id,
+            wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
             chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
             valid_from: None,
             valid_until: None,
@@ -151,27 +77,6 @@ async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicG
         .unwrap()
 }
 
-/// `evm_token_transfer_log.log_id` references the shared `evm_transaction_log` table, so
-/// tests recording a token transfer need a real row there to point at.
-async fn insert_transaction_log(
-    conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    basic: &EvmBasicGrant,
-    eth_value: U256,
-) -> i32 {
-    insert_into(schema::evm_transaction_log::table)
-        .values(models::NewEvmTransactionLog {
-            grant_id: basic.id,
-            wallet_access_id: basic.wallet_access_id,
-            chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
-            eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(eth_value).to_vec(),
-            signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
-        })
-        .returning(schema::evm_transaction_log::id)
-        .get_result(conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-}
-
 fn make_settings(target: Option<Address>, max_volume: Option<u64>) -> Settings {
     Settings {
         token_contract: DAI,
@@ -193,6 +98,7 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
         chain: CHAIN_ID,
         valid_from: None,
         valid_until: None,
+        revoked_at: None,
         max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
         max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
         rate_limit: None,
@@ -336,11 +242,10 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_volume_at_exact_limit() {
         .unwrap();
 
     // Record a past transfer of 900, with current transfer 100 => exactly 1000 limit
-    let log_id = insert_transaction_log(&mut conn, &basic, U256::from(900u64)).await;
-    insert_into(schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
-        .values(models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
+    insert_into(db::schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
+        .values(db::models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
             grant_id,
-            log_id,
+            log_id: 0,
             chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
             token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
             recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
@@ -381,11 +286,10 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
         .await
         .unwrap();
 
-    let log_id = insert_transaction_log(&mut conn, &basic, U256::from(1_000u64)).await;
-    insert_into(schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
-        .values(models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
+    insert_into(db::schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
+        .values(db::models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
             grant_id,
-            log_id,
+            log_id: 0,
             chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
             token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
             recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/safe_signer.rs

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for SafeSigner {
 /// Returns the protected key bytes and the derived Ethereum address.
 pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::Rng) -> (SafeCell<[u8; 32]>, Address) {
     loop {
-        let mut cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|w: &mut [u8; 32]| {
+        let mut cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|w: &mut [u8; 32]| {
             rng.fill_bytes(w);
         });
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/client/auth.rs

@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ impl Convert for auth::Outbound {
                         .timestamp
                         .timestamp_nanos_opt()
                         .expect("timestamp within range")
-                        as u64,
+                        .cast_unsigned(),
                     random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
                 })
             }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator.rs

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ use tracing::{error, info, warn};
 
 mod auth;
 mod evm;
-mod governance;
 mod inbound;
 mod outbound;
 mod sdk_client;
@@ -116,7 +115,6 @@ async fn dispatch_inner(
             warn!("Unsupported post-auth operator auth request");
             Err(Status::invalid_argument("Unsupported operator request"))
         }
-        OperatorRequestPayload::Governance(req) => governance::dispatch(actor, req).await,
     }
 }
 
@@ -129,23 +127,14 @@ pub async fn start(
     let (oob_sender, oob_receiver) = mpsc::channel(16);
     let oob_adapter = OutOfBandAdapter(oob_sender);
 
-    let started = {
+    let actor = {
         let transport = auth::AuthTransportAdapter::new(&mut bi, &mut request_tracker);
-        crate::peers::operator::start(&mut conn, transport, Box::new(oob_adapter)).await
-    };
-
-    let actor = match started {
-        Ok(actor) => actor,
-        // §3.5: a recovery operator is turned away from the session rather than failing. Say so
-        // on the stream, so it does not look like the server dropped the connection.
-        Err(e @ crate::peers::operator::Error::RecoveryOperatorHasNoSession) => {
-            info!("Recovery operator connection closed after the vault gate");
-            let _ = bi.send(Err(Status::permission_denied(e.to_string()))).await;
-            return;
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            warn!(error = ?e, "Operator connection failed");
-            return;
+        match crate::peers::operator::start(&mut conn, transport, Box::new(oob_adapter)).await {
+            Ok(actor) => actor,
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(error = ?e, "Operator connection failed");
+                return;
+            }
         }
     };
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/auth.rs

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
                         .timestamp
                         .timestamp_nanos_opt()
                         .expect("timestamp within range")
-                        as u64,
+                        .cast_unsigned(),
                     random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
                 })
             }
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
 
                 Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
                     pubkey,
-                    bootstrap_token,
+                    bootstrap_token: bootstrap_token.map(String::into_bytes),
                 })
             }
             AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => {

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/evm.rs

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ async fn handle_wallet_list(
                 .into_iter()
                 .map(|(id, address)| WalletEntry {
                     address: address.to_vec(),
-                    id: id.to_raw(),
+                    id,
                 })
                 .collect(),
         }),
@@ -217,6 +217,11 @@ async fn handle_sign_transaction(
                 result: Some(vet_error.convert()),
             }
         }
+        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
+            SessionSignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected,
+        )) => {
+            return Err(Status::permission_denied("client not connected"));
+        }
         Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(SessionSignTransactionError::Internal)) => {
             EvmSignTransactionResponse {
                 result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/governance.rs

@@ -1,256 +0,0 @@
-use crate::{
-    actors::proposal_manager::{Error as ProposalError, VoteOutcome},
-    db::models::{OperatorIdentityId, ProposalId},
-    db::proposal::{
-        ProposalKind, approve_sdk_client, grant_wallet_access, one_off_transaction,
-        persistent_grant, replace_operator,
-    },
-    peers::operator::{
-        OperatorSession,
-        session::handlers::{HandleCastVote, HandleCreateProposal, HandleQueryPending},
-    },
-};
-use arbiter_proto::proto::operator::{
-    governance::{
-        self as proto_gov, CreateProposalRequest, QueryPendingRequest, QueryPendingResponse,
-        VoteOutcome as ProtoVoteOutcome, create_proposal_request::Kind as ProtoKind,
-        request::Payload as GovRequestPayload, response::Payload as GovResponsePayload,
-    },
-    operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
-};
-use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
-use tonic::Status;
-use tracing::warn;
-
-const fn wrap(payload: GovResponsePayload) -> OperatorResponsePayload {
-    OperatorResponsePayload::Governance(proto_gov::Response {
-        payload: Some(payload),
-    })
-}
-
-pub(super) async fn dispatch(
-    actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
-    req: proto_gov::Request,
-) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
-    let Some(payload) = req.payload else {
-        return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
-            "Missing governance request payload",
-        ));
-    };
-
-    match payload {
-        GovRequestPayload::Create(req) => handle_create(actor, req).await,
-        GovRequestPayload::Vote(req) => handle_vote(actor, req).await,
-        GovRequestPayload::Query(QueryPendingRequest {}) => handle_query(actor).await,
-    }
-}
-
-async fn handle_create(
-    actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
-    req: CreateProposalRequest,
-) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
-    let kind = match req.kind {
-        Some(ProtoKind::ApproveSdkClient(p)) => {
-            ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(approve_sdk_client::Settings {
-                client_id: p.client_id,
-            })
-        }
-        Some(ProtoKind::GrantWalletAccess(p)) => {
-            ProposalKind::GrantWalletAccess(grant_wallet_access::Settings {
-                wallet_id: p.wallet_id,
-                client_id: p.client_id,
-            })
-        }
-        Some(ProtoKind::ReplaceOperator(p)) => {
-            ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(replace_operator::Settings {
-                old_operator_id: OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(p.old_operator_id),
-                new_pubkey: p.new_pubkey,
-            })
-        }
-        Some(ProtoKind::TriggerRekey(())) => ProposalKind::TriggerRekey,
-        Some(ProtoKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(p)) => {
-            ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(Box::new(parse_persistent_grant(p)?))
-        }
-        Some(ProtoKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(p)) => {
-            ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(Box::new(parse_one_off_transaction(p)?))
-        }
-        None => return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing proposal kind")),
-    };
-    let proposal_id = actor
-        .ask(HandleCreateProposal {
-            kind,
-            ttl_secs: req.ttl_secs,
-        })
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            warn!(?e, "create_proposal failed");
-            Status::internal("Failed to create proposal")
-        })?;
-
-    Ok(Some(wrap(GovResponsePayload::Created(
-        proto_gov::CreateProposalResponse {
-            proposal_id: proposal_id.to_raw(),
-        },
-    ))))
-}
-
-/// Validates the grant where the request enters, so a malformed one is refused before
-/// any operator votes on it instead of failing after quorum.
-fn parse_persistent_grant(
-    p: proto_gov::ApprovePersistentGrantPayload,
-) -> Result<persistent_grant::Settings, Status> {
-    use proto_gov::approve_persistent_grant_payload::Specific;
-
-    let volume =
-        |l: proto_gov::VolumeLimitProto| -> Result<persistent_grant::VolumeLimit, Status> {
-            Ok(persistent_grant::VolumeLimit {
-                max_volume: fixed(&l.max_volume, "max_volume must be 32 bytes")?,
-                window_secs: l.window_secs,
-            })
-        };
-
-    let specific = match p.specific {
-        Some(Specific::EtherTransfer(spec)) => {
-            let targets = spec
-                .targets
-                .iter()
-                .map(|target| fixed(target, "ether transfer target must be 20 bytes"))
-                .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
-            let limit = spec
-                .limit
-                .ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("missing ether transfer limit"))?;
-            persistent_grant::Specific::EtherTransfer {
-                targets,
-                limit: volume(limit)?,
-            }
-        }
-        Some(Specific::TokenTransfer(spec)) => {
-            let volume_limits = spec
-                .volume_limits
-                .into_iter()
-                .map(volume)
-                .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
-            persistent_grant::Specific::TokenTransfer {
-                token_contract: fixed(&spec.token_contract, "token_contract must be 20 bytes")?,
-                receiver: spec
-                    .target
-                    .map(|t| fixed(&t, "token transfer target must be 20 bytes"))
-                    .transpose()?,
-                volume_limits,
-            }
-        }
-        None => return Err(Status::invalid_argument("missing grant specific")),
-    };
-
-    Ok(persistent_grant::Settings {
-        wallet_access_id: p.wallet_access_id,
-        chain_id: p.chain_id,
-        valid_from_secs: p.valid_from_secs,
-        valid_until_secs: p.valid_until_secs,
-        max_gas_fee_per_gas: p
-            .max_gas_fee_per_gas
-            .map(|v| fixed(&v, "max_gas_fee_per_gas must be 32 bytes"))
-            .transpose()?,
-        max_priority_fee_per_gas: p
-            .max_priority_fee_per_gas
-            .map(|v| fixed(&v, "max_priority_fee_per_gas must be 32 bytes"))
-            .transpose()?,
-        rate_limit: p.rate_limit.map(|r| persistent_grant::RateLimit {
-            count: r.count,
-            window_secs: r.window_secs,
-        }),
-        specific,
-    })
-}
-
-fn fixed<const N: usize>(bytes: &[u8], message: &'static str) -> Result<[u8; N], Status> {
-    <[u8; N]>::try_from(bytes).map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument(message))
-}
-
-/// Validates the transaction where the request enters, so a malformed one is refused
-/// before any operator votes on it instead of failing after quorum.
-fn parse_one_off_transaction(
-    p: proto_gov::ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload,
-) -> Result<one_off_transaction::Settings, Status> {
-    Ok(one_off_transaction::Settings {
-        client_id: p.client_id,
-        wallet_address: fixed(&p.wallet_address, "wallet_address must be 20 bytes")?,
-        chain_id: p.chain_id,
-        nonce: p.nonce,
-        gas_limit: p.gas_limit,
-        max_fee_per_gas: u128::from_be_bytes(fixed(
-            &p.max_fee_per_gas,
-            "max_fee_per_gas must be 16 bytes",
-        )?),
-        max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128::from_be_bytes(fixed(
-            &p.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
-            "max_priority_fee_per_gas must be 16 bytes",
-        )?),
-        to: fixed(&p.to, "to must be 20 bytes")?,
-        value: fixed(&p.value, "value must be 32 bytes")?,
-        input: p.input,
-    })
-}
-
-async fn handle_vote(
-    actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
-    req: proto_gov::CastVoteRequest,
-) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
-    let result = actor
-        .ask(HandleCastVote {
-            proposal_id: ProposalId::from_raw(req.proposal_id),
-            approve: req.approve,
-            signature: req.signature,
-        })
-        .await;
-
-    let outcome = match result {
-        Ok(VoteOutcome::Pending) => ProtoVoteOutcome::Pending,
-        Ok(VoteOutcome::Approved) => ProtoVoteOutcome::Approved,
-        Ok(VoteOutcome::Rejected) => ProtoVoteOutcome::Rejected,
-        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::AlreadyVoted)) => {
-            return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Already voted on this proposal"));
-        }
-        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::InvalidSignature)) => {
-            return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid vote signature"));
-        }
-        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::ProposalNotFound)) => {
-            return Err(Status::not_found("Proposal not found"));
-        }
-        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::Unavailable)) => {
-            return Err(Status::unavailable("Proposal manager is unavailable"));
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            warn!(?e, "cast_vote failed");
-            return Err(Status::internal("Failed to cast vote"));
-        }
-    };
-
-    Ok(Some(wrap(GovResponsePayload::Voted(
-        proto_gov::VoteResponse {
-            outcome: outcome.into(),
-        },
-    ))))
-}
-
-async fn handle_query(
-    actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
-) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
-    let summaries = actor.ask(HandleQueryPending {}).await.unwrap_or_default();
-
-    let proposals = summaries
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|s| proto_gov::ProposalSummary {
-            id: s.id.to_raw(),
-            kind: <&'static str>::from(s.kind).to_owned(),
-            initiator_id: s.initiator_id.to_raw(),
-            expires_at: s.expires_at.0.timestamp(),
-            approve_count: s.approve_count,
-            reject_count: s.reject_count,
-        })
-        .collect();
-
-    Ok(Some(wrap(GovResponsePayload::Pending(
-        QueryPendingResponse { proposals },
-    ))))
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/inbound.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 use crate::{
-    db::models::{CoreEvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmWalletAccess},
+    db::models::{CoreEvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess},
     evm::policies::{
         SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit, ether_transfer,
         token_transfers,
     },
-    grpc::{Convert, TryConvert},
+    grpc::Convert,
+    grpc::TryConvert,
 };
 use arbiter_proto::{
     proto::evm::{
@@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ impl TryConvert for ProtoSharedSettings {
                 .valid_until
                 .map(ProtoTimestamp::try_convert)
                 .transpose()?,
+            revoked_at: None,
             max_gas_fee_per_gas: self
                 .max_gas_fee_per_gas
                 .as_deref()
@@ -149,7 +151,7 @@ impl Convert for WalletAccess {
 
     fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
         NewEvmWalletAccess {
-            wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(self.wallet_id),
+            wallet_id: self.wallet_id,
             client_id: self.sdk_client_id,
         }
     }
@@ -164,7 +166,7 @@ impl TryConvert for SdkClientWalletAccess {
             return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing wallet access entry"));
         };
         Ok(CoreEvmWalletAccess {
-            wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(access.wallet_id),
+            wallet_id: access.wallet_id,
             client_id: access.sdk_client_id,
             id: self.id,
         })

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/outbound.rs

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ impl Convert for EvmWalletAccess {
         Self::Output {
             id: self.id,
             access: Some(WalletAccess {
-                wallet_id: self.wallet_id.to_raw(),
+                wallet_id: self.wallet_id,
                 sdk_client_id: self.client_id,
             }),
         }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/sdk_client.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use crate::{
     db::models::NewEvmWalletAccess,
     grpc::Convert,
     peers::operator::{
-        OperatorSession, OutOfBand,
+        OutOfBand, OperatorSession,
         session::handlers::{
             HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess, HandleListWalletAccess, HandleNewClientApprove,
             HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess, HandleSdkClientList,
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ use crate::{
 };
 use arbiter_crypto::authn;
 use arbiter_proto::proto::{
+    shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientMetadata,
     operator::{
-        operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
         sdk_client::{
             self as proto_sdk_client, ConnectionCancel as ProtoSdkClientConnectionCancel,
             ConnectionRequest as ProtoSdkClientConnectionRequest,
@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
             request::Payload as SdkClientRequestPayload,
             response::Payload as SdkClientResponsePayload,
         },
+        operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
     },
-    shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientMetadata,
 };
 
 use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ async fn handle_list(
             clients: clients
                 .into_iter()
                 .map(|(client, metadata)| ProtoSdkClientEntry {
-                    id: client.id.to_raw(),
+                    id: client.id,
                     pubkey: client.public_key.clone(),
                     info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
                         name: metadata.name,

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/vault.rs

@@ -1,30 +1,19 @@
 use crate::{
     actors::vault::VaultState,
-    peers::operator::{
-        OperatorSession,
-        session::{
-            Error as SessionError,
-            handlers::{
-                HandleContributeRecoveryRekeyPassphrase, HandleContributeRekeyPassphrase,
-                HandleQueryVaultState,
-            },
-        },
-    },
+    peers::operator::{OperatorSession, session::handlers::HandleQueryVaultState},
 };
 use arbiter_proto::{
+    proto::shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
     proto::operator::{
         operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
         vault::{
-            self as proto_vault,
-            rekey::{self as proto_rekey, RekeyResult as ProtoRekeyResult},
-            request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
+            self as proto_vault, request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
             response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload,
         },
     },
-    proto::shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
 };
 
-use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
+use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
 use tonic::Status;
 use tracing::warn;
 
@@ -44,7 +33,6 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
 
     match payload {
         VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(()) => handle_query_vault_state(actor).await,
-        VaultRequestPayload::Rekey(req) => handle_rekey(actor, req).await,
         VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(_) | VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(_) => {
             Err(Status::permission_denied(
                 "Vault is already unsealed; unseal/bootstrap not permitted in session",
@@ -53,58 +41,6 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
     }
 }
 
-/// A re-key share belongs to exactly one role (§3.3), so a contribution from the wrong one is a
-/// policy answer and must not reach the peer as an opaque `internal`.
-fn rekey_status<M>(err: SendError<M, SessionError>, context: &'static str) -> Status {
-    match err {
-        SendError::HandlerError(err @ SessionError::RoleNotPermitted) => {
-            Status::permission_denied(err.to_string())
-        }
-        err => {
-            warn!(?err, "{context}");
-            Status::internal(context)
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-async fn handle_rekey(
-    actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
-    req: proto_rekey::Request,
-) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
-    use arbiter_proto::proto::operator::vault::rekey::request::Payload as RekeyPayload;
-
-    let payload = req
-        .payload
-        .ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing rekey payload"))?;
-
-    let done: bool = match payload {
-        RekeyPayload::ContributePassphrase(cp) => actor
-            .ask(HandleContributeRekeyPassphrase {
-                passphrase: cp.passphrase,
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| rekey_status(e, "Rekey contribution failed"))?,
-        RekeyPayload::ContributeRecoveryPassphrase(crp) => actor
-            .ask(HandleContributeRecoveryRekeyPassphrase {
-                passphrase: crp.passphrase,
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| rekey_status(e, "Rekey recovery contribution failed"))?,
-    };
-
-    let proto_result = if done {
-        ProtoRekeyResult::Success
-    } else {
-        ProtoRekeyResult::AwaitingContributions
-    };
-
-    Ok(Some(wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Rekey(
-        proto_rekey::Response {
-            result: proto_result.into(),
-        },
-    ))))
-}
-
 async fn handle_query_vault_state(
     actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
 ) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/vault_gate/inbound.rs

@@ -1,17 +1,14 @@
 use crate::{
     grpc::{Convert, TryConvert},
     peers::operator::vault_gate::{
-        self as vault_gate, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase,
-        HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase, HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase,
-        HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase, HandleDeclareCommittee, HandleHandshake,
-        HandleUnsealEncryptedKey,
+        self as vault_gate, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleHandshake, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey,
     },
 };
 use arbiter_proto::proto::operator::{
     operator_request::Payload as OperatorRequestPayload,
     vault::{
         self as proto_vault,
-        bootstrap::{self as proto_bootstrap, request::Payload as BootstrapRequestPayload},
+        bootstrap::{self as proto_bootstrap},
         request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
         unseal::{self as proto_unseal, request::Payload as UnsealRequestPayload},
     },
@@ -53,9 +50,6 @@ impl TryConvert for VaultRequestPayload {
             Self::QueryState(()) => Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleVaultState),
             Self::Unseal(req) => req.try_convert(),
             Self::Bootstrap(req) => req.try_convert(),
-            Self::Rekey(_) => Err(Status::permission_denied(
-                "Rekey requires an authenticated session",
-            )),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -79,20 +73,6 @@ impl TryConvert for UnsealRequestPayload {
         match self {
             Self::Start(start) => start.try_convert(),
             Self::EncryptedKey(key) => Ok(key.convert()),
-            Self::ContributePassphrase(cp) => Ok(
-                vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase(
-                    HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase {
-                        passphrase: cp.passphrase,
-                    },
-                ),
-            ),
-            Self::ContributeRecoveryPassphrase(crp) => Ok(
-                vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase(
-                    HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase {
-                        passphrase: crp.passphrase,
-                    },
-                ),
-            ),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -127,43 +107,12 @@ impl TryConvert for proto_bootstrap::Request {
     type Error = Status;
 
     fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
-        self.payload
-            .ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing bootstrap payload"))?
+        self.encrypted_key
+            .ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing bootstrap encrypted key"))?
             .try_convert()
     }
 }
 
-impl TryConvert for BootstrapRequestPayload {
-    type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
-    type Error = Status;
-
-    fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
-        match self {
-            Self::EncryptedKey(key) => key.try_convert(),
-            Self::DeclareCommittee(dc) => Ok(
-                vault_gate::Inbound::HandleDeclareCommittee(HandleDeclareCommittee {
-                    count: dc.count as usize,
-                    recovery_count: dc.recovery_count as usize,
-                }),
-            ),
-            Self::ContributePassphrase(cp) => Ok(
-                vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase(
-                    HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase {
-                        passphrase: cp.passphrase,
-                    },
-                ),
-            ),
-            Self::ContributeRecoveryPassphrase(crp) => Ok(
-                vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase(
-                    HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase {
-                        passphrase: crp.passphrase,
-                    },
-                ),
-            ),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 impl TryConvert for proto_bootstrap::BootstrapEncryptedKey {
     type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
     type Error = Status;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/vault_gate/outbound.rs

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ use crate::{
     peers::operator::vault_gate::{self as vault_gate},
 };
 use arbiter_proto::proto::{
+    shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
     operator::{
         operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
         vault::{
@@ -16,7 +17,6 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
             },
         },
     },
-    shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
 };
 
 use tonic::Status;
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
                 let proto_result = match result {
                     Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
                     Err(vault_gate::Error::InvalidKey) => ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey,
+                    Err(vault_gate::Error::LockedOut) => ProtoUnsealResult::LockedOut,
                     Err(err) => {
                         warn!(?err, "unseal failed");
                         return Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault"));
@@ -103,9 +104,6 @@ impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
                     Err(vault_gate::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped) => {
                         ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped
                     }
-                    Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
-                        return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
-                    }
                     Err(err) => {
                         warn!(?err, "bootstrap failed");
                         return Err(Status::internal("Failed to bootstrap vault"));
@@ -113,85 +111,6 @@ impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
                 };
                 Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))
             }
-            Self::HandleDeclareCommittee(result) => {
-                let proto_result = match result {
-                    Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
-                    // A role refusal is a policy answer, not a server fault, so it leaves the
-                    // gate as `PERMISSION_DENIED` rather than as an opaque `internal`.
-                    Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
-                        return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
-                    }
-                    Err(err) => {
-                        warn!(?err, "declare committee failed");
-                        return Err(Status::internal("Failed to declare committee"));
-                    }
-                };
-                Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))
-            }
-            Self::HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase(result) => {
-                let proto_result = match result {
-                    Ok(true) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
-                    Ok(false) => ProtoBootstrapResult::AwaitingContributions,
-                    Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
-                        return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
-                    }
-                    Err(err) => {
-                        warn!(?err, "contribute bootstrap passphrase failed");
-                        return Err(Status::internal("Failed to contribute bootstrap passphrase"));
-                    }
-                };
-                Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))
-            }
-            Self::HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase(result) => {
-                let proto_result = match result {
-                    Ok(true) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
-                    Ok(false) => ProtoBootstrapResult::AwaitingContributions,
-                    Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
-                        return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
-                    }
-                    Err(err) => {
-                        warn!(?err, "contribute recovery bootstrap passphrase failed");
-                        return Err(Status::internal(
-                            "Failed to contribute recovery bootstrap passphrase",
-                        ));
-                    }
-                };
-                Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))
-            }
-            Self::HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase(result) => {
-                let proto_result = match result {
-                    Ok(true) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
-                    Ok(false) => ProtoUnsealResult::AwaitingContributions,
-                    Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
-                        return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
-                    }
-                    Err(err) => {
-                        warn!(?err, "contribute unseal passphrase failed");
-                        return Err(Status::internal("Failed to contribute unseal passphrase"));
-                    }
-                };
-                Ok(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Result(
-                    proto_result.into(),
-                )))
-            }
-            Self::HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase(result) => {
-                let proto_result = match result {
-                    Ok(true) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
-                    Ok(false) => ProtoUnsealResult::AwaitingContributions,
-                    Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
-                        return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
-                    }
-                    Err(err) => {
-                        warn!(?err, "contribute recovery unseal passphrase failed");
-                        return Err(Status::internal(
-                            "Failed to contribute recovery unseal passphrase",
-                        ));
-                    }
-                };
-                Ok(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Result(
-                    proto_result.into(),
-                )))
-            }
         }
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/client/auth.rs

@@ -8,24 +8,23 @@ use crate::{
     crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
     db::{
         self,
-        models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
+        models::ProgramClientMetadata,
         schema::program_client,
     },
 };
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, SigningContext};
+use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT};
 use arbiter_proto::{
     ClientMetadata,
     transport::{Bi, expect_message},
 };
 
-use chrono::Utc;
 use diesel::{
     ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
-    dsl::insert_into, update,
+    dsl::insert_into,
 };
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
 use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
-use tracing::error;
+use tracing::{error, warn};
 
 #[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum Error {
@@ -211,71 +210,47 @@ async fn insert_client(
     .await
 }
 
-async fn sync_client_metadata(
+/// Compares stored metadata against what a reconnecting client presents.
+/// Metadata is frozen after initial operator approval and must not be silently
+/// overwritten. Doing so would let an approved client forge its displayed
+/// identity in later approval prompts. Drift is logged and ignored.
+async fn check_metadata_drift(
     db: &db::DatabasePool,
     client_id: i32,
-    metadata: &ClientMetadata,
+    presented: &ClientMetadata,
 ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history};
-
-    let now = SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now());
+    use crate::db::schema::client_metadata;
 
     let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
         error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
         Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
     })?;
 
-    conn.exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
-        let (current_metadata_id, current): (i32, ProgramClientMetadata) = program_client::table
-            .find(client_id)
-            .inner_join(client_metadata::table)
-            .select((
-                program_client::metadata_id,
-                ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
-            ))
-            .first(&mut *conn)
-            .await?;
+    let current: ProgramClientMetadata = program_client::table
+        .find(client_id)
+        .inner_join(client_metadata::table)
+        .select(ProgramClientMetadata::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
+            Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
+        })?;
 
-        let unchanged = current.name == metadata.name
-            && current.description == metadata.description
-            && current.version == metadata.version;
-        if unchanged {
-            return Ok(());
-        }
+    let changed = current.name != presented.name
+        || current.description != presented.description
+        || current.version != presented.version;
 
-        insert_into(client_metadata_history::table)
-            .values((
-                client_metadata_history::metadata_id.eq(current_metadata_id),
-                client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut *conn)
-            .await?;
+    if changed {
+        warn!(
+            client_id,
+            stored_name = %current.name,
+            presented_name = %presented.name,
+            "reconnecting client presented different metadata; ignoring - metadata is frozen after operator approval"
+        );
+    }
 
-        let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
-            .values((
-                client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
-                client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
-                client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
-            ))
-            .returning(client_metadata::id)
-            .get_result::<i32>(&mut *conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        update(program_client::table.find(client_id))
-            .set((
-                program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-                program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut *conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok::<(), diesel::result::Error>(())
-    })
-    .await
-    .map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
-        Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-    })
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 async fn challenge_client<T>(
@@ -306,7 +281,7 @@ where
         Error::Transport
     })?;
 
-    if !pubkey.verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Client, &signature) {
+    if !pubkey.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature) {
         error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
         return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
     }
@@ -324,6 +299,7 @@ where
 
     let client_id = if let Some(id) = get_client_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
         verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey).await?;
+        check_metadata_drift(&props.db, id, &metadata).await?;
         id
     } else {
         approve_new_client(
@@ -337,8 +313,6 @@ where
         insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
     };
 
-    sync_client_metadata(&props.db, client_id, &metadata).await?;
-
     let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
     challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge).await?;
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/client/session.rs

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ impl Actor for ClientSession {
         args.props
             .actors
             .flow_coordinator
-            .ask(RegisterClient { actor: this })
+            .ask(RegisterClient { client_id: args.client_id, actor: this })
             .await
             .map_err(|_| Error::ConnectionRegistrationFailed)?;
         Ok(args)

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/auth/mod.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use super::{AuthenticatedOperator, OperatorConnection};
+use super::{Credentials, OperatorConnection};
 use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge};
 use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
 
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ mod state;
 pub enum Inbound {
     AuthChallengeRequest {
         pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
-        bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
+        bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
     },
     AuthChallengeSolution {
         signature: Vec<u8>,
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
 pub async fn authenticate<T>(
     props: &mut OperatorConnection,
     transport: &mut T,
-) -> Result<AuthenticatedOperator, Error>
+) -> Result<Credentials, Error>
 where
     T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
 {

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/auth/state.rs

@@ -1,35 +1,31 @@
 use super::{
-    super::{AuthenticatedOperator, Credentials, OperatorConnection, RecoveryCredentials},
+    super::{Credentials, OperatorConnection},
     Error,
 };
 use crate::{
-    actors::bootstrap::VerifyToken,
-    db::{
-        DatabasePool,
-        schema::{arbiter_settings, operator_identity, recovery_operator_identity},
-    },
+    actors::bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
+    db::{DatabasePool, schema::operator_client},
     peers::operator::auth::Outbound,
 };
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, SigningContext};
+use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT};
 use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
 
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection as _, RunQueryDsl};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 use tracing::error;
 
-pub(crate) struct ChallengeRequest {
-    pub(crate) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
-    pub(crate) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
+pub(super) struct ChallengeRequest {
+    pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+    pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
 }
 
 pub struct ChallengeContext {
-    pub challenge: AuthChallenge,
-    pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
-    pub bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
+    pub(super) challenge: AuthChallenge,
+    pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
 }
 
-pub(crate) struct ChallengeSolution {
-    pub(crate) solution: Vec<u8>,
+pub(super) struct ChallengeSolution {
+    pub(super) solution: Vec<u8>,
 }
 
 smlang::statemachine!(
@@ -37,7 +33,7 @@ smlang::statemachine!(
     custom_error: true,
     transitions: {
         *Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
-        SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthenticatedOperator),
+        SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(Credentials),
     }
 );
 
@@ -47,30 +43,9 @@ async fn get_client_id(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<O
         Error::internal("Database unavailable")
     })?;
 
-    operator_identity::table
-        .filter(operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
-        .select(operator_identity::id)
-        .first::<i32>(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .optional()
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
-            Error::internal("Database operation failed")
-        })
-}
-
-async fn get_recovery_operator_id(
-    db: &DatabasePool,
-    pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
-) -> Result<Option<i32>, Error> {
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::internal("Database unavailable")
-    })?;
-
-    recovery_operator_identity::table
-        .filter(recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
-        .select(recovery_operator_identity::id)
+    operator_client::table
+        .filter(operator_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
+        .select(operator_client::id)
         .first::<i32>(&mut conn)
         .await
         .optional()
@@ -87,42 +62,32 @@ async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<i3
         Error::internal("Database unavailable")
     })?;
 
-    conn.transaction(async move |conn| {
-        // The database is authoritative on whether bootstrap has completed: `Vault::bootstrap`
-        // commits `root_key_id` before it publishes `events::Bootstrapped`, and `Bootstrapper`
-        // only learns of that two mailbox hops later. Re-checking it here, in the same
-        // transaction as the insert, closes that window deterministically instead of trusting
-        // a token that verified against `Bootstrapper`'s possibly-stale in-memory state.
-        let already_bootstrapped: bool = arbiter_settings::table
-            .select(arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
-            .first::<Option<i32>>(&mut *conn)
-            .await?
-            .is_some();
+    let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(operator_client::table)
+        .values((operator_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),))
+        .returning(operator_client::id)
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
+            Error::internal("Database operation failed")
+        })?;
 
-        if already_bootstrapped {
-            error!("Bootstrap token used to register after the vault was already bootstrapped");
-            return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
-        }
-
-        let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(operator_identity::table)
-            .values((operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),))
-            .returning(operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut *conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(id)
-    })
-    .await
+    Ok(id)
 }
 
 pub(super) struct AuthContext<'a, T: ?Sized> {
     pub(super) conn: &'a mut OperatorConnection,
     pub(super) transport: &'a mut T,
+    bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
 }
 
 impl<'a, T: ?Sized> AuthContext<'a, T> {
     pub(super) const fn new(conn: &'a mut OperatorConnection, transport: &'a mut T) -> Self {
-        Self { conn, transport }
+        Self {
+            conn,
+            transport,
+            bootstrap_token: None,
+        }
     }
 }
 
@@ -139,16 +104,16 @@ where
             bootstrap_token,
         }: ChallengeRequest,
     ) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
-        // Verify pubkey is registered in either identity table (unless bootstrapping)
-        if bootstrap_token.is_none()
-            && get_client_id(&self.conn.db, &pubkey).await?.is_none()
-            && get_recovery_operator_id(&self.conn.db, &pubkey)
-                .await?
-                .is_none()
-        {
-            return Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey);
+        // Verify pubkey is registered (unless bootstrapping)
+        if bootstrap_token.is_none() {
+            let id = get_client_id(&self.conn.db, &pubkey).await?;
+            if id.is_none() {
+                return Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey);
+            }
         }
 
+        self.bootstrap_token = bootstrap_token;
+
         let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
 
         self.transport
@@ -161,28 +126,20 @@ where
                 Error::Transport
             })?;
 
-        Ok(ChallengeContext {
-            challenge,
-            pubkey,
-            bootstrap_token,
-        })
+        Ok(ChallengeContext { challenge, pubkey })
     }
 
     async fn verify_solution(
         &mut self,
-        ChallengeContext {
-            challenge,
-            pubkey,
-            bootstrap_token,
-        }: &ChallengeContext,
+        ChallengeContext { challenge, pubkey }: &ChallengeContext,
         ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
-    ) -> Result<AuthenticatedOperator, Self::Error> {
+    ) -> Result<Credentials, Self::Error> {
         let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
             error!("Failed to decode signature in challenge solution");
             Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
         })?;
 
-        let valid = pubkey.verify(challenge, SigningContext::Operator, &signature);
+        let valid = pubkey.verify(challenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT, &signature);
 
         if !valid {
             self.transport
@@ -192,21 +149,18 @@ where
             return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
         }
 
-        // Resolve the peer's role: bootstrap (verify token, then register as an ordinary
-        // operator) or look the key up in whichever identity table holds it.
-        let authenticated = match bootstrap_token {
+        // Resolve client id: bootstrap (consume token + register) or lookup
+        let id = match self.bootstrap_token.take() {
             Some(token) => {
                 let token_ok: bool = self
                     .conn
                     .actors
                     .bootstrapper
-                    .ask(VerifyToken {
-                        token: token.clone(),
-                    })
+                    .ask(ConsumeToken { token })
                     .await
                     .map_err(|e| {
-                        error!(?e, "Failed to verify bootstrap token");
-                        Error::internal("Failed to verify bootstrap token")
+                        error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
+                        Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
                     })?;
 
                 if !token_ok {
@@ -218,59 +172,11 @@ where
                     return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
                 }
 
-                let id = match register_key(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await {
-                    Ok(id) => id,
-                    // `register_key` refuses a token that verified here but lost the race
-                    // against bootstrap. Reported to the peer exactly like the refusal above,
-                    // so that operator sees a protocol error rather than a handshake that
-                    // stops with nothing on the wire.
-                    Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken) => {
-                        self.transport
-                            .send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
-                            .await
-                            .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
-                        return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
-                    }
-                    Err(err) => return Err(err),
-                };
-
-                AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(Credentials {
-                    id,
-                    pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
-                })
-            }
-            None => {
-                // The tables are searched in this order, so a key registered in both resolves
-                // as `Ordinary` and could never submit its recovery share. Nothing enforces
-                // that the two sets are disjoint: `unique` is per table, and the only writer
-                // today is `register_key` above -- `recovery_operator_identity` has no
-                // registration path yet. Whoever builds one must refuse a key that
-                // `operator_identity` already holds, and vice versa, or §3.5's "separate peer
-                // type" holds only by convention.
-                if let Some(id) = get_client_id(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await? {
-                    AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(Credentials {
-                        id,
-                        pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
-                    })
-                } else {
-                    // `prepare_challenge` already found the key in one of the tables, so
-                    // arriving here means it was removed mid-handshake. Reported to the peer
-                    // for the same reason `InvalidBootstrapToken` is above: an operator that
-                    // has sent its solution sees a protocol error rather than a handshake that
-                    // stops with nothing on the wire.
-                    let Some(id) = get_recovery_operator_id(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await? else {
-                        self.transport
-                            .send(Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey))
-                            .await
-                            .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
-                        return Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey);
-                    };
-                    AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(RecoveryCredentials {
-                        id,
-                        pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
-                    })
-                }
+                register_key(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await?
             }
+            None => get_client_id(&self.conn.db, pubkey)
+                .await?
+                .ok_or(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey)?,
         };
 
         self.transport
@@ -278,6 +184,9 @@ where
             .await
             .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
 
-        Ok(authenticated)
+        Ok(Credentials {
+            id,
+            pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
+        })
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/mod.rs

@@ -33,26 +33,6 @@ impl Integrable for Credentials {
     const KIND: &'static str = "operator_credentials";
 }
 
-/// §3.5: recovery operators are a separate peer type with their own identity table. Their
-/// attestation kind differs from an ordinary operator's so the two id spaces cannot collide.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hashable)]
-pub struct RecoveryCredentials {
-    pub id: i32,
-    pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
-}
-
-impl Integrable for RecoveryCredentials {
-    const KIND: &'static str = "recovery_operator_credentials";
-}
-
-/// The outcome of an operator handshake. The variant, not a field, decides what the peer may
-/// do — so no call site can pass an unauthenticated recovery id.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub enum AuthenticatedOperator {
-    Ordinary(Credentials),
-    Recovery(RecoveryCredentials),
-}
-
 // Messages, sent by operator to connection client without having a request
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub enum OutOfBand {
@@ -82,12 +62,6 @@ pub enum Error {
     Transport,
     #[error("database error: {0}")]
     Database(DatabaseError),
-    /// §3.5: a recovery operator's authority stops at the vault gate. It has no operator
-    /// session, because a session is the whole ordinary-governance surface -- wallets, grants,
-    /// SDK clients, proposals -- which §3.5 puts out of a recovery operator's reach. Named
-    /// rather than folded into `Internal`, so a policy refusal is not logged as a fault.
-    #[error("recovery operators do not have an operator session")]
-    RecoveryOperatorHasNoSession,
     #[error("internal: {0}")]
     Internal(String),
 }
@@ -134,7 +108,7 @@ async fn should_run_gate(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
 async fn run_vault_gate<T>(
     props: &OperatorConnection,
     transport: &mut T,
-    auth_creds: AuthenticatedOperator,
+    auth_creds: Credentials,
 ) -> Result<(), Error>
 where
     T: Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
@@ -194,27 +168,18 @@ where
     T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send,
     T: Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> + Send,
 {
-    let authenticated = authenticate(props, &mut transport).await?;
+    let creds = authenticate(props, &mut transport).await?;
 
     // should run vault gate only if sealed / unbootstrapped
     if should_run_gate(&props.actors.vault).await? {
-        // §3.5 lets a recovery operator take part in unsealing, and the gate is where that
-        // happens, so both roles run it. The gate decides per message which role may send it.
-        run_vault_gate(props, &mut transport, authenticated.clone()).await?;
+        run_vault_gate(props, &mut transport, creds.clone()).await?;
     }
 
-    // Past the gate the connection turns into an ordinary operator session, which a recovery
-    // operator may not have.
-    let AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(creds) = &authenticated else {
-        return Err(Error::RecoveryOperatorHasNoSession);
-    };
-
     // checking the integrity
-    verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, creds).await?;
+    verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &creds).await?;
 
     Ok(OperatorSession::spawn(OperatorSession::new(
         props.clone(),
-        authenticated.clone(),
         oob_sender,
     )))
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/session/handlers.rs

@@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
 use super::{Error, OperatorSession};
-use crate::db::models::{OperatorIdentityId, ProposalId};
 use crate::{
-    actors::{
-        evm::{
-            ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, OperatorCreateGrant, OperatorDeleteGrant,
-            OperatorListGrants, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
-        },
-        flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
-        vault::VaultState,
+    actors::evm::{
+        ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, OperatorCreateGrant, OperatorListGrants,
+        SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
     },
-    db::models::{
-        EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
+    actors::flow_coordinator::{IsClientConnected, client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer},
+    actors::vault::VaultState,
+    db::{
+        models::{EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata},
+        schema::program_client,
     },
     evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant},
 };
@@ -20,13 +18,16 @@ use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
 use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
 use kameo::{error::SendError, messages, prelude::Context};
-use tracing::error;
+use tracing::{error, info, warn};
 
 #[derive(Debug, Error)]
 pub enum SignTransactionError {
     #[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
     Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
 
+    #[error("Client not connected")]
+    ClientNotConnected,
+
     #[error("Internal signing error")]
     Internal,
 }
@@ -75,9 +76,7 @@ impl OperatorSession {
     }
 
     #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(
-        &mut self,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<(EvmWalletId, Address)>, Error> {
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
         match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
             Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
             Err(err) => {
@@ -123,23 +122,22 @@ impl OperatorSession {
     }
 
     #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(
-        &mut self,
-        grant_id: i32,
-    ) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
-        match self
-            .props
-            .actors
-            .evm
-            .ask(OperatorDeleteGrant { grant_id })
-            .await
-        {
-            Ok(()) => Ok(()),
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
-                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
-            }
-        }
+    pub(crate) fn handle_grant_delete(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
+        // match self
+        //     .props
+        //     .actors
+        //     .evm
+        //     .ask(OperatorDeleteGrant { grant_id })
+        //     .await
+        // {
+        //     Ok(()) => Ok(()),
+        //     Err(err) => {
+        //         error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
+        //         Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
+        //     }
+        // }
+        let _ = grant_id;
+        todo!()
     }
 
     #[message]
@@ -149,6 +147,30 @@ impl OperatorSession {
         wallet_address: Address,
         transaction: TxEip1559,
     ) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
+        if !self.approved_client_ids.contains(&client_id) {
+            warn!(
+                client_id,
+                "operator attempted to sign for client not in its approved set"
+            );
+            return Err(SignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected);
+        }
+
+        let connected = self
+            .props
+            .actors
+            .flow_coordinator
+            .ask(IsClientConnected { client_id })
+            .await
+            .unwrap_or(false);
+
+        if !connected {
+            self.approved_client_ids.remove(&client_id);
+            warn!(client_id, "operator attempted to sign for disconnected client");
+            return Err(SignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected);
+        }
+
+        info!(client_id, event = "sign_transaction", "operator.sign_transaction");
+
         match self
             .props
             .actors
@@ -177,27 +199,41 @@ impl OperatorSession {
         entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
     ) -> Result<(), Error> {
         let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
-        grant_wallet_access(&mut conn, entries).await?;
+        conn.transaction(async |conn| {
+            use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
+
+            for entry in entries {
+                diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
+                    .values(&entry)
+                    .on_conflict_do_nothing()
+                    .execute(&mut *conn)
+                    .await?;
+            }
+
+            Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
+        })
+        .await?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
-    /// A revoke that matched fewer rows than it named did not do what the operator asked:
-    /// the id was never granted, or someone revoked it first. Answering `Ok` there tells the
-    /// operator access is cut off when nothing changed. The rows that did match stay revoked
-    /// -- rolling them back to report the shortfall would leave live access behind.
     #[message]
     pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
         &mut self,
         entries: Vec<i32>,
     ) -> Result<(), Error> {
         let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
-        let revoked = revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &entries).await?;
-        if revoked != entries.len() {
-            return Err(Error::PartialRevoke {
-                requested: entries.len(),
-                revoked,
-            });
-        }
+        conn.transaction(async |conn| {
+            use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
+            for entry in entries {
+                diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
+                    .filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry))
+                    .execute(&mut *conn)
+                    .await?;
+            }
+
+            Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
+        })
+        .await?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -205,10 +241,8 @@ impl OperatorSession {
     pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
         &mut self,
     ) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
-        use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
         let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
-        let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
-            .filter(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
+        let access_entries = crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access::table
             .select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
             .load::<_>(&mut conn)
             .await?;
@@ -216,81 +250,6 @@ impl OperatorSession {
     }
 }
 
-/// Grants access, reviving a previously revoked row rather than leaving it shadowed:
-/// `uniq_wallet_access` is a unique index on `(wallet_id, client_id)`, so a plain insert
-/// would conflict forever on a row that was revoked but never deleted.
-///
-/// Reviving restores visibility and nothing else: [`revoke_wallet_access`] closes the grants
-/// that hung off the access, so a persistent grant takes its own vote again (§3.2).
-pub(crate) async fn grant_wallet_access(
-    conn: &mut crate::db::DatabaseConnection,
-    entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
-) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
-    use crate::db::{models::SqliteTimestamp, schema::evm_wallet_access};
-
-    conn.transaction(async |conn| {
-        for entry in entries {
-            diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
-                .values(&entry)
-                .on_conflict((evm_wallet_access::wallet_id, evm_wallet_access::client_id))
-                .do_update()
-                .set(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(None::<SqliteTimestamp>))
-                .execute(&mut *conn)
-                .await?;
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    })
-    .await
-}
-
-/// Marks access rows revoked by their own id rather than deleting them, and revokes every
-/// grant that hangs off them. Returns how many access rows this call revoked.
-///
-/// The wire carries `WalletAccessEntry.id` values, so filtering by `wallet_id` here would
-/// revoke every client's access to that wallet. Deleting is not an option: `evm_basic_grant`,
-/// `evm_transaction_log`, and `proposal_persistent_grant` all reference this row
-/// `on delete restrict`, so an access that was ever granted, signed with, or proposed
-/// against can never be deleted -- only marked revoked.
-///
-/// The dependent grants have to go with it. `grant_wallet_access` revives a revoked row by
-/// its id, and grant lookup keys on `wallet_access_id` alone, so leaving the grants live
-/// would make a later re-grant restore every persistent grant the access ever held, with its
-/// original volume and rate limits. §3.2 votes visibility and a persistent grant separately;
-/// a committee that approves visibility must not silently hand back signing authority it did
-/// not vote on. The filter names every requested id, not just the rows this call flipped, so
-/// an access revoked before this fix has its orphaned grants closed too.
-pub(crate) async fn revoke_wallet_access(
-    conn: &mut crate::db::DatabaseConnection,
-    ids: &[i32],
-) -> Result<usize, diesel::result::Error> {
-    use crate::db::{
-        models::SqliteTimestamp,
-        schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_wallet_access},
-    };
-
-    conn.transaction(async |conn| {
-        let now = SqliteTimestamp::now();
-
-        let revoked = diesel::update(evm_wallet_access::table)
-            .filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq_any(ids))
-            .filter(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
-            .set(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(now.clone()))
-            .execute(&mut *conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        diesel::update(evm_basic_grant::table)
-            .filter(evm_basic_grant::wallet_access_id.eq_any(ids))
-            .filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
-            .set(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(now))
-            .execute(&mut *conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(revoked)
-    })
-    .await
-}
-
 #[messages]
 impl OperatorSession {
     #[message(ctx)]
@@ -320,6 +279,30 @@ impl OperatorSession {
 
         ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
 
+        if approved {
+            let pubkey_bytes = pending_approval.pubkey.to_bytes();
+            match self.props.db.get().await {
+                Ok(mut conn) => {
+                    match program_client::table
+                        .filter(program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.as_slice()))
+                        .select(program_client::id)
+                        .first::<i32>(&mut conn)
+                        .await
+                    {
+                        Ok(client_id) => {
+                            self.approved_client_ids.insert(client_id);
+                        }
+                        Err(err) => {
+                            error!(?err, "Failed to look up client_id for approved pubkey");
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                Err(err) => {
+                    error!(?err, "DB pool error after client approval");
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -343,589 +326,141 @@ impl OperatorSession {
     }
 }
 
-#[messages]
-impl OperatorSession {
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_create_proposal(
-        &mut self,
-        kind: crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind,
-        ttl_secs: Option<u32>,
-    ) -> Result<ProposalId, Error> {
-        use crate::actors::proposal_manager::CreateProposal;
-        let initiator_id = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(self.ordinary_id()?);
-        self.props
-            .actors
-            .proposal_manager
-            .ask(CreateProposal { kind, initiator_id, ttl_secs })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| {
-                error!(?e, "create_proposal failed");
-                Error::internal("Failed to create proposal")
-            })
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_cast_vote(
-        &mut self,
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        approve: bool,
-        signature: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<crate::actors::proposal_manager::VoteOutcome, crate::actors::proposal_manager::Error> {
-        use crate::actors::proposal_manager::CastVote;
-        let operator_id = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(
-            self.ordinary_id()
-                .map_err(|_| crate::actors::proposal_manager::Error::NotAllowedForRecoveryOperator)?,
-        );
-        self.props
-            .actors
-            .proposal_manager
-            .ask(CastVote { proposal_id, operator_id, approve, signature })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|err| match err {
-                SendError::HandlerError(e) => e,
-                _ => crate::actors::proposal_manager::Error::Unavailable,
-            })
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_query_pending(
-        &mut self,
-    ) -> Vec<crate::actors::proposal_manager::ProposalSummary> {
-        use crate::actors::proposal_manager::QueryPending;
-        let Ok(id) = self.ordinary_id() else {
-            // The pending list is per ordinary operator; a recovery operator has no view of it.
-            return Vec::new();
-        };
-        let operator_id = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(id);
-        self.props
-            .actors
-            .proposal_manager
-            .ask(QueryPending { operator_id })
-            .await
-            .unwrap_or_default()
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl OperatorSession {
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_contribute_rekey_passphrase(
-        &mut self,
-        passphrase: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        use crate::actors::vault_coordinator::ContributeRekey;
-        use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-
-        let operator_id = self.ordinary_id()?;
-        self.props
-            .actors
-            .vault_coordinator
-            .ask(ContributeRekey {
-                operator_id,
-                passphrase: SafeCell::new(passphrase),
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
-    }
-
-    /// §3.3: a re-key refreshes every share, recovery shares included, so a recovery operator
-    /// has one to contribute here.
-    ///
-    /// It cannot reach this handler yet: `peers::operator::start` refuses a recovery peer an
-    /// operator session, because a session carries the whole ordinary-governance surface that
-    /// §3.5 keeps out of a recovery operator's hands. Until a recovery-scoped session exists,
-    /// this refuses every caller -- which is the safe direction, and the id it would use comes
-    /// from the handshake either way.
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_contribute_recovery_rekey_passphrase(
-        &mut self,
-        passphrase: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        use crate::actors::vault_coordinator::ContributeRecoveryRekey;
-        use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-
-        let recovery_operator_id = self.recovery_id()?;
-        self.props
-            .actors
-            .vault_coordinator
-            .ask(ContributeRecoveryRekey {
-                recovery_operator_id,
-                passphrase: SafeCell::new(passphrase),
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
-    }
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::{grant_wallet_access, revoke_wallet_access};
-    use crate::db::{self, models, schema};
+    use crate::db::{self, models::NewEvmWalletAccess, schema::evm_wallet_access};
+    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
+    use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
 
-    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, dsl::insert_into};
-    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-
-    /// Inserts a fresh root key, an aead-encrypted wallet secret, and the wallet itself.
-    /// Returns the wallet's id and its 20-byte address.
-    async fn seed_wallet(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection) -> (models::EvmWalletId, Vec<u8>) {
-        let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
-            .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
-                ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-                tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-                root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                schema_version: 1,
-                salt: vec![0u8; 16],
-            })
-            .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
-            .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
-                ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
-                tag: vec![0u8; 16],
-                current_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
-                schema_version: 1,
-                associated_root_key_id: root_key_id,
-                created_at: chrono::Utc::now().into(),
-            })
-            .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let address = rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec();
-        let wallet_id: models::EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(address.clone()),
-                schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        (wallet_id, address)
-    }
-
-    async fn seed_client_metadata(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
-        insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
-            .values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
-            .returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    /// Inserts a `program_client` row under the given `client_metadata` row, keyed by its
-    /// own random public key.
-    async fn seed_client(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection, metadata_id: i32) -> i32 {
-        insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
-                schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::program_client::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    /// Inserts an access row directly, for fixtures that need one to already exist.
-    /// Production code grants access through [`grant_wallet_access`].
-    async fn insert_wallet_access(
-        conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection,
-        wallet_id: models::EvmWalletId,
-        client_id: i32,
-    ) -> i32 {
-        insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    /// The grants that grant lookup would treat as live for this access: the exact filter
-    /// `EtherTransfer::try_find_grant` and `TokenTransfer::try_find_grant` apply.
-    async fn live_grants_for(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection, access_id: i32) -> Vec<i32> {
-        schema::evm_basic_grant::table
-            .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::wallet_access_id.eq(access_id))
-            .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
-            .select(schema::evm_basic_grant::id)
-            .load(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    /// Two clients share one wallet. Revoking one access row must leave the other alone,
-    /// and must mark the row revoked rather than deleting it.
+    /// Regression test: revocation must delete by access-entry `id`, not by `wallet_id`.
+    ///
+    /// Before the fix, revoking `entry_id=1` would delete all rows where `wallet_id=1`,
+    /// wiping out every client's access to wallet #1.
     #[tokio::test]
-    async fn revoking_one_access_leaves_the_other_client_alone() {
-        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
-        let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
-        let first_client = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
-        let second_client = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
-
-        let first_access = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, first_client).await;
-        let _second_access = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, second_client).await;
-
-        let removed = revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[first_access])
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(removed, 1);
-
-        let active: Vec<i32> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
-            .select(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id)
-            .load(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            active,
-            vec![second_client],
-            "revoking one access row removed another client's access"
-        );
-
-        let total: i64 = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            total, 2,
-            "revoking an access row must mark it revoked, not delete it"
-        );
-
-        // The count `handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access` answers on: a second revoke of the same
-        // id, like a revoke of an id that never existed, changes nothing and must say so.
-        let again = revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[first_access])
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(again, 0, "an already revoked access must report no rows");
-    }
-
-    /// The bug this round fixes: once an access has been used for a grant, a signed
-    /// transaction, or a proposed persistent grant, three tables reference
-    /// `evm_wallet_access` `on delete restrict`, so deleting the row is no longer possible
-    /// once foreign keys are enforced. Revoking must still succeed by marking it revoked.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn revoking_an_access_with_grant_log_and_proposal_succeeds() {
-        use crate::db::proposal::{Proposal as _, persistent_grant, persistent_grant::PersistentGrant};
+    async fn revoke_deletes_by_entry_id_not_wallet_id() {
+        use crate::db::models::EvmWalletAccess;
 
         let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await.expect("pool connection");
 
-        let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
-        let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
-        let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
-        let access_id = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, client_id).await;
-
-        // A grant against this access...
-        let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
-            .values(models::NewEvmBasicGrant {
-                wallet_access_id: access_id,
-                chain_id: 1u64.into(),
-                valid_from: None,
-                valid_until: None,
-                max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
-                max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
-                rate_limit_count: None,
-                rate_limit_window_secs: None,
-                revoked_at: None,
+        // Insert two access entries for the same wallet but different clients.
+        // entry A: id will be 1, wallet_id=1, client_id=10
+        // entry B: id will be 2, wallet_id=1, client_id=20
+        let entry_a = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
+            .values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
+                wallet_id: 1,
+                client_id: 10,
             })
-            .returning(schema::evm_basic_grant::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
+            .get_result(&mut *conn)
             .await
-            .unwrap();
+            .expect("insert entry A");
 
-        // ...a signed transaction against that grant...
-        insert_into(schema::evm_transaction_log::table)
-            .values(models::NewEvmTransactionLog {
-                grant_id,
-                wallet_access_id: access_id,
-                chain_id: 1u64.into(),
-                eth_value: vec![0u8; 32],
-                signed_at: models::SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now()),
+        let entry_b = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
+            .values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
+                wallet_id: 1,
+                client_id: 20,
             })
-            .execute(&mut conn)
+            .returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
+            .get_result(&mut *conn)
             .await
-            .unwrap();
+            .expect("insert entry B");
 
-        // ...and a persistent-grant proposal that named this access before it was voted on.
-        let operator_id: models::OperatorIdentityId =
-            insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-                .values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()))
-                .returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
-                .get_result(&mut conn)
+        // Revoke only entry A by its primary key id.
+        conn.transaction(async |conn| {
+            diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
+                .filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_a.id))
+                .execute(&mut *conn)
                 .await
-                .unwrap();
-        let proposal_id: models::ProposalId = insert_into(schema::proposal::table)
-            .values(&models::NewProposal {
-                kind: db::proposal::ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant,
-                initiator_id: operator_id,
-                expires_at: models::SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::days(1)),
-            })
-            .returning(schema::proposal::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        PersistentGrant::insert(
-            proposal_id,
-            &persistent_grant::Settings {
-                wallet_access_id: access_id,
-                chain_id: 1,
-                valid_from_secs: None,
-                valid_until_secs: None,
-                max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
-                max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
-                rate_limit: None,
-                specific: persistent_grant::Specific::EtherTransfer {
-                    targets: vec![[0u8; 20]],
-                    limit: persistent_grant::VolumeLimit {
-                        max_volume: [0u8; 32],
-                        window_secs: 3600,
-                    },
-                },
-            },
-            &mut conn,
-        )
+        })
         .await
-        .unwrap();
+        .expect("revoke entry A");
 
-        // Before this round's fix, this would fail with a foreign-key violation.
-        let removed = revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(removed, 1);
-
-        let revoked_at: Option<models::SqliteTimestamp> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-            .find(access_id)
-            .select(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            revoked_at.is_some(),
-            "the row must be marked revoked, not deleted"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// A revoked access must no longer resolve through the lookup `shared_analyze_transaction`
-    /// and `client_sign_transaction` share -- otherwise the SDK client keeps signing after
-    /// the operator believes it has been cut off.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn revoked_access_no_longer_authorizes_signing() {
-        use crate::actors::{
-            GlobalActors,
-            evm::{EvmActor, SignTransactionError},
-            vault::Vault,
-        };
-        use alloy::{
-            consensus::TxEip1559,
-            eips::eip2930::AccessList,
-            primitives::{Address, Bytes, TxKind, U256},
-        };
-        use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
-
-        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let (wallet_id, address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
-        let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
-        let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
-        let access_id = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, client_id).await;
-        drop(conn);
-
-        let vault = Vault::spawn(
-            Vault::new(pool.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
-                .await
-                .unwrap(),
-        );
-        let mut evm_actor = EvmActor::new(vault, pool.clone());
-
-        let transaction = TxEip1559 {
-            chain_id: 1,
-            nonce: 0,
-            gas_limit: 21_000,
-            max_fee_per_gas: 0,
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: 0,
-            to: TxKind::Call(Address::ZERO),
-            value: U256::ZERO,
-            input: Bytes::new(),
-            access_list: AccessList::default(),
-        };
-        let wallet_address = Address::from_slice(&address);
-
-        // The paired positive case: while the access stands, both lookups resolve it and the
-        // calls fail further along (no grant, sealed vault) rather than at the access filter.
-        // Without this, a filter that rejected every row would pass the assertions below.
-        let live_analyze = evm_actor
-            .shared_analyze_transaction(client_id, wallet_address, transaction.clone())
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            !matches!(live_analyze, Err(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)),
-            "a live access must resolve through shared_analyze_transaction: {live_analyze:?}"
-        );
-        let live_sign = evm_actor
-            .client_sign_transaction(client_id, wallet_address, transaction.clone())
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            !matches!(live_sign, Err(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)),
-            "a live access must resolve through client_sign_transaction: {live_sign:?}"
-        );
-
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-        revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
-        drop(conn);
-
-        // Both lookups resolve access the same way; both must reject the revoked row before
-        // ever touching the vault (neither call bootstraps one).
-        let analyze_result = evm_actor
-            .shared_analyze_transaction(client_id, wallet_address, transaction.clone())
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            matches!(analyze_result, Err(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)),
-            "a revoked access must not authorize shared_analyze_transaction: {analyze_result:?}"
-        );
-
-        let sign_result = evm_actor
-            .client_sign_transaction(client_id, wallet_address, transaction)
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            matches!(sign_result, Err(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)),
-            "a revoked access must not authorize client_sign_transaction: {sign_result:?}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Re-granting a revoked access must restore it rather than silently doing nothing:
-    /// `uniq_wallet_access` is a unique index on `(wallet_id, client_id)`, so a plain insert
-    /// would conflict on the revoked row forever.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn regranting_a_revoked_access_restores_it() {
-        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
-        let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
-        let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
-        let access_id = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, client_id).await;
-
-        revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
-
-        grant_wallet_access(
-            &mut conn,
-            vec![models::NewEvmWalletAccess {
-                wallet_id,
-                client_id,
-            }],
-        )
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let revoked_at: Option<models::SqliteTimestamp> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-            .find(access_id)
-            .select(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            revoked_at.is_none(),
-            "re-granting a revoked access must clear revoked_at"
-        );
-
-        let total: i64 = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
+        // Entry A must be gone.
+        let gone = evm_wallet_access::table
+            .filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_a.id))
             .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
             .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(
-            total, 1,
-            "re-granting a revoked access must revive the existing row, not add a second one"
-        );
+            .expect("count entry A");
+        assert_eq!(gone, 0, "revoked entry must be deleted");
+
+        // Entry B (same wallet, different client) must still exist.
+        let still_there = evm_wallet_access::table
+            .filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_b.id))
+            .count()
+            .get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
+            .await
+            .expect("count entry B");
+        assert_eq!(still_there, 1, "unrelated entry must not be deleted");
     }
 
-    /// §3.2 puts wallet visibility and a persistent grant to two separate votes. Reviving a
-    /// revoked access restores visibility, and must restore nothing else: grant lookup keys on
-    /// `wallet_access_id` with `revoked_at is null`, so a grant left open when the access was
-    /// cut off would come back live -- with its original volume and rate limits -- the moment
-    /// the id revives. `EvmActor::grant_wallet_access` executes an approved `GrantWalletAccess`
-    /// proposal, so that would hand signing authority back to a committee that voted only on
-    /// visibility.
+    /// Regression test: when `entry_id` and `wallet_id` differ, only the correct row is removed.
+    ///
+    /// This specifically catches the case where `entry.id=5` and `wallet_id=1` are different values;
+    /// the old bug would delete by `wallet_id`, potentially matching a completely different entry.
     #[tokio::test]
-    async fn regranting_an_access_does_not_revive_its_grants() {
+    async fn revoke_with_mismatched_wallet_and_entry_ids() {
+        use crate::db::models::EvmWalletAccess;
+
         let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await.expect("pool connection");
 
-        let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
-        let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
-        let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
+        // Insert entries to force auto-increment IDs to diverge from wallet_ids.
+        // We'll insert 5 placeholder entries first so that the real entry gets id=6.
+        for i in 1_i32..=5 {
+            diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
+                .values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
+                    wallet_id: 99,
+                    client_id: i,
+                })
+                .execute(&mut *conn)
+                .await
+                .expect("insert placeholder");
+        }
 
-        let entry = || models::NewEvmWalletAccess {
-            wallet_id,
-            client_id,
-        };
-        grant_wallet_access(&mut conn, vec![entry()]).await.unwrap();
-        let access_id: i32 = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id))
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
-            .select(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        // The row every persistent grant hangs off: the specific ether- or token-transfer
-        // rows reference it, so liveness is decided here.
-        let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
-            .values(models::NewEvmBasicGrant {
-                wallet_access_id: access_id,
-                chain_id: 1u64.into(),
-                valid_from: None,
-                valid_until: None,
-                max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
-                max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
-                rate_limit_count: None,
-                rate_limit_window_secs: None,
-                revoked_at: None,
+        // Real target: wallet_id=1, will get id=6.
+        let target = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
+            .values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
+                wallet_id: 1,
+                client_id: 1,
             })
-            .returning(schema::evm_basic_grant::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
+            .get_result(&mut *conn)
             .await
-            .unwrap();
+            .expect("insert target");
 
-        assert_eq!(
-            live_grants_for(&mut conn, access_id).await,
-            vec![grant_id],
-            "the seeded grant must start out live, or the assertions below prove nothing"
+        // Sanity: target.id != target.wallet_id
+        assert_ne!(
+            target.id, target.wallet_id,
+            "test prerequisite: id and wallet_id must differ"
         );
 
-        revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            live_grants_for(&mut conn, access_id).await.is_empty(),
-            "revoking an access must revoke the grants that hang off it"
-        );
+        // Revoke by entry id.
+        conn.transaction(async |conn| {
+            diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
+                .filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(target.id))
+                .execute(&mut *conn)
+                .await
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("revoke target");
 
-        grant_wallet_access(&mut conn, vec![entry()]).await.unwrap();
-
-        let revoked_at: Option<models::SqliteTimestamp> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-            .find(access_id)
-            .select(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at)
-            .first(&mut conn)
+        let remaining = evm_wallet_access::table
+            .filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(target.id))
+            .count()
+            .get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
             .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            revoked_at.is_none(),
-            "re-granting must restore visibility for the access itself"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            live_grants_for(&mut conn, access_id).await.is_empty(),
-            "re-granting an access must not revive the grants it held before revocation"
-        );
+            .expect("count target");
+        assert_eq!(remaining, 0, "target must be deleted by its entry id");
+
+        // Placeholders for wallet_id=99 must be untouched.
+        let placeholders = evm_wallet_access::table
+            .filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(99))
+            .count()
+            .get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
+            .await
+            .expect("count placeholders");
+        assert_eq!(placeholders, 5, "unrelated entries must survive");
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/session/mod.rs

@@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
-use super::{AuthenticatedOperator, OutOfBand, OperatorConnection};
+use super::{OutOfBand, OperatorConnection};
 use crate::{
     actors::{
-        flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
-        operator_registry::ConnectOperator,
-    },
-    peers::client::ClientProfile,
+        flow_coordinator::{GetConnectedClientIds, client_connect_approval::{ClientApprovalAnswer, ClientApprovalController}}, operator_registry::ConnectOperator,
+    }, peers::client::ClientProfile,
 };
 use arbiter_crypto::authn;
 use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
 
 use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
-use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};
+use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::{HashMap, HashSet}};
 use thiserror::Error;
 use tracing::error;
 
@@ -19,17 +17,6 @@ pub enum Error {
     #[error("State transition failed")]
     State,
 
-    /// §3.5: the ordinary and recovery roles reach for different handlers here. A refusal is a
-    /// policy answer, so it is named rather than folded into `Internal` beside real faults.
-    #[error("This operator role may not perform that action")]
-    RoleNotPermitted,
-
-    /// Fewer access rows were revoked than the request named. Like `RoleNotPermitted` this is
-    /// an answer about the request, not a fault, so it is named rather than folded into
-    /// `Internal`.
-    #[error("Revoked {revoked} of {requested} wallet access entries")]
-    PartialRevoke { requested: usize, revoked: usize },
-
     #[error("Internal error: {message}")]
     Internal { message: Cow<'static, str> },
 }
@@ -62,40 +49,24 @@ pub struct PendingClientApproval {
 
 pub struct OperatorSession {
     props: OperatorConnection,
-    credentials: AuthenticatedOperator,
     sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
 
     pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>,
+    /// DB `client_ids` this operator session is allowed to sign for.
+    /// Seeded from currently-connected clients on start, then updated as
+    /// approvals are granted or denied during the session lifetime.
+    approved_client_ids: HashSet<i32>,
 }
 
 pub mod handlers;
 
 impl OperatorSession {
-    pub(crate) fn new(props: OperatorConnection, credentials: AuthenticatedOperator, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
+    pub(crate) fn new(props: OperatorConnection, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
         Self {
             props,
-            credentials,
             sender,
             pending_client_approvals: HashMap::default(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The id of the ordinary operator on the other end, or a refusal.
-    ///
-    /// Read from the handshake, never from a request body, so a peer cannot act under an id it
-    /// did not authenticate as.
-    const fn ordinary_id(&self) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-        match &self.credentials {
-            AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(credentials) => Ok(credentials.id),
-            AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(_) => Err(Error::RoleNotPermitted),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The id of the recovery operator on the other end, or a refusal. See `ordinary_id`.
-    const fn recovery_id(&self) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-        match &self.credentials {
-            AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(credentials) => Ok(credentials.id),
-            AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(_) => Err(Error::RoleNotPermitted),
+            approved_client_ids: HashSet::default(),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -120,6 +91,7 @@ impl OperatorSession {
                 actor = "operator",
                 event = "failed to announce new client connection"
             );
+            let _ = controller.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved: false }).await;
             return;
         }
 
@@ -138,7 +110,7 @@ impl Actor for OperatorSession {
 
     type Error = Error;
 
-    async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+    async fn on_start(mut args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
         args.props
             .actors
             .operator_registry
@@ -153,6 +125,16 @@ impl Actor for OperatorSession {
                 );
                 Error::internal("Failed to register operator connection with operator registry")
             })?;
+
+        // Seed approved set with clients already connected when this session starts.
+        // New clients will be added via handle_new_client_approve as they are approved.
+        match args.props.actors.flow_coordinator.ask(GetConnectedClientIds {}).await {
+            Ok(ids) => args.approved_client_ids.extend(ids),
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "Failed to fetch connected client IDs on operator session start");
+            }
+        }
+
         Ok(args)
     }
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/vault_gate/mod.rs

@@ -1,14 +1,10 @@
-use super::AuthenticatedOperator;
+use super::Credentials;
 use crate::{
     actors::{
         GlobalActors,
         vault::{self, Bootstrap, GetState, TryUnseal, VaultState, events},
-        vault_coordinator::{
-            ContributeBootstrap, ContributeRecoveryBootstrap, ContributeRecoveryUnseal,
-            ContributeUnseal, StartBootstrap,
-        },
     },
-    crypto::{KeyCell, integrity::{self}},
+    crypto::integrity::{self},
     db::DatabasePool,
 };
 use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
@@ -21,9 +17,6 @@ use tokio::sync::oneshot;
 use tracing::{error, info};
 use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey, SharedSecret};
 
-pub use VaultGateMessage as Inbound;
-pub use VaultGateMessageReply as Outbound;
-
 pub mod state;
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -32,16 +25,12 @@ pub enum Error {
     AlreadyBootstrapped,
     #[error("Invalid key provided")]
     InvalidKey,
+    #[error("Vault locked: too many failed unseal attempts")]
+    LockedOut,
 
     #[error("State transition failed")]
     State,
 
-    /// §3.5: ordinary and recovery operators hold different shares of the same split, so each
-    /// contribution belongs to exactly one of the two roles. A refusal here is a policy answer
-    /// and is kept out of `Internal`, which carries genuine faults.
-    #[error("This operator role may not perform that vault action")]
-    RoleNotPermitted,
-
     #[error("Internal error: {0}")]
     Internal(String),
 }
@@ -56,7 +45,7 @@ pub struct HandshakeResponse {
 }
 
 pub struct VaultGate {
-    pub auth_creds: AuthenticatedOperator,
+    pub auth_creds: Credentials,
     pub promotion_tx: Option<oneshot::Sender<Result<(), Error>>>,
     pub state: State,
     pub actors: GlobalActors,
@@ -65,7 +54,7 @@ pub struct VaultGate {
 
 impl VaultGate {
     pub fn new(
-        auth_creds: AuthenticatedOperator,
+        auth_creds: Credentials,
         actors: GlobalActors,
         db: DatabasePool,
         promotion_tx: oneshot::Sender<Result<(), Error>>,
@@ -106,33 +95,16 @@ impl Actor for VaultGate {
 }
 
 impl VaultGate {
-    /// The id of the ordinary operator on the other end, or a refusal.
-    ///
-    /// The id is read from the handshake rather than from the request body, so a peer cannot
-    /// name an operator it did not authenticate as.
-    const fn ordinary_id(&self) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-        match &self.auth_creds {
-            AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(credentials) => Ok(credentials.id),
-            AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(_) => Err(Error::RoleNotPermitted),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The id of the recovery operator on the other end, or a refusal. See `ordinary_id`.
-    const fn recovery_id(&self) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-        match &self.auth_creds {
-            AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(credentials) => Ok(credentials.id),
-            AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(_) => Err(Error::RoleNotPermitted),
-        }
-    }
-
     fn decrypt_key(
         secret: &SharedSecret,
         nonce: &[u8],
         ciphertext: &[u8],
         associated_data: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<KeyCell, ()> {
+    ) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
         let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
+
         let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(secret.as_bytes().into());
+
         let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
 
         let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
@@ -140,9 +112,7 @@ impl VaultGate {
         });
 
         match decryption_result {
-            Ok(()) => KeyCell::try_from(key_buffer).map_err(|()| {
-                error!("Decrypted key material has unexpected length");
-            }),
+            Ok(()) => Ok(key_buffer),
             Err(err) => {
                 error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
                 Err(())
@@ -151,7 +121,7 @@ impl VaultGate {
     }
 }
 
-#[messages(enum)]
+#[messages(messages = Inbound, replies = Outbound)]
 impl VaultGate {
     #[message]
     pub fn handle_handshake(
@@ -173,13 +143,6 @@ impl VaultGate {
         })
     }
 
-    /// Deliberately open to both roles, unlike `handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key` below.
-    ///
-    /// Handing over the whole seal key to open a sealed vault is participating in unsealing,
-    /// which §3.5 grants a recovery operator, and the peer has to hold that key already -- it
-    /// gains nothing here it did not bring. Bootstrap is the opposite: it *chooses* the key for
-    /// a vault that has none, which is sole custody of the root key and belongs to no §3.5
-    /// power. The reasoning that admits one does not admit the other.
     #[message]
     pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
         &mut self,
@@ -191,14 +154,17 @@ impl VaultGate {
             return Err(Error::State);
         };
 
-        let Ok(seal_key) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data) else {
+        let Ok(seal_key_buffer) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data)
+        else {
             return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
         };
 
         match self
             .actors
             .vault
-            .ask(TryUnseal { seal_key })
+            .ask(TryUnseal {
+                seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
+            })
             .await
         {
             Ok(()) => {
@@ -206,6 +172,7 @@ impl VaultGate {
                 Ok(())
             }
             Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::InvalidKey)) => Err(Error::InvalidKey),
+            Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::LockedOut)) => Err(Error::LockedOut),
             Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
                 error!(?err, "Vault failed to unseal key");
                 Err(Error::InvalidKey)
@@ -217,10 +184,6 @@ impl VaultGate {
         }
     }
 
-    /// §3.4/§3.5: bootstrapping picks the root key for a vault that has none, so whoever gets
-    /// here holds sole custody until the committee splits it. That is not one of a recovery
-    /// operator's two powers, and the check comes first because the vault commits before this
-    /// handler could refuse anything afterwards.
     #[message]
     pub async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
         &mut self,
@@ -228,20 +191,21 @@ impl VaultGate {
         ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
         associated_data: Vec<u8>,
     ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let _ = self.ordinary_id()?;
-
         let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else {
             return Err(Error::State);
         };
 
-        let Ok(seal_key) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data) else {
+        let Ok(seal_key_buffer) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data)
+        else {
             return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
         };
 
         match self
             .actors
             .vault
-            .ask(Bootstrap { seal_key })
+            .ask(Bootstrap {
+                seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
+            })
             .await
         {
             Ok(()) => {
@@ -273,97 +237,6 @@ impl VaultGate {
 
         Ok(answer)
     }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn handle_declare_committee(
-        &mut self,
-        count: usize,
-        recovery_count: usize,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let operator_id = self.ordinary_id()?;
-
-        self.actors
-            .vault_coordinator
-            .ask(StartBootstrap {
-                operator_id,
-                declared_count: count,
-                recovery_count,
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn handle_contribute_bootstrap_passphrase(
-        &mut self,
-        passphrase: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let operator_id = self.ordinary_id()?;
-
-        let passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase);
-        self.actors
-            .vault_coordinator
-            .ask(ContributeBootstrap {
-                operator_id,
-                passphrase: passphrase_cell,
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn handle_contribute_recovery_bootstrap_passphrase(
-        &mut self,
-        passphrase: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let recovery_operator_id = self.recovery_id()?;
-
-        let passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase);
-        self.actors
-            .vault_coordinator
-            .ask(ContributeRecoveryBootstrap {
-                recovery_operator_id,
-                passphrase: passphrase_cell,
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn handle_contribute_unseal_passphrase(
-        &mut self,
-        passphrase: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let operator_id = self.ordinary_id()?;
-
-        let passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase);
-        self.actors
-            .vault_coordinator
-            .ask(ContributeUnseal {
-                operator_id,
-                passphrase: passphrase_cell,
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn handle_contribute_recovery_unseal_passphrase(
-        &mut self,
-        passphrase: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let recovery_operator_id = self.recovery_id()?;
-
-        let passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase);
-        self.actors
-            .vault_coordinator
-            .ask(ContributeRecoveryUnseal {
-                recovery_operator_id,
-                passphrase: passphrase_cell,
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
-    }
 }
 
 impl Message<events::Bootstrapped> for VaultGate {
@@ -380,28 +253,13 @@ impl Message<events::Bootstrapped> for VaultGate {
                 .get()
                 .await
                 .map_err(|_| Error::internal("DB unavailable"))?;
-            // Each role signs under its own `Integrable::KIND`, so the two id spaces cannot
-            // collide in `integrity_envelope`.
-            match &self.auth_creds {
-                AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(credentials) => {
-                    integrity::sign_entity(
-                        &mut conn,
-                        &self.actors.vault,
-                        credentials,
-                        credentials.id,
-                    )
-                    .await
-                }
-                AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(credentials) => {
-                    integrity::sign_entity(
-                        &mut conn,
-                        &self.actors.vault,
-                        credentials,
-                        credentials.id,
-                    )
-                    .await
-                }
-            }
+            integrity::sign_entity(
+                &mut conn,
+                &self.actors.vault,
+                &self.auth_creds,
+                self.auth_creds.id,
+            )
+            .await
             .map_err(|e| {
                 error!(?e, "Failed to sign integrity envelope on bootstrap");
                 Error::internal("Integrity sign failed")

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/client/auth.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
-use super::common::{ChannelTransport, spawn_actors};
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, SigningContext};
+use super::common::ChannelTransport;
+use arbiter_crypto::{
+    authn::{self, AuthChallenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT},
+    safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+};
 use arbiter_proto::{
     ClientMetadata,
     transport::{Receiver, Sender},
@@ -71,7 +74,7 @@ async fn insert_registered_client(
 fn sign_client_challenge(key: &SigningKey<MlDsa87>, challenge: &AuthChallenge) -> authn::Signature {
     let challenge = challenge.format();
     key.signing_key()
-        .sign_deterministic(&challenge, SigningContext::Client.as_bytes())
+        .sign_deterministic(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
         .unwrap()
         .into()
 }
@@ -83,8 +86,8 @@ async fn insert_bootstrap_sentinel_operator(db: &db::DatabasePool) {
         .0
         .to_vec();
 
-    insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-        .values((schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(sentinel_key),))
+    insert_into(schema::operator_client::table)
+        .values((schema::operator_client::public_key.eq(sentinel_key),))
         .execute(&mut conn)
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -93,11 +96,11 @@ async fn insert_bootstrap_sentinel_operator(db: &db::DatabasePool) {
 async fn spawn_test_actors(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> GlobalActors {
     insert_bootstrap_sentinel_operator(db).await;
 
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
     actors
         .vault
         .ask(Bootstrap {
-            seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
+            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
         })
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -263,7 +266,7 @@ pub async fn metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
+pub async fn metadata_frozen_after_approval_ignores_reconnect_changes() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
     let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
@@ -284,6 +287,7 @@ pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
         connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
     });
 
+    // Reconnect presenting different metadata — must be silently ignored.
     test_transport
         .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
             pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
@@ -310,6 +314,7 @@ pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
             client_metadata, client_metadata_history, program_client,
         };
         let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+        // Metadata is frozen: no new row, no history entry.
         let metadata_count: i64 = client_metadata::table
             .count()
             .get_result(&mut conn)
@@ -335,15 +340,16 @@ pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
             .first::<(String, Option<String>, Option<String>)>(&mut conn)
             .await
             .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(metadata_count, 2);
-        assert_eq!(history_count, 1);
+        assert_eq!(metadata_count, 1, "frozen: no new metadata row on reconnect");
+        assert_eq!(history_count, 0, "frozen: no history entry on reconnect");
         assert_eq!(
             current,
             (
                 "client".to_owned(),
-                Some("new".to_owned()),
-                Some("2.0.0".to_owned())
-            )
+                Some("old".to_owned()),
+                Some("1.0.0".to_owned())
+            ),
+            "frozen: original metadata must be preserved"
         );
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/common/mod.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
     dead_code,
     reason = "Common test utilities that may not be used in every test"
 )]
+use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Error, Receiver, Sender};
 use arbiter_server::{
     actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Vault},
@@ -18,42 +19,12 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
         .await
         .unwrap();
     actor
-        .bootstrap(arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]))
+        .bootstrap(SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()))
         .await
         .unwrap();
     actor
 }
 
-/// Spawns a full `GlobalActors` for a test, backing `Bootstrapper`'s token file with a
-/// throwaway temp directory rather than the real `~/.arbiter` -- a test must never be able to
-/// reach, let alone write to, the developer's real bootstrap token file.
-pub(crate) async fn spawn_actors(db: db::DatabasePool) -> GlobalActors {
-    let home = tempfile::tempdir().expect("failed to create a temp home directory for a test");
-    GlobalActors::spawn_in(db, home.path())
-        .await
-        .expect("failed to spawn GlobalActors for a test")
-}
-
-/// Retries `probe` until it yields a value, then returns it.
-///
-/// Effects that travel over the message bus are not visible the moment the publishing call
-/// returns: `Publish` only enqueues to the bus's mailbox, which then delivers to each
-/// subscriber's mailbox in turn. A test observing such an effect waits for it instead of
-/// reading straight after the call that triggered it.
-pub(crate) async fn eventually<T, F, Fut>(what: &str, mut probe: F) -> T
-where
-    F: FnMut() -> Fut,
-    Fut: Future<Output = Option<T>>,
-{
-    for _ in 0..100 {
-        if let Some(value) = probe().await {
-            return value;
-        }
-        tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(20)).await;
-    }
-    panic!("{what} did not happen within 2s");
-}
-
 pub(crate) async fn root_key_history_id(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> i32 {
     let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
     let id = schema::arbiter_settings::table

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/operator/auth.rs

@@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
-use super::common::{ChannelTransport, bootstrapped_vault, eventually, spawn_actors};
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, SigningContext};
+use super::common::ChannelTransport;
+use arbiter_crypto::{
+    authn::{self, AuthChallenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT},
+    safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+};
 use arbiter_proto::transport::{Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender};
 use arbiter_server::{
-    actors::{
-        bootstrap::GetToken,
-        vault::{self, Bootstrap},
-    },
+    actors::{GlobalActors, bootstrap::GetToken, vault::Bootstrap},
     crypto::integrity,
     db::{self, schema},
-    peers::operator::{
-        self, AuthenticatedOperator, Credentials, OperatorConnection, auth, vault_gate,
-    },
+    peers::operator::{self, Credentials, OperatorConnection, auth, vault_gate},
 };
 
 use async_trait::async_trait;
@@ -29,7 +27,7 @@ fn sign_operator_challenge(
 ) -> authn::Signature {
     let challenge = challenge.format();
     key.signing_key()
-        .sign_deterministic(&challenge, SigningContext::Operator.as_bytes())
+        .sign_deterministic(&challenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT)
         .unwrap()
         .into()
 }
@@ -155,7 +153,14 @@ impl Sender<auth::Inbound> for StartTestTransport {
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn bootstrap_token_auth() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    actors
+        .vault
+        .ask(Bootstrap {
+            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
     let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
 
     let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
@@ -169,7 +174,7 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_token_auth() {
     test_transport
         .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
             pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
-            bootstrap_token: Some(token),
+            bootstrap_token: Some(token.into_bytes()),
         })
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -198,287 +203,22 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_token_auth() {
         .expect("should receive auth result");
     assert!(matches!(response, Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess)));
 
-    let authenticated = task.await.unwrap().unwrap();
+    task.await.unwrap().unwrap();
 
     let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-    let (stored_id, stored_pubkey): (i32, Vec<u8>) = schema::operator_identity::table
-        .select((
-            schema::operator_identity::id,
-            schema::operator_identity::public_key,
-        ))
-        .first::<(i32, Vec<u8>)>(&mut conn)
+    let stored_pubkey: Vec<u8> = schema::operator_client::table
+        .select(schema::operator_client::public_key)
+        .first::<Vec<u8>>(&mut conn)
         .await
         .unwrap();
     assert_eq!(stored_pubkey, verifying_key(&new_key).encode().0.to_vec());
-
-    // A key registered through the bootstrap token is an ordinary operator, carrying the id its
-    // registration wrote. Asserted here because this is the file's only bootstrap-arm check on
-    // what `authenticate` actually returns.
-    match authenticated {
-        AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(creds) => assert_eq!(creds.id, stored_id),
-        AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(creds) => panic!(
-            "expected the ordinary role, got a recovery operator with id {}",
-            creds.id
-        ),
-    }
-}
-
-/// A multi-operator committee must all register with the same bootstrap token before bootstrap
-/// completes, so verifying the token must not consume it. This is the reachability bug fixed by
-/// replacing `consume_token` with `verify_token`.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-pub async fn bootstrap_token_registers_every_committee_member() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
-    let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
-
-    for _ in 0..2 {
-        let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
-        let db_for_task = db.clone();
-        let actors_for_task = actors.clone();
-        let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
-            let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors_for_task);
-            auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
-        });
-
-        let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-        test_transport
-            .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-                pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
-                bootstrap_token: Some(token.clone()),
-            })
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let response = test_transport
-            .recv()
-            .await
-            .expect("should receive challenge");
-        let challenge = match response {
-            Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
-            other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
-        };
-
-        let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&new_key, &challenge);
-        test_transport
-            .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
-                signature: signature.to_bytes(),
-            })
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let response = test_transport
-            .recv()
-            .await
-            .expect("should receive auth result");
-        assert!(matches!(response, Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess)));
-
-        task.await.unwrap().unwrap();
-    }
-
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-    let registered: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
-        .count()
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(registered, 2);
-
-    // Bootstrap has not completed: the token must still be valid.
-    assert_eq!(
-        actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap(),
-        Some(token)
-    );
-}
-
-/// `GlobalActors` must subscribe `Bootstrapper` to `events::Bootstrapped` on the message bus.
-/// Without that one registration the token stays valid forever in production, which is the
-/// defect this task exists to fix, and no other test notices: the test below drives the event
-/// handler directly, and the `challenge_auth` family never re-reads the token after
-/// bootstrapping. This one goes the whole way round -- real `Vault::bootstrap`, real bus --
-/// and waits for the effect rather than reading straight after the call, because `Publish`
-/// only enqueues to the bus's mailbox.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-pub async fn bootstrapped_event_retires_the_token_through_the_message_bus() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
-
-    assert!(
-        actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().is_some(),
-        "the token must exist before the vault is bootstrapped"
-    );
-
-    actors
-        .vault
-        .ask(Bootstrap {
-            seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    eventually("the bootstrap token to be retired", || async {
-        actors
-            .bootstrapper
-            .ask(GetToken)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-            .is_none()
-            .then_some(())
-    })
-    .await;
-}
-
-/// Once the vault reports `Bootstrapped`, the token is retired: further registrations must be
-/// rejected even with a token that verified successfully moments earlier.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-pub async fn bootstrap_token_rejected_after_bootstrapped_event() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
-    let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
-
-    // Drive the Bootstrapper's own event handler directly rather than through
-    // `actors.vault.ask(Bootstrap { .. })` + the message bus: bus delivery is fire-and-forget,
-    // so asserting on it would be racy. The handler under test is the same either way.
-    actors
-        .bootstrapper
-        .ask(vault::events::Bootstrapped)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert!(actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().is_none());
-
-    let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
-    let db_for_task = db.clone();
-    let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
-        let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
-        auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
-    });
-
-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    test_transport
-        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
-            bootstrap_token: Some(token),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let response = test_transport
-        .recv()
-        .await
-        .expect("should receive challenge");
-    let challenge = match response {
-        Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
-        other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
-    };
-
-    let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&new_key, &challenge);
-    test_transport
-        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
-            signature: signature.to_bytes(),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    assert!(matches!(
-        task.await.unwrap(),
-        Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
-    ));
-
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-    let count: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
-        .count()
-        .get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(count, 0);
-}
-
-/// `register_key`'s database gate must refuse a registration once `arbiter_settings.root_key_id`
-/// is set, even when `Bootstrapper`'s own in-memory token has not yet been retired -- exactly
-/// the two-mailbox-hop window between `Vault::bootstrap`'s commit and the `Bootstrapped` event
-/// reaching `Bootstrapper` in production. "database bootstrapped, Bootstrapper not yet notified"
-/// is reproduced deterministically by bootstrapping a throwaway `Vault` wired to its own message
-/// bus: it commits `root_key_id` in the same database without ever publishing to the bus
-/// `actors.bootstrapper` is registered on, so `actors.bootstrapper`'s token is left untouched.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-pub async fn bootstrap_token_rejected_once_the_database_is_bootstrapped() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
-    let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
-
-    bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
-
-    // From Bootstrapper's point of view the token still verifies: it never received an event.
-    assert_eq!(
-        actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap(),
-        Some(token.clone())
-    );
-
-    let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
-    let db_for_task = db.clone();
-    let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
-        let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
-        auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
-    });
-
-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    test_transport
-        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
-            bootstrap_token: Some(token),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let response = test_transport
-        .recv()
-        .await
-        .expect("should receive challenge");
-    let challenge = match response {
-        Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
-        other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
-    };
-
-    let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&new_key, &challenge);
-    test_transport
-        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
-            signature: signature.to_bytes(),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    // The refusal has to reach the peer, not just the task's return value: a registration
-    // refused after the database was bootstrapped must look like the refusal of a token that
-    // never verified, rather than a handshake that stops with nothing on the wire.
-    let refusal = test_transport
-        .recv()
-        .await
-        .expect("the refusal must be sent to the peer");
-    assert!(matches!(refusal, Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)));
-
-    assert!(matches!(
-        task.await.unwrap(),
-        Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
-    ));
-
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-    let count: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
-        .count()
-        .get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(count, 0);
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
 
     let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
     let db_for_task = db.clone();
@@ -491,7 +231,7 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
     test_transport
         .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
             pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
-            bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_owned()),
+            bootstrap_token: Some(b"invalid_token".to_vec()),
         })
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -513,21 +253,13 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
         .await
         .unwrap();
 
-    // The reference behaviour the refusal above has to match: a token that never verified is
-    // reported to the peer. Pinned here so the two refusal paths cannot drift apart again.
-    let refusal = test_transport
-        .recv()
-        .await
-        .expect("the refusal must be sent to the peer");
-    assert!(matches!(refusal, Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)));
-
     assert!(matches!(
         task.await.unwrap(),
         Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
     ));
 
     let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-    let count: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
+    let count: i64 = schema::operator_client::table
         .count()
         .get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
         .await
@@ -539,11 +271,11 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn challenge_auth() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
     actors
         .vault
         .ask(Bootstrap {
-            seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
+            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
         })
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -553,9 +285,9 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth() {
 
     {
         let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        let id: i32 = insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values((schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),))
-            .returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
+        let id: i32 = insert_into(schema::operator_client::table)
+            .values((schema::operator_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),))
+            .returning(schema::operator_client::id)
             .get_result(&mut conn)
             .await
             .unwrap();
@@ -624,12 +356,12 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth() {
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
 
     actors
         .vault
         .ask(Bootstrap {
-            seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
+            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
         })
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -639,8 +371,8 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed() {
 
     {
         let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values((schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),))
+        insert_into(schema::operator_client::table)
+            .values((schema::operator_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),))
             .execute(&mut conn)
             .await
             .unwrap();
@@ -668,7 +400,7 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed() {
     let challenge = match response {
         Ok(resp) => match resp {
             auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge } => challenge,
-            other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
+            other @ auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
         },
         Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
     };
@@ -698,11 +430,11 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed() {
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
     actors
         .vault
         .ask(Bootstrap {
-            seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
+            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
         })
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -712,9 +444,9 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
 
     {
         let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        let id: i32 = insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values((schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),))
-            .returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
+        let id: i32 = insert_into(schema::operator_client::table)
+            .values((schema::operator_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),))
+            .returning(schema::operator_client::id)
             .get_result(&mut conn)
             .await
             .unwrap();
@@ -774,230 +506,3 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
         Err(auth::Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
     ));
 }
-
-/// §3.5: a recovery operator is a separate peer type. Its key resolves against
-/// `recovery_operator_identity`, and authentication reports the recovery role.
-///
-/// An ordinary operator is registered alongside it so the recovery key is not simply the only
-/// key on file: the handshake has to reach the recovery table while `operator_identity` is
-/// populated. Both tables autoincrement from 1, so the fixture also pushes the authenticating
-/// recovery operator to id 2 -- with one row in each table an id taken from the wrong table
-/// would still read as 1, and only the variant would be under test.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-pub async fn recovery_operator_authenticates_with_its_own_identity() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
-
-    let ordinary_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    let other_recovery_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    let recovery_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    let recovery_pubkey_bytes = authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&recovery_key)).to_bytes();
-
-    let recovery_id: i32 = {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values((schema::operator_identity::public_key
-                .eq(authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&ordinary_key)).to_bytes()),))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
-            .values((schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key
-                .eq(authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&other_recovery_key)).to_bytes()),))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
-            .values((schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(recovery_pubkey_bytes),))
-            .returning(schema::recovery_operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    };
-    assert_eq!(
-        recovery_id, 2,
-        "the fixture must give the authenticating recovery operator an id no ordinary \
-         operator holds, or the id assertion below cannot discriminate"
-    );
-
-    let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
-    let db_for_task = db.clone();
-    let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
-        let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
-        auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
-    });
-
-    test_transport
-        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: verifying_key(&recovery_key).into(),
-            bootstrap_token: None,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let response = test_transport
-        .recv()
-        .await
-        .expect("should receive challenge");
-    let challenge = match response {
-        Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
-        other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
-    };
-
-    let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&recovery_key, &challenge);
-    test_transport
-        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
-            signature: signature.to_bytes(),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let response = test_transport
-        .recv()
-        .await
-        .expect("should receive auth result");
-    assert!(matches!(response, Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess)));
-
-    let authenticated = task
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .expect("recovery operator should authenticate");
-    match authenticated {
-        AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(creds) => assert_eq!(creds.id, recovery_id),
-        AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(creds) => panic!(
-            "expected the recovery role, got the ordinary operator with id {}",
-            creds.id
-        ),
-    }
-}
-
-/// A key present in neither identity table is still rejected: accepting a key found in either
-/// table must not degrade into accepting any key at all. Both tables hold a row so the refusal
-/// cannot come from an empty lookup.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-pub async fn unknown_key_is_rejected_when_both_tables_are_populated() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
-
-    let ordinary_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    let recovery_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values((schema::operator_identity::public_key
-                .eq(authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&ordinary_key)).to_bytes()),))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
-            .values((schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key
-                .eq(authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&recovery_key)).to_bytes()),))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-    }
-
-    let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
-    let db_for_task = db.clone();
-    let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
-        let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
-        auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
-    });
-
-    let unknown_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    test_transport
-        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: verifying_key(&unknown_key).into(),
-            bootstrap_token: None,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    assert!(matches!(
-        task.await.unwrap(),
-        Err(auth::Error::UnregisteredPublicKey)
-    ));
-}
-
-/// `verify_solution` resolves the recovery id only after the peer has sent its solution, so a
-/// recovery row removed between challenge and solution reaches that refusal. It has to be sent
-/// on the transport, like the `InvalidBootstrapToken` refusals in the arm above: an operator
-/// that has answered the challenge sees a protocol error rather than a handshake that stops
-/// with nothing on the wire.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-pub async fn recovery_key_removed_mid_handshake_is_refused_on_the_wire() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
-
-    let recovery_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    let recovery_pubkey_bytes = authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&recovery_key)).to_bytes();
-    {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(recovery_pubkey_bytes.clone()),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-    }
-
-    let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
-    let db_for_task = db.clone();
-    let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
-        let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
-        auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
-    });
-
-    test_transport
-        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: verifying_key(&recovery_key).into(),
-            bootstrap_token: None,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let response = test_transport
-        .recv()
-        .await
-        .expect("should receive challenge");
-    let challenge = match response {
-        Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
-        other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
-    };
-
-    // The challenge has been issued and the solution has not been sent, so the server cannot
-    // have read the table again yet: the row is gone by the time `verify_solution` looks.
-    {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        diesel::delete(
-            schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
-                .filter(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(recovery_pubkey_bytes)),
-        )
-        .execute(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    }
-
-    let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&recovery_key, &challenge);
-    test_transport
-        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
-            signature: signature.to_bytes(),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let refusal = test_transport
-        .recv()
-        .await
-        .expect("the refusal must be sent to the peer");
-    assert!(matches!(refusal, Err(auth::Error::UnregisteredPublicKey)));
-
-    assert!(matches!(
-        task.await.unwrap(),
-        Err(auth::Error::UnregisteredPublicKey)
-    ));
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/operator/unseal.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
-use super::common::spawn_actors;
-use arbiter_crypto::authn;
+use arbiter_crypto::{
+    authn,
+    safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+};
 use arbiter_server::{
-    actors::vault::{Bootstrap, Seal},
+    actors::{
+        GlobalActors,
+        vault::{Bootstrap, Seal},
+    },
     db,
     peers::operator::{
-        AuthenticatedOperator, Credentials,
+        Credentials,
         vault_gate::{
             Error as VaultGateError, HandleHandshake, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, VaultGate,
         },
@@ -17,19 +22,19 @@ use tokio::sync::oneshot;
 use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
 
 async fn setup_sealed_gate(
-    seal_key: &[u8; 32],
+    seal_key: &[u8],
 ) -> (
     db::DatabasePool,
     kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
     oneshot::Receiver<Result<(), VaultGateError>>,
 ) {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
 
     actors
         .vault
         .ask(Bootstrap {
-            seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from(*seal_key),
+            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(seal_key.to_vec()),
         })
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -37,7 +42,7 @@ async fn setup_sealed_gate(
 
     let (promotion_tx, promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
     let pubkey = authn::SigningKey::generate().public_key();
-    let auth_creds = AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(Credentials { id: 1, pubkey });
+    let auth_creds = Credentials { id: 1, pubkey };
     let gate = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(auth_creds, actors, db.clone(), promotion_tx));
 
     (db, gate, promotion_rx)
@@ -45,7 +50,7 @@ async fn setup_sealed_gate(
 
 async fn client_dh_encrypt(
     gate: &kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
-    key_to_send: &[u8; 32],
+    key_to_send: &[u8],
 ) -> HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
     let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
     let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
@@ -78,7 +83,7 @@ async fn client_dh_encrypt(
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn unseal_success() {
-    let seal_key = b"test-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
+    let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
     let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
 
     let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, seal_key).await;
@@ -90,10 +95,10 @@ pub async fn unseal_success() {
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
-    let seal_key = b"test-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
+    let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
     let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
 
-    let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key-padded-to-32-bytes!!!!").await;
+    let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key").await;
 
     let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
     assert!(matches!(
@@ -107,7 +112,7 @@ pub async fn unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
-    let seal_key = b"test-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
+    let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
     let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
 
     let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
@@ -138,11 +143,11 @@ pub async fn unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {
-    let seal_key = b"real-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
+    let seal_key = b"real-seal-key";
     let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
 
     {
-        let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key-padded-to-32-bytes!!!!").await;
+        let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key").await;
 
         let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
         assert!(matches!(

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/vault/concurrency.rs

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
 use tokio::task::JoinSet;
 
+const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
+
 async fn write_concurrently(
     actor: ActorRef<Vault>,
     prefix: &'static str,
@@ -27,6 +29,7 @@ async fn write_concurrently(
             let id = actor
                 .ask(CreateNew {
                     plaintext: SafeCell::new(plaintext.clone()),
+                    aad: TEST_AAD.to_vec(),
                 })
                 .await
                 .unwrap();
@@ -120,7 +123,7 @@ async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
     drop(conn);
 
     let err = actor
-        .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"should fail".to_vec()))
+        .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"should fail".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
         .await
         .unwrap_err();
     assert!(matches!(err, Error::DatabaseTransaction(_)));
@@ -166,12 +169,12 @@ async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
         .await
         .unwrap();
     decryptor
-        .try_unseal(arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]))
+        .try_unseal(SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()))
         .await
         .unwrap();
 
     for (id, plaintext) in expected {
-        let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap();
+        let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
         assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/vault/lifecycle.rs

@@ -1,46 +1,28 @@
 use crate::common;
-use arbiter_crypto::{
-    authn,
-    safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
-};
+use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 use arbiter_server::{
     actors::{
         GlobalActors,
-        vault::{Error, GetState, Vault, VaultState},
-        vault_coordinator::{
-            ContributeBootstrap, ContributeRecoveryBootstrap, ContributeRecoveryUnseal,
-            ContributeUnseal, Error as CoordinatorError, StartBootstrap, VaultCoordinator,
-        },
+        vault::{Error, Vault},
     },
-    crypto::{KeyCell, encryption::v1::{Nonce, ROOT_KEY_TAG}},
+    crypto::encryption::v1::{Nonce, ROOT_KEY_TAG},
     db::{self, models, schema},
-    peers::operator::{
-        AuthenticatedOperator, Credentials, RecoveryCredentials,
-        vault_gate::{
-            Error as VaultGateError, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey,
-            HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase, HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase,
-            HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase, HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase,
-            HandleDeclareCommittee, HandleHandshake, VaultGate,
-        },
-    },
 };
 
-use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, insert_into, sql_query};
+use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
-use tokio::sync::oneshot;
-use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
+
+const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_bootstrap() {
+async fn bootstrap() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
         .await
         .unwrap();
 
-    let seal_key = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
+    let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
     actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
 
     let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -59,25 +41,25 @@ async fn test_bootstrap() {
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
+async fn bootstrap_rejects_double() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
 
-    let seal_key2 = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
+    let seal_key2 = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
     let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2).await.unwrap_err();
     assert!(matches!(err, Error::AlreadyBootstrapped));
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
+async fn create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
         .await
         .unwrap();
 
     let err = actor
-        .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec()))
+        .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
         .await
         .unwrap_err();
     assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
@@ -85,19 +67,19 @@ async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
+async fn decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
         .await
         .unwrap();
 
-    let err = actor.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
+    let err = actor.decrypt(1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
     assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() {
+async fn new_restores_sealed_state() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
     drop(actor);
@@ -105,19 +87,19 @@ async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() {
     let mut actor2 = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
         .await
         .unwrap();
-    let err = actor2.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
+    let err = actor2.decrypt(1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
     assert!(matches!(err, Error::Sealed));
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
+async fn unseal_correct_password() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
 
     let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
     let aead_id = actor
-        .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
+        .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
         .await
         .unwrap();
     drop(actor);
@@ -125,22 +107,22 @@ async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
     let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
         .await
         .unwrap();
-    let seal_key = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
+    let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
     actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
 
-    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
+    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
+async fn unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
 
     let plaintext = b"important data";
     let aead_id = actor
-        .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
+        .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
         .await
         .unwrap();
     drop(actor);
@@ -149,674 +131,13 @@ async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
         .await
         .unwrap();
 
-    let bad_key = KeyCell::from([1u8; 32]);
+    let bad_key = SafeCell::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec());
     let err = actor.try_unseal(bad_key).await.unwrap_err();
     assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidKey));
 
-    let good_key = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
+    let good_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
     actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
 
-    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
+    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
 }
-
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-async fn two_operator_vault_requires_recovery_share() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let bus = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
-    let vault_ref = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus).await.unwrap());
-    let coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db, vault_ref));
-
-    let err = coordinator
-        .ask(StartBootstrap {
-            operator_id: 1,
-            declared_count: 2,
-            recovery_count: 0,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-
-    assert!(
-        matches!(
-            err,
-            kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(CoordinatorError::TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery)
-        ),
-        "expected TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery, got {err:?}"
-    );
-}
-
-/// §3.4: Bootstrap with 1 ordinary + 1 recovery operator produces a valid 1-of-2 Shamir split.
-/// Both ordinary and recovery shares are stored; the vault can be unsealed with either one.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-async fn recovery_share_stored_and_used_for_unseal() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let bus = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
-    let vault_ref = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus).await.unwrap());
-    let coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref.clone()));
-
-    // Register one ordinary operator and one recovery operator in the DB
-    let ordinary_id: i32 = {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![1u8; 32]))
-            .returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    };
-    let recovery_id: i32 = {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![2u8; 32]))
-            .returning(schema::recovery_operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    };
-
-    // Declare committee: 1 ordinary + 1 recovery
-    coordinator
-        .ask(StartBootstrap {
-            operator_id: ordinary_id,
-            declared_count: 1,
-            recovery_count: 1,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    // Recovery operator contributes first — bootstrap should not finalize yet
-    let done = coordinator
-        .ask(ContributeRecoveryBootstrap {
-            recovery_operator_id: recovery_id,
-            passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"recovery-pass".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert!(!done, "should not finalize with only recovery passphrase");
-
-    // Ordinary operator contributes — now bootstrap finalizes
-    let done = coordinator
-        .ask(ContributeBootstrap {
-            operator_id: ordinary_id,
-            passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"ordinary-pass".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert!(done, "should finalize once all contributors are in");
-
-    // After bootstrap, vault is Unsealed (seal key still in memory).
-    let state = vault_ref.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(state, VaultState::Unsealed);
-
-    // Verify recovery_operator row was created
-    let recovery_share_count: i64 = {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        schema::recovery_operator::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    };
-    assert_eq!(recovery_share_count, 1);
-
-    // Simulate restart: drop vault and coordinator, create fresh vault (comes up Sealed).
-    drop(coordinator);
-    drop(vault_ref);
-    let bus2 = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
-    let vault_ref2 = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus2).await.unwrap());
-    let state = vault_ref2.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(state, VaultState::Sealed);
-
-    // §3.6: the recovery operator's share only counts once a wake-up request has stood
-    // uncancelled for the full dispute window, so back-date one here before unsealing.
-    {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        sql_query(format!(
-            "INSERT INTO recovery_wakeup_request (requested_by, requested_at) \
-             VALUES ({ordinary_id}, unixepoch('now') - 14*24*3600 - 1)"
-        ))
-        .execute(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    }
-
-    // §3.5: Unseal using ONLY the recovery operator share (threshold = shamir_threshold(1) = 1).
-    let coordinator2 = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref2.clone()));
-    let done = coordinator2
-        .ask(ContributeRecoveryUnseal {
-            recovery_operator_id: recovery_id,
-            passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"recovery-pass".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert!(done, "recovery share alone should satisfy threshold");
-
-    let state = vault_ref2.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(state, VaultState::Unsealed);
-}
-
-/// A committee of zero ordinary operators used to reach `shamir_threshold(0)` and panic,
-/// taking the global coordinator down with it.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-async fn empty_committee_is_rejected_without_panicking() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let bus = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
-    let vault_ref = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus).await.unwrap());
-    let coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db, vault_ref));
-
-    let err = coordinator
-        .ask(StartBootstrap {
-            operator_id: 1,
-            declared_count: 0,
-            recovery_count: 1,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-
-    assert!(
-        matches!(
-            err,
-            kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(CoordinatorError::EmptyCommittee)
-        ),
-        "expected EmptyCommittee, got {err:?}"
-    );
-
-    // The actor must still be alive to serve the next caller.
-    let err = coordinator
-        .ask(StartBootstrap {
-            operator_id: 1,
-            declared_count: 0,
-            recovery_count: 0,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-    assert!(matches!(
-        err,
-        kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(CoordinatorError::EmptyCommittee)
-    ));
-}
-
-/// An approved-but-unfinished operator replacement deletes a share row. The unseal threshold
-/// must still describe the split that is actually stored, not the surviving row count.
-///
-/// Four ordinary operators give a real 3-of-4 `vsss-rs` split (`shamir_threshold(4) == 3`).
-/// Deleting one share row leaves 3 rows, and `shamir_threshold(3) == 2` -- a *different* number
-/// from the recorded threshold. A recount-based unseal would therefore finalize one contribution
-/// early, combine only 2 shares of a 3-of-4 split, and fail to reconstruct the seal key.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-async fn unseal_threshold_survives_a_deleted_share_row() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let bus = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
-    let vault_ref = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus).await.unwrap());
-    let coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref));
-
-    // Four ordinary operators: threshold is 3-of-4.
-    let mut ids = Vec::new();
-    for n in 1..=4u8 {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        let id: i32 = insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![n; 32]))
-            .returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        ids.push(id);
-    }
-
-    coordinator
-        .ask(StartBootstrap {
-            operator_id: ids[0],
-            declared_count: 4,
-            recovery_count: 0,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    for (n, id) in ids.iter().enumerate() {
-        coordinator
-            .ask(ContributeBootstrap {
-                operator_id: *id,
-                passphrase: SafeCell::new(format!("pass-{n}").into_bytes()),
-            })
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-    }
-
-    let stored: Option<i32> = {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        schema::arbiter_settings::table
-            .select(schema::arbiter_settings::shamir_threshold)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    };
-    assert_eq!(stored, Some(3), "bootstrap must record the split threshold");
-
-    // Simulate the aborted replacement: one share row is gone, leaving 3 of the 4 shares.
-    {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        diesel::delete(schema::operator::table)
-            .filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(ids[3])))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-    }
-
-    // Restart and unseal with the three surviving operators' original passphrases.
-    drop(coordinator);
-    let bus2 = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
-    let vault_ref2 = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus2).await.unwrap());
-    let coordinator2 = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref2.clone()));
-
-    let done = coordinator2
-        .ask(ContributeUnseal {
-            operator_id: ids[0],
-            passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"pass-0".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert!(!done, "one share must not be enough for a 3-of-4 split");
-
-    let done = coordinator2
-        .ask(ContributeUnseal {
-            operator_id: ids[1],
-            passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"pass-1".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert!(
-        !done,
-        "two shares must not be enough for a 3-of-4 split -- a recount would wrongly finalize here"
-    );
-
-    let done = coordinator2
-        .ask(ContributeUnseal {
-            operator_id: ids[2],
-            passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"pass-2".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert!(done, "three shares must reconstruct a 3-of-4 split");
-    assert_eq!(
-        vault_ref2.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap(),
-        VaultState::Unsealed
-    );
-}
-
-/// §3.6: recovery operators are asleep by default. Without a wake-up whose 14-day dispute
-/// window has elapsed, their share must not count towards an unseal.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-async fn sleeping_recovery_operator_cannot_contribute_to_unseal() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let bus = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
-    let vault_ref = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus).await.unwrap());
-    let coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref.clone()));
-
-    let ordinary_id: i32 = {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![1u8; 32]))
-            .returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    };
-    let recovery_id: i32 = {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![2u8; 32]))
-            .returning(schema::recovery_operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    };
-
-    coordinator
-        .ask(StartBootstrap {
-            operator_id: ordinary_id,
-            declared_count: 1,
-            recovery_count: 1,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    coordinator
-        .ask(ContributeRecoveryBootstrap {
-            recovery_operator_id: recovery_id,
-            passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"recovery-pass".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    coordinator
-        .ask(ContributeBootstrap {
-            operator_id: ordinary_id,
-            passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"ordinary-pass".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    // Restart so the vault comes up Sealed.
-    drop(coordinator);
-    drop(vault_ref);
-    let bus2 = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
-    let vault_ref2 = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus2).await.unwrap());
-    let coordinator2 = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref2.clone()));
-
-    let err = coordinator2
-        .ask(ContributeRecoveryUnseal {
-            recovery_operator_id: recovery_id,
-            passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"recovery-pass".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-
-    assert!(
-        matches!(
-            err,
-            kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(CoordinatorError::RecoveryNotActive)
-        ),
-        "expected RecoveryNotActive, got {err:?}"
-    );
-    assert_eq!(
-        vault_ref2.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap(),
-        VaultState::Sealed,
-        "a sleeping recovery operator unsealed the vault"
-    );
-}
-
-type PromotionRx = oneshot::Receiver<Result<(), VaultGateError>>;
-
-/// One `VaultGate` per authenticated role against a shared `GlobalActors`, which is what
-/// `peers::operator::start` builds for two connected peers.
-struct RoleGates {
-    ordinary: kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
-    recovery: kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
-    ordinary_id: i32,
-    recovery_id: i32,
-    /// Held only so the gates' promotion channels stay open for the fixture's lifetime.
-    _promotions: (PromotionRx, PromotionRx),
-}
-
-/// Registers one ordinary and one recovery identity, then spawns a gate for each.
-async fn spawn_role_gates(db: &db::DatabasePool, actors: &GlobalActors) -> RoleGates {
-    let ordinary_pubkey = authn::SigningKey::generate().public_key();
-    let recovery_pubkey = authn::SigningKey::generate().public_key();
-
-    let ordinary_id: i32 = {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(ordinary_pubkey.to_bytes()))
-            .returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    };
-    let recovery_id: i32 = {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
-            .values(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(recovery_pubkey.to_bytes()))
-            .returning(schema::recovery_operator_identity::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    };
-
-    let (ordinary_promotion_tx, ordinary_promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
-    let ordinary = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(
-        AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(Credentials {
-            id: ordinary_id,
-            pubkey: ordinary_pubkey,
-        }),
-        actors.clone(),
-        db.clone(),
-        ordinary_promotion_tx,
-    ));
-
-    let (recovery_promotion_tx, recovery_promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
-    let recovery = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(
-        AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(RecoveryCredentials {
-            id: recovery_id,
-            pubkey: recovery_pubkey,
-        }),
-        actors.clone(),
-        db.clone(),
-        recovery_promotion_tx,
-    ));
-
-    RoleGates {
-        ordinary,
-        recovery,
-        ordinary_id,
-        recovery_id,
-        _promotions: (ordinary_promotion_rx, recovery_promotion_rx),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Runs the gate's X25519 handshake and encrypts `seal_key` to the shared secret, producing the
-/// message a peer would send to bootstrap the vault. Mirrors `tests/operator/unseal.rs`'s
-/// `client_dh_encrypt`, which does the same for the unseal side.
-async fn bootstrap_key_for(
-    gate: &kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
-    seal_key: &[u8; 32],
-) -> HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
-    let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
-    let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
-
-    let response = gate
-        .ask(HandleHandshake {
-            client_pubkey: client_public,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&response.server_pubkey);
-    let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
-    let nonce = XNonce::from([0u8; 24]);
-    let associated_data = b"bootstrap";
-    let mut ciphertext = seal_key.to_vec();
-    cipher
-        .encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut ciphertext)
-        .unwrap();
-
-    HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
-        nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
-        ciphertext,
-        associated_data: associated_data.to_vec(),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Asserts a gate turned a request down on the peer's role rather than on anything else --
-/// notably not on coordinator state, which is what an unguarded handler would have reported.
-#[track_caller]
-fn assert_role_refused<T: std::fmt::Debug, M>(
-    what: &str,
-    result: Result<T, kameo::error::SendError<M, VaultGateError>>,
-) {
-    match result {
-        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(VaultGateError::RoleNotPermitted)) => {}
-        other => panic!("{what}: expected RoleNotPermitted, got {other:?}"),
-    }
-}
-
-/// §3.5: which committee seat a passphrase fills is decided by the handshake, not by the
-/// request, so neither role can spend the other's slot.
-///
-/// Neither request carries an operator id, so the ordinary peer has nothing left to forge; the
-/// point of running the bootstrap to completion afterwards is that its refusal left the
-/// recovery seat empty rather than filling it under a chosen id.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-async fn ordinary_operator_cannot_contribute_a_recovery_share() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = common::spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
-    let gates = spawn_role_gates(&db, &actors).await;
-    assert_eq!(
-        gates.ordinary_id, gates.recovery_id,
-        "the two ids must collide for the attestation check at the end to mean anything"
-    );
-
-    gates
-        .ordinary
-        .ask(HandleDeclareCommittee {
-            count: 1,
-            recovery_count: 1,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    assert_role_refused(
-        "an ordinary operator contributed a recovery share",
-        gates
-            .ordinary
-            .ask(HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase {
-                passphrase: b"forged-recovery-pass".to_vec(),
-            })
-            .await,
-    );
-
-    assert_role_refused(
-        "a recovery operator contributed an ordinary share",
-        gates
-            .recovery
-            .ask(HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase {
-                passphrase: b"forged-ordinary-pass".to_vec(),
-            })
-            .await,
-    );
-
-    // The recovery seat is still empty: had the forged contribution landed, this one would come
-    // back as a duplicate instead of being accepted.
-    let done = gates
-        .recovery
-        .ask(HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase {
-            passphrase: b"recovery-pass".to_vec(),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert!(!done, "the ordinary share is still outstanding");
-
-    let done = gates
-        .ordinary
-        .ask(HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase {
-            passphrase: b"ordinary-pass".to_vec(),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert!(done, "both seats are filled, so bootstrap must finalize");
-    assert_eq!(
-        actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap(),
-        VaultState::Unsealed
-    );
-
-    // Both peers hold the same id in their own table (asserted above), so only the attestation
-    // kind tells the two envelopes apart. Two rows means the recovery peer signed as itself
-    // rather than overwriting the ordinary operator's attestation.
-    let kinds = common::eventually("both bootstrap attestations are written", || {
-        let db = db.clone();
-        async move {
-            let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-            let mut kinds: Vec<String> = schema::integrity_envelope::table
-                .select(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind)
-                .load(&mut conn)
-                .await
-                .unwrap();
-            kinds.sort();
-            (kinds.len() == 2).then_some(kinds)
-        }
-    })
-    .await;
-    assert_eq!(
-        kinds,
-        vec![
-            "operator_credentials".to_owned(),
-            "recovery_operator_credentials".to_owned(),
-        ]
-    );
-}
-
-/// Every gate action that belongs to one role refuses the other, and refuses it before the
-/// action takes effect.
-///
-/// The vault is left unbootstrapped and the coordinator idle on purpose: an unguarded handler
-/// would reach the vault or the coordinator and come back with `State`, `NotBootstrapping` or
-/// `NotUnsealing`, so `RoleNotPermitted` can only come from the role check itself.
-///
-/// §3.4/§3.5: `HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey` matters most here. It hands the vault a root key of
-/// the peer's choosing, and the window it needs -- an unbootstrapped vault that already holds
-/// recovery identity rows -- is exactly the state committee formation has to pass through.
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-async fn vault_gate_refuses_the_actions_of_the_other_role() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = common::spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
-    let gates = spawn_role_gates(&db, &actors).await;
-
-    assert_role_refused(
-        "a recovery operator declared the committee",
-        gates
-            .recovery
-            .ask(HandleDeclareCommittee {
-                count: 1,
-                recovery_count: 1,
-            })
-            .await,
-    );
-
-    // A key the vault would have accepted, negotiated through the gate's own handshake -- so
-    // the refusal comes from the role and not from a malformed request.
-    let seized_key = bootstrap_key_for(&gates.recovery, b"recovery-seized-32-byte-seal-key").await;
-    assert_role_refused(
-        "a recovery operator bootstrapped the vault",
-        gates.recovery.ask(seized_key).await,
-    );
-
-    assert_role_refused(
-        "a recovery operator contributed an ordinary bootstrap share",
-        gates
-            .recovery
-            .ask(HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase {
-                passphrase: b"forged-ordinary-pass".to_vec(),
-            })
-            .await,
-    );
-
-    assert_role_refused(
-        "an ordinary operator contributed a recovery bootstrap share",
-        gates
-            .ordinary
-            .ask(HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase {
-                passphrase: b"forged-recovery-pass".to_vec(),
-            })
-            .await,
-    );
-
-    assert_role_refused(
-        "a recovery operator contributed an ordinary unseal share",
-        gates
-            .recovery
-            .ask(HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase {
-                passphrase: b"forged-ordinary-pass".to_vec(),
-            })
-            .await,
-    );
-
-    assert_role_refused(
-        "an ordinary operator contributed a recovery unseal share",
-        gates
-            .ordinary
-            .ask(HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase {
-                passphrase: b"forged-recovery-pass".to_vec(),
-            })
-            .await,
-    );
-
-    // Nothing above took effect: the refusals came before the vault and the coordinator.
-    assert_eq!(
-        actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap(),
-        VaultState::Unbootstrapped,
-        "a refused request still reached the vault"
-    );
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/vault/storage.rs

@@ -10,45 +10,47 @@ use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 use std::collections::HashSet;
 
+const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
+
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
+async fn create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
 
     let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
     let aead_id = actor
-        .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
+        .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
         .await
         .unwrap();
 
-    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
+    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
+async fn decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
 
-    let err = actor.decrypt(9999).await.unwrap_err();
+    let err = actor.decrypt(9999, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
     assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotFound));
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
+async fn ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
 
     let plaintext = b"same content";
     let id1 = actor
-        .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
+        .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
         .await
         .unwrap();
     let id2 = actor
-        .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
+        .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
         .await
         .unwrap();
 
@@ -68,22 +70,22 @@ async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
 
     assert_ne!(row1.ciphertext, row2.ciphertext);
 
-    let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1).await.unwrap();
-    let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2).await.unwrap();
+    let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
+    let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(*d1.read(), plaintext);
     assert_eq!(*d2.read(), plaintext);
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
-async fn test_nonce_never_reused() {
+async fn nonce_never_reused() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
 
     let n = 5;
     for i in 0..n {
         actor
-            .create_new(SafeCell::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()))
+            .create_new(SafeCell::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
             .await
             .unwrap();
     }
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
     drop(conn);
 
     let err = actor
-        .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"must fail".to_vec()))
+        .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"must fail".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
         .await
         .unwrap_err();
     assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
     let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
     let id = actor
-        .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()))
+        .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
         .await
         .unwrap();
     let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -156,6 +158,6 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
         .unwrap();
     drop(conn);
 
-    let err = actor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap_err();
+    let err = actor.decrypt(id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
     assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
 }