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hdbg 205227a3df fix(server::integrity): vault now differentias between expected/unexpected states for commands more granularly

2026-04-08 18:21:48 +02:00

.claude/memory

feat(evm): add EVM grants screen with create UI and list

2026-04-03 22:20:07 +02:00

.woodpecker

ci(server-test): ensure that all features are compiling

2026-04-04 14:06:02 +00:00

app

refactor(transport): implemented Bi stream based abstraction for actor communication with next loop override

2026-03-11 14:07:46 +01:00

docs/superpowers

feat(useragent): vibe-coded access list

2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00

protobufs

fix(server::user_agent): useragents now self-sign themselves on bootstrap

2026-04-08 17:40:45 +02:00

scripts

feat(server::evm): more criterion types

2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00

server

fix(server::integrity): vault now differentias between expected/unexpected states for commands more granularly

2026-04-08 18:21:48 +02:00

useragent

fix(useragent): unsafe, but working implementation of ml-dsa

2026-04-08 17:43:51 +02:00

.gitignore

feat(evm): add EVM grants screen with create UI and list

2026-04-03 22:20:07 +02:00

AGENTS.md

refactor(server): reorganized client/user_agent actors into separate module peers and added event MessageBus

2026-04-08 12:34:16 +02:00

ARCHITECTURE.md

docs: add recovery operators and multi-operator details

2026-04-05 08:27:24 +00:00

CLAUDE.md

refactor(server): reorganized client/user_agent actors into separate module peers and added event MessageBus

2026-04-08 12:34:16 +02:00

IMPLEMENTATION.md

docs: ml-dsa scheme everywhere

2026-04-07 15:02:32 +02:00

LICENSE

misc: create license and readme

2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00

mise.lock

fix(useragent): unsafe, but working implementation of ml-dsa

2026-04-08 17:43:51 +02:00

mise.toml

fix(useragent): unsafe, but working implementation of ml-dsa

2026-04-08 17:43:51 +02:00

README.md

misc: create license and readme

2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00

README.md

Arbiter

Policy-first multi-client wallet daemon, allowing permissioned transactions across blockchains

Security warning

Arbiter can't meaningfully protect against host compromise. Potential attack flow:

Attacker steals TLS keys from database
Pretends to be server; just accepts user agent challenge solutions
Pretend to be in sealed state and performing DH with client
Steals user password and derives seal key

While this attack is highly targetive, it's still possible.

This software is experimental. Do not use with funds you cannot afford to lose.

Languages

Rust 57.1%

Dart 39.6%

C++ 1.1%

CMake 0.9%

Ruby 0.3%

Other 0.8%