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Author SHA1 Message Date
CleverWild
a30bef11da fix: terminate VaultGate connection after vault lockout
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2026-06-30 20:07:01 +02:00
357726bc5d Merge pull request 'security: batch of fixes' (#95) from zeroized-bootstrap-token into main
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Reviewed-on: #95
2026-06-29 18:00:14 +00:00
Clippy Bot
23827c613e test(client-auth): update metadata test to reflect frozen-metadata behavior
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2026-06-28 12:06:06 +02:00
Clippy Bot
8381b68a52 Merge branch 'main' into zeroized-bootstrap-token
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2026-06-27 13:25:27 +02:00
Clippy Bot
022003ac5e fix: lints
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2026-06-25 20:09:18 +02:00
CleverWild
00ddf99d77 fix!: protect evm_wallet integrity and bind key ciphertext to wallet address
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Three independent failures allowed an offline attacker with DB write access
to sign transactions using a different wallet's private key:
1. evm_wallet had no HMAC envelope — aead_encrypted_id could be swapped silently.
2. AEAD used a static tag as AAD — any valid ciphertext decrypted as any wallet key.
3. No post-decryption check that the derived address matched the requested wallet.

Fix: sign_entity covers (address, aead_encrypted_id) in a single transaction;
CreateNew/Decrypt take caller-provided AAD (wallet address bytes); after decryption
signer.address() is verified against the requested wallet address.
2026-06-22 17:53:34 +02:00
CleverWild
b7ab5c79b7 fix(client-auth): freeze client metadata after initial operator approval
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2026-06-22 16:07:58 +02:00
CleverWild
b8e092b9d7 fix(operator): bind sign-transaction to operator-approved client set
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2026-06-22 15:58:40 +02:00
CleverWild
9c9dc1fbb5 fix(integrity): return AttestationStatus::Unavailable for key version mismatch
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2026-06-22 15:50:43 +02:00
CleverWild
77bf19f99e fix(wallet): delete access entries by entry ID instead of wallet ID
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2026-06-22 14:55:32 +02:00
CleverWild
f0456157d5 security(bootstrap): use SafeCell for token storage instead of zeroize
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2026-06-19 22:53:28 +02:00
CleverWild
c12c12d73e fix(UA): signing endpoint accepts arbitrary client_id
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2026-06-19 22:21:48 +02:00
CleverWild
670448292a security: feat unseal and bootstrap handshake brute-force protection
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2026-06-18 21:16:38 +02:00
CleverWild
85f27d8f09 fix(bootstrap): token persists on disk with weak file permissions #59
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2026-06-18 20:59:24 +02:00
CleverWild
32ceb27d77 security(server): use SysRng directly for bootstrap token generation
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Replace make_rng()/StdRng with UnwrapErr(SysRng) to eliminate the PRNG
intermediate layer and make OS entropy derivation explicit and unambiguous.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 19:30:31 +02:00
CleverWild
dc03923c24 security(memory): zeroization of bootstrap token
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2026-06-18 17:16:06 +02:00
CleverWild
b843105533 fix(user-agent): zombie sessions #74
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2026-06-18 16:29:43 +02:00
a8e4a710f1 Merge pull request 'security(server): bind grant revocation state (revoked_at) to integrity hash' (#83) from security-hash-revoke_at into main
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Reviewed-on: #83
2026-06-11 09:44:28 +00:00
CleverWild
d99c87c473 fix: lints
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2026-06-09 21:07:01 +02:00
CleverWild
303120c9ac Merge branch 'main' into security-hash-revoke_at
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2026-06-09 20:58:20 +02:00
CleverWild
32f317384d security(evm): remove client-controlled wallet_access_id from grant revocation
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2026-06-09 19:36:44 +02:00
CleverWild
4bb2c062dc feat(evm): add wallet_access_id to grant deletion requests and revocation logic
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2026-06-09 19:16:21 +02:00
CleverWild
b0a3f37cea refactor(evm): implement revoke_grant method for grant revocation 2026-06-09 19:11:39 +02:00
CleverWild
58a72da46c Merge branch 'security-hash-revoke_at' of ssh://git.markettakers.org:22222/MarketTakers/arbiter into security-hash-revoke_at
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2026-06-09 19:10:57 +02:00
CleverWild
e287459b10 revert(server): bind grant revocation state (revoked_at) to integrity hash 2026-06-09 18:45:30 +02:00
CleverWild
3c482da917 fix(smlang::statemachine): macro invocation requires inner types to be public
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2026-06-08 18:00:52 +02:00
CleverWild
5a34463228 security(server): bind grant revocation state (revoked_at) to integrity hash
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2026-04-08 12:09:54 +02:00
33 changed files with 980 additions and 257 deletions

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1; UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2; UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3; UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
UNSEAL_RESULT_LOCKED_OUT = 4;
} }
message Request { message Request {

9
server/Cargo.lock generated
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@@ -771,6 +771,7 @@ dependencies = [
"proptest", "proptest",
"prost-types", "prost-types",
"rand 0.10.1", "rand 0.10.1",
"rand_core 0.10.1",
"rcgen", "rcgen",
"restructed", "restructed",
"rstest", "rstest",
@@ -6261,18 +6262,18 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]] [[package]]
name = "zeroize" name = "zeroize"
version = "1.8.2" version = "1.9.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b97154e67e32c85465826e8bcc1c59429aaaf107c1e4a9e53c8d8ccd5eff88d0" checksum = "e13c156562582aa81c60cb29407084cdb54c4164760106ab78e6c5b0858cf64e"
dependencies = [ dependencies = [
"zeroize_derive", "zeroize_derive",
] ]
[[package]] [[package]]
name = "zeroize_derive" name = "zeroize_derive"
version = "1.4.3" version = "1.5.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "85a5b4158499876c763cb03bc4e49185d3cccbabb15b33c627f7884f43db852e" checksum = "3c50655cbb0fe3fc43170059e702f1ce5e19b84cec58dc87b037a09935c2f328"
dependencies = [ dependencies = [
"proc-macro2", "proc-macro2",
"quote", "quote",

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ mutants = "0.0.4"
prost = "0.14.3" prost = "0.14.3"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] } prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
rand = "0.10.1" rand = "0.10.1"
rand_core = "0.10.1"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs", "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false } rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs", "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false }
rstest = "0.26.1" rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls = { version = "0.23.40", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false } rustls = { version = "0.23.40", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ needless_pass_by_ref_mut = "allow"
pub_underscore_fields = "allow" pub_underscore_fields = "allow"
redundant_pub_crate = "allow" redundant_pub_crate = "allow"
uninhabited_references = "allow" # safe with unsafe_code = "forbid" and standard uninhabited pattern (match *self {}) uninhabited_references = "allow" # safe with unsafe_code = "forbid" and standard uninhabited pattern (match *self {})
too-many-lines = "allow" # this is a very common pattern in server code, and it's not always possible to break it down into smaller modules without hurting readability
# restriction lints # restriction lints
alloc_instead_of_core = "warn" alloc_instead_of_core = "warn"

View File

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
key: &SigningKey, key: &SigningKey,
challenge: AuthChallenge, challenge: AuthChallenge,
) -> Result<(), AuthError> { ) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos as i64); let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos.cast_signed());
let challenge = authn::AuthChallenge { let challenge = authn::AuthChallenge {
nonce: *challenge nonce: *challenge
.random .random

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.2", features = ["sqlite"] }
async-trait.workspace = true async-trait.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true tokio-stream.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true rand.workspace = true
rand_core.workspace = true
rcgen.workspace = true rcgen.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true chrono.workspace = true
kameo.workspace = true kameo.workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,29 +1,48 @@
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema}; use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path}; use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::QueryDsl; use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl; use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages}; use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng}; use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, rngs::SysRng};
use rand_core::UnwrapErr;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _; use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
use thiserror::Error; use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::warn;
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64; const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> { async fn write_token_file(path: &Path, content: &str) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
let rng: StdRng = make_rng(); tokio::fs::write(path, content.as_bytes()).await?;
let token = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold( #[cfg(unix)]
String::default(), {
|mut accum, char| { use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
accum += char.to_string().as_str(); tokio::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).await?;
accum }
},
);
tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?; Ok(())
}
Ok(token) async fn generate_token(path: &Path) -> Result<SafeCell<[u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]>, std::io::Error> {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new([0u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]);
{
let mut buf = cell.write();
for (slot, b) in buf
.iter_mut()
.zip(UnwrapErr(SysRng).sample_iter(Alphanumeric))
{
*slot = b;
}
}
let token_str = cell.read_inline(|buf| String::from_utf8_lossy(buf.as_ref()).into_owned());
write_token_file(path, &token_str).await?;
Ok(cell)
} }
#[derive(Error, Debug)] #[derive(Error, Debug)]
@@ -40,7 +59,8 @@ pub enum Error {
#[derive(Actor)] #[derive(Actor)]
pub struct Bootstrapper { pub struct Bootstrapper {
token: Option<String>, token: Option<SafeCell<[u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]>>,
token_path: Option<PathBuf>,
} }
impl Bootstrapper { impl Bootstrapper {
@@ -54,34 +74,37 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
.await? .await?
}; };
let token = if row_count == 0 { let (token, token_path) = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?; let path = home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH);
Some(token) let token = generate_token(&path).await?;
(Some(token), Some(path))
} else { } else {
None (None, None)
}; };
Ok(Self { token }) Ok(Self { token, token_path })
}
}
impl Bootstrapper {
fn is_correct_token(&mut self, token: &[u8]) -> bool {
self.token.as_mut().is_some_and(|expected| {
expected.read_inline(|exp| bool::from(exp.as_ref().ct_eq(token)))
})
} }
} }
#[messages] #[messages]
impl Bootstrapper { impl Bootstrapper {
#[message] #[message]
pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool { pub async fn consume_token(&mut self, token: Vec<u8>) -> bool {
self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| { if self.is_correct_token(&token) {
let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
bool::from(choice)
})
}
#[message]
pub fn consume_token(&mut self, token: String) -> bool {
if self.is_correct_token(token) {
self.token = None; self.token = None;
if let Some(path) = self.token_path.take()
&& let Err(e) = tokio::fs::remove_file(&path).await
{
warn!(error = ?e, path = ?path, "Failed to delete bootstrap token file after consumption");
}
true true
} else { } else {
false false
@@ -92,7 +115,9 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
#[messages] #[messages]
impl Bootstrapper { impl Bootstrapper {
#[message] #[message]
pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> { pub fn get_token(&mut self) -> Option<String> {
self.token.clone() self.token
.as_mut()
.map(|cell| cell.read_inline(|buf| String::from_utf8_lossy(buf.as_ref()).into_owned()))
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
use crate::{ use crate::{
actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault}, actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
crypto::integrity, crypto::integrity::{self, Integrable},
db::{ db::{
DatabaseError, DatabasePool, DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
models::{self}, models::{self},
@@ -25,14 +25,35 @@ use diesel::{
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl; use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages}; use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng}; use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use tracing::error;
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer; pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
/// Integrity guard that binds a wallet's encrypted key ID to its Ethereum address.
/// Both fields are included in the HMAC — swapping `aead_encrypted_id` in the DB
/// invalidates the envelope MAC, and the AEAD ciphertext is also bound to `address`
/// as AAD, so decryption fails too.
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
struct EvmWalletIntegrity {
aead_encrypted_id: i32,
address: Address,
}
impl Integrable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
const KIND: &'static str = "evm_wallet";
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)] #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError { pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Wallet not found")] #[error("Wallet not found")]
WalletNotFound, WalletNotFound,
#[error("Decrypted key does not match requested wallet address")]
KeyAddressMismatch,
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
#[error("Database error: {0}")] #[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError), Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
@@ -64,6 +85,12 @@ pub enum Error {
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error), Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
} }
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
Self::Database(DatabaseError::from(e))
}
}
#[derive(Actor)] #[derive(Actor)]
pub struct EvmActor { pub struct EvmActor {
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>, pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
@@ -97,20 +124,39 @@ impl EvmActor {
let aead_id: i32 = self let aead_id: i32 = self
.vault .vault
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext }) .ask(CreateNew {
plaintext,
aad: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
})
.await .await
.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?; .map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?; let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table) let wallet_id = conn
.values(&models::NewEvmWallet { .exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(), let wallet_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id, .values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
})
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)
.map_err(Error::Database)?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&self.vault,
&EvmWalletIntegrity { address, aead_encrypted_id: aead_id },
wallet_id,
)
.await
.map_err(Error::Integrity)?;
Ok::<i32, Error>(wallet_id)
}) })
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id) .await?;
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok((wallet_id, address)) Ok((wallet_id, address))
} }
@@ -160,29 +206,14 @@ impl EvmActor {
} }
#[message] #[message]
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "reserved for impl")] pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(
pub async fn operator_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> { &mut self,
// let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?; grant_id: i32,
// let vault = self.vault.clone(); ) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.engine
// diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| { .revoke_grant(grant_id)
// Box::pin(async move { .await
// diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table) .map_err(Error::from)
// .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
// .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
// .execute(conn)
// .await?;
// let signed = integrity::evm::load_signed_grant_by_basic_id(conn, grant_id).await?;
// diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(())
// })
// })
// .await
// .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// Ok(())
todo!()
} }
#[message] #[message]
@@ -256,16 +287,51 @@ impl EvmActor {
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?; .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
drop(conn); drop(conn);
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let attestation = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut conn,
&self.vault,
&EvmWalletIntegrity {
address: wallet_address,
aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
},
wallet.id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, wallet_id = wallet.id, "EVM wallet integrity check failed");
SignTransactionError::Internal
})?;
drop(conn);
if attestation != integrity::AttestationStatus::Attested {
error!(
wallet_id = wallet.id,
"EVM wallet integrity unavailable; refusing to sign"
);
return Err(SignTransactionError::Internal);
}
let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
.vault .vault
.ask(Decrypt { .ask(Decrypt {
aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id, aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
aad: wallet.address.clone(),
}) })
.await .await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?; .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?; let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
if signer.address() != wallet_address {
error!(
expected = %wallet_address,
actual = %signer.address(),
"Decrypted private key address does not match requested wallet"
);
return Err(SignTransactionError::KeyAddressMismatch);
}
self.engine self.engine
.evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution) .evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.await?; .await?;

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,9 @@ use kameo::{
prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef}, prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::ReplySender, reply::ReplySender,
}; };
use std::ops::ControlFlow; use std::{ops::ControlFlow, time::Duration};
const APPROVAL_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
pub struct Args { pub struct Args {
pub client: ClientProfile, pub client: ClientProfile,
@@ -64,6 +66,14 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
.await; .await;
} }
let weak = actor_ref.downgrade();
tokio::spawn(async move {
tokio::time::sleep(APPROVAL_TIMEOUT).await;
if let Some(r) = weak.upgrade() {
let _ = r.tell(OnApprovalTimeout {}).await;
}
});
Ok(this) Ok(this)
} }
@@ -104,4 +114,14 @@ impl ClientApprovalController {
ctx.stop(); ctx.stop();
} }
} }
/// Fired after `APPROVAL_TIMEOUT` elapses. Any operator that hasn't responded
/// by then is treated as a denial to prevent zombie sessions from blocking the flow.
#[message(ctx)]
pub fn on_approval_timeout(&mut self, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
if self.pending > 0 {
self.send_reply(Ok(false));
ctx.stop();
}
}
} }

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ pub mod client_connect_approval;
pub struct FlowCoordinator { pub struct FlowCoordinator {
pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>, pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
/// Maps DB `client_id` → `ActorId` for fast connected-client lookup.
client_ids: HashMap<i32, ActorId>,
operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>, operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
} }
@@ -27,6 +29,7 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
pub fn new(operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>) -> Self { pub fn new(operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>) -> Self {
Self { Self {
clients: HashMap::default(), clients: HashMap::default(),
client_ids: HashMap::default(),
operator_registry, operator_registry,
} }
} }
@@ -48,6 +51,7 @@ impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
_: ActorStopReason, _: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> { ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() { if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
self.client_ids.retain(|_, actor_id| *actor_id != id);
info!( info!(
?id, ?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator", actor = "FlowCoordinator",
@@ -75,14 +79,28 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
#[message(ctx)] #[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_client( pub async fn register_client(
&mut self, &mut self,
client_id: i32,
actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>, actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) { ) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected"); info!(id = %actor.id(), client_id, actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await; ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.client_ids.insert(client_id, actor.id());
self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor); self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor);
} }
#[message]
pub fn is_client_connected(&self, client_id: i32) -> bool {
self.client_ids.contains_key(&client_id)
}
/// Returns the DB `client_ids` of all currently connected SDK clients.
/// Used by operator sessions on startup to seed their approved-client set.
#[message]
pub fn get_connected_client_ids(&self) -> Vec<i32> {
self.client_ids.keys().copied().collect()
}
#[message(ctx)] #[message(ctx)]
pub async fn request_client_approval( pub async fn request_client_approval(
&mut self, &mut self,

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages}; use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish}; use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant}; use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info}; use tracing::{error, info, warn};
pub mod events { pub mod events {
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ pub enum Error {
Sealed, Sealed,
#[error("Invalid key provided")] #[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey, InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault locked: too many failed unseal attempts")]
LockedOut,
#[error("Requested aead entry not found")] #[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
NotFound, NotFound,
@@ -61,6 +63,9 @@ pub enum Error {
#[error("Broken database")] #[error("Broken database")]
BrokenDatabase, BrokenDatabase,
#[error("Integrity key version mismatch: envelope uses key {envelope}, current key is {current}")]
KeyVersionMismatch { envelope: i32, current: i32 },
} }
struct Unsealed { struct Unsealed {
@@ -79,6 +84,8 @@ enum State {
Unsealed(Unsealed), Unsealed(Unsealed),
} }
const MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 5;
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed). /// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
/// ///
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key. /// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
@@ -88,6 +95,7 @@ pub struct Vault {
db: db::DatabasePool, db: db::DatabasePool,
state: State, state: State,
events: ActorRef<MessageBus>, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
unseal_failures: u32,
} }
#[messages] #[messages]
@@ -110,7 +118,7 @@ impl Vault {
} }
}; };
Ok(Self { db, state, events }) Ok(Self { db, state, events, unseal_failures: 0 })
} }
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write // Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write
@@ -219,6 +227,10 @@ impl Vault {
#[message] #[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> { pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
if self.unseal_failures >= MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS {
return Err(Error::LockedOut);
}
let State::Sealed { let State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id, root_key_history_id,
} = &self.state } = &self.state
@@ -251,13 +263,27 @@ impl Vault {
Error::BrokenDatabase Error::BrokenDatabase
})?; })?;
seal_key if seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key) .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
.map_err(|err| { .is_err()
error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key"); {
Error::InvalidKey self.unseal_failures += 1;
})?; if self.unseal_failures >= MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS {
error!(
attempts = self.unseal_failures,
"Vault locked: maximum failed unseal attempts reached"
);
} else {
warn!(
attempts = self.unseal_failures,
remaining = MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS - self.unseal_failures,
"Failed unseal attempt"
);
}
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
}
self.unseal_failures = 0;
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed { self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: current_key.id, root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| { root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
@@ -272,8 +298,10 @@ impl Vault {
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
/// Decrypts an AEAD entry. The `aad` must match the value used at encryption time;
/// a mismatch causes authentication failure, preventing cross-wallet key swaps.
#[message] #[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> { pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32, aad: Vec<u8>) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?; let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = { let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
@@ -295,13 +323,15 @@ impl Vault {
Error::BrokenDatabase Error::BrokenDatabase
})?; })?;
let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext); let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?; root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut output)?;
Ok(output) Ok(output)
} }
/// Creates a new `aead_encrypted` entry and returns its ID.
/// The `aad` is bound into the ciphertext and must be reproduced exactly at decryption time.
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID // Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message] #[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> { pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, aad: Vec<u8>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let Unsealed { let Unsealed {
root_key, root_key,
root_key_history_id, root_key_history_id,
@@ -313,7 +343,7 @@ impl Vault {
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write(); let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut(); let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?; root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer); let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
@@ -346,12 +376,10 @@ impl Vault {
root_key_history_id, root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?; } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let mut hmac = root_key let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
.0 HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
.read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) { .unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
Ok(v) => v, });
Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
});
hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes()); hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input); hmac.update(&mac_input);
@@ -372,15 +400,16 @@ impl Vault {
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?; } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
if *root_key_history_id != key_version { if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
return Ok(false); return Err(Error::KeyVersionMismatch {
envelope: key_version,
current: *root_key_history_id,
});
} }
let mut hmac = root_key let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
.0 HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
.read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) { .unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
Ok(v) => v, });
Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
});
hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes()); hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input); hmac.update(&mac_input);
@@ -423,12 +452,13 @@ mod tests {
async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() { async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await; let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let root_key_history_id = match actor.state {
State::Unsealed(Unsealed { let State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id, root_key_history_id,
.. ..
}) => root_key_history_id, }) = actor.state
_ => panic!("expected unsealed state"), else {
panic!("expected unsealed state")
}; };
let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id) let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
@@ -440,15 +470,15 @@ mod tests {
assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase"); assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap(); let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table let root_row: RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
.select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select()) .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn) .first(&mut conn)
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec()); assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
let id = actor let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()), b"test-aad".to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table

View File

@@ -192,7 +192,9 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch { Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND, entity_kind: E::KIND,
}), }),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable), Err(SendError::HandlerError(
vault::Error::Sealed | vault::Error::KeyVersionMismatch { .. },
)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend), Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
} }
} }
@@ -331,4 +333,47 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap_err(); .unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. })); assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
} }
#[tokio::test]
async fn key_version_mismatch_returns_unavailable_not_mac_mismatch() {
use crate::db::schema::integrity_envelope;
use super::AttestationStatus;
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-rotation-test";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
// Simulate key rotation: update the stored key_version to a stale value.
// After real rotation the vault's root_key_history_id would advance, but
// here we achieve the same mismatch by back-dating the envelope's key_version.
diesel::update(integrity_envelope::table)
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.set(integrity_envelope::key_version.eq(0))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// Must NOT error — version mismatch is Unavailable, not tampered.
let status = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.expect("key version mismatch must not be treated as an error");
assert_eq!(
status,
AttestationStatus::Unavailable,
"stale key_version must yield Unavailable, not MacMismatch"
);
}
} }

View File

@@ -1,28 +1,34 @@
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use crate::{ use crate::{
actors::vault::Vault, actors::vault::Vault,
crypto::integrity, crypto::integrity,
db::{ db::{
self, DatabaseError, self, DatabaseError,
models::{ models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp, EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget,
EvmEtherTransferLimit, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
}, },
schema::{self, evm_transaction_log}, schema::{self, evm_transaction_log},
}, },
evm::policies::{ evm::policies::{
CombinedSettings, DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, CombinedSettings, DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy,
SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
token_transfers::TokenTransfer, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
}, },
}; };
use alloy::{ use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559, consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{TxKind, U256}, primitives::{Address, TxKind, U256},
}; };
use chrono::Utc; use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite}; use diesel::{
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl}; ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, SelectableHelper,
use kameo::actor::ActorRef; insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite, update,
};
pub mod abi; pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer; pub mod safe_signer;
@@ -272,6 +278,151 @@ impl Engine {
Ok(id) Ok(id)
} }
pub async fn revoke_grant(
&self,
basic_grant_id: i32,
) -> Result<(), DatabaseError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let vault = self.vault.clone();
conn.transaction(async move |conn| {
use crate::db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target,
evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
};
update(evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(basic_grant_id))
.set(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = evm_basic_grant::table
.filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(basic_grant_id))
.select(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.first(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let shared = SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?;
if let Some(ether_grant) = evm_ether_transfer_grant::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(basic_grant_id))
.select(EvmEtherTransferGrant::as_select())
.first(&mut *conn)
.await
.optional()?
{
let target_rows: Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget> =
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq(ether_grant.id))
.select(EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget::as_select())
.load(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let targets: Vec<Address> = target_rows
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|target| {
let arr: [u8; 20] = target.address.try_into().ok()?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
})
.collect();
let limit: EvmEtherTransferLimit = evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq(ether_grant.limit_id))
.select(EvmEtherTransferLimit::as_select())
.first(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let settings = CombinedSettings {
shared: shared.clone(),
specific: policies::ether_transfer::Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(
|err| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
},
)?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs.into()),
},
},
};
integrity::sign_entity(&mut *conn, &vault, &settings, basic_grant_id)
.await
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
return QueryResult::Ok(());
}
if let Some(token_grant) = evm_token_transfer_grant::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(basic_grant_id))
.select(EvmTokenTransferGrant::as_select())
.first(&mut *conn)
.await
.optional()?
{
let volume_limit_rows: Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit> =
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq(token_grant.id))
.select(EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit::as_select())
.load(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = volume_limit_rows
.into_iter()
.map(|row| {
Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(
|err| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
},
)?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(row.window_secs.into()),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
let target: Option<Address> = match token_grant.receiver {
None => None,
Some(bytes) => {
let arr: [u8; 20] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid receiver address length".into(),
)
})?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
}
};
let token_contract: [u8; 20] =
token_grant.token_contract.clone().try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid token contract address length".into(),
)
})?;
let settings = CombinedSettings {
shared,
specific: policies::token_transfers::Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
},
};
integrity::sign_entity(&mut *conn, &vault, &settings, basic_grant_id)
.await
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
return QueryResult::Ok(());
}
Err(diesel::result::Error::NotFound)
})
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)
}
async fn list_one_kind<Kind: Policy, Y>( async fn list_one_kind<Kind: Policy, Y>(
&self, &self,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>, conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
@@ -351,11 +502,15 @@ impl Engine {
#[cfg(test)] #[cfg(test)]
mod tests { mod tests {
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address}; use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc}; use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into}; use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl; use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
use rstest::rstest; use rstest::rstest;
use crate::actors::{GlobalActors, vault::{Bootstrap, Vault}};
use crate::crypto::integrity;
use crate::db::{ use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection, self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{ models::{
@@ -363,8 +518,10 @@ mod tests {
}, },
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log}, schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
}; };
use crate::evm::policies::ether_transfer::EtherTransfer;
use crate::evm::policies::{ use crate::evm::policies::{
EvalContext, EvalViolation, SharedGrantSettings, TransactionRateLimit, CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit,
}; };
use super::check_shared_constraints; use super::check_shared_constraints;
@@ -396,6 +553,7 @@ mod tests {
chain: CHAIN_ID, chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None, valid_from: None,
valid_until: None, valid_until: None,
revoked_at: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None, max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None, max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None, rate_limit: None,
@@ -604,4 +762,115 @@ mod tests {
assert!(violations.is_empty()); assert!(violations.is_empty());
} }
} }
async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
let actor = Vault::spawn(
Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap(),
);
actor
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actor
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoke_grant_preserves_revoked_integrity() {
use crate::db::schema::evm_basic_grant;
use diesel::ExpressionMethods as _;
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let engine = super::Engine::new(db.clone(), vault.clone());
let full_grant = CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
revoked_at: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
},
specific: super::policies::ether_transfer::Settings {
target: vec![RECIPIENT],
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(100u64),
window: Duration::hours(1),
},
},
};
let grant_id = engine
.create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(full_grant)
.await
.unwrap();
engine.revoke_grant(grant_id).await.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
diesel::update(evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
.set(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq::<Option<SqliteTimestamp>>(None))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let wallet_access = EvmWalletAccess {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: 10,
client_id: 20,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
};
let context = EvalContext {
target: wallet_access,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
to: RECIPIENT,
value: U256::ONE,
calldata: Bytes::new(),
max_fee_per_gas: 1,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 1,
};
let grant = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(
&context, &mut conn,
)
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
let result =
integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await;
assert!(matches!(
result,
Err(integrity::Error::MacMismatch { .. })
));
}
#[test]
fn shared_settings_hash_changes_when_revoked_at_changes() {
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
use sha2::Digest;
let active = shared_settings();
let revoked = SharedGrantSettings {
revoked_at: Some(Utc::now()),
..shared_settings()
};
let mut active_hash = sha2::Sha256::new();
active.hash(&mut active_hash);
let mut revoked_hash = sha2::Sha256::new();
revoked.hash(&mut revoked_hash);
assert_ne!(active_hash.finalize(), revoked_hash.finalize());
}
} }

View File

@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
pub valid_from: Option<DateTime<Utc>>, pub valid_from: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub valid_until: Option<DateTime<Utc>>, pub valid_until: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub revoked_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>, pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>, pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ impl SharedGrantSettings {
chain: model.chain_id.into(), chain: model.chain_id.into(),
valid_from: model.valid_from.map(Into::into), valid_from: model.valid_from.map(Into::into),
valid_until: model.valid_until.map(Into::into), valid_until: model.valid_until.map(Into::into),
revoked_at: model.revoked_at.map(Into::into),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: model max_gas_fee_per_gas: model
.max_gas_fee_per_gas .max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b)) .map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))

View File

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
chain: CHAIN_ID, chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None, valid_from: None,
valid_until: None, valid_until: None,
revoked_at: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None, max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None, max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None, rate_limit: None,

View File

@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
chain: CHAIN_ID, chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None, valid_from: None,
valid_until: None, valid_until: None,
revoked_at: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None, max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None, max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None, rate_limit: None,

View File

@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ impl Convert for auth::Outbound {
.timestamp .timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt() .timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("timestamp within range") .expect("timestamp within range")
as u64, .cast_unsigned(),
random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(), random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
}) })
} }

View File

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
.timestamp .timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt() .timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("timestamp within range") .expect("timestamp within range")
as u64, .cast_unsigned(),
random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(), random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
}) })
} }
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey, pubkey,
bootstrap_token, bootstrap_token: bootstrap_token.map(String::into_bytes),
}) })
} }
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => { AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => {

View File

@@ -217,6 +217,11 @@ async fn handle_sign_transaction(
result: Some(vet_error.convert()), result: Some(vet_error.convert()),
} }
} }
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
SessionSignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected,
)) => {
return Err(Status::permission_denied("client not connected"));
}
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(SessionSignTransactionError::Internal)) => { Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(SessionSignTransactionError::Internal)) => {
EvmSignTransactionResponse { EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Error( result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(

View File

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ impl TryConvert for ProtoSharedSettings {
.valid_until .valid_until
.map(ProtoTimestamp::try_convert) .map(ProtoTimestamp::try_convert)
.transpose()?, .transpose()?,
revoked_at: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: self max_gas_fee_per_gas: self
.max_gas_fee_per_gas .max_gas_fee_per_gas
.as_deref() .as_deref()

View File

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
let proto_result = match result { let proto_result = match result {
Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success, Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Err(vault_gate::Error::InvalidKey) => ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey, Err(vault_gate::Error::InvalidKey) => ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey,
Err(vault_gate::Error::LockedOut) => ProtoUnsealResult::LockedOut,
Err(err) => { Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "unseal failed"); warn!(?err, "unseal failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault")); return Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault"));

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use crate::{
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus}, crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
db::{ db::{
self, self,
models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp}, models::ProgramClientMetadata,
schema::program_client, schema::program_client,
}, },
}; };
@@ -18,14 +18,13 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
transport::{Bi, expect_message}, transport::{Bi, expect_message},
}; };
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _, ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
dsl::insert_into, update, dsl::insert_into,
}; };
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _; use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError}; use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tracing::error; use tracing::{error, warn};
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] #[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Error { pub enum Error {
@@ -211,71 +210,47 @@ async fn insert_client(
.await .await
} }
async fn sync_client_metadata( /// Compares stored metadata against what a reconnecting client presents.
/// Metadata is frozen after initial operator approval and must not be silently
/// overwritten. Doing so would let an approved client forge its displayed
/// identity in later approval prompts. Drift is logged and ignored.
async fn check_metadata_drift(
db: &db::DatabasePool, db: &db::DatabasePool,
client_id: i32, client_id: i32,
metadata: &ClientMetadata, presented: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<(), Error> { ) -> Result<(), Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history}; use crate::db::schema::client_metadata;
let now = SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now());
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| { let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error"); error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?; })?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(async |conn| { let current: ProgramClientMetadata = program_client::table
let (current_metadata_id, current): (i32, ProgramClientMetadata) = program_client::table .find(client_id)
.find(client_id) .inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.inner_join(client_metadata::table) .select(ProgramClientMetadata::as_select())
.select(( .first(&mut conn)
program_client::metadata_id, .await
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(), .map_err(|e| {
)) error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
.first(&mut *conn) Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
.await?; })?;
let unchanged = current.name == metadata.name let changed = current.name != presented.name
&& current.description == metadata.description || current.description != presented.description
&& current.version == metadata.version; || current.version != presented.version;
if unchanged {
return Ok(());
}
insert_into(client_metadata_history::table) if changed {
.values(( warn!(
client_metadata_history::metadata_id.eq(current_metadata_id), client_id,
client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id), stored_name = %current.name,
)) presented_name = %presented.name,
.execute(&mut *conn) "reconnecting client presented different metadata; ignoring - metadata is frozen after operator approval"
.await?; );
}
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table) Ok(())
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut *conn)
.await?;
update(program_client::table.find(client_id))
.set((
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Ok::<(), diesel::result::Error>(())
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
} }
async fn challenge_client<T>( async fn challenge_client<T>(
@@ -298,7 +273,7 @@ where
let signature = expect_message(transport, |req: Inbound| match req { let signature = expect_message(transport, |req: Inbound| match req {
Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => Some(signature), Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => Some(signature),
_ => None, Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { .. } => None,
}) })
.await .await
.map_err(|e| { .map_err(|e| {
@@ -324,6 +299,7 @@ where
let client_id = if let Some(id) = get_client_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? { let client_id = if let Some(id) = get_client_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey).await?; verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey).await?;
check_metadata_drift(&props.db, id, &metadata).await?;
id id
} else { } else {
approve_new_client( approve_new_client(
@@ -337,8 +313,6 @@ where
insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey, &metadata).await? insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
}; };
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, client_id, &metadata).await?;
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng()); let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge).await?; challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge).await?;

View File

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ impl Actor for ClientSession {
args.props args.props
.actors .actors
.flow_coordinator .flow_coordinator
.ask(RegisterClient { actor: this }) .ask(RegisterClient { client_id: args.client_id, actor: this })
.await .await
.map_err(|_| Error::ConnectionRegistrationFailed)?; .map_err(|_| Error::ConnectionRegistrationFailed)?;
Ok(args) Ok(args)

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ mod state;
pub enum Inbound { pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest { AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey, pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
bootstrap_token: Option<String>, bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}, },
AuthChallengeSolution { AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: Vec<u8>, signature: Vec<u8>,

View File

@@ -16,13 +16,12 @@ use tracing::error;
pub(super) struct ChallengeRequest { pub(super) struct ChallengeRequest {
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey, pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<String>, pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
} }
pub(super) struct ChallengeContext { pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub(super) challenge: AuthChallenge, pub(super) challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey, pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
} }
pub(super) struct ChallengeSolution { pub(super) struct ChallengeSolution {
@@ -79,11 +78,16 @@ async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<i3
pub(super) struct AuthContext<'a, T: ?Sized> { pub(super) struct AuthContext<'a, T: ?Sized> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut OperatorConnection, pub(super) conn: &'a mut OperatorConnection,
pub(super) transport: &'a mut T, pub(super) transport: &'a mut T,
bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
} }
impl<'a, T: ?Sized> AuthContext<'a, T> { impl<'a, T: ?Sized> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) const fn new(conn: &'a mut OperatorConnection, transport: &'a mut T) -> Self { pub(super) const fn new(conn: &'a mut OperatorConnection, transport: &'a mut T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport } Self {
conn,
transport,
bootstrap_token: None,
}
} }
} }
@@ -108,6 +112,8 @@ where
} }
} }
self.bootstrap_token = bootstrap_token;
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng()); let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
self.transport self.transport
@@ -120,22 +126,12 @@ where
Error::Transport Error::Transport
})?; })?;
Ok(ChallengeContext { Ok(ChallengeContext { challenge, pubkey })
challenge,
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
})
} }
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution( async fn verify_solution(
&mut self, &mut self,
ChallengeContext { ChallengeContext { challenge, pubkey }: &ChallengeContext,
challenge,
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution, ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<Credentials, Self::Error> { ) -> Result<Credentials, Self::Error> {
let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|()| { let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
@@ -154,15 +150,13 @@ where
} }
// Resolve client id: bootstrap (consume token + register) or lookup // Resolve client id: bootstrap (consume token + register) or lookup
let id = match bootstrap_token { let id = match self.bootstrap_token.take() {
Some(token) => { Some(token) => {
let token_ok: bool = self let token_ok: bool = self
.conn .conn
.actors .actors
.bootstrapper .bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken { .ask(ConsumeToken { token })
token: token.clone(),
})
.await .await
.map_err(|e| { .map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token"); error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");

View File

@@ -4,9 +4,12 @@ use crate::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, OperatorCreateGrant, OperatorListGrants, ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, OperatorCreateGrant, OperatorListGrants,
SignTransactionError as EvmSignError, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
}, },
actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer, actors::flow_coordinator::{IsClientConnected, client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer},
actors::vault::VaultState, actors::vault::VaultState,
db::models::{EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata}, db::{
models::{EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata},
schema::program_client,
},
evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant}, evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant},
}; };
use arbiter_crypto::authn; use arbiter_crypto::authn;
@@ -15,13 +18,16 @@ use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper}; use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl}; use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{error::SendError, messages, prelude::Context}; use kameo::{error::SendError, messages, prelude::Context};
use tracing::error; use tracing::{error, info, warn};
#[derive(Debug, Error)] #[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError { pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")] #[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError), Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Client not connected")]
ClientNotConnected,
#[error("Internal signing error")] #[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal, Internal,
} }
@@ -141,6 +147,30 @@ impl OperatorSession {
wallet_address: Address, wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559, transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> { ) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
if !self.approved_client_ids.contains(&client_id) {
warn!(
client_id,
"operator attempted to sign for client not in its approved set"
);
return Err(SignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected);
}
let connected = self
.props
.actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(IsClientConnected { client_id })
.await
.unwrap_or(false);
if !connected {
self.approved_client_ids.remove(&client_id);
warn!(client_id, "operator attempted to sign for disconnected client");
return Err(SignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected);
}
info!(client_id, event = "sign_transaction", "operator.sign_transaction");
match self match self
.props .props
.actors .actors
@@ -196,7 +226,7 @@ impl OperatorSession {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access; use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries { for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table) diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry)) .filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry))
.execute(&mut *conn) .execute(&mut *conn)
.await?; .await?;
} }
@@ -212,8 +242,7 @@ impl OperatorSession {
&mut self, &mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> { ) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?; let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access; let access_entries = crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access::table
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select()) .select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn) .load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?; .await?;
@@ -250,6 +279,30 @@ impl OperatorSession {
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await; ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
if approved {
let pubkey_bytes = pending_approval.pubkey.to_bytes();
match self.props.db.get().await {
Ok(mut conn) => {
match program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.as_slice()))
.select(program_client::id)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
{
Ok(client_id) => {
self.approved_client_ids.insert(client_id);
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to look up client_id for approved pubkey");
}
}
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "DB pool error after client approval");
}
}
}
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
@@ -272,3 +325,142 @@ impl OperatorSession {
Ok(clients) Ok(clients)
} }
} }
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::db::{self, models::NewEvmWalletAccess, schema::evm_wallet_access};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
/// Regression test: revocation must delete by access-entry `id`, not by `wallet_id`.
///
/// Before the fix, revoking `entry_id=1` would delete all rows where `wallet_id=1`,
/// wiping out every client's access to wallet #1.
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoke_deletes_by_entry_id_not_wallet_id() {
use crate::db::models::EvmWalletAccess;
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.expect("pool connection");
// Insert two access entries for the same wallet but different clients.
// entry A: id will be 1, wallet_id=1, client_id=10
// entry B: id will be 2, wallet_id=1, client_id=20
let entry_a = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: 1,
client_id: 10,
})
.returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert entry A");
let entry_b = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: 1,
client_id: 20,
})
.returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert entry B");
// Revoke only entry A by its primary key id.
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_a.id))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
})
.await
.expect("revoke entry A");
// Entry A must be gone.
let gone = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_a.id))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count entry A");
assert_eq!(gone, 0, "revoked entry must be deleted");
// Entry B (same wallet, different client) must still exist.
let still_there = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_b.id))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count entry B");
assert_eq!(still_there, 1, "unrelated entry must not be deleted");
}
/// Regression test: when `entry_id` and `wallet_id` differ, only the correct row is removed.
///
/// This specifically catches the case where `entry.id=5` and `wallet_id=1` are different values;
/// the old bug would delete by `wallet_id`, potentially matching a completely different entry.
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoke_with_mismatched_wallet_and_entry_ids() {
use crate::db::models::EvmWalletAccess;
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.expect("pool connection");
// Insert entries to force auto-increment IDs to diverge from wallet_ids.
// We'll insert 5 placeholder entries first so that the real entry gets id=6.
for i in 1_i32..=5 {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: 99,
client_id: i,
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert placeholder");
}
// Real target: wallet_id=1, will get id=6.
let target = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: 1,
client_id: 1,
})
.returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert target");
// Sanity: target.id != target.wallet_id
assert_ne!(
target.id, target.wallet_id,
"test prerequisite: id and wallet_id must differ"
);
// Revoke by entry id.
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(target.id))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
})
.await
.expect("revoke target");
let remaining = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(target.id))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count target");
assert_eq!(remaining, 0, "target must be deleted by its entry id");
// Placeholders for wallet_id=99 must be untouched.
let placeholders = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(99))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count placeholders");
assert_eq!(placeholders, 5, "unrelated entries must survive");
}
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
use super::{OutOfBand, OperatorConnection}; use super::{OutOfBand, OperatorConnection};
use crate::{ use crate::{
actors::{ actors::{
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController, flow_coordinator::{GetConnectedClientIds, client_connect_approval::{ClientApprovalAnswer, ClientApprovalController}}, operator_registry::ConnectOperator,
operator_registry::ConnectOperator, }, peers::client::ClientProfile,
},
peers::client::ClientProfile,
}; };
use arbiter_crypto::authn; use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender; use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages}; use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap}; use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::{HashMap, HashSet}};
use thiserror::Error; use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::error; use tracing::error;
@@ -54,6 +52,10 @@ pub struct OperatorSession {
sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>, pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>,
/// DB `client_ids` this operator session is allowed to sign for.
/// Seeded from currently-connected clients on start, then updated as
/// approvals are granted or denied during the session lifetime.
approved_client_ids: HashSet<i32>,
} }
pub mod handlers; pub mod handlers;
@@ -63,7 +65,8 @@ impl OperatorSession {
Self { Self {
props, props,
sender, sender,
pending_client_approvals: Default::default(), pending_client_approvals: HashMap::default(),
approved_client_ids: HashSet::default(),
} }
} }
} }
@@ -88,6 +91,7 @@ impl OperatorSession {
actor = "operator", actor = "operator",
event = "failed to announce new client connection" event = "failed to announce new client connection"
); );
let _ = controller.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved: false }).await;
return; return;
} }
@@ -106,7 +110,7 @@ impl Actor for OperatorSession {
type Error = Error; type Error = Error;
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { async fn on_start(mut args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props args.props
.actors .actors
.operator_registry .operator_registry
@@ -121,6 +125,16 @@ impl Actor for OperatorSession {
); );
Error::internal("Failed to register operator connection with operator registry") Error::internal("Failed to register operator connection with operator registry")
})?; })?;
// Seed approved set with clients already connected when this session starts.
// New clients will be added via handle_new_client_approve as they are approved.
match args.props.actors.flow_coordinator.ask(GetConnectedClientIds {}).await {
Ok(ids) => args.approved_client_ids.extend(ids),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to fetch connected client IDs on operator session start");
}
}
Ok(args) Ok(args)
} }

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use state::State; use state::State;
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce}; use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce};
use kameo::{Actor, error::SendError, messages, prelude::Message}; use kameo::{Actor, error::SendError, messages, prelude::{Context, Message}};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::Register; use kameo_actors::message_bus::Register;
use tokio::sync::oneshot; use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tracing::{error, info}; use tracing::{error, info};
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ pub enum Error {
AlreadyBootstrapped, AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Invalid key provided")] #[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey, InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault locked: too many failed unseal attempts")]
LockedOut,
#[error("State transition failed")] #[error("State transition failed")]
State, State,
@@ -141,12 +143,13 @@ impl VaultGate {
}) })
} }
#[message] #[message(ctx)]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key( pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self, &mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>, nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>, ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>, associated_data: Vec<u8>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> { ) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else { let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else {
return Err(Error::State); return Err(Error::State);
@@ -170,6 +173,12 @@ impl VaultGate {
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::InvalidKey)) => Err(Error::InvalidKey), Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::InvalidKey)) => Err(Error::InvalidKey),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::LockedOut)) => {
// Vault is permanently locked — terminate this gate so the
// run_vault_gate loop breaks and the connection is closed.
ctx.stop();
Err(Error::LockedOut)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => { Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Vault failed to unseal key"); error!(?err, "Vault failed to unseal key");
Err(Error::InvalidKey) Err(Error::InvalidKey)
@@ -242,7 +251,7 @@ impl Message<events::Bootstrapped> for VaultGate {
async fn handle( async fn handle(
&mut self, &mut self,
_: events::Bootstrapped, _: events::Bootstrapped,
ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>, ctx: &mut Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply { ) -> Self::Reply {
let result = async { let result = async {
let mut conn = self let mut conn = self
@@ -278,7 +287,7 @@ impl Message<events::Unsealed> for VaultGate {
async fn handle( async fn handle(
&mut self, &mut self,
_: events::Unsealed, _: events::Unsealed,
ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>, ctx: &mut Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply { ) -> Self::Reply {
if let Some(tx) = self.promotion_tx.take() { if let Some(tx) = self.promotion_tx.take() {
let _ = tx.send(Ok(())); let _ = tx.send(Ok(()));

View File

@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ pub async fn metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() { pub async fn metadata_frozen_after_approval_ignores_reconnect_changes() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await; let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng()); let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await; connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
}); });
// Reconnect presenting different metadata — must be silently ignored.
test_transport test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(), pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
@@ -313,6 +314,7 @@ pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
client_metadata, client_metadata_history, program_client, client_metadata, client_metadata_history, program_client,
}; };
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap(); let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
// Metadata is frozen: no new row, no history entry.
let metadata_count: i64 = client_metadata::table let metadata_count: i64 = client_metadata::table
.count() .count()
.get_result(&mut conn) .get_result(&mut conn)
@@ -338,15 +340,16 @@ pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
.first::<(String, Option<String>, Option<String>)>(&mut conn) .first::<(String, Option<String>, Option<String>)>(&mut conn)
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
assert_eq!(metadata_count, 2); assert_eq!(metadata_count, 1, "frozen: no new metadata row on reconnect");
assert_eq!(history_count, 1); assert_eq!(history_count, 0, "frozen: no history entry on reconnect");
assert_eq!( assert_eq!(
current, current,
( (
"client".to_owned(), "client".to_owned(),
Some("new".to_owned()), Some("old".to_owned()),
Some("2.0.0".to_owned()) Some("1.0.0".to_owned())
) ),
"frozen: original metadata must be preserved"
); );
} }
} }

View File

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_token_auth() {
test_transport test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(), pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some(token), bootstrap_token: Some(token.into_bytes()),
}) })
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
test_transport test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(), pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_owned()), bootstrap_token: Some(b"invalid_token".to_vec()),
}) })
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed() {
let challenge = match response { let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp { Ok(resp) => match resp {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge } => challenge, auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge } => challenge,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"), other @ auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
}, },
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"), Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
}; };

View File

@@ -140,6 +140,47 @@ pub async fn unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
)); ));
} }
/// After MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS wrong keys, the vault locks and the VaultGate
/// must stop itself so the connection is dropped.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn lockout_stops_vault_gate() {
use kameo::error::SendError;
let seal_key = b"real-seal-key";
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
// Exhaust all MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS (5) with wrong keys; each returns InvalidKey.
for _ in 0..5 {
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key").await;
assert!(matches!(
gate.ask(encrypted_key).await,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(VaultGateError::InvalidKey))
));
}
// Sixth attempt: vault is now locked, returns LockedOut, and the gate stops itself.
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key").await;
assert!(matches!(
gate.ask(encrypted_key).await,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(VaultGateError::LockedOut))
));
// Give the actor scheduler time to process the stop signal.
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
// Any subsequent message must be rejected because the gate is stopped.
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
assert!(
matches!(
gate.ask(HandleHandshake { client_pubkey: client_public }).await,
Err(SendError::ActorNotRunning(_))
),
"VaultGate must be stopped after LockedOut"
);
}
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
pub async fn unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() { pub async fn unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet}; use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use tokio::task::JoinSet; use tokio::task::JoinSet;
const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
async fn write_concurrently( async fn write_concurrently(
actor: ActorRef<Vault>, actor: ActorRef<Vault>,
prefix: &'static str, prefix: &'static str,
@@ -27,6 +29,7 @@ async fn write_concurrently(
let id = actor let id = actor
.ask(CreateNew { .ask(CreateNew {
plaintext: SafeCell::new(plaintext.clone()), plaintext: SafeCell::new(plaintext.clone()),
aad: TEST_AAD.to_vec(),
}) })
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
@@ -120,7 +123,7 @@ async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
drop(conn); drop(conn);
let err = actor let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"should fail".to_vec())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"should fail".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap_err(); .unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::DatabaseTransaction(_))); assert!(matches!(err, Error::DatabaseTransaction(_)));
@@ -171,7 +174,7 @@ async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
for (id, plaintext) in expected { for (id, plaintext) in expected {
let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap(); let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext); assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
} }
} }

View File

@@ -12,9 +12,11 @@ use arbiter_server::{
use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper}; use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl; use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_bootstrap() { async fn bootstrap() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus()) let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await .await
@@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ async fn test_bootstrap() {
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() { async fn bootstrap_rejects_double() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await; let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
@@ -50,14 +52,14 @@ async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() { async fn create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus()) let mut actor = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
let err = actor let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap_err(); .unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped)); assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
@@ -65,19 +67,19 @@ async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() { async fn decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus()) let mut actor = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
let err = actor.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err(); let err = actor.decrypt(1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped)); assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
} }
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() { async fn new_restores_sealed_state() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await; let actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
drop(actor); drop(actor);
@@ -85,19 +87,19 @@ async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() {
let mut actor2 = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus()) let mut actor2 = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
let err = actor2.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err(); let err = actor2.decrypt(1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::Sealed)); assert!(matches!(err, Error::Sealed));
} }
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_unseal_correct_password() { async fn unseal_correct_password() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await; let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"survive a restart"; let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
let aead_id = actor let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
drop(actor); drop(actor);
@@ -108,19 +110,19 @@ async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()); let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap(); actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap(); let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext); assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
} }
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() { async fn unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await; let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"important data"; let plaintext = b"important data";
let aead_id = actor let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
drop(actor); drop(actor);
@@ -136,6 +138,6 @@ async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let good_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()); let good_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap(); actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap(); let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext); assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
} }

View File

@@ -10,45 +10,47 @@ use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl; use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use std::collections::HashSet; use std::collections::HashSet;
const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() { async fn create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await; let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"hello arbiter"; let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
let aead_id = actor let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap(); let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext); assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
} }
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() { async fn decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await; let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let err = actor.decrypt(9999).await.unwrap_err(); let err = actor.decrypt(9999, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotFound)); assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotFound));
} }
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() { async fn ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await; let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"same content"; let plaintext = b"same content";
let id1 = actor let id1 = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
let id2 = actor let id2 = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
@@ -68,22 +70,22 @@ async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
assert_ne!(row1.ciphertext, row2.ciphertext); assert_ne!(row1.ciphertext, row2.ciphertext);
let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1).await.unwrap(); let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2).await.unwrap(); let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*d1.read(), plaintext); assert_eq!(*d1.read(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d2.read(), plaintext); assert_eq!(*d2.read(), plaintext);
} }
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test] #[test_log::test]
async fn test_nonce_never_reused() { async fn nonce_never_reused() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await; let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let n = 5; let n = 5;
for i in 0..n { for i in 0..n {
actor actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
} }
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
drop(conn); drop(conn);
let err = actor let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"must fail".to_vec())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"must fail".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap_err(); .unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase)); assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await; let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let id = actor let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec())) .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap(); let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -156,6 +158,6 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
drop(conn); drop(conn);
let err = actor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap_err(); let err = actor.decrypt(id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase)); assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
} }