fix(clippy): apply auto-fixable linting suggestions

Reviewed-on: #83

.claude/memory/feedback_widget_decomposition.md

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
----
+---
-name: Widget decomposition and provider subscriptions
+name: Widget decomposition and provider subscriptions
-description: Prefer splitting screens into multiple focused files/widgets; each widget subscribes to its own relevant providers
+description: Prefer splitting screens into multiple focused files/widgets; each widget subscribes to its own relevant providers
-type: feedback
+type: feedback
----
+---
-
+
-Split screens into multiple smaller widgets across multiple files. Each widget should subscribe only to the providers it needs (`ref.watch` at lowest possible level), rather than having one large screen widget that watches everything and passes data down as parameters.
+Split screens into multiple smaller widgets across multiple files. Each widget should subscribe only to the providers it needs (`ref.watch` at lowest possible level), rather than having one large screen widget that watches everything and passes data down as parameters.
-
+
-**Why:** Reduces unnecessary rebuilds; improves readability; each file has one clear responsibility.
+**Why:** Reduces unnecessary rebuilds; improves readability; each file has one clear responsibility.
-
+
-**How to apply:** When building a new screen, identify which sub-widgets need their own provider subscriptions and extract them into separate files (e.g., `widgets/grant_card.dart` watches enrichment providers itself, rather than the screen doing it and passing resolved strings down).
+**How to apply:** When building a new screen, identify which sub-widgets need their own provider subscriptions and extract them into separate files (e.g., `widgets/grant_card.dart` watches enrichment providers itself, rather than the screen doing it and passing resolved strings down).

.gitignore

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-target/
+target/
-scripts/__pycache__/
+scripts/__pycache__/
-.DS_Store
+.DS_Store
-.cargo/config.toml
+.cargo/config.toml
-.vscode/
+.vscode/
-docs/
+docs/superpowers

.woodpecker/server-audit.yaml

@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-when:
+when:
-  - event: pull_request
+  - event: pull_request
-    path:
+    path:
-      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
-  - event: push
+  - event: push
-    branch: main
+    branch: main
-    path:
+    path:
-      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
-
+
-steps:
+steps:
-  - name: audit
+  - name: audit
-    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
+    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
-    directory: server
+    directory: server
-    environment:
+    environment:
-      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
-      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
+      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
-      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
+      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
-    volumes:
+    volumes:
-      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
+      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
-      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
+      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
-    commands:
+    commands:
-      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
+      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
-      # Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI
+      # Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI
-      - mise install rust 
+      - mise install rust 
-      - mise install cargo:cargo-audit
+      - mise install cargo:cargo-audit
       - mise exec cargo:cargo-audit -- cargo audit

.woodpecker/server-clippy-fix.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+when:
+  - event: push
+    branch: main
+    path:
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+
+steps:
+  - name: clippy-fix
+    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
+    directory: server
+    environment:
+      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
+      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
+      GITEA_TOKEN:
+        from_secret: GITEA_TOKEN
+      GITEA_URL:
+        from_secret: GITEA_URL
+    volumes:
+      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
+      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
+    commands:
+      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config curl
+      - mise install rust
+      - mise install protoc
+      - mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --fix --allow-dirty --all
+      - |
+        cd ..
+        if git diff --quiet HEAD; then
+          echo "No machine-applicable clippy fixes found, nothing to do."
+          exit 0
+        fi
+        git config user.email "bot@arbiter"
+        git config user.name "Clippy Bot"
+        git add -A
+        git commit -m "fix(clippy): apply auto-fixable linting suggestions"
+        git config http.extraHeader "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}"
+        git push --force origin HEAD:refs/heads/bot/clippy-fixes
+        HTTP_STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
+          -X POST "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${CI_REPO}/pulls" \
+          -H "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}" \
+          -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+          -d "{\"title\":\"fix(clippy): apply auto-fixable linting suggestions\",\"head\":\"bot/clippy-fixes\",\"base\":\"main\",\"body\":\"Automated clippy fixes generated by CI bot.\"}")
+        echo "Gitea API response: ${HTTP_STATUS}"
+        [ "$HTTP_STATUS" = "201" ] || [ "$HTTP_STATUS" = "409" ] || [ "$HTTP_STATUS" = "422" ] || exit 1

.woodpecker/server-lint.yaml

@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
-when:
+when:
-  - event: pull_request
+  - event: pull_request
-    path:
+    path:
-      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
-  - event: push
+  - event: push
-    branch: main
+    branch: main
-    path:
+    path:
-      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
-
+
-steps:
+steps:
-  - name: lint
+  - name: lint
-    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
+    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
-    directory: server
+    directory: server
-    environment:
+    environment:
-      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
-      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
+      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
-      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
+      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
-    volumes:
+    volumes:
-      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
+      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
-      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
+      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
-    commands:
+    commands:
-      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
+      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
-      - mise install rust 
+      - mise install rust 
-      - mise install protoc
+      - mise install protoc
       - mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all -- -D warnings

.woodpecker/server-test.yaml

@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
-when:
+when:
-  - event: pull_request
+  - event: pull_request
-    path:
+    path:
-      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
-  - event: push
+  - event: push
-    branch: main
+    branch: main
-    path:
+    path:
-      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
-
+
-steps:
+steps:
-  - name: test
+  - name: test
-    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
+    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
-    directory: server
+    directory: server
-    environment:
+    environment:
-      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
-      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
+      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
-      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
+      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
-    volumes:
+    volumes:
-      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
+      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
-      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
+      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
-    commands:
+    commands:
-      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
+      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
-      # Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI
+      # Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI
-      - mise install rust 
+      - mise install rust 
-      - mise install protoc
+      - mise install protoc
-      - mise install cargo:cargo-nextest
+      - mise install cargo:cargo-nextest
       - mise exec cargo:cargo-nextest -- cargo nextest run --no-fail-fast --all-features

.woodpecker/server-vet.yaml

@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-when:
+when:
-  - event: pull_request
+  - event: pull_request
-    path:
+    path:
-      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
-  - event: push
+  - event: push
-    branch: main
+    branch: main
-    path:
+    path:
-      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
-
+
-steps:
+steps:
-  - name: vet
+  - name: vet
-    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
+    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
-    directory: server
+    directory: server
-    environment:
+    environment:
-      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
-      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
+      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
-      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
+      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
-    volumes:
+    volumes:
-      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
+      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
-      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
+      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
-    commands:
+    commands:
-      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
+      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
-      # Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI
+      # Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI
-      - mise install rust 
+      - mise install rust 
-      - mise install cargo:cargo-vet
+      - mise install cargo:cargo-vet
       - mise exec cargo:cargo-vet -- cargo vet

.woodpecker/useragent-analyze.yaml

@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
-when:
+when:
-  - event: pull_request
+  - event: pull_request
-    path:
+    path:
-      include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**']
+      include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**']
-  - event: push
+  - event: push
-    branch: main
+    branch: main
-    path:
+    path:
-      include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**']
+      include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**']
-
+
-steps:
+steps:
-  - name: analyze
+  - name: analyze
-    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
+    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
-    commands:
+    commands:
-      - mise install flutter 
+      - mise install flutter 
-      - mise install protoc
+      - mise install protoc
-      # Reruns codegen to catch protocol drift
+      # Reruns codegen to catch protocol drift
-      - mise codegen 
+      - mise codegen 
       - cd useragent/ && flutter analyze

AGENTS.md

@@ -1,128 +1,149 @@
-# AGENTS.md
+# AGENTS.md
-
+
-This file provides guidance to Codex (Codex.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
+This file provides guidance to Codex (Codex.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
-
+
-## Project Overview
+## Project Overview
-
+
-Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
+Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
-- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
+- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
-- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
+- **`operator/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
-- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
+- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
-
+
-The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
+The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
-
+
-## Toolchain Setup
+## Toolchain Setup
-
+
-Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
+Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
-```sh
+```sh
-mise install
+mise install
-```
+```
-
+
-Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
+Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
-
+
-## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
+## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
-
+
-### Crates
+### Crates
-
+
-| Crate | Purpose |
+| Crate | Purpose |
-|---|---|
+|---|---|
-| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
+| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
-| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
+| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
-| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
+| `arbiter-operator` | Rust client library for the operator side of the gRPC protocol |
-| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
+| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
-
+
-### Common Commands
+### Common Commands
-
+
-```sh
+```sh
-cd server
+cd server
-
+
-# Build
+# Build
-cargo build
+cargo build
-
+
-# Run the server daemon
+# Run the server daemon
-cargo run -p arbiter-server
+cargo run -p arbiter-server
-
+
-# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
+# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
-cargo nextest run
+cargo nextest run
-
+
-# Run a single test
+# Run a single test
-cargo nextest run <test_name>
+cargo nextest run <test_name>
-
+
-# Lint
+# Lint
-cargo clippy
+cargo clippy
-
+
-# Security audit
+# Security audit
-cargo audit
+cargo audit
-
+
-# Check unused dependencies
+# Check unused dependencies
-cargo shear
+cargo shear
-
+
-# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
+# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
-cargo insta review
+cargo insta review
-```
+```
-
+
-### Architecture
+### Architecture
-
+
-The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
+The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
-
+
-- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
+- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
-- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
+- **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
-- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
+- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between operators and SDK clients.
-- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
+- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
-
+
-Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
+Per-connection actors live under `actors/operator/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
-
+
-**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
+**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
-
+
-**Cryptography:**
+**Cryptography:**
-- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
+- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
-- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
+- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
-- Password KDF: Argon2
+- Password KDF: Argon2
-- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
+- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
-- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
+- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
-
+
-**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
+**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
-
+
-### Proto Regeneration
+### Proto Regeneration
-
+
-When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
+When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
-```sh
+```sh
-cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
+cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
-```
+```
-
+
-### Database Migrations
+### Database Migrations
-
+
-```sh
+```sh
-# Create a new migration
+# Create a new migration
-diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
+diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
-
+
-# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
+# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
-diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
+diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
-```
+```
-
+
-## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
+### Code Conventions
-
+
-The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
+**`#[must_use]` Attribute:**
-
+Apply the `#[must_use]` attribute to return types of functions where the return value is critical and should not be accidentally ignored. This is commonly used for:
-Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
+
-
+- Methods that return `bool` indicating success/failure or validation state
-```sh
+- Any function where ignoring the return value indicates a logic error
-cd useragent && rinf gen
+
-```
+Do not apply `#[must_use]` redundantly to items (types or functions) that are already annotated with `#[must_use]`.
-
+
-### Common Commands
+Example:
-
+
-```sh
+```rust
-cd useragent
+#[must_use]
-
+pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
-# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
+    // verification logic
-flutter run
+}
-
+```
-# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
+
-rinf gen
+This forces callers to either use the return value or explicitly ignore it with `let _ = ...;`, preventing silent failures.
-
+
-# Analyze Dart code
+## Operator (Flutter + Rinf at `operator/`)
-flutter analyze
+
-```
+The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `operator/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-operator` for the gRPC client.
-
+
-The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.
+Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `operator/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
+
+```sh
+cd operator && rinf gen
+```
+
+### Common Commands
+
+```sh
+cd operator
+
+# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
+flutter run
+
+# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
+rinf gen
+
+# Analyze Dart code
+flutter analyze
+```
+
+The Rinf Rust entry point is `operator/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `operator/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1,128 +1 @@
-# CLAUDE.md
+Refer to @AGENTS.md for instructions.
-
-This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
-
-## Project Overview
-
-Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
-- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
-- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
-- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
-
-The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
-
-## Toolchain Setup
-
-Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
-```sh
-mise install
-```
-
-Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
-
-## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
-
-### Crates
-
-| Crate | Purpose |
-|---|---|
-| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
-| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
-| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
-| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
-
-### Common Commands
-
-```sh
-cd server
-
-# Build
-cargo build
-
-# Run the server daemon
-cargo run -p arbiter-server
-
-# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
-cargo nextest run
-
-# Run a single test
-cargo nextest run <test_name>
-
-# Lint
-cargo clippy
-
-# Security audit
-cargo audit
-
-# Check unused dependencies
-cargo shear
-
-# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
-cargo insta review
-```
-
-### Architecture
-
-The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
-
-- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
-- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
-- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
-- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
-
-Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
-
-**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
-
-**Cryptography:**
-- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
-- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
-- Password KDF: Argon2
-- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
-- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
-
-**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
-
-### Proto Regeneration
-
-When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
-```sh
-cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
-```
-
-### Database Migrations
-
-```sh
-# Create a new migration
-diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
-
-# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
-diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
-```
-
-## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
-
-The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
-
-Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
-
-```sh
-cd useragent && rinf gen
-```
-
-### Common Commands
-
-```sh
-cd useragent
-
-# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
-flutter run
-
-# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
-rinf gen
-
-# Analyze Dart code
-flutter analyze
-```
-
-The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

LICENSE

@@ -1,190 +1,190 @@
-                                 Apache License
+                                 Apache License
-                           Version 2.0, January 2004
+                           Version 2.0, January 2004
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-
+
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+   TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION
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-
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-
+
-   Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+   Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-   you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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-
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+       http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-
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-   See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+   See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-   limitations under the License.
+   limitations under the License.

README.md

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-# Arbiter
+# Arbiter
-> Policy-first multi-client wallet daemon, allowing permissioned transactions across blockchains
+> Policy-first multi-client wallet daemon, allowing permissioned transactions across blockchains
-
+
-## Security warning
+## Security warning
-Arbiter can't meaningfully protect against host compromise. Potential attack flow:
+Arbiter can't meaningfully protect against host compromise. Potential attack flow:
-- Attacker steals TLS keys from database
+- Attacker steals TLS keys from database
-- Pretends to be server; just accepts user agent challenge solutions
+- Pretends to be server; just accepts operator challenge solutions
-- Pretend to be in sealed state and performing DH with client
+- Pretend to be in sealed state and performing DH with client
-- Steals user password and derives seal key
+- Steals user password and derives seal key
-
+
-While this attack is highly targetive, it's still possible. 
+While this attack is highly targetive, it's still possible. 
-
+
 > This software is experimental. Do not use with funds you cannot afford to lose.

app/.dart_tool/extension_discovery/README.md

@@ -1,31 +1,31 @@
-Extension Discovery Cache
+Extension Discovery Cache
-=========================
+=========================
-
+
-This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
+This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
-packages that contains extensions for other packages.
+packages that contains extensions for other packages.
-
+
-DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
+DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
-----------------------
+----------------------
-
+
- * Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
+ * Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
- * Do write to this folder.
+ * Do write to this folder.
-
+
-If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
+If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
-API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
+API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
-
+
-If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
+If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
-contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
+contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
-
+
-Use package `extension_discovery`
+Use package `extension_discovery`
----------------------------------
+---------------------------------
-
+
-If you want to access information from this folder.
+If you want to access information from this folder.
-
+
-Feel free to delete this folder
+Feel free to delete this folder
--------------------------------
+-------------------------------
-
+
-Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
+Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
-are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
+are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
-
+
-Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
+Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
-need to do please file a bug.
+need to do please file a bug.

app/.dart_tool/package_config.json

@@ -1,178 +1,178 @@
-{
+{
-  "configVersion": 2,
+  "configVersion": 2,
-  "packages": [
+  "packages": [
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "async",
+      "name": "async",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/async-2.13.0",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/async-2.13.0",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "boolean_selector",
+      "name": "boolean_selector",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/boolean_selector-2.1.2",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/boolean_selector-2.1.2",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "characters",
+      "name": "characters",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/characters-1.4.0",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/characters-1.4.0",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "clock",
+      "name": "clock",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/clock-1.1.2",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/clock-1.1.2",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "collection",
+      "name": "collection",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/collection-1.19.1",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/collection-1.19.1",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "cupertino_icons",
+      "name": "cupertino_icons",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/cupertino_icons-1.0.8",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/cupertino_icons-1.0.8",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "fake_async",
+      "name": "fake_async",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/fake_async-1.3.3",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/fake_async-1.3.3",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.3"
+      "languageVersion": "3.3"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "flutter",
+      "name": "flutter",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "flutter_lints",
+      "name": "flutter_lints",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/flutter_lints-6.0.0",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/flutter_lints-6.0.0",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "flutter_test",
+      "name": "flutter_test",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter_test",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter_test",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "leak_tracker",
+      "name": "leak_tracker",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker-11.0.2",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker-11.0.2",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.2"
+      "languageVersion": "3.2"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
+      "name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker_flutter_testing-3.0.10",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker_flutter_testing-3.0.10",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.2"
+      "languageVersion": "3.2"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "leak_tracker_testing",
+      "name": "leak_tracker_testing",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker_testing-3.0.2",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker_testing-3.0.2",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.2"
+      "languageVersion": "3.2"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "lints",
+      "name": "lints",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/lints-6.1.0",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/lints-6.1.0",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "matcher",
+      "name": "matcher",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/matcher-0.12.17",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/matcher-0.12.17",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "material_color_utilities",
+      "name": "material_color_utilities",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/material_color_utilities-0.11.1",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/material_color_utilities-0.11.1",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "2.17"
+      "languageVersion": "2.17"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "meta",
+      "name": "meta",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/meta-1.17.0",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/meta-1.17.0",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.5"
+      "languageVersion": "3.5"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "path",
+      "name": "path",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/path-1.9.1",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/path-1.9.1",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "sky_engine",
+      "name": "sky_engine",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/bin/cache/pkg/sky_engine",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/bin/cache/pkg/sky_engine",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "source_span",
+      "name": "source_span",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/source_span-1.10.2",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/source_span-1.10.2",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "stack_trace",
+      "name": "stack_trace",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stack_trace-1.12.1",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stack_trace-1.12.1",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "stream_channel",
+      "name": "stream_channel",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stream_channel-2.1.4",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stream_channel-2.1.4",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.3"
+      "languageVersion": "3.3"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "string_scanner",
+      "name": "string_scanner",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/string_scanner-1.4.1",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/string_scanner-1.4.1",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "term_glyph",
+      "name": "term_glyph",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/term_glyph-1.2.2",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/term_glyph-1.2.2",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "test_api",
+      "name": "test_api",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/test_api-0.7.7",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/test_api-0.7.7",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.5"
+      "languageVersion": "3.5"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "vector_math",
+      "name": "vector_math",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vector_math-2.2.0",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vector_math-2.2.0",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "vm_service",
+      "name": "vm_service",
-      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vm_service-15.0.2",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vm_service-15.0.2",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.5"
+      "languageVersion": "3.5"
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "app",
+      "name": "app",
-      "rootUri": "../",
+      "rootUri": "../",
-      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
-      "languageVersion": "3.10"
+      "languageVersion": "3.10"
-    }
+    }
-  ],
+  ],
-  "generator": "pub",
+  "generator": "pub",
-  "generatorVersion": "3.10.8",
+  "generatorVersion": "3.10.8",
-  "flutterRoot": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable",
+  "flutterRoot": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable",
-  "flutterVersion": "3.38.9",
+  "flutterVersion": "3.38.9",
-  "pubCache": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache"
+  "pubCache": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache"
-}
+}

app/.dart_tool/package_graph.json

@@ -1,230 +1,230 @@
-{
+{
-  "roots": [
+  "roots": [
-    "app"
+    "app"
-  ],
+  ],
-  "packages": [
+  "packages": [
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "app",
+      "name": "app",
-      "version": "1.0.0+1",
+      "version": "1.0.0+1",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "cupertino_icons",
+        "cupertino_icons",
-        "flutter"
+        "flutter"
-      ],
+      ],
-      "devDependencies": [
+      "devDependencies": [
-        "flutter_lints",
+        "flutter_lints",
-        "flutter_test"
+        "flutter_test"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "flutter_lints",
+      "name": "flutter_lints",
-      "version": "6.0.0",
+      "version": "6.0.0",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "lints"
+        "lints"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "flutter_test",
+      "name": "flutter_test",
-      "version": "0.0.0",
+      "version": "0.0.0",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "clock",
+        "clock",
-        "collection",
+        "collection",
-        "fake_async",
+        "fake_async",
-        "flutter",
+        "flutter",
-        "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
+        "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
-        "matcher",
+        "matcher",
-        "meta",
+        "meta",
-        "path",
+        "path",
-        "stack_trace",
+        "stack_trace",
-        "stream_channel",
+        "stream_channel",
-        "test_api",
+        "test_api",
-        "vector_math"
+        "vector_math"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "cupertino_icons",
+      "name": "cupertino_icons",
-      "version": "1.0.8",
+      "version": "1.0.8",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "flutter",
+      "name": "flutter",
-      "version": "0.0.0",
+      "version": "0.0.0",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "characters",
+        "characters",
-        "collection",
+        "collection",
-        "material_color_utilities",
+        "material_color_utilities",
-        "meta",
+        "meta",
-        "sky_engine",
+        "sky_engine",
-        "vector_math"
+        "vector_math"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "lints",
+      "name": "lints",
-      "version": "6.1.0",
+      "version": "6.1.0",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "stream_channel",
+      "name": "stream_channel",
-      "version": "2.1.4",
+      "version": "2.1.4",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "async"
+        "async"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "meta",
+      "name": "meta",
-      "version": "1.17.0",
+      "version": "1.17.0",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "collection",
+      "name": "collection",
-      "version": "1.19.1",
+      "version": "1.19.1",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
+      "name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
-      "version": "3.0.10",
+      "version": "3.0.10",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "flutter",
+        "flutter",
-        "leak_tracker",
+        "leak_tracker",
-        "leak_tracker_testing",
+        "leak_tracker_testing",
-        "matcher",
+        "matcher",
-        "meta"
+        "meta"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "vector_math",
+      "name": "vector_math",
-      "version": "2.2.0",
+      "version": "2.2.0",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "stack_trace",
+      "name": "stack_trace",
-      "version": "1.12.1",
+      "version": "1.12.1",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "path"
+        "path"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "clock",
+      "name": "clock",
-      "version": "1.1.2",
+      "version": "1.1.2",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "fake_async",
+      "name": "fake_async",
-      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "clock",
+        "clock",
-        "collection"
+        "collection"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "path",
+      "name": "path",
-      "version": "1.9.1",
+      "version": "1.9.1",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "matcher",
+      "name": "matcher",
-      "version": "0.12.17",
+      "version": "0.12.17",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "async",
+        "async",
-        "meta",
+        "meta",
-        "stack_trace",
+        "stack_trace",
-        "term_glyph",
+        "term_glyph",
-        "test_api"
+        "test_api"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "test_api",
+      "name": "test_api",
-      "version": "0.7.7",
+      "version": "0.7.7",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "async",
+        "async",
-        "boolean_selector",
+        "boolean_selector",
-        "collection",
+        "collection",
-        "meta",
+        "meta",
-        "source_span",
+        "source_span",
-        "stack_trace",
+        "stack_trace",
-        "stream_channel",
+        "stream_channel",
-        "string_scanner",
+        "string_scanner",
-        "term_glyph"
+        "term_glyph"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "sky_engine",
+      "name": "sky_engine",
-      "version": "0.0.0",
+      "version": "0.0.0",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "material_color_utilities",
+      "name": "material_color_utilities",
-      "version": "0.11.1",
+      "version": "0.11.1",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "collection"
+        "collection"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "characters",
+      "name": "characters",
-      "version": "1.4.0",
+      "version": "1.4.0",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "async",
+      "name": "async",
-      "version": "2.13.0",
+      "version": "2.13.0",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "collection",
+        "collection",
-        "meta"
+        "meta"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "leak_tracker_testing",
+      "name": "leak_tracker_testing",
-      "version": "3.0.2",
+      "version": "3.0.2",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "leak_tracker",
+        "leak_tracker",
-        "matcher",
+        "matcher",
-        "meta"
+        "meta"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "leak_tracker",
+      "name": "leak_tracker",
-      "version": "11.0.2",
+      "version": "11.0.2",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "clock",
+        "clock",
-        "collection",
+        "collection",
-        "meta",
+        "meta",
-        "path",
+        "path",
-        "vm_service"
+        "vm_service"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "term_glyph",
+      "name": "term_glyph",
-      "version": "1.2.2",
+      "version": "1.2.2",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "string_scanner",
+      "name": "string_scanner",
-      "version": "1.4.1",
+      "version": "1.4.1",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "source_span"
+        "source_span"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "source_span",
+      "name": "source_span",
-      "version": "1.10.2",
+      "version": "1.10.2",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "collection",
+        "collection",
-        "path",
+        "path",
-        "term_glyph"
+        "term_glyph"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "boolean_selector",
+      "name": "boolean_selector",
-      "version": "2.1.2",
+      "version": "2.1.2",
-      "dependencies": [
+      "dependencies": [
-        "source_span",
+        "source_span",
-        "string_scanner"
+        "string_scanner"
-      ]
+      ]
-    },
+    },
-    {
+    {
-      "name": "vm_service",
+      "name": "vm_service",
-      "version": "15.0.2",
+      "version": "15.0.2",
-      "dependencies": []
+      "dependencies": []
-    }
+    }
-  ],
+  ],
-  "configVersion": 1
+  "configVersion": 1
 }

app/macos/Flutter/ephemeral/Flutter-Generated.xcconfig

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-// This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
+// This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
-FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable
+FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable
-FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app
+FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app
-COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true
+COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true
-FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build
+FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build
-FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0
+FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0
-FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1
+FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1
-DART_OBFUSCATION=false
+DART_OBFUSCATION=false
-TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true
+TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true
-TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false
+TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false
-PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json
+PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json

app/macos/Flutter/ephemeral/flutter_export_environment.sh

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/sh
-# This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
+# This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
-export "FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable"
+export "FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable"
-export "FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app"
+export "FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app"
-export "COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true"
+export "COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true"
-export "FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build"
+export "FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build"
-export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0"
+export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0"
-export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1"
+export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1"
-export "DART_OBFUSCATION=false"
+export "DART_OBFUSCATION=false"
-export "TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true"
+export "TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true"
-export "TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false"
+export "TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false"
-export "PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json"
+export "PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json"

docs/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -1,332 +1,334 @@
-# Arbiter
+# Arbiter
-
+
-Arbiter is a permissioned signing service for cryptocurrency wallets. It runs as a background service on the user's machine with an optional client application for vault management.
+Arbiter is a permissioned signing service for cryptocurrency wallets. It runs as a background service on the user's machine with an optional client application for vault management.
-
+
-**Core principle:** The vault NEVER exposes key material. It only produces signatures when a request satisfies the configured policies.
+**Core principle:** The vault NEVER exposes key material. It only produces signatures when a request satisfies the configured policies.
----
+---
-
+
-## 1. Peer Types
+## 1. Peer Types
-
+
-Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers:
+Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers:
-
+
-- **User Agent** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies).
+- **Operator** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies).
-- **SDK Client** — A consumer of signing capabilities, typically an automation tool. In the future, this could include a browser-based wallet.
+- **SDK Client** — A consumer of signing capabilities, typically an automation tool. In the future, this could include a browser-based wallet.
-- **Recovery Operator** — A dormant recovery participant with narrowly scoped authority used only for custody recovery and operator replacement.
+- **Recovery Operator** — A dormant recovery participant with narrowly scoped authority used only for custody recovery and operator replacement.
-
+
----
+---
-
+
-## 2. Authentication
+## 2. Authentication
-
+
-### 2.1 Challenge-Response
+### 2.1 Challenge-Response
-
+
-All peers authenticate via public-key cryptography using a challenge-response protocol:
+All peers authenticate via public-key cryptography using a challenge-response protocol:
-
+
-1. The peer sends its public key and requests a challenge.
+1. The peer sends its public key and requests a challenge.
-2. The server looks up the key in its database. If found, it increments the nonce and returns a challenge (replay-attack protection).
+2. The server looks up the key in its database. If found, it generates a fresh challenge from random bytes plus the current timestamp.
-3. The peer signs the challenge with its private key and sends the signature back.
+3. The peer signs the canonical challenge payload with its private key and sends the signature back.
-4. The server verifies the signature:
+4. The server verifies the signature:
-   - **Pass:** The connection is considered authenticated.
+   - **Pass:** The connection is considered authenticated.
-   - **Fail:** The server closes the connection.
+   - **Fail:** The server closes the connection.
-
+
-### 2.2 User Agent Bootstrap
+Authentication challenges are per-connection, ephemeral values. They are not persisted in the peer tables, and peer records store no challenge state.
-
+
-On first run — when no User Agents are registered — the server generates a one-time bootstrap token. It is made available in two ways:
+### 2.2 Operator Bootstrap
-
+
-- **Local setup:** Written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` for automatic discovery by a co-located User Agent.
+On first run — when no Operators are registered — the server generates a one-time bootstrap token. It is made available in two ways:
-- **Remote setup:** Printed to the server's console output.
+
-
+- **Local setup:** Written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` for automatic discovery by a co-located Operator.
-The first User Agent must present this token alongside the standard challenge-response to complete registration.
+- **Remote setup:** Printed to the server's console output.
-
+
-### 2.3 SDK Client Registration
+The first Operator must present this token alongside the standard challenge-response to complete registration.
-
+
-There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approved by an already-registered User Agent.
+### 2.3 SDK Client Registration
-
+
----
+There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approved by an already-registered Operator.
-
+
-## 3. Multi-Operator Governance
+---
-
+
-When more than one User Agent is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision.
+## 3. Multi-Operator Governance
-
+
-### 3.1 Voting Rules
+When more than one Operator is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision.
-
+
-Voting is based on the total number of registered operators:
+### 3.1 Voting Rules
-
+
-- **1 operator:** no vote is needed; the single operator decides directly.
+Voting is based on the total number of registered operators:
-- **2 operators:** full consensus is required; both operators must approve.
+
-- **3 or more operators:** quorum is `floor(N / 2) + 1`.
+- **1 operator:** no vote is needed; the single operator decides directly.
-
+- **2 operators:** full consensus is required; both operators must approve.
-For a decision to count, the operator's approval or rejection must be signed by that operator's associated key. Unsigned votes, or votes that fail signature verification, are ignored.
+- **3 or more operators:** quorum is `floor(N / 2) + 1`.
-
+
-Examples:
+For a decision to count, the operator's approval or rejection must be signed by that operator's associated key. Unsigned votes, or votes that fail signature verification, are ignored.
-
+
-- **3 operators:** 2 approvals required
+Examples:
-- **4 operators:** 3 approvals required
+
-
+- **3 operators:** 2 approvals required
-### 3.2 Actions Requiring a Vote
+- **4 operators:** 3 approvals required
-
+
-In multi-operator mode, a successful vote is required for:
+### 3.2 Actions Requiring a Vote
-
+
-- approving new SDK clients
+In multi-operator mode, a successful vote is required for:
-- granting an SDK client visibility to a wallet
+
-- approving a one-off transaction
+- approving new SDK clients
-- approving creation of a persistent grant
+- granting an SDK client visibility to a wallet
-- approving operator replacement
+- approving a one-off transaction
-- approving server updates
+- approving creation of a persistent grant
-- updating Shamir secret-sharing parameters
+- approving operator replacement
-
+- approving server updates
-### 3.3 Special Rule for Key Rotation
+- updating Shamir secret-sharing parameters
-
+
-Key rotation always requires full quorum, regardless of the normal voting threshold.
+### 3.3 Special Rule for Key Rotation
-
+
-This is stricter than ordinary governance actions because rotating the root key requires every operator to participate in coordinated share refresh/update steps. The root key itself is not redistributed directly, but each operator's share material must be changed consistently.
+Key rotation always requires full quorum, regardless of the normal voting threshold.
-
+
-### 3.4 Root Key Custody
+This is stricter than ordinary governance actions because rotating the root key requires every operator to participate in coordinated share refresh/update steps. The root key itself is not redistributed directly, but each operator's share material must be changed consistently.
-
+
-When the vault has multiple operators, the vault root key is protected using Shamir secret sharing.
+### 3.4 Root Key Custody
-
+
-The vault root key is encrypted in a way that requires reconstruction from user-held shares rather than from a single shared password.
+When the vault has multiple operators, the vault root key is protected using Shamir secret sharing.
-
+
-For ordinary operators, the Shamir threshold matches the ordinary governance quorum. For example:
+The vault root key is encrypted in a way that requires reconstruction from user-held shares rather than from a single shared password.
-
+
-- **2 operators:** `2-of-2`
+For ordinary operators, the Shamir threshold matches the ordinary governance quorum. For example:
-- **3 operators:** `2-of-3`
+
-- **4 operators:** `3-of-4`
+- **2 operators:** `2-of-2`
-
+- **3 operators:** `2-of-3`
-In practice, the Shamir share set also includes Recovery Operator shares. This means the effective Shamir parameters are computed over the combined share pool while keeping the same threshold. For example:
+- **4 operators:** `3-of-4`
-
+
-- **3 ordinary operators + 2 recovery shares:** `2-of-5`
+In practice, the Shamir share set also includes Recovery Operator shares. This means the effective Shamir parameters are computed over the combined share pool while keeping the same threshold. For example:
-
+
-This ensures that the normal custody threshold follows the ordinary operator quorum, while still allowing dormant recovery shares to exist for break-glass recovery flows.
+- **3 ordinary operators + 2 recovery shares:** `2-of-5`
-
+
-### 3.5 Recovery Operators
+This ensures that the normal custody threshold follows the ordinary operator quorum, while still allowing dormant recovery shares to exist for break-glass recovery flows.
-
+
-Recovery Operators are a separate peer type from ordinary vault operators.
+### 3.5 Recovery Operators
-
+
-Their role is intentionally narrow. They can only:
+Recovery Operators are a separate peer type from ordinary vault operators.
-
+
-- participate in unsealing the vault
+Their role is intentionally narrow. They can only:
-- vote for operator replacement
+
-
+- participate in unsealing the vault
-Recovery Operators do not participate in routine governance such as approving SDK clients, granting wallet visibility, approving transactions, creating grants, approving server updates, or changing Shamir parameters.
+- vote for operator replacement
-
+
-### 3.6 Sleeping and Waking Recovery Operators
+Recovery Operators do not participate in routine governance such as approving SDK clients, granting wallet visibility, approving transactions, creating grants, approving server updates, or changing Shamir parameters.
-
+
-By default, Recovery Operators are **sleeping** and do not participate in any active flow.
+### 3.6 Sleeping and Waking Recovery Operators
-
+
-Any ordinary operator may request that Recovery Operators **wake up**.
+By default, Recovery Operators are **sleeping** and do not participate in any active flow.
-
+
-Any ordinary operator may also cancel a pending wake-up request.
+Any ordinary operator may request that Recovery Operators **wake up**.
-
+
-This creates a dispute window before recovery powers become active. The default wake-up delay is **14 days**.
+Any ordinary operator may also cancel a pending wake-up request.
-
+
-Recovery Operators are therefore part of the break-glass recovery path rather than the normal operating quorum.
+This creates a dispute window before recovery powers become active. The default wake-up delay is **14 days**.
-
+
-The high-level recovery flow is:
+Recovery Operators are therefore part of the break-glass recovery path rather than the normal operating quorum.
-
+
-```mermaid
+The high-level recovery flow is:
-sequenceDiagram
+
-    autonumber
+```mermaid
-    actor Op as Ordinary Operator
+sequenceDiagram
-    participant Server
+    autonumber
-    actor Other as Other Operator
+    actor Op as Ordinary Operator
-    actor Rec as Recovery Operator
+    participant Server
-
+    actor Other as Other Operator
-    Op->>Server: Request recovery wake-up
+    actor Rec as Recovery Operator
-    Server-->>Op: Wake-up pending
+
-    Note over Server: Default dispute window: 14 days
+    Op->>Server: Request recovery wake-up
-
+    Server-->>Op: Wake-up pending
-    alt Wake-up cancelled during dispute window
+    Note over Server: Default dispute window: 14 days
-        Other->>Server: Cancel wake-up
+
-        Server-->>Op: Recovery cancelled
+    alt Wake-up cancelled during dispute window
-        Server-->>Rec: Stay sleeping
+        Other->>Server: Cancel wake-up
-    else No cancellation for 14 days
+        Server-->>Op: Recovery cancelled
-        Server-->>Rec: Wake up
+        Server-->>Rec: Stay sleeping
-        Rec->>Server: Join recovery flow
+    else No cancellation for 14 days
-        critical Recovery authority
+        Server-->>Rec: Wake up
-            Rec->>Server: Participate in unseal
+        Rec->>Server: Join recovery flow
-            Rec->>Server: Vote on operator replacement
+        critical Recovery authority
-        end
+            Rec->>Server: Participate in unseal
-        Server-->>Op: Recovery mode active
+            Rec->>Server: Vote on operator replacement
-    end
+        end
-```
+        Server-->>Op: Recovery mode active
-
+    end
-### 3.7 Committee Formation
+```
-
+
-There are two ways to form a multi-operator committee:
+### 3.7 Committee Formation
-
+
-- convert an existing single-operator vault by adding new operators
+There are two ways to form a multi-operator committee:
-- bootstrap an unbootstrapped vault directly into multi-operator mode
+
-
+- convert an existing single-operator vault by adding new operators
-In both cases, committee formation is a coordinated process. Arbiter does not allow multi-operator custody to emerge implicitly from unrelated registrations.
+- bootstrap an unbootstrapped vault directly into multi-operator mode
-
+
-### 3.8 Bootstrapping an Unbootstrapped Vault into Multi-Operator Mode
+In both cases, committee formation is a coordinated process. Arbiter does not allow multi-operator custody to emerge implicitly from unrelated registrations.
-
+
-When an unbootstrapped vault is initialized as a multi-operator vault, the setup proceeds as follows:
+### 3.8 Bootstrapping an Unbootstrapped Vault into Multi-Operator Mode
-
+
-1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using a User Agent and the bootstrap token.
+When an unbootstrapped vault is initialized as a multi-operator vault, the setup proceeds as follows:
-2. During bootstrap setup, that operator declares:
+
-   - the total number of ordinary operators
+1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using an Operator and the bootstrap token.
-   - the total number of Recovery Operators
+2. During bootstrap setup, that operator declares:
-3. The vault enters **multi-bootstrap mode**.
+   - the total number of ordinary operators
-4. While in multi-bootstrap mode:
+   - the total number of Recovery Operators
-   - every ordinary operator must connect with a User Agent using the bootstrap token
+3. The vault enters **multi-bootstrap mode**.
-   - every Recovery Operator must also connect using the bootstrap token
+4. While in multi-bootstrap mode:
-   - each participant is registered individually
+   - every ordinary operator must connect with an Operator using the bootstrap token
-   - each participant's share is created and protected with that participant's credentials
+   - every Recovery Operator must also connect using the bootstrap token
-5. The vault is considered fully bootstrapped only after all declared operator and recovery-share registrations have completed successfully.
+   - each participant is registered individually
-
+   - each participant's share is created and protected with that participant's credentials
-This means the operator and recovery set is fixed at bootstrap completion time, based on the counts declared when multi-bootstrap mode was entered.
+5. The vault is considered fully bootstrapped only after all declared operator and recovery-share registrations have completed successfully.
-
+
-### 3.9 Special Bootstrap Constraint for Two-Operator Vaults
+This means the operator and recovery set is fixed at bootstrap completion time, based on the counts declared when multi-bootstrap mode was entered.
-
+
-If a vault is declared with exactly **2 ordinary operators**, Arbiter requires at least **1 Recovery Operator** to be configured during bootstrap.
+### 3.9 Special Bootstrap Constraint for Two-Operator Vaults
-
+
-This prevents the worst-case custody failure in which a `2-of-2` operator set becomes permanently unrecoverable after loss of a single operator.
+If a vault is declared with exactly **2 ordinary operators**, Arbiter requires at least **1 Recovery Operator** to be configured during bootstrap.
-
+
----
+This prevents the worst-case custody failure in which a `2-of-2` operator set becomes permanently unrecoverable after loss of a single operator.
-
+
-## 4. Server Identity
+---
-
+
-The server proves its identity using TLS with a self-signed certificate. The TLS private key is generated on first run and is long-term; no rotation mechanism exists yet due to the complexity of multi-peer coordination.
+## 4. Server Identity
-
+
-Peers verify the server by its **public key fingerprint**:
+The server proves its identity using TLS with a self-signed certificate. The TLS private key is generated on first run and is long-term; no rotation mechanism exists yet due to the complexity of multi-peer coordination.
-
+
-- **User Agent (local):** Receives the fingerprint automatically through the bootstrap token.
+Peers verify the server by its **public key fingerprint**:
-- **User Agent (remote) / SDK Client:** Must receive the fingerprint out-of-band.
+
-
+- **Operator (local):** Receives the fingerprint automatically through the bootstrap token.
-> A streamlined setup mechanism using a single connection string is planned but not yet implemented.
+- **Operator (remote) / SDK Client:** Must receive the fingerprint out-of-band.
-
+
----
+> A streamlined setup mechanism using a single connection string is planned but not yet implemented.
-
+
-## 5. Key Management
+---
-
+
-### 5.1 Key Hierarchy
+## 5. Key Management
-
+
-There are three layers of keys:
+### 5.1 Key Hierarchy
-
+
-| Key | Encrypts | Encrypted by |
+There are three layers of keys:
-|---|---|---|
+
-| **User key** (password) | Root key | — (derived from user input) |
+| Key | Encrypts | Encrypted by |
-| **Root key** | Wallet keys | User key |
+|---|---|---|
-| **Wallet keys** | — (used for signing) | Root key |
+| **User key** (password) | Root key | — (derived from user input) |
-
+| **Root key** | Wallet keys | User key |
-This layered design enables:
+| **Wallet keys** | — (used for signing) | Root key |
-
+
-- **Password rotation** without re-encrypting every wallet key (only the root key is re-encrypted).
+This layered design enables:
-- **Root key rotation** without requiring the user to change their password.
+
-
+- **Password rotation** without re-encrypting every wallet key (only the root key is re-encrypted).
-### 5.2 Encryption at Rest
+- **Root key rotation** without requiring the user to change their password.
-
+
-The database stores everything in encrypted form using symmetric AEAD. The encryption scheme is versioned to support transparent migration — when the vault unseals, Arbiter automatically re-encrypts any entries that are behind the current scheme version. See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the specific scheme and versioning mechanism.
+### 5.2 Encryption at Rest
-
+
----
+The database stores everything in encrypted form using symmetric AEAD. The encryption scheme is versioned to support transparent migration — when the vault unseals, Arbiter automatically re-encrypts any entries that are behind the current scheme version. See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the specific scheme and versioning mechanism.
-
+
-## 6. Vault Lifecycle
+---
-
+
-### 6.1 Sealed State
+## 6. Vault Lifecycle
-
+
-On boot, the root key is encrypted and the server cannot perform any signing operations. This state is called **Sealed**.
+### 6.1 Sealed State
-
+
-### 6.2 Unseal Flow
+On boot, the root key is encrypted and the server cannot perform any signing operations. This state is called **Sealed**.
-
+
-To transition to the **Unsealed** state, a User Agent must provide the password:
+### 6.2 Unseal Flow
-
+
-1. The User Agent initiates an unseal request.
+To transition to the **Unsealed** state, an Operator must provide the password:
-2. The server generates a one-time key pair and returns the public key.
+
-3. The User Agent encrypts the user's password with this one-time public key and sends the ciphertext to the server.
+1. The Operator initiates an unseal request.
-4. The server decrypts and verifies the password:
+2. The server generates a one-time key pair and returns the public key.
-   - **Success:** The root key is decrypted and placed into a hardened memory cell. The server transitions to `Unsealed`. Any entries pending encryption scheme migration are re-encrypted.
+3. The Operator encrypts the user's password with this one-time public key and sends the ciphertext to the server.
-   - **Failure:** The server returns an error indicating the password is incorrect.
+4. The server decrypts and verifies the password:
-
+   - **Success:** The root key is decrypted and placed into a hardened memory cell. The server transitions to `Unsealed`. Any entries pending encryption scheme migration are re-encrypted.
-### 6.3 Memory Protection
+   - **Failure:** The server returns an error indicating the password is incorrect.
-
+
-Once unsealed, the root key must be protected in memory against:
+### 6.3 Memory Protection
-
+
-- Memory dumps
+Once unsealed, the root key must be protected in memory against:
-- Page swaps to disk
+
-- Hibernation files
+- Memory dumps
-
+- Page swaps to disk
-See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the current and planned memory protection approaches.
+- Hibernation files
-
+
----
+See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the current and planned memory protection approaches.
-
+
-## 7. Permission Engine
+---
-
+
-### 7.1 Fundamental Rules
+## 7. Permission Engine
-
+
-- SDK clients have **no access by default**.
+### 7.1 Fundamental Rules
-- Access is granted **explicitly** by a User Agent.
+
-- Grants are scoped to **specific wallets** and governed by **policies**.
+- SDK clients have **no access by default**.
-
+- Access is granted **explicitly** by an Operator.
-Each blockchain requires its own policy system due to differences in static transaction analysis. Currently, only EVM is supported; Solana support is planned.
+- Grants are scoped to **specific wallets** and governed by **policies**.
-
+
-Arbiter is also responsible for ensuring that **transaction nonces are never reused**.
+Each blockchain requires its own policy system due to differences in static transaction analysis. Currently, only EVM is supported; Solana support is planned.
-
+
-### 7.2 EVM Policies
+Arbiter is also responsible for ensuring that **transaction nonces are never reused**.
-
+
-Every EVM grant is scoped to a specific **wallet** and **chain ID**.
+### 7.2 EVM Policies
-
+
-#### 7.2.0 Transaction Signing Sequence
+Every EVM grant is scoped to a specific **wallet** and **chain ID**.
-
+
-The high-level interaction order is:
+#### 7.2.0 Transaction Signing Sequence
-
+
-```mermaid
+The high-level interaction order is:
-sequenceDiagram
+
-    autonumber
+```mermaid
-    actor SDK as SDK Client
+sequenceDiagram
-    participant Server
+    autonumber
-    participant UA as User Agent
+    actor SDK as SDK Client
-
+    participant Server
-    SDK->>Server: SignTransactionRequest
+    participant operator as Operator
-    Server->>Server: Resolve wallet and wallet visibility
+
-    alt Visibility approval required
+    SDK->>Server: SignTransactionRequest
-        Server->>UA: Ask for wallet visibility approval
+    Server->>Server: Resolve wallet and wallet visibility
-        UA-->>Server: Vote result
+    alt Visibility approval required
-    end
+        Server->>operator: Ask for wallet visibility approval
-    Server->>Server: Evaluate transaction
+        operator-->>Server: Vote result
-    Server->>Server: Load grant and limits context
+    end
-    alt Grant approval required
+    Server->>Server: Evaluate transaction
-        Server->>UA: Ask for execution / grant approval
+    Server->>Server: Load grant and limits context
-        UA-->>Server: Vote result
+    alt Grant approval required
-        opt Create persistent grant
+        Server->>operator: Ask for execution / grant approval
-            Server->>Server: Create and store grant
+        operator-->>Server: Vote result
-        end
+        opt Create persistent grant
-        Server->>Server: Retry evaluation
+            Server->>Server: Create and store grant
-    end
+        end
-    critical Final authorization path
+        Server->>Server: Retry evaluation
-        Server->>Server: Check limits and record execution
+    end
-        Server-->>Server: Signature or evaluation error
+    critical Final authorization path
-    end
+        Server->>Server: Check limits and record execution
-    Server-->>SDK: Signature or error
+        Server-->>Server: Signature or evaluation error
-```
+    end
-
+    Server-->>SDK: Signature or error
-#### 7.2.1 Transaction Sub-Grants
+```
-
+
-Arbiter maintains an ever-expanding database of known contracts and their ABIs. Based on contract knowledge, transaction requests fall into three categories:
+#### 7.2.1 Transaction Sub-Grants
-
+
-**1. Known contract (ABI available)**
+Arbiter maintains an ever-expanding database of known contracts and their ABIs. Based on contract knowledge, transaction requests fall into three categories:
-
+
-The transaction can be decoded and presented with semantic meaning. For example: *"Client X wants to transfer Y USDT to address Z."*
+**1. Known contract (ABI available)**
-
+
-Available restrictions:
+The transaction can be decoded and presented with semantic meaning. For example: *"Client X wants to transfer Y USDT to address Z."*
-- Volume limits (e.g., "no more than 10,000 tokens ever")
+
-- Rate limits (e.g., "no more than 100 tokens per hour")
+Available restrictions:
-
+- Volume limits (e.g., "no more than 10,000 tokens ever")
-**2. Unknown contract (no ABI)**
+- Rate limits (e.g., "no more than 100 tokens per hour")
-
+
-The transaction cannot be decoded, so its effects are opaque — it could do anything, including draining all tokens. The user is warned, and if approved, access is granted to all interactions with the contract (matched by the `to` field).
+**2. Unknown contract (no ABI)**
-
+
-Available restrictions:
+The transaction cannot be decoded, so its effects are opaque — it could do anything, including draining all tokens. The user is warned, and if approved, access is granted to all interactions with the contract (matched by the `to` field).
-- Transaction count limits (e.g., "no more than 100 transactions ever")
+
-- Rate limits (e.g., "no more than 5 transactions per hour")
+Available restrictions:
-
+- Transaction count limits (e.g., "no more than 100 transactions ever")
-**3. Plain ether transfer (no calldata)**
+- Rate limits (e.g., "no more than 5 transactions per hour")
-
+
-These transactions have no `calldata` and therefore cannot interact with contracts. They can be subject to the same volume and rate restrictions as above.
+**3. Plain ether transfer (no calldata)**
-
+
-#### 7.2.2 Global Limits
+These transactions have no `calldata` and therefore cannot interact with contracts. They can be subject to the same volume and rate restrictions as above.
-
+
-In addition to sub-grant-specific restrictions, the following limits can be applied across all grant types:
+#### 7.2.2 Global Limits
-
+
-- **Gas limit** — Maximum gas per transaction.
+In addition to sub-grant-specific restrictions, the following limits can be applied across all grant types:
-- **Time-window restrictions** — e.g., signing allowed only 08:00–20:00 on Mondays and Thursdays.
+
+- **Gas limit** — Maximum gas per transaction.
+- **Time-window restrictions** — e.g., signing allowed only 08:00–20:00 on Mondays and Thursdays.

docs/IMPLEMENTATION.md

@@ -1,239 +1,226 @@
-# Implementation Details
+# Implementation Details
-
+
-This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the architectural design, see [ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md).
+This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the architectural design, see [ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md).
-
+
----
+---
-
+
-## Client Connection Flow
+## Client Connection Flow
-
+
-### Authentication Result Semantics
+### Authentication Result Semantics
-
+
-Authentication no longer uses an implicit success-only response shape. Both `client` and `user-agent` return explicit auth status enums over the wire.
+Authentication no longer uses an implicit success-only response shape. Both `client` and `operator` return explicit auth status enums over the wire.
-
+
-- **Client:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `APPROVAL_DENIED`, `NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE`, or `INTERNAL`
+- **Client:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `APPROVAL_DENIED`, `NO_OPERATORS_ONLINE`, or `INTERNAL`
-- **User-agent:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED`, `TOKEN_INVALID`, or `INTERNAL`
+- **Operator:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED`, `TOKEN_INVALID`, or `INTERNAL`
-
+
-This makes transport-level failures and actor/domain-level auth failures distinct:
+This makes transport-level failures and actor/domain-level auth failures distinct:
-
+
-- **Transport/protocol failures** are surfaced as stream/status errors
+- **Transport/protocol failures** are surfaced as stream/status errors
-- **Authentication failures** are surfaced as successful protocol responses carrying an explicit auth status
+- **Authentication failures** are surfaced as successful protocol responses carrying an explicit auth status
-
+
-Clients are expected to handle these status codes directly and present the concrete failure reason to the user.
+Clients are expected to handle these status codes directly and present the concrete failure reason to the user.
-
+
-### New Client Approval
+### New Client Approval
-
+
-When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected user agents are asked to approve the connection. The first agent to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel.
+When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected operators are asked to approve the connection. The first operator to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel.
-
+
-```mermaid
+```mermaid
-flowchart TD
+flowchart TD
-    A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest]
+    A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest]
-    B --> C{pubkey in DB?}
+    B --> C{pubkey in DB?}
-
+
-    C -- yes --> D[Read nonce\nIncrement nonce in DB]
+    C -- yes --> G[Generate AuthChallenge]
-    D --> G
+
-
+    C -- no --> E[Ask all Operators:\nClientConnectionRequest]
-    C -- no --> E[Ask all UserAgents:\nClientConnectionRequest]
+    E --> F{First response}
-    E --> F{First response}
+    F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection])
-    F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection])
+    F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nOperator requests]
-    F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nUserAgent requests]
+    F2 --> F3[INSERT client]
-    F2 --> F3[INSERT client\nnonce = 1]
+    F3 --> G
-    F3 --> G[Send AuthChallenge\nwith nonce]
+
-
+    G --> H[Send AuthChallenge\ntimestamp + random bytes]
-    G --> H[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
+    H --> I[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
-    H --> I{Signature valid?}
+    I --> K{Signature valid?}
-    I -- no --> Z
+    K -- no --> Z
-    I -- yes --> J([Session started])
+    K -- yes --> J([Session started])
-```
+```
-
+
-### Known Issue: Concurrent Registration Race (TOCTOU)
+Auth challenges are generated from fresh random bytes plus a nanosecond timestamp. The server keeps the issued challenge only in the in-flight authentication state for that connection, then verifies the signature against the same canonical challenge payload.
-
+
-Two connections presenting the same previously-unknown public key can race through the approval flow simultaneously:
+The authentication schema stores peer identity, not replay counters:
-
+
-1. Both check the DB → neither is registered.
+- `program_client` stores the SDK client's public key, metadata binding, and timestamps.
-2. Both request approval from user agents → both receive approval.
+- `operator_client` stores the Operator public key and timestamps.
-3. Both `INSERT` the client record → the second insert silently overwrites the first, resetting the nonce.
+- Neither table stores an authentication nonce, and challenge generation does not update either table.
-
+
-This means the first connection's nonce is invalidated by the second, causing its challenge verification to fail. A fix requires either serialising new-client registration (e.g. an in-memory lock keyed on pubkey) or replacing the separate check + insert with an `INSERT OR IGNORE` / upsert guarded by a unique constraint on `public_key`.
+---
-
+
-### Nonce Semantics
+## Cryptography
-
+
-The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it is always one ahead of the nonce last issued in a challenge.
+### Authentication
-
+- **Client protocol:** ML-DSA
-- **New client:** inserted with `nonce = 1`; the first challenge is issued with `nonce = 0`.
+
-- **Existing client:** the current DB value is read and used as the challenge nonce, then immediately incremented within the same exclusive transaction, preventing replay.
+### User-Agent Authentication
-
+
----
+Operator authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
-
+
-## Cryptography
+- **Supported schemes:** ML-DSA
-
+- **Why:** Secure Enclave (MacOS) support them natively, on other platforms we could emulate while they roll-out
-### Authentication
+
-- **Client protocol:** ed25519
+### Encryption at Rest
-
+- **Scheme:** Symmetric AEAD — currently **XChaCha20-Poly1305**
-### User-Agent Authentication
+- **Version tracking:** Each `aead_encrypted` database entry carries a `scheme` field denoting the version, enabling transparent migration on unseal
-
+
-User-agent authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
+### Server Identity
-
+- **Transport:** TLS with a self-signed certificate
-- **Supported schemes:** RSA, Ed25519, ECDSA (secp256k1)
+- **Key type:** Generated on first run; long-term (no rotation mechanism yet)
-- **Why:** the user agent authenticates with keys backed by platform facilities, and those facilities differ by platform
+
-- **Apple Silicon Secure Enclave / Secure Element:** ECDSA-only in practice
+---
-- **Windows Hello / TPM 2.0:** currently RSA-backed in our integration
+
-
+## Communication
-This is why the user-agent auth protocol carries an explicit `KeyType`, while the SDK client protocol remains fixed to ed25519.
+
-
+- **Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers
-### Encryption at Rest
+- **Request/response matching:** multiplexed over a single bidirectional stream using per-connection request IDs
-- **Scheme:** Symmetric AEAD — currently **XChaCha20-Poly1305**
+- **Server identity distribution:** `ServerInfo` protobuf struct containing the TLS public key fingerprint
-- **Version tracking:** Each `aead_encrypted` database entry carries a `scheme` field denoting the version, enabling transparent migration on unseal
+- **Future consideration:** grpc-web lacks bidirectional stream support, so a browser-based wallet may require protojson over WebSocket
-
+
-### Server Identity
+### Request Multiplexing
-- **Transport:** TLS with a self-signed certificate
+
-- **Key type:** Generated on first run; long-term (no rotation mechanism yet)
+Both `client` and `operator` connections support multiple in-flight requests over one gRPC bidi stream.
-
+
----
+- Every request carries a monotonically increasing request ID
-
+- Every normal response echoes the request ID it corresponds to
-## Communication
+- Out-of-band server messages omit the response ID entirely
-
+- The server rejects already-seen request IDs at the transport adapter boundary before business logic sees the message
-- **Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers
+
-- **Request/response matching:** multiplexed over a single bidirectional stream using per-connection request IDs
+This keeps request correlation entirely in transport/client connection code while leaving actor and domain handlers unaware of request IDs.
-- **Server identity distribution:** `ServerInfo` protobuf struct containing the TLS public key fingerprint
+
-- **Future consideration:** grpc-web lacks bidirectional stream support, so a browser-based wallet may require protojson over WebSocket
+---
-
+
-### Request Multiplexing
+## EVM Policy Engine
-
+
-Both `client` and `user-agent` connections support multiple in-flight requests over one gRPC bidi stream.
+### Overview
-
+
-- Every request carries a monotonically increasing request ID
+The EVM engine classifies incoming transactions, enforces grant constraints, and records executions. It is the sole path through which a wallet key is used for signing.
-- Every normal response echoes the request ID it corresponds to
+
-- Out-of-band server messages omit the response ID entirely
+The central abstraction is the `Policy` trait. Each implementation handles one semantic transaction category and owns its own database tables for grant storage and transaction logging.
-- The server rejects already-seen request IDs at the transport adapter boundary before business logic sees the message
+
-
+### Transaction Evaluation Flow
-This keeps request correlation entirely in transport/client connection code while leaving actor and domain handlers unaware of request IDs.
+
-
+`Engine::evaluate_transaction` runs the following steps in order:
----
+
-
+1. **Classify** — Each registered policy's `analyze(context)` inspects the transaction fields (`chain`, `to`, `value`, `calldata`). The first one returning `Some(meaning)` wins. If none match, the transaction is rejected as `UnsupportedTransactionType`.
-## EVM Policy Engine
+2. **Find grant** — `Policy::try_find_grant` queries for a non-revoked grant covering this wallet, client, chain, and target address.
-
+3. **Check shared constraints** — `check_shared_constraints` runs in the engine before any policy-specific logic. It enforces the validity window, gas fee caps, and transaction count rate limit (see below).
-### Overview
+4. **Evaluate** — `Policy::evaluate` checks the decoded meaning against the grant's policy-specific constraints and returns any violations.
-
+5. **Record** — If `RunKind::Execution` and there are no violations, the engine writes to `evm_transaction_log` and calls `Policy::record_transaction` for any policy-specific logging (e.g., token transfer volume).
-The EVM engine classifies incoming transactions, enforces grant constraints, and records executions. It is the sole path through which a wallet key is used for signing.
+
-
+The detailed branch structure is shown below:
-The central abstraction is the `Policy` trait. Each implementation handles one semantic transaction category and owns its own database tables for grant storage and transaction logging.
+
-
+```mermaid
-### Transaction Evaluation Flow
+flowchart TD
-
+    A[SDK Client sends sign transaction request] --> B[Server resolves wallet]
-`Engine::evaluate_transaction` runs the following steps in order:
+    B --> C{Wallet exists?}
-
+
-1. **Classify** — Each registered policy's `analyze(context)` inspects the transaction fields (`chain`, `to`, `value`, `calldata`). The first one returning `Some(meaning)` wins. If none match, the transaction is rejected as `UnsupportedTransactionType`.
+    C -- No --> Z1[Return wallet not found error]
-2. **Find grant** — `Policy::try_find_grant` queries for a non-revoked grant covering this wallet, client, chain, and target address.
+    C -- Yes --> D[Check SDK client wallet visibility]
-3. **Check shared constraints** — `check_shared_constraints` runs in the engine before any policy-specific logic. It enforces the validity window, gas fee caps, and transaction count rate limit (see below).
+
-4. **Evaluate** — `Policy::evaluate` checks the decoded meaning against the grant's policy-specific constraints and returns any violations.
+    D --> E{Wallet visible to SDK client?}
-5. **Record** — If `RunKind::Execution` and there are no violations, the engine writes to `evm_transaction_log` and calls `Policy::record_transaction` for any policy-specific logging (e.g., token transfer volume).
+    E -- No --> F[Start wallet visibility voting flow]
-
+    F --> G{Vote approved?}
-The detailed branch structure is shown below:
+    G -- No --> Z2[Return wallet access denied error]
-
+    G -- Yes --> H[Persist wallet visibility]
-```mermaid
+    E -- Yes --> I[Classify transaction meaning]
-flowchart TD
+    H --> I
-    A[SDK Client sends sign transaction request] --> B[Server resolves wallet]
+
-    B --> C{Wallet exists?}
+    I --> J{Meaning supported?}
-
+    J -- No --> Z3[Return unsupported transaction error]
-    C -- No --> Z1[Return wallet not found error]
+    J -- Yes --> K[Find matching grant]
-    C -- Yes --> D[Check SDK client wallet visibility]
+
-
+    K --> L{Grant exists?}
-    D --> E{Wallet visible to SDK client?}
+    L -- Yes --> M[Check grant limits]
-    E -- No --> F[Start wallet visibility voting flow]
+    L -- No --> N[Start execution or grant voting flow]
-    F --> G{Vote approved?}
+
-    G -- No --> Z2[Return wallet access denied error]
+    N --> O{Operator decision}
-    G -- Yes --> H[Persist wallet visibility]
+    O -- Reject --> Z4[Return no matching grant error]
-    E -- Yes --> I[Classify transaction meaning]
+    O -- Allow once --> M
-    H --> I
+    O -- Create grant --> P[Create grant with user-selected limits]
-
+    P --> Q[Persist grant]
-    I --> J{Meaning supported?}
+    Q --> M
-    J -- No --> Z3[Return unsupported transaction error]
+
-    J -- Yes --> K[Find matching grant]
+    M --> R{Limits exceeded?}
-
+    R -- Yes --> Z5[Return evaluation error]
-    K --> L{Grant exists?}
+    R -- No --> S[Record transaction in logs]
-    L -- Yes --> M[Check grant limits]
+    S --> T[Produce signature]
-    L -- No --> N[Start execution or grant voting flow]
+    T --> U[Return signature to SDK client]
-
+
-    N --> O{User-agent decision}
+    note1[Limit checks include volume, count, and gas constraints.]
-    O -- Reject --> Z4[Return no matching grant error]
+    note2[Grant lookup depends on classified meaning, such as ether transfer or token transfer.]
-    O -- Allow once --> M
+
-    O -- Create grant --> P[Create grant with user-selected limits]
+    K -. uses .-> note2
-    P --> Q[Persist grant]
+    M -. checks .-> note1
-    Q --> M
+```
-
+
-    M --> R{Limits exceeded?}
+### Policy Trait
-    R -- Yes --> Z5[Return evaluation error]
+
-    R -- No --> S[Record transaction in logs]
+| Method | Purpose |
-    S --> T[Produce signature]
+|---|---|
-    T --> U[Return signature to SDK client]
+| `analyze` | Pure — classifies a transaction into a typed `Meaning`, or `None` if this policy doesn't apply |
-
+| `evaluate` | Checks the `Meaning` against a `Grant`; returns a list of `EvalViolation`s |
-    note1[Limit checks include volume, count, and gas constraints.]
+| `create_grant` | Inserts policy-specific rows; returns the specific grant ID |
-    note2[Grant lookup depends on classified meaning, such as ether transfer or token transfer.]
+| `try_find_grant` | Finds a matching non-revoked grant for the given `EvalContext` |
-
+| `find_all_grants` | Returns all non-revoked grants (used for listing) |
-    K -. uses .-> note2
+| `record_transaction` | Persists policy-specific data after execution |
-    M -. checks .-> note1
+
-```
+`analyze` and `evaluate` are intentionally separate: classification is pure and cheap, while evaluation may involve DB queries (e.g., fetching past transfer volume).
-
+
-### Policy Trait
+### Registered Policies
-
+
-| Method | Purpose |
+**EtherTransfer** — plain ETH transfers (empty calldata)
-|---|---|
+
-| `analyze` | Pure — classifies a transaction into a typed `Meaning`, or `None` if this policy doesn't apply |
+- Grant requires: allowlist of recipient addresses + one volumetric rate limit (max ETH over a time window)
-| `evaluate` | Checks the `Meaning` against a `Grant`; returns a list of `EvalViolation`s |
+- Violations: recipient not in allowlist, cumulative ETH volume exceeded
-| `create_grant` | Inserts policy-specific rows; returns the specific grant ID |
+
-| `try_find_grant` | Finds a matching non-revoked grant for the given `EvalContext` |
+**TokenTransfer** — ERC-20 `transfer(address,uint256)` calls
-| `find_all_grants` | Returns all non-revoked grants (used for listing) |
+
-| `record_transaction` | Persists policy-specific data after execution |
+- Recognised by ABI-decoding the `transfer(address,uint256)` selector against a static registry of known token contracts (`arbiter_tokens_registry`)
-
+- Grant requires: token contract address, optional recipient restriction, zero or more volumetric rate limits
-`analyze` and `evaluate` are intentionally separate: classification is pure and cheap, while evaluation may involve DB queries (e.g., fetching past transfer volume).
+- Violations: recipient mismatch, any volumetric limit exceeded
-
+
-### Registered Policies
+### Grant Model
-
+
-**EtherTransfer** — plain ETH transfers (empty calldata)
+Every grant has two layers:
-
+
-- Grant requires: allowlist of recipient addresses + one volumetric rate limit (max ETH over a time window)
+- **Shared (`evm_basic_grant`)** — wallet, chain, validity period, gas fee caps, transaction count rate limit. One row per grant regardless of type.
-- Violations: recipient not in allowlist, cumulative ETH volume exceeded
+- **Specific** — policy-owned tables (`evm_ether_transfer_grant`, `evm_token_transfer_grant`) holding type-specific configuration.
-
+
-**TokenTransfer** — ERC-20 `transfer(address,uint256)` calls
+`find_all_grants` uses a `#[diesel::auto_type]` base join between the specific and shared tables, then batch-loads related rows (targets, volume limits) in two additional queries to avoid N+1.
-
+
-- Recognised by ABI-decoding the `transfer(address,uint256)` selector against a static registry of known token contracts (`arbiter_tokens_registry`)
+The engine exposes `list_all_grants` which collects across all policy types into `Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>` via a blanket `From<Grant<S>> for Grant<SpecificGrant>` conversion.
-- Grant requires: token contract address, optional recipient restriction, zero or more volumetric rate limits
+
-- Violations: recipient mismatch, any volumetric limit exceeded
+### Shared Constraints (enforced by the engine)
-
+
-### Grant Model
+These are checked centrally in `check_shared_constraints` before policy evaluation:
-
+
-Every grant has two layers:
+| Constraint | Fields | Behaviour |
-
+|---|---|---|
-- **Shared (`evm_basic_grant`)** — wallet, chain, validity period, gas fee caps, transaction count rate limit. One row per grant regardless of type.
+| Validity window | `valid_from`, `valid_until` | Emits `InvalidTime` if current time is outside the range |
-- **Specific** — policy-owned tables (`evm_ether_transfer_grant`, `evm_token_transfer_grant`) holding type-specific configuration.
+| Gas fee cap | `max_gas_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas` | Emits `GasLimitExceeded` if either cap is breached |
-
+| Tx count rate limit | `rate_limit` (`count` + `window`) | Counts rows in `evm_transaction_log` within the window; emits `RateLimitExceeded` if at or above the limit |
-`find_all_grants` uses a `#[diesel::auto_type]` base join between the specific and shared tables, then batch-loads related rows (targets, volume limits) in two additional queries to avoid N+1.
+
-
+---
-The engine exposes `list_all_grants` which collects across all policy types into `Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>` via a blanket `From<Grant<S>> for Grant<SpecificGrant>` conversion.
+
-
+### Known Limitations
-### Shared Constraints (enforced by the engine)
+
-
+- **Only EIP-1559 transactions are supported.** Legacy and EIP-2930 types are rejected outright.
-These are checked centrally in `check_shared_constraints` before policy evaluation:
+- **No opaque-calldata (unknown contract) grant type.** The architecture describes a category for unrecognised contracts, but no policy implements it yet. Any transaction that is not a plain ETH transfer or a known ERC-20 transfer is unconditionally rejected.
-
+- **Token registry is static.** Tokens are recognised only if they appear in the hard-coded `arbiter_tokens_registry` crate. There is no mechanism to register additional contracts at runtime.
-| Constraint | Fields | Behaviour |
+
-|---|---|---|
+---
-| Validity window | `valid_from`, `valid_until` | Emits `InvalidTime` if current time is outside the range |
+
-| Gas fee cap | `max_gas_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas` | Emits `GasLimitExceeded` if either cap is breached |
+## Memory Protection
-| Tx count rate limit | `rate_limit` (`count` + `window`) | Counts rows in `evm_transaction_log` within the window; emits `RateLimitExceeded` if at or above the limit |
+
-
+The unsealed root key must be held in a hardened memory cell resistant to dumps, page swaps, and hibernation.
----
+
-
+- **Current:** A dedicated memory-protection abstraction is in place, with `memsafe` used behind that abstraction today
-### Known Limitations
+- **Planned:** Additional backends can be introduced behind the same abstraction, including a custom implementation based on `mlock` (Unix) and `VirtualProtect` (Windows)
-
-- **Only EIP-1559 transactions are supported.** Legacy and EIP-2930 types are rejected outright.
-- **No opaque-calldata (unknown contract) grant type.** The architecture describes a category for unrecognised contracts, but no policy implements it yet. Any transaction that is not a plain ETH transfer or a known ERC-20 transfer is unconditionally rejected.
-- **Token registry is static.** Tokens are recognised only if they appear in the hard-coded `arbiter_tokens_registry` crate. There is no mechanism to register additional contracts at runtime.
-
----
-
-## Memory Protection
-
-The unsealed root key must be held in a hardened memory cell resistant to dumps, page swaps, and hibernation.
-
-- **Current:** A dedicated memory-protection abstraction is in place, with `memsafe` used behind that abstraction today
-- **Planned:** Additional backends can be introduced behind the same abstraction, including a custom implementation based on `mlock` (Unix) and `VirtualProtect` (Windows)

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-03-28-grant-grid-view-design.md

@@ -1,170 +1,170 @@
-# Grant Grid View — Design Spec
+# Grant Grid View — Design Spec
-
+
-**Date:** 2026-03-28
+**Date:** 2026-03-28
-
+
-## Overview
+## Overview
-
+
-Add a "Grants" dashboard tab to the Flutter user-agent app that displays all EVM grants as a card-based grid. Each card shows a compact summary (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with a revoke action. The tab integrates into the existing `AdaptiveScaffold` navigation alongside Wallets, Clients, and About.
+Add a "Grants" dashboard tab to the Flutter operator app that displays all EVM grants as a card-based grid. Each card shows a compact summary (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with a revoke action. The tab integrates into the existing `AdaptiveScaffold` navigation alongside Wallets, Clients, and About.
-
+
-## Scope
+## Scope
-
+
-- New `walletAccessListProvider` for fetching wallet access entries with their DB row IDs
+- New `walletAccessListProvider` for fetching wallet access entries with their DB row IDs
-- New `EvmGrantsScreen` as a dashboard tab
+- New `EvmGrantsScreen` as a dashboard tab
-- Grant card widget with enriched display (type, chain, wallet, client)
+- Grant card widget with enriched display (type, chain, wallet, client)
-- Revoke action wired to existing `executeRevokeEvmGrant` mutation
+- Revoke action wired to existing `executeRevokeEvmGrant` mutation
-- Dashboard tab bar and router updated
+- Dashboard tab bar and router updated
-- New token-transfer accent color added to `Palette`
+- New token-transfer accent color added to `Palette`
-
+
-**Out of scope:** Fixing grant creation (separate task).
+**Out of scope:** Fixing grant creation (separate task).
-
+
----
+---
-
+
-## Data Layer
+## Data Layer
-
+
-### `walletAccessListProvider`
+### `walletAccessListProvider`
-
+
-**File:** `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
+**File:** `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
-
+
-- `@riverpod` class, watches `connectionManagerProvider.future`
+- `@riverpod` class, watches `connectionManagerProvider.future`
-- Returns `List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?` (null when not connected)
+- Returns `List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?` (null when not connected)
-- Each entry: `.id` (wallet_access_id), `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
+- Each entry: `.id` (wallet_access_id), `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
-- Exposes a `refresh()` method following the same pattern as `EvmGrants.refresh()`
+- Exposes a `refresh()` method following the same pattern as `EvmGrants.refresh()`
-
+
-### Enrichment at render time (Approach A)
+### Enrichment at render time (Approach A)
-
+
-The `EvmGrantsScreen` watches four providers:
+The `EvmGrantsScreen` watches four providers:
-1. `evmGrantsProvider` — the grant list
+1. `evmGrantsProvider` — the grant list
-2. `walletAccessListProvider` — to resolve wallet_access_id → (wallet_id, sdk_client_id)
+2. `walletAccessListProvider` — to resolve wallet_access_id → (wallet_id, sdk_client_id)
-3. `evmProvider` — to resolve wallet_id → wallet address
+3. `evmProvider` — to resolve wallet_id → wallet address
-4. `sdkClientsProvider` — to resolve sdk_client_id → client name
+4. `sdkClientsProvider` — to resolve sdk_client_id → client name
-
+
-All lookups are in-memory Maps built inside the build method; no extra model class needed.
+All lookups are in-memory Maps built inside the build method; no extra model class needed.
-
+
-Fallbacks:
+Fallbacks:
-- Wallet address not found → `"Access #N"` where N is the wallet_access_id
+- Wallet address not found → `"Access #N"` where N is the wallet_access_id
-- Client name not found → `"Client #N"` where N is the sdk_client_id
+- Client name not found → `"Client #N"` where N is the sdk_client_id
-
+
----
+---
-
+
-## Route Structure
+## Route Structure
-
+
-```
+```
-/dashboard
+/dashboard
-  /evm          ← existing (Wallets tab)
+  /evm          ← existing (Wallets tab)
-  /clients      ← existing (Clients tab)
+  /clients      ← existing (Clients tab)
-  /grants       ← NEW (Grants tab)
+  /grants       ← NEW (Grants tab)
-  /about        ← existing
+  /about        ← existing
-
+
-/evm-grants/create  ← existing push route (unchanged)
+/evm-grants/create  ← existing push route (unchanged)
-```
+```
-
+
-### Changes to `router.dart`
+### Changes to `router.dart`
-
+
-Add inside dashboard children:
+Add inside dashboard children:
-```dart
+```dart
-AutoRoute(page: EvmGrantsRoute.page, path: 'grants'),
+AutoRoute(page: EvmGrantsRoute.page, path: 'grants'),
-```
+```
-
+
-### Changes to `dashboard.dart`
+### Changes to `dashboard.dart`
-
+
-Add to `routes` list:
+Add to `routes` list:
-```dart
+```dart
-const EvmGrantsRoute()
+const EvmGrantsRoute()
-```
+```
-
+
-Add `NavigationDestination`:
+Add `NavigationDestination`:
-```dart
+```dart
-NavigationDestination(
+NavigationDestination(
-  icon: Icon(Icons.policy_outlined),
+  icon: Icon(Icons.policy_outlined),
-  selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.policy),
+  selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.policy),
-  label: 'Grants',
+  label: 'Grants',
-),
+),
-```
+```
-
+
----
+---
-
+
-## Screen: `EvmGrantsScreen`
+## Screen: `EvmGrantsScreen`
-
+
-**File:** `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
+**File:** `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
-
+
-```
+```
-Scaffold
+Scaffold
-└─ SafeArea
+└─ SafeArea
-   └─ RefreshIndicator.adaptive (refreshes evmGrantsProvider + walletAccessListProvider)
+   └─ RefreshIndicator.adaptive (refreshes evmGrantsProvider + walletAccessListProvider)
-      └─ ListView (BouncingScrollPhysics + AlwaysScrollableScrollPhysics)
+      └─ ListView (BouncingScrollPhysics + AlwaysScrollableScrollPhysics)
-         ├─ PageHeader
+         ├─ PageHeader
-         │    title: 'EVM Grants'
+         │    title: 'EVM Grants'
-         │    isBusy: evmGrantsProvider.isLoading
+         │    isBusy: evmGrantsProvider.isLoading
-         │    actions: [CreateGrantButton, RefreshButton]
+         │    actions: [CreateGrantButton, RefreshButton]
-         ├─ SizedBox(height: 1.8.h)
+         ├─ SizedBox(height: 1.8.h)
-         └─ <content>
+         └─ <content>
-```
+```
-
+
-### State handling
+### State handling
-
+
-Matches the pattern from `EvmScreen` and `ClientsScreen`:
+Matches the pattern from `EvmScreen` and `ClientsScreen`:
-
+
-| State | Display |
+| State | Display |
-|---|---|
+|---|---|
-| Loading (no data yet) | `_StatePanel` with spinner, "Loading grants" |
+| Loading (no data yet) | `_StatePanel` with spinner, "Loading grants" |
-| Error | `_StatePanel` with coral icon, error message, Retry button |
+| Error | `_StatePanel` with coral icon, error message, Retry button |
-| No connection | `_StatePanel`, "No active server connection" |
+| No connection | `_StatePanel`, "No active server connection" |
-| Empty list | `_StatePanel`, "No grants yet", with Create Grant shortcut |
+| Empty list | `_StatePanel`, "No grants yet", with Create Grant shortcut |
-| Data | Column of `_GrantCard` widgets |
+| Data | Column of `_GrantCard` widgets |
-
+
-### Header actions
+### Header actions
-
+
-**CreateGrantButton:** `FilledButton.icon` with `Icons.add_rounded`, pushes `CreateEvmGrantRoute()` via `context.router.push(...)`.
+**CreateGrantButton:** `FilledButton.icon` with `Icons.add_rounded`, pushes `CreateEvmGrantRoute()` via `context.router.push(...)`.
-
+
-**RefreshButton:** `OutlinedButton.icon` with `Icons.refresh`, calls `ref.read(evmGrantsProvider.notifier).refresh()`.
+**RefreshButton:** `OutlinedButton.icon` with `Icons.refresh`, calls `ref.read(evmGrantsProvider.notifier).refresh()`.
-
+
----
+---
-
+
-## Grant Card: `_GrantCard`
+## Grant Card: `_GrantCard`
-
+
-**Layout:**
+**Layout:**
-
+
-```
+```
-Container (rounded 24, Palette.cream bg, Palette.line border)
+Container (rounded 24, Palette.cream bg, Palette.line border)
-└─ IntrinsicHeight > Row
+└─ IntrinsicHeight > Row
-   ├─ Accent strip (0.8.w wide, full height, rounded left)
+   ├─ Accent strip (0.8.w wide, full height, rounded left)
-   └─ Padding > Column
+   └─ Padding > Column
-        ├─ Row 1: TypeBadge + ChainChip + Spacer + RevokeButton
+        ├─ Row 1: TypeBadge + ChainChip + Spacer + RevokeButton
-        └─ Row 2: WalletText + "·" + ClientText
+        └─ Row 2: WalletText + "·" + ClientText
-```
+```
-
+
-**Accent color by grant type:**
+**Accent color by grant type:**
-- Ether transfer → `Palette.coral`
+- Ether transfer → `Palette.coral`
-- Token transfer → `Palette.token` (new entry in `Palette` — indigo, e.g. `Color(0xFF5C6BC0)`)
+- Token transfer → `Palette.token` (new entry in `Palette` — indigo, e.g. `Color(0xFF5C6BC0)`)
-
+
-**TypeBadge:** Small pill container with accent color background at 15% opacity, accent-colored text. Label: `'Ether'` or `'Token'`.
+**TypeBadge:** Small pill container with accent color background at 15% opacity, accent-colored text. Label: `'Ether'` or `'Token'`.
-
+
-**ChainChip:** Small container: `'Chain ${grant.shared.chainId}'`, muted ink color.
+**ChainChip:** Small container: `'Chain ${grant.shared.chainId}'`, muted ink color.
-
+
-**WalletText:** Short hex address (`0xabc...def`) from wallet lookup, `bodySmall`, monospace font family.
+**WalletText:** Short hex address (`0xabc...def`) from wallet lookup, `bodySmall`, monospace font family.
-
+
-**ClientText:** Client name from `sdkClientsProvider` lookup, or fallback string. `bodySmall`, muted ink.
+**ClientText:** Client name from `sdkClientsProvider` lookup, or fallback string. `bodySmall`, muted ink.
-
+
-**RevokeButton:**
+**RevokeButton:**
-- `OutlinedButton` with `Icons.block_rounded` icon, label `'Revoke'`
+- `OutlinedButton` with `Icons.block_rounded` icon, label `'Revoke'`
-- `foregroundColor: Palette.coral`, `side: BorderSide(color: Palette.coral.withValues(alpha: 0.4))`
+- `foregroundColor: Palette.coral`, `side: BorderSide(color: Palette.coral.withValues(alpha: 0.4))`
-- Disabled (replaced with `CircularProgressIndicator`) while `revokeEvmGrantMutation` is pending — note: this is a single global mutation, so all revoke buttons disable while any revoke is in flight
+- Disabled (replaced with `CircularProgressIndicator`) while `revokeEvmGrantMutation` is pending — note: this is a single global mutation, so all revoke buttons disable while any revoke is in flight
-- On press: calls `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: grant.id)`; shows `SnackBar` on error
+- On press: calls `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: grant.id)`; shows `SnackBar` on error
-
+
----
+---
-
+
-## Adaptive Sizing
+## Adaptive Sizing
-
+
-All sizing uses `sizer` units (`1.h`, `1.w`, etc.). No hardcoded pixel values.
+All sizing uses `sizer` units (`1.h`, `1.w`, etc.). No hardcoded pixel values.
-
+
----
+---
-
+
-## Files to Create / Modify
+## Files to Create / Modify
-
+
-| File | Action |
+| File | Action |
-|---|---|
+|---|---|
-| `lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify — add `Palette.token` color |
+| `lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify — add `Palette.token` color |
-| `lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create |
+| `lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create |
-| `lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create |
+| `lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create |
-| `lib/router.dart` | Modify — add grants route to dashboard children |
+| `lib/router.dart` | Modify — add grants route to dashboard children |
-| `lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify — add tab to routes list and NavigationDestinations |
+| `lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify — add tab to routes list and NavigationDestinations |

mise.lock

@@ -1,51 +1,51 @@
 # @generated - this file is auto-generated by `mise lock` https://mise.jdx.dev/dev-tools/mise-lock.html
 
 [[tools.ast-grep]]
-version = "0.42.0"
+version = "0.42.1"
 backend = "aqua:ast-grep/ast-grep"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64"]
-checksum = "sha256:5c830eae8456569e2f7212434ed9c238f58dca412d76045418ed6d394a755836"
+checksum = "sha256:3ba383839044cf9817929435f5ce0027f91d06931e8efb32d942e58d73d92be5"
-url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
+url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
-checksum = "sha256:5c830eae8456569e2f7212434ed9c238f58dca412d76045418ed6d394a755836"
+checksum = "sha256:3ba383839044cf9817929435f5ce0027f91d06931e8efb32d942e58d73d92be5"
-url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
+url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:e825a05603f0bcc4cd9076c4cc8c9abd6d008b7cd07d9aa3cc323ba4b8606651"
+checksum = "sha256:5de8b87cba67fc8dc3e239d54b6484802ad745a7ae3de76be4fe89661dc52657"
-url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
+url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
-checksum = "sha256:e825a05603f0bcc4cd9076c4cc8c9abd6d008b7cd07d9aa3cc323ba4b8606651"
+checksum = "sha256:5de8b87cba67fc8dc3e239d54b6484802ad745a7ae3de76be4fe89661dc52657"
-url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
+url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-arm64"]
-checksum = "sha256:fc300d5293b1c770a5aece03a8a193b92e71e87cec726c28096990691a582620"
+checksum = "sha256:c3961d8e8a4ee0ce2d0d98c7beeb168bb331cdc766b53630118a7b6c4fd39015"
-url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-aarch64-apple-darwin.zip"
+url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64-apple-darwin.zip"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:979ffe611327056f4730a1ae71b0209b3b830f58b22c6ed194cda34f55400db2"
+checksum = "sha256:a038965bfd7fe44257c771cdf8918dc3467dd8ec0eef673b8b14f639b144cdbd"
-url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-apple-darwin.zip"
+url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-apple-darwin.zip"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.windows-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:55836fa1b2c65dc7d61615a4d9368622a0d2371a76d28b9a165e5a3ab6ae32a4"
+checksum = "sha256:fe34f631bb24c08ad146f92ca2a92971a53d179461b509fd8d32dc863bff9f83"
-url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip"
+url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-audit"]]
 version = "0.22.1"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-audit"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-edit"]]
-version = "0.13.9"
+version = "0.13.10"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-edit"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-features-manager"]]
-version = "0.11.1"
+version = "0.12.0"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-insta"]]
-version = "1.46.3"
+version = "1.47.2"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-mutants"]]
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ version = "27.0.0"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-mutants"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
-version = "0.9.126"
+version = "0.9.133"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-shear"]]
@@ -65,15 +65,19 @@ version = "0.10.2"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-vet"
 
 [[tools."cargo:diesel_cli"]]
-version = "2.3.6"
+version = "2.3.7"
 backend = "cargo:diesel_cli"
 
 [tools."cargo:diesel_cli".options]
 default-features = "false"
 features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled"
 
+[[tools."cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"]]
+version = "2.12.0"
+backend = "cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"
+
 [[tools.flutter]]
-version = "3.38.9-stable"
+version = "3.41.7-stable"
 backend = "asdf:flutter"
 
 [[tools.protoc]]
@@ -109,44 +113,44 @@ checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f
 url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"
 
 [[tools.python]]
-version = "3.14.3"
+version = "3.14.4"
 backend = "core:python"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64"]
-checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
+checksum = "sha256:b8b597fdb2f8dccdc502c11947b60a4b65eb6bce79cfa60c7ccf9b6e8352c60a"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
-checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
+checksum = "sha256:b8b597fdb2f8dccdc502c11947b60a4b65eb6bce79cfa60c7ccf9b6e8352c60a"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
+checksum = "sha256:fe9a9c32d13870af632cbac3dfc7528ae53597e94472aa4c7d6a42e8166136cd"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
-checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
+checksum = "sha256:fe9a9c32d13870af632cbac3dfc7528ae53597e94472aa4c7d6a42e8166136cd"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
-checksum = "sha256:c43aecde4a663aebff99b9b83da0efec506479f1c3f98331442f33d2c43501f9"
+checksum = "blake3:0314ec66e0f33ec04959583b5900bc8edae371a396aa96b8874e750d1fe936e6"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.macos-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:9ab41dbc2f100a2a45d1833b9c11165f51051c558b5213eda9a9731d5948a0c0"
+checksum = "sha256:d51250a32fa5d9f0799c7bcb71720c27b10a3afd4a7de288120f96085d508a5a"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.windows-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:bbe19034b35b0267176a7442575ae7dc6343480fd4d35598cb7700173d431e09"
+checksum = "sha256:a976991dcd085c1bb5d9a8084823a6bc8b7f9b079d8c432574a6ddd68c3a6fe1"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [[tools.rust]]
-version = "1.93.0"
+version = "1.95.0"
 backend = "core:rust"

mise.toml

@@ -1,23 +1,24 @@
-[tools]
+[tools]
-"cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.6", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = false }
+"cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.7", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = "false" }
-"cargo:cargo-audit" = "0.22.1"
+"cargo:cargo-audit" = "0.22.1"
-"cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
+"cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
-flutter = "3.38.9-stable"
+flutter = "3.41.7-stable"
-protoc = "29.6"
+protoc = "29.6"
-"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy"}
+rust = { version = "1.95.0", components = "clippy,rust-analyzer" }
-"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.11.1"
+"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.12.0"
-"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
+"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.133"
-"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
+"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
-"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.46.3"
+"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.47.2"
-python = "3.14.3"
+python = "3.14.4"
-ast-grep = "0.42.0"
+ast-grep = "0.42.1"
-"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.9"
+"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.10"
-"cargo:cargo-mutants" = "27.0.0"
+"cargo:cargo-mutants" = "27.0.0"
-
+"cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen" = "2.12.0"
-[tasks.codegen]
+
-sources = ['protobufs/*.proto', 'protobufs/**/*.proto']
+[tasks.codegen]
-outputs = ['useragent/lib/proto/**']
+sources = ['protobufs/*.proto', 'protobufs/**/*.proto']
-run = '''
+outputs = ['useragent/lib/proto/**']
-dart pub global activate protoc_plugin && \
+run = '''
-protoc --dart_out=grpc:useragent/lib/proto --proto_path=protobufs/ $(find protobufs -name '*.proto' | sort)
+dart pub global activate protoc_plugin && \
-'''
+protoc --dart_out=grpc:useragent/lib/proto --proto_path=protobufs/ $(find protobufs -name '*.proto' | sort)
+'''

protobufs/arbiter.proto

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter;
+package arbiter;
-
+
-import "client.proto";
+import "client.proto";
-import "user_agent.proto";
+import "operator.proto";
-
+
-message ServerInfo {
+message ServerInfo {
-  string version = 1;
+  string version = 1;
-  bytes cert_public_key = 2;
+  bytes cert_public_key = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-service ArbiterService {
+service ArbiterService {
-  rpc Client(stream arbiter.client.ClientRequest) returns (stream arbiter.client.ClientResponse);
+  rpc Client(stream arbiter.client.ClientRequest) returns (stream arbiter.client.ClientResponse);
-  rpc UserAgent(stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentRequest) returns (stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentResponse);
+  rpc Operator(stream arbiter.operator.OperatorRequest) returns (stream arbiter.operator.OperatorResponse);
-}
+}

protobufs/client.proto

@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.client;
+package arbiter.client;
-
+
-import "client/auth.proto";
+import "client/auth.proto";
-import "client/evm.proto";
+import "client/evm.proto";
-import "client/vault.proto";
+import "client/vault.proto";
-
+
-message ClientRequest {
+message ClientRequest {
-  int32 request_id = 4;
+  int32 request_id = 4;
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    auth.Request auth = 1;
+    auth.Request auth = 1;
-    vault.Request vault = 2;
+    vault.Request vault = 2;
-    evm.Request evm = 3;
+    evm.Request evm = 3;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message ClientResponse {
+message ClientResponse {
-  optional int32 request_id = 7;
+  optional int32 request_id = 7;
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    auth.Response auth = 1;
+    auth.Response auth = 1;
-    vault.Response vault = 2;
+    vault.Response vault = 2;
-    evm.Response evm = 3;
+    evm.Response evm = 3;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/client/auth.proto

@@ -1,43 +1,43 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.client.auth;
+package arbiter.client.auth;
-
+
-import "shared/client.proto";
+import "shared/client.proto";
-
+
-message AuthChallengeRequest {
+message AuthChallengeRequest {
-  bytes pubkey = 1;
+  bytes pubkey = 1;
-  arbiter.shared.ClientInfo client_info = 2;
+  arbiter.shared.ClientInfo client_info = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message AuthChallenge {
+message AuthChallenge {
-  bytes pubkey = 1;
+  uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
-  int32 nonce = 2;
+  bytes random = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message AuthChallengeSolution {
+message AuthChallengeSolution {
-  bytes signature = 1;
+  bytes signature = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-enum AuthResult {
+enum AuthResult {
-  AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
-  AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
+  AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
-  AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
+  AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
-  AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
+  AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
-  AUTH_RESULT_APPROVAL_DENIED = 4;
+  AUTH_RESULT_APPROVAL_DENIED = 4;
-  AUTH_RESULT_NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE = 5;
+  AUTH_RESULT_NO_OPERATORS_ONLINE = 5;
-  AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
+  AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
-}
+}
-
+
-message Request {
+message Request {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    AuthChallengeRequest challenge_request = 1;
+    AuthChallengeRequest challenge_request = 1;
-    AuthChallengeSolution challenge_solution = 2;
+    AuthChallengeSolution challenge_solution = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message Response {
+message Response {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    AuthChallenge challenge = 1;
+    AuthChallenge challenge = 1;
-    AuthResult result = 2;
+    AuthResult result = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/client/evm.proto

@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.client.evm;
+package arbiter.client.evm;
-
+
-import "evm.proto";
+import "evm.proto";
-
+
-message Request {
+message Request {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest sign_transaction = 1;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest sign_transaction = 1;
-    arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest analyze_transaction = 2;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest analyze_transaction = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message Response {
+message Response {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse sign_transaction = 1;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse sign_transaction = 1;
-    arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse analyze_transaction = 2;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse analyze_transaction = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/client/vault.proto

@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.client.vault;
+package arbiter.client.vault;
-
+
-import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
+import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
-import "shared/vault.proto";
+import "shared/vault.proto";
-
+
-message Request {
+message Request {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
+    google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message Response {
+message Response {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
+    arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/evm.proto

@@ -1,153 +1,153 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.evm;
+package arbiter.evm;
-
+
-import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
+import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
-import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
+import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
-import "shared/evm.proto";
+import "shared/evm.proto";
-
+
-enum EvmError {
+enum EvmError {
-  EVM_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  EVM_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
-  EVM_ERROR_VAULT_SEALED = 1;
+  EVM_ERROR_VAULT_SEALED = 1;
-  EVM_ERROR_INTERNAL = 2;
+  EVM_ERROR_INTERNAL = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message WalletEntry {
+message WalletEntry {
-  int32 id = 1;
+  int32 id = 1;
-  bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
+  bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
-}
+}
-
+
-message WalletList {
+message WalletList {
-  repeated WalletEntry wallets = 1;
+  repeated WalletEntry wallets = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-message WalletCreateResponse {
+message WalletCreateResponse {
-  oneof result {
+  oneof result {
-    WalletEntry wallet = 1;
+    WalletEntry wallet = 1;
-    EvmError error = 2;
+    EvmError error = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message WalletListResponse {
+message WalletListResponse {
-  oneof result {
+  oneof result {
-    WalletList wallets = 1;
+    WalletList wallets = 1;
-    EvmError error = 2;
+    EvmError error = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-// --- Grant types ---
+// --- Grant types ---
-
+
-message TransactionRateLimit {
+message TransactionRateLimit {
-  uint32 count = 1;
+  uint32 count = 1;
-  int64 window_secs = 2;
+  int64 window_secs = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message VolumeRateLimit {
+message VolumeRateLimit {
-  bytes max_volume = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
+  bytes max_volume = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
-  int64 window_secs = 2;
+  int64 window_secs = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message SharedSettings {
+message SharedSettings {
-  int32 wallet_access_id = 1;
+  int32 wallet_access_id = 1;
-  uint64 chain_id = 2;
+  uint64 chain_id = 2;
-  optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_from = 3;
+  optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_from = 3;
-  optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_until = 4;
+  optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_until = 4;
-  optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 5; // U256 as big-endian bytes
+  optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 5; // U256 as big-endian bytes
-  optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6; // U256 as big-endian bytes
+  optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6; // U256 as big-endian bytes
-  optional TransactionRateLimit rate_limit = 7;
+  optional TransactionRateLimit rate_limit = 7;
-}
+}
-
+
-message EtherTransferSettings {
+message EtherTransferSettings {
-  repeated bytes targets = 1; // list of 20-byte Ethereum addresses
+  repeated bytes targets = 1; // list of 20-byte Ethereum addresses
-  VolumeRateLimit limit = 2;
+  VolumeRateLimit limit = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message TokenTransferSettings {
+message TokenTransferSettings {
-  bytes token_contract = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
+  bytes token_contract = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
-  optional bytes target = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address; absent means any recipient allowed
+  optional bytes target = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address; absent means any recipient allowed
-  repeated VolumeRateLimit volume_limits = 3;
+  repeated VolumeRateLimit volume_limits = 3;
-}
+}
-
+
-message SpecificGrant {
+message SpecificGrant {
-  oneof grant {
+  oneof grant {
-    EtherTransferSettings ether_transfer = 1;
+    EtherTransferSettings ether_transfer = 1;
-    TokenTransferSettings token_transfer = 2;
+    TokenTransferSettings token_transfer = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-// --- UserAgent grant management ---
+// --- Operator grant management ---
-message EvmGrantCreateRequest {
+message EvmGrantCreateRequest {
-  SharedSettings shared = 1;
+  SharedSettings shared = 1;
-  SpecificGrant specific = 2;
+  SpecificGrant specific = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message EvmGrantCreateResponse {
+message EvmGrantCreateResponse {
-  oneof result {
+  oneof result {
-    int32 grant_id = 1;
+    int32 grant_id = 1;
-    EvmError error = 2;
+    EvmError error = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message EvmGrantDeleteRequest {
+message EvmGrantDeleteRequest {
-  int32 grant_id = 1;
+  int32 grant_id = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-message EvmGrantDeleteResponse {
+message EvmGrantDeleteResponse {
-  oneof result {
+  oneof result {
-    google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
+    google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
-    EvmError error = 2;
+    EvmError error = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-// Basic grant info returned in grant listings
+// Basic grant info returned in grant listings
-message GrantEntry {
+message GrantEntry {
-  int32 id = 1;
+  int32 id = 1;
-  int32 wallet_access_id = 2;
+  int32 wallet_access_id = 2;
-  SharedSettings shared = 3;
+  SharedSettings shared = 3;
-  SpecificGrant specific = 4;
+  SpecificGrant specific = 4;
-}
+}
-
+
-message EvmGrantListRequest {
+message EvmGrantListRequest {
-  optional int32 wallet_access_id = 1;
+  optional int32 wallet_access_id = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-message EvmGrantListResponse {
+message EvmGrantListResponse {
-  oneof result {
+  oneof result {
-    EvmGrantList grants = 1;
+    EvmGrantList grants = 1;
-    EvmError error = 2;
+    EvmError error = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message EvmGrantList {
+message EvmGrantList {
-  repeated GrantEntry grants = 1;
+  repeated GrantEntry grants = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-// --- Client transaction operations ---
+// --- Client transaction operations ---
-
+
-message EvmSignTransactionRequest {
+message EvmSignTransactionRequest {
-  bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
+  bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
-  bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction (unsigned)
+  bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction (unsigned)
-}
+}
-
+
-// oneof because signing and evaluation happen atomically — a signing failure
+// oneof because signing and evaluation happen atomically — a signing failure
-// is always either an eval error or an internal error, never a partial success
+// is always either an eval error or an internal error, never a partial success
-message EvmSignTransactionResponse {
+message EvmSignTransactionResponse {
-  oneof result {
+  oneof result {
-    bytes signature = 1; // 65-byte signature: r[32] || s[32] || v[1]
+    bytes signature = 1; // 65-byte signature: r[32] || s[32] || v[1]
-    arbiter.shared.evm.TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
+    arbiter.shared.evm.TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
-    EvmError error = 3;
+    EvmError error = 3;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest {
+message EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest {
-  bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
+  bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
-  bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction
+  bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction
-}
+}
-
+
-message EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse {
+message EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse {
-  oneof result {
+  oneof result {
-    arbiter.shared.evm.SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
+    arbiter.shared.evm.SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
-    arbiter.shared.evm.TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
+    arbiter.shared.evm.TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
-    EvmError error = 3;
+    EvmError error = 3;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/operator.proto

@@ -1,28 +1,28 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.user_agent;
+package arbiter.operator;
-
+
-import "user_agent/auth.proto";
+import "operator/auth.proto";
-import "user_agent/evm.proto";
+import "operator/evm.proto";
-import "user_agent/sdk_client.proto";
+import "operator/sdk_client.proto";
-import "user_agent/vault/vault.proto";
+import "operator/vault/vault.proto";
-
+
-message UserAgentRequest {
+message OperatorRequest {
-  int32 id = 16;
+  int32 id = 16;
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    auth.Request auth = 1;
+    auth.Request auth = 1;
-    vault.Request vault = 2;
+    vault.Request vault = 2;
-    evm.Request evm = 3;
+    evm.Request evm = 3;
-    sdk_client.Request sdk_client = 4;
+    sdk_client.Request sdk_client = 4;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message UserAgentResponse {
+message OperatorResponse {
-  optional int32 id = 16;
+  optional int32 id = 16;
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    auth.Response auth = 1;
+    auth.Response auth = 1;
-    vault.Response vault = 2;
+    vault.Response vault = 2;
-    evm.Response evm = 3;
+    evm.Response evm = 3;
-    sdk_client.Response sdk_client = 4;
+    sdk_client.Response sdk_client = 4;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/operator/auth.proto

@@ -1,48 +1,41 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.user_agent.auth;
+package arbiter.operator.auth;
-
+
-enum KeyType {
+message AuthChallengeRequest {
-  KEY_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  bytes pubkey = 1;
-  KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 1;
+  optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
-  KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1 = 2;
+}
-  KEY_TYPE_RSA = 3;
+
-}
+message AuthChallenge {
-
+  uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
-message AuthChallengeRequest {
+  bytes random = 2;
-  bytes pubkey = 1;
+}
-  optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
+
-  KeyType key_type = 3;
+message AuthChallengeSolution {
-}
+  bytes signature = 1;
-
+}
-message AuthChallenge {
+
-  int32 nonce = 1;
+enum AuthResult {
-}
+  AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
-
+  AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
-message AuthChallengeSolution {
+  AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
-  bytes signature = 1;
+  AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
-}
+  AUTH_RESULT_BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED = 4;
-
+  AUTH_RESULT_TOKEN_INVALID = 5;
-enum AuthResult {
+  AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
-  AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+}
-  AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
+
-  AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
+message Request {
-  AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
+  oneof payload {
-  AUTH_RESULT_BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED = 4;
+    AuthChallengeRequest challenge_request = 1;
-  AUTH_RESULT_TOKEN_INVALID = 5;
+    AuthChallengeSolution challenge_solution = 2;
-  AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message Request {
+message Response {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    AuthChallengeRequest challenge_request = 1;
+    AuthChallenge challenge = 1;
-    AuthChallengeSolution challenge_solution = 2;
+    AuthResult result = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
-message Response {
-  oneof payload {
-    AuthChallenge challenge = 1;
-    AuthResult result = 2;
-  }
-}

protobufs/operator/evm.proto

@@ -1,33 +1,33 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.user_agent.evm;
+package arbiter.operator.evm;
-
+
-import "evm.proto";
+import "evm.proto";
-import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
+import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
-
+
-message SignTransactionRequest {
+message SignTransactionRequest {
-  int32 client_id = 1;
+  int32 client_id = 1;
-  arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest request = 2;
+  arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest request = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message Request {
+message Request {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    google.protobuf.Empty wallet_create = 1;
+    google.protobuf.Empty wallet_create = 1;
-    google.protobuf.Empty wallet_list = 2;
+    google.protobuf.Empty wallet_list = 2;
-    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateRequest grant_create = 3;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateRequest grant_create = 3;
-    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteRequest grant_delete = 4;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteRequest grant_delete = 4;
-    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListRequest grant_list = 5;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListRequest grant_list = 5;
-    SignTransactionRequest sign_transaction = 6;
+    SignTransactionRequest sign_transaction = 6;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message Response {
+message Response {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.evm.WalletCreateResponse wallet_create = 1;
+    arbiter.evm.WalletCreateResponse wallet_create = 1;
-    arbiter.evm.WalletListResponse wallet_list = 2;
+    arbiter.evm.WalletListResponse wallet_list = 2;
-    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateResponse grant_create = 3;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateResponse grant_create = 3;
-    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteResponse grant_delete = 4;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteResponse grant_delete = 4;
-    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListResponse grant_list = 5;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListResponse grant_list = 5;
-    arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse sign_transaction = 6;
+    arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse sign_transaction = 6;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/operator/sdk_client.proto

@@ -1,100 +1,100 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.user_agent.sdk_client;
+package arbiter.operator.sdk_client;
-
+
-import "shared/client.proto";
+import "shared/client.proto";
-import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
+import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
-
+
-enum Error {
+enum Error {
-  ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
-  ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS = 1;
+  ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS = 1;
-  ERROR_NOT_FOUND = 2;
+  ERROR_NOT_FOUND = 2;
-  ERROR_HAS_RELATED_DATA = 3; // hard-delete blocked by FK (client has grants or transaction logs)
+  ERROR_HAS_RELATED_DATA = 3; // hard-delete blocked by FK (client has grants or transaction logs)
-  ERROR_INTERNAL = 4;
+  ERROR_INTERNAL = 4;
-}
+}
-
+
-message RevokeRequest {
+message RevokeRequest {
-  int32 client_id = 1;
+  int32 client_id = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-message Entry {
+message Entry {
-  int32 id = 1;
+  int32 id = 1;
-  bytes pubkey = 2;
+  bytes pubkey = 2;
-  arbiter.shared.ClientInfo info = 3;
+  arbiter.shared.ClientInfo info = 3;
-  int32 created_at = 4;
+  int32 created_at = 4;
-}
+}
-
+
-message List {
+message List {
-  repeated Entry clients = 1;
+  repeated Entry clients = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-message RevokeResponse {
+message RevokeResponse {
-  oneof result {
+  oneof result {
-    google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
+    google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
-    Error error = 2;
+    Error error = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message ListResponse {
+message ListResponse {
-  oneof result {
+  oneof result {
-    List clients = 1;
+    List clients = 1;
-    Error error = 2;
+    Error error = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message ConnectionRequest {
+message ConnectionRequest {
-  bytes pubkey = 1;
+  bytes pubkey = 1;
-  arbiter.shared.ClientInfo info = 2;
+  arbiter.shared.ClientInfo info = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message ConnectionResponse {
+message ConnectionResponse {
-  bool approved = 1;
+  bool approved = 1;
-  bytes pubkey = 2;
+  bytes pubkey = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message ConnectionCancel {
+message ConnectionCancel {
-  bytes pubkey = 1;
+  bytes pubkey = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-message WalletAccess {
+message WalletAccess {
-  int32 wallet_id = 1;
+  int32 wallet_id = 1;
-  int32 sdk_client_id = 2;
+  int32 sdk_client_id = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message WalletAccessEntry {
+message WalletAccessEntry {
-  int32 id = 1;
+  int32 id = 1;
-  WalletAccess access = 2;
+  WalletAccess access = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message GrantWalletAccess {
+message GrantWalletAccess {
-  repeated WalletAccess accesses = 1;
+  repeated WalletAccess accesses = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-message RevokeWalletAccess {
+message RevokeWalletAccess {
-  repeated int32 accesses = 1;
+  repeated int32 accesses = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-message ListWalletAccessResponse {
+message ListWalletAccessResponse {
-  repeated WalletAccessEntry accesses = 1;
+  repeated WalletAccessEntry accesses = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-message Request {
+message Request {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    ConnectionResponse connection_response = 1;
+    ConnectionResponse connection_response = 1;
-    RevokeRequest revoke = 2;
+    RevokeRequest revoke = 2;
-    google.protobuf.Empty list = 3;
+    google.protobuf.Empty list = 3;
-    GrantWalletAccess grant_wallet_access = 4;
+    GrantWalletAccess grant_wallet_access = 4;
-    RevokeWalletAccess revoke_wallet_access = 5;
+    RevokeWalletAccess revoke_wallet_access = 5;
-    google.protobuf.Empty list_wallet_access = 6;
+    google.protobuf.Empty list_wallet_access = 6;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message Response {
+message Response {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    ConnectionRequest connection_request = 1;
+    ConnectionRequest connection_request = 1;
-    ConnectionCancel connection_cancel = 2;
+    ConnectionCancel connection_cancel = 2;
-    RevokeResponse revoke = 3;
+    RevokeResponse revoke = 3;
-    ListResponse list = 4;
+    ListResponse list = 4;
-    ListWalletAccessResponse list_wallet_access = 5;
+    ListWalletAccessResponse list_wallet_access = 5;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/operator/vault/bootstrap.proto

@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.user_agent.vault.bootstrap;
+package arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap;
-
+
-message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
+message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
-  bytes nonce = 1;
+  bytes nonce = 1;
-  bytes ciphertext = 2;
+  bytes ciphertext = 2;
-  bytes associated_data = 3;
+  bytes associated_data = 3;
-}
+}
-
+
-enum BootstrapResult {
+enum BootstrapResult {
-  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
-  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
+  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
-  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2;
+  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2;
-  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3;
+  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3;
-}
+}
-
+
-message Request {
+message Request {
-  BootstrapEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
+  BootstrapEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-message Response {
+message Response {
-  BootstrapResult result = 1;
+  BootstrapResult result = 1;
-}
+}

protobufs/operator/vault/unseal.proto

@@ -1,37 +1,37 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.user_agent.vault.unseal;
+package arbiter.operator.vault.unseal;
-
+
-message UnsealStart {
+message UnsealStart {
-  bytes client_pubkey = 1;
+  bytes client_pubkey = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-message UnsealStartResponse {
+message UnsealStartResponse {
-  bytes server_pubkey = 1;
+  bytes server_pubkey = 1;
-}
+}
-message UnsealEncryptedKey {
+message UnsealEncryptedKey {
-  bytes nonce = 1;
+  bytes nonce = 1;
-  bytes ciphertext = 2;
+  bytes ciphertext = 2;
-  bytes associated_data = 3;
+  bytes associated_data = 3;
-}
+}
-
+
-enum UnsealResult {
+enum UnsealResult {
-  UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
-  UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
-  UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
-  UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
-}
+}
-
+
-message Request {
+message Request {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    UnsealStart start = 1;
+    UnsealStart start = 1;
-    UnsealEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
+    UnsealEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message Response {
+message Response {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    UnsealStartResponse start = 1;
+    UnsealStartResponse start = 1;
-    UnsealResult result = 2;
+    UnsealResult result = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/operator/vault/vault.proto

@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.user_agent.vault;
+package arbiter.operator.vault;
-
+
-import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
+import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
-import "shared/vault.proto";
+import "shared/vault.proto";
-import "user_agent/vault/bootstrap.proto";
+import "operator/vault/bootstrap.proto";
-import "user_agent/vault/unseal.proto";
+import "operator/vault/unseal.proto";
-
+
-message Request {
+message Request {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
+    google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
-    unseal.Request unseal = 2;
+    unseal.Request unseal = 2;
-    bootstrap.Request bootstrap = 3;
+    bootstrap.Request bootstrap = 3;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message Response {
+message Response {
-  oneof payload {
+  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
+    arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
-    unseal.Response unseal = 2;
+    unseal.Response unseal = 2;
-    bootstrap.Response bootstrap = 3;
+    bootstrap.Response bootstrap = 3;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/shared/client.proto

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.shared;
+package arbiter.shared;
-
+
-message ClientInfo {
+message ClientInfo {
-  string name = 1;
+  string name = 1;
-  optional string description = 2;
+  optional string description = 2;
-  optional string version = 3;
+  optional string version = 3;
-}
+}

protobufs/shared/evm.proto

@@ -1,74 +1,74 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.shared.evm;
+package arbiter.shared.evm;
-
+
-import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
+import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
-
+
-message EtherTransferMeaning {
+message EtherTransferMeaning {
-  bytes to = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
+  bytes to = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
-  bytes value = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
+  bytes value = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
-}
+}
-
+
-message TokenInfo {
+message TokenInfo {
-  string symbol = 1;
+  string symbol = 1;
-  bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
+  bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
-  uint64 chain_id = 3;
+  uint64 chain_id = 3;
-}
+}
-
+
-// Mirror of token_transfers::Meaning
+// Mirror of token_transfers::Meaning
-message TokenTransferMeaning {
+message TokenTransferMeaning {
-  TokenInfo token = 1;
+  TokenInfo token = 1;
-  bytes to = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
+  bytes to = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
-  bytes value = 3; // U256 as big-endian bytes
+  bytes value = 3; // U256 as big-endian bytes
-}
+}
-
+
-// Mirror of policies::SpecificMeaning
+// Mirror of policies::SpecificMeaning
-message SpecificMeaning {
+message SpecificMeaning {
-  oneof meaning {
+  oneof meaning {
-    EtherTransferMeaning ether_transfer = 1;
+    EtherTransferMeaning ether_transfer = 1;
-    TokenTransferMeaning token_transfer = 2;
+    TokenTransferMeaning token_transfer = 2;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-message GasLimitExceededViolation {
+message GasLimitExceededViolation {
-  optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
+  optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
-  optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
+  optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
-}
+}
-
+
-message EvalViolation {
+message EvalViolation {
-  message ChainIdMismatch {
+  message ChainIdMismatch {
-    uint64 expected = 1;
+    uint64 expected = 1;
-    uint64 actual = 2;
+    uint64 actual = 2;
-  }
+  }
-  oneof kind {
+  oneof kind {
-    bytes invalid_target = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
+    bytes invalid_target = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
-    GasLimitExceededViolation gas_limit_exceeded = 2;
+    GasLimitExceededViolation gas_limit_exceeded = 2;
-    google.protobuf.Empty rate_limit_exceeded = 3;
+    google.protobuf.Empty rate_limit_exceeded = 3;
-    google.protobuf.Empty volumetric_limit_exceeded = 4;
+    google.protobuf.Empty volumetric_limit_exceeded = 4;
-    google.protobuf.Empty invalid_time = 5;
+    google.protobuf.Empty invalid_time = 5;
-    google.protobuf.Empty invalid_transaction_type = 6;
+    google.protobuf.Empty invalid_transaction_type = 6;
-
+
-    ChainIdMismatch chain_id_mismatch = 7;
+    ChainIdMismatch chain_id_mismatch = 7;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}
-
+
-// Transaction was classified but no grant covers it
+// Transaction was classified but no grant covers it
-message NoMatchingGrantError {
+message NoMatchingGrantError {
-  SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
+  SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
-}
+}
-
+
-// Transaction was classified and a grant was found, but constraints were violated
+// Transaction was classified and a grant was found, but constraints were violated
-message PolicyViolationsError {
+message PolicyViolationsError {
-  SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
+  SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
-  repeated EvalViolation violations = 2;
+  repeated EvalViolation violations = 2;
-}
+}
-
+
-// top-level error returned when transaction evaluation fails
+// top-level error returned when transaction evaluation fails
-message TransactionEvalError {
+message TransactionEvalError {
-  oneof kind {
+  oneof kind {
-    google.protobuf.Empty contract_creation_not_supported = 1;
+    google.protobuf.Empty contract_creation_not_supported = 1;
-    google.protobuf.Empty unsupported_transaction_type = 2;
+    google.protobuf.Empty unsupported_transaction_type = 2;
-    NoMatchingGrantError no_matching_grant = 3;
+    NoMatchingGrantError no_matching_grant = 3;
-    PolicyViolationsError policy_violations = 4;
+    PolicyViolationsError policy_violations = 4;
-  }
+  }
-}
+}

protobufs/shared/vault.proto

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
+syntax = "proto3";
-
+
-package arbiter.shared;
+package arbiter.shared;
-
+
-enum VaultState {
+enum VaultState {
-  VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
-  VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
+  VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
-  VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
+  VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
-  VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
+  VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
-  VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
+  VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
-}
+}

scripts/gen_erc20_registry.py

@@ -1,150 +1,150 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""
+"""
-Fetch the Uniswap default token list and emit Rust `TokenInfo` statics.
+Fetch the Uniswap default token list and emit Rust `TokenInfo` statics.
-
+
-Usage:
+Usage:
-    python3 gen_erc20_registry.py                       # fetch from IPFS
+    python3 gen_erc20_registry.py                       # fetch from IPFS
-    python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json           # local file
+    python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json           # local file
-    python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json out.rs    # custom output file
+    python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json out.rs    # custom output file
-"""
+"""
-
+
-import json
+import json
-import re
+import re
-import sys
+import sys
-import unicodedata
+import unicodedata
-import urllib.request
+import urllib.request
-
+
-UNISWAP_URL = "https://ipfs.io/ipns/tokens.uniswap.org"
+UNISWAP_URL = "https://ipfs.io/ipns/tokens.uniswap.org"
-
+
-SOLANA_CHAIN_ID = 501000101
+SOLANA_CHAIN_ID = 501000101
-IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+")
+IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+")
-
+
-
+
-def load_tokens(source=None):
+def load_tokens(source=None):
-    if source:
+    if source:
-        with open(source) as f:
+        with open(source) as f:
-            return json.load(f)
+            return json.load(f)
-    req = urllib.request.Request(
+    req = urllib.request.Request(
-        UNISWAP_URL,
+        UNISWAP_URL,
-        headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "gen_tokens/1.0"},
+        headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "gen_tokens/1.0"},
-    )
+    )
-    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp:
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp:
-        return json.loads(resp.read())
+        return json.loads(resp.read())
-
+
-
+
-def escape(s: str) -> str:
+def escape(s: str) -> str:
-    return s.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
+    return s.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
-
+
-
+
-def to_screaming_case(name: str) -> str:
+def to_screaming_case(name: str) -> str:
-    normalized = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", name or "")
+    normalized = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", name or "")
-    ascii_name = normalized.encode("ascii", "ignore").decode("ascii")
+    ascii_name = normalized.encode("ascii", "ignore").decode("ascii")
-    snake = IDENTIFIER_RE.sub("_", ascii_name).strip("_").upper()
+    snake = IDENTIFIER_RE.sub("_", ascii_name).strip("_").upper()
-    if not snake:
+    if not snake:
-        snake = "TOKEN"
+        snake = "TOKEN"
-    if snake[0].isdigit():
+    if snake[0].isdigit():
-        snake = f"TOKEN_{snake}"
+        snake = f"TOKEN_{snake}"
-    return snake
+    return snake
-
+
-
+
-def static_name_for_token(token: dict, used_names: set[str]) -> str:
+def static_name_for_token(token: dict, used_names: set[str]) -> str:
-    base = to_screaming_case(token.get("name", ""))
+    base = to_screaming_case(token.get("name", ""))
-    if base not in used_names:
+    if base not in used_names:
-        used_names.add(base)
+        used_names.add(base)
-        return base
+        return base
-
+
-    address = token["address"]
+    address = token["address"]
-    suffix = f"{token['chainId']}_{address[2:].upper()[-8:]}"
+    suffix = f"{token['chainId']}_{address[2:].upper()[-8:]}"
-    candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}"
+    candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}"
-
+
-    i = 2
+    i = 2
-    while candidate in used_names:
+    while candidate in used_names:
-        candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}_{i}"
+        candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}_{i}"
-        i += 1
+        i += 1
-
+
-    used_names.add(candidate)
+    used_names.add(candidate)
-    return candidate
+    return candidate
-
+
-
+
-def main():
+def main():
-    source = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
+    source = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
-    output = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "generated_tokens.rs"
+    output = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "generated_tokens.rs"
-    data = load_tokens(source)
+    data = load_tokens(source)
-    tokens = data["tokens"]
+    tokens = data["tokens"]
-
+
-    # Deduplicate by (chainId, address)
+    # Deduplicate by (chainId, address)
-    seen = set()
+    seen = set()
-    unique = []
+    unique = []
-    for t in tokens:
+    for t in tokens:
-        key = (t["chainId"], t["address"].lower())
+        key = (t["chainId"], t["address"].lower())
-        if key not in seen:
+        if key not in seen:
-            seen.add(key)
+            seen.add(key)
-            unique.append(t)
+            unique.append(t)
-
+
-    unique.sort(key=lambda t: (t["chainId"], t.get("symbol", "").upper()))
+    unique.sort(key=lambda t: (t["chainId"], t.get("symbol", "").upper()))
-    evm_tokens = [t for t in unique if t["chainId"] != SOLANA_CHAIN_ID]
+    evm_tokens = [t for t in unique if t["chainId"] != SOLANA_CHAIN_ID]
-
+
-    ver = data["version"]
+    ver = data["version"]
-    lines = []
+    lines = []
-    w = lines.append
+    w = lines.append
-
+
-    w(
+    w(
-        f"// Auto-generated from Uniswap token list v{ver['major']}.{ver['minor']}.{ver['patch']}"
+        f"// Auto-generated from Uniswap token list v{ver['major']}.{ver['minor']}.{ver['patch']}"
-    )
+    )
-    w(f"// {len(evm_tokens)} tokens")
+    w(f"// {len(evm_tokens)} tokens")
-    w("// DO NOT EDIT - regenerate with gen_erc20_registry.py")
+    w("// DO NOT EDIT - regenerate with gen_erc20_registry.py")
-    w("")
+    w("")
-
+
-    used_static_names = set()
+    used_static_names = set()
-    token_statics = []
+    token_statics = []
-    for t in evm_tokens:
+    for t in evm_tokens:
-        static_name = static_name_for_token(t, used_static_names)
+        static_name = static_name_for_token(t, used_static_names)
-        token_statics.append((static_name, t))
+        token_statics.append((static_name, t))
-
+
-    for static_name, t in token_statics:
+    for static_name, t in token_statics:
-        addr = t["address"]
+        addr = t["address"]
-        name = escape(t.get("name", ""))
+        name = escape(t.get("name", ""))
-        symbol = escape(t.get("symbol", ""))
+        symbol = escape(t.get("symbol", ""))
-        decimals = t.get("decimals", 18)
+        decimals = t.get("decimals", 18)
-        logo = t.get("logoURI")
+        logo = t.get("logoURI")
-        chain = t["chainId"]
+        chain = t["chainId"]
-
+
-        logo_val = f'Some("{escape(logo)}")' if logo else "None"
+        logo_val = f'Some("{escape(logo)}")' if logo else "None"
-
+
-        w(f"pub static {static_name}: TokenInfo = TokenInfo {{")
+        w(f"pub static {static_name}: TokenInfo = TokenInfo {{")
-        w(f'    name: "{name}",')
+        w(f'    name: "{name}",')
-        w(f'    symbol: "{symbol}",')
+        w(f'    symbol: "{symbol}",')
-        w(f"    decimals: {decimals},")
+        w(f"    decimals: {decimals},")
-        w(f'    contract: address!("{addr}"),')
+        w(f'    contract: address!("{addr}"),')
-        w(f"    chain: {chain},")
+        w(f"    chain: {chain},")
-        w(f"    logo_uri: {logo_val},")
+        w(f"    logo_uri: {logo_val},")
-        w("};")
+        w("};")
-        w("")
+        w("")
-
+
-    w("pub static TOKENS: &[&TokenInfo] = &[")
+    w("pub static TOKENS: &[&TokenInfo] = &[")
-    for static_name, _ in token_statics:
+    for static_name, _ in token_statics:
-        w(f"    &{static_name},")
+        w(f"    &{static_name},")
-    w("];")
+    w("];")
-    w("")
+    w("")
-    w("pub fn get_token(")
+    w("pub fn get_token(")
-    w("    chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId,")
+    w("    chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId,")
-    w("    address: alloy::primitives::Address,")
+    w("    address: alloy::primitives::Address,")
-    w(") -> Option<&'static TokenInfo> {")
+    w(") -> Option<&'static TokenInfo> {")
-    w("    match (chain_id, address) {")
+    w("    match (chain_id, address) {")
-    for static_name, t in token_statics:
+    for static_name, t in token_statics:
-        w(
+        w(
-            f'        ({t["chainId"]}, addr) if addr == address!("{t["address"]}") => Some(&{static_name}),'
+            f'        ({t["chainId"]}, addr) if addr == address!("{t["address"]}") => Some(&{static_name}),'
-        )
+        )
-    w("        _ => None,")
+    w("        _ => None,")
-    w("    }")
+    w("    }")
-    w("}")
+    w("}")
-    w("")
+    w("")
-
+
-    with open(output, "w") as f:
+    with open(output, "w") as f:
-        f.write("\n".join(lines))
+        f.write("\n".join(lines))
-
+
-    print(f"Wrote {len(token_statics)} tokens to {output}")
+    print(f"Wrote {len(token_statics)} tokens to {output}")
-
+
-
+
-if __name__ == "__main__":
+if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
+    main()

server/.cargo/audit.toml

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-[advisories]
+[advisories]
-# RUSTSEC-2023-0071: Marvin Attack timing side-channel in rsa crate.
+# RUSTSEC-2023-0071: Marvin Attack timing side-channel in rsa crate.
-# No fixed version is available upstream.
+# No fixed version is available upstream.
-# RSA support is required for Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager
+# RSA support is required for Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager
-# (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.security.credentials.keycredentialmanager.requestcreateasync),
+# (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.security.credentials.keycredentialmanager.requestcreateasync),
-# which only issues RSA-2048 keys.
+# which only issues RSA-2048 keys.
-# Mitigations in place:
+# Mitigations in place:
-#   - Signing uses BlindedSigningKey (PSS+SHA-256), which applies blinding to
+#   - Signing uses BlindedSigningKey (PSS+SHA-256), which applies blinding to
-#     protect the private key from timing recovery during signing.
+#     protect the private key from timing recovery during signing.
-#   - RSA decryption is never performed; we only verify public-key signatures.
+#   - RSA decryption is never performed; we only verify public-key signatures.
-#   - The attack requires local, high-resolution timing access against the
+#   - The attack requires local, high-resolution timing access against the
-#     signing process, which is not exposed in our threat model.
+#     signing process, which is not exposed in our threat model.
-ignore = ["RUSTSEC-2023-0071"]
+ignore = ["RUSTSEC-2023-0071"]

server/.cargo/config.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[env]
+MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = "26.3"

server/.cargo/mutants.toml

@@ -1 +1 @@
-test_tool = "nextest"
+test_tool = "nextest"

server/.gitignore

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-mutants.out/
+mutants.out/
 mutants.out.old/

server/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,47 +1,171 @@
-[workspace]
+[workspace]
-members = [
+members = [
-    "crates/*",
+    "crates/*",
-]
+]
-resolver = "3"
+resolver = "3"
-
+
-[workspace.lints.clippy]
+
-disallowed-methods = "deny"
+[workspace.dependencies]
-
+alloy = "2.0.4"
-
+async-trait = "0.1.89"
-[workspace.dependencies]
+base64 = "0.22.1"
-tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [
+chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
-    "deflate",
+futures = "0.3.32"
-    "gzip",
+k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
-    "tls-connect-info",
+kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
-    "zstd",
+kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
-] }
+hmac = "0.13.0"
-tracing = "0.1.44"
+miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
-tokio = { version = "1.50.0", features = ["full"] }
+ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.9", features = ["zeroize"] }
-ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
+mutants = "0.0.4"
-chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
+prost = "0.14.3"
-rand = "0.10.0"
+prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
-rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
+rand = "0.10.1"
-smlang = "0.8.0"
+rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs",  "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false }
-thiserror = "2.0.18"
+rstest = "0.26.1"
-async-trait = "0.1.89"
+rustls = { version = "0.23.40", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
-futures = "0.3.32"
+rustls-pki-types = "1.14.1"
-tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
+sha2 = "0.11"
-kameo = "0.19.2"
+smlang = "0.8.0"
-prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
+thiserror = "2.0.18"
-x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
+tokio = { version = "1.52.1", features = ["full"] }
-rstest = "0.26.1"
+tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
-rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
+tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [ "deflate", "gzip", "tls-connect-info", "zstd" ] }
-alloy = "1.7.3"
+tracing = "0.1.44"
-rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
+x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
-    "aws_lc_rs",
+
-    "pem",
+[workspace.lints.rust]
-    "x509-parser",
+missing_unsafe_on_extern = "deny"
-    "zeroize",
+unsafe_attr_outside_unsafe = "deny"
-], default-features = false }
+unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn = "deny"
-k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
+unstable_features = "deny"
-rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
+
-sha2 = "0.10"
+deprecated_safe_2024 = "warn"
-spki = "0.7"
+ffi_unwind_calls = "warn"
-prost = "0.14.3"
+linker_messages = "warn"
-miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
+
-mutants = "0.0.4"
+elided_lifetimes_in_paths = "warn"
+explicit_outlives_requirements = "warn"
+impl-trait-overcaptures = "warn"
+impl-trait-redundant-captures = "warn"
+redundant_lifetimes = "warn"
+single_use_lifetimes = "warn"
+unused_lifetimes = "warn"
+
+macro_use_extern_crate = "warn"
+redundant_imports = "warn"
+unused_import_braces = "warn"
+unused_macro_rules = "warn"
+unused_qualifications = "warn"
+
+unit_bindings = "warn"
+
+# missing_docs = "warn" # ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
+unnameable_types = "warn"
+
+[workspace.lints.clippy]
+derive_partial_eq_without_eq = "allow" 
+future_not_send = "allow"
+inconsistent_struct_constructor = "allow"
+inline_always = "allow"
+missing_errors_doc = "allow"
+missing_fields_in_debug = "allow"
+missing_panics_doc = "allow"
+must_use_candidate = "allow"
+needless_pass_by_ref_mut = "allow"
+pub_underscore_fields = "allow"
+redundant_pub_crate = "allow" 
+uninhabited_references = "allow" # safe with unsafe_code = "forbid" and standard uninhabited pattern (match *self {})
+too-many-lines = "allow" # this is a very common pattern in server code, and it's not always possible to break it down into smaller modules without hurting readability
+
+# restriction lints
+alloc_instead_of_core = "warn"
+allow_attributes_without_reason = "warn"
+as_conversions = "warn"
+assertions_on_result_states = "warn"
+cfg_not_test = "warn"
+clone_on_ref_ptr = "warn"
+cognitive_complexity = "warn"
+create_dir = "warn"
+dbg_macro = "warn"
+decimal_literal_representation = "warn"
+default_union_representation = "warn"
+deref_by_slicing = "warn"
+disallowed_script_idents = "warn"
+doc_include_without_cfg = "warn"
+empty_drop = "warn"
+empty_enum_variants_with_brackets = "warn"
+empty_structs_with_brackets = "warn"
+exit = "warn"
+filetype_is_file = "warn"
+float_arithmetic = "warn"
+float_cmp_const = "warn"
+fn_to_numeric_cast_any = "warn"
+get_unwrap = "warn"
+if_then_some_else_none = "warn"
+indexing_slicing = "warn"
+infinite_loop = "warn"
+inline_asm_x86_att_syntax = "warn"
+inline_asm_x86_intel_syntax = "warn"
+integer_division = "warn"
+large_include_file = "warn"
+lossy_float_literal = "warn"
+map_with_unused_argument_over_ranges = "warn"
+mem_forget = "warn"
+missing_assert_message = "warn"
+mixed_read_write_in_expression = "warn"
+modulo_arithmetic = "warn"
+multiple_unsafe_ops_per_block = "warn"
+mutex_atomic = "warn"
+mutex_integer = "warn"
+needless_raw_strings = "warn"
+non_ascii_literal = "warn"
+non_zero_suggestions = "warn"
+pathbuf_init_then_push = "warn"
+pointer_format = "warn"
+precedence_bits = "warn"
+pub_without_shorthand = "warn"
+rc_buffer = "warn"
+rc_mutex = "warn"
+redundant_test_prefix = "warn"
+redundant_type_annotations = "warn"
+ref_patterns = "warn"
+renamed_function_params = "warn"
+rest_pat_in_fully_bound_structs = "warn"
+return_and_then = "warn"
+semicolon_inside_block = "warn"
+str_to_string = "warn"
+string_add = "warn"
+string_lit_chars_any = "warn"
+string_slice = "warn"
+suspicious_xor_used_as_pow = "warn"
+try_err = "warn"
+undocumented_unsafe_blocks = "warn"
+uninlined_format_args = "warn"
+unnecessary_safety_comment = "warn"
+unnecessary_safety_doc = "warn"
+unnecessary_self_imports = "warn"
+unneeded_field_pattern = "warn"
+unused_result_ok = "warn"
+verbose_file_reads = "warn"
+
+# cargo lints
+negative_feature_names = "warn"
+redundant_feature_names = "warn"
+wildcard_dependencies = "warn"
+
+# ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
+# todo = "warn"
+# unimplemented = "warn"
+# panic = "warn"
+# panic_in_result_fn = "warn"
+# 
+# cargo_common_metadata = "warn"
+# multiple_crate_versions = "warn" # a controversial option since it's really difficult to maintain
+
+disallowed_methods = "deny"
+
+nursery = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
+pedantic = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
+
+type_repetition_in_bounds = "allow"   # sometimes, it's better for readability this way

server/clippy.toml

@@ -1,9 +1,28 @@
-disallowed-methods = [
+disallowed-methods = [
-    # RSA decryption is forbidden: the rsa crate has RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack).
+    # RSA decryption is forbidden: the rsa crate has RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack).
-    # We only use RSA for Windows Hello (KeyCredentialManager) public-key verification — decryption
+    # We only use RSA for Windows Hello (KeyCredentialManager) public-key verification — decryption
-    # is never required and must not be introduced.
+    # is never required and must not be introduced.
-    { path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
+    { path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
-    { path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt_blinded", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
+    { path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt_blinded", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
-    { path = "rsa::traits::Decryptor::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
+    { path = "rsa::traits::Decryptor::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
-    { path = "rsa::traits::RandomizedDecryptor::decrypt_with_rng", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt_with_rng() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
+    { path = "rsa::traits::RandomizedDecryptor::decrypt_with_rng", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt_with_rng() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
-]
+]
+
+allow-indexing-slicing-in-tests = true
+allow-panic-in-tests = true
+check-inconsistent-struct-field-initializers = true
+suppress-restriction-lint-in-const = true
+allow-renamed-params-for = [
+    "core::convert::From",
+    "core::convert::TryFrom",
+    "core::str::FromStr",
+    "kameo::actor::Actor",
+]
+
+module-items-ordered-within-groupings = ["UPPER_SNAKE_CASE"]
+source-item-ordering = ["enum"]
+trait-assoc-item-kinds-order = [
+    "const",
+    "type",
+    "fn",
+] # community tested standard

server/crates/arbiter-client/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
-[package]
+[package]
-name = "arbiter-client"
+name = "arbiter-client"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2024"
+edition = "2024"
-repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
+repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
-license = "Apache-2.0"
+license = "Apache-2.0"
-
+
-[lints]
+[lints]
-workspace = true
+workspace = true
-
+
-[features]
+[features]
-evm = ["dep:alloy"]
+evm = ["dep:alloy"]
-
+
-[dependencies]
+[dependencies]
-arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
+arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
-alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
+arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
-tonic.workspace = true
+alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
-tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
+tonic.workspace = true
-tokio.workspace = true
+tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
-tokio-stream.workspace = true
+tokio.workspace = true
-ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
+tokio-stream.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
-http = "1.4.0"
+http = "1.4.0"
-rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.10", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
+rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.13", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
-async-trait.workspace = true
+async-trait.workspace = true
-rand.workspace = true
+chrono.workspace = true
+
+[lib]
+doctest = false

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/auth.rs

@@ -1,149 +1,160 @@
-use arbiter_proto::{
+use crate::{
-    ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
+    storage::StorageError,
-    proto::{
+    transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
-        client::{
+};
-            ClientRequest,
+use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey};
-            auth::{
+use arbiter_proto::{
-                self as proto_auth, AuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthChallengeSolution,
+    ClientMetadata,
-                AuthResult, request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload,
+    proto::{
-                response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
+        client::{
-            },
+            ClientRequest,
-            client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
+            auth::{
-            client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
+                self as proto_auth, AuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthChallengeSolution,
-        },
+                AuthResult, request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload,
-        shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo,
+                response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
-    },
+            },
-};
+            client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
-use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
+            client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
-
+        },
-use crate::{
+        shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo,
-    storage::StorageError,
+    },
-    transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
+};
-};
+
-
+use chrono::DateTime;
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+
-pub enum AuthError {
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-    #[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
+pub enum AuthError {
-    MissingAuthChallenge,
+    #[error("Server sent invalid auth challenge")]
-
+    InvalidChallenge,
-    #[error("Client approval denied by User Agent")]
+    #[error("Client approval denied by Operator")]
-    ApprovalDenied,
+    ApprovalDenied,
-
+    #[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
-    #[error("No User Agents online to approve client")]
+    MissingAuthChallenge,
-    NoUserAgentsOnline,
+
-
+    #[error("No Operators online to approve client")]
-    #[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
+    NoOperatorsOnline,
-    UnexpectedAuthResponse,
+
-
+    #[error("Signing key storage error")]
-    #[error("Signing key storage error")]
+    Storage(#[from] StorageError),
-    Storage(#[from] StorageError),
+
-}
+    #[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
-
+    UnexpectedAuthResponse,
-fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
+}
-    match AuthResult::try_from(code).unwrap_or(AuthResult::Unspecified) {
+
-        AuthResult::ApprovalDenied => AuthError::ApprovalDenied,
+fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
-        AuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline => AuthError::NoUserAgentsOnline,
+    match AuthResult::try_from(code).unwrap_or(AuthResult::Unspecified) {
-        AuthResult::Unspecified
+        AuthResult::ApprovalDenied => AuthError::ApprovalDenied,
-        | AuthResult::Success
+        AuthResult::NoOperatorsOnline => AuthError::NoOperatorsOnline,
-        | AuthResult::InvalidKey
+        AuthResult::Unspecified
-        | AuthResult::InvalidSignature
+        | AuthResult::Success
-        | AuthResult::Internal => AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse,
+        | AuthResult::InvalidKey
-    }
+        | AuthResult::InvalidSignature
-}
+        | AuthResult::Internal => AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse,
-
+    }
-async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
+}
-    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
+
-    metadata: ClientMetadata,
+async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
-    key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
+    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
-) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
+    metadata: ClientMetadata,
-    transport
+    key: &SigningKey,
-        .send(ClientRequest {
+) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
-            request_id: next_request_id(),
+    transport
-            payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
+        .send(ClientRequest {
-                payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest {
+            request_id: next_request_id(),
-                    pubkey: key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
+            payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
-                    client_info: Some(ProtoClientInfo {
+                payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest {
-                        name: metadata.name,
+                    pubkey: key.public_key().to_bytes(),
-                        description: metadata.description,
+                    client_info: Some(ProtoClientInfo {
-                        version: metadata.version,
+                        name: metadata.name,
-                    }),
+                        description: metadata.description,
-                })),
+                        version: metadata.version,
-            })),
+                    }),
-        })
+                })),
-        .await
+            })),
-        .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
+        })
-}
+        .await
-
+        .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
-async fn receive_auth_challenge(
+}
-    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
+
-) -> std::result::Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
+async fn receive_auth_challenge(
-    let response = transport
+    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
-        .recv()
+) -> Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
-        .await
+    let response = transport
-        .map_err(|_| AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge)?;
+        .recv()
-
+        .await
-    let payload = response.payload.ok_or(AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge)?;
+        .map_err(|_| AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge)?;
-    match payload {
+
-        ClientResponsePayload::Auth(response) => match response.payload {
+    let payload = response.payload.ok_or(AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge)?;
-            Some(AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(challenge)) => Ok(challenge),
+    match payload {
-            Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result)) => Err(map_auth_result(result)),
+        ClientResponsePayload::Auth(response) => match response.payload {
-            None => Err(AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge),
+            Some(AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(challenge)) => Ok(challenge),
-        },
+            Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result)) => Err(map_auth_result(result)),
-        _ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
+            None => Err(AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge),
-    }
+        },
-}
+        _ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
-
+    }
-async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
+}
-    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
+
-    key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
+async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
-    challenge: AuthChallenge,
+    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
-) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
+    key: &SigningKey,
-    let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
+    challenge: AuthChallenge,
-    let signature = key.sign(&challenge_payload).to_bytes().to_vec();
+) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
-
+    let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos.cast_signed());
-    transport
+    let challenge = authn::AuthChallenge {
-        .send(ClientRequest {
+        nonce: *challenge
-            request_id: next_request_id(),
+            .random
-            payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
+            .as_array()
-                payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(
+            .ok_or(AuthError::InvalidChallenge)?,
-                    AuthChallengeSolution { signature },
+        timestamp,
-                )),
+    };
-            })),
+    let challenge_payload: Vec<u8> = challenge.format();
-        })
+    let signature = key
-        .await
+        .sign_message(&challenge_payload, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
-        .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
+        .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?
-}
+        .to_bytes();
-
+
-async fn receive_auth_confirmation(
+    transport
-    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
+        .send(ClientRequest {
-) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
+            request_id: next_request_id(),
-    let response = transport
+            payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
-        .recv()
+                payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(
-        .await
+                    AuthChallengeSolution { signature },
-        .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?;
+                )),
-
+            })),
-    let payload = response.payload.ok_or(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?;
+        })
-    match payload {
+        .await
-        ClientResponsePayload::Auth(response) => match response.payload {
+        .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
-            Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result))
+}
-                if AuthResult::try_from(result).ok() == Some(AuthResult::Success) =>
+
-            {
+async fn receive_auth_confirmation(transport: &mut ClientTransport) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
-                Ok(())
+    let response = transport
-            }
+        .recv()
-            Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result)) => Err(map_auth_result(result)),
+        .await
-            _ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
+        .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?;
-        },
+
-        _ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
+    let payload = response.payload.ok_or(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?;
-    }
+    match payload {
-}
+        ClientResponsePayload::Auth(response) => match response.payload {
-
+            Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result))
-pub(crate) async fn authenticate(
+                if AuthResult::try_from(result).ok() == Some(AuthResult::Success) =>
-    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
+            {
-    metadata: ClientMetadata,
+                Ok(())
-    key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
+            }
-) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
+            Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result)) => Err(map_auth_result(result)),
-    send_auth_challenge_request(transport, metadata, key).await?;
+            _ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
-    let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?;
+        },
-    send_auth_challenge_solution(transport, key, challenge).await?;
+        _ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
-    receive_auth_confirmation(transport).await
+    }
-}
+}
+
+pub async fn authenticate(
+    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
+    metadata: ClientMetadata,
+    key: &SigningKey,
+) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
+    send_auth_challenge_request(transport, metadata, key).await?;
+    let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?;
+    send_auth_challenge_solution(transport, key, challenge).await?;
+    receive_auth_confirmation(transport).await
+}

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/bin/test_connect.rs

@@ -1,44 +1,44 @@
-use std::io::{self, Write};
+use arbiter_client::ArbiterClient;
-
+use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, url::ArbiterUrl};
-use arbiter_client::ArbiterClient;
+
-use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, url::ArbiterUrl};
+use std::io::{self, Write};
-
+
-#[tokio::main]
+#[tokio::main]
-async fn main() {
+async fn main() {
-    println!("Testing connection to Arbiter server...");
+    println!("Testing connection to Arbiter server...");
-    print!("Enter ArbiterUrl: ");
+    print!("Enter ArbiterUrl: ");
-    let _ = io::stdout().flush();
+    let _ = io::stdout().flush();
-
+
-    let mut input = String::new();
+    let mut input = String::new();
-    if let Err(err) = io::stdin().read_line(&mut input) {
+    if let Err(err) = io::stdin().read_line(&mut input) {
-        eprintln!("Failed to read input: {err}");
+        eprintln!("Failed to read input: {err}");
-        return;
+        return;
-    }
+    }
-
+
-    let input = input.trim();
+    let input = input.trim();
-    if input.is_empty() {
+    if input.is_empty() {
-        eprintln!("ArbiterUrl cannot be empty");
+        eprintln!("ArbiterUrl cannot be empty");
-        return;
+        return;
-    }
+    }
-
+
-    let url = match ArbiterUrl::try_from(input) {
+    let url = match ArbiterUrl::try_from(input) {
-        Ok(url) => url,
+        Ok(url) => url,
-        Err(err) => {
+        Err(err) => {
-            eprintln!("Invalid ArbiterUrl: {err}");
+            eprintln!("Invalid ArbiterUrl: {err}");
-            return;
+            return;
-        }
+        }
-    };
+    };
-
+
-    println!("{:#?}", url);
+    println!("{url:#?}");
-
+
-    let metadata = ClientMetadata {
+    let metadata = ClientMetadata {
-        name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_string(),
+        name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_owned(),
-        description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_string()),
+        description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_owned()),
-        version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string()),
+        version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_owned()),
-    };
+    };
-
+
-    match ArbiterClient::connect(url, metadata).await {
+    match ArbiterClient::connect(url, metadata).await {
-        Ok(_) => println!("Connected and authenticated successfully."),
+        Ok(_) => println!("Connected and authenticated successfully."),
-        Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {:#?}", err),
+        Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {err:#?}"),
-    }
+    }
-}
+}

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/client.rs

@@ -1,94 +1,101 @@
-use arbiter_proto::{
+#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
-    ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
+use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
-};
+use crate::{
-use std::sync::Arc;
+    StorageError,
-use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
+    auth::{AuthError, authenticate},
-use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
+    storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage},
-use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
+    transport::{BUFFER_LENGTH, ClientTransport},
-
+};
-use crate::{
+use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
-    StorageError,
+use arbiter_proto::{
-    auth::{AuthError, authenticate},
+    ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
-    storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage},
+};
-    transport::{BUFFER_LENGTH, ClientTransport},
+
-};
+use std::sync::Arc;
-
+use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
-#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
+use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
-use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
+use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
-
+
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum Error {
+pub enum ArbiterClientError {
-    #[error("gRPC error")]
+    #[error("Authentication error")]
-    Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
+    Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
-
+
-    #[error("Could not establish connection")]
+    #[error("Could not establish connection")]
-    Connection(#[from] tonic::transport::Error),
+    Connection(#[from] tonic::transport::Error),
-
+
-    #[error("Invalid server URI")]
+    #[error("gRPC error")]
-    InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
+    Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
-
+
-    #[error("Invalid CA certificate")]
+    #[error("Invalid CA certificate")]
-    InvalidCaCert(#[from] webpki::Error),
+    InvalidCaCert(#[from] webpki::Error),
-
+
-    #[error("Authentication error")]
+    #[error("Invalid server URI")]
-    Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
+    InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
-
+
-    #[error("Storage error")]
+    #[error("Storage error")]
-    Storage(#[from] StorageError),
+    Storage(#[from] StorageError),
-}
+}
-
+
-pub struct ArbiterClient {
+pub struct ArbiterClient {
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    #[expect(
-    transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
+        dead_code,
-}
+        reason = "transport will be used in future methods for sending requests and receiving responses"
-
+    )]
-impl ArbiterClient {
+    transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
-    pub async fn connect(url: ArbiterUrl, metadata: ClientMetadata) -> Result<Self, Error> {
+}
-        let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::from_default_location()?;
+
-        Self::connect_with_storage(url, metadata, &storage).await
+impl ArbiterClient {
-    }
+    pub async fn connect(
-
+        url: ArbiterUrl,
-    pub async fn connect_with_storage<S: SigningKeyStorage>(
+        metadata: ClientMetadata,
-        url: ArbiterUrl,
+    ) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
-        metadata: ClientMetadata,
+        let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::from_default_location()?;
-        storage: &S,
+        Self::connect_with_storage(url, metadata, &storage).await
-    ) -> Result<Self, Error> {
+    }
-        let key = storage.load_or_create()?;
+
-        Self::connect_with_key(url, metadata, key).await
+    pub async fn connect_with_storage<S: SigningKeyStorage>(
-    }
+        url: ArbiterUrl,
-
+        metadata: ClientMetadata,
-    pub async fn connect_with_key(
+        storage: &S,
-        url: ArbiterUrl,
+    ) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
-        metadata: ClientMetadata,
+        let key = storage.load_or_create()?;
-        key: ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
+        Self::connect_with_key(url, metadata, key).await
-    ) -> Result<Self, Error> {
+    }
-        let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned();
+
-        let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);
+    pub async fn connect_with_key(
-
+        url: ArbiterUrl,
-        let channel =
+        metadata: ClientMetadata,
-            tonic::transport::Channel::from_shared(format!("https://{}:{}", url.host, url.port))?
+        key: SigningKey,
-                .tls_config(tls)?
+    ) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
-                .connect()
+        let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned();
-                .await?;
+        let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);
-
+
-        let mut client = ArbiterServiceClient::new(channel);
+        let channel =
-        let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(BUFFER_LENGTH);
+            tonic::transport::Channel::from_shared(format!("https://{}:{}", url.host, url.port))?
-        let response_stream = client.client(ReceiverStream::new(rx)).await?.into_inner();
+                .tls_config(tls)?
-
+                .connect()
-        let mut transport = ClientTransport {
+                .await?;
-            sender: tx,
+
-            receiver: response_stream,
+        let mut client = ArbiterServiceClient::new(channel);
-        };
+        let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(BUFFER_LENGTH);
-
+        let response_stream = client.client(ReceiverStream::new(rx)).await?.into_inner();
-        authenticate(&mut transport, metadata, &key).await?;
+
-
+        let mut transport = ClientTransport {
-        Ok(Self {
+            sender: tx,
-            transport: Arc::new(Mutex::new(transport)),
+            receiver: response_stream,
-        })
+        };
-    }
+
-
+        authenticate(&mut transport, metadata, &key).await?;
-    #[cfg(feature = "evm")]
+
-    pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, Error> {
+        Ok(Self {
-        todo!("fetch EVM wallet list from server")
+            transport: Arc::new(Mutex::new(transport)),
-    }
+        })
-}
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "evm")]
+    #[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "false positive")]
+    pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, ArbiterClientError> {
+        todo!("fetch EVM wallet list from server")
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-mod auth;
+mod auth;
-mod client;
+mod client;
-mod storage;
+mod storage;
-mod transport;
+mod transport;
-pub mod wallets;
+pub mod wallets;
-
+
-pub use auth::AuthError;
+pub use auth::AuthError;
-pub use client::{ArbiterClient, Error};
+pub use client::{ArbiterClient, ArbiterClientError};
-pub use storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
+pub use storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
-
+
-#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
+#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
-pub use wallets::evm::{ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError, ArbiterEvmWallet};
+pub use wallets::evm::{ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError, ArbiterEvmWallet};

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/storage.rs

@@ -1,132 +1,134 @@
-use arbiter_proto::home_path;
+use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
-use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use arbiter_proto::home_path;
-
+
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
-pub enum StorageError {
+
-    #[error("I/O error")]
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
+pub enum StorageError {
-
+    #[error("Invalid signing key length in storage: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
-    #[error("Invalid signing key length in storage: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
+    InvalidKeyLength { expected: usize, actual: usize },
-    InvalidKeyLength { expected: usize, actual: usize },
+
-}
+    #[error("I/O error")]
-
+    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
-pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
+}
-    fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError>;
+
-}
+pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
-
+    fn load_or_create(&self) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError>;
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+}
-pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage {
+
-    path: PathBuf,
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-}
+pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage {
-
+    path: PathBuf,
-impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
+}
-    pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ed25519.key";
+
-
+impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
-    pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
+    pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ml_dsa.key";
-        Self { path: path.into() }
+
-    }
+    pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
-
+        Self { path: path.into() }
-    pub fn from_default_location() -> std::result::Result<Self, StorageError> {
+    }
-        Ok(Self::new(home_path()?.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME)))
+
-    }
+    pub fn from_default_location() -> Result<Self, StorageError> {
-
+        Ok(Self::new(home_path()?.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME)))
-    fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
+    }
-        let bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
+
-        let raw: [u8; 32] =
+    fn read_key(path: &Path) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
-            bytes
+        let bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
-                .try_into()
+        let raw: [u8; 32] =
-                .map_err(|v: Vec<u8>| StorageError::InvalidKeyLength {
+            bytes
-                    expected: 32,
+                .try_into()
-                    actual: v.len(),
+                .map_err(|v: Vec<u8>| StorageError::InvalidKeyLength {
-                })?;
+                    expected: 32,
-        Ok(ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&raw))
+                    actual: v.len(),
-    }
+                })?;
-}
+        Ok(SigningKey::from_seed(raw))
-
+    }
-impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
+}
-    fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
+
-        if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
+impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
-            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
+    fn load_or_create(&self) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
-        }
+        if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
-
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
-        if self.path.exists() {
+        }
-            return Self::read_key(&self.path);
+
-        }
+        if self.path.exists() {
-
+            return Self::read_key(&self.path);
-        let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+        }
-        let raw_key = key.to_bytes();
+
-
+        let key = SigningKey::generate();
-        // Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
+        let raw_key = key.to_seed();
-        match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+
-            .create_new(true)
+        // Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
-            .write(true)
+        match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
-            .open(&self.path)
+            .create_new(true)
-        {
+            .write(true)
-            Ok(mut file) => {
+            .open(&self.path)
-                use std::io::Write as _;
+        {
-                file.write_all(&raw_key)?;
+            Ok(mut file) => {
-                Ok(key)
+                use std::io::Write as _;
-            }
+                file.write_all(&raw_key)?;
-            Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => {
+                Ok(key)
-                Self::read_key(&self.path)
+            }
-            }
+            Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => {
-            Err(err) => Err(StorageError::Io(err)),
+                Self::read_key(&self.path)
-        }
+            }
-    }
+            Err(err) => Err(StorageError::Io(err)),
-}
+        }
-
+    }
-#[cfg(test)]
+}
-mod tests {
+
-    use super::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
+#[cfg(test)]
-
+mod tests {
-    fn unique_temp_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
+    use super::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
-        let nanos = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+
-            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+    fn unique_temp_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
-            .expect("clock should be after unix epoch")
+        let nanos = std::time::SystemTime::now()
-            .as_nanos();
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
-        std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
+            .expect("clock should be after unix epoch")
-            "arbiter-client-key-{}-{}.bin",
+            .as_nanos();
-            std::process::id(),
+        std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
-            nanos
+            "arbiter-client-key-{}-{}.bin",
-        ))
+            std::process::id(),
-    }
+            nanos
-
+        ))
-    #[test]
+    }
-    fn file_storage_creates_and_reuses_key() {
+
-        let path = unique_temp_key_path();
+    #[test]
-        let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone());
+    fn file_storage_creates_and_reuses_key() {
-
+        let path = unique_temp_key_path();
-        let key_a = storage
+        let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone());
-            .load_or_create()
+
-            .expect("first load_or_create should create key");
+        let key_a = storage
-        let key_b = storage
+            .load_or_create()
-            .load_or_create()
+            .expect("first load_or_create should create key");
-            .expect("second load_or_create should read same key");
+        let key_b = storage
-
+            .load_or_create()
-        assert_eq!(key_a.to_bytes(), key_b.to_bytes());
+            .expect("second load_or_create should read same key");
-        assert!(path.exists());
+
-
+        assert_eq!(key_a.to_seed(), key_b.to_seed());
-        std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
+        assert!(path.exists());
-    }
+
-
+        std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
-    #[test]
+    }
-    fn file_storage_rejects_invalid_key_length() {
+
-        let path = unique_temp_key_path();
+    #[test]
-        std::fs::write(&path, [42u8; 31]).expect("should write invalid key file");
+    fn file_storage_rejects_invalid_key_length() {
-        let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone());
+        let path = unique_temp_key_path();
-
+        std::fs::write(&path, [42u8; 31]).expect("should write invalid key file");
-        let err = storage
+        let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone());
-            .load_or_create()
+
-            .expect_err("storage should reject non-32-byte key file");
+        let err = storage
-
+            .load_or_create()
-        match err {
+            .expect_err("storage should reject non-32-byte key file");
-            StorageError::InvalidKeyLength { expected, actual } => {
+
-                assert_eq!(expected, 32);
+        match err {
-                assert_eq!(actual, 31);
+            StorageError::InvalidKeyLength { expected, actual } => {
-            }
+                assert_eq!(expected, 32);
-            other => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"),
+                assert_eq!(actual, 31);
-        }
+            }
-
+            other @ StorageError::Io(_) => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"),
-        std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
+        }
-    }
+
-}
+        std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/transport.rs

@@ -1,44 +1,41 @@
-use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse};
+use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse};
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering};
+
-use tokio::sync::mpsc;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering};
-
+use tokio::sync::mpsc;
-pub(crate) const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
+
-static NEXT_REQUEST_ID: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(1);
+pub const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
-
+static NEXT_REQUEST_ID: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(1);
-pub(crate) fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
+
-    NEXT_REQUEST_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
+pub fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
-}
+    NEXT_REQUEST_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
-
+}
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+
-pub(crate) enum ClientSignError {
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-    #[error("Transport channel closed")]
+pub enum ClientSignError {
-    ChannelClosed,
+    #[error("Transport channel closed")]
-
+    ChannelClosed,
-    #[error("Connection closed by server")]
+
-    ConnectionClosed,
+    #[error("Connection closed by server")]
-}
+    ConnectionClosed,
-
+}
-pub(crate) struct ClientTransport {
+
-    pub(crate) sender: mpsc::Sender<ClientRequest>,
+pub struct ClientTransport {
-    pub(crate) receiver: tonic::Streaming<ClientResponse>,
+    pub(crate) sender: mpsc::Sender<ClientRequest>,
-}
+    pub(crate) receiver: tonic::Streaming<ClientResponse>,
-
+}
-impl ClientTransport {
+
-    pub(crate) async fn send(
+impl ClientTransport {
-        &mut self,
+    pub(crate) async fn send(&mut self, request: ClientRequest) -> Result<(), ClientSignError> {
-        request: ClientRequest,
+        self.sender
-    ) -> std::result::Result<(), ClientSignError> {
+            .send(request)
-        self.sender
+            .await
-            .send(request)
+            .map_err(|_| ClientSignError::ChannelClosed)
-            .await
+    }
-            .map_err(|_| ClientSignError::ChannelClosed)
+
-    }
+    pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
-
+        match self.receiver.message().await {
-    pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> std::result::Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
+            Ok(Some(resp)) => Ok(resp),
-        match self.receiver.message().await {
+            Ok(None) | Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
-            Ok(Some(resp)) => Ok(resp),
+        }
-            Ok(None) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
+    }
-            Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
+}
-        }
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/wallets/evm.rs

@@ -1,196 +1,197 @@
-use alloy::{
+use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
-    consensus::SignableTransaction,
+use arbiter_proto::proto::{
-    network::TxSigner,
+    client::{
-    primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
+        ClientRequest,
-    signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
+        client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
-};
+        client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
-use async_trait::async_trait;
+        evm::{
-use std::sync::Arc;
+            self as proto_evm, request::Payload as EvmRequestPayload,
-use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+            response::Payload as EvmResponsePayload,
-
+        },
-use arbiter_proto::proto::{
+    },
-    client::{
+    evm::{
-        ClientRequest,
+        EvmSignTransactionRequest,
-        client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
+        evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult,
-        client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
+    },
-        evm::{
+    shared::evm::TransactionEvalError,
-            self as proto_evm, request::Payload as EvmRequestPayload,
+};
-            response::Payload as EvmResponsePayload,
+
-        },
+use alloy::{
-    },
+    consensus::SignableTransaction,
-    evm::{
+    network::TxSigner,
-        EvmSignTransactionRequest,
+    primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
-        evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult,
+    signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
-    },
+};
-    shared::evm::TransactionEvalError,
+use async_trait::async_trait;
-};
+use std::sync::Arc;
-
+use tokio::sync::Mutex;
-use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
+
-
+/// A typed error payload returned by [`ArbiterEvmWallet`] transaction signing.
-/// A typed error payload returned by [`ArbiterEvmWallet`] transaction signing.
+///
-///
+/// This is wrapped into `alloy::signers::Error::Other`, so consumers can downcast by [`TryFrom`] and
-/// This is wrapped into `alloy::signers::Error::Other`, so consumers can downcast by [`TryFrom`] and
+/// interpret the concrete policy evaluation failure instead of parsing strings.
-/// interpret the concrete policy evaluation failure instead of parsing strings.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
-#[non_exhaustive]
+pub enum ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError {
-pub enum ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError {
+    #[error("transaction rejected by policy: {0:?}")]
-    #[error("transaction rejected by policy: {0:?}")]
+    PolicyEval(TransactionEvalError),
-    PolicyEval(TransactionEvalError),
+}
-}
+
-
+impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a Error> for &'a ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError {
-impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a Error> for &'a ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError {
+    type Error = ();
-    type Error = ();
+
-
+    fn try_from(value: &'a Error) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-    fn try_from(value: &'a Error) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        if let Error::Other(inner) = value
-        if let Error::Other(inner) = value
+            && let Some(eval_error) = inner.downcast_ref()
-            && let Some(eval_error) = inner.downcast_ref()
+        {
-        {
+            Ok(eval_error)
-            Ok(eval_error)
+        } else {
-        } else {
+            Err(())
-            Err(())
+        }
-        }
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
-
+pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet {
-pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet {
+    transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
-    transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
+    address: Address,
-    address: Address,
+    chain_id: Option<ChainId>,
-    chain_id: Option<ChainId>,
+}
-}
+
-
+impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
-impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
+    #[expect(
-    #[expect(
+        dead_code,
-        dead_code,
+        reason = "new will be used in future methods for creating wallets with different parameters"
-        reason = "constructor may be used in future extensions, e.g. to support wallet listing"
+    )]
-    )]
+    pub(crate) const fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
-    pub(crate) fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
+        Self {
-        Self {
+            transport,
-            transport,
+            address,
-            address,
+            chain_id: None,
-            chain_id: None,
+        }
-        }
+    }
-    }
+
-
+    pub const fn address(&self) -> Address {
-    pub fn address(&self) -> Address {
+        self.address
-        self.address
+    }
-    }
+
-
+    #[must_use]
-    pub fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
+    pub const fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
-        self.chain_id = Some(chain_id);
+        self.chain_id = Some(chain_id);
-        self
+        self
-    }
+    }
-
+
-    fn validate_chain_id(&self, tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>) -> Result<()> {
+    fn validate_chain_id(&self, tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>) -> Result<()> {
-        if let Some(chain_id) = self.chain_id
+        if let Some(chain_id) = self.chain_id
-            && !tx.set_chain_id_checked(chain_id)
+            && !tx.set_chain_id_checked(chain_id)
-        {
+        {
-            return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
+            return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
-                signer: chain_id,
+                signer: chain_id,
-                tx: tx.chain_id().unwrap(),
+                tx: tx.chain_id().unwrap(),
-            });
+            });
-        }
+        }
-
+
-        Ok(())
+        Ok(())
-    }
+    }
-}
+}
-
+
-#[async_trait]
+#[async_trait]
-impl Signer for ArbiterEvmWallet {
+impl Signer for ArbiterEvmWallet {
-    async fn sign_hash(&self, _hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
+    async fn sign_hash(&self, _hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
-        Err(Error::other(
+        Err(Error::other(
-            "hash-only signing is not supported for ArbiterEvmWallet; use transaction signing",
+            "hash-only signing is not supported for ArbiterEvmWallet; use transaction signing",
-        ))
+        ))
-    }
+    }
-
+
-    fn address(&self) -> Address {
+    fn address(&self) -> Address {
-        self.address
+        self.address
-    }
+    }
-
+
-    fn chain_id(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
+    fn chain_id(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
-        self.chain_id
+        self.chain_id
-    }
+    }
-
+
-    fn set_chain_id(&mut self, chain_id: Option<ChainId>) {
+    fn set_chain_id(&mut self, chain_id: Option<ChainId>) {
-        self.chain_id = chain_id;
+        self.chain_id = chain_id;
-    }
+    }
-}
+}
-
+
-#[async_trait]
+#[async_trait]
-impl TxSigner<Signature> for ArbiterEvmWallet {
+impl TxSigner<Signature> for ArbiterEvmWallet {
-    fn address(&self) -> Address {
+    fn address(&self) -> Address {
-        self.address
+        self.address
-    }
+    }
-
+
-    async fn sign_transaction(
+    async fn sign_transaction(
-        &self,
+        &self,
-        tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
+        tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
-    ) -> Result<Signature> {
+    ) -> Result<Signature> {
-        self.validate_chain_id(tx)?;
+        self.validate_chain_id(tx)?;
-
+
-        let mut transport = self.transport.lock().await;
+        let mut transport = self.transport.lock().await;
-        let request_id = next_request_id();
+        let request_id = next_request_id();
-        let rlp_transaction = tx.encoded_for_signing();
+        let rlp_transaction = tx.encoded_for_signing();
-
+
-        transport
+        transport
-            .send(ClientRequest {
+            .send(ClientRequest {
-                request_id,
+                request_id,
-                payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Evm(proto_evm::Request {
+                payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Evm(proto_evm::Request {
-                    payload: Some(EvmRequestPayload::SignTransaction(
+                    payload: Some(EvmRequestPayload::SignTransaction(
-                        EvmSignTransactionRequest {
+                        EvmSignTransactionRequest {
-                            wallet_address: self.address.to_vec(),
+                            wallet_address: self.address.to_vec(),
-                            rlp_transaction,
+                            rlp_transaction,
-                        },
+                        },
-                    )),
+                    )),
-                })),
+                })),
-            })
+            })
-            .await
+            .await
-            .map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to send evm sign transaction request"))?;
+            .map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to send evm sign transaction request"))?;
-
+
-        let response = transport
+        let response = transport
-            .recv()
+            .recv()
-            .await
+            .await
-            .map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to receive evm sign transaction response"))?;
+            .map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to receive evm sign transaction response"))?;
-
+        drop(transport);
-        if response.request_id != Some(request_id) {
+
-            return Err(Error::other(
+        if response.request_id != Some(request_id) {
-                "received mismatched response id for evm sign transaction",
+            return Err(Error::other(
-            ));
+                "received mismatched response id for evm sign transaction",
-        }
+            ));
-
+        }
-        let payload = response
+
-            .payload
+        let payload = response
-            .ok_or_else(|| Error::other("missing evm sign transaction response payload"))?;
+            .payload
-
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::other("missing evm sign transaction response payload"))?;
-        let ClientResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
+
-            payload: Some(payload),
+        let ClientResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
-        }) = payload
+            payload: Some(payload),
-        else {
+        }) = payload
-            return Err(Error::other(
+        else {
-                "unexpected response payload for evm sign transaction request",
+            return Err(Error::other(
-            ));
+                "unexpected response payload for evm sign transaction request",
-        };
+            ));
-
+        };
-        let EvmResponsePayload::SignTransaction(response) = payload else {
+
-            return Err(Error::other(
+        let EvmResponsePayload::SignTransaction(response) = payload else {
-                "unexpected evm response payload for sign transaction request",
+            return Err(Error::other(
-            ));
+                "unexpected evm response payload for sign transaction request",
-        };
+            ));
-
+        };
-        let result = response
+
-            .result
+        let result = response
-            .ok_or_else(|| Error::other("missing evm sign transaction result"))?;
+            .result
-
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::other("missing evm sign transaction result"))?;
-        match result {
+
-            EvmSignTransactionResult::Signature(signature) => {
+        match result {
-                Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice())
+            EvmSignTransactionResult::Signature(signature) => {
-                    .map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid signature returned by server"))
+                Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice())
-            }
+                    .map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid signature returned by server"))
-            EvmSignTransactionResult::EvalError(eval_error) => Err(Error::other(
+            }
-                ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError::PolicyEval(eval_error),
+            EvmSignTransactionResult::EvalError(eval_error) => Err(Error::other(
-            )),
+                ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError::PolicyEval(eval_error),
-            EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(code) => Err(Error::other(format!(
+            )),
-                "server failed to sign transaction with error code {code}"
+            EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(code) => Err(Error::other(format!(
-            ))),
+                "server failed to sign transaction with error code {code}"
-        }
+            ))),
-    }
+        }
-}
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/wallets/mod.rs

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
+#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
-pub mod evm;
+pub mod evm;

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/target

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+[package]
+name = "arbiter-crypto"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = "2024"
+
+[dependencies]
+ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true }
+rand = {workspace = true, optional = true}
+memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true}
+hmac.workspace = true
+alloy.workspace = true
+x-wing = { version = "0.1.0-rc.0", features = ["zeroize"] }
+chrono.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true
+
+[features]
+default = ["authn", "safecell"]
+authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand"]
+safecell = ["dep:memsafe"]
+
+[lib]
+doctest = false

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/authn/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+pub mod v1;
+pub use v1::*;

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/authn/v1.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
+use hmac::digest::Digest;
+use ml_dsa::{
+    EncodedVerifyingKey, Error, KeyGen, MlDsa87, Seed, Signature as MlDsaSignature,
+    SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _,
+};
+use rand::RngExt;
+
+pub static CLIENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_client";
+pub static OPERATOR_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_operator";
+
+const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 32;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
+#[error("invalid length: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
+pub struct InvalidLength {
+    pub expected: usize,
+    pub actual: usize,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct AuthChallenge {
+    pub nonce: [u8; NONCE_SIZE],
+    pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
+}
+
+impl AuthChallenge {
+    pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::CryptoRng) -> Self {
+        let timestamp = Utc::now();
+        let nonce = {
+            let mut array = [0; NONCE_SIZE];
+            rng.fill(&mut array);
+            array
+        };
+
+        Self { nonce, timestamp }
+    }
+
+    pub fn format(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        {
+            let mut buffer = Vec::from(self.nonce);
+
+            let stamp = self
+                .timestamp
+                .timestamp_nanos_opt()
+                .expect("We would be long dead by the time this triggers :)");
+            buffer.extend_from_slice(stamp.to_be_bytes().as_slice());
+
+            buffer
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn from_parts(nonce: &[u8], timestamp: i64) -> Result<Self, InvalidLength> {
+        let random_nonce = nonce.as_array().ok_or(InvalidLength {
+            expected: NONCE_SIZE,
+            actual: nonce.len(),
+        })?;
+        Ok(Self {
+            nonce: *random_nonce,
+            timestamp: DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(timestamp),
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+pub type KeyParams = MlDsa87;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct PublicKey(Box<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>>);
+
+impl crate::hashing::Hashable for PublicKey {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self.to_bytes());
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct Signature(Box<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>>);
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct SigningKey(Box<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>>);
+
+impl PublicKey {
+    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn verify(&self, challenge: &AuthChallenge, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
+        let challenge = challenge.format();
+        self.0
+            .verify_with_context(&challenge, context, &signature.0)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Signature {
+    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
+    }
+}
+
+impl SigningKey {
+    pub fn generate() -> Self {
+        Self(Box::new(KeyParams::key_gen(&mut rand::rng())))
+    }
+
+    pub fn from_seed(seed: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+        Self(Box::new(KeyParams::from_seed(&Seed::from(seed))))
+    }
+
+    pub fn to_seed(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+        self.0.to_seed().into()
+    }
+
+    pub fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
+        self.0.verifying_key().into()
+    }
+
+    pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
+        self.0
+            .signing_key()
+            .sign_deterministic(message, context)
+            .map(Into::into)
+    }
+
+    pub fn sign_challenge(
+        &self,
+        challenge: &AuthChallenge,
+        context: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
+        let challenge = challenge.format();
+
+        self.sign_message(&challenge, context)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>> for PublicKey {
+    fn from(value: MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
+        Self(Box::new(value))
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>> for Signature {
+    fn from(value: MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>) -> Self {
+        Self(Box::new(value))
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>> for SigningKey {
+    fn from(value: MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
+        Self(Box::new(value))
+    }
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for PublicKey {
+    type Error = ();
+
+    fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
+    }
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for PublicKey {
+    type Error = ();
+
+    fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        let encoded = EncodedVerifyingKey::<KeyParams>::try_from(value).map_err(|_| ())?;
+        Ok(Self(Box::new(MlDsaVerifyingKey::decode(&encoded))))
+    }
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for Signature {
+    type Error = ();
+
+    fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
+    }
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for Signature {
+    type Error = ();
+
+    fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        MlDsaSignature::try_from(value)
+            .map(|sig| Self(Box::new(sig)))
+            .map_err(|_| ())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, signature::Keypair as _};
+
+    use crate::authn::AuthChallenge;
+
+    use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, OPERATOR_CONTEXT};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() {
+        let key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
+        let encoded = PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()).to_bytes();
+
+        let decoded = PublicKey::try_from(encoded.as_slice()).expect("public key should decode");
+
+        assert_eq!(decoded, PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn signature_round_trip_decodes() {
+        let key = SigningKey::generate();
+        let signature = key
+            .sign_message(b"challenge", CLIENT_CONTEXT)
+            .expect("signature should be created");
+
+        let decoded =
+            Signature::try_from(signature.to_bytes().as_slice()).expect("signature should decode");
+
+        assert_eq!(decoded, signature);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn challenge_verification_uses_context_and_canonical_key_bytes() {
+        let key = SigningKey::generate();
+        let public_key = key.public_key();
+        let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+        let signature = key
+            .sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
+            .expect("signature should be created");
+
+        assert!(public_key.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
+        assert!(!public_key.verify(&challenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT, &signature));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn signing_key_round_trip_seed_preserves_public_key_and_signing() {
+        let original = SigningKey::generate();
+        let restored = SigningKey::from_seed(original.to_seed());
+
+        assert_eq!(restored.public_key(), original.public_key());
+
+        let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+
+        let signature = restored
+            .sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
+            .expect("signature should be created");
+
+        assert!(
+            restored
+                .public_key()
+                .verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature)
+        );
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/hashing.rs

@@ -1,107 +1,112 @@
-use hmac::digest::Digest;
+use std::collections::HashSet;
-use std::collections::HashSet;
+
-
+pub use hmac::digest::Digest;
-/// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
+
-pub trait Hashable {
+/// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H);
+#[diagnostic::on_unimplemented(
-}
+    note = "for local types consider adding `#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]` to your `{Self}` type",
-
+    note = "for types from other crates check whether the crate offers a `Hashable` implementation"
-macro_rules! impl_numeric {
+)]
-($($t:ty),*) => {
+pub trait Hashable {
-    $(
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H);
-        impl Hashable for $t {
+}
-            fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+
-                hasher.update(&self.to_be_bytes());
+macro_rules! impl_numeric {
-            }
+    ($($t:ty),*) => {
-        }
+        $(
-    )*
+            impl Hashable for $t {
-};
+                fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-}
+                    hasher.update(&self.to_be_bytes());
-
+                }
-impl_numeric!(u8, u16, u32, u64, i8, i16, i32, i64);
+            }
-
+        )*
-impl Hashable for &[u8] {
+    };
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+}
-        hasher.update(self);
+
-    }
+impl_numeric!(u8, u16, u32, u64, i8, i16, i32, i64);
-}
+
-
+impl Hashable for &[u8] {
-impl Hashable for String {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self);
-        hasher.update(self.as_bytes());
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
-
+impl Hashable for String {
-impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for Vec<T> {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self.as_bytes());
-        let ref_sorted = {
+    }
-            let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
+}
-            sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
+
-            sorted
+impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for Vec<T> {
-        };
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        for item in ref_sorted {
+        let ref_sorted = {
-            item.hash(hasher);
+            let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
-        }
+            sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
-    }
+            sorted
-}
+        };
-
+        for item in ref_sorted {
-impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for HashSet<T> {
+            item.hash(hasher);
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        }
-        let ref_sorted = {
+    }
-            let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
+}
-            sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
+
-            sorted
+impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd, S: std::hash::BuildHasher> Hashable for HashSet<T, S> {
-        };
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        for item in ref_sorted {
+        let ref_sorted = {
-            item.hash(hasher);
+            let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
-        }
+            sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
-    }
+            sorted
-}
+        };
-
+        for item in ref_sorted {
-impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Option<T> {
+            item.hash(hasher);
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        }
-        match self {
+    }
-            Some(value) => {
+}
-                hasher.update([1]);
+
-                value.hash(hasher);
+impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Option<T> {
-            }
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-            None => hasher.update([0]),
+        match self {
-        }
+            Some(value) => {
-    }
+                hasher.update([1]);
-}
+                value.hash(hasher);
-
+            }
-impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Box<T> {
+            None => hasher.update([0]),
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        }
-        self.as_ref().hash(hasher);
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
-
+impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Box<T> {
-impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for &T {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.as_ref().hash(hasher);
-        (*self).hash(hasher);
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
-
+impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for &T {
-impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::Address {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        (*self).hash(hasher);
-        hasher.update(self.as_slice());
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
-
+impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::Address {
-impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::U256 {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self.as_slice());
-        hasher.update(self.to_be_bytes::<32>());
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
-
+impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::U256 {
-impl Hashable for chrono::Duration {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self.to_be_bytes::<32>());
-        hasher.update(self.num_seconds().to_be_bytes());
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
-
+impl Hashable for chrono::Duration {
-impl Hashable for chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self.num_seconds().to_be_bytes());
-        hasher.update(self.timestamp_millis().to_be_bytes());
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
+impl Hashable for chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self.timestamp_millis().to_be_bytes());
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#[cfg(feature = "authn")]
+pub mod authn;
+pub mod hashing;
+#[cfg(feature = "safecell")]
+pub mod safecell;
+
+pub use x_wing;

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/safecell.rs

@@ -1,111 +1,118 @@
-use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
-use std::{any::type_name, fmt};
+use std::{
-
+    any::type_name,
-use memsafe::MemSafe;
+    fmt,
-
+    ops::{Deref, DerefMut},
-pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
+};
-    type CellRead<'a>: Deref<Target = T>
+
-    where
+pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
-        Self: 'a,
+    type CellRead<'a>: Deref<Target = T>
-        T: 'a;
+    where
-    type CellWrite<'a>: Deref<Target = T> + DerefMut<Target = T>
+        Self: 'a,
-    where
+        T: 'a;
-        Self: 'a,
+    type CellWrite<'a>: Deref<Target = T> + DerefMut<Target = T>
-        T: 'a;
+    where
-
+        Self: 'a,
-    fn new(value: T) -> Self
+        T: 'a;
-    where
+
-        Self: Sized;
+    fn new(value: T) -> Self
-
+    where
-    fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_>;
+        Self: Sized;
-    fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_>;
+
-
+    fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_>;
-    fn new_inline<F>(f: F) -> Self
+    fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_>;
-    where
+
-        Self: Sized,
+    fn new_inline<F>(f: F) -> Self
-        T: Default,
+    where
-        F: for<'a> FnOnce(&'a mut T),
+        Self: Sized,
-    {
+        T: Default,
-        let mut cell = Self::new(T::default());
+        F: for<'a> FnOnce(&'a mut T),
-        {
+    {
-            let mut handle = cell.write();
+        let mut cell = Self::new(T::default());
-            f(handle.deref_mut());
+        {
-        }
+            let mut handle = cell.write();
-        cell
+            f(&mut *handle);
-    }
+        }
-
+        cell
-    #[inline(always)]
+    }
-    fn read_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
+
-    where
+    #[inline(always)]
-        F: FnOnce(&T) -> R,
+    fn read_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
-    {
+    where
-        f(&*self.read())
+        F: FnOnce(&T) -> R,
-    }
+    {
-
+        f(&*self.read())
-    #[inline(always)]
+    }
-    fn write_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
+
-    where
+    #[inline(always)]
-        F: FnOnce(&mut T) -> R,
+    fn write_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
-    {
+    where
-        f(&mut *self.write())
+        F: FnOnce(&mut T) -> R,
-    }
+    {
-}
+        f(&mut *self.write())
-
+    }
-pub struct MemSafeCell<T>(MemSafe<T>);
+}
-
+
-impl<T> fmt::Debug for MemSafeCell<T> {
+pub struct MemSafeCell<T>(MemSafe<T>);
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+
-        f.debug_struct("MemSafeCell")
+impl<T> fmt::Debug for MemSafeCell<T> {
-            .field("inner", &format_args!("<protected {}>", type_name::<T>()))
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
-            .finish()
+        f.debug_struct("MemSafeCell")
-    }
+            .field("inner", &format_args!("<protected {}>", type_name::<T>()))
-}
+            .finish()
-
+    }
-impl<T> SafeCellHandle<T> for MemSafeCell<T> {
+}
-    type CellRead<'a>
+
-        = memsafe::MemSafeRead<'a, T>
+impl<T> SafeCellHandle<T> for MemSafeCell<T> {
-    where
+    type CellRead<'a>
-        Self: 'a,
+        = memsafe::MemSafeRead<'a, T>
-        T: 'a;
+    where
-    type CellWrite<'a>
+        Self: 'a,
-        = memsafe::MemSafeWrite<'a, T>
+        T: 'a;
-    where
+    type CellWrite<'a>
-        Self: 'a,
+        = memsafe::MemSafeWrite<'a, T>
-        T: 'a;
+    where
-
+        Self: 'a,
-    fn new(value: T) -> Self {
+        T: 'a;
-        match MemSafe::new(value) {
+
-            Ok(inner) => Self(inner),
+    fn new(value: T) -> Self {
-            Err(err) => {
+        match MemSafe::new(value) {
-                // If protected memory cannot be allocated, process integrity is compromised.
+            Ok(inner) => Self(inner),
-                abort_memory_breach("safe cell allocation", &err)
+            Err(err) => {
-            }
+                // If protected memory cannot be allocated, process integrity is compromised.
-        }
+                abort_memory_breach("safe cell allocation", &err)
-    }
+            }
-
+        }
-    #[inline(always)]
+    }
-    fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_> {
+
-        match self.0.read() {
+    #[inline(always)]
-            Ok(inner) => inner,
+    fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_> {
-            Err(err) => abort_memory_breach("safe cell read", &err),
+        match self.0.read() {
-        }
+            Ok(inner) => inner,
-    }
+            Err(err) => abort_memory_breach("safe cell read", &err),
-
+        }
-    #[inline(always)]
+    }
-    fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_> {
+
-        match self.0.write() {
+    #[inline(always)]
-            Ok(inner) => inner,
+    fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_> {
-            Err(err) => {
+        match self.0.write() {
-                // If protected memory becomes unwritable here, treat it as a fatal memory breach.
+            Ok(inner) => inner,
-                abort_memory_breach("safe cell write", &err)
+            Err(err) => {
-            }
+                // If protected memory becomes unwritable here, treat it as a fatal memory breach.
-        }
+                abort_memory_breach("safe cell write", &err)
-    }
+            }
-}
+        }
-
+    }
-fn abort_memory_breach(action: &str, err: &memsafe::error::MemoryError) -> ! {
+}
-    eprintln!("fatal {action}: {err}");
+
-    std::process::abort();
+fn abort_memory_breach(action: &str, err: &memsafe::error::MemoryError) -> ! {
-}
+    eprintln!("fatal {action}: {err}");
-
+    // SAFETY: Intentionally cause a segmentation fault to prevent further execution in a compromised state.
-pub type SafeCell<T> = MemSafeCell<T>;
+    unsafe {
+        let unsafe_pointer = std::ptr::null_mut::<u8>();
+        std::ptr::write_volatile(unsafe_pointer, 0);
+    }
+    std::process::abort();
+}
+
+pub type SafeCell<T> = MemSafeCell<T>;

server/crates/arbiter-macros/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[package]
+name = "arbiter-macros"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = "2024"
+
+[lib]
+proc-macro = true
+doctest = false
+
+[dependencies]
+proc-macro2 = "1.0"
+quote = "1.0"
+syn = { version = "2.0", features = ["derive", "fold", "full", "visit-mut"] }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+arbiter-crypto = { path = "../arbiter-crypto" }
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true

server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/hashable.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+use crate::utils::{HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH, HMAC_DIGEST_PATH};
+
+use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream, TokenTree};
+use quote::quote;
+use syn::{DataStruct, DeriveInput, Fields, Generics, Index, parse_quote, spanned::Spanned};
+
+pub(crate) fn derive(input: &DeriveInput) -> TokenStream {
+    match &input.data {
+        syn::Data::Struct(struct_data) => hashable_struct(input, struct_data),
+        syn::Data::Enum(_) => {
+            syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable can currently be derived only for structs")
+                .to_compile_error()
+        }
+        syn::Data::Union(_) => {
+            syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable cannot be derived for unions")
+                .to_compile_error()
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn hashable_struct(input: &DeriveInput, struct_data: &DataStruct) -> TokenStream {
+    let ident = &input.ident;
+    let hashable_trait = HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH.to_path();
+    let hmac_digest = HMAC_DIGEST_PATH.to_path();
+    let generics = add_hashable_bounds(input.generics.clone(), &hashable_trait);
+    let field_accesses = collect_field_accesses(struct_data);
+    let hash_calls = build_hash_calls(&field_accesses, &hashable_trait);
+
+    let (impl_generics, ty_generics, where_clause) = generics.split_for_impl();
+
+    quote! {
+        #[automatically_derived]
+        impl #impl_generics #hashable_trait for #ident #ty_generics #where_clause {
+            fn hash<H: #hmac_digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+                #(#hash_calls)*
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn add_hashable_bounds(mut generics: Generics, hashable_trait: &syn::Path) -> Generics {
+    for type_param in generics.type_params_mut() {
+        type_param.bounds.push(parse_quote!(#hashable_trait));
+    }
+
+    generics
+}
+
+struct FieldAccess {
+    access: TokenStream,
+    span: Span,
+}
+
+fn collect_field_accesses(struct_data: &DataStruct) -> Vec<FieldAccess> {
+    match &struct_data.fields {
+        Fields::Named(fields) => {
+            // Keep deterministic alphabetical order for named fields.
+            // Do not remove this sort, because it keeps hash output stable regardless of source order.
+            let mut named_fields = fields
+                .named
+                .iter()
+                .map(|field| {
+                    let name = field
+                        .ident
+                        .as_ref()
+                        .expect("Fields::Named(fields) must have names")
+                        .clone();
+                    (name.to_string(), name)
+                })
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+            named_fields.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0));
+
+            named_fields
+                .into_iter()
+                .map(|(_, name)| FieldAccess {
+                    access: quote! { #name },
+                    span: name.span(),
+                })
+                .collect()
+        }
+        Fields::Unnamed(fields) => fields
+            .unnamed
+            .iter()
+            .enumerate()
+            .map(|(i, field)| FieldAccess {
+                access: {
+                    let index = Index::from(i);
+                    quote! { #index }
+                },
+                span: field.ty.span(),
+            })
+            .collect(),
+        Fields::Unit => Vec::new(),
+    }
+}
+
+fn build_hash_calls(
+    field_accesses: &[FieldAccess],
+    hashable_trait: &syn::Path,
+) -> Vec<TokenStream> {
+    field_accesses
+        .iter()
+        .map(|field| {
+            let access = &field.access;
+            let call = quote! {
+                #hashable_trait::hash(&self.#access, hasher);
+            };
+
+            respan(call, field.span)
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+/// Recursively set span on all tokens, including interpolated ones.
+fn respan(tokens: TokenStream, span: Span) -> TokenStream {
+    tokens
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|tt| match tt {
+            TokenTree::Group(g) => {
+                let mut new = proc_macro2::Group::new(g.delimiter(), respan(g.stream(), span));
+                new.set_span(span);
+                TokenTree::Group(new)
+            }
+            mut other => {
+                other.set_span(span);
+                other
+            }
+        })
+        .collect()
+}

server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+use syn::{DeriveInput, parse_macro_input};
+
+mod hashable;
+mod utils;
+
+#[proc_macro_derive(Hashable)]
+pub fn derive_hashable(input: proc_macro::TokenStream) -> proc_macro::TokenStream {
+    let input = parse_macro_input!(input as DeriveInput);
+    hashable::derive(&input).into()
+}

server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/utils.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+pub(crate) struct ToPath(pub &'static str);
+
+impl ToPath {
+    pub(crate) fn to_path(&self) -> syn::Path {
+        syn::parse_str(self.0).expect("Invalid path")
+    }
+}
+
+macro_rules! ensure_path {
+    ($path:path as $name:ident) => {
+        const _: () = {
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            #[expect(
+                unused_imports,
+                reason = "Ensures the path is valid and will cause a compile error if not"
+            )]
+            use $path as _;
+        };
+        pub(crate) const $name: ToPath = ToPath(stringify!($path));
+    };
+}
+
+ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable as HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH);
+ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Digest as HMAC_DIGEST_PATH);

server/crates/arbiter-proto/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,36 +1,35 @@
-[package]
+[package]
-name = "arbiter-proto"
+name = "arbiter-proto"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2024"
+edition = "2024"
-repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
+repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
-license = "Apache-2.0"
+license = "Apache-2.0"
-
+
-[dependencies]
+[dependencies]
-tonic.workspace = true
+tonic.workspace = true
-tokio.workspace = true
+tokio.workspace = true
-futures.workspace = true
+futures.workspace = true
-hex = "0.4.3"
+tonic-prost = "0.14.5"
-tonic-prost = "0.14.5"
+prost.workspace = true
-prost.workspace = true
+kameo.workspace = true
-kameo.workspace = true
+url = "2.5.8"
-url = "2.5.8"
+miette.workspace = true
-miette.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
+rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
-rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
+base64.workspace = true
-base64 = "0.22.1"
+prost-types.workspace = true
-prost-types.workspace = true
+async-trait.workspace = true
-tracing.workspace = true
+tokio-stream.workspace = true
-async-trait.workspace = true
+
-tokio-stream.workspace = true
+[build-dependencies]
-
+tonic-prost-build = "0.14.5"
-[build-dependencies]
+
-tonic-prost-build = "0.14.5"
+[dev-dependencies]
-protoc-bin-vendored = "3"
+rstest.workspace = true
-
+rcgen.workspace = true
-[dev-dependencies]
+
-rstest.workspace = true
+[lib]
-rand.workspace = true
+doctest = false
-rcgen.workspace = true
+
-
+[package.metadata.cargo-shear]
-[package.metadata.cargo-shear]
+ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost"]
-ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost", "kameo"]

server/crates/arbiter-proto/build.rs

@@ -1,21 +1,21 @@
-use tonic_prost_build::configure;
+use tonic_prost_build::configure;
-
+
-static PROTOBUF_DIR: &str = "../../../protobufs";
+static PROTOBUF_DIR: &str = "../../../protobufs";
-
+
-fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-    println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={PROTOBUF_DIR}");
+    println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={PROTOBUF_DIR}");
-
+
-    configure()
+    configure()
-        .message_attribute(".", "#[derive(::kameo::Reply)]")
+        .message_attribute(".", "#[derive(::kameo::Reply)]")
-        .compile_protos(
+        .compile_protos(
-            &[
+            &[
-                format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
+                format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
-                format!("{}/user_agent.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
+                format!("{}/operator.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
-                format!("{}/client.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
+                format!("{}/client.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
-                format!("{}/evm.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
+                format!("{}/evm.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
-            ],
+            ],
-            &[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()],
+            &[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()],
-        )
+        )
-        .unwrap();
+        .unwrap();
-    Ok(())
+    Ok(())
-}
+}

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,91 +1,84 @@
-pub mod transport;
+pub mod transport;
-pub mod url;
+pub mod url;
-
+
-use base64::{Engine, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
+pub mod proto {
-
+    tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");
-pub mod proto {
+
-    tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");
+    pub mod shared {
-
+        tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.shared");
-    pub mod shared {
+
-        tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.shared");
+        pub mod evm {
-
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.shared.evm");
-        pub mod evm {
+        }
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.shared.evm");
+    }
-        }
+
-    }
+    pub mod operator {
-
+        tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator");
-    pub mod user_agent {
+
-        tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent");
+        pub mod auth {
-
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.auth");
-        pub mod auth {
+        }
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.auth");
+
-        }
+        pub mod evm {
-
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.evm");
-        pub mod evm {
+        }
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.evm");
+
-        }
+        pub mod sdk_client {
-
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.sdk_client");
-        pub mod sdk_client {
+        }
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.sdk_client");
+
-        }
+        pub mod vault {
-
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault");
-        pub mod vault {
+
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault");
+            pub mod bootstrap {
-
+                tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap");
-            pub mod bootstrap {
+            }
-                tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault.bootstrap");
+
-            }
+            pub mod unseal {
-
+                tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.unseal");
-            pub mod unseal {
+            }
-                tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault.unseal");
+        }
-            }
+    }
-        }
+
-    }
+    pub mod client {
-
+        tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client");
-    pub mod client {
+
-        tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client");
+        pub mod auth {
-
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.auth");
-        pub mod auth {
+        }
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.auth");
+
-        }
+        pub mod evm {
-
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.evm");
-        pub mod evm {
+        }
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.evm");
+
-        }
+        pub mod vault {
-
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.vault");
-        pub mod vault {
+        }
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.vault");
+    }
-        }
+
-    }
+    pub mod evm {
-
+        tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.evm");
-    pub mod evm {
+    }
-        tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.evm");
+}
-    }
+
-}
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-
+pub struct ClientMetadata {
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+    pub name: String,
-pub struct ClientMetadata {
+    pub description: Option<String>,
-    pub name: String,
+    pub version: Option<String>,
-    pub description: Option<String>,
+}
-    pub version: Option<String>,
+
-}
+pub static BOOTSTRAP_PATH: &str = "bootstrap_token";
-
+
-pub static BOOTSTRAP_PATH: &str = "bootstrap_token";
+pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
-
+    static ARBITER_HOME: &str = ".arbiter";
-pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
+    let home_dir = std::env::home_dir().ok_or(std::io::Error::new(
-    static ARBITER_HOME: &str = ".arbiter";
+        std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
-    let home_dir = std::env::home_dir().ok_or(std::io::Error::new(
+        "can not get home directory",
-        std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
+    ))?;
-        "can not get home directory",
+
-    ))?;
+    let arbiter_home = home_dir.join(ARBITER_HOME);
-
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(&arbiter_home)?;
-    let arbiter_home = home_dir.join(ARBITER_HOME);
+
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(&arbiter_home)?;
+    Ok(arbiter_home)
-
+}
-    Ok(arbiter_home)
-}
-
-pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
-    concat_form.into_bytes()
-}

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/transport.rs

@@ -1,163 +1,218 @@
-//! Transport-facing abstractions shared by protocol/session code.
+//! Transport-facing abstractions shared by protocol/session code.
-//!
+//!
-//! This module defines a small set of transport traits that actors and other
+//! This module defines a small set of transport traits that actors and other
-//! protocol code can depend on without knowing anything about the concrete
+//! protocol code can depend on without knowing anything about the concrete
-//! transport underneath.
+//! transport underneath.
-//!
+//!
-//! The abstraction is split into:
+//! The abstraction is split into:
-//! - [`Sender`] for outbound delivery
+//! - [`Sender`] for outbound delivery
-//! - [`Receiver`] for inbound delivery
+//! - [`Receiver`] for inbound delivery
-//! - [`Bi`] as the combined duplex form (`Sender + Receiver`)
+//! - [`Bi`] as the combined duplex form (`Sender + Receiver`)
-//!
+//!
-//! This split lets code depend only on the half it actually needs. For
+//! This split lets code depend only on the half it actually needs. For
-//! example, some actor/session code only sends out-of-band messages, while
+//! example, some actor/session code only sends out-of-band messages, while
-//! auth/state-machine code may need full duplex access.
+//! auth/state-machine code may need full duplex access.
-//!
+//!
-//! [`Bi`] remains intentionally minimal and transport-agnostic:
+//! [`Bi`] remains intentionally minimal and transport-agnostic:
-//! - [`Receiver::recv`] yields inbound messages
+//! - [`Receiver::recv`] yields inbound messages
-//! - [`Sender::send`] accepts outbound messages
+//! - [`Sender::send`] accepts outbound messages
-//!
+//!
-//! Transport-specific adapters, including protobuf or gRPC bridges, live in the
+//! Transport-specific adapters, including protobuf or gRPC bridges, live in the
-//! crates that own those boundaries rather than in `arbiter-proto`.
+//! crates that own those boundaries rather than in `arbiter-proto`.
-//!
+//!
-//! [`Bi`] deliberately does not model request/response correlation. Some
+//! [`Bi`] deliberately does not model request/response correlation. Some
-//! transports may carry multiplexed request/response traffic, some may emit
+//! transports may carry multiplexed request/response traffic, some may emit
-//! out-of-band messages, and some may be one-message-at-a-time state machines.
+//! out-of-band messages, and some may be one-message-at-a-time state machines.
-//! Correlation concerns such as request IDs, pending response maps, and
+//! Correlation concerns such as request IDs, pending response maps, and
-//! out-of-band routing belong in the adapter or connection layer built on top
+//! out-of-band routing belong in the adapter or connection layer built on top
-//! of [`Bi`], not in this abstraction itself.
+//! of [`Bi`], not in this abstraction itself.
-//!
+//!
-//! # Generic Ordering Rule
+//! # Generic Ordering Rule
-//!
+//!
-//! This module consistently uses `Inbound` first and `Outbound` second in
+//! This module consistently uses `Inbound` first and `Outbound` second in
-//! generic parameter lists.
+//! generic parameter lists.
-//!
+//!
-//! For [`Receiver`], [`Sender`], and [`Bi`], this means:
+//! For [`Receiver`], [`Sender`], and [`Bi`], this means:
-//! - `Receiver<Inbound>`
+//! - `Receiver<Inbound>`
-//! - `Sender<Outbound>`
+//! - `Sender<Outbound>`
-//! - `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>`
+//! - `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>`
-//!
+//!
-//! Concretely, for [`Bi`]:
+//! Concretely, for [`Bi`]:
-//! - `recv() -> Option<Inbound>`
+//! - `recv() -> Option<Inbound>`
-//! - `send(Outbound)`
+//! - `send(Outbound)`
-//!
+//!
-//! [`expect_message`] is a small helper for linear protocol steps: it reads one
+//! [`expect_message`] is a small helper for linear protocol steps: it reads one
-//! inbound message from a transport and extracts a typed value from it, failing
+//! inbound message from a transport and extracts a typed value from it, failing
-//! if the channel closes or the message shape is not what the caller expected.
+//! if the channel closes or the message shape is not what the caller expected.
-//!
+//!
-//! [`DummyTransport`] is a no-op implementation useful for tests and local
+//! [`DummyTransport`] is a no-op implementation useful for tests and local
-//! actor execution where no real stream exists.
+//! actor execution where no real stream exists.
-//!
+//!
-//! # Design Notes
+//! # Design Notes
-//!
+//!
-//! - [`Bi::send`] returns [`Error`] only for transport delivery failures, such
+//! - [`Bi::send`] returns [`Error`] only for transport delivery failures, such
-//!   as a closed outbound channel.
+//!   as a closed outbound channel.
-//! - [`Bi::recv`] returns `None` when the underlying transport closes.
+//! - [`Bi::recv`] returns `None` when the underlying transport closes.
-//! - Message translation is intentionally out of scope for this module.
+//! - Message translation is intentionally out of scope for this module.
-
+use async_trait::async_trait;
-use std::marker::PhantomData;
+use kameo::{error::Infallible, prelude::*};
-
+use std::marker::PhantomData;
-use async_trait::async_trait;
+
-
+/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
-/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
-#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
+pub enum Error {
-pub enum Error {
+    #[error("Transport channel is closed")]
-    #[error("Transport channel is closed")]
+    ChannelClosed,
-    ChannelClosed,
+    #[error("Unexpected message received")]
-    #[error("Unexpected message received")]
+    UnexpectedMessage,
-    UnexpectedMessage,
+}
-}
+
-
+/// Receives one message from `transport` and extracts a value from it using
-/// Receives one message from `transport` and extracts a value from it using
+/// `extractor`. Returns [`Error::ChannelClosed`] if the transport closes and
-/// `extractor`. Returns [`Error::ChannelClosed`] if the transport closes and
+/// [`Error::UnexpectedMessage`] if `extractor` returns `None`.
-/// [`Error::UnexpectedMessage`] if `extractor` returns `None`.
+pub async fn expect_message<T, Inbound, Outbound, Target, F>(
-pub async fn expect_message<T, Inbound, Outbound, Target, F>(
+    transport: &mut T,
-    transport: &mut T,
+    extractor: F,
-    extractor: F,
+) -> Result<Target, Error>
-) -> Result<Target, Error>
+where
-where
+    T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
-    T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
+    F: FnOnce(Inbound) -> Option<Target>,
-    F: FnOnce(Inbound) -> Option<Target>,
+{
-{
+    let msg = transport.recv().await.ok_or(Error::ChannelClosed)?;
-    let msg = transport.recv().await.ok_or(Error::ChannelClosed)?;
+    extractor(msg).ok_or(Error::UnexpectedMessage)
-    extractor(msg).ok_or(Error::UnexpectedMessage)
+}
-}
+
-
+#[async_trait]
-#[async_trait]
+pub trait Sender<Outbound>: Send + Sync {
-pub trait Sender<Outbound>: Send + Sync {
+    async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error>;
-    async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error>;
+}
-}
+
-
+#[async_trait]
-#[async_trait]
+pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync {
-pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync {
+    async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound>;
-    async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound>;
+}
-}
+
-
+/// Minimal bidirectional transport abstraction used by protocol code.
-/// Minimal bidirectional transport abstraction used by protocol code.
+///
-///
+/// `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>` is the combined duplex form of [`Sender`] and
-/// `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>` is the combined duplex form of [`Sender`] and
+/// [`Receiver`].
-/// [`Receiver`].
+///
-///
+/// It models a channel with:
-/// It models a channel with:
+/// - inbound items of type `Inbound` read via [`Bi::recv`]
-/// - inbound items of type `Inbound` read via [`Bi::recv`]
+/// - outbound items of type `Outbound` written via [`Bi::send`]
-/// - outbound items of type `Outbound` written via [`Bi::send`]
+///
-///
+/// It does not imply request/response sequencing, one-at-a-time exchange, or
-/// It does not imply request/response sequencing, one-at-a-time exchange, or
+/// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items.
-/// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items.
+pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
-pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
+
-
+#[async_trait]
-pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> {
+impl<T, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for &mut T
-    type Sender: Sender<Outbound>;
+where
-    type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>;
+    T: Sender<Outbound> + ?Sized,
-
+    Outbound: Send + 'static,
-    fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver);
+{
-    fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self;
+    async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
-}
+        (**self).send(item).await
-
+    }
-/// No-op [`Bi`] transport for tests and manual actor usage.
+}
-///
+
-/// `send` drops all items and succeeds. [`Bi::recv`] never resolves and therefore
+#[async_trait]
-/// does not busy-wait or spuriously close the stream.
+impl<T, Inbound> Receiver<Inbound> for &mut T
-pub struct DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
+where
-    _marker: PhantomData<(Inbound, Outbound)>,
+    T: Receiver<Inbound> + ?Sized,
-}
+    Inbound: Send + 'static,
-
+{
-impl<Inbound, Outbound> Default for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
+    async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
-    fn default() -> Self {
+        (**self).recv().await
-        Self {
+    }
-            _marker: PhantomData,
+}
-        }
+
-    }
+impl<T, Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for &mut T
-}
+where
-
+    T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
-#[async_trait]
+    Inbound: Send + 'static,
-impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
+    Outbound: Send + 'static,
-where
+{
-    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+}
-    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+
-{
+pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> {
-    async fn send(&mut self, _item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    type Sender: Sender<Outbound>;
-        Ok(())
+    type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>;
-    }
+
-}
+    fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver);
-
+    fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self;
-#[async_trait]
+}
-impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Inbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
+
-where
+/// No-op [`Bi`] transport for tests and manual actor usage.
-    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+///
-    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+/// `send` drops all items and succeeds. [`Bi::recv`] never resolves and therefore
-{
+/// does not busy-wait or spuriously close the stream.
-    async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
+pub struct DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
-        std::future::pending::<()>().await;
+    _marker: PhantomData<(Inbound, Outbound)>,
-        None
+}
-    }
+
-}
+impl<Inbound, Outbound> Default for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
-
+    fn default() -> Self {
-impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
+        Self {
-where
+            _marker: PhantomData,
-    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+        }
-    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    }
-{
+}
-}
+
-
+#[async_trait]
-pub mod grpc;
+impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
+where
+    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+{
+    async fn send(&mut self, _item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Inbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
+where
+    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+{
+    async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
+        std::future::pending::<()>().await;
+        None
+    }
+}
+
+impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
+where
+    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+{
+}
+
+pub mod grpc;
+
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
+pub enum ForwardError<I> {
+    #[error("Transport error: {0}")]
+    Transport(#[from] Error),
+    #[error("Actor delivery error: {0}")]
+    Actor(SendError<I>),
+}
+
+pub async fn forward_to_actor<Transport, Inbound, Outbound, Handler>(
+    transport: &mut Transport,
+    actor: &ActorRef<Handler>,
+) -> Result<(), ForwardError<Inbound>>
+where
+    Transport: Bi<Inbound, <Outbound as Reply>::Ok>,
+    Handler: Actor + Message<Inbound, Reply = Outbound>,
+    Inbound: Send + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + 'static + Reply<Error = Infallible>, // `Infallible` to enforce contract that `Outbound` carries handler-level error
+{
+    while let Some(request) = transport.recv().await {
+        let resp = actor.ask(request).await.map_err(ForwardError::Actor)?;
+        transport.send(resp).await?
+    }
+
+    Err(Error::ChannelClosed.into())
+}

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/transport/grpc.rs

@@ -1,106 +1,106 @@
-use async_trait::async_trait;
+use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
-use futures::StreamExt;
+
-use tokio::sync::mpsc;
+use async_trait::async_trait;
-use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
+use futures::StreamExt;
-
+use tokio::sync::mpsc;
-use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
+use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
-
+
-pub struct GrpcSender<Outbound> {
+pub struct GrpcSender<Outbound> {
-    tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
+    tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
-}
+}
-
+
-#[async_trait]
+#[async_trait]
-impl<Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcSender<Outbound>
+impl<Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcSender<Outbound>
-where
+where
-    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-{
+{
-    async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> {
+    async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> {
-        self.tx
+        self.tx
-            .send(item)
+            .send(item)
-            .await
+            .await
-            .map_err(|_| super::Error::ChannelClosed)
+            .map_err(|_| super::Error::ChannelClosed)
-    }
+    }
-}
+}
-
+
-pub struct GrpcReceiver<Inbound> {
+pub struct GrpcReceiver<Inbound> {
-    rx: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
+    rx: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
-}
+}
-#[async_trait]
+#[async_trait]
-impl<Inbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcReceiver<Inbound>
+impl<Inbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcReceiver<Inbound>
-where
+where
-    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-{
+{
-    async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> {
+    async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> {
-        self.rx.next().await
+        self.rx.next().await
-    }
+    }
-}
+}
-
+
-pub struct GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> {
+pub struct GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> {
-    sender: GrpcSender<Outbound>,
+    sender: GrpcSender<Outbound>,
-    receiver: GrpcReceiver<Inbound>,
+    receiver: GrpcReceiver<Inbound>,
-}
+}
-
+
-impl<Inbound, Outbound> GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
+impl<Inbound, Outbound> GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
-where
+where
-    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-{
+{
-    pub fn from_bi_stream(
+    pub fn from_bi_stream(
-        receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
+        receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
-    ) -> (Self, ReceiverStream<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>) {
+    ) -> (Self, ReceiverStream<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>) {
-        let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(10);
+        let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(10);
-        let sender = GrpcSender { tx };
+        let sender = GrpcSender { tx };
-        let receiver = GrpcReceiver { rx: receiver };
+        let receiver = GrpcReceiver { rx: receiver };
-        let bi = GrpcBi { sender, receiver };
+        let bi = GrpcBi { sender, receiver };
-        (bi, ReceiverStream::new(rx))
+        (bi, ReceiverStream::new(rx))
-    }
+    }
-}
+}
-
+
-#[async_trait]
+#[async_trait]
-impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
+impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
-where
+where
-    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-{
+{
-    async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> {
+    async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> {
-        self.sender.send(item).await
+        self.sender.send(item).await
-    }
+    }
-}
+}
-
+
-#[async_trait]
+#[async_trait]
-impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
+impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
-where
+where
-    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-{
+{
-    async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> {
+    async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> {
-        self.receiver.recv().await
+        self.receiver.recv().await
-    }
+    }
-}
+}
-
+
-impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>
+impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>
-    for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
+    for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
-where
+where
-    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-{
+{
-}
+}
-
+
-impl<Inbound, Outbound>
+impl<Inbound, Outbound>
-    super::SplittableBi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>
+    super::SplittableBi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>
-    for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
+    for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
-where
+where
-    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
-{
+{
-    type Sender = GrpcSender<Outbound>;
+    type Sender = GrpcSender<Outbound>;
-    type Receiver = GrpcReceiver<Inbound>;
+    type Receiver = GrpcReceiver<Inbound>;
-
+
-    fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver) {
+    fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver) {
-        (self.sender, self.receiver)
+        (self.sender, self.receiver)
-    }
+    }
-
+
-    fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self {
+    fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self {
-        GrpcBi { sender, receiver }
+        GrpcBi { sender, receiver }
-    }
+    }
-}
+}

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/url.rs

@@ -1,129 +1,128 @@
-use std::fmt::Display;
+use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_URL_SAFE};
-
+use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
-use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_URL_SAFE};
+use std::fmt::Display;
-use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
+
-
+const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter";
-const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter";
+const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert";
-const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert";
+const BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY: &str = "bootstrap_token";
-const BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY: &str = "bootstrap_token";
+
-
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ArbiterUrl {
-pub struct ArbiterUrl {
+    pub host: String,
-    pub host: String,
+    pub port: u16,
-    pub port: u16,
+    pub ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
-    pub ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
+    pub bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
-    pub bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
+}
-}
+
-
+impl Display for ArbiterUrl {
-impl Display for ArbiterUrl {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        let mut base = format!(
-        let mut base = format!(
+            "{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://{}:{}?{CERT_QUERY_KEY}={}",
-            "{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://{}:{}?{CERT_QUERY_KEY}={}",
+            self.host,
-            self.host,
+            self.port,
-            self.port,
+            BASE64_URL_SAFE.encode(&self.ca_cert)
-            BASE64_URL_SAFE.encode(&self.ca_cert)
+        );
-        );
+        if let Some(token) = &self.bootstrap_token {
-        if let Some(token) = &self.bootstrap_token {
+            base.push_str(&format!("&{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY}={}", token));
-            base.push_str(&format!("&{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY}={}", token));
+        }
-        }
+        f.write_str(&base)
-        f.write_str(&base)
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
-
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
+pub enum Error {
-pub enum Error {
+    #[error("Invalid URL scheme, expected '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")]
-    #[error("Invalid URL scheme, expected '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")]
+    #[diagnostic(
-    #[diagnostic(
+        code(arbiter::url::invalid_scheme),
-        code(arbiter::url::invalid_scheme),
+        help("The URL must start with '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")
-        help("The URL must start with '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")
+    )]
-    )]
+    InvalidScheme,
-    InvalidScheme,
+    #[error("Missing host in URL")]
-    #[error("Missing host in URL")]
+    #[diagnostic(
-    #[diagnostic(
+        code(arbiter::url::missing_host),
-        code(arbiter::url::missing_host),
+        help("The URL must include a host, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:<port>'")
-        help("The URL must include a host, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:<port>'")
+    )]
-    )]
+    MissingHost,
-    MissingHost,
+    #[error("Missing port in URL")]
-    #[error("Missing port in URL")]
+    #[diagnostic(
-    #[diagnostic(
+        code(arbiter::url::missing_port),
-        code(arbiter::url::missing_port),
+        help("The URL must include a port, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:1234'")
-        help("The URL must include a port, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:1234'")
+    )]
-    )]
+    MissingPort,
-    MissingPort,
+    #[error("Missing 'cert' query parameter in URL")]
-    #[error("Missing 'cert' query parameter in URL")]
+    #[diagnostic(
-    #[diagnostic(
+        code(arbiter::url::missing_cert),
-        code(arbiter::url::missing_cert),
+        help("The URL must include a 'cert' query parameter")
-        help("The URL must include a 'cert' query parameter")
+    )]
-    )]
+    MissingCert,
-    MissingCert,
+    #[error("Invalid base64 in 'cert' query parameter: {0}")]
-    #[error("Invalid base64 in 'cert' query parameter: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::url::invalid_cert_base64))]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::url::invalid_cert_base64))]
+    InvalidCertBase64(#[from] base64::DecodeError),
-    InvalidCertBase64(#[from] base64::DecodeError),
+}
-}
+
-
+impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a str> for ArbiterUrl {
-impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a str> for ArbiterUrl {
+    type Error = Error;
-    type Error = Error;
+
-
+    fn try_from(value: &'a str) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-    fn try_from(value: &'a str) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        let url = url::Url::parse(value).map_err(|_| Error::InvalidScheme)?;
-        let url = url::Url::parse(value).map_err(|_| Error::InvalidScheme)?;
+
-
+        if url.scheme() != ARBITER_URL_SCHEME {
-        if url.scheme() != ARBITER_URL_SCHEME {
+            return Err(Error::InvalidScheme);
-            return Err(Error::InvalidScheme);
+        }
-        }
+
-
+        let host = url.host_str().ok_or(Error::MissingHost)?.to_string();
-        let host = url.host_str().ok_or(Error::MissingHost)?.to_string();
+        let port = url.port().ok_or(Error::MissingPort)?;
-        let port = url.port().ok_or(Error::MissingPort)?;
+        let cert_str = url
-        let cert_str = url
+            .query_pairs()
-            .query_pairs()
+            .find(|(k, _)| k == CERT_QUERY_KEY)
-            .find(|(k, _)| k == CERT_QUERY_KEY)
+            .ok_or(Error::MissingCert)?
-            .ok_or(Error::MissingCert)?
+            .1;
-            .1;
+
-
+        let cert = BASE64_URL_SAFE.decode(cert_str.as_ref())?;
-        let cert = BASE64_URL_SAFE.decode(cert_str.as_ref())?;
+        let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&cert).into_owned();
-        let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&cert).into_owned();
+
-
+        let bootstrap_token = url
-        let bootstrap_token = url
+            .query_pairs()
-            .query_pairs()
+            .find(|(k, _)| k == BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY)
-            .find(|(k, _)| k == BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY)
+            .map(|(_, v)| v.to_string());
-            .map(|(_, v)| v.to_string());
+
-
+        Ok(ArbiterUrl {
-        Ok(ArbiterUrl {
+            host,
-            host,
+            port,
-            port,
+            ca_cert: cert,
-            ca_cert: cert,
+            bootstrap_token,
-            bootstrap_token,
+        })
-        })
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
-
+#[cfg(test)]
-#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
-mod tests {
+    use rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed;
-    use rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed;
+    use rstest::rstest;
-    use rstest::rstest;
+
-
+    use super::*;
-    use super::*;
+
-
+    #[rstest]
-    #[rstest]
+
-
+    fn parsing_correctness(
-    fn test_parsing_correctness(
+        #[values("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "192.168.1.1", "some.domain.com")] host: &str,
-        #[values("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "192.168.1.1", "some.domain.com")] host: &str,
+
-
+        #[values(None, Some("token123".to_string()))] bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
-        #[values(None, Some("token123".to_string()))] bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
+    ) {
-    ) {
+        let cert = generate_simple_self_signed(&["Arbiter CA".into()]).unwrap();
-        let cert = generate_simple_self_signed(&["Arbiter CA".into()]).unwrap();
+        let cert = cert.cert.der();
-        let cert = cert.cert.der();
+
-
+        let url = ArbiterUrl {
-        let url = ArbiterUrl {
+            host: host.to_string(),
-            host: host.to_string(),
+            port: 1234,
-            port: 1234,
+            ca_cert: cert.clone().into_owned(),
-            ca_cert: cert.clone().into_owned(),
+            bootstrap_token,
-            bootstrap_token,
+        };
-        };
+        let url_str = url.to_string();
-        let url_str = url.to_string();
+        let parsed_url = ArbiterUrl::try_from(url_str.as_str()).unwrap();
-        let parsed_url = ArbiterUrl::try_from(url_str.as_str()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(url.host, parsed_url.host);
-        assert_eq!(url.host, parsed_url.host);
+        assert_eq!(url.port, parsed_url.port);
-        assert_eq!(url.port, parsed_url.port);
+        assert_eq!(url.ca_cert.to_vec(), parsed_url.ca_cert.to_vec());
-        assert_eq!(url.ca_cert.to_vec(), parsed_url.ca_cert.to_vec());
+        assert_eq!(url.bootstrap_token, parsed_url.bootstrap_token);
-        assert_eq!(url.bootstrap_token, parsed_url.bootstrap_token);
+    }
-    }
+}
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,71 +1,61 @@
-[package]
+[package]
-name = "arbiter-server"
+name = "arbiter-server"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2024"
+edition = "2024"
-repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
+repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
-license = "Apache-2.0"
+license = "Apache-2.0"
-
+
-[lints]
+[lints]
-workspace = true
+workspace = true
-
+
-[dependencies]
+[dependencies]
-diesel = { version = "2.3.7", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
+diesel = { version = "2.3.9", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
-diesel-async = { version = "0.8.0", features = [
+diesel-async = { version = "0.9.0", features = [
-    "bb8",
+    "bb8",
-    "migrations",
+    "migrations",
-    "sqlite",
+    "sqlite",
-    "tokio",
+    "tokio",
-] }
+] }
-ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
+arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
-ed25519-dalek.features = ["serde"]
+arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
-arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
+arbiter-macros.path = "../arbiter-macros"
-tracing.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
-tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
+tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
-tonic.workspace = true
+tonic.workspace = true
-tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
+tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
-tokio.workspace = true
+tokio.workspace = true
-rustls.workspace = true
+rustls.workspace = true
-smlang.workspace = true
+smlang.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
-fatality = "0.1.1"
+diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.2", features = ["sqlite"] }
-diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.1", features = ["sqlite"] }
+async-trait.workspace = true
-async-trait.workspace = true
+tokio-stream.workspace = true
-secrecy = "0.10.3"
+rand.workspace = true
-futures.workspace = true
+rcgen.workspace = true
-tokio-stream.workspace = true
+chrono.workspace = true
-dashmap = "6.1.0"
+kameo.workspace = true
-rand.workspace = true
+chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
-rcgen.workspace = true
+argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
-chrono.workspace = true
+restructed = "0.2.2"
-memsafe = "0.4.0"
+strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
-zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
+pem = "3.0.6"
-kameo.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
-x25519-dalek.workspace = true
+hmac.workspace = true
-chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
+alloy.workspace = true
-argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
+prost-types.workspace = true
-restructed = "0.2.2"
+arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
-strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
+anyhow = "1.0.102"
-pem = "3.0.6"
+mutants.workspace = true
-k256.workspace = true
+subtle = "2.6.1"
-k256.features = ["serde"]
+x25519-dalek.workspace = true
-rsa.workspace = true
+k256.workspace = true
-rsa.features = ["serde"]
+kameo_actors.workspace = true
-sha2.workspace = true
+
-hmac = "0.12"
+[dev-dependencies]
-spki.workspace = true
+proptest = "1.11.0"
-alloy.workspace = true
+rstest.workspace = true
-prost-types.workspace = true
+test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }
-prost.workspace = true
+ml-dsa.workspace = true
-arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
+
-anyhow = "1.0.102"
+[lib]
-serde_with = "3.18.0"
+doctest = false
-mutants.workspace = true
-subtle = "2.6.1"
-macro_rules_attribute = "0.2.2"
-paste = "1.0.15"
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-insta = "1.46.3"
-proptest = "1.11.0"
-rstest.workspace = true
-test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }

server/crates/arbiter-server/diesel.toml

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-# For documentation on how to configure this file,
+# For documentation on how to configure this file,
-# see https://diesel.rs/guides/configuring-diesel-cli
+# see https://diesel.rs/guides/configuring-diesel-cli
-
+
-[print_schema]
+[print_schema]
-file = "src/db/schema.rs"
+file = "src/db/schema.rs"
-custom_type_derives = ["diesel::query_builder::QueryId", "Clone"]
+custom_type_derives = ["diesel::query_builder::QueryId", "Clone"]
-
+
-[migrations_directory]
+[migrations_directory]
-dir = "migrations"
+dir = "migrations"

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-14-171124-0000_init/down.sql

@@ -1 +1 @@
--- This file should undo anything in `up.sql`
+-- This file should undo anything in `up.sql`

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-14-171124-0000_init/up.sql

@@ -1,209 +1,206 @@
-create table if not exists root_key_history (
+create table if not exists root_key_history (
-    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
+    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
-    -- root key stored as aead encrypted artifact, with only difference that it's decrypted by unseal key (derived from user password)
+    -- root key stored as aead encrypted artifact, with only difference that it's decrypted by unseal key (derived from user password)
-    root_key_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented. Used for encrypting root key
+    root_key_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented. Used for encrypting root key
-    data_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- nonce used for encrypting with key itself
+    data_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- nonce used for encrypting with key itself
-    ciphertext blob not null,
+    ciphertext blob not null,
-    tag blob not null,
+    tag blob not null,
-    schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
+    schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
-    salt blob not null -- for key deriviation 
+    salt blob not null -- for key deriviation 
-) STRICT;
+) STRICT;
-
+
-create table if not exists aead_encrypted (
+create table if not exists aead_encrypted (
-    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
+    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
-    current_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
+    current_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
-    ciphertext blob not null,
+    ciphertext blob not null,
-    tag blob not null,
+    tag blob not null,
-    schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
+    schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
-    associated_root_key_id integer not null references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT,
+    associated_root_key_id integer not null references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT,
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-) STRICT;
+) STRICT;
-
+
-create unique index if not exists uniq_nonce_per_root_key on aead_encrypted (
+create unique index if not exists uniq_nonce_per_root_key on aead_encrypted (
-    current_nonce,
+    current_nonce,
-    associated_root_key_id
+    associated_root_key_id
-);
+);
-
+
-create table if not exists tls_history (
+create table if not exists tls_history (
-    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
+    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
-    cert text not null,
+    cert text not null,
-    cert_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
+    cert_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
-    ca_cert text not null,
+    ca_cert text not null,
-    ca_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
+    ca_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-) STRICT;
+) STRICT;
-
+
--- This is a singleton
+-- This is a singleton
-create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
+create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
-    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1
+    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1
-    root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
+    root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
-    tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT
+    tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT
-) STRICT;
+) STRICT;
-
+
-insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
+insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
--- ensure singleton row exists
+-- ensure singleton row exists
-
+
-create table if not exists useragent_client (
+create table if not exists operator_client (
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    id integer not null primary key,
-    nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
+    public_key blob not null,
-    public_key blob not null,
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
-    key_type integer not null default(1), -- 1=Ed25519, 2=ECDSA(secp256k1)
+    updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
+) STRICT;
-    updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+create unique index if not exists uniq_operator_client_public_key on operator_client (public_key);
-) STRICT;
+
-create unique index if not exists uniq_useragent_client_public_key on useragent_client (public_key, key_type);
+create table if not exists client_metadata (
-
+    id integer not null primary key,
-create table if not exists client_metadata (
+    name text not null, -- human-readable name for the client
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    description text, -- optional description for the client
-    name text not null, -- human-readable name for the client
+    version text, -- client version for tracking and debugging
-    description text, -- optional description for the client
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-    version text, -- client version for tracking and debugging
+) STRICT;
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+
-) STRICT;
+-- created to track history of changes
-
+create table if not exists client_metadata_history (
--- created to track history of changes
+    id integer not null primary key,
-create table if not exists client_metadata_history (
+    metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
-    metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-    client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
+) STRICT;
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+
-) STRICT;
+create unique index if not exists uniq_metadata_binding_client on client_metadata_history (client_id);
-
+
-create unique index if not exists uniq_metadata_binding_client on client_metadata_history (client_id);
+create table if not exists program_client (
-
+    id integer not null primary key,
-create table if not exists program_client (
+    public_key blob not null,
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
-    nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
-    public_key blob not null,
+    updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-    metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
+) STRICT;
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
+
-    updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+create unique index if not exists program_client_public_key_unique
-) STRICT;
+    on program_client (public_key);
-
+
-create unique index if not exists program_client_public_key_unique
+create unique index if not exists uniq_program_client_public_key on program_client (public_key);
-    on program_client (public_key);
+
-
+create table if not exists evm_wallet (
-create unique index if not exists uniq_program_client_public_key on program_client (public_key);
+    id integer not null primary key,
-
+    address blob not null, -- 20-byte Ethereum address
-create table if not exists evm_wallet (
+    aead_encrypted_id integer not null references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT,
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-    address blob not null, -- 20-byte Ethereum address
+) STRICT;
-    aead_encrypted_id integer not null references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT,
+
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_address on evm_wallet (address);
-) STRICT;
+
-
+create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_aead on evm_wallet (aead_encrypted_id);
-create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_address on evm_wallet (address);
+
-
+create table if not exists evm_wallet_access (
-create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_aead on evm_wallet (aead_encrypted_id);
+    id integer not null primary key,
-
+    wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet (id) on delete cascade,
-create table if not exists evm_wallet_access (
+    client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-    wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet (id) on delete cascade,
+) STRICT;
-    client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
+
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+create unique index if not exists uniq_wallet_access on evm_wallet_access (wallet_id, client_id);
-) STRICT;
+
-
+create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_limit (
-create unique index if not exists uniq_wallet_access on evm_wallet_access (wallet_id, client_id);
+    id integer not null primary key,
-
+    window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
-create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_limit (
+    max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
-    id integer not null primary key,
+) STRICT;
-    window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
+
-    max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
+-- Shared grant properties: client scope, timeframe, fee caps, and rate limit
-) STRICT;
+create table if not exists evm_basic_grant (
-
+    id integer not null primary key,
--- Shared grant properties: client scope, timeframe, fee caps, and rate limit
+    wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
-create table if not exists evm_basic_grant (
+    chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    valid_from integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no lower bound
-    wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
+    valid_until integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no upper bound
-    chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
+    max_gas_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
-    valid_from integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no lower bound
+    max_priority_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
-    valid_until integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no upper bound
+    rate_limit_count integer, -- max transactions in window, null = unlimited
-    max_gas_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
+    rate_limit_window_secs integer, -- window duration in seconds, null = unlimited
-    max_priority_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
+    revoked_at integer, -- unix timestamp when revoked, null = still active
-    rate_limit_count integer, -- max transactions in window, null = unlimited
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-    rate_limit_window_secs integer, -- window duration in seconds, null = unlimited
+) STRICT;
-    revoked_at integer, -- unix timestamp when revoked, null = still active
+
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+-- Shared transaction log for all EVM grants, used for rate limit tracking and auditing
-) STRICT;
+create table if not exists evm_transaction_log (
-
+    id integer not null primary key,
--- Shared transaction log for all EVM grants, used for rate limit tracking and auditing
+    wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
-create table if not exists evm_transaction_log (
+    grant_id integer not null references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete restrict,
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    chain_id integer not null,
-    wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
+    eth_value blob not null, -- always present on any EVM tx
-    grant_id integer not null references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete restrict,
+    signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-    chain_id integer not null,
+) STRICT;
-    eth_value blob not null, -- always present on any EVM tx
+
-    signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+create index if not exists idx_evm_basic_grant_access_chain on evm_basic_grant (wallet_access_id, chain_id);
-) STRICT;
+
-
+-- ===============================
-create index if not exists idx_evm_basic_grant_access_chain on evm_basic_grant (wallet_access_id, chain_id);
+-- ERC20 token transfer grant
-
+-- ===============================
--- ===============================
+create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_grant (
--- ERC20 token transfer grant
+    id integer not null primary key,
--- ===============================
+    basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete cascade,
-create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_grant (
+    token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    receiver blob -- 20-byte recipient address or null if every recipient allowed
-    basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete cascade,
+) STRICT;
-    token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
+
-    receiver blob -- 20-byte recipient address or null if every recipient allowed
+-- Per-window volume limits for token transfer grants
-) STRICT;
+create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (
-
+    id integer not null primary key,
--- Per-window volume limits for token transfer grants
+    grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant (id) on delete cascade,
-create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (
+    window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
-    grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant (id) on delete cascade,
+) STRICT;
-    window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
+
-    max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
+-- Log table for token transfer grant usage
-) STRICT;
+create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_log (
-
+    id integer not null primary key,
--- Log table for token transfer grant usage
+    grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant (id) on delete restrict,
-create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_log (
+    log_id integer not null references evm_transaction_log (id) on delete restrict,
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
-    grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant (id) on delete restrict,
+    token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
-    log_id integer not null references evm_transaction_log (id) on delete restrict,
+    recipient_address blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
-    chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
+    value blob not null, -- big-endian 32-byte U256
-    token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-    recipient_address blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
+) STRICT;
-    value blob not null, -- big-endian 32-byte U256
+
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_grant on evm_token_transfer_log (grant_id);
-) STRICT;
+
-
+create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_log_id on evm_token_transfer_log (log_id);
-create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_grant on evm_token_transfer_log (grant_id);
+
-
+create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_chain on evm_token_transfer_log (chain_id);
-create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_log_id on evm_token_transfer_log (log_id);
+
-
+-- ===============================
-create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_chain on evm_token_transfer_log (chain_id);
+-- Ether transfer grant (uses base log)
-
+-- ===============================
--- ===============================
+create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant (
--- Ether transfer grant (uses base log)
+    id integer not null primary key,
--- ===============================
+    basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete cascade,
-create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant (
+    limit_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_limit (id) on delete restrict
-    id integer not null primary key,
+) STRICT;
-    basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete cascade,
+
-    limit_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_limit (id) on delete restrict
+-- Specific recipient addresses for an ether transfer grant
-) STRICT;
+create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (
-
+    id integer not null primary key,
--- Specific recipient addresses for an ether transfer grant
+    grant_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_grant (id) on delete cascade,
-create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (
+    address blob not null -- 20-byte recipient address
-    id integer not null primary key,
+) STRICT;
-    grant_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_grant (id) on delete cascade,
+
-    address blob not null -- 20-byte recipient address
+create unique index if not exists uniq_ether_transfer_target on evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (grant_id, address);
-) STRICT;
+
-
+-- ===============================
-create unique index if not exists uniq_ether_transfer_target on evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (grant_id, address);
+-- Integrity Envelopes
-
+-- ===============================
--- ===============================
+create table if not exists integrity_envelope (
--- Integrity Envelopes
+    id integer not null primary key,
--- ===============================
+    entity_kind text not null,
-create table if not exists integrity_envelope (
+    entity_id blob not null,
-    id integer not null primary key,
+    payload_version integer not null,
-    entity_kind text not null,
+    key_version integer not null,
-    entity_id blob not null,
+    mac blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
-    payload_version integer not null,
+    signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
-    key_version integer not null,
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-    mac blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
+) STRICT;
-    signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
+
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+create unique index if not exists uniq_integrity_envelope_entity on integrity_envelope (entity_kind, entity_id);
-) STRICT;
-
-create unique index if not exists uniq_integrity_envelope_entity on integrity_envelope (entity_kind, entity_id);

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/bootstrap.rs

@@ -1,101 +1,98 @@
-use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
+use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
-use diesel::QueryDsl;
+use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+
-use kameo::{Actor, messages};
+use diesel::QueryDsl;
-
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
+use kameo::{Actor, messages};
-use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
+use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
-use thiserror::Error;
+use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
-
+use thiserror::Error;
-use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
+
-const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
+const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
-
+
-pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
+pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
-    let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
+    let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
-
+
-    let token: String = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
+    let token = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
-        Default::default(),
+        String::default(),
-        |mut accum, char| {
+        |mut accum, char| {
-            accum += char.to_string().as_str();
+            accum += char.to_string().as_str();
-            accum
+            accum
-        },
+        },
-    );
+    );
-
+
-    tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
+    tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
-
+
-    Ok(token)
+    Ok(token)
-}
+}
-
+
-#[derive(Error, Debug)]
+#[derive(Error, Debug)]
-pub enum Error {
+pub enum Error {
-    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
+    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
-    Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
+    Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
-
+
-    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
+    #[error("I/O error: {0}")]
-    Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
-
+
-    #[error("I/O error: {0}")]
+    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
-    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
+    Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-}
+}
-
+
-#[derive(Actor)]
+#[derive(Actor)]
-pub struct Bootstrapper {
+pub struct Bootstrapper {
-    token: Option<String>,
+    token: Option<String>,
-}
+}
-
+
-impl Bootstrapper {
+impl Bootstrapper {
-    pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
+    pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
-        let row_count: i64 = {
+        let row_count: i64 = {
-            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
+            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-
+
-            schema::useragent_client::table
+            schema::operator_client::table
-                .count()
+                .count()
-                .get_result(&mut conn)
+                .get_result(&mut conn)
-                .await?
+                .await?
-        };
+        };
-
+
-        let token = if row_count == 0 {
+        let token = if row_count == 0 {
-            let token = generate_token().await?;
+            let token = generate_token().await?;
-            Some(token)
+            Some(token)
-        } else {
+        } else {
-            None
+            None
-        };
+        };
-
+
-        Ok(Self { token })
+        Ok(Self { token })
-    }
+    }
-}
+}
-
+
-#[messages]
+#[messages]
-impl Bootstrapper {
+impl Bootstrapper {
-    #[message]
+    #[message]
-    pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
+    pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
-        match &self.token {
+        self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| {
-            Some(expected) => {
+            let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
-                let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
+            let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
-                let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
+
-
+            let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
-                let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
+            bool::from(choice)
-                bool::from(choice)
+        })
-            }
+    }
-            None => false,
+
-        }
+    #[message]
-    }
+    pub fn consume_token(&mut self, token: String) -> bool {
-
+        if self.is_correct_token(token) {
-    #[message]
+            self.token = None;
-    pub fn consume_token(&mut self, token: String) -> bool {
+            true
-        if self.is_correct_token(token) {
+        } else {
-            self.token = None;
+            false
-            true
+        }
-        } else {
+    }
-            false
+}
-        }
+
-    }
+#[messages]
-}
+impl Bootstrapper {
-
+    #[message]
-#[messages]
+    pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
-impl Bootstrapper {
+        self.token.clone()
-    #[message]
+    }
-    pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
+}
-        self.token.clone()
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/auth.rs

@@ -1,400 +0,0 @@
-use arbiter_proto::{
-    ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
-    transport::{Bi, expect_message},
-};
-use chrono::Utc;
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
-    dsl::insert_into, update,
-};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
-use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
-use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
-use tracing::error;
-
-use crate::{
-    actors::{
-        client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, ClientProfile},
-        flow_coordinator::{self, RequestClientApproval},
-        keyholder::KeyHolder,
-    },
-    crypto::integrity::{self, Verified, verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor},
-    db::{
-        self,
-        models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
-        schema::program_client,
-    },
-};
-
-#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum Error {
-    #[error("Database pool unavailable")]
-    DatabasePoolUnavailable,
-    #[error("Database operation failed")]
-    DatabaseOperationFailed,
-    #[error("Integrity check failed")]
-    IntegrityCheckFailed,
-    #[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
-    InvalidChallengeSolution,
-    #[error("Client approval request failed")]
-    ApproveError(#[from] ApproveError),
-    #[error("Transport error")]
-    Transport,
-}
-
-impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
-    fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
-        error!(?e, "Database error");
-        Self::DatabaseOperationFailed
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum ApproveError {
-    #[error("Internal error")]
-    Internal,
-    #[error("Client connection denied by user agents")]
-    Denied,
-    #[error("Upstream error: {0}")]
-    Upstream(flow_coordinator::ApprovalError),
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub enum Inbound {
-    AuthChallengeRequest {
-        pubkey: VerifyingKey,
-        metadata: ClientMetadata,
-    },
-    AuthChallengeSolution {
-        signature: Signature,
-    },
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub enum Outbound {
-    AuthChallenge { pubkey: VerifyingKey, nonce: i32 },
-    AuthSuccess,
-}
-
-/// Returns the current nonce and client ID for a registered client.
-/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
-async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
-    db: &db::DatabasePool,
-    pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
-) -> Result<Option<(i32, i32)>, Error> {
-    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
-    })?;
-    program_client::table
-        .filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
-        .select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
-        .first::<(i32, i32)>(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .optional()
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
-            Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-        })
-}
-
-/// Atomically increments the nonce and re-signs the integrity envelope.
-/// Returns the new nonce, which is used as the challenge nonce.
-async fn create_nonce(
-    db: &db::DatabasePool,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
-) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
-
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
-    })?;
-
-    conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
-        let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
-        Box::pin(async move {
-            let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(program_client::table)
-                .filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
-                .set(program_client::nonce.eq(program_client::nonce + 1))
-                .returning((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
-                .get_result(conn)
-                .await?;
-
-            integrity::sign_entity(
-                conn,
-                &keyholder,
-                &ClientCredentials {
-                    pubkey: *pubkey,
-                    nonce: new_nonce,
-                },
-                id,
-            )
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| {
-                error!(?e, "Integrity sign failed after nonce update");
-                Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-            })?
-            .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-            Ok(new_nonce)
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-}
-
-async fn approve_new_client(
-    actors: &crate::actors::GlobalActors,
-    profile: ClientProfile,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let result = actors
-        .flow_coordinator
-        .ask(RequestClientApproval { client: profile })
-        .await;
-
-    match result {
-        Ok(true) => Ok(()),
-        Ok(false) => Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Denied)),
-        Err(SendError::HandlerError(e)) => {
-            error!(error = ?e, "Approval upstream error");
-            Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Upstream(e)))
-        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            error!(error = ?e, "Approval request to flow coordinator failed");
-            Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Internal))
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-async fn insert_client(
-    db: &db::DatabasePool,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
-    metadata: &ClientMetadata,
-) -> Result<Verified<i32>, Error> {
-    use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
-    let metadata = metadata.clone();
-
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
-    })?;
-
-    conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
-        let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
-        Box::pin(async move {
-            const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
-
-            let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
-                .values((
-                    client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
-                    client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
-                    client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
-                ))
-                .returning(client_metadata::id)
-                .get_result::<i32>(conn)
-                .await?;
-
-            let client_id = insert_into(program_client::table)
-                .values((
-                    program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
-                    program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-                    program_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
-                ))
-                .on_conflict_do_nothing()
-                .returning(program_client::id)
-                .get_result::<i32>(conn)
-                .await?;
-
-            let verified_id = integrity::sign_entity(
-                conn,
-                &keyholder,
-                &ClientCredentials {
-                    pubkey: *pubkey,
-                    nonce: NONCE_START,
-                },
-                client_id,
-            )
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| {
-                error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new client key");
-                Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-            })?
-            .unqualify_origin();
-
-            Ok(verified_id)
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-}
-
-async fn sync_client_metadata(
-    db: &db::DatabasePool,
-    client_id: i32,
-    metadata: &ClientMetadata,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history};
-
-    let now = SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now());
-
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
-    })?;
-
-    conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
-        let metadata = metadata.clone();
-        Box::pin(async move {
-            let (current_metadata_id, current): (i32, ProgramClientMetadata) =
-                program_client::table
-                    .find(client_id)
-                    .inner_join(client_metadata::table)
-                    .select((
-                        program_client::metadata_id,
-                        ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
-                    ))
-                    .first(conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-            let unchanged = current.name == metadata.name
-                && current.description == metadata.description
-                && current.version == metadata.version;
-            if unchanged {
-                return Ok(());
-            }
-
-            insert_into(client_metadata_history::table)
-                .values((
-                    client_metadata_history::metadata_id.eq(current_metadata_id),
-                    client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id),
-                ))
-                .execute(conn)
-                .await?;
-
-            let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
-                .values((
-                    client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
-                    client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
-                    client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
-                ))
-                .returning(client_metadata::id)
-                .get_result::<i32>(conn)
-                .await?;
-
-            update(program_client::table.find(client_id))
-                .set((
-                    program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-                    program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
-                ))
-                .execute(conn)
-                .await?;
-
-            Ok::<(), diesel::result::Error>(())
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
-        Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-    })
-}
-
-async fn challenge_client<T>(
-    transport: &mut T,
-    pubkey: VerifyingKey,
-    nonce: i32,
-) -> Result<(), Error>
-where
-    T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + ?Sized,
-{
-    transport
-        .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce }))
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
-            Error::Transport
-        })?;
-
-    let signature = expect_message(transport, |req: Inbound| match req {
-        Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => Some(signature),
-        _ => None,
-    })
-    .await
-    .map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Failed to receive challenge solution");
-        Error::Transport
-    })?;
-
-    let formatted = format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes());
-
-    pubkey.verify_strict(&formatted, &signature).map_err(|_| {
-        error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
-        Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
-    })?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub async fn authenticate<T>(
-    props: &mut ClientConnection,
-    transport: &mut T,
-) -> Result<Verified<i32>, Error>
-where
-    T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
-{
-    let Some(Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { pubkey, metadata }) = transport.recv().await else {
-        return Err(Error::Transport);
-    };
-
-    // fixme! triage needed: probable regretion since in match->Some get_current_nonce_and_id called only once instead of twice
-    let client_id = match get_current_nonce_and_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
-        Some((nonce, id)) => {
-            let mut db_conn = props.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-                error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-                Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
-            })?;
-
-            integrity::verify_entity(
-                &mut db_conn,
-                &props.actors.key_holder,
-                ClientCredentials { pubkey, nonce },
-                id,
-            )
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| {
-                error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
-                Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
-            })?
-            .inherit()
-            .entity_id
-            .unqualify_origin()
-        }
-        None => {
-            approve_new_client(
-                &props.actors,
-                ClientProfile {
-                    pubkey,
-                    metadata: metadata.clone(),
-                },
-            )
-            .await?;
-            insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
-        }
-    };
-
-    sync_client_metadata(&props.db, *client_id, &metadata).await?;
-    let challenge_nonce = create_nonce(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
-    challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge_nonce).await?;
-
-    transport
-        .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth success");
-            Error::Transport
-        })?;
-
-    Ok(client_id)
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/evm/mod.rs

@@ -1,346 +1,260 @@
-use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
+use crate::{
-use diesel::{
+    actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
-    ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
+    crypto::integrity,
-};
+    db::{
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+        DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
-use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
+        models::{self},
-use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
+        schema,
-
+    },
-use crate::{
+    evm::{
-    actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
+        self, ListError, RunKind,
-    crypto::integrity::{self, Integrable, Verified, hashing::Hashable},
+        policies::{
-    db::{
+            CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
-        DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
+            ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
-        models::{self},
+        },
-        schema,
+    },
-    },
+};
-    evm::{
+use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-        self, ListError, RunKind,
+
-        policies::{
+use alloy::{
-            CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
+    consensus::TxEip1559, network::TxSignerSync as _, primitives::Address, signers::Signature,
-            ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
+};
-        },
+use diesel::{
-    },
+    ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
-    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+};
-};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-
+use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
-pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
+use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
-
+
-/// Hashable structure for wallet integrity protection.
+pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
-/// Binds the encrypted private key to the wallet address using HMAC.
+
-pub struct EvmWalletIntegrity {
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-    pub address: Vec<u8>,       // 20-byte Ethereum address
+pub enum SignTransactionError {
-    pub aead_encrypted_id: i32, // Reference to encrypted key material
+    #[error("Wallet not found")]
-}
+    WalletNotFound,
-
+
-impl Hashable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
+    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+    Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
-        hasher.update(&self.address);
+
-        hasher.update(self.aead_encrypted_id.to_be_bytes());
+    #[error("Vault error: {0}")]
-    }
+    Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
-}
+
-
+    #[error("Vault mailbox error")]
-impl Integrable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
+    VaultSend,
-    const KIND: &'static str = "evm_wallet";
+
-}
+    #[error("Signing error: {0}")]
-
+    Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+
-pub enum SignTransactionError {
+    #[error("Policy error: {0}")]
-    #[error("Wallet not found")]
+    Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
-    WalletNotFound,
+}
-
+
-    #[error("Wallet integrity check failed")]
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-    WalletIntegrityCheckFailed,
+pub enum Error {
-
+    #[error("Vault error: {0}")]
-    #[error(
+    Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
-        "Decrypted key does not correspond to wallet address (CRITICAL: possible key substitution attack)"
+
-    )]
+    #[error("Vault mailbox error")]
-    KeyAddressMismatch,
+    VaultSend,
-
+
-    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
+    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
-    Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
+    Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
-
+
-    #[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
+    #[error("Integrity violation: {0}")]
-    Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
+    Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
-
+}
-    #[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
+
-    KeyholderSend,
+#[derive(Actor)]
-
+pub struct EvmActor {
-    #[error("Signing error: {0}")]
+    pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
-    Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
+    pub db: DatabasePool,
-
+    pub rng: StdRng,
-    #[error("Policy error: {0}")]
+    pub engine: evm::Engine,
-    Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
+}
-
+
-    #[error("Integrity error: {0}")]
+impl EvmActor {
-    Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
+    pub fn new(vault: ActorRef<Vault>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
-}
+        // is it safe to seed rng from system once?
-
+        // todo: audit
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+        let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
-pub enum Error {
+        let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), vault.clone());
-    #[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
+        Self {
-    Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
+            vault,
-
+            db,
-    #[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
+            rng,
-    KeyholderSend,
+            engine,
-
+        }
-    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
+    }
-    Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
+}
-
+
-    #[error("Integrity violation: {0}")]
+#[messages]
-    Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
+impl EvmActor {
-}
+    #[message]
-
+    pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
-#[derive(Actor)]
+        let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);
-pub struct EvmActor {
+
-    pub keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+        let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
-    pub db: DatabasePool,
+
-    pub rng: StdRng,
+        let aead_id: i32 = self
-    pub engine: evm::Engine,
+            .vault
-}
+            .ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
-
+            .await
-impl EvmActor {
+            .map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
-    pub fn new(keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
+
-        // is it safe to seed rng from system once?
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        // todo: audit
+        let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
-        let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
+            .values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
-        let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), keyholder.clone());
+                address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
-        Self {
+                aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
-            keyholder,
+            })
-            db,
+            .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
-            rng,
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            engine,
+            .await
-        }
+            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-    }
+
-}
+        Ok((wallet_id, address))
-
+    }
-#[messages]
+
-impl EvmActor {
+    #[message]
-    #[message]
+    pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
-    pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(Verified<i32>, Address), Error> {
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);
+        let rows: Vec<models::EvmWallet> = schema::evm_wallet::table
-
+            .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
-        let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
+            .load(&mut conn)
-
+            .await
-        let aead_id: i32 = self
+            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-            .keyholder
+
-            .ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
+        Ok(rows
-            .await
+            .into_iter()
-            .map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?;
+            .map(|w| (w.id, Address::from_slice(&w.address)))
-
+            .collect())
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+    }
-        let wallet_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
+}
-            .values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
+
-                address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
+#[messages]
-                aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
+impl EvmActor {
-            })
+    #[message]
-            .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
+    pub async fn operator_create_grant(
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+        &mut self,
-            .await
+        basic: SharedGrantSettings,
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+        grant: SpecificGrant,
-
+    ) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-        // Sign integrity envelope to bind encrypted key to wallet address
+        match grant {
-        let wallet_integrity = EvmWalletIntegrity {
+            SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self
-            address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
+                .engine
-            aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
+                .create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
-        };
+                    shared: basic,
-        let verified_wallet_id =
+                    specific: settings,
-            integrity::sign_entity(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, &wallet_integrity, wallet_id)
+                })
-                .await?
+                .await
-                .unqualify_origin();
+                .map_err(Error::from),
-
+            SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => self
-        Ok((verified_wallet_id, address))
+                .engine
-    }
+                .create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
-
+                    shared: basic,
-    #[message]
+                    specific: settings,
-    pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
+                })
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+                .await
-        let rows: Vec<models::EvmWallet> = schema::evm_wallet::table
+                .map_err(Error::from),
-            .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
+        }
-            .load(&mut conn)
+    }
-            .await
+
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+    #[message]
-
+    pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(
-        Ok(rows
+        &mut self,
-            .into_iter()
+        grant_id: i32,
-            .map(|w| (w.id, Address::from_slice(&w.address)))
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-            .collect())
+        self.engine
-    }
+            .revoke_grant(grant_id)
-}
+            .await
-
+            .map_err(Error::from)
-#[messages]
+    }
-impl EvmActor {
+
-    #[message]
+    #[message]
-    pub async fn useragent_create_grant(
+    pub async fn operator_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
-        &mut self,
+        match self.engine.list_all_grants().await {
-        basic: SharedGrantSettings,
+            Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
-        grant: SpecificGrant,
+            Err(ListError::Database(db_err)) => Err(Error::Database(db_err)),
-    ) -> Result<integrity::Verified<i32>, Error> {
+            Err(ListError::Integrity(integrity_err)) => Err(Error::Integrity(integrity_err)),
-        match grant {
+        }
-            SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self
+    }
-                .engine
+
-                .create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
+    #[message]
-                    shared: basic,
+    pub async fn shared_analyze_transaction(
-                    specific: settings,
+        &mut self,
-                })
+        client_id: i32,
-                .await
+        wallet_address: Address,
-                .map_err(Error::from),
+        transaction: TxEip1559,
-            SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => self
+    ) -> Result<SpecificMeaning, SignTransactionError> {
-                .engine
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-                .create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
+        let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
-                    shared: basic,
+            .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
-                    specific: settings,
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
-                })
+            .first(&mut conn)
-                .await
+            .await
-                .map_err(Error::from),
+            .optional()
-        }
+            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
-    }
+            .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
-
+        let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-    #[message]
+            .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-    pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
-        // let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
-        // let keyholder = self.keyholder.clone();
+            .first(&mut conn)
-
+            .await
-        // diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| {
+            .optional()
-        //     Box::pin(async move {
+            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
-        //         diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
+            .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
-        //             .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
+        drop(conn);
-        //             .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
+
-        //             .execute(conn)
+        let meaning = self
-        //             .await?;
+            .engine
-
+            .evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
-        //         let signed = integrity::evm::load_signed_grant_by_basic_id(conn, grant_id).await?;
+            .await?;
-
+
-        //         diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(())
+        Ok(meaning)
-        //     })
+    }
-        // })
+
-        // .await
+    #[message]
-        // .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+    pub async fn client_sign_transaction(
-
+        &mut self,
-        // Ok(())
+        client_id: i32,
-        todo!()
+        wallet_address: Address,
-    }
+        mut transaction: TxEip1559,
-
+    ) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
-    #[message]
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-    pub async fn useragent_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
+        let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
-        match self.engine.list_all_grants().await {
+            .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
-            Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
-            Err(ListError::Database(db_err)) => Err(Error::Database(db_err)),
+            .first(&mut conn)
-            Err(ListError::Integrity(integrity_err)) => Err(Error::Integrity(integrity_err)),
+            .await
-        }
+            .optional()
-    }
+            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
-
+            .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
-    #[message]
+        let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-    pub async fn shared_analyze_transaction(
+            .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-        &mut self,
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
-        client_id: i32,
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
-        wallet_address: Address,
+            .first(&mut conn)
-        transaction: TxEip1559,
+            .await
-    ) -> Result<SpecificMeaning, SignTransactionError> {
+            .optional()
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
-        let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
+            .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
-            .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
+        drop(conn);
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
+
-            .first(&mut conn)
+        let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
-            .await
+            .vault
-            .optional()
+            .ask(Decrypt {
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
+                aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
-            .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
+            })
-
+            .await
-        // Verify wallet integrity envelope
+            .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
-        let wallet = integrity::verify_entity(
+
-            &mut conn,
+        let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
-            &self.keyholder,
+
-            EvmWalletIntegrity {
+        self.engine
-                address: wallet.address.clone(),
+            .evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
-                aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
+            .await?;
-            },
+
-            wallet.id,
+        Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
-        )
+    }
-        .await
+}
-        .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::WalletIntegrityCheckFailed)?;
-
-        let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-            .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.entity_id))
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .optional()
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
-            .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
-        drop(conn);
-
-        let meaning = self
-            .engine
-            .evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(meaning)
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn client_sign_transaction(
-        &mut self,
-        client_id: i32,
-        wallet_address: Address,
-        mut transaction: TxEip1559,
-    ) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
-            .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .optional()
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
-            .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
-
-        // Verify wallet integrity envelope to ensure encrypted key is bound to address
-        let wallet = integrity::verify_entity(
-            &mut conn,
-            &self.keyholder,
-            EvmWalletIntegrity {
-                address: wallet.address.clone(),
-                aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
-            },
-            wallet.id,
-        )
-        .await
-        .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::WalletIntegrityCheckFailed)?;
-
-        let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
-            .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.entity_id))
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .optional()
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
-            .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
-        drop(conn);
-
-        let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
-            .keyholder
-            .ask(Decrypt {
-                aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::KeyholderSend)?;
-
-        let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
-
-        // Verify that the decrypted key's derived address matches the wallet address
-        // This prevents an attacker from substituting one wallet's key with another's even if they compromised the DB
-        if signer.address() != wallet_address {
-            return Err(SignTransactionError::KeyAddressMismatch);
-        }
-
-        self.engine
-            .evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
-            .await?;
-
-        use alloy::network::TxSignerSync as _;
-        Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/flow_coordinator/client_connect_approval.rs

@@ -1,105 +1,127 @@
-use std::ops::ControlFlow;
+use crate::{
-
+    actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
-use kameo::{
+    peers::{
-    Actor, messages,
+        client::ClientProfile,
-    prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
+        operator::{OperatorSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
-    reply::ReplySender,
+    },
-};
+};
-
+
-use crate::actors::{
+use kameo::{
-    client::ClientProfile,
+    Actor, messages,
-    flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
+    prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
-    user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
+    reply::ReplySender,
-};
+};
-
+use std::{ops::ControlFlow, time::Duration};
-pub struct Args {
+
-    pub client: ClientProfile,
+const APPROVAL_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
-    pub user_agents: Vec<ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
+
-    pub reply: ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>,
+pub struct Args {
-}
+    pub client: ClientProfile,
-
+    pub operators: Vec<ActorRef<OperatorSession>>,
-pub struct ClientApprovalController {
+    pub reply: ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>,
-    /// Number of UAs that have not yet responded (approval or denial) or died.
+}
-    pending: usize,
+
-    /// Number of approvals received so far.
+pub struct ClientApprovalController {
-    approved: usize,
+    /// Number of operators that have not yet responded (approval or denial) or died.
-    reply: Option<ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>,
+    pending: usize,
-}
+    /// Number of approvals received so far.
-
+    approved: usize,
-impl ClientApprovalController {
+    reply: Option<ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>,
-    fn send_reply(&mut self, result: Result<bool, ApprovalError>) {
+}
-        if let Some(reply) = self.reply.take() {
+
-            reply.send(result);
+impl ClientApprovalController {
-        }
+    fn send_reply(&mut self, result: Result<bool, ApprovalError>) {
-    }
+        if let Some(reply) = self.reply.take() {
-}
+            reply.send(result);
-
+        }
-impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
+    }
-    type Args = Args;
+}
-    type Error = ();
+
-
+impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
-    async fn on_start(
+    type Args = Args;
-        Args {
+    type Error = ();
-            client,
+
-            mut user_agents,
+    async fn on_start(
-            reply,
+        Args {
-        }: Self::Args,
+            client,
-        actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>,
+            operators,
-    ) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+            reply,
-        let this = Self {
+        }: Self::Args,
-            pending: user_agents.len(),
+        actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>,
-            approved: 0,
+    ) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-            reply: Some(reply),
+        let this = Self {
-        };
+            pending: operators.len(),
-
+            approved: 0,
-        for user_agent in user_agents.drain(..) {
+            reply: Some(reply),
-            actor_ref.link(&user_agent).await;
+        };
-            let _ = user_agent
+
-                .tell(BeginNewClientApproval {
+        for operator in operators {
-                    client: client.clone(),
+            actor_ref.link(&operator).await;
-                    controller: actor_ref.clone(),
+
-                })
+            let _ = operator
-                .await;
+                .tell(BeginNewClientApproval {
-        }
+                    client: client.clone(),
-
+                    controller: actor_ref.clone(),
-        Ok(this)
+                })
-    }
+                .await;
-
+        }
-    async fn on_link_died(
+
-        &mut self,
+        let weak = actor_ref.downgrade();
-        _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
-        _: ActorId,
+            tokio::time::sleep(APPROVAL_TIMEOUT).await;
-        _: ActorStopReason,
+            if let Some(r) = weak.upgrade() {
-    ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
+                let _ = r.tell(OnApprovalTimeout {}).await;
-        // A linked UA died before responding — counts as a non-approval.
+            }
-        self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
+        });
-        if self.pending == 0 {
+
-            // At least one UA didn't approve: deny.
+        Ok(this)
-            self.send_reply(Ok(false));
+    }
-            return Ok(ControlFlow::Break(ActorStopReason::Normal));
+
-        }
+    async fn on_link_died(
-        Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
+        &mut self,
-    }
+        _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
-}
+        _: ActorId,
-
+        _: ActorStopReason,
-#[messages]
+    ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
-impl ClientApprovalController {
+        // A linked operator died before responding — counts as a non-approval.
-    #[message(ctx)]
+        self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
-    pub async fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
+        if self.pending == 0 {
-        if !approved {
+            // At least one operator didn't approve: deny.
-            // Denial wins immediately regardless of other pending responses.
+            self.send_reply(Ok(false));
-            self.send_reply(Ok(false));
+            return Ok(ControlFlow::Break(ActorStopReason::Normal));
-            ctx.stop();
+        }
-            return;
+        Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
-        }
+    }
-
+}
-        self.approved += 1;
+
-        self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
+#[messages]
-
+impl ClientApprovalController {
-        if self.pending == 0 {
+    #[message(ctx)]
-            // Every connected UA approved.
+    pub fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
-            self.send_reply(Ok(true));
+        if !approved {
-            ctx.stop();
+            // Denial wins immediately regardless of other pending responses.
-        }
+            self.send_reply(Ok(false));
-    }
+            ctx.stop();
-}
+            return;
+        }
+
+        self.approved += 1;
+        self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
+
+        if self.pending == 0 {
+            // Every connected operator approved.
+            self.send_reply(Ok(true));
+            ctx.stop();
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Fired after `APPROVAL_TIMEOUT` elapses. Any operator that hasn't responded
+    /// by then is treated as a denial to prevent zombie sessions from blocking the flow.
+    #[message(ctx)]
+    pub fn on_approval_timeout(&mut self, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
+        if self.pending > 0 {
+            self.send_reply(Ok(false));
+            ctx.stop();
+        }
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/flow_coordinator/mod.rs

@@ -1,118 +1,114 @@
-use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
+use crate::{
-
+    actors::{
-use kameo::{
+        flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
-    Actor,
+        operator_registry::{GetConnected, OperatorRegistry},
-    actor::{ActorId, ActorRef, Spawn},
+    },
-    messages,
+    peers::client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
-    prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
+};
-    reply::DelegatedReply,
+
-};
+use kameo::{
-use tracing::info;
+    Actor,
-
+    actor::{ActorId, ActorRef, Spawn},
-use crate::actors::{
+    messages,
-    client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
+    prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
-    flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
+    reply::DelegatedReply,
-    user_agent::session::UserAgentSession,
+};
-};
+use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
-
+use tracing::info;
-pub mod client_connect_approval;
+
-
+pub mod client_connect_approval;
-#[derive(Default)]
+
-pub struct FlowCoordinator {
+pub struct FlowCoordinator {
-    pub user_agents: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
+    pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
-    pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
+    operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
-}
+}
-
+
-impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
+impl FlowCoordinator {
-    type Args = Self;
+    pub fn new(operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>) -> Self {
-
+        Self {
-    type Error = ();
+            clients: HashMap::default(),
-
+            operator_registry,
-    async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        }
-        Ok(args)
+    }
-    }
+}
-
+
-    async fn on_link_died(
+impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
-        &mut self,
+    type Args = Self;
-        _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
+
-        id: ActorId,
+    type Error = ();
-        _: ActorStopReason,
+
-    ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
+    async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        if self.user_agents.remove(&id).is_some() {
+        Ok(args)
-            info!(
+    }
-                ?id,
+
-                actor = "FlowCoordinator",
+    async fn on_link_died(
-                event = "useragent.disconnected"
+        &mut self,
-            );
+        _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
-        } else if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
+        id: ActorId,
-            info!(
+        _: ActorStopReason,
-                ?id,
+    ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
-                actor = "FlowCoordinator",
+        if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
-                event = "client.disconnected"
+            info!(
-            );
+                ?id,
-        } else {
+                actor = "FlowCoordinator",
-            info!(
+                event = "client.disconnected"
-                ?id,
+            );
-                actor = "FlowCoordinator",
+        } else {
-                event = "unknown.actor.disconnected"
+            info!(
-            );
+                ?id,
-        }
+                actor = "FlowCoordinator",
-        Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
+                event = "unknown.actor.disconnected"
-    }
+            );
-}
+        }
-
+        Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+    }
-pub enum ApprovalError {
+}
-    #[error("No user agents connected")]
+
-    NoUserAgentsConnected,
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
-}
+pub enum ApprovalError {
-
+    #[error("No operators connected")]
-#[messages]
+    NoOperatorsConnected,
-impl FlowCoordinator {
+}
-    #[message(ctx)]
+
-    pub async fn register_user_agent(
+#[messages]
-        &mut self,
+impl FlowCoordinator {
-        actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
+    #[message(ctx)]
-        ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
+    pub async fn register_client(
-    ) {
+        &mut self,
-        info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "useragent.connected");
+        actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
-        ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
+        ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
-        self.user_agents.insert(actor.id(), actor);
+    ) {
-    }
+        info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
-
+        ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
-    #[message(ctx)]
+        self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor);
-    pub async fn register_client(
+    }
-        &mut self,
+
-        actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
+    #[message(ctx)]
-        ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
+    pub async fn request_client_approval(
-    ) {
+        &mut self,
-        info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
+        client: ClientProfile,
-        ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
+        ctx: &mut Context<Self, DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>,
-        self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor);
+    ) -> DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>> {
-    }
+        let (reply, Some(reply_sender)) = ctx.reply_sender() else {
-
+            unreachable!("Expected `request_client_approval` to have callback channel");
-    #[message(ctx)]
+        };
-    pub async fn request_client_approval(
+
-        &mut self,
+        let Ok(refs) = self.operator_registry.ask(GetConnected).await else {
-        client: ClientProfile,
+            reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoOperatorsConnected));
-        ctx: &mut Context<Self, DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>,
+            return reply;
-    ) -> DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>> {
+        };
-        let (reply, Some(reply_sender)) = ctx.reply_sender() else {
+
-            unreachable!("Expected `request_client_approval` to have callback channel");
+        if refs.is_empty() {
-        };
+            reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoOperatorsConnected));
-
+            return reply;
-        let refs: Vec<_> = self.user_agents.values().cloned().collect();
+        }
-        if refs.is_empty() {
+
-            reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected));
+        ClientApprovalController::spawn(client_connect_approval::Args {
-            return reply;
+            client,
-        }
+            operators: refs,
-
+            reply: reply_sender,
-        ClientApprovalController::spawn(client_connect_approval::Args {
+        });
-            client,
+
-            user_agents: refs,
+        reply
-            reply: reply_sender,
+    }
-        });
+}
-
-        reply
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/mod.rs

@@ -1,47 +1,59 @@
-use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
+use crate::{
-use thiserror::Error;
+    actors::{
-
+        bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
-use crate::{
+        operator_registry::OperatorRegistry, vault::Vault,
-    actors::{
+    },
-        bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
+    db,
-        keyholder::KeyHolder,
+};
-    },
+
-    db,
+use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
-};
+use kameo_actors::{DeliveryStrategy, message_bus::MessageBus};
-
+use thiserror::Error;
-pub mod bootstrap;
+
-pub mod client;
+pub mod bootstrap;
-mod evm;
+pub mod evm;
-pub mod flow_coordinator;
+pub mod flow_coordinator;
-pub mod keyholder;
+pub mod operator_registry;
-pub mod user_agent;
+pub mod vault;
-
+
-#[derive(Error, Debug)]
+#[derive(Error, Debug)]
-pub enum SpawnError {
+pub enum SpawnError {
-    #[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
+    #[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
-    Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
+    Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
-
+
-    #[error("Failed to spawn KeyHolder actor")]
+    #[error("Failed to spawn Vault actor")]
-    KeyHolder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
+    Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
-}
+}
-
+
-/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
+/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct GlobalActors {
+pub struct GlobalActors {
-    pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
-    pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
+    pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
-    pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
+    pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
-    pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
+    pub operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
-}
+    pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
-
+    pub events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
-impl GlobalActors {
+}
-    pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
+
-        let key_holder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?);
+impl GlobalActors {
-        Ok(Self {
+    pub fn spawn_message_bus() -> ActorRef<MessageBus> {
-            bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
+        MessageBus::spawn(MessageBus::new(DeliveryStrategy::Guaranteed))
-            evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
+    }
-            key_holder,
+
-            flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::default()),
+    pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
-        })
+        let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
-    }
+        let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
-}
+        let operator_registry = OperatorRegistry::spawn(OperatorRegistry::default());
+        Ok(Self {
+            bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
+            evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
+            vault: key_holder,
+            flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::new(
+                operator_registry.clone(),
+            )),
+            operator_registry,
+            events: message_bus,
+        })
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/operator_registry.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+use crate::peers::operator::OperatorSession;
+
+use kameo::{
+    Actor,
+    actor::{ActorId, ActorRef},
+    error::Infallible,
+    messages,
+    prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
+};
+use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
+use tracing::info;
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct OperatorRegistry {
+    connected: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<OperatorSession>>,
+}
+
+impl Actor for OperatorRegistry {
+    type Args = Self;
+
+    type Error = Infallible;
+
+    async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        Ok(args)
+    }
+
+    async fn on_link_died(
+        &mut self,
+        _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
+        id: ActorId,
+        _: ActorStopReason,
+    ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
+        if self.connected.remove(&id).is_some() {
+            info!(
+                ?id,
+                actor = "OperatorRegistry",
+                event = "operator.disconnected"
+            );
+        }
+        Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
+    }
+}
+
+#[messages]
+impl OperatorRegistry {
+    #[message(ctx)]
+    pub async fn connect_operator(
+        &mut self,
+        actor: ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
+        ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
+    ) {
+        info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "OperatorRegistry", event = "operator.connected");
+        ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
+        self.connected.insert(actor.id(), actor);
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub fn get_connected(&self) -> Vec<ActorRef<OperatorSession>> {
+        self.connected.values().cloned().collect()
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/auth/state.rs

@@ -1,347 +0,0 @@
-use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
-use tracing::error;
-
-use super::Error;
-use crate::{
-    actors::{
-        bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
-        keyholder::KeyHolder,
-        user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentCredentials, auth::Outbound},
-    },
-    crypto::integrity,
-    db::{DatabasePool, schema::useragent_client},
-};
-
-pub struct ChallengeRequest {
-    pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
-}
-
-pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
-    pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
-    pub token: String,
-}
-
-pub struct ChallengeContext {
-    pub challenge_nonce: i32,
-    pub key: AuthPublicKey,
-}
-
-pub struct ChallengeSolution {
-    pub solution: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-smlang::statemachine!(
-    name: Auth,
-    custom_error: true,
-    transitions: {
-        *Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
-        Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
-        SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
-    }
-);
-
-/// Returns the current nonce, ready to use for the challenge nonce.
-async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
-    db: &DatabasePool,
-    key: &AuthPublicKey,
-) -> Result<(i32, i32), Error> {
-    let mut db_conn = db
-        .get()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
-    db_conn
-        .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
-            Box::pin(async move {
-                useragent_client::table
-                    .filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(key.to_stored_bytes()))
-                    .filter(useragent_client::key_type.eq(key.key_type()))
-                    .select((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
-                    .first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
-                    .await
-            })
-        })
-        .await
-        .optional()
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?
-        .ok_or_else(|| {
-            error!(?key, "Public key not found in database");
-            Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
-        })
-}
-
-async fn verify_integrity(
-    db: &DatabasePool,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let mut db_conn = db
-        .get()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
-
-    let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?;
-
-    let attestation_status = integrity::check_entity_attestation(
-        &mut db_conn,
-        keyholder,
-        &UserAgentCredentials {
-            pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
-            nonce,
-        },
-        id,
-    )
-    .await
-    .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Integrity verification failed", &e))?;
-
-    use integrity::AttestationStatus as AS;
-    // SAFETY (policy): challenge auth must work in both vault states.
-    // While sealed, integrity checks can only report `Unavailable` because key material is not
-    // accessible. While unsealed, the same check can report `Attested`.
-    // This path intentionally accepts both outcomes to keep challenge auth available across state
-    // transitions; stricter verification is enforced in sensitive post-auth flows.
-    match attestation_status {
-        AS::Attested | AS::Unavailable => Ok(()),
-    }
-}
-
-async fn create_nonce(
-    db: &DatabasePool,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
-) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-    let mut db_conn = db
-        .get()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
-    let new_nonce = db_conn
-        .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
-            Box::pin(async move {
-                let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(useragent_client::table)
-                    .filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_stored_bytes()))
-                    .filter(useragent_client::key_type.eq(pubkey.key_type()))
-                    .set(useragent_client::nonce.eq(useragent_client::nonce + 1))
-                    .returning((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
-                    .get_result(conn)
-                    .await
-                    .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?;
-
-                integrity::sign_entity(
-                    conn,
-                    keyholder,
-                    &UserAgentCredentials {
-                        pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
-                        nonce: new_nonce,
-                    },
-                    id,
-                )
-                .await
-                .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database error", &e))?
-                .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(new_nonce)
-            })
-        })
-        .await?;
-    Ok(new_nonce)
-}
-
-async fn register_key(
-    db: &DatabasePool,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
-    let key_type = pubkey.key_type();
-    let mut conn = db
-        .get()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
-
-    conn.transaction(|conn| {
-        Box::pin(async move {
-            const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
-
-            let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(useragent_client::table)
-                .values((
-                    useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
-                    useragent_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
-                    useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type),
-                ))
-                .returning(useragent_client::id)
-                .get_result(conn)
-                .await
-                .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?;
-
-            if let Err(e) = integrity::sign_entity(
-                conn,
-                keyholder,
-                &UserAgentCredentials {
-                    pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
-                    nonce: NONCE_START,
-                },
-                id,
-            )
-            .await
-            {
-                match e {
-                    integrity::Error::Keyholder(
-                        crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped,
-                    ) => {
-                        // IMPORTANT: bootstrap-token auth must work before the vault has a root key.
-                        // We intentionally allow creating the DB row first and backfill envelopes
-                        // after bootstrap/unseal to keep the bootstrap flow possible.
-                    }
-                    other => {
-                        return Err(Error::internal("Failed to register public key", &other));
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-
-            Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
-        })
-    })
-    .await?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub struct AuthContext<'a, T> {
-    pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
-    pub(super) transport: T,
-}
-
-impl<'a, T> AuthContext<'a, T> {
-    pub fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: T) -> Self {
-        Self { conn, transport }
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
-where
-    T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send,
-{
-    type Error = Error;
-
-    async fn prepare_challenge(
-        &mut self,
-        ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
-    ) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
-        verify_integrity(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
-
-        let nonce = create_nonce(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
-
-        self.transport
-            .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }))
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| {
-                error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
-                Error::Transport
-            })?;
-
-        Ok(ChallengeContext {
-            challenge_nonce: nonce,
-            key: pubkey,
-        })
-    }
-
-    #[allow(missing_docs)]
-    #[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
-    async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
-        &mut self,
-        BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
-    ) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
-        let token_ok: bool = self
-            .conn
-            .actors
-            .bootstrapper
-            .ask(ConsumeToken {
-                token: token.clone(),
-            })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token", &e))?;
-
-        if !token_ok {
-            error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
-            return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
-        }
-
-        match token_ok {
-            true => {
-                register_key(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
-                self.transport
-                    .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
-                    .await
-                    .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
-                Ok(pubkey)
-            }
-            false => {
-                error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
-                self.transport
-                    .send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
-                    .await
-                    .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
-                Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[allow(missing_docs)]
-    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
-    async fn verify_solution(
-        &mut self,
-        ChallengeContext {
-            challenge_nonce,
-            key,
-        }: &ChallengeContext,
-        ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
-    ) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
-        let formatted = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(*challenge_nonce, &key.to_stored_bytes());
-
-        let valid = match key {
-            AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(vk) => {
-                let sig = solution.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
-                    error!(?solution, "Invalid Ed25519 signature length");
-                    Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
-                })?;
-                vk.verify_strict(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
-            }
-            AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(vk) => {
-                use k256::ecdsa::signature::Verifier as _;
-                let sig = k256::ecdsa::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
-                    error!(?solution, "Invalid ECDSA signature bytes");
-                    Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
-                })?;
-                vk.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
-            }
-            AuthPublicKey::Rsa(pk) => {
-                use rsa::signature::Verifier as _;
-                let verifying_key = rsa::pss::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha256>::new(pk.clone());
-                let sig = rsa::pss::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
-                    error!(?solution, "Invalid RSA signature bytes");
-                    Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
-                })?;
-                verifying_key.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
-            }
-        };
-
-        match valid {
-            true => {
-                self.transport
-                    .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
-                    .await
-                    .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
-                Ok(key.clone())
-            }
-            false => {
-                self.transport
-                    .send(Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution))
-                    .await
-                    .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
-                Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/mod.rs

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-use crate::{
-    actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile},
-    crypto::integrity::Integrable,
-    db::{self, models::KeyType},
-};
-
-/// Abstraction over Ed25519 / ECDSA-secp256k1 / RSA public keys used during the auth handshake.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub enum AuthPublicKey {
-    Ed25519(ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey),
-    /// Compressed SEC1 public key; signature bytes are raw 64-byte (r||s).
-    EcdsaSecp256k1(k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey),
-    /// RSA-2048+ public key (Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager); signature bytes are PSS+SHA-256.
-    Rsa(rsa::RsaPublicKey),
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct UserAgentCredentials {
-    pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
-    pub nonce: i32,
-}
-
-impl Integrable for UserAgentCredentials {
-    const KIND: &'static str = "useragent_credentials";
-}
-
-impl AuthPublicKey {
-    /// Canonical bytes stored in DB and echoed back in the challenge.
-    /// Ed25519: raw 32 bytes. ECDSA: SEC1 compressed 33 bytes. RSA: DER-encoded SPKI.
-    pub fn to_stored_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        match self {
-            AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(k) => k.to_bytes().to_vec(),
-            // SEC1 compressed (33 bytes) is the natural compact format for secp256k1
-            AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(k) => k.to_encoded_point(true).as_bytes().to_vec(),
-            AuthPublicKey::Rsa(k) => {
-                use rsa::pkcs8::EncodePublicKey as _;
-                #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
-                k.to_public_key_der()
-                    .expect("rsa SPKI encoding is infallible")
-                    .to_vec()
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn key_type(&self) -> KeyType {
-        match self {
-            AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(_) => KeyType::Ed25519,
-            AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(_) => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
-            AuthPublicKey::Rsa(_) => KeyType::Rsa,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<(KeyType, Vec<u8>)> for AuthPublicKey {
-    type Error = &'static str;
-
-    fn try_from(value: (KeyType, Vec<u8>)) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let (key_type, bytes) = value;
-        match key_type {
-            KeyType::Ed25519 => {
-                let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| "invalid Ed25519 key length")?;
-                let key = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&bytes)
-                    .map_err(|_e| "invalid Ed25519 key")?;
-                Ok(AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(key))
-            }
-            KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => {
-                let point =
-                    k256::EncodedPoint::from_bytes(&bytes).map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
-                let key = k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_encoded_point(&point)
-                    .map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
-                Ok(AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(key))
-            }
-            KeyType::Rsa => {
-                use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
-                let key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&bytes)
-                    .map_err(|_e| "invalid RSA key")?;
-                Ok(AuthPublicKey::Rsa(key))
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub enum OutOfBand {
-    ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
-    ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey },
-}
-
-pub struct UserAgentConnection {
-    pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
-    pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
-}
-
-impl UserAgentConnection {
-    pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
-        Self { db, actors }
-    }
-}
-
-pub mod auth;
-pub mod session;
-
-pub use auth::authenticate;
-pub use session::UserAgentSession;
-
-use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
-
-impl Hashable for AuthPublicKey {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self.to_stored_bytes());
-    }
-}
-
-impl Hashable for UserAgentCredentials {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.pubkey.hash(hasher);
-        self.nonce.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/session/connection.rs

@@ -1,592 +0,0 @@
-use std::sync::Mutex;
-
-use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
-use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-use kameo::error::SendError;
-use kameo::messages;
-use kameo::prelude::Context;
-use tracing::{error, info};
-use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
-
-use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
-use crate::actors::user_agent::session::Error;
-use crate::db::models::{
-    EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
-};
-use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
-use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
-use crate::{
-    actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
-    crypto::integrity::{self, Verified},
-};
-use crate::{
-    actors::{
-        evm::{
-            ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
-            UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentDeleteGrant, UseragentListGrants,
-        },
-        keyholder::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
-        user_agent::session::{
-            UserAgentSession,
-            state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
-        },
-        user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentCredentials},
-    },
-    db::schema::useragent_client,
-    safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
-};
-
-fn is_vault_sealed_from_evm<M>(err: &SendError<M, crate::actors::evm::Error>) -> bool {
-    matches!(
-        err,
-        SendError::HandlerError(crate::actors::evm::Error::Keyholder(
-            keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped
-        )) | SendError::HandlerError(crate::actors::evm::Error::Integrity(
-            crate::crypto::integrity::Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
-        ))
-    )
-}
-
-impl UserAgentSession {
-    async fn backfill_useragent_integrity(&self) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
-        let keyholder = self.props.actors.key_holder.clone();
-
-        conn.transaction(|conn| {
-            Box::pin(async move {
-                let rows: Vec<(i32, i32, Vec<u8>, crate::db::models::KeyType)> =
-                    useragent_client::table
-                        .select((
-                            useragent_client::id,
-                            useragent_client::nonce,
-                            useragent_client::public_key,
-                            useragent_client::key_type,
-                        ))
-                        .load(conn)
-                        .await?;
-
-                for (id, nonce, public_key, key_type) in rows {
-                    let pubkey = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, public_key)).map_err(|e| {
-                        Error::internal(format!("Invalid user-agent key in db: {e}"))
-                    })?;
-
-                    integrity::sign_entity(
-                        conn,
-                        &keyholder,
-                        &UserAgentCredentials { pubkey, nonce },
-                        id,
-                    )
-                    .await
-                    .map_err(|e| {
-                        Error::internal(format!("Failed to backfill user-agent integrity: {e}"))
-                    })?
-                    .drop_verification_provenance();
-                }
-
-                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
-            })
-        })
-        .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    fn take_unseal_secret(&mut self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), Error> {
-        let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
-            error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
-            return Err(Error::internal("Invalid state for unseal encrypted key"));
-        };
-
-        let ephemeral_secret = {
-            #[allow(
-                clippy::unwrap_used,
-                reason = "Mutex poison is unrecoverable and should panic"
-            )]
-            let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
-            let secret = secret_lock.take();
-            match secret {
-                Some(secret) => secret,
-                None => {
-                    drop(secret_lock);
-                    error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
-                    return Err(Error::internal("Ephemeral secret already taken"));
-                }
-            }
-        };
-
-        Ok((ephemeral_secret, unseal_context.client_public_key))
-    }
-
-    fn decrypt_client_key_material(
-        ephemeral_secret: EphemeralSecret,
-        client_public_key: PublicKey,
-        nonce: &[u8],
-        ciphertext: &[u8],
-        associated_data: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
-        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
-
-        let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_public_key);
-        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
-
-        let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
-
-        let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
-            cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
-        });
-
-        match decryption_result {
-            Ok(_) => Ok(key_buffer),
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
-                Err(())
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-pub struct UnsealStartResponse {
-    pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Error)]
-pub enum UnsealError {
-    #[error("Invalid key provided for unsealing")]
-    InvalidKey,
-    #[error("Internal error during unsealing process")]
-    General(#[from] super::Error),
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Error)]
-pub enum BootstrapError {
-    #[error("Invalid key provided for bootstrapping")]
-    InvalidKey,
-    #[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
-    AlreadyBootstrapped,
-
-    #[error("Internal error during bootstrapping process")]
-    General(#[from] super::Error),
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Error)]
-pub enum SignTransactionError {
-    #[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
-    Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
-
-    #[error("Internal signing error")]
-    Internal,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Error)]
-pub enum GrantMutationError {
-    #[error("Vault is sealed")]
-    VaultSealed,
-
-    #[error("Internal grant mutation error")]
-    Internal,
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl UserAgentSession {
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn handle_unseal_request(
-        &mut self,
-        client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
-    ) -> Result<UnsealStartResponse, Error> {
-        let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
-        let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
-
-        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
-            secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
-            client_public_key: client_pubkey,
-        }))?;
-
-        Ok(UnsealStartResponse {
-            server_pubkey: public_key,
-        })
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
-        &mut self,
-        nonce: Vec<u8>,
-        ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
-        associated_data: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
-        let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
-            Ok(values) => values,
-            Err(Error::State) => {
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
-                return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
-            }
-            Err(_err) => {
-                return Err(Error::internal("Failed to take unseal secret").into());
-            }
-        };
-
-        let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
-            ephemeral_secret,
-            client_public_key,
-            &nonce,
-            &ciphertext,
-            &associated_data,
-        ) {
-            Ok(buffer) => buffer,
-            Err(()) => {
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
-                return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
-            }
-        };
-
-        match self
-            .props
-            .actors
-            .key_holder
-            .ask(TryUnseal {
-                seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
-            })
-            .await
-        {
-            Ok(_) => {
-                self.backfill_useragent_integrity().await?;
-                info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
-                Ok(())
-            }
-            Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
-                Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
-            }
-            Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
-                error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
-                Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
-            }
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
-                Err(Error::internal("Vault actor error").into())
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
-        &mut self,
-        nonce: Vec<u8>,
-        ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
-        associated_data: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
-        let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
-            Ok(values) => values,
-            Err(Error::State) => {
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
-                return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
-            }
-            Err(err) => return Err(err.into()),
-        };
-
-        let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
-            ephemeral_secret,
-            client_public_key,
-            &nonce,
-            &ciphertext,
-            &associated_data,
-        ) {
-            Ok(buffer) => buffer,
-            Err(()) => {
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
-                return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
-            }
-        };
-
-        match self
-            .props
-            .actors
-            .key_holder
-            .ask(Bootstrap {
-                seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
-            })
-            .await
-        {
-            Ok(_) => {
-                self.backfill_useragent_integrity().await?;
-                info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
-                Ok(())
-            }
-            Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
-                Err(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)
-            }
-            Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
-                error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to bootstrap vault");
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
-                Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)
-            }
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to keyholder");
-                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
-                Err(BootstrapError::General(Error::internal(
-                    "Vault actor error",
-                )))
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl UserAgentSession {
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
-        use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
-
-        let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
-            Ok(state) => state,
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "keyholder.query.failed");
-                return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
-            }
-        };
-
-        Ok(vault_state)
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl UserAgentSession {
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(
-        &mut self,
-    ) -> Result<(Verified<i32>, Address), Error> {
-        match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
-            Ok(address) => Ok(address),
-            Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
-                "EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
-            ))),
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
-                Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
-        match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
-            Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
-                Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl UserAgentSession {
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(
-        &mut self,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, GrantMutationError> {
-        match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
-            Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
-            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
-                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
-        &mut self,
-        basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
-        grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
-    ) -> Result<Verified<i32>, GrantMutationError> {
-        match self
-            .props
-            .actors
-            .evm
-            .ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
-            .await
-        {
-            Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
-            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
-                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(
-        &mut self,
-        grant_id: i32,
-    ) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
-        match self
-            .props
-            .actors
-            .evm
-            .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant {
-                _grant_id: grant_id,
-            })
-            .await
-        {
-            Ok(()) => Ok(()),
-            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
-                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
-        &mut self,
-        client_id: i32,
-        wallet_address: Address,
-        transaction: TxEip1559,
-    ) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
-        match self
-            .props
-            .actors
-            .evm
-            .ask(ClientSignTransaction {
-                client_id,
-                wallet_address,
-                transaction,
-            })
-            .await
-        {
-            Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
-            Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
-                Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
-            }
-            Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
-                Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
-        &mut self,
-        entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
-        conn.transaction(|conn| {
-            Box::pin(async move {
-                use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
-
-                for entry in entries {
-                    diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
-                        .values(&entry)
-                        .on_conflict_do_nothing()
-                        .execute(conn)
-                        .await?;
-                }
-
-                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
-            })
-        })
-        .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
-        &mut self,
-        entries: Vec<i32>,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
-        conn.transaction(|conn| {
-            Box::pin(async move {
-                use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
-                for entry in entries {
-                    diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
-                        .filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
-                        .execute(conn)
-                        .await?;
-                }
-
-                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
-            })
-        })
-        .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
-        &mut self,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
-        use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
-        let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
-            .select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-            .load::<_>(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(access_entries)
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl UserAgentSession {
-    #[message(ctx)]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
-        &mut self,
-        approved: bool,
-        pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
-        ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let pending_approval = match self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey) {
-            Some(approval) => approval,
-            None => {
-                error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
-                return Err(Error::internal("Unknown client in connection response"));
-            }
-        };
-
-        pending_approval
-            .controller
-            .tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|err| {
-                error!(
-                    ?err,
-                    "Failed to send client approval response to controller"
-                );
-                Error::internal("Failed to send client approval response to controller")
-            })?;
-
-        ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
-        &mut self,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, Error> {
-        use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
-        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
-
-        let clients = program_client::table
-            .inner_join(client_metadata::table)
-            .select((
-                ProgramClient::as_select(),
-                ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
-            ))
-            .load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(clients)
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/session/state.rs

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-use std::sync::Mutex;
-
-use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
-
-pub struct UnsealContext {
-    pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
-    pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
-}
-
-smlang::statemachine!(
-    name: UserAgent,
-    custom_error: false,
-    transitions: {
-        *Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
-        WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
-        WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
-    }
-);
-
-pub struct DummyContext;
-impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
-    #[allow(missing_docs)]
-    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
-    fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
-        Ok(event_data)
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/vault/mod.rs

@@ -1,461 +1,462 @@
-use chrono::Utc;
+use crate::{
-use diesel::{
+    crypto::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
+        KeyCell, derive_key,
-    dsl::{insert_into, update},
+        encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
-};
+        integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+    },
-use hmac::Mac as _;
+    db::{
-use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
+        self,
-use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
+        models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
-use tracing::{error, info};
+        schema::{self},
-
+    },
-use crate::{
+};
-    crypto::{
+use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-        KeyCell, derive_key,
+
-        encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
+use chrono::Utc;
-        integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
+use diesel::{
-    },
+    ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
-    safe_cell::SafeCell,
+    dsl::{insert_into, update},
-};
+};
-use crate::{
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-    db::{
+use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
-        self,
+use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
-        models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
+use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
-        schema::{self},
+use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
-    },
+use tracing::{error, info};
-    safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
+
-};
+pub mod events {
-
+
-#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
+    #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(KeyHolderState))]
+    pub struct Bootstrapped;
-enum State {
+
-    #[default]
+    #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-    Unbootstrapped,
+    pub struct Unsealed;
-    Sealed {
+
-        root_key_history_id: i32,
+    #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-    },
+    pub struct VaultResealed;
-    Unsealed {
+}
-        root_key_history_id: i32,
+
-        root_key: KeyCell,
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-    },
+pub enum Error {
-}
+    #[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
-
+    AlreadyBootstrapped,
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+    #[error("Vault is not bootstrapped")]
-pub enum Error {
+    NotBootstrapped,
-    #[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")]
+    #[error("Vault is sealed")]
-    AlreadyBootstrapped,
+    Sealed,
-    #[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")]
+    #[error("Invalid key provided")]
-    NotBootstrapped,
+    InvalidKey,
-    #[error("Invalid key provided")]
+
-    InvalidKey,
+    #[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
-
+    NotFound,
-    #[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
+
-    NotFound,
+    #[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
-
+    Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
-    #[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
+
-    Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
+    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
-
+    DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
-    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
+
-    DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
+    #[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
-
+    DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-    #[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
+
-    DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+    #[error("Broken database")]
-
+    BrokenDatabase,
-    #[error("Broken database")]
+}
-    BrokenDatabase,
+
-}
+struct Unsealed {
-
+    root_key_history_id: i32,
-/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
+    root_key: KeyCell,
-/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
+}
-/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
+
-#[derive(Actor)]
+#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
-pub struct KeyHolder {
+#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(VaultState))]
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
+enum State {
-    state: State,
+    #[default]
-}
+    Unbootstrapped,
-
+    Sealed {
-#[messages]
+        root_key_history_id: i32,
-impl KeyHolder {
+    },
-    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
+    Unsealed(Unsealed),
-        let state = {
+}
-            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
+
-
+/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
-            let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
+///
-                .left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
+/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
-                .select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
+/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
-                .get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
+#[derive(Actor)]
-                .await?;
+pub struct Vault {
-
+    db: db::DatabasePool,
-            match root_key_history {
+    state: State,
-                Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
+    events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
-                    root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id,
+}
-                },
+
-                None => State::Unbootstrapped,
+#[messages]
-            }
+impl Vault {
-        };
+    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
-
+        let state = {
-        Ok(Self { db, state })
+            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-    }
+
-
+            let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
-    // Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple keyholders write
+                .left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
-    // additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
+                .select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
-    async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
+                .get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
+                .await?;
-
+
-        let nonce = conn
+            match root_key_history {
-            .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
+                Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
-                Box::pin(async move {
+                    root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id,
-                    let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
+                },
-                        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
+                None => State::Unbootstrapped,
-                        .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
+            }
-                        .first(conn)
+        };
-                        .await?;
+
-
+        Ok(Self { db, state, events })
-                    let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+    }
-                        error!(
+
-                            "Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
+    // Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write
-                            root_key_id
+    // additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
-                        );
+    async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
-                        Error::BrokenDatabase
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
-                    })?;
+
-                    nonce.increment();
+        let nonce = conn
-
+            .exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
-                    update(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
-                        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
+                    .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
-                        .set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
+                    .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
-                        .execute(conn)
+                    .first(&mut *conn)
-                        .await?;
+                    .await?;
-
+
-                    Result::<_, Error>::Ok(nonce)
+                let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
-                })
+                    error!(
-            })
+                        "Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
-            .await?;
+                        root_key_id
-
+                    );
-        Ok(nonce)
+                    Error::BrokenDatabase
-    }
+                })?;
-
+                nonce.increment();
-    #[message]
+
-    pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
+                update(schema::root_key_history::table)
-        if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
+                    .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
-            return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
+                    .set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
-        }
+                    .execute(&mut *conn)
-        let salt = v1::generate_salt();
+                    .await?;
-        let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
+
-        let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
+                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(nonce)
-
+            })
-        // Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
+            .await?;
-        let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default();
+
-        let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
+        Ok(nonce)
-
+    }
-        let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| {
+
-            let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice();
+    const fn expect_unsealed(state: &mut State) -> Result<&mut Unsealed, Error> {
-            seal_key
+        match state {
-                .encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
+            State::Unsealed(unsealed) => Ok(unsealed),
-                .map_err(|err| {
+            State::Unbootstrapped => Err(Error::NotBootstrapped),
-                    error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
+            State::Sealed { .. } => Err(Error::Sealed),
-                    Error::Encryption(err)
+        }
-                })
+    }
-        })?;
+
-
+    #[message]
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+    pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
-
+        if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
-        let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
+            return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
-        let root_key_history_id = conn
+        }
-            .transaction(|conn| {
+        let salt = v1::generate_salt();
-                Box::pin(async move {
+        let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
-                    let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
+        let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
-                        .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
+
-                            ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext,
+        // Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
-                            tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
+        let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default();
-                            root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
+        let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
-                            data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes,
+
-                            schema_version: 1,
+        let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| {
-                            salt: salt.to_vec(),
+            let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice();
-                        })
+            seal_key
-                        .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
+                .encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
-                        .get_result(conn)
+                .map_err(|err| {
-                        .await?;
+                    error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
-
+                    Error::Encryption(err)
-                    update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
+                })
-                        .set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
+        })?;
-                        .execute(conn)
+
-                        .await?;
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
+
-                    Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id)
+        let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
-                })
+        let root_key_history_id = conn
-            })
+            .transaction(async |conn| {
-            .await?;
+                let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
-
+                    .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
-        self.state = State::Unsealed {
+                        ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext.clone(),
-            root_key,
+                        tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
-            root_key_history_id,
+                        root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
-        };
+                        data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes.clone(),
-
+                        schema_version: 1,
-        info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully");
+                        salt: salt.to_vec(),
-
+                    })
-        Ok(())
+                    .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
-    }
+                    .get_result(&mut *conn)
-
+                    .await?;
-    #[message]
+
-    pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
+                update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
-        let State::Sealed {
+                    .set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
-            root_key_history_id,
+                    .execute(&mut *conn)
-        } = &self.state
+                    .await?;
-        else {
+
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+                Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id)
-        };
+            })
-
+            .await?;
-        // We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
+
-        let current_key = {
+        self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
-            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+            root_key,
-            schema::root_key_history::table
+            root_key_history_id,
-                .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
+        });
-                .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+
-                .first(&mut conn)
+        info!("Vault bootstrapped successfully");
-                .await?
+        let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await;
-        };
+
-
+        Ok(())
-        let salt = &current_key.salt;
+    }
-        let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+
-            error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
+    #[message]
-            Error::BrokenDatabase
+    pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        })?;
+        let State::Sealed {
-        let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
+            root_key_history_id,
-
+        } = &self.state
-        let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
+        else {
-
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
-        let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(
+        };
-            |_| {
+
-                error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
+        // We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
-                Error::BrokenDatabase
+        let current_key = {
-            },
+            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        )?;
+            schema::root_key_history::table
-
+                .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
-        seal_key
+                .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
-            .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
+                .first(&mut conn)
-            .map_err(|err| {
+                .await?
-                error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
+        };
-                Error::InvalidKey
+
-            })?;
+        let salt = &current_key.salt;
-
+        let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
-        self.state = State::Unsealed {
+            error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
-            root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
+            Error::BrokenDatabase
-            root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
+        })?;
-                error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
+        let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
-                Error::BrokenDatabase
+
-            })?,
+        let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
-        };
+
-
+        let nonce =
-        info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully");
+            Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
-
+                error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
-        Ok(())
+                Error::BrokenDatabase
-    }
+            })?;
-
+
-    #[message]
+        seal_key
-    pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
+            .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
-        let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
+            .map_err(|err| {
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+                error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
-        };
+                Error::InvalidKey
-
+            })?;
-        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
+
-            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+        self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
-            schema::aead_encrypted::table
+            root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
-                .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+            root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
-                .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
+                error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
-                .first(&mut conn)
+                Error::BrokenDatabase
-                .await
+            })?,
-                .optional()?
+        });
-                .ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
+
-        };
+        info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
-
+        let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Unsealed)).await;
-        let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+
-            error!(
+        Ok(())
-                "Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
+    }
-                aead_id
+
-            );
+    #[message]
-            Error::BrokenDatabase
+    pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
-        })?;
+        let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-        let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
+
-        root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
+        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
-        Ok(output)
+            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-    }
+            schema::aead_encrypted::table
-
+                .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
-    // Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
+                .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
-    #[message]
+                .first(&mut conn)
-    pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+                .await
-        let State::Unsealed {
+                .optional()?
-            root_key,
+                .ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
-            root_key_history_id,
+        };
-            ..
+
-        } = &mut self.state
+        let nonce = Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
-        else {
+            error!(
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+                "Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
-        };
+                aead_id
-
+            );
-        // Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
+            Error::BrokenDatabase
-        // Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
+        })?;
-        let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
+        let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
-
+        root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
-        let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
+        Ok(output)
-        let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
+    }
-        root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
+
-
+    // Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
-        let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
+    #[message]
-
+    pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+        let Unsealed {
-        let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
+            root_key,
-            .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
+            root_key_history_id,
-                ciphertext,
+        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-                tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
+
-                current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
+        // Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
-                schema_version: 1,
+        // Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
-                associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
+        let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
-                created_at: Utc::now().into(),
+
-            })
+        let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
-            .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
+        let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+        root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
-            .await?;
+
-
+        let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
-        Ok(aead_id)
+
-    }
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
+        let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
-    #[message]
+            .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
-    pub fn get_state(&self) -> KeyHolderState {
+                ciphertext,
-        self.state.discriminant()
+                tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
-    }
+                current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
-
+                schema_version: 1,
-    #[message]
+                associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
-    pub fn sign_integrity(&mut self, mac_input: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(i32, Vec<u8>), Error> {
+                created_at: Utc::now().into(),
-        let State::Unsealed {
+            })
-            root_key,
+            .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
-            root_key_history_id,
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
-        } = &mut self.state
+            .await?;
-        else {
+
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        Ok(aead_id)
-        };
+    }
-
+
-        let mut hmac = root_key
+    #[message]
-            .0
+    pub fn get_state(&self) -> VaultState {
-            .read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) {
+        self.state.discriminant()
-                Ok(v) => v,
+    }
-                Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
+
-            });
+    #[message]
-        hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes());
+    pub fn sign_integrity(&mut self, mac_input: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(i32, Vec<u8>), Error> {
-        hmac.update(&mac_input);
+        let Unsealed {
-
+            root_key,
-        let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
+            root_key_history_id,
-        Ok((*root_key_history_id, mac))
+        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-    }
+
-
+        let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
-    #[message]
+            HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
-    pub fn verify_integrity(
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
-        &mut self,
+        });
-        mac_input: Vec<u8>,
+        hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes());
-        expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
+        hmac.update(&mac_input);
-        key_version: i32,
+
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
+        let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
-        let State::Unsealed {
+        Ok((*root_key_history_id, mac))
-            root_key,
+    }
-            root_key_history_id,
+
-        } = &mut self.state
+    #[message]
-        else {
+    pub fn verify_integrity(
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        &mut self,
-        };
+        mac_input: Vec<u8>,
-
+        expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
-        if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
+        key_version: i32,
-            return Ok(false);
+    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        }
+        let Unsealed {
-
+            root_key,
-        let mut hmac = root_key
+            root_key_history_id,
-            .0
+        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-            .read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) {
+
-                Ok(v) => v,
+        if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
-                Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
+            return Ok(false);
-            });
+        }
-        hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes());
+
-        hmac.update(&mac_input);
+        let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
-
+            HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
-        Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
-    }
+        });
-
+        hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes());
-    #[message]
+        hmac.update(&mac_input);
-    pub fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
+
-        let State::Unsealed {
+        Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
-            root_key_history_id,
+    }
-            ..
+
-        } = &self.state
+    #[message]
-        else {
+    pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        let Unsealed {
-        };
+            root_key_history_id,
-        self.state = State::Sealed {
+            ..
-            root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
+        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-        };
+
-        Ok(())
+        self.state = State::Sealed {
-    }
+            root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
-}
+        };
-
+        let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
-#[cfg(test)]
+        Ok(())
-mod tests {
+    }
-    use diesel::SelectableHelper;
+}
-
+
-    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+#[cfg(test)]
-
+mod tests {
-    use crate::{
+    use crate::actors::GlobalActors;
-        db::{self},
+    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::SafeCellHandle as _;
-        safe_cell::SafeCell,
+
-    };
+    use super::*;
-
+
-    use super::*;
+    async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
-
+        let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
-    async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
+            .await
-        let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+            .unwrap();
-        let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
+        let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
-        actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
+        actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
-        actor
+        actor
-    }
+    }
-
+
-    #[tokio::test]
+    #[tokio::test]
-    #[test_log::test]
+    #[test_log::test]
-    async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
+    async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
+        let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
-        let root_key_history_id = match actor.state {
+
-            State::Unsealed {
+        let State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
-                root_key_history_id,
+            root_key_history_id,
-                ..
+            ..
-            } => root_key_history_id,
+        }) = actor.state
-            _ => panic!("expected unsealed state"),
+        else {
-        };
+            panic!("expected unsealed state")
-
+        };
-        let n1 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
+
-            .await
+        let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
-            .unwrap();
+            .await
-        let n2 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
+            .unwrap();
-            .await
+        let n2 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
-            .unwrap();
+            .await
-        assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
+            .unwrap();
-
+        assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
-        let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-            .select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+        let root_row: RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
-            .first(&mut conn)
+            .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
-            .await
+            .first(&mut conn)
-            .unwrap();
+            .await
-        assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
+            .unwrap();
-
+        assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
-        let id = actor
+
-            .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
+        let id = actor
-            .await
+            .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
-            .unwrap();
+            .await
-        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+            .unwrap();
-            .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id))
+        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
-            .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+            .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id))
-            .first(&mut conn)
+            .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
-            .await
+            .first(&mut conn)
-            .unwrap();
+            .await
-        assert!(
+            .unwrap();
-            row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(),
+        assert!(
-            "next write must advance nonce"
+            row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(),
-        );
+            "next write must advance nonce"
-    }
+        );
-}
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/mod.rs

@@ -1,58 +1,57 @@
-use std::sync::Arc;
+use crate::{
-
+    actors::GlobalActors,
-use thiserror::Error;
+    context::tls::TlsManager,
-
+    db::{self},
-use crate::{
+};
-    actors::GlobalActors,
+
-    context::tls::TlsManager,
+use std::sync::Arc;
-    db::{self},
+use thiserror::Error;
-};
+
-
+pub mod tls;
-pub mod tls;
+
-
+#[derive(Error, Debug)]
-#[derive(Error, Debug)]
+pub enum InitError {
-pub enum InitError {
+    #[error("Database setup failed: {0}")]
-    #[error("Database setup failed: {0}")]
+    DatabaseSetup(#[from] db::DatabaseSetupError),
-    DatabaseSetup(#[from] db::DatabaseSetupError),
+
-
+    #[error("Connection acquire failed: {0}")]
-    #[error("Connection acquire failed: {0}")]
+    DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
-    DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
+
-
+    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
-    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
+    DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-    DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+
-
+    #[error("TLS initialization failed: {0}")]
-    #[error("TLS initialization failed: {0}")]
+    Tls(#[from] tls::InitError),
-    Tls(#[from] tls::InitError),
+
-
+    #[error("Actor spawn failed: {0}")]
-    #[error("Actor spawn failed: {0}")]
+    ActorSpawn(#[from] crate::actors::SpawnError),
-    ActorSpawn(#[from] crate::actors::SpawnError),
+
-
+    #[error("I/O Error: {0}")]
-    #[error("I/O Error: {0}")]
+    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
-    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
+}
-}
+
-
+pub struct __ServerContextInner {
-pub struct _ServerContextInner {
+    pub db: db::DatabasePool,
-    pub db: db::DatabasePool,
+    pub tls: TlsManager,
-    pub tls: TlsManager,
+    pub actors: GlobalActors,
-    pub actors: GlobalActors,
+}
-}
+#[derive(Clone)]
-#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct ServerContext(Arc<__ServerContextInner>);
-pub struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
+
-
+impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
-impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
+    type Target = __ServerContextInner;
-    type Target = _ServerContextInner;
+
-
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        &self.0
-        &self.0
+    }
-    }
+}
-}
+
-
+impl ServerContext {
-impl ServerContext {
+    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
-    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+        Ok(Self(Arc::new(__ServerContextInner {
-        Ok(Self(Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
+            actors: GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await?,
-            actors: GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await?,
+            tls: TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?,
-            tls: TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?,
+            db,
-            db,
+        })))
-        })))
+    }
-    }
+}
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/tls.rs

@@ -1,250 +1,257 @@
-use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
+use crate::db::{
-
+    self,
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
+    models::{NewTlsHistory, TlsHistory},
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+    schema::{
-
+        arbiter_settings,
-use pem::Pem;
+        tls_history::{self},
-use rcgen::{
+    },
-    BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
+};
-    IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
+
-};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
-use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-use thiserror::Error;
+use pem::Pem;
-use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
+use rcgen::{
-
+    BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
-use crate::db::{
+    IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
-    self,
+};
-    models::{NewTlsHistory, TlsHistory},
+use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
-    schema::{
+use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
-        arbiter_settings,
+use thiserror::Error;
-        tls_history::{self},
+use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
-    },
+
-};
+const ENCODE_CONFIG: pem::EncodeConfig = {
-
+    let line_ending = if cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
-const ENCODE_CONFIG: pem::EncodeConfig = {
+        pem::LineEnding::CRLF
-    let line_ending = match cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
+    } else {
-        true => pem::LineEnding::CRLF,
+        pem::LineEnding::LF
-        false => pem::LineEnding::LF,
+    };
-    };
+    pem::EncodeConfig::new().set_line_ending(line_ending)
-    pem::EncodeConfig::new().set_line_ending(line_ending)
+};
-};
+
-
+#[derive(Error, Debug)]
-#[derive(Error, Debug)]
+pub enum InitError {
-pub enum InitError {
+    #[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
-    #[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
+    KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
-    KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
+
-
+    #[error("Key invalid format: {0}")]
-    #[error("Key invalid format: {0}")]
+    KeyInvalidFormat(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
-    KeyInvalidFormat(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
+
-
+    #[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")]
-    #[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")]
+    KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
-    KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
+
-
+    #[error("Database error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
-    #[error("Database error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
+    DatabaseError(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-    DatabaseError(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+
-
+    #[error("Pem deserialization error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
-    #[error("Pem deserialization error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
+    PemDeserializationError(#[from] rustls::pki_types::pem::Error),
-    PemDeserializationError(#[from] rustls::pki_types::pem::Error),
+
-
+    #[error("Database pool acquire error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
-    #[error("Database pool acquire error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
+    DatabasePoolAcquire(#[from] db::PoolError),
-    DatabasePoolAcquire(#[from] db::PoolError),
+}
-}
+
-
+pub type PemCert = String;
-pub type PemCert = String;
+
-
+pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer<'_>) -> PemCert {
-pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer) -> PemCert {
+    pem::encode_config(&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()), ENCODE_CONFIG)
-    pem::encode_config(&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()), ENCODE_CONFIG)
+}
-}
+
-
+#[expect(
-#[allow(unused)]
+    unused,
-struct SerializedTls {
+    reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
-    cert_pem: PemCert,
+)]
-    cert_key_pem: String,
+struct SerializedTls {
-}
+    cert_pem: PemCert,
-
+    cert_key_pem: String,
-struct TlsCa {
+}
-    issuer: Issuer<'static, KeyPair>,
+
-    cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
+struct TlsCa {
-}
+    issuer: Issuer<'static, KeyPair>,
-
+    cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
-impl TlsCa {
+}
-    fn generate() -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+
-        let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
+impl TlsCa {
-        let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance CA".into()])?;
+    fn generate() -> Result<Self, InitError> {
-        params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
-        params.key_usages = vec![
+        let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance CA".into()])?;
-            KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign,
+        params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
-            KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign,
+        params.key_usages = vec![
-            KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
+            KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign,
-        ];
+            KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign,
-
+            KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
-        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+        ];
-        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance CA");
+
-        params.distinguished_name = dn;
+        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
-        let certified_issuer = CertifiedIssuer::self_signed(params, keypair)?;
+        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance CA");
-
+        params.distinguished_name = dn;
-        let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem();
+        let certified_issuer = CertifiedIssuer::self_signed(params, keypair)?;
-
+
-        #[allow(
+        let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem();
-            clippy::unwrap_used,
+
-            reason = "Broken cert couldn't bootstrap server anyway"
+        #[expect(
-        )]
+            clippy::unwrap_used,
-        let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(
+            reason = "Broken cert couldn't bootstrap server anyway"
-            &certified_issuer.pem(),
+        )]
-            KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem.as_ref()).unwrap(),
+        let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(
-        )
+            &certified_issuer.pem(),
-        .unwrap();
+            KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem.as_ref()).unwrap(),
-
+        )
-        Ok(Self {
+        .unwrap();
-            issuer,
+
-            cert: certified_issuer.der().clone(),
+        Ok(Self {
-        })
+            issuer,
-    }
+            cert: certified_issuer.der().clone(),
-    fn generate_leaf(&self) -> Result<TlsCert, InitError> {
+        })
-        let cert_key = KeyPair::generate()?;
+    }
-        let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance Leaf".into()])?;
+    fn generate_leaf(&self) -> Result<TlsCert, InitError> {
-        params.is_ca = IsCa::NoCa;
+        let cert_key = KeyPair::generate()?;
-        params.key_usages = vec![
+        let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance Leaf".into()])?;
-            KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
+        params.is_ca = IsCa::NoCa;
-            KeyUsagePurpose::KeyEncipherment,
+        params.key_usages = vec![
-        ];
+            KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
-        params
+            KeyUsagePurpose::KeyEncipherment,
-            .subject_alt_names
+        ];
-            .push(SanType::IpAddress(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST.into()));
+        params
-
+            .subject_alt_names
-        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+            .push(SanType::IpAddress(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST.into()));
-        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance Leaf");
+
-        params.distinguished_name = dn;
+        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
-
+        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance Leaf");
-        let new_cert = params.signed_by(&cert_key, &self.issuer)?;
+        params.distinguished_name = dn;
-
+
-        Ok(TlsCert {
+        let new_cert = params.signed_by(&cert_key, &self.issuer)?;
-            cert: new_cert,
+
-            cert_key,
+        Ok(TlsCert {
-        })
+            cert: new_cert,
-    }
+            cert_key,
-
+        })
-    #[allow(unused)]
+    }
-    fn serialize(&self) -> Result<SerializedTls, InitError> {
+
-        let cert_key_pem = self.issuer.key().serialize_pem();
+    #[expect(
-        Ok(SerializedTls {
+        unused,
-            cert_pem: encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert),
+        clippy::unnecessary_wraps,
-            cert_key_pem,
+        reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
-        })
+    )]
-    }
+    fn serialize(&self) -> Result<SerializedTls, InitError> {
-
+        let cert_key_pem = self.issuer.key().serialize_pem();
-    #[allow(unused)]
+        Ok(SerializedTls {
-    fn try_deserialize(cert_pem: &str, cert_key_pem: &str) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+            cert_pem: encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert),
-        let keypair =
+            cert_key_pem,
-            KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem).map_err(InitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
+        })
-        let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(cert_pem, keypair)?;
+    }
-        Ok(Self {
+
-            issuer,
+    #[expect(
-            cert: CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(cert_pem.as_bytes())?,
+        unused,
-        })
+        reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
-    }
+    )]
-}
+    fn try_deserialize(cert_pem: &str, cert_key_pem: &str) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
-
+        let keypair =
-struct TlsCert {
+            KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem).map_err(InitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
-    cert: Certificate,
+        let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(cert_pem, keypair)?;
-    cert_key: KeyPair,
+        Ok(Self {
-}
+            issuer,
-
+            cert: CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(cert_pem.as_bytes())?,
-// TODO: Implement cert rotation
+        })
-pub struct TlsManager {
+    }
-    cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
+}
-    keypair: KeyPair,
+
-    ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
+struct TlsCert {
-    _db: db::DatabasePool,
+    cert: Certificate,
-}
+    cert_key: KeyPair,
-
+}
-impl TlsManager {
+
-    pub async fn generate_new(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+// TODO: Implement cert rotation
-        let ca = TlsCa::generate()?;
+pub struct TlsManager {
-        let new_cert = ca.generate_leaf()?;
+    cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
-
+    keypair: KeyPair,
-        {
+    ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
-            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
+    _db: db::DatabasePool,
-            conn.transaction(|conn| {
+}
-                Box::pin(async {
+
-                    let new_tls_history = NewTlsHistory {
+impl TlsManager {
-                        cert: new_cert.cert.pem(),
+    pub async fn generate_new(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
-                        cert_key: new_cert.cert_key.serialize_pem(),
+        let ca = TlsCa::generate()?;
-                        ca_cert: encode_cert_to_pem(&ca.cert),
+        let new_cert = ca.generate_leaf()?;
-                        ca_key: ca.issuer.key().serialize_pem(),
+
-                    };
+        {
-
+            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-                    let inserted_tls_history: i32 = diesel::insert_into(tls_history::table)
+            conn.transaction(async |conn| {
-                        .values(&new_tls_history)
+                let new_tls_history = NewTlsHistory {
-                        .returning(tls_history::id)
+                    cert: new_cert.cert.pem(),
-                        .get_result(conn)
+                    cert_key: new_cert.cert_key.serialize_pem(),
-                        .await?;
+                    ca_cert: encode_cert_to_pem(&ca.cert),
-
+                    ca_key: ca.issuer.key().serialize_pem(),
-                    diesel::update(arbiter_settings::table)
+                };
-                        .set(arbiter_settings::tls_id.eq(inserted_tls_history))
+
-                        .execute(conn)
+                let inserted_tls_history: i32 = diesel::insert_into(tls_history::table)
-                        .await?;
+                    .values(&new_tls_history)
-
+                    .returning(tls_history::id)
-                    Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(())
+                    .get_result(&mut *conn)
-                })
+                    .await?;
-            })
+
-            .await?;
+                diesel::update(arbiter_settings::table)
-        }
+                    .set(arbiter_settings::tls_id.eq(inserted_tls_history))
-
+                    .execute(&mut *conn)
-        Ok(Self {
+                    .await?;
-            cert: new_cert.cert.der().clone(),
+
-            keypair: new_cert.cert_key,
+                Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(())
-            ca_cert: ca.cert,
+            })
-            _db: db.clone(),
+            .await?;
-        })
+        }
-    }
+
-
+        Ok(Self {
-    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+            cert: new_cert.cert.der().clone(),
-        let cert_data: Option<TlsHistory> = {
+            keypair: new_cert.cert_key,
-            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
+            ca_cert: ca.cert,
-            arbiter_settings::table
+            _db: db.clone(),
-                .left_join(tls_history::table)
+        })
-                .select(Option::<TlsHistory>::as_select())
+    }
-                .first(&mut conn)
+
-                .await?
+    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
-        };
+        let cert_data: Option<TlsHistory> = {
-
+            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-        match cert_data {
+            arbiter_settings::table
-            Some(data) => {
+                .left_join(tls_history::table)
-                let try_load = || -> Result<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+                .select(Option::<TlsHistory>::as_select())
-                    let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&data.cert_key)?;
+                .first(&mut conn)
-                    let cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.cert.as_bytes())?;
+                .await?
-                    let ca_cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.ca_cert.as_bytes())?;
+        };
-                    Ok(Self {
+
-                        cert,
+        match cert_data {
-                        keypair,
+            Some(data) => {
-                        ca_cert,
+                let try_load = || -> Result<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-                        _db: db.clone(),
+                    let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&data.cert_key)?;
-                    })
+                    let cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.cert.as_bytes())?;
-                };
+                    let ca_cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.ca_cert.as_bytes())?;
-                match try_load() {
+                    Ok(Self {
-                    Ok(manager) => Ok(manager),
+                        cert,
-                    Err(e) => {
+                        keypair,
-                        eprintln!("Failed to load existing TLS certs: {e}. Generating new ones.");
+                        ca_cert,
-                        Self::generate_new(&db).await
+                        _db: db.clone(),
-                    }
+                    })
-                }
+                };
-            }
+                match try_load() {
-            None => Self::generate_new(&db).await,
+                    Ok(manager) => Ok(manager),
-        }
+                    Err(e) => {
-    }
+                        eprintln!("Failed to load existing TLS certs: {e}. Generating new ones.");
-
+                        Self::generate_new(&db).await
-    pub fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
+                    }
-        &self.cert
+                }
-    }
+            }
-    pub fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
+            None => Self::generate_new(&db).await,
-        &self.ca_cert
+        }
-    }
+    }
-
+
-    pub fn cert_pem(&self) -> PemCert {
+    pub const fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
-        encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert)
+        &self.cert
-    }
+    }
-    pub fn key_pem(&self) -> String {
+    pub const fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
-        self.keypair.serialize_pem()
+        &self.ca_cert
-    }
+    }
-}
+
+    pub fn cert_pem(&self) -> PemCert {
+        encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert)
+    }
+    pub fn key_pem(&self) -> String {
+        self.keypair.serialize_pem()
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/encryption/mod.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-pub mod v1;
+pub mod v1;
-
+
-pub use v1::*;
+pub use v1::*;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/encryption/v1.rs

@@ -1,109 +1,102 @@
-use argon2::password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt;
+use argon2::password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt;
-
+use rand::{
-use rand::{
+    Rng as _, SeedableRng,
-    Rng as _, SeedableRng,
+    rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
-    rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
+};
-};
+
-
+pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/seal/v1";
-pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
+pub const TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/private-key/v1";
-pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
+
-
+pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
-pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
+
-
+#[derive(Default)]
-#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct Nonce(pub [u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
-pub struct Nonce(pub [u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
+impl Nonce {
-impl Nonce {
+    pub fn increment(&mut self) {
-    pub fn increment(&mut self) {
+        for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
-        for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
+            if let Some(byte) = self.0.get_mut(i) {
-            if self.0[i] == 0xFF {
+                if *byte == 0xFF {
-                self.0[i] = 0;
+                    *byte = 0;
-            } else {
+                } else {
-                self.0[i] += 1;
+                    *byte += 1;
-                break;
+                    break;
-            }
+                }
-        }
+            }
-    }
+        }
-
+    }
-    pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+
-        self.0.to_vec()
+    pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-    }
+        self.0.to_vec()
-}
+    }
-impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce {
+}
-    type Error = ();
+impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce {
-
+    type Error = ();
-    fn try_from(value: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+
-        if value.len() != NONCE_LENGTH {
+    fn try_from(value: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-            return Err(());
+        if value.len() != NONCE_LENGTH {
-        }
+            return Err(());
-        let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LENGTH];
+        }
-        nonce.copy_from_slice(value);
+        let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LENGTH];
-        Ok(Self(nonce))
+        nonce.copy_from_slice(value);
-    }
+        Ok(Self(nonce))
-}
+    }
-
+}
-pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
+
-
+pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
-pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
+
-    let mut salt = Salt::default();
+pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
-    #[allow(
+    let mut salt = Salt::default();
-        clippy::unwrap_used,
+    let mut rng =
-        reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
+        StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
-    )]
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
-    let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
+    salt
-    rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
+}
-    salt
+
-}
+#[cfg(test)]
-
+mod tests {
-#[cfg(test)]
+    use super::*;
-mod tests {
+    use crate::crypto::derive_key;
-    use std::ops::Deref as _;
+    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-
+
-    use super::*;
+    #[test]
-    use crate::{
+    fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
-        crypto::derive_key,
+        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
-        safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
-    };
+        let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
-
+        let salt = generate_salt();
-    #[test]
+
-    pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
+        let mut key1 = derive_key(password, &salt);
-        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
+        let mut key2 = derive_key(password2, &salt);
-        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+
-        let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
-        let salt = generate_salt();
+        let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
-
+
-        let mut key1 = derive_key(password, &salt);
+        assert_eq!(&*key1_reader, &*key2_reader);
-        let mut key2 = derive_key(password2, &salt);
+    }
-
+
-        let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
+    #[test]
-        let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
+    fn successful_derive() {
-
+        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
-        assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
+        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
-    }
+        let salt = generate_salt();
-
+
-    #[test]
+        let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
-    pub fn successful_derive() {
+        let key_reader = key.0.read();
-        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
+
-        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        assert_ne!(key_reader.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
-        let salt = generate_salt();
+    }
-
+
-        let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
+    #[test]
-        let key_reader = key.0.read();
+    // We should fuzz this
-        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+    pub fn nonce_increment() {
-
+        let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
-        assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
+        nonce.increment();
-    }
+
-
+        assert_eq!(
-    #[test]
+            nonce.0,
-    // We should fuzz this
+            [
-    pub fn test_nonce_increment() {
+                0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
-        let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
+            ]
-        nonce.increment();
+        );
-
+    }
-        assert_eq!(
+}
-            nonce.0,
-            [
-                0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
-            ]
-        );
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/mod.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-pub mod v1;
+pub mod v1;
-
+
-pub use v1::*;
+pub use v1::*;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs

@@ -1,319 +1,334 @@
-use crate::actors::keyholder;
+use crate::{
-use hmac::Hmac;
+    actors::vault::{self, GetState, SignIntegrity, Vault, VerifyIntegrity},
-use sha2::Sha256;
+    db::{
-use std::future::Future;
+        self,
-use std::ops::Deref;
+        models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
-use std::pin::Pin;
+        schema::integrity_envelope,
-
+    },
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
+};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
-use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
+
-use sha2::Digest as _;
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
-
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-pub mod hashing;
+use hmac::Hmac;
-pub mod verified;
+use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
-use self::hashing::Hashable;
+use sha2::{Digest as _, Sha256};
-
+
-use crate::{
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-    actors::keyholder::{KeyHolder, SignIntegrity, VerifyIntegrity},
+pub enum Error {
-    db::{
+    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
-        self,
+    Database(#[from] db::DatabaseError),
-        models::{IntegrityEnvelope as IntegrityEnvelopeRow, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
+
-        schema::integrity_envelope,
+    #[error("Vault error: {0}")]
-    },
+    Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
-};
+
-
+    #[error("Vault mailbox error")]
-pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
+    VaultSend,
-pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
+
-
+    #[error("Integrity envelope is missing for entity {entity_kind}")]
-pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
+    MissingEnvelope { entity_kind: &'static str },
-pub use self::verified::{Nested, Root, VerificationOrigin, Verified};
+
-
+    #[error(
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+        "Integrity payload version mismatch for entity {entity_kind}: expected {expected}, found {found}"
-pub enum Error {
+    )]
-    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
+    PayloadVersionMismatch {
-    Database(#[from] db::DatabaseError),
+        entity_kind: &'static str,
-
+        expected: i32,
-    #[error("KeyHolder error: {0}")]
+        found: i32,
-    Keyholder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
+    },
-
+
-    #[error("KeyHolder mailbox error")]
+    #[error("Integrity MAC mismatch for entity {entity_kind}")]
-    KeyholderSend,
+    MacMismatch { entity_kind: &'static str },
-
+}
-    #[error("Integrity envelope is missing for entity {entity_kind}")]
+
-    MissingEnvelope { entity_kind: &'static str },
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-
+pub enum AttestationStatus {
-    #[error(
+    Attested,
-        "Integrity payload version mismatch for entity {entity_kind}: expected {expected}, found {found}"
+    Unavailable,
-    )]
+}
-    PayloadVersionMismatch {
+
-        entity_kind: &'static str,
+pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
-        expected: i32,
+pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
-        found: i32,
+
-    },
+pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
-
+
-    #[error("Integrity MAC mismatch for entity {entity_kind}")]
+pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
-    MacMismatch { entity_kind: &'static str },
+    const KIND: &'static str;
-}
+    const VERSION: i32 = 1;
-
+}
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+
-#[must_use]
+fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
-pub enum AttestationStatus {
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
-    Attested,
+    payload.hash(&mut hasher);
-    Unavailable,
+    hasher.finalize().into()
-}
+}
-
+
-pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
+fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
-    const KIND: &'static str;
+    #[expect(
-    const VERSION: i32 = 1;
+        clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
-}
+        clippy::as_conversions,
-
+        reason = "fixme! #85"
-impl<T: Integrable> Integrable for &T {
+    )]
-    const KIND: &'static str = T::KIND;
+    out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
-    const VERSION: i32 = T::VERSION;
+    out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
-}
+}
-
+
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+fn build_mac_input(
-pub struct EntityId(Vec<u8>);
+    entity_kind: &str,
-
+    entity_id: &[u8],
-impl Deref for EntityId {
+    payload_version: i32,
-    type Target = [u8];
+    payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
-
+) -> Vec<u8> {
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
-        &self.0
+    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
-    }
+    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
-}
+    out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
-
+    out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
-impl From<i32> for EntityId {
+    out
-    fn from(value: i32) -> Self {
+}
-        Self(value.to_be_bytes().to_vec())
+
-    }
+pub trait IntoId {
-}
+    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8>;
-
+}
-impl From<&'_ [u8]> for EntityId {
+
-    fn from(bytes: &'_ [u8]) -> Self {
+impl IntoId for i32 {
-        Self(bytes.to_vec())
+    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
-    }
+        self.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
-}
+    }
-
+}
-pub async fn lookup_verified<E, Id, C, F, Fut>(
+
-    conn: &mut C,
+impl IntoId for &'_ [u8] {
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
-    entity_id: Id,
+        self.to_vec()
-    load: F,
+    }
-) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error>
+}
-where
+
-    C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
-    E: Integrable,
+    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
+    vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
-    F: FnOnce(&mut C) -> Fut,
+    entity: &E,
-    Fut: Future<Output = Result<E, db::DatabaseError>>,
+    entity_id: impl IntoId,
-{
+) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let entity = load(conn).await?;
+    let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
-    verify_entity(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id).await
+
-}
+    let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
-
+
-pub async fn lookup_verified_from_query<E, Id, C, F>(
+    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
-    conn: &mut C,
+
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    let (key_version, mac) =
-    load: F,
+        vault
-) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error>
+            .ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
-where
+            .await
-    C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite> + Send,
+            .map_err(|err| match err {
-    E: Integrable,
+                SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Vault(inner),
-    Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
+                _ => Error::VaultSend,
-    F: for<'a> FnOnce(
+            })?;
-        &'a mut C,
+
-    ) -> Pin<
+    insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
-        Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<(Id, E), db::DatabaseError>> + Send + 'a>,
+        .values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
-    >,
+            entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
-{
+            entity_id,
-    let (entity_id, entity) = load(conn).await?;
+            payload_version: E::VERSION,
-    verify_entity(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id).await
+            key_version,
-}
+            mac: mac.clone(),
-
+        })
-pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
+        .on_conflict((
-    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+            integrity_envelope::entity_id,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+            integrity_envelope::entity_kind,
-    entity: &E,
+        ))
-    as_entity_id: Id,
+        .do_update()
-) -> Result<Verified<Id, Nested<E>>, Error> {
+        .set((
-    let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
+            integrity_envelope::payload_version.eq(E::VERSION),
-
+            integrity_envelope::key_version.eq(key_version),
-    let entity_id = as_entity_id.clone().into();
+            integrity_envelope::mac.eq(mac),
-
+        ))
-    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
+        .execute(conn)
-
+        .await
-    let (key_version, mac) = keyholder
+        .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
-        .ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
+
-        .await
+    Ok(())
-        .map_err(|err| match err {
+}
-            kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Keyholder(inner),
+
-            _ => Error::KeyholderSend,
+pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
-        })?;
+    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-
+    vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
-    insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
+    entity: &E,
-        .values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
+    entity_id: impl IntoId,
-            entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
+) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
-            entity_id: entity_id.to_vec(),
+    let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
-            payload_version: E::VERSION,
+    let envelope: IntegrityEnvelope = integrity_envelope::table
-            key_version,
+        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
-            mac: mac.to_vec(),
+        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&entity_id))
-        })
+        .first(conn)
-        .on_conflict((
+        .await
-            integrity_envelope::entity_id,
+        .map_err(|err| match err {
-            integrity_envelope::entity_kind,
+            diesel::result::Error::NotFound => Error::MissingEnvelope {
-        ))
+                entity_kind: E::KIND,
-        .do_update()
+            },
-        .set((
+            other => Error::Database(db::DatabaseError::from(other)),
-            integrity_envelope::payload_version.eq(E::VERSION),
+        })?;
-            integrity_envelope::key_version.eq(key_version),
+
-            integrity_envelope::mac.eq(mac),
+    if envelope.payload_version != E::VERSION {
-        ))
+        return Err(Error::PayloadVersionMismatch {
-        .execute(conn)
+            entity_kind: E::KIND,
-        .await
+            expected: E::VERSION,
-        .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
+            found: envelope.payload_version,
-
+        });
-    Ok(Verified::<Id, Nested<E>>::new(as_entity_id))
+    }
-}
+
-
+    let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
-pub async fn check_entity_attestation<E: Integrable>(
+    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash);
-    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    let result = vault
-    entity: &E,
+        .ask(VerifyIntegrity {
-    entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
+            mac_input,
-) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
+            expected_mac: envelope.mac,
-    let entity_id = entity_id.into();
+            key_version: envelope.key_version,
-    let envelope: IntegrityEnvelopeRow = integrity_envelope::table
+        })
-        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
+        .await;
-        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id))
+
-        .first(conn)
+    match result {
-        .await
+        Ok(true) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested),
-        .map_err(|err| match err {
+        Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
-            diesel::result::Error::NotFound => Error::MissingEnvelope {
+            entity_kind: E::KIND,
-                entity_kind: E::KIND,
+        }),
-            },
+        Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
-            other => Error::Database(db::DatabaseError::from(other)),
+        Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
-        })?;
+    }
-
+}
-    if envelope.payload_version != E::VERSION {
+
-        return Err(Error::PayloadVersionMismatch {
+pub async fn is_signing_available(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-            entity_kind: E::KIND,
+    let state = vault.ask(GetState).await.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
-            expected: E::VERSION,
+    Ok(matches!(state, vault::VaultState::Unsealed))
-            found: envelope.payload_version,
+}
-        });
+
-    }
+#[cfg(test)]
-
+mod tests {
-    let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
+    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
-    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash);
+    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-
+    use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
-    let result = keyholder
+
-        .ask(VerifyIntegrity {
+    use crate::{
-            mac_input,
+        actors::{
-            expected_mac: envelope.mac,
+            GlobalActors,
-            key_version: envelope.key_version,
+            vault::{Bootstrap, Vault},
-        })
+        },
-        .await;
+        db::{self, schema},
-
+    };
-    match result {
+    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-        Ok(true) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested),
+
-        Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
+    use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
-            entity_kind: E::KIND,
+    #[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
-        }),
+    struct DummyEntity {
-        Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)) => {
+        payload_version: i32,
-            Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable)
+        payload: Vec<u8>,
-        }
+    }
-        Err(_) => Err(Error::KeyholderSend),
+    impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
-    }
+        const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
-}
+    }
-
+
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, crate::VerifiedFields!)]
+    async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
-#[repr(C)]
+        let actor = Vault::spawn(
-pub struct Entity<E, Id> {
+            Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
-    pub entity: E,
+                .await
-    pub entity_id: Id,
+                .unwrap(),
-}
+        );
-
+        actor
-impl<E, Id> Deref for Entity<E, Id> {
+            .ask(Bootstrap {
-    type Target = E;
+                seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
-
+            })
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+            .await
-        &self.entity
+            .unwrap();
-    }
+        actor
-}
+    }
-
+
-pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
+    #[tokio::test]
-    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+    async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
-    entity: E,
+
-    entity_id: Id,
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
+        let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
-    match check_entity_attestation(conn, keyholder, &entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(Entity {
+
-            entity,
+        let entity = DummyEntity {
-            entity_id,
+            payload_version: 1,
-        })),
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)),
+        };
-    }
+
-}
+        sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-
+            .await
-pub async fn verify_entity_ref<'e, E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
+            .unwrap();
-    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+        let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
-    entity: &'e E,
+            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
-    entity_id: Id,
+            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
-) -> Result<Verified<Entity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
+            .count()
-    match check_entity_attestation(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
-        AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<Entity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(Entity {
+            .await
-            entity,
+            .unwrap();
-            entity_id,
+
-        })),
+        assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
-        AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)),
+        verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-    }
+            .await
-}
+            .unwrap();
-
+    }
-pub async fn delete_envelope<E: Integrable>(
+
-    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+    #[tokio::test]
-    entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
+    async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
-) -> Result<usize, Error> {
+        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
-    let entity_id = entity_id.into();
+
-
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let affected = diesel::delete(
+        let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
-        integrity_envelope::table
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-            .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
+
-            .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id)),
+        let entity = DummyEntity {
-    )
+            payload_version: 1,
-    .execute(conn)
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    .await
+        };
-    .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
+
-
+        sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-    Ok(affected)
+            .await
-}
+            .unwrap();
-
+
-fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
+        diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
-    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
-    payload.hash(&mut hasher);
+            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
-    hasher.finalize().into()
+            .set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
-}
+            .execute(&mut conn)
-
+            .await
-fn build_mac_input(
+            .unwrap();
-    entity_kind: &str,
+
-    entity_id: &[u8],
+        let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-    payload_version: i32,
+            .await
-    payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
+            .unwrap_err();
-) -> Vec<u8> {
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
-    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
+    }
-    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
+
-    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
+    #[tokio::test]
-    out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
+    async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
-    out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
+        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
-    out
+
-}
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-
+        let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
-fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-    out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+
-    out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
+        let entity = DummyEntity {
-}
+            payload_version: 1,
-
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-#[cfg(test)]
+        };
-mod tests;
+
+        sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let tampered = DummyEntity {
+            payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
+            ..entity
+        };
+
+        let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/tests.rs

@@ -1,298 +0,0 @@
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
-use sha2::Digest;
-
-use crate::{
-    actors::keyholder::{Bootstrap, KeyHolder},
-    db::{self, schema},
-    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
-};
-
-use super::hashing::Hashable;
-use super::{
-    Error, Integrable, check_entity_attestation, lookup_verified, lookup_verified_from_query,
-    sign_entity, verify_entity,
-};
-
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-struct DummyEntity {
-    payload_version: i32,
-    payload: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-impl Hashable for DummyEntity {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.payload_version.hash(hasher);
-        self.payload.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}
-impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
-    const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
-}
-
-async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<KeyHolder> {
-    let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
-    actor
-        .ask(Bootstrap {
-            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    actor
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
-        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
-        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
-        .count()
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
-    let _ = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
-        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
-        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
-        .set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
-        .execute(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-    assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    let tampered = DummyEntity {
-        payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
-        ..entity
-    };
-
-    let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-    assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn strict_verify_fails_closed_while_sealed() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-41";
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-    drop(keyholder);
-
-    let sealed_keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
-
-    let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-    assert!(matches!(
-        err,
-        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
-    ));
-
-    let err = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| async {
-        Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
-            payload_version: 1,
-            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap_err();
-    assert!(matches!(
-        err,
-        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
-    ));
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn lookup_verified_supports_loaded_aggregate() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 77;
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    let verified = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| async {
-        Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
-            payload_version: 1,
-            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap();
-
-    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn extension_trait_lookup_verified_required_works() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 79;
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    let verified = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| {
-        Box::pin(async {
-            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
-                payload_version: 1,
-                payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-            })
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap();
-
-    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn lookup_verified_from_query_helpers_work() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 80;
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    let verified = lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &keyholder, |_| {
-        Box::pin(async {
-            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>((
-                ENTITY_ID,
-                DummyEntity {
-                    payload_version: 1,
-                    payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-                },
-            ))
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap();
-
-    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
-
-    drop(keyholder);
-    let sealed_keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
-
-    let err = lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, |_| {
-        Box::pin(async {
-            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>((
-                ENTITY_ID,
-                DummyEntity {
-                    payload_version: 1,
-                    payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-                },
-            ))
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap_err();
-
-    assert!(matches!(
-        err,
-        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
-    ));
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/verified.rs

@@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
-use std::ops::Deref;
-
-use super::Integrable;
-
-mod private {
-    pub trait Sealed {}
-}
-
-/// Marker trait for type-level verification provenance.
-///
-/// This trait is intentionally sealed so external code cannot invent arbitrary
-/// provenance tags and bypass the intended type-level guarantees.
-pub trait VerificationOrigin: private::Sealed {
-    type Origin: VerificationOrigin;
-}
-
-/// Root provenance marker for values directly produced by integrity APIs.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Default)]
-pub struct Root;
-
-/// Nested provenance marker carrying the source integrable type and previous
-/// provenance marker in the chain.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
-pub struct Nested<From, P: VerificationOrigin = Root>(core::marker::PhantomData<(From, P)>);
-
-impl private::Sealed for Root {}
-impl VerificationOrigin for Root {
-    type Origin = Self;
-}
-
-impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> private::Sealed for Nested<T, P> {}
-impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> VerificationOrigin for Nested<T, P> {
-    type Origin = P;
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-#[repr(transparent)]
-#[must_use = "Verified<T> is a proof-bearing wrapper; use self.drop_verification_provenance() to explicitly discard integrity provenance when needed"]
-pub struct Verified<T, O: VerificationOrigin = Root> {
-    inner: T,
-    origin: core::marker::PhantomData<O>,
-}
-
-impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> AsRef<Verified<T, O>> for Verified<&T, O> {
-    fn as_ref(&self) -> &Verified<T, O> {
-        // SAFETY: `Verified<T>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so `&T`
-        // and `&Verified<T>` have identical layout.
-        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<T, Verified<T, O>>(self.inner) }
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T, U: Integrable, O: VerificationOrigin> Deref for Verified<T, Nested<U, O>> {
-    type Target = Verified<T, O::Origin>;
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        // SAFETY: `Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so `&Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>`
-        // and `&Nested<U, O>` have identical layout.
-        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<Self, Verified<T, O::Origin>>(self) }
-    }
-}
-impl<T> Deref for Verified<T, Root> {
-    type Target = T;
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        &self.inner
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> Verified<T, O> {
-    /// Unwraps the verified value, discarding the integrity provenance.
-    ///
-    /// The name is intentionally verbose — call sites where provenance is
-    /// dropped should be easy to find and audit.
-    pub fn drop_verification_provenance(self) -> T {
-        self.inner
-    }
-
-    /// Downgrades the origin provenance to any lower nestedness level,
-    /// e.g. `Verified<T, Nested<Other>>` to `Verified<T, Root>`.
-    pub fn unqualify_origin<Target: VerificationOrigin>(self) -> Verified<T, Target>
-    where
-        O: VerificationOrigin<Origin = Target>,
-    {
-        Verified {
-            inner: self.inner,
-            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Constructs a `Verified<T>` by wrapping a `T`.
-    pub(super) fn new(value: T) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            inner: value,
-            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Constructs a `Verified<T>` from a raw value without performing any
-    /// integrity check. Only available in test builds; use the integrity
-    /// module's functions to obtain a `Verified<T>` in production code.
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    pub(crate) fn new_unchecked(value: T) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            inner: value,
-            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Reinterprets `&T` as `&Verified<T>`.
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
-    pub(super) fn from_ref(from: &T) -> &Self {
-        // SAFETY: `Self` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`.
-        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<T, Self>(from) }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Bit-copies `value: From` into a `To`, suppressing the source destructor so
-/// the destination owns the bytes.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// The caller must guarantee that `From` and `To` have identical in-memory
-/// layout — the raw bytes that encode a valid `From` must also encode a valid
-/// `To`.
-///
-/// A `union` is used instead of [`std::mem::transmute`] because `transmute`
-/// rejects generic source/destination types at the call site even when their
-/// sizes are provably equal at monomorphization time.
-#[allow(dead_code)]
-#[inline]
-pub const unsafe fn reinterpret_layout<From, To>(value: From) -> To {
-    const {
-        assert!(
-            ::std::mem::size_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::size_of::<To>(),
-            "reinterpret_layout: source and destination must have identical size"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            ::std::mem::align_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::align_of::<To>(),
-            "reinterpret_layout: source and destination must have identical alignment"
-        );
-    }
-    union Reinterpret<A, B> {
-        from: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop<A>,
-        to: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop<B>,
-    }
-    // SAFETY: caller guarantees layout equivalence (see fn docs). The union
-    // write-read copies the raw bytes of `value` into a `To` slot, and
-    // `ManuallyDrop` on the source side suppresses its destructor so the
-    // destination owns the bytes unambiguously — no double-drop is possible.
-    unsafe {
-        ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop::into_inner(
-            Reinterpret {
-                from: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop::new(value),
-            }
-            .to,
-        )
-    }
-}
-
-/// Reinterprets `&From` as `&To` via a layout-preserving pointer cast.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// Same invariants as [`reinterpret_layout`].
-#[inline]
-pub const unsafe fn reinterpret_layout_ref<From, To>(value: &From) -> &To {
-    const {
-        assert!(
-            ::std::mem::size_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::size_of::<To>(),
-            "reinterpret_layout_ref: source and destination must have identical size"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            ::std::mem::align_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::align_of::<To>(),
-            "reinterpret_layout_ref: source and destination must have identical alignment"
-        );
-    }
-    // SAFETY: caller guarantees layout equivalence (see fn docs). A reference
-    // cast between identically-laid-out types produces a reference with the
-    // same address and lifetime, which is sound.
-    unsafe { &*(value as *const From as *const To) }
-}
-
-/// Implemented on `Verified<T>` by [`VerifiedFields!`], exposing the field-wise counterpart.
-///
-/// ## Disclaimer
-/// Do not implement this trait manually. It is intended to be implemented only
-/// by the `VerifiedFields!` macro, which generates the necessary layout
-/// guarantees for sound pointer casts.
-///
-/// ## Soundness
-/// When [`verify_entity`][crate::crypto::integrity::verify_entity] attests an
-/// entity, it returns `Verified<T>` — an aggregate proof over the whole value.
-/// This trait converts that wrapper into `Counterpart` (e.g.
-/// `VerifiedMyStruct`), where every field is individually wrapped in
-/// [`Verified`], allowing verified data to flow into functions that require
-/// `Verified<FieldType>` without re-verifying.
-///
-/// ## Safety
-/// The conversion is a zero-cost reinterpretation — no copying (beyond a
-/// bitwise move in the owned variant) or HMAC work occurs. Soundness rests on
-/// identical memory layout between `Verified<T>` and `Counterpart`:
-///
-/// - `T` carries `#[repr(C)]` (enforced by `@require_repr` in the macro).
-/// - `T` does **not** carry `packed` (enforced by `@reject_packed`).
-/// - `Counterpart` also carries `#[repr(C)]`, with the same fields in the same
-///   order.
-/// - Each `Verified<F>` field is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, so its size
-///   and alignment match `F` exactly.
-/// - `Verified<T>` itself is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`.
-///
-/// As an additional machine-checked guard, [`reinterpret_layout`] and
-/// [`reinterpret_layout_ref`] assert size/align equality of the two types at
-/// monomorphization time.
-///
-/// The trait is implemented directly on `Verified<T>` (not on `T`), so no
-/// `Deref`-coercion or auto-ref stripping is needed at call sites — the impl
-/// is unambiguous.
-pub trait VerifiedFieldsAccessor {
-    /// The field-wise verified counterpart, e.g. `VerifiedMyStruct`.
-    type Counterpart;
-
-    /// Reinterprets `&self` as `&Counterpart` via a layout-preserving pointer cast.
-    ///
-    /// No data is copied and no re-verification occurs. The returned reference
-    /// borrows from `self` and has the same lifetime.
-    fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart;
-
-    /// Consumes `self` and returns `Counterpart` via a layout-preserving
-    /// bitwise move.
-    ///
-    /// The original `Verified<T>` is moved without running its destructor
-    /// (there is none — `Verified` is a transparent wrapper with no heap
-    /// allocation), and the returned counterpart owns the original bytes. No
-    /// re-verification occurs.
-    fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart;
-}
-
-// todo! rewrite macro_rules to derive crate
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! VerifiedFields {
-    // --- Entry point (no source generics) ---
-    (
-        $(#$attr:tt)*
-        $vis:vis struct $name:ident
-        {
-            $(
-                $field_vis:vis $field_name:ident : $field_ty:ty
-            ),* $(,)?
-        }
-    ) => {
-        // Attribute-list checks run in isolation — they only receive the attrs,
-        // not the struct body.
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$(#$attr)*]);
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$(#$attr)*]);
-
-        paste::paste! {
-            #[doc = concat!(
-                "Field-wise verified counterpart of [`", stringify!($name), "`]."
-            )]
-            //
-            // `#[repr(C)]` is required for the pointer casts in `inherit_ref`
-            // and `inherit` to be sound. Both the source struct (enforced by
-            // `@require_repr`) and this counterpart carry `#[repr(C)]`, which
-            // guarantees matching field offsets. Combined with each
-            // `Verified<F>` being `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, the two
-            // structs have identical memory layout.
-            //
-            // `#[repr(transparent)]` is not usable here because it only permits
-            // a single non-ZST field; multi-field structs would fail to compile.
-            #[repr(C)]
-            $vis struct [<Verified $name>]<P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
-            {
-                $(
-                    $field_vis $field_name : $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$field_ty, P>
-                ),*
-            }
-
-            impl<P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
-                $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor
-                for $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$name, P>
-            {
-                type Counterpart = [<Verified $name>]<P>;
-
-                fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart {
-                    // SAFETY: `Self` is `Verified<T>` (transparent over
-                    // `T #[repr(C)]`) and `Self::Counterpart` is `#[repr(C)]`
-                    // with the same fields in the same order, each wrapped in
-                    // a `#[repr(transparent)]` `Verified<F>`. The two types
-                    // therefore have identical memory layout, which
-                    // `reinterpret_layout_ref` re-checks as size/align
-                    // equality at monomorphization.
-                    unsafe {
-                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout_ref::<
-                            Self,
-                            Self::Counterpart,
-                        >(self)
-                    }
-                }
-
-                fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart {
-                    // SAFETY: identical layout — see `inherit_ref`. The owned
-                    // helper additionally suppresses the source destructor so
-                    // the returned counterpart owns the original bytes (no
-                    // double-drop is possible).
-                    unsafe {
-                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout::<
-                            Self,
-                            Self::Counterpart,
-                        >(self)
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    };
-
-    // --- Entry point (source has generics) ---
-    (
-        $(#$attr:tt)*
-        $vis:vis struct $name:ident <$($gen:tt),*>
-        {
-            $(
-                $field_vis:vis $field_name:ident : $field_ty:ty
-            ),* $(,)?
-        }
-    ) => {
-        // Attribute-list checks run in isolation — they only receive the attrs,
-        // not the struct body.
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$(#$attr)*]);
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$(#$attr)*]);
-
-        paste::paste! {
-            #[doc = concat!(
-                "Field-wise verified counterpart of [`", stringify!($name), "`]."
-            )]
-            //
-            // `#[repr(C)]` is required for the pointer casts in `inherit_ref`
-            // and `inherit` to be sound. Both the source struct (enforced by
-            // `@require_repr`) and this counterpart carry `#[repr(C)]`, which
-            // guarantees matching field offsets. Combined with each
-            // `Verified<F>` being `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, the two
-            // structs have identical memory layout.
-            //
-            // `#[repr(transparent)]` is not usable here because it only permits
-            // a single non-ZST field; multi-field structs would fail to compile.
-            #[repr(C)]
-            $vis struct [<Verified $name>]<$($gen),*, P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
-            {
-                $(
-                    $field_vis $field_name : $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$field_ty, P>
-                ),*
-            }
-
-            impl<$($gen),*, P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
-                $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor
-                for $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$name<$($gen),*>, P>
-            {
-                type Counterpart = [<Verified $name>]<$($gen),*, P>;
-
-                fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart {
-                    // SAFETY: `Self` is `Verified<T>` (transparent over
-                    // `T #[repr(C)]`) and `Self::Counterpart` is `#[repr(C)]`
-                    // with the same fields in the same order, each wrapped in
-                    // a `#[repr(transparent)]` `Verified<F>`. The two types
-                    // therefore have identical memory layout, which
-                    // `reinterpret_layout_ref` re-checks as size/align
-                    // equality at monomorphization.
-                    unsafe {
-                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout_ref::<
-                            Self,
-                            Self::Counterpart,
-                        >(self)
-                    }
-                }
-
-                fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart {
-                    // SAFETY: identical layout — see `inherit_ref`. The owned
-                    // helper additionally suppresses the source destructor so
-                    // the returned counterpart owns the original bytes (no
-                    // double-drop is possible).
-                    unsafe {
-                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout::<
-                            Self,
-                            Self::Counterpart,
-                        >(self)
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    };
-
-    // --- @require_repr: ensure `#[repr(C)]` appears in the attribute list ---
-    (@require_repr [#[repr(C)] $($rest:tt)*]) => {};
-    (@require_repr [#$other:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$($rest)*]);
-    };
-    (@require_repr []) => {
-        ::std::compile_error!(
-            "VerifiedFields requires `#[repr(C)]` on the struct to guarantee field layout"
-        );
-    };
-
-    // --- @reject_packed: walk attrs and reject any `#[repr(..., packed, ...)]`.
-    //
-    // Without this, a packed struct would still fail at monomorphization via
-    // the const assertions inside the `reinterpret_layout*` helpers, but the
-    // diagnostic would be much harder to read. `align(N)` is *not* rejected
-    // here because const assertions catch alignment mismatches cleanly, and
-    // forbidding it would be unnecessarily restrictive.
-    (@reject_packed [#[repr($($inner:tt)*)] $($rest:tt)*]) => {
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed_inner [$($inner)*]);
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$($rest)*]);
-    };
-    (@reject_packed [#$other:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$($rest)*]);
-    };
-    (@reject_packed []) => {};
-
-    (@reject_packed_inner [packed $($rest:tt)*]) => {
-        ::std::compile_error!(
-            "VerifiedFields does not support packed layouts; the generated \
-             counterpart would not share layout with the source struct"
-        );
-    };
-    (@reject_packed_inner [$first:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed_inner [$($rest)*]);
-    };
-    (@reject_packed_inner []) => {};
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
-    #[repr(C)]
-    #[derive(Default, Clone)]
-    pub struct MyStruct<T> {
-        pub field1: String,
-        pub field2: T,
-    }
-
-    fn verify<T>(t: T) -> Verified<T> {
-        Verified {
-            inner: t,
-            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
-        }
-    }
-
-    // --- inherit_ref ---
-
-    // Verifies that `inherit_ref` returns a reference to the same memory
-    // address, confirming that no copy is made and the cast is purely a
-    // reinterpretation.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_ref_is_same_address() {
-        let v = verify(MyStruct {
-            field1: "hello".into(),
-            field2: 42u32,
-        });
-        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
-        assert_eq!(
-            &v as *const _ as *const u8, fields as *const _ as *const u8,
-            "inherit_ref must return a pointer to the same memory, not a copy"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // Verifies that field values are correctly accessible after `inherit_ref`.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_ref_field_values() {
-        let v = verify(MyStruct {
-            field1: "hello".into(),
-            field2: 99u32,
-        });
-        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
-        assert_eq!(*fields.field1, "hello");
-        assert_eq!(*fields.field2, 99u32);
-    }
-
-    // Verifies that casting the counterpart back to `Verified<T>` via a raw
-    // pointer lands on the original address — confirms the round-trip is a
-    // pure reinterpretation.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_ref_cast_roundtrip() {
-        let v = verify(MyStruct {
-            field1: "x".into(),
-            field2: 7u32,
-        });
-        let fields: &VerifiedMyStruct<u32, Root> = v.inherit_ref();
-        let back_ptr =
-            fields as *const VerifiedMyStruct<u32, Root> as *const Verified<MyStruct<u32>>;
-        assert_eq!(
-            back_ptr as *const u8, &v as *const _ as *const u8,
-            "cast of counterpart must point back to the same Verified<T>"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // ZST fields must still produce a counterpart with identical layout — the
-    // const asserts in `reinterpret_layout_ref` guard this at monomorphization.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_ref_with_zst_field() {
-        #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
-        #[repr(C)]
-        struct WithZst {
-            pub unit: (),
-            pub val: u64,
-        }
-
-        let v = Verified::<WithZst>::new_unchecked(WithZst { unit: (), val: 777 });
-        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
-        assert_eq!(*fields.val, 777);
-        assert_eq!(*fields.unit, ());
-    }
-
-    // --- inherit ---
-
-    // Verifies that `inherit` preserves field values in the owned counterpart.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_field_values() {
-        let v = verify(MyStruct {
-            field1: "world".into(),
-            field2: 1234u64,
-        });
-        let VerifiedMyStruct { field1, field2 } = v.inherit();
-        assert_eq!(*field1, "world");
-        assert_eq!(*field2, 1234u64);
-    }
-
-    // Verifies that `inherit` does not double-drop the inner value.
-    // If `ManuallyDrop` handling is wrong, running under Miri or with a drop
-    // counter catches a double-free.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_no_double_drop() {
-        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-
-        static DROP_COUNT: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
-
-        struct DropCounter;
-        impl Drop for DropCounter {
-            fn drop(&mut self) {
-                DROP_COUNT.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
-            }
-        }
-
-        #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
-        #[repr(C)]
-        struct WithDrop {
-            pub val: DropCounter,
-        }
-
-        DROP_COUNT.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
-        {
-            let v = Verified::<WithDrop>::new_unchecked(WithDrop { val: DropCounter });
-            let _ = v.inherit();
-        }
-        assert_eq!(
-            DROP_COUNT.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
-            1,
-            "DropCounter must be dropped exactly once"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // --- Verified::from_ref ---
-
-    #[test]
-    fn from_ref_is_same_address() {
-        let val = 42u32;
-        let verified: &Verified<u32> = Verified::from_ref(&val);
-        assert_eq!(
-            &val as *const u32 as *const u8, verified as *const _ as *const u8,
-            "from_ref must alias the original reference, not copy the value"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn from_ref_value_preserved() {
-        let val = String::from("test");
-        let verified: &Verified<String> = Verified::from_ref(&val);
-        assert_eq!(**verified, "test");
-    }
-
-    // --- AsRef<Verified<T>> for Verified<&T> ---
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verified_ref_as_ref_is_same_address() {
-        let val = 99u32;
-        let vref: Verified<&u32> = Verified::new_unchecked(&val);
-        let v: &Verified<u32> = vref.as_ref();
-        assert_eq!(
-            &val as *const u32 as *const u8, v as *const _ as *const u8,
-            "AsRef<Verified<T>> for Verified<&T> must alias the referent, not copy it"
-        );
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs

@@ -1,169 +1,155 @@
-use std::ops::Deref as _;
+use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-
+use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
-use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
+
-use chacha20poly1305::{
+use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
-    AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
+use chacha20poly1305::{
-    aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload},
+    AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
-};
+    aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload},
-use rand::{
+};
-    Rng as _, SeedableRng as _,
+use rand::{
-    rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
+    Rng as _, SeedableRng as _,
-};
+    rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
-
+};
-use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+
-
+pub mod encryption;
-pub mod encryption;
+pub mod integrity;
-pub mod integrity;
+
-
+pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
-use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
+impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
-
+    fn from(value: SafeCell<Key>) -> Self {
-pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
+        Self(value)
-impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
+    }
-    fn from(value: SafeCell<Key>) -> Self {
+}
-        Self(value)
+impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
-    }
+    type Error = ();
-}
+
-impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
+    fn try_from(mut value: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-    type Error = ();
+        let value = value.read();
-
+        if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
-    fn try_from(mut value: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+            return Err(());
-        let value = value.read();
+        }
-        if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
+        let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
-            return Err(());
+            cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
-        }
+        });
-        let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
+        Ok(Self(cell))
-            cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
+    }
-        });
+}
-        Ok(Self(cell))
+
-    }
+impl KeyCell {
-}
+    pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
-
+        let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
-impl KeyCell {
+            let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng)
-    pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
+                .expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
-        let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
+            rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
-            #[allow(
+        });
-                clippy::unwrap_used,
+
-                reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
+        key.into()
-            )]
+    }
-            let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
+
-            rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
+    pub fn encrypt_in_place(
-        });
+        &mut self,
-
+        nonce: &Nonce,
-        key.into()
+        associated_data: &[u8],
-    }
+        mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
-
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    pub fn encrypt_in_place(
+        let key_reader = self.0.read();
-        &mut self,
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
-        nonce: &Nonce,
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
-        associated_data: &[u8],
+        let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
-        mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
+        cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    }
-        let key_reader = self.0.read();
+    pub fn decrypt_in_place(
-        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+        &mut self,
-        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
+        nonce: &Nonce,
-        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
+        associated_data: &[u8],
-        let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
+        buffer: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-        cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    }
+        let key_reader = self.0.read();
-    pub fn decrypt_in_place(
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
-        &mut self,
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
-        nonce: &Nonce,
+        let mut buffer = buffer.write();
-        associated_data: &[u8],
+        let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
-        buffer: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
+        cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    }
-        let key_reader = self.0.read();
+
-        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+    pub fn encrypt(
-        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
+        &mut self,
-        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
+        nonce: &Nonce,
-        let mut buffer = buffer.write();
+        associated_data: &[u8],
-        let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
+        plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
-        cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
+    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
-    }
+        let key_reader = self.0.read();
-
+        let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
-    pub fn encrypt(
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
-        &mut self,
+
-        nonce: &Nonce,
+        let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
-        associated_data: &[u8],
+            nonce,
-        plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
+            Payload {
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
+                msg: plaintext.as_ref(),
-        let key_reader = self.0.read();
+                aad: associated_data,
-        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+            },
-        let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
+        )?;
-        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
+        Ok(ciphertext)
-
+    }
-        let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
+}
-            nonce,
+
-            Payload {
+/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
-                msg: plaintext.as_ref(),
+pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
-                aad: associated_data,
+    let params = {
-            },
+        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
-        )?;
+        {
-        Ok(ciphertext)
+            argon2::Params::new(8, 1, 1, None).unwrap()
-    }
+        }
-}
+
-
+        #[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
-/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
+        {
-pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
+            argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap()
-    let params = {
+        }
-        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+    };
-        {
+
-            argon2::Params::new(8, 1, 1, None).unwrap()
+    let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
-        }
+    let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
-
+    password.read_inline(|password_source| {
-        #[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
+        let mut key_buffer = key.write();
-        {
+        let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
-            argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap()
+
-        }
+        hasher
-    };
+            .hash_password_into(password_source, salt, key_buffer)
-
+            .expect("Better fail completely than return a weak key");
-    #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+    });
-    let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
+
-    let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
+    key.into()
-    password.read_inline(|password_source| {
+}
-        let mut key_buffer = key.write();
+
-        let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
+#[cfg(test)]
-
+mod tests {
-        #[allow(
+    use super::{
-            clippy::unwrap_used,
+        derive_key,
-            reason = "Better fail completely than return a weak key"
+        encryption::v1::{Nonce, generate_salt},
-        )]
+    };
-        hasher
+    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-            .hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
+
-            .unwrap();
+    #[test]
-    });
+    fn encrypt_decrypt() {
-
+        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
-    key.into()
+        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
-}
+        let salt = generate_salt();
-
+
-#[cfg(test)]
+        let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
-mod tests {
+        let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
-    use super::{
+        let associated_data = b"associated data";
-        derive_key,
+        let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();
-        encryption::v1::{Nonce, generate_salt},
+
-    };
+        key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
-    use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+            .unwrap();
-
+        assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
-    #[test]
+
-    pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
+        let mut buffer = SafeCell::new(buffer);
-        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
+
-        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
-        let salt = generate_salt();
+            .unwrap();
-
+
-        let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
+        let buffer = buffer.read();
-        let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
+        assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
-        let associated_data = b"associated data";
+    }
-        let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();
+}
-
-        key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
-
-        let mut buffer = SafeCell::new(buffer);
-
-        key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let buffer = buffer.read();
-        assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/mod.rs

@@ -1,153 +1,156 @@
-use diesel::{Connection as _, SqliteConnection, connection::SimpleConnection as _};
+use diesel::{Connection as _, SqliteConnection, connection::SimpleConnection as _};
-use diesel_async::{
+use diesel_async::{
-    AsyncConnection, SimpleAsyncConnection,
+    AsyncConnection, SimpleAsyncConnection,
-    pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig},
+    pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig},
-    sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
+    sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
-};
+};
-use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
+use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
-
+use thiserror::Error;
-use thiserror::Error;
+use tracing::info;
-use tracing::info;
+
-
+pub mod models;
-pub mod models;
+pub mod schema;
-pub mod schema;
+
-
+pub type DatabaseConnection = SyncConnectionWrapper<SqliteConnection>;
-pub type DatabaseConnection = SyncConnectionWrapper<SqliteConnection>;
+pub type DatabasePool = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::Pool<DatabaseConnection>;
-pub type DatabasePool = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::Pool<DatabaseConnection>;
+pub type PoolInitError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::PoolError;
-pub type PoolInitError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::PoolError;
+pub type PoolError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::RunError;
-pub type PoolError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::RunError;
+
-
+static DB_FILE: &str = "arbiter.sqlite";
-static DB_FILE: &str = "arbiter.sqlite";
+
-
+const MIGRATIONS: EmbeddedMigrations = embed_migrations!("migrations");
-const MIGRATIONS: EmbeddedMigrations = embed_migrations!("migrations");
+
-
+#[derive(Error, Debug)]
-#[derive(Error, Debug)]
+pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
-pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
+    #[error(transparent)]
-    #[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
+    ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
-    HomeDir(std::io::Error),
+
-
+    #[error(transparent)]
-    #[error(transparent)]
+    Connection(diesel::ConnectionError),
-    Connection(diesel::ConnectionError),
+
-
+    #[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
-    #[error(transparent)]
+    HomeDir(std::io::Error),
-    ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
+
-
+    #[error(transparent)]
-    #[error(transparent)]
+    Migration(Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>),
-    Migration(Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>),
+
-
+    #[error(transparent)]
-    #[error(transparent)]
+    Pool(#[from] PoolInitError),
-    Pool(#[from] PoolInitError),
+}
-}
+
-
+#[derive(Error, Debug)]
-#[derive(Error, Debug)]
+pub enum DatabaseError {
-pub enum DatabaseError {
+    #[error("Database query error")]
-    #[error("Database connection error")]
+    Connection(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-    Pool(#[from] PoolError),
+
-    #[error("Database query error")]
+    #[error("Database connection error")]
-    Connection(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+    Pool(#[from] PoolError),
-}
+}
-
+
-#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
+#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
-fn database_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, DatabaseSetupError> {
+fn database_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, DatabaseSetupError> {
-    let arbiter_home = arbiter_proto::home_path().map_err(DatabaseSetupError::HomeDir)?;
+    let arbiter_home = arbiter_proto::home_path().map_err(DatabaseSetupError::HomeDir)?;
-
+
-    let db_path = arbiter_home.join(DB_FILE);
+    let db_path = arbiter_home.join(DB_FILE);
-
+
-    Ok(db_path)
+    Ok(db_path)
-}
+}
-
+
-#[tracing::instrument(level = "info", skip(conn))]
+#[tracing::instrument(level = "info", skip(conn))]
-fn db_config(conn: &mut SqliteConnection) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
+fn db_config(conn: &mut SqliteConnection) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
-    // fsync only in critical moments
+    // fsync only in critical moments
-    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA synchronous = NORMAL;")?;
+    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA synchronous = NORMAL;")?;
-    // write WAL changes back every 1000 pages, for an in average 1MB WAL file.
+    // write WAL changes back every 1000 pages, for an in average 1MB WAL file.
-    // May affect readers if number is increased
+    // May affect readers if number is increased
-    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_autocheckpoint = 1000;")?;
+    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_autocheckpoint = 1000;")?;
-    // free some space by truncating possibly massive WAL files from the last run
+    // free some space by truncating possibly massive WAL files from the last run
-    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE);")?;
+    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE);")?;
-
+
-    // sqlite foreign keys are disabled by default, enable them for safety
+    // sqlite foreign keys are disabled by default, enable them for safety
-    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;")?;
+    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;")?;
-
+
-    // better space reclamation
+    // better space reclamation
-    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA auto_vacuum = FULL;")?;
+    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA auto_vacuum = FULL;")?;
-
+
-    // secure delete, overwrite deleted content with zeros to prevent recovery
+    // secure delete, overwrite deleted content with zeros to prevent recovery
-    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA secure_delete = ON;")?;
+    conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA secure_delete = ON;")?;
-
+
-    Ok(())
+    Ok(())
-}
+}
-
+
-#[tracing::instrument(level = "info", skip(url))]
+#[tracing::instrument(level = "info", skip(url))]
-fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
+fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
-    let mut conn = SqliteConnection::establish(url).map_err(DatabaseSetupError::Connection)?;
+    let mut conn = SqliteConnection::establish(url).map_err(DatabaseSetupError::Connection)?;
-
+
-    db_config(&mut conn).map_err(DatabaseSetupError::ConcurrencySetup)?;
+    db_config(&mut conn).map_err(DatabaseSetupError::ConcurrencySetup)?;
-
+
-    conn.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS)
+    conn.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS)
-        .map_err(DatabaseSetupError::Migration)?;
+        .map_err(DatabaseSetupError::Migration)?;
-
+
-    info!(%url, "Database initialized successfully");
+    info!(%url, "Database initialized successfully");
-
+
-    Ok(())
+    Ok(())
-}
+}
-
+
-#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
+#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
-pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
+/// Creates a connection pool for the `SQLite` database.
-    let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
+///
-        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
+/// # Panics
-        database_path()?
+/// Panics if the database path is not valid UTF-8.
-            .to_str()
+pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
-            .expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
+    let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
-            .to_string(),
+        database_path()?
-    );
+            .to_str()
-
+            .expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
-    initialize_database(&database_url)?;
+            .to_owned(),
-
+    );
-    let mut config = ManagerConfig::default();
+
-    config.custom_setup = Box::new(|url| {
+    initialize_database(&database_url)?;
-        Box::pin(async move {
+
-            let mut conn = DatabaseConnection::establish(url).await?;
+    let mut config = ManagerConfig::default();
-
+    config.custom_setup = Box::new(|url| {
-            // see https://fractaledmind.github.io/2023/09/07/enhancing-rails-sqlite-fine-tuning/
+        Box::pin(async move {
-            // sleep if the database is busy, this corresponds to up to 9 seconds sleeping time.
+            let mut conn = DatabaseConnection::establish(url).await?;
-            conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout = 9000;")
+
-                .await
+            // see https://fractaledmind.github.io/2023/09/07/enhancing-rails-sqlite-fine-tuning/
-                .map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?;
+            // sleep if the database is busy, this corresponds to up to 9 seconds sleeping time.
-            // better write-concurrency
+            conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout = 9000;")
-            conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;")
+                .await
-                .await
+                .map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?;
-                .map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?;
+            // better write-concurrency
-
+            conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;")
-            Ok(conn)
+                .await
-        })
+                .map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?;
-    });
+
-
+            Ok(conn)
-    let pool = DatabasePool::builder()
+        })
-        .build(AsyncDieselConnectionManager::new_with_config(
+    });
-            database_url,
+
-            config,
+    let pool = DatabasePool::builder()
-        ))
+        .build(AsyncDieselConnectionManager::new_with_config(
-        .await?;
+            database_url,
-
+            config,
-    Ok(pool)
+        ))
-}
+        .await?;
-
+
-#[mutants::skip]
+    Ok(pool)
-pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
+}
-    use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
+
-
+#[mutants::skip]
-    let tempfile_name = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), 16);
+#[expect(clippy::missing_panics_doc, reason = "Tests oriented function")]
-
+/// Creates a test database pool with a temporary `SQLite` database file.
-    let file = std::env::temp_dir().join(tempfile_name);
+pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
-    #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
+    use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
-    let url = file
+
-        .to_str()
+    let tempfile_name = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), 16);
-        .expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
+
-        .to_string();
+    let file = std::env::temp_dir().join(tempfile_name);
-
+    let url = file
-    #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
+        .to_str()
-    create_pool(Some(&url))
+        .expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
-        .await
+        .to_owned();
-        .expect("Failed to create test database pool")
+
-}
+    create_pool(Some(&url))
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to create test database pool")
+}