30 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Skipper
9ab074170b merge: feat-lints into main
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2026-04-18 15:04:33 +02:00
18b8a3bbf5 Merge pull request 'refactor-integrity-check' (#90) from refactor-integrity-check into main
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Reviewed-on: #90
2026-04-18 11:54:30 +00:00
Skipper
38cf1b98b9 housekeeping(server): clippy warns fix
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2026-04-18 13:53:11 +02:00
Skipper
9cf87b2058 merge: refactor-integrity-check into main
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2026-04-18 13:46:28 +02:00
Skipper
929d50b589 housekeeping(server): clean too-broad visibility markers and organize imports
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2026-04-18 13:30:09 +02:00
Skipper
70acfc99b5 merge: refactor-integrity-check into main 2026-04-18 13:19:13 +02:00
28f84d03ab Merge pull request 'housekeeping(server): dependencies upgrade' (#89) from push-zmvtzuwrnyyv into main
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Reviewed-on: #89
2026-04-17 19:20:50 +00:00
Skipper
4a8e51ef32 docs: updated to new auth challenge format and removed stale TOCTOU race condition note
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2026-04-17 18:25:55 +02:00
Skipper
9ee86afc19 fix(useragent): now using new challenge format 2026-04-17 18:19:51 +02:00
Skipper
790026e93b fix(server::tests): api surface of auth challenge changed 2026-04-17 17:58:22 +02:00
Skipper
0e09afda5d refactor(server::{useragent::auth, client::auth}): use random based + timestamp nonce instead of monotonic counter in database 2026-04-17 17:44:42 +02:00
Skipper
51e6571d80 refactor(server): now keeps track of useragents, instead of 2026-04-17 00:00:43 +02:00
Skipper
3b828d5874 refactor(server::grpc::vault_gate): standard approach using / traits 2026-04-16 22:15:18 +02:00
Skipper
a6f94e3115 fix(server): sending fixed vault state when on stage 2026-04-16 19:36:41 +02:00
hdbg
f49e995c2f WIP: kameo::messages wiring for transport generalization
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2026-04-16 17:18:46 +02:00
Skipper
e88df432fb housekeeping(server): dependencies upgrade
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2026-04-14 19:10:07 +02:00
hdbg
87ee0fe87b feat(user-agent): add VaultGate for sealed vault authentication 2026-04-12 11:53:05 +02:00
CleverWild
41b3fc5d39 fix(lints): remove unstable ones
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2026-04-10 01:00:21 +02:00
CleverWild
f6a0c32b9d feat: rustc and clippy linting
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2026-04-10 00:42:43 +02:00
hdbg
205227a3df fix(server::integrity): vault now differentias between expected/unexpected states for commands more granularly 2026-04-08 18:21:48 +02:00
hdbg
a4070e7df7 fix(useragent): unsafe, but working implementation of ml-dsa 2026-04-08 17:43:51 +02:00
hdbg
6b8da567dd fix(server::user_agent): useragents now self-sign themselves on bootstrap 2026-04-08 17:40:45 +02:00
hdbg
1585f90cae refactor(server): reorganized client/user_agent actors into separate module peers and added event MessageBus 2026-04-08 12:34:16 +02:00
62dff3f810 Merge pull request 'refactor(hashing): introduce Hashable derive macro and migrate server types' (#82) from hashing-proc-macro into main
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Reviewed-on: #82
Reviewed-by: Stas <business@jexter.tech>
2026-04-08 00:18:40 +00:00
CleverWild
6e22f368c9 refactor(hashing): introduce Hashable derive macro and migrate server types
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2026-04-08 01:32:59 +02:00
f3cf6a9438 Merge pull request 'Post-quantum crypto and better useragent security' (#80) from push-xrxykvkuxpsv into main
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Reviewed-on: #80
2026-04-07 19:26:54 +00:00
hdbg
a9f9fc2a9d housekeeping(server): fixed clippy warns
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2026-04-07 16:28:47 +02:00
hdbg
d22ab49e3d refactor(server): moved shared module crypto into arbiter-crypto 2026-04-07 16:24:51 +02:00
hdbg
a845181ef6 docs: ml-dsa scheme everywhere
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2026-04-07 15:02:32 +02:00
hdbg
0d424f3afc refactor(server): migrated auth to ml-dsa 2026-04-07 14:55:31 +02:00
217 changed files with 16393 additions and 5065 deletions

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@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ cargo insta review
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
@@ -100,6 +100,27 @@ diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migration
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
### Code Conventions
**`#[must_use]` Attribute:**
Apply the `#[must_use]` attribute to return types of functions where the return value is critical and should not be accidentally ignored. This is commonly used for:
- Methods that return `bool` indicating success/failure or validation state
- Any function where ignoring the return value indicates a logic error
Do not apply `#[must_use]` redundantly to items (types or functions) that are already annotated with `#[must_use]`.
Example:
```rust
#[must_use]
pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
// verification logic
}
```
This forces callers to either use the return value or explicitly ignore it with `let _ = ...;`, preventing silent failures.
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.

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@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ cargo insta review
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
@@ -100,6 +100,27 @@ diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migration
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
### Code Conventions
**`#[must_use]` Attribute:**
Apply the `#[must_use]` attribute to return types of functions where the return value is critical and should not be accidentally ignored. This is commonly used for:
- Methods that return `bool` indicating success/failure or validation state
- Any function where ignoring the return value indicates a logic error
Do not apply `#[must_use]` redundantly to items (types or functions) that are already annotated with `#[must_use]`.
Example:
```rust
#[must_use]
pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
// verification logic
}
```
This forces callers to either use the return value or explicitly ignore it with `let _ = ...;`, preventing silent failures.
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.

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@@ -29,56 +29,37 @@ flowchart TD
A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest]
B --> C{pubkey in DB?}
C -- yes --> D[Read nonce\nIncrement nonce in DB]
D --> G
C -- yes --> G[Generate AuthChallenge]
C -- no --> E[Ask all UserAgents:\nClientConnectionRequest]
E --> F{First response}
F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection])
F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nUserAgent requests]
F2 --> F3[INSERT client\nnonce = 1]
F3 --> G[Send AuthChallenge\nwith nonce]
F2 --> F3[INSERT client]
F3 --> G
G --> H[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
H --> I{Signature valid?}
I -- no --> Z
I -- yes --> J([Session started])
G --> H[Send AuthChallenge\ntimestamp + random bytes]
H --> I[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
I --> K{Signature valid?}
K -- no --> Z
K -- yes --> J([Session started])
```
### Known Issue: Concurrent Registration Race (TOCTOU)
Two connections presenting the same previously-unknown public key can race through the approval flow simultaneously:
1. Both check the DB → neither is registered.
2. Both request approval from user agents → both receive approval.
3. Both `INSERT` the client record → the second insert silently overwrites the first, resetting the nonce.
This means the first connection's nonce is invalidated by the second, causing its challenge verification to fail. A fix requires either serialising new-client registration (e.g. an in-memory lock keyed on pubkey) or replacing the separate check + insert with an `INSERT OR IGNORE` / upsert guarded by a unique constraint on `public_key`.
### Nonce Semantics
The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it is always one ahead of the nonce last issued in a challenge.
- **New client:** inserted with `nonce = 1`; the first challenge is issued with `nonce = 0`.
- **Existing client:** the current DB value is read and used as the challenge nonce, then immediately incremented within the same exclusive transaction, preventing replay.
Auth challenges are generated from fresh random bytes plus a timestamp. They are signed as the canonical challenge payload and are not persisted in `program_client`.
---
## Cryptography
### Authentication
- **Client protocol:** ed25519
- **Client protocol:** ML-DSA
### User-Agent Authentication
User-agent authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
- **Supported schemes:** RSA, Ed25519, ECDSA (secp256k1)
- **Why:** the user agent authenticates with keys backed by platform facilities, and those facilities differ by platform
- **Apple Silicon Secure Enclave / Secure Element:** ECDSA-only in practice
- **Windows Hello / TPM 2.0:** currently RSA-backed in our integration
This is why the user-agent auth protocol carries an explicit `KeyType`, while the SDK client protocol remains fixed to ed25519.
- **Supported schemes:** ML-DSA
- **Why:** Secure Enclave (MacOS) support them natively, on other platforms we could emulate while they roll-out
### Encryption at Rest
- **Scheme:** Symmetric AEAD — currently **XChaCha20-Poly1305**

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@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ backend = "cargo:diesel_cli"
default-features = "false"
features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled"
[[tools."cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"]]
version = "2.12.0"
backend = "cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"
[[tools.flutter]]
version = "3.38.9-stable"
backend = "asdf:flutter"

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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
"cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
flutter = "3.38.9-stable"
protoc = "29.6"
"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy"}
"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy,rust-analyzer"}
"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.11.1"
"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ python = "3.14.3"
ast-grep = "0.42.0"
"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.9"
"cargo:cargo-mutants" = "27.0.0"
"cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen" = "2.12.0"
[tasks.codegen]
sources = ['protobufs/*.proto', 'protobufs/**/*.proto']

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@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ message AuthChallengeRequest {
}
message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1;
int32 nonce = 2;
uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
bytes random = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {

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@@ -2,21 +2,14 @@ syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.auth;
enum KeyType {
KEY_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 1;
KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1 = 2;
KEY_TYPE_RSA = 3;
}
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
KeyType key_type = 3;
}
message AuthChallenge {
int32 nonce = 1;
uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
bytes random = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {

1170
server/Cargo.lock generated

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@@ -4,44 +4,170 @@ members = [
]
resolver = "3"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
disallowed-methods = "deny"
[workspace.dependencies]
tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [
"deflate",
"gzip",
"tls-connect-info",
"zstd",
] }
tracing = "0.1.44"
tokio = { version = "1.50.0", features = ["full"] }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
rand = "0.10.0"
rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
smlang = "0.8.0"
thiserror = "2.0.18"
alloy = "2.0.0"
async-trait = "0.1.89"
base64 = "0.22.1"
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
futures = "0.3.32"
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
kameo = "0.19.2"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
alloy = "1.7.3"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
"aws_lc_rs",
"pem",
"x509-parser",
"zeroize",
], default-features = false }
k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
sha2 = "0.10"
spki = "0.7"
prost = "0.14.3"
kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
hmac = "0.13.0"
miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.8", features = ["zeroize"] }
mutants = "0.0.4"
prost = "0.14.3"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
rand = "0.10.1"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs", "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false }
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls = { version = "0.23.38", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
sha2 = "0.11"
smlang = "0.8.0"
spki = "0.8"
thiserror = "2.0.18"
tokio = { version = "1.52.1", features = ["full"] }
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [ "deflate", "gzip", "tls-connect-info", "zstd" ] }
tracing = "0.1.44"
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
[workspace.lints.rust]
missing_unsafe_on_extern = "deny"
unsafe_attr_outside_unsafe = "deny"
unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn = "deny"
unstable_features = "deny"
deprecated_safe_2024 = "warn"
ffi_unwind_calls = "warn"
linker_messages = "warn"
elided_lifetimes_in_paths = "warn"
explicit_outlives_requirements = "warn"
impl-trait-overcaptures = "warn"
impl-trait-redundant-captures = "warn"
redundant_lifetimes = "warn"
single_use_lifetimes = "warn"
unused_lifetimes = "warn"
macro_use_extern_crate = "warn"
redundant_imports = "warn"
unused_import_braces = "warn"
unused_macro_rules = "warn"
unused_qualifications = "warn"
unit_bindings = "warn"
# missing_docs = "warn" # ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
unnameable_types = "warn"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
derive_partial_eq_without_eq = "allow"
future_not_send = "allow"
inconsistent_struct_constructor = "allow"
inline_always = "allow"
missing_errors_doc = "allow"
missing_fields_in_debug = "allow"
missing_panics_doc = "allow"
must_use_candidate = "allow"
needless_pass_by_ref_mut = "allow"
pub_underscore_fields = "allow"
redundant_pub_crate = "allow"
uninhabited_references = "allow" # safe with unsafe_code = "forbid" and standard uninhabited pattern (match *self {})
# restriction lints
alloc_instead_of_core = "warn"
allow_attributes_without_reason = "warn"
as_conversions = "warn"
assertions_on_result_states = "warn"
cfg_not_test = "warn"
clone_on_ref_ptr = "warn"
cognitive_complexity = "warn"
create_dir = "warn"
dbg_macro = "warn"
decimal_literal_representation = "warn"
default_union_representation = "warn"
deref_by_slicing = "warn"
disallowed_script_idents = "warn"
doc_include_without_cfg = "warn"
empty_drop = "warn"
empty_enum_variants_with_brackets = "warn"
empty_structs_with_brackets = "warn"
exit = "warn"
filetype_is_file = "warn"
float_arithmetic = "warn"
float_cmp_const = "warn"
fn_to_numeric_cast_any = "warn"
get_unwrap = "warn"
if_then_some_else_none = "warn"
indexing_slicing = "warn"
infinite_loop = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_att_syntax = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_intel_syntax = "warn"
integer_division = "warn"
large_include_file = "warn"
lossy_float_literal = "warn"
map_with_unused_argument_over_ranges = "warn"
mem_forget = "warn"
missing_assert_message = "warn"
mixed_read_write_in_expression = "warn"
modulo_arithmetic = "warn"
multiple_unsafe_ops_per_block = "warn"
mutex_atomic = "warn"
mutex_integer = "warn"
needless_raw_strings = "warn"
non_ascii_literal = "warn"
non_zero_suggestions = "warn"
pathbuf_init_then_push = "warn"
pointer_format = "warn"
precedence_bits = "warn"
pub_without_shorthand = "warn"
rc_buffer = "warn"
rc_mutex = "warn"
redundant_test_prefix = "warn"
redundant_type_annotations = "warn"
ref_patterns = "warn"
renamed_function_params = "warn"
rest_pat_in_fully_bound_structs = "warn"
return_and_then = "warn"
semicolon_inside_block = "warn"
str_to_string = "warn"
string_add = "warn"
string_lit_chars_any = "warn"
string_slice = "warn"
suspicious_xor_used_as_pow = "warn"
try_err = "warn"
undocumented_unsafe_blocks = "warn"
uninlined_format_args = "warn"
unnecessary_safety_comment = "warn"
unnecessary_safety_doc = "warn"
unnecessary_self_imports = "warn"
unneeded_field_pattern = "warn"
unused_result_ok = "warn"
verbose_file_reads = "warn"
# cargo lints
negative_feature_names = "warn"
redundant_feature_names = "warn"
wildcard_dependencies = "warn"
# ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
# todo = "warn"
# unimplemented = "warn"
# panic = "warn"
# panic_in_result_fn = "warn"
#
# cargo_common_metadata = "warn"
# multiple_crate_versions = "warn" # a controversial option since it's really difficult to maintain
disallowed_methods = "deny"
nursery = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
pedantic = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
type_repetition_in_bounds = "allow" # sometimes, it's better for readability this way

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@@ -7,3 +7,22 @@ disallowed-methods = [
{ path = "rsa::traits::Decryptor::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
{ path = "rsa::traits::RandomizedDecryptor::decrypt_with_rng", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt_with_rng() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
]
allow-indexing-slicing-in-tests = true
allow-panic-in-tests = true
check-inconsistent-struct-field-initializers = true
suppress-restriction-lint-in-const = true
allow-renamed-params-for = [
"core::convert::From",
"core::convert::TryFrom",
"core::str::FromStr",
"kameo::actor::Actor",
]
module-items-ordered-within-groupings = ["UPPER_SNAKE_CASE"]
source-item-ordering = ["enum"]
trait-assoc-item-kinds-order = [
"const",
"type",
"fn",
] # community tested standard

View File

@@ -13,14 +13,15 @@ evm = ["dep:alloy"]
[dependencies]
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
tonic.workspace = true
tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
tokio.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
http = "1.4.0"
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.10", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.12", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
async-trait.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
use crate::{
storage::StorageError,
transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
ClientMetadata,
proto::{
client::{
ClientRequest,
@@ -14,29 +19,26 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo,
},
};
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use crate::{
storage::StorageError,
transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
};
use chrono::DateTime;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AuthError {
#[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
MissingAuthChallenge,
#[error("Server sent invalid auth challenge")]
InvalidChallenge,
#[error("Client approval denied by User Agent")]
ApprovalDenied,
#[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
MissingAuthChallenge,
#[error("No User Agents online to approve client")]
NoUserAgentsOnline,
#[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
UnexpectedAuthResponse,
#[error("Signing key storage error")]
Storage(#[from] StorageError),
#[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
UnexpectedAuthResponse,
}
fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
@@ -54,14 +56,14 @@ fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
key: &SigningKey,
) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
request_id: next_request_id(),
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey: key.public_key().to_bytes(),
client_info: Some(ProtoClientInfo {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
@@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
async fn receive_auth_challenge(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
) -> Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
let response = transport
.recv()
.await
@@ -95,11 +97,22 @@ async fn receive_auth_challenge(
async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
key: &SigningKey,
challenge: AuthChallenge,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let signature = key.sign(&challenge_payload).to_bytes().to_vec();
) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos as i64);
let challenge = authn::AuthChallenge {
nonce: *challenge
.random
.as_array()
.ok_or(AuthError::InvalidChallenge)?,
timestamp,
};
let challenge_payload: Vec<u8> = challenge.format();
let signature = key
.sign_message(&challenge_payload, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?
.to_bytes();
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
@@ -114,9 +127,7 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
}
async fn receive_auth_confirmation(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
async fn receive_auth_confirmation(transport: &mut ClientTransport) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
let response = transport
.recv()
.await
@@ -137,11 +148,11 @@ async fn receive_auth_confirmation(
}
}
pub(crate) async fn authenticate(
pub async fn authenticate(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
key: &SigningKey,
) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
send_auth_challenge_request(transport, metadata, key).await?;
let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?;
send_auth_challenge_solution(transport, key, challenge).await?;

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
use std::io::{self, Write};
use arbiter_client::ArbiterClient;
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, url::ArbiterUrl};
use std::io::{self, Write};
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
println!("Testing connection to Arbiter server...");
@@ -29,16 +29,16 @@ async fn main() {
}
};
println!("{:#?}", url);
println!("{url:#?}");
let metadata = ClientMetadata {
name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_string(),
description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_string()),
version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string()),
name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_owned(),
description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_owned()),
version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_owned()),
};
match ArbiterClient::connect(url, metadata).await {
Ok(_) => println!("Connected and authenticated successfully."),
Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {:#?}", err),
Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {err:#?}"),
}
}

View File

@@ -1,49 +1,55 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
use crate::{
StorageError,
auth::{AuthError, authenticate},
storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage},
transport::{BUFFER_LENGTH, ClientTransport},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
};
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("gRPC error")]
Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
pub enum ArbiterClientError {
#[error("Authentication error")]
Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
#[error("Could not establish connection")]
Connection(#[from] tonic::transport::Error),
#[error("Invalid server URI")]
InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
#[error("gRPC error")]
Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
#[error("Invalid CA certificate")]
InvalidCaCert(#[from] webpki::Error),
#[error("Authentication error")]
Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
#[error("Invalid server URI")]
InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
#[error("Storage error")]
Storage(#[from] StorageError),
}
pub struct ArbiterClient {
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[expect(
dead_code,
reason = "transport will be used in future methods for sending requests and receiving responses"
)]
transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
}
impl ArbiterClient {
pub async fn connect(url: ArbiterUrl, metadata: ClientMetadata) -> Result<Self, Error> {
pub async fn connect(
url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::from_default_location()?;
Self::connect_with_storage(url, metadata, &storage).await
}
@@ -52,7 +58,7 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
storage: &S,
) -> Result<Self, Error> {
) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
let key = storage.load_or_create()?;
Self::connect_with_key(url, metadata, key).await
}
@@ -60,8 +66,8 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
pub async fn connect_with_key(
url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> Result<Self, Error> {
key: SigningKey,
) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned();
let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);
@@ -88,7 +94,8 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, Error> {
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "false positive")]
pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, ArbiterClientError> {
todo!("fetch EVM wallet list from server")
}
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ mod transport;
pub mod wallets;
pub use auth::AuthError;
pub use client::{ArbiterClient, Error};
pub use client::{ArbiterClient, ArbiterClientError};
pub use storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,19 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use arbiter_proto::home_path;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum StorageError {
#[error("I/O error")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
#[error("Invalid signing key length in storage: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
InvalidKeyLength { expected: usize, actual: usize },
#[error("I/O error")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
}
pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError>;
fn load_or_create(&self) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError>;
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
@@ -20,17 +22,17 @@ pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage {
}
impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ed25519.key";
pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ml_dsa.key";
pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
Self { path: path.into() }
}
pub fn from_default_location() -> std::result::Result<Self, StorageError> {
pub fn from_default_location() -> Result<Self, StorageError> {
Ok(Self::new(home_path()?.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME)))
}
fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
fn read_key(path: &Path) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
let bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
let raw: [u8; 32] =
bytes
@@ -39,12 +41,12 @@ impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
expected: 32,
actual: v.len(),
})?;
Ok(ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&raw))
Ok(SigningKey::from_seed(raw))
}
}
impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
}
@@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
return Self::read_key(&self.path);
}
let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let raw_key = key.to_bytes();
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let raw_key = key.to_seed();
// Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
@@ -103,7 +105,7 @@ mod tests {
.load_or_create()
.expect("second load_or_create should read same key");
assert_eq!(key_a.to_bytes(), key_b.to_bytes());
assert_eq!(key_a.to_seed(), key_b.to_seed());
assert!(path.exists());
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(expected, 32);
assert_eq!(actual, 31);
}
other => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"),
other @ StorageError::Io(_) => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"),
}
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
pub(crate) const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
pub const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
static NEXT_REQUEST_ID: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(1);
pub(crate) fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
pub fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
NEXT_REQUEST_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub(crate) enum ClientSignError {
pub enum ClientSignError {
#[error("Transport channel closed")]
ChannelClosed,
@@ -18,27 +19,23 @@ pub(crate) enum ClientSignError {
ConnectionClosed,
}
pub(crate) struct ClientTransport {
pub struct ClientTransport {
pub(crate) sender: mpsc::Sender<ClientRequest>,
pub(crate) receiver: tonic::Streaming<ClientResponse>,
}
impl ClientTransport {
pub(crate) async fn send(
&mut self,
request: ClientRequest,
) -> std::result::Result<(), ClientSignError> {
pub(crate) async fn send(&mut self, request: ClientRequest) -> Result<(), ClientSignError> {
self.sender
.send(request)
.await
.map_err(|_| ClientSignError::ChannelClosed)
}
pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> std::result::Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
match self.receiver.message().await {
Ok(Some(resp)) => Ok(resp),
Ok(None) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
Ok(None) | Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,4 @@
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::TxSigner,
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
ClientRequest,
@@ -25,7 +16,15 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
shared::evm::TransactionEvalError,
};
use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::TxSigner,
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
/// A typed error payload returned by [`ArbiterEvmWallet`] transaction signing.
///
@@ -61,9 +60,9 @@ pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet {
impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
#[expect(
dead_code,
reason = "constructor may be used in future extensions, e.g. to support wallet listing"
reason = "new will be used in future methods for creating wallets with different parameters"
)]
pub(crate) fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
pub(crate) const fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
Self {
transport,
address,
@@ -71,11 +70,12 @@ impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
}
}
pub fn address(&self) -> Address {
pub const fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
pub fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
#[must_use]
pub const fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
self.chain_id = Some(chain_id);
self
}
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ impl TxSigner<Signature> for ArbiterEvmWallet {
.recv()
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to receive evm sign transaction response"))?;
drop(transport);
if response.request_id != Some(request_id) {
return Err(Error::other(

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
/target

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
[package]
name = "arbiter-crypto"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
[dependencies]
ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true }
rand = {workspace = true, optional = true}
memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true}
hmac.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
x-wing = { version = "0.1.0-rc.0", features = ["zeroize"] }
chrono.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = ["authn", "safecell"]
authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand"]
safecell = ["dep:memsafe"]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
pub mod v1;
pub use v1::*;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use hmac::digest::Digest;
use ml_dsa::{
EncodedVerifyingKey, Error, KeyGen, MlDsa87, Seed, Signature as MlDsaSignature,
SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _,
};
use rand::RngExt;
pub static CLIENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_client";
pub static USERAGENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_user_agent";
const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 32;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("invalid length: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
pub struct InvalidLength {
pub expected: usize,
pub actual: usize,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AuthChallenge {
pub nonce: [u8; NONCE_SIZE],
pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
}
impl AuthChallenge {
pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::CryptoRng) -> Self {
let timestamp = Utc::now();
let nonce = {
let mut array = [0; NONCE_SIZE];
rng.fill(&mut array);
array
};
Self { nonce, timestamp }
}
pub fn format(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
{
let mut buffer = Vec::from(self.nonce);
let stamp = self
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("We would be long dead by the time this triggers :)");
buffer.extend_from_slice(stamp.to_be_bytes().as_slice());
buffer
}
}
pub fn from_parts(nonce: &[u8], timestamp: i64) -> Result<Self, InvalidLength> {
let random_nonce = nonce.as_array().ok_or(InvalidLength {
expected: NONCE_SIZE,
actual: nonce.len(),
})?;
Ok(Self {
nonce: *random_nonce,
timestamp: DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(timestamp),
})
}
}
pub type KeyParams = MlDsa87;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct PublicKey(Box<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>>);
impl crate::hashing::Hashable for PublicKey {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.to_bytes());
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct Signature(Box<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>>);
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct SigningKey(Box<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>>);
impl PublicKey {
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
}
#[must_use]
pub fn verify(&self, challenge: &AuthChallenge, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
let challenge = challenge.format();
self.0
.verify_with_context(&challenge, context, &signature.0)
}
}
impl Signature {
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
}
}
impl SigningKey {
pub fn generate() -> Self {
Self(Box::new(KeyParams::key_gen(&mut rand::rng())))
}
pub fn from_seed(seed: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(KeyParams::from_seed(&Seed::from(seed))))
}
pub fn to_seed(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
self.0.to_seed().into()
}
pub fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
self.0.verifying_key().into()
}
pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
self.0
.signing_key()
.sign_deterministic(message, context)
.map(Into::into)
}
pub fn sign_challenge(
&self,
challenge: &AuthChallenge,
context: &[u8],
) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
let challenge = challenge.format();
self.sign_message(&challenge, context)
}
}
impl From<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>> for PublicKey {
fn from(value: MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value))
}
}
impl From<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>> for Signature {
fn from(value: MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value))
}
}
impl From<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>> for SigningKey {
fn from(value: MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value))
}
}
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for PublicKey {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
}
}
impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for PublicKey {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let encoded = EncodedVerifyingKey::<KeyParams>::try_from(value).map_err(|_| ())?;
Ok(Self(Box::new(MlDsaVerifyingKey::decode(&encoded))))
}
}
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for Signature {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
}
}
impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for Signature {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
MlDsaSignature::try_from(value)
.map(|sig| Self(Box::new(sig)))
.map_err(|_| ())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, signature::Keypair as _};
use crate::authn::AuthChallenge;
use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
#[test]
fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() {
let key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let encoded = PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()).to_bytes();
let decoded = PublicKey::try_from(encoded.as_slice()).expect("public key should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded, PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()));
}
#[test]
fn signature_round_trip_decodes() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let signature = key
.sign_message(b"challenge", CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
let decoded =
Signature::try_from(signature.to_bytes().as_slice()).expect("signature should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded, signature);
}
#[test]
fn challenge_verification_uses_context_and_canonical_key_bytes() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let public_key = key.public_key();
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let signature = key
.sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(public_key.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
assert!(!public_key.verify(&challenge, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
}
#[test]
fn signing_key_round_trip_seed_preserves_public_key_and_signing() {
let original = SigningKey::generate();
let restored = SigningKey::from_seed(original.to_seed());
assert_eq!(restored.public_key(), original.public_key());
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let signature = restored
.sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(
restored
.public_key()
.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature)
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,26 @@
use hmac::digest::Digest;
use std::collections::HashSet;
pub use hmac::digest::Digest;
/// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
#[diagnostic::on_unimplemented(
note = "for local types consider adding `#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]` to your `{Self}` type",
note = "for types from other crates check whether the crate offers a `Hashable` implementation"
)]
pub trait Hashable {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H);
}
macro_rules! impl_numeric {
($($t:ty),*) => {
$(
impl Hashable for $t {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(&self.to_be_bytes());
($($t:ty),*) => {
$(
impl Hashable for $t {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(&self.to_be_bytes());
}
}
}
)*
};
)*
};
}
impl_numeric!(u8, u16, u32, u64, i8, i16, i32, i64);
@@ -45,7 +50,7 @@ impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for Vec<T> {
}
}
impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for HashSet<T> {
impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd, S: std::hash::BuildHasher> Hashable for HashSet<T, S> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
let ref_sorted = {
let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
#[cfg(feature = "authn")]
pub mod authn;
pub mod hashing;
#[cfg(feature = "safecell")]
pub mod safecell;
pub use x_wing;

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
use std::{any::type_name, fmt};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use std::{
any::type_name,
fmt,
ops::{Deref, DerefMut},
};
pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
type CellRead<'a>: Deref<Target = T>
@@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
let mut cell = Self::new(T::default());
{
let mut handle = cell.write();
f(handle.deref_mut());
f(&mut *handle);
}
cell
}
@@ -105,6 +107,11 @@ impl<T> SafeCellHandle<T> for MemSafeCell<T> {
fn abort_memory_breach(action: &str, err: &memsafe::error::MemoryError) -> ! {
eprintln!("fatal {action}: {err}");
// SAFETY: Intentionally cause a segmentation fault to prevent further execution in a compromised state.
unsafe {
let unsafe_pointer = std::ptr::null_mut::<u8>();
std::ptr::write_volatile(unsafe_pointer, 0);
}
std::process::abort();
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
[package]
name = "arbiter-macros"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
[lib]
proc-macro = true
[dependencies]
proc-macro2 = "1.0"
quote = "1.0"
syn = { version = "2.0", features = ["derive", "fold", "full", "visit-mut"] }
[dev-dependencies]
arbiter-crypto = { path = "../arbiter-crypto" }
[lints]
workspace = true

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
use crate::utils::{HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH, HMAC_DIGEST_PATH};
use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream, TokenTree};
use quote::quote;
use syn::{DataStruct, DeriveInput, Fields, Generics, Index, parse_quote, spanned::Spanned};
pub(crate) fn derive(input: &DeriveInput) -> TokenStream {
match &input.data {
syn::Data::Struct(struct_data) => hashable_struct(input, struct_data),
syn::Data::Enum(_) => {
syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable can currently be derived only for structs")
.to_compile_error()
}
syn::Data::Union(_) => {
syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable cannot be derived for unions")
.to_compile_error()
}
}
}
fn hashable_struct(input: &DeriveInput, struct_data: &DataStruct) -> TokenStream {
let ident = &input.ident;
let hashable_trait = HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH.to_path();
let hmac_digest = HMAC_DIGEST_PATH.to_path();
let generics = add_hashable_bounds(input.generics.clone(), &hashable_trait);
let field_accesses = collect_field_accesses(struct_data);
let hash_calls = build_hash_calls(&field_accesses, &hashable_trait);
let (impl_generics, ty_generics, where_clause) = generics.split_for_impl();
quote! {
#[automatically_derived]
impl #impl_generics #hashable_trait for #ident #ty_generics #where_clause {
fn hash<H: #hmac_digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
#(#hash_calls)*
}
}
}
}
fn add_hashable_bounds(mut generics: Generics, hashable_trait: &syn::Path) -> Generics {
for type_param in generics.type_params_mut() {
type_param.bounds.push(parse_quote!(#hashable_trait));
}
generics
}
struct FieldAccess {
access: TokenStream,
span: Span,
}
fn collect_field_accesses(struct_data: &DataStruct) -> Vec<FieldAccess> {
match &struct_data.fields {
Fields::Named(fields) => {
// Keep deterministic alphabetical order for named fields.
// Do not remove this sort, because it keeps hash output stable regardless of source order.
let mut named_fields = fields
.named
.iter()
.map(|field| {
let name = field
.ident
.as_ref()
.expect("Fields::Named(fields) must have names")
.clone();
(name.to_string(), name)
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
named_fields.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0));
named_fields
.into_iter()
.map(|(_, name)| FieldAccess {
access: quote! { #name },
span: name.span(),
})
.collect()
}
Fields::Unnamed(fields) => fields
.unnamed
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(i, field)| FieldAccess {
access: {
let index = Index::from(i);
quote! { #index }
},
span: field.ty.span(),
})
.collect(),
Fields::Unit => Vec::new(),
}
}
fn build_hash_calls(
field_accesses: &[FieldAccess],
hashable_trait: &syn::Path,
) -> Vec<TokenStream> {
field_accesses
.iter()
.map(|field| {
let access = &field.access;
let call = quote! {
#hashable_trait::hash(&self.#access, hasher);
};
respan(call, field.span)
})
.collect()
}
/// Recursively set span on all tokens, including interpolated ones.
fn respan(tokens: TokenStream, span: Span) -> TokenStream {
tokens
.into_iter()
.map(|tt| match tt {
TokenTree::Group(g) => {
let mut new = proc_macro2::Group::new(g.delimiter(), respan(g.stream(), span));
new.set_span(span);
TokenTree::Group(new)
}
mut other => {
other.set_span(span);
other
}
})
.collect()
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
use syn::{DeriveInput, parse_macro_input};
mod hashable;
mod utils;
#[proc_macro_derive(Hashable)]
pub fn derive_hashable(input: proc_macro::TokenStream) -> proc_macro::TokenStream {
let input = parse_macro_input!(input as DeriveInput);
hashable::derive(&input).into()
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
pub(crate) struct ToPath(pub &'static str);
impl ToPath {
pub(crate) fn to_path(&self) -> syn::Path {
syn::parse_str(self.0).expect("Invalid path")
}
}
macro_rules! ensure_path {
($path:path as $name:ident) => {
const _: () = {
#[cfg(test)]
#[expect(
unused_imports,
reason = "Ensures the path is valid and will cause a compile error if not"
)]
use $path as _;
};
pub(crate) const $name: ToPath = ToPath(stringify!($path));
};
}
ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable as HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH);
ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Digest as HMAC_DIGEST_PATH);

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ url = "2.5.8"
miette.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
base64 = "0.22.1"
base64.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
pub mod transport;
pub mod url;
use base64::{Engine, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");
@@ -84,8 +82,3 @@ pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
Ok(arbiter_home)
}
pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes()
}

View File

@@ -54,10 +54,9 @@
//! as a closed outbound channel.
//! - [`Bi::recv`] returns `None` when the underlying transport closes.
//! - Message translation is intentionally out of scope for this module.
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::{error::Infallible, prelude::*};
use std::marker::PhantomData;
/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
@@ -106,6 +105,36 @@ pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync {
/// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items.
pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for &mut T
where
T: Sender<Outbound> + ?Sized,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
(**self).send(item).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Inbound> Receiver<Inbound> for &mut T
where
T: Receiver<Inbound> + ?Sized,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
(**self).recv().await
}
}
impl<T, Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for &mut T
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
{
}
pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> {
type Sender: Sender<Outbound>;
type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>;
@@ -161,3 +190,29 @@ where
}
pub mod grpc;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
pub enum ForwardError<I> {
#[error("Transport error: {0}")]
Transport(#[from] Error),
#[error("Actor delivery error: {0}")]
Actor(SendError<I>),
}
pub async fn forward_to_actor<Transport, Inbound, Outbound, Handler>(
transport: &mut Transport,
actor: &ActorRef<Handler>,
) -> Result<(), ForwardError<Inbound>>
where
Transport: Bi<Inbound, <Outbound as Reply>::Ok>,
Handler: Actor + Message<Inbound, Reply = Outbound>,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static + Reply<Error = Infallible>, // `Infallible` to enforce contract that `Outbound` carries handler-level error
{
while let Some(request) = transport.recv().await {
let resp = actor.ask(request).await.map_err(ForwardError::Actor)?;
transport.send(resp).await?
}
Err(Error::ChannelClosed.into())
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use futures::StreamExt;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
pub struct GrpcSender<Outbound> {
tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
use std::fmt::Display;
use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_URL_SAFE};
use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
use std::fmt::Display;
const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter";
const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert";
@@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ mod tests {
#[rstest]
fn test_parsing_correctness(
fn parsing_correctness(
#[values("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "192.168.1.1", "some.domain.com")] host: &str,
#[values(None, Some("token123".to_string()))] bootstrap_token: Option<String>,

View File

@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ diesel-async = { version = "0.8.0", features = [
"sqlite",
"tokio",
] }
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.features = ["serde"]
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
arbiter-macros.path = "../arbiter-macros"
tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
tonic.workspace = true
@@ -37,21 +37,15 @@ dashmap = "6.1.0"
rand.workspace = true
rcgen.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
memsafe = "0.4.0"
zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
kameo.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
restructed = "0.2.2"
strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
pem = "3.0.6"
k256.workspace = true
k256.features = ["serde"]
rsa.workspace = true
rsa.features = ["serde"]
sha2.workspace = true
hmac = "0.12"
hmac.workspace = true
spki.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
@@ -61,11 +55,14 @@ anyhow = "1.0.102"
serde_with = "3.18.0"
mutants.workspace = true
subtle = "2.6.1"
macro_rules_attribute = "0.2.2"
paste = "1.0.15"
ml-dsa.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
k256.workspace = true
kameo_actors.workspace = true
[dev-dependencies]
insta = "1.46.3"
insta = "1.47.2"
proptest = "1.11.0"
rstest.workspace = true
test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }

View File

@@ -45,13 +45,11 @@ insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
create table if not exists useragent_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
key_type integer not null default(1), -- 1=Ed25519, 2=ECDSA(secp256k1)
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_useragent_client_public_key on useragent_client (public_key, key_type);
create unique index if not exists uniq_useragent_client_public_key on useragent_client (public_key);
create table if not exists client_metadata (
id integer not null primary key,
@@ -73,7 +71,6 @@ create unique index if not exists uniq_metadata_binding_client on client_metadat
create table if not exists program_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),

View File

@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
let token: String = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
Default::default(),
let token = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
String::default(),
|mut accum, char| {
accum += char.to_string().as_str();
accum
@@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("I/O error: {0}")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
#[derive(Actor)]
@@ -69,16 +69,13 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
match &self.token {
Some(expected) => {
let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| {
let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
bool::from(choice)
}
None => false,
}
let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
bool::from(choice)
})
}
#[message]

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
crypto::integrity::{self, Integrable, Verified, hashing::Hashable},
actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
crypto::integrity,
db::{
DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
models::{self},
@@ -21,68 +13,49 @@ use crate::{
ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559, network::TxSignerSync as _, primitives::Address, signers::Signature,
};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
/// Hashable structure for wallet integrity protection.
/// Binds the encrypted private key to the wallet address using HMAC.
pub struct EvmWalletIntegrity {
pub address: Vec<u8>, // 20-byte Ethereum address
pub aead_encrypted_id: i32, // Reference to encrypted key material
}
impl Hashable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(&self.address);
hasher.update(self.aead_encrypted_id.to_be_bytes());
}
}
impl Integrable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
const KIND: &'static str = "evm_wallet";
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Wallet not found")]
WalletNotFound,
#[error("Wallet integrity check failed")]
WalletIntegrityCheckFailed,
#[error(
"Decrypted key does not correspond to wallet address (CRITICAL: possible key substitution attack)"
)]
KeyAddressMismatch,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Signing error: {0}")]
Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
#[error("Policy error: {0}")]
Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
#[error("Integrity error: {0}")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
@@ -93,20 +66,20 @@ pub enum Error {
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct EvmActor {
pub keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub db: DatabasePool,
pub rng: StdRng,
pub engine: evm::Engine,
}
impl EvmActor {
pub fn new(keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
pub fn new(vault: ActorRef<Vault>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
// is it safe to seed rng from system once?
// todo: audit
let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), keyholder.clone());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), vault.clone());
Self {
keyholder,
vault,
db,
rng,
engine,
@@ -117,19 +90,19 @@ impl EvmActor {
#[messages]
impl EvmActor {
#[message]
pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(Verified<i32>, Address), Error> {
pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);
let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
let aead_id: i32 = self
.keyholder
.vault
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?;
.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
@@ -139,17 +112,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// Sign integrity envelope to bind encrypted key to wallet address
let wallet_integrity = EvmWalletIntegrity {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
};
let verified_wallet_id =
integrity::sign_entity(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, &wallet_integrity, wallet_id)
.await?
.unqualify_origin();
Ok((verified_wallet_id, address))
Ok((wallet_id, address))
}
#[message]
@@ -175,7 +138,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
&mut self,
basic: SharedGrantSettings,
grant: SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<integrity::Verified<i32>, Error> {
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match grant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self
.engine
@@ -197,9 +160,10 @@ impl EvmActor {
}
#[message]
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "reserved for impl")]
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
// let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// let keyholder = self.keyholder.clone();
// let vault = self.vault.clone();
// diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| {
// Box::pin(async move {
@@ -246,23 +210,9 @@ impl EvmActor {
.optional()
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
// Verify wallet integrity envelope
let wallet = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut conn,
&self.keyholder,
EvmWalletIntegrity {
address: wallet.address.clone(),
aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
},
wallet.id,
)
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::WalletIntegrityCheckFailed)?;
let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.entity_id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
@@ -295,23 +245,9 @@ impl EvmActor {
.optional()
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
// Verify wallet integrity envelope to ensure encrypted key is bound to address
let wallet = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut conn,
&self.keyholder,
EvmWalletIntegrity {
address: wallet.address.clone(),
aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
},
wallet.id,
)
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::WalletIntegrityCheckFailed)?;
let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.entity_id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
@@ -321,26 +257,19 @@ impl EvmActor {
drop(conn);
let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
.keyholder
.vault
.ask(Decrypt {
aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::KeyholderSend)?;
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
// Verify that the decrypted key's derived address matches the wallet address
// This prevents an attacker from substituting one wallet's key with another's even if they compromised the DB
if signer.address() != wallet_address {
return Err(SignTransactionError::KeyAddressMismatch);
}
self.engine
.evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.await?;
use alloy::network::TxSignerSync as _;
Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
use std::ops::ControlFlow;
use crate::{
actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
peers::{
client::ClientProfile,
user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
},
};
use kameo::{
Actor, messages,
prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::ReplySender,
};
use crate::actors::{
client::ClientProfile,
flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
};
use std::ops::ControlFlow;
pub struct Args {
pub client: ClientProfile,
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
async fn on_start(
Args {
client,
mut user_agents,
user_agents,
reply,
}: Self::Args,
actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>,
@@ -52,8 +53,9 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
reply: Some(reply),
};
for user_agent in user_agents.drain(..) {
for user_agent in user_agents {
actor_ref.link(&user_agent).await;
let _ = user_agent
.tell(BeginNewClientApproval {
client: client.clone(),
@@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
#[messages]
impl ClientApprovalController {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
pub fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
if !approved {
// Denial wins immediately regardless of other pending responses.
self.send_reply(Ok(false));

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use crate::{
actors::{
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
useragent_registry::{GetConnected, UserAgentRegistry},
},
peers::client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
};
use kameo::{
Actor,
@@ -7,20 +13,23 @@ use kameo::{
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::DelegatedReply,
};
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use tracing::info;
use crate::actors::{
client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
user_agent::session::UserAgentSession,
};
pub mod client_connect_approval;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct FlowCoordinator {
pub user_agents: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
useragent_registry: ActorRef<UserAgentRegistry>,
}
impl FlowCoordinator {
pub fn new(useragent_registry: ActorRef<UserAgentRegistry>) -> Self {
Self {
clients: HashMap::default(),
useragent_registry,
}
}
}
impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
@@ -38,13 +47,7 @@ impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
id: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.user_agents.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
event = "useragent.disconnected"
);
} else if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
@@ -69,17 +72,6 @@ pub enum ApprovalError {
#[messages]
impl FlowCoordinator {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_user_agent(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "useragent.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.user_agents.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_client(
&mut self,
@@ -101,7 +93,11 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
unreachable!("Expected `request_client_approval` to have callback channel");
};
let refs: Vec<_> = self.user_agents.values().cloned().collect();
let Ok(refs) = self.useragent_registry.ask(GetConnected).await else {
reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected));
return reply;
};
if refs.is_empty() {
reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected));
return reply;

View File

@@ -1,47 +1,59 @@
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
keyholder::KeyHolder,
useragent_registry::UserAgentRegistry, vault::Vault,
},
db,
};
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use kameo_actors::{DeliveryStrategy, message_bus::MessageBus};
use thiserror::Error;
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod client;
mod evm;
pub mod evm;
pub mod flow_coordinator;
pub mod keyholder;
pub mod user_agent;
pub mod useragent_registry;
pub mod vault;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum SpawnError {
#[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn KeyHolder actor")]
KeyHolder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn Vault actor")]
Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
}
/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct GlobalActors {
pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
pub useragent_registry: ActorRef<UserAgentRegistry>,
pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
pub events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
impl GlobalActors {
pub fn spawn_message_bus() -> ActorRef<MessageBus> {
MessageBus::spawn(MessageBus::new(DeliveryStrategy::Guaranteed))
}
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let key_holder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?);
let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
let useragent_registry = UserAgentRegistry::spawn(UserAgentRegistry::default());
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
key_holder,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::default()),
vault: key_holder,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::new(
useragent_registry.clone(),
)),
useragent_registry,
events: message_bus,
})
}
}

View File

@@ -1,347 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tracing::error;
use super::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
keyholder::KeyHolder,
user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentCredentials, auth::Outbound},
},
crypto::integrity,
db::{DatabasePool, schema::useragent_client},
};
pub struct ChallengeRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
pub token: String,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge_nonce: i32,
pub key: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct ChallengeSolution {
pub solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
}
);
/// Returns the current nonce, ready to use for the challenge nonce.
async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
db: &DatabasePool,
key: &AuthPublicKey,
) -> Result<(i32, i32), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db
.get()
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
useragent_client::table
.filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(key.to_stored_bytes()))
.filter(useragent_client::key_type.eq(key.key_type()))
.select((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
.await
})
})
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?
.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(?key, "Public key not found in database");
Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
})
}
async fn verify_integrity(
db: &DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db
.get()
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?;
let attestation_status = integrity::check_entity_attestation(
&mut db_conn,
keyholder,
&UserAgentCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::internal("Integrity verification failed", &e))?;
use integrity::AttestationStatus as AS;
// SAFETY (policy): challenge auth must work in both vault states.
// While sealed, integrity checks can only report `Unavailable` because key material is not
// accessible. While unsealed, the same check can report `Attested`.
// This path intentionally accepts both outcomes to keep challenge auth available across state
// transitions; stricter verification is enforced in sensitive post-auth flows.
match attestation_status {
AS::Attested | AS::Unavailable => Ok(()),
}
}
async fn create_nonce(
db: &DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let mut db_conn = db
.get()
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
let new_nonce = db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(useragent_client::table)
.filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_stored_bytes()))
.filter(useragent_client::key_type.eq(pubkey.key_type()))
.set(useragent_client::nonce.eq(useragent_client::nonce + 1))
.returning((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
keyholder,
&UserAgentCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: new_nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database error", &e))?
.drop_verification_provenance();
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(new_nonce)
})
})
.await?;
Ok(new_nonce)
}
async fn register_key(
db: &DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let key_type = pubkey.key_type();
let mut conn = db
.get()
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(useragent_client::table)
.values((
useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
useragent_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type),
))
.returning(useragent_client::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?;
if let Err(e) = integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
keyholder,
&UserAgentCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: NONCE_START,
},
id,
)
.await
{
match e {
integrity::Error::Keyholder(
crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped,
) => {
// IMPORTANT: bootstrap-token auth must work before the vault has a root key.
// We intentionally allow creating the DB row first and backfill envelopes
// after bootstrap/unseal to keep the bootstrap flow possible.
}
other => {
return Err(Error::internal("Failed to register public key", &other));
}
}
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
pub struct AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
pub(super) transport: T,
}
impl<'a, T> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
type Error = Error;
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
verify_integrity(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
let nonce = create_nonce(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce: nonce,
key: pubkey,
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token", &e))?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
match token_ok {
true => {
register_key(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(pubkey)
}
false => {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
}
}
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce,
key,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
let formatted = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(*challenge_nonce, &key.to_stored_bytes());
let valid = match key {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(vk) => {
let sig = solution.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid Ed25519 signature length");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify_strict(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(vk) => {
use k256::ecdsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let sig = k256::ecdsa::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid ECDSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(pk) => {
use rsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let verifying_key = rsa::pss::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha256>::new(pk.clone());
let sig = rsa::pss::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid RSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
verifying_key.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
};
match valid {
true => {
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(key.clone())
}
false => {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile},
crypto::integrity::Integrable,
db::{self, models::KeyType},
};
/// Abstraction over Ed25519 / ECDSA-secp256k1 / RSA public keys used during the auth handshake.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub enum AuthPublicKey {
Ed25519(ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey),
/// Compressed SEC1 public key; signature bytes are raw 64-byte (r||s).
EcdsaSecp256k1(k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey),
/// RSA-2048+ public key (Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager); signature bytes are PSS+SHA-256.
Rsa(rsa::RsaPublicKey),
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct UserAgentCredentials {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
pub nonce: i32,
}
impl Integrable for UserAgentCredentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "useragent_credentials";
}
impl AuthPublicKey {
/// Canonical bytes stored in DB and echoed back in the challenge.
/// Ed25519: raw 32 bytes. ECDSA: SEC1 compressed 33 bytes. RSA: DER-encoded SPKI.
pub fn to_stored_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(k) => k.to_bytes().to_vec(),
// SEC1 compressed (33 bytes) is the natural compact format for secp256k1
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(k) => k.to_encoded_point(true).as_bytes().to_vec(),
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(k) => {
use rsa::pkcs8::EncodePublicKey as _;
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
k.to_public_key_der()
.expect("rsa SPKI encoding is infallible")
.to_vec()
}
}
}
pub fn key_type(&self) -> KeyType {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(_) => KeyType::Ed25519,
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(_) => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(_) => KeyType::Rsa,
}
}
}
impl TryFrom<(KeyType, Vec<u8>)> for AuthPublicKey {
type Error = &'static str;
fn try_from(value: (KeyType, Vec<u8>)) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let (key_type, bytes) = value;
match key_type {
KeyType::Ed25519 => {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| "invalid Ed25519 key length")?;
let key = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&bytes)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid Ed25519 key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(key))
}
KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => {
let point =
k256::EncodedPoint::from_bytes(&bytes).map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
let key = k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_encoded_point(&point)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(key))
}
KeyType::Rsa => {
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
let key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&bytes)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid RSA key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Rsa(key))
}
}
}
}
// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey },
}
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub use auth::authenticate;
pub use session::UserAgentSession;
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
impl Hashable for AuthPublicKey {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.to_stored_bytes());
}
}
impl Hashable for UserAgentCredentials {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.pubkey.hash(hasher);
self.nonce.hash(hasher);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,592 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use kameo::messages;
use kameo::prelude::Context;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
use crate::actors::user_agent::session::Error;
use crate::db::models::{
EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
};
use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
use crate::{
actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
crypto::integrity::{self, Verified},
};
use crate::{
actors::{
evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentDeleteGrant, UseragentListGrants,
},
keyholder::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
user_agent::session::{
UserAgentSession,
state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
},
user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentCredentials},
},
db::schema::useragent_client,
safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
};
fn is_vault_sealed_from_evm<M>(err: &SendError<M, crate::actors::evm::Error>) -> bool {
matches!(
err,
SendError::HandlerError(crate::actors::evm::Error::Keyholder(
keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped
)) | SendError::HandlerError(crate::actors::evm::Error::Integrity(
crate::crypto::integrity::Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
))
)
}
impl UserAgentSession {
async fn backfill_useragent_integrity(&self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let keyholder = self.props.actors.key_holder.clone();
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let rows: Vec<(i32, i32, Vec<u8>, crate::db::models::KeyType)> =
useragent_client::table
.select((
useragent_client::id,
useragent_client::nonce,
useragent_client::public_key,
useragent_client::key_type,
))
.load(conn)
.await?;
for (id, nonce, public_key, key_type) in rows {
let pubkey = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, public_key)).map_err(|e| {
Error::internal(format!("Invalid user-agent key in db: {e}"))
})?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&keyholder,
&UserAgentCredentials { pubkey, nonce },
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
Error::internal(format!("Failed to backfill user-agent integrity: {e}"))
})?
.drop_verification_provenance();
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
fn take_unseal_secret(&mut self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), Error> {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(Error::internal("Invalid state for unseal encrypted key"));
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Mutex poison is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
match secret {
Some(secret) => secret,
None => {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
return Err(Error::internal("Ephemeral secret already taken"));
}
}
};
Ok((ephemeral_secret, unseal_context.client_public_key))
}
fn decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret: EphemeralSecret,
client_public_key: PublicKey,
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => Ok(key_buffer),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
}
}
}
}
pub struct UnsealStartResponse {
pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum UnsealError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for unsealing")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Internal error during unsealing process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum BootstrapError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for bootstrapping")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Internal error during bootstrapping process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum GrantMutationError {
#[error("Vault is sealed")]
VaultSealed,
#[error("Internal grant mutation error")]
Internal,
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_request(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
) -> Result<UnsealStartResponse, Error> {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
client_public_key: client_pubkey,
}))?;
Ok(UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key,
})
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(_err) => {
return Err(Error::internal("Failed to take unseal secret").into());
}
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
self.backfill_useragent_integrity().await?;
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(Error::internal("Vault actor error").into())
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(err) => return Err(err.into()),
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
self.backfill_useragent_integrity().await?;
info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to bootstrap vault");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::General(Error::internal(
"Vault actor error",
)))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "keyholder.query.failed");
return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(
&mut self,
) -> Result<(Verified<i32>, Address), Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => Ok(address),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
"EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
))),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, GrantMutationError> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
&mut self,
basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<Verified<i32>, GrantMutationError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
.await
{
Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(
&mut self,
grant_id: i32,
) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentDeleteGrant {
_grant_id: grant_id,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<i32>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(access_entries)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message(ctx)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
&mut self,
approved: bool,
pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pending_approval = match self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey) {
Some(approval) => approval,
None => {
error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
return Err(Error::internal("Unknown client in connection response"));
}
};
pending_approval
.controller
.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to send client approval response to controller"
);
Error::internal("Failed to send client approval response to controller")
})?;
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let clients = program_client::table
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
ProgramClient::as_select(),
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(clients)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
use crate::peers::user_agent::UserAgentSession;
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorId, ActorRef},
error::Infallible,
messages,
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
};
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use tracing::info;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct UserAgentRegistry {
connected: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
}
impl Actor for UserAgentRegistry {
type Args = Self;
type Error = Infallible;
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(args)
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.connected.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "UserAgentRegistry",
event = "useragent.disconnected"
);
}
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentRegistry {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn connect_useragent(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "UserAgentRegistry", event = "useragent.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.connected.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message]
pub fn get_connected(&self) -> Vec<ActorRef<UserAgentSession>> {
self.connected.values().cloned().collect()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,51 +1,49 @@
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
dsl::{insert_into, update},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use hmac::Mac as _;
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
crypto::{
KeyCell, derive_key,
encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
},
safe_cell::SafeCell,
};
use crate::{
db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
},
safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(KeyHolderState))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
},
Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
root_key: KeyCell,
},
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
dsl::{insert_into, update},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
pub mod events {
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Bootstrapped;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Unsealed;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct VaultResealed;
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")]
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")]
#[error("Vault is not bootstrapped")]
NotBootstrapped,
#[error("Vault is sealed")]
Sealed,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
@@ -65,18 +63,36 @@ pub enum Error {
BrokenDatabase,
}
struct Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
root_key: KeyCell,
}
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(VaultState))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
},
Unsealed(Unsealed),
}
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
///
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct KeyHolder {
pub struct Vault {
db: db::DatabasePool,
state: State,
events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
#[messages]
impl KeyHolder {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
impl Vault {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let state = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
@@ -94,10 +110,10 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
};
Ok(Self { db, state })
Ok(Self { db, state, events })
}
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple keyholders write
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write
// additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
@@ -111,7 +127,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
.first(conn)
.await?;
let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
root_key_id
@@ -134,6 +150,14 @@ impl KeyHolder {
Ok(nonce)
}
const fn expect_unsealed(state: &mut State) -> Result<&mut Unsealed, Error> {
match state {
State::Unsealed(unsealed) => Ok(unsealed),
State::Unbootstrapped => Err(Error::NotBootstrapped),
State::Sealed { .. } => Err(Error::Sealed),
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
@@ -186,12 +210,13 @@ impl KeyHolder {
})
.await?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
};
});
info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully");
info!("Vault bootstrapped successfully");
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await;
Ok(())
}
@@ -224,12 +249,11 @@ impl KeyHolder {
let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(
|_| {
let nonce =
Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
Error::BrokenDatabase
},
)?;
})?;
seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
@@ -238,24 +262,23 @@ impl KeyHolder {
Error::InvalidKey
})?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?,
};
});
info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully");
info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Unsealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
@@ -268,7 +291,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
.ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
};
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
aead_id
@@ -283,14 +306,10 @@ impl KeyHolder {
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
..
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
// Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
// Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
@@ -320,19 +339,16 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
#[message]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> KeyHolderState {
pub fn get_state(&self) -> VaultState {
self.state.discriminant()
}
#[message]
pub fn sign_integrity(&mut self, mac_input: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(i32, Vec<u8>), Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let mut hmac = root_key
.0
@@ -354,13 +370,10 @@ impl KeyHolder {
expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
key_version: i32,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
return Ok(false);
@@ -379,36 +392,31 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
#[message]
pub fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = &self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
};
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use diesel::SelectableHelper;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::{
db::{self},
safe_cell::SafeCell,
};
use crate::actors::GlobalActors;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::SafeCellHandle as _;
use super::*;
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
actor
@@ -420,17 +428,17 @@ mod tests {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let root_key_history_id = match actor.state {
State::Unsealed {
State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} => root_key_history_id,
}) => root_key_history_id,
_ => panic!("expected unsealed state"),
};
let n1 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
let n2 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
let n2 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors,
context::tls::TlsManager,
db::{self},
};
use std::sync::Arc;
use thiserror::Error;
pub mod tls;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
@@ -31,16 +30,16 @@ pub enum InitError {
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
}
pub struct _ServerContextInner {
pub struct __ServerContextInner {
pub db: db::DatabasePool,
pub tls: TlsManager,
pub actors: GlobalActors,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
pub struct ServerContext(Arc<__ServerContextInner>);
impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
type Target = _ServerContextInner;
type Target = __ServerContextInner;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.0
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
impl ServerContext {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
Ok(Self(Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
Ok(Self(Arc::new(__ServerContextInner {
actors: GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await?,
tls: TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?,
db,

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,3 @@
use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use pem::Pem;
use rcgen::{
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
};
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
use thiserror::Error;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
use crate::db::{
self,
models::{NewTlsHistory, TlsHistory},
@@ -21,10 +7,23 @@ use crate::db::{
},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use pem::Pem;
use rcgen::{
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
};
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
use thiserror::Error;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
const ENCODE_CONFIG: pem::EncodeConfig = {
let line_ending = match cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
true => pem::LineEnding::CRLF,
false => pem::LineEnding::LF,
let line_ending = if cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
pem::LineEnding::CRLF
} else {
pem::LineEnding::LF
};
pem::EncodeConfig::new().set_line_ending(line_ending)
};
@@ -52,11 +51,14 @@ pub enum InitError {
pub type PemCert = String;
pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer) -> PemCert {
pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer<'_>) -> PemCert {
pem::encode_config(&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()), ENCODE_CONFIG)
}
#[allow(unused)]
#[expect(
unused,
reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
)]
struct SerializedTls {
cert_pem: PemCert,
cert_key_pem: String,
@@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ impl TlsCa {
let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem();
#[allow(
#[expect(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Broken cert couldn't bootstrap server anyway"
)]
@@ -124,7 +126,11 @@ impl TlsCa {
})
}
#[allow(unused)]
#[expect(
unused,
clippy::unnecessary_wraps,
reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
)]
fn serialize(&self) -> Result<SerializedTls, InitError> {
let cert_key_pem = self.issuer.key().serialize_pem();
Ok(SerializedTls {
@@ -133,7 +139,10 @@ impl TlsCa {
})
}
#[allow(unused)]
#[expect(
unused,
reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
)]
fn try_deserialize(cert_pem: &str, cert_key_pem: &str) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
let keypair =
KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem).map_err(InitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
@@ -234,10 +243,10 @@ impl TlsManager {
}
}
pub fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
pub const fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
&self.cert
}
pub fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
pub const fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
&self.ca_cert
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
use argon2::password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt;
use rand::{
Rng as _, SeedableRng,
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/seal/v1";
pub const TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/private-key/v1";
pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
@@ -15,11 +14,13 @@ pub struct Nonce(pub [u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
impl Nonce {
pub fn increment(&mut self) {
for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
if self.0[i] == 0xFF {
self.0[i] = 0;
} else {
self.0[i] += 1;
break;
if let Some(byte) = self.0.get_mut(i) {
if *byte == 0xFF {
*byte = 0;
} else {
*byte += 1;
break;
}
}
}
}
@@ -45,27 +46,20 @@ pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
let mut salt = Salt::default();
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
let mut rng =
StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
salt
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::ops::Deref as _;
use super::*;
use crate::{
crypto::derive_key,
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use crate::crypto::derive_key;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[test]
pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
@@ -77,25 +71,24 @@ mod tests {
let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
assert_eq!(&*key1_reader, &*key2_reader);
}
#[test]
pub fn successful_derive() {
fn successful_derive() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
let key_reader = key.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
assert_ne!(key_reader.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
}
#[test]
// We should fuzz this
pub fn test_nonce_increment() {
pub fn nonce_increment() {
let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
nonce.increment();

View File

@@ -1,44 +1,29 @@
use crate::actors::keyholder;
use hmac::Hmac;
use sha2::Sha256;
use std::future::Future;
use std::ops::Deref;
use std::pin::Pin;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use sha2::Digest as _;
pub mod hashing;
pub mod verified;
use self::hashing::Hashable;
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{KeyHolder, SignIntegrity, VerifyIntegrity},
actors::vault::{self, GetState, SignIntegrity, Vault, VerifyIntegrity},
db::{
self,
models::{IntegrityEnvelope as IntegrityEnvelopeRow, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
schema::integrity_envelope,
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
pub use self::verified::{Nested, Root, VerificationOrigin, Verified};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use hmac::Hmac;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use sha2::{Digest as _, Sha256};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] db::DatabaseError),
#[error("KeyHolder error: {0}")]
Keyholder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
#[error("KeyHolder mailbox error")]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Integrity envelope is missing for entity {entity_kind}")]
MissingEnvelope { entity_kind: &'static str },
@@ -57,108 +42,95 @@ pub enum Error {
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[must_use]
pub enum AttestationStatus {
Attested,
Unavailable,
}
pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
const KIND: &'static str;
const VERSION: i32 = 1;
}
impl<T: Integrable> Integrable for &T {
const KIND: &'static str = T::KIND;
const VERSION: i32 = T::VERSION;
fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
payload.hash(&mut hasher);
hasher.finalize().into()
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct EntityId(Vec<u8>);
fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #85"
)]
out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
}
impl Deref for EntityId {
type Target = [u8];
fn build_mac_input(
entity_kind: &str,
entity_id: &[u8],
payload_version: i32,
payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
out
}
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.0
pub trait IntoId {
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8>;
}
impl IntoId for i32 {
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
}
}
impl From<i32> for EntityId {
fn from(value: i32) -> Self {
Self(value.to_be_bytes().to_vec())
impl IntoId for &'_ [u8] {
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.to_vec()
}
}
impl From<&'_ [u8]> for EntityId {
fn from(bytes: &'_ [u8]) -> Self {
Self(bytes.to_vec())
}
}
pub async fn lookup_verified<E, Id, C, F, Fut>(
conn: &mut C,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
entity_id: Id,
load: F,
) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error>
where
C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
E: Integrable,
Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
F: FnOnce(&mut C) -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = Result<E, db::DatabaseError>>,
{
let entity = load(conn).await?;
verify_entity(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id).await
}
pub async fn lookup_verified_from_query<E, Id, C, F>(
conn: &mut C,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
load: F,
) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error>
where
C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite> + Send,
E: Integrable,
Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
F: for<'a> FnOnce(
&'a mut C,
) -> Pin<
Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<(Id, E), db::DatabaseError>> + Send + 'a>,
>,
{
let (entity_id, entity) = load(conn).await?;
verify_entity(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id).await
}
pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity: &E,
as_entity_id: Id,
) -> Result<Verified<Id, Nested<E>>, Error> {
let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
entity_id: impl IntoId,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
let entity_id = as_entity_id.clone().into();
let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
let (key_version, mac) = keyholder
.ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Keyholder(inner),
_ => Error::KeyholderSend,
})?;
let (key_version, mac) =
vault
.ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Vault(inner),
_ => Error::VaultSend,
})?;
insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
.values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
entity_id: entity_id.to_vec(),
entity_id,
payload_version: E::VERSION,
key_version,
mac: mac.to_vec(),
mac: mac.clone(),
})
.on_conflict((
integrity_envelope::entity_id,
@@ -174,19 +146,19 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
.await
.map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(Verified::<Id, Nested<E>>::new(as_entity_id))
Ok(())
}
pub async fn check_entity_attestation<E: Integrable>(
pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity: &E,
entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
entity_id: impl IntoId,
) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
let entity_id = entity_id.into();
let envelope: IntegrityEnvelopeRow = integrity_envelope::table
let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
let envelope: IntegrityEnvelope = integrity_envelope::table
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id))
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&entity_id))
.first(conn)
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
@@ -204,10 +176,10 @@ pub async fn check_entity_attestation<E: Integrable>(
});
}
let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash);
let result = keyholder
let result = vault
.ask(VerifyIntegrity {
mac_input,
expected_mac: envelope.mac,
@@ -220,100 +192,143 @@ pub async fn check_entity_attestation<E: Integrable>(
Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
}),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)) => {
Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable)
}
Err(_) => Err(Error::KeyholderSend),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, crate::VerifiedFields!)]
#[repr(C)]
pub struct Entity<E, Id> {
pub entity: E,
pub entity_id: Id,
}
impl<E, Id> Deref for Entity<E, Id> {
type Target = E;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.entity
}
}
pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
entity: E,
entity_id: Id,
) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
match check_entity_attestation(conn, keyholder, &entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(Entity {
entity,
entity_id,
})),
AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)),
}
}
pub async fn verify_entity_ref<'e, E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
entity: &'e E,
entity_id: Id,
) -> Result<Verified<Entity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
match check_entity_attestation(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<Entity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(Entity {
entity,
entity_id,
})),
AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)),
}
}
pub async fn delete_envelope<E: Integrable>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
) -> Result<usize, Error> {
let entity_id = entity_id.into();
let affected = diesel::delete(
integrity_envelope::table
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id)),
)
.execute(conn)
.await
.map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(affected)
}
fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
payload.hash(&mut hasher);
hasher.finalize().into()
}
fn build_mac_input(
entity_kind: &str,
entity_id: &[u8],
payload_version: i32,
payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
out
}
fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
pub async fn is_signing_available(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let state = vault.ask(GetState).await.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
Ok(matches!(state, vault::VaultState::Unsealed))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
mod tests {
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{Bootstrap, Vault},
},
db::{self, schema},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
#[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
struct DummyEntity {
payload_version: i32,
payload: Vec<u8>,
}
impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
}
async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
let actor = Vault::spawn(
Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap(),
);
actor
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actor
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
let tampered = DummyEntity {
payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
..entity
};
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
}

View File

@@ -1,298 +0,0 @@
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
use sha2::Digest;
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{Bootstrap, KeyHolder},
db::{self, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use super::hashing::Hashable;
use super::{
Error, Integrable, check_entity_attestation, lookup_verified, lookup_verified_from_query,
sign_entity, verify_entity,
};
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
struct DummyEntity {
payload_version: i32,
payload: Vec<u8>,
}
impl Hashable for DummyEntity {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.payload_version.hash(hasher);
self.payload.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
}
async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<KeyHolder> {
let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
actor
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actor
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap()
.drop_verification_provenance();
let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
let _ = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap()
.drop_verification_provenance();
diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap()
.drop_verification_provenance();
let tampered = DummyEntity {
payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
..entity
};
let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn strict_verify_fails_closed_while_sealed() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-41";
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap()
.drop_verification_provenance();
drop(keyholder);
let sealed_keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(
err,
Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
));
let err = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| async {
Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
})
})
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(
err,
Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn lookup_verified_supports_loaded_aggregate() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 77;
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap()
.drop_verification_provenance();
let verified = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| async {
Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
})
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn extension_trait_lookup_verified_required_works() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 79;
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap()
.drop_verification_provenance();
let verified = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| {
Box::pin(async {
Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
})
})
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn lookup_verified_from_query_helpers_work() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 80;
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap()
.drop_verification_provenance();
let verified = lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &keyholder, |_| {
Box::pin(async {
Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>((
ENTITY_ID,
DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
},
))
})
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
drop(keyholder);
let sealed_keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
let err = lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, |_| {
Box::pin(async {
Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>((
ENTITY_ID,
DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
},
))
})
})
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(
err,
Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
));
}

View File

@@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
use std::ops::Deref;
use super::Integrable;
mod private {
pub trait Sealed {}
}
/// Marker trait for type-level verification provenance.
///
/// This trait is intentionally sealed so external code cannot invent arbitrary
/// provenance tags and bypass the intended type-level guarantees.
pub trait VerificationOrigin: private::Sealed {
type Origin: VerificationOrigin;
}
/// Root provenance marker for values directly produced by integrity APIs.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Default)]
pub struct Root;
/// Nested provenance marker carrying the source integrable type and previous
/// provenance marker in the chain.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Nested<From, P: VerificationOrigin = Root>(core::marker::PhantomData<(From, P)>);
impl private::Sealed for Root {}
impl VerificationOrigin for Root {
type Origin = Self;
}
impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> private::Sealed for Nested<T, P> {}
impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> VerificationOrigin for Nested<T, P> {
type Origin = P;
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[repr(transparent)]
#[must_use = "Verified<T> is a proof-bearing wrapper; use self.drop_verification_provenance() to explicitly discard integrity provenance when needed"]
pub struct Verified<T, O: VerificationOrigin = Root> {
inner: T,
origin: core::marker::PhantomData<O>,
}
impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> AsRef<Verified<T, O>> for Verified<&T, O> {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &Verified<T, O> {
// SAFETY: `Verified<T>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so `&T`
// and `&Verified<T>` have identical layout.
unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<T, Verified<T, O>>(self.inner) }
}
}
impl<T, U: Integrable, O: VerificationOrigin> Deref for Verified<T, Nested<U, O>> {
type Target = Verified<T, O::Origin>;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
// SAFETY: `Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so `&Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>`
// and `&Nested<U, O>` have identical layout.
unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<Self, Verified<T, O::Origin>>(self) }
}
}
impl<T> Deref for Verified<T, Root> {
type Target = T;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.inner
}
}
impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> Verified<T, O> {
/// Unwraps the verified value, discarding the integrity provenance.
///
/// The name is intentionally verbose — call sites where provenance is
/// dropped should be easy to find and audit.
pub fn drop_verification_provenance(self) -> T {
self.inner
}
/// Downgrades the origin provenance to any lower nestedness level,
/// e.g. `Verified<T, Nested<Other>>` to `Verified<T, Root>`.
pub fn unqualify_origin<Target: VerificationOrigin>(self) -> Verified<T, Target>
where
O: VerificationOrigin<Origin = Target>,
{
Verified {
inner: self.inner,
origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
/// Constructs a `Verified<T>` by wrapping a `T`.
pub(super) fn new(value: T) -> Self {
Self {
inner: value,
origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
/// Constructs a `Verified<T>` from a raw value without performing any
/// integrity check. Only available in test builds; use the integrity
/// module's functions to obtain a `Verified<T>` in production code.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn new_unchecked(value: T) -> Self {
Self {
inner: value,
origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
/// Reinterprets `&T` as `&Verified<T>`.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(super) fn from_ref(from: &T) -> &Self {
// SAFETY: `Self` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`.
unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<T, Self>(from) }
}
}
/// Bit-copies `value: From` into a `To`, suppressing the source destructor so
/// the destination owns the bytes.
///
/// # Safety
///
/// The caller must guarantee that `From` and `To` have identical in-memory
/// layout — the raw bytes that encode a valid `From` must also encode a valid
/// `To`.
///
/// A `union` is used instead of [`std::mem::transmute`] because `transmute`
/// rejects generic source/destination types at the call site even when their
/// sizes are provably equal at monomorphization time.
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[inline]
pub const unsafe fn reinterpret_layout<From, To>(value: From) -> To {
const {
assert!(
::std::mem::size_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::size_of::<To>(),
"reinterpret_layout: source and destination must have identical size"
);
assert!(
::std::mem::align_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::align_of::<To>(),
"reinterpret_layout: source and destination must have identical alignment"
);
}
union Reinterpret<A, B> {
from: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop<A>,
to: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop<B>,
}
// SAFETY: caller guarantees layout equivalence (see fn docs). The union
// write-read copies the raw bytes of `value` into a `To` slot, and
// `ManuallyDrop` on the source side suppresses its destructor so the
// destination owns the bytes unambiguously — no double-drop is possible.
unsafe {
::std::mem::ManuallyDrop::into_inner(
Reinterpret {
from: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop::new(value),
}
.to,
)
}
}
/// Reinterprets `&From` as `&To` via a layout-preserving pointer cast.
///
/// # Safety
///
/// Same invariants as [`reinterpret_layout`].
#[inline]
pub const unsafe fn reinterpret_layout_ref<From, To>(value: &From) -> &To {
const {
assert!(
::std::mem::size_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::size_of::<To>(),
"reinterpret_layout_ref: source and destination must have identical size"
);
assert!(
::std::mem::align_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::align_of::<To>(),
"reinterpret_layout_ref: source and destination must have identical alignment"
);
}
// SAFETY: caller guarantees layout equivalence (see fn docs). A reference
// cast between identically-laid-out types produces a reference with the
// same address and lifetime, which is sound.
unsafe { &*(value as *const From as *const To) }
}
/// Implemented on `Verified<T>` by [`VerifiedFields!`], exposing the field-wise counterpart.
///
/// ## Disclaimer
/// Do not implement this trait manually. It is intended to be implemented only
/// by the `VerifiedFields!` macro, which generates the necessary layout
/// guarantees for sound pointer casts.
///
/// ## Soundness
/// When [`verify_entity`][crate::crypto::integrity::verify_entity] attests an
/// entity, it returns `Verified<T>` — an aggregate proof over the whole value.
/// This trait converts that wrapper into `Counterpart` (e.g.
/// `VerifiedMyStruct`), where every field is individually wrapped in
/// [`Verified`], allowing verified data to flow into functions that require
/// `Verified<FieldType>` without re-verifying.
///
/// ## Safety
/// The conversion is a zero-cost reinterpretation — no copying (beyond a
/// bitwise move in the owned variant) or HMAC work occurs. Soundness rests on
/// identical memory layout between `Verified<T>` and `Counterpart`:
///
/// - `T` carries `#[repr(C)]` (enforced by `@require_repr` in the macro).
/// - `T` does **not** carry `packed` (enforced by `@reject_packed`).
/// - `Counterpart` also carries `#[repr(C)]`, with the same fields in the same
/// order.
/// - Each `Verified<F>` field is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, so its size
/// and alignment match `F` exactly.
/// - `Verified<T>` itself is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`.
///
/// As an additional machine-checked guard, [`reinterpret_layout`] and
/// [`reinterpret_layout_ref`] assert size/align equality of the two types at
/// monomorphization time.
///
/// The trait is implemented directly on `Verified<T>` (not on `T`), so no
/// `Deref`-coercion or auto-ref stripping is needed at call sites — the impl
/// is unambiguous.
pub trait VerifiedFieldsAccessor {
/// The field-wise verified counterpart, e.g. `VerifiedMyStruct`.
type Counterpart;
/// Reinterprets `&self` as `&Counterpart` via a layout-preserving pointer cast.
///
/// No data is copied and no re-verification occurs. The returned reference
/// borrows from `self` and has the same lifetime.
fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart;
/// Consumes `self` and returns `Counterpart` via a layout-preserving
/// bitwise move.
///
/// The original `Verified<T>` is moved without running its destructor
/// (there is none — `Verified` is a transparent wrapper with no heap
/// allocation), and the returned counterpart owns the original bytes. No
/// re-verification occurs.
fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart;
}
// todo! rewrite macro_rules to derive crate
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! VerifiedFields {
// --- Entry point (no source generics) ---
(
$(#$attr:tt)*
$vis:vis struct $name:ident
{
$(
$field_vis:vis $field_name:ident : $field_ty:ty
),* $(,)?
}
) => {
// Attribute-list checks run in isolation — they only receive the attrs,
// not the struct body.
$crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$(#$attr)*]);
$crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$(#$attr)*]);
paste::paste! {
#[doc = concat!(
"Field-wise verified counterpart of [`", stringify!($name), "`]."
)]
//
// `#[repr(C)]` is required for the pointer casts in `inherit_ref`
// and `inherit` to be sound. Both the source struct (enforced by
// `@require_repr`) and this counterpart carry `#[repr(C)]`, which
// guarantees matching field offsets. Combined with each
// `Verified<F>` being `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, the two
// structs have identical memory layout.
//
// `#[repr(transparent)]` is not usable here because it only permits
// a single non-ZST field; multi-field structs would fail to compile.
#[repr(C)]
$vis struct [<Verified $name>]<P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
{
$(
$field_vis $field_name : $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$field_ty, P>
),*
}
impl<P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
$crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor
for $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$name, P>
{
type Counterpart = [<Verified $name>]<P>;
fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart {
// SAFETY: `Self` is `Verified<T>` (transparent over
// `T #[repr(C)]`) and `Self::Counterpart` is `#[repr(C)]`
// with the same fields in the same order, each wrapped in
// a `#[repr(transparent)]` `Verified<F>`. The two types
// therefore have identical memory layout, which
// `reinterpret_layout_ref` re-checks as size/align
// equality at monomorphization.
unsafe {
$crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout_ref::<
Self,
Self::Counterpart,
>(self)
}
}
fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart {
// SAFETY: identical layout — see `inherit_ref`. The owned
// helper additionally suppresses the source destructor so
// the returned counterpart owns the original bytes (no
// double-drop is possible).
unsafe {
$crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout::<
Self,
Self::Counterpart,
>(self)
}
}
}
}
};
// --- Entry point (source has generics) ---
(
$(#$attr:tt)*
$vis:vis struct $name:ident <$($gen:tt),*>
{
$(
$field_vis:vis $field_name:ident : $field_ty:ty
),* $(,)?
}
) => {
// Attribute-list checks run in isolation — they only receive the attrs,
// not the struct body.
$crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$(#$attr)*]);
$crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$(#$attr)*]);
paste::paste! {
#[doc = concat!(
"Field-wise verified counterpart of [`", stringify!($name), "`]."
)]
//
// `#[repr(C)]` is required for the pointer casts in `inherit_ref`
// and `inherit` to be sound. Both the source struct (enforced by
// `@require_repr`) and this counterpart carry `#[repr(C)]`, which
// guarantees matching field offsets. Combined with each
// `Verified<F>` being `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, the two
// structs have identical memory layout.
//
// `#[repr(transparent)]` is not usable here because it only permits
// a single non-ZST field; multi-field structs would fail to compile.
#[repr(C)]
$vis struct [<Verified $name>]<$($gen),*, P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
{
$(
$field_vis $field_name : $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$field_ty, P>
),*
}
impl<$($gen),*, P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
$crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor
for $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$name<$($gen),*>, P>
{
type Counterpart = [<Verified $name>]<$($gen),*, P>;
fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart {
// SAFETY: `Self` is `Verified<T>` (transparent over
// `T #[repr(C)]`) and `Self::Counterpart` is `#[repr(C)]`
// with the same fields in the same order, each wrapped in
// a `#[repr(transparent)]` `Verified<F>`. The two types
// therefore have identical memory layout, which
// `reinterpret_layout_ref` re-checks as size/align
// equality at monomorphization.
unsafe {
$crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout_ref::<
Self,
Self::Counterpart,
>(self)
}
}
fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart {
// SAFETY: identical layout — see `inherit_ref`. The owned
// helper additionally suppresses the source destructor so
// the returned counterpart owns the original bytes (no
// double-drop is possible).
unsafe {
$crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout::<
Self,
Self::Counterpart,
>(self)
}
}
}
}
};
// --- @require_repr: ensure `#[repr(C)]` appears in the attribute list ---
(@require_repr [#[repr(C)] $($rest:tt)*]) => {};
(@require_repr [#$other:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
$crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$($rest)*]);
};
(@require_repr []) => {
::std::compile_error!(
"VerifiedFields requires `#[repr(C)]` on the struct to guarantee field layout"
);
};
// --- @reject_packed: walk attrs and reject any `#[repr(..., packed, ...)]`.
//
// Without this, a packed struct would still fail at monomorphization via
// the const assertions inside the `reinterpret_layout*` helpers, but the
// diagnostic would be much harder to read. `align(N)` is *not* rejected
// here because const assertions catch alignment mismatches cleanly, and
// forbidding it would be unnecessarily restrictive.
(@reject_packed [#[repr($($inner:tt)*)] $($rest:tt)*]) => {
$crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed_inner [$($inner)*]);
$crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$($rest)*]);
};
(@reject_packed [#$other:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
$crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$($rest)*]);
};
(@reject_packed []) => {};
(@reject_packed_inner [packed $($rest:tt)*]) => {
::std::compile_error!(
"VerifiedFields does not support packed layouts; the generated \
counterpart would not share layout with the source struct"
);
};
(@reject_packed_inner [$first:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
$crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed_inner [$($rest)*]);
};
(@reject_packed_inner []) => {};
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
#[repr(C)]
#[derive(Default, Clone)]
pub struct MyStruct<T> {
pub field1: String,
pub field2: T,
}
fn verify<T>(t: T) -> Verified<T> {
Verified {
inner: t,
origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
// --- inherit_ref ---
// Verifies that `inherit_ref` returns a reference to the same memory
// address, confirming that no copy is made and the cast is purely a
// reinterpretation.
#[test]
fn inherit_ref_is_same_address() {
let v = verify(MyStruct {
field1: "hello".into(),
field2: 42u32,
});
let fields = v.inherit_ref();
assert_eq!(
&v as *const _ as *const u8, fields as *const _ as *const u8,
"inherit_ref must return a pointer to the same memory, not a copy"
);
}
// Verifies that field values are correctly accessible after `inherit_ref`.
#[test]
fn inherit_ref_field_values() {
let v = verify(MyStruct {
field1: "hello".into(),
field2: 99u32,
});
let fields = v.inherit_ref();
assert_eq!(*fields.field1, "hello");
assert_eq!(*fields.field2, 99u32);
}
// Verifies that casting the counterpart back to `Verified<T>` via a raw
// pointer lands on the original address — confirms the round-trip is a
// pure reinterpretation.
#[test]
fn inherit_ref_cast_roundtrip() {
let v = verify(MyStruct {
field1: "x".into(),
field2: 7u32,
});
let fields: &VerifiedMyStruct<u32, Root> = v.inherit_ref();
let back_ptr =
fields as *const VerifiedMyStruct<u32, Root> as *const Verified<MyStruct<u32>>;
assert_eq!(
back_ptr as *const u8, &v as *const _ as *const u8,
"cast of counterpart must point back to the same Verified<T>"
);
}
// ZST fields must still produce a counterpart with identical layout — the
// const asserts in `reinterpret_layout_ref` guard this at monomorphization.
#[test]
fn inherit_ref_with_zst_field() {
#[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
#[repr(C)]
struct WithZst {
pub unit: (),
pub val: u64,
}
let v = Verified::<WithZst>::new_unchecked(WithZst { unit: (), val: 777 });
let fields = v.inherit_ref();
assert_eq!(*fields.val, 777);
assert_eq!(*fields.unit, ());
}
// --- inherit ---
// Verifies that `inherit` preserves field values in the owned counterpart.
#[test]
fn inherit_field_values() {
let v = verify(MyStruct {
field1: "world".into(),
field2: 1234u64,
});
let VerifiedMyStruct { field1, field2 } = v.inherit();
assert_eq!(*field1, "world");
assert_eq!(*field2, 1234u64);
}
// Verifies that `inherit` does not double-drop the inner value.
// If `ManuallyDrop` handling is wrong, running under Miri or with a drop
// counter catches a double-free.
#[test]
fn inherit_no_double_drop() {
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
static DROP_COUNT: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
struct DropCounter;
impl Drop for DropCounter {
fn drop(&mut self) {
DROP_COUNT.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
}
#[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
#[repr(C)]
struct WithDrop {
pub val: DropCounter,
}
DROP_COUNT.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
{
let v = Verified::<WithDrop>::new_unchecked(WithDrop { val: DropCounter });
let _ = v.inherit();
}
assert_eq!(
DROP_COUNT.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
1,
"DropCounter must be dropped exactly once"
);
}
// --- Verified::from_ref ---
#[test]
fn from_ref_is_same_address() {
let val = 42u32;
let verified: &Verified<u32> = Verified::from_ref(&val);
assert_eq!(
&val as *const u32 as *const u8, verified as *const _ as *const u8,
"from_ref must alias the original reference, not copy the value"
);
}
#[test]
fn from_ref_value_preserved() {
let val = String::from("test");
let verified: &Verified<String> = Verified::from_ref(&val);
assert_eq!(**verified, "test");
}
// --- AsRef<Verified<T>> for Verified<&T> ---
#[test]
fn verified_ref_as_ref_is_same_address() {
let val = 99u32;
let vref: Verified<&u32> = Verified::new_unchecked(&val);
let v: &Verified<u32> = vref.as_ref();
assert_eq!(
&val as *const u32 as *const u8, v as *const _ as *const u8,
"AsRef<Verified<T>> for Verified<&T> must alias the referent, not copy it"
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
use std::ops::Deref as _;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
use chacha20poly1305::{
@@ -10,13 +11,9 @@ use rand::{
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
pub mod encryption;
pub mod integrity;
use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
fn from(value: SafeCell<Key>) -> Self {
@@ -41,11 +38,8 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
impl KeyCell {
pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng)
.expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
});
@@ -59,8 +53,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
@@ -72,8 +65,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
buffer: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let mut buffer = buffer.write();
let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
@@ -87,8 +79,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
@@ -116,20 +107,15 @@ pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
}
};
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
password.read_inline(|password_source| {
let mut key_buffer = key.write();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Better fail completely than return a weak key"
)]
hasher
.hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
.unwrap();
.hash_password_into(password_source, salt, key_buffer)
.expect("Better fail completely than return a weak key");
});
key.into()
@@ -141,10 +127,10 @@ mod tests {
derive_key,
encryption::v1::{Nonce, generate_salt},
};
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[test]
pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
fn encrypt_decrypt() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ use diesel_async::{
sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
};
use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::info;
@@ -23,14 +22,14 @@ const MIGRATIONS: EmbeddedMigrations = embed_migrations!("migrations");
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
#[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
HomeDir(std::io::Error),
#[error(transparent)]
ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
#[error(transparent)]
Connection(diesel::ConnectionError),
#[error(transparent)]
ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
HomeDir(std::io::Error),
#[error(transparent)]
Migration(Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>),
@@ -41,10 +40,11 @@ pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum DatabaseError {
#[error("Database connection error")]
Pool(#[from] PoolError),
#[error("Database query error")]
Connection(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Database connection error")]
Pool(#[from] PoolError),
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
@@ -93,13 +93,16 @@ fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
/// Creates a connection pool for the `SQLite` database.
///
/// # Panics
/// Panics if the database path is not valid UTF-8.
pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
database_path()?
.to_str()
.expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_string(),
.to_owned(),
);
initialize_database(&database_url)?;
@@ -134,19 +137,19 @@ pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetu
}
#[mutants::skip]
#[expect(clippy::missing_panics_doc, reason = "Tests oriented function")]
/// Creates a test database pool with a temporary `SQLite` database file.
pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
let tempfile_name = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), 16);
let file = std::env::temp_dir().join(tempfile_name);
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
let url = file
.to_str()
.expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_string();
.to_owned();
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
create_pool(Some(&url))
.await
.expect("Failed to create test database pool")

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
#![allow(unused)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
#![allow(
clippy::duplicated_attributes,
reason = "restructed's #[view] causes false positives"
)]
use crate::db::schema::{
self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_transaction_log, evm_wallet,
integrity_envelope, root_key_history, tls_history,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
use restructed::Models;
@@ -27,16 +28,16 @@ pub mod types {
pub struct SqliteTimestamp(pub DateTime<Utc>);
impl SqliteTimestamp {
pub fn now() -> Self {
SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())
Self(Utc::now())
}
}
impl From<chrono::DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from(dt: chrono::DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
SqliteTimestamp(dt)
impl From<DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from(dt: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
Self(dt)
}
}
impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for chrono::DateTime<Utc> {
impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for DateTime<Utc> {
fn from(ts: SqliteTimestamp) -> Self {
ts.0
}
@@ -47,6 +48,11 @@ pub mod types {
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #84; this will break up in 2038 :3"
)]
let unix_timestamp = self.0.timestamp() as i32;
out.set_value(unix_timestamp);
Ok(IsNull::No)
@@ -69,41 +75,47 @@ pub mod types {
let datetime =
DateTime::from_timestamp(unix_timestamp, 0).ok_or("Timestamp is out of bounds")?;
Ok(SqliteTimestamp(datetime))
Ok(Self(datetime))
}
}
/// Key algorithm stored in the `useragent_client.key_type` column.
/// Values must stay stable — they are persisted in the database.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, strum::FromRepr)]
#[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum KeyType {
Ed25519 = 1,
EcdsaSecp256k1 = 2,
Rsa = 3,
}
#[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
pub struct ChainId(pub i32);
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_sign_loss,
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants"
)]
const _: () = {
impl From<ChainId> for alloy::primitives::ChainId {
fn from(chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
chain_id.0 as Self
}
}
impl From<alloy::primitives::ChainId> for ChainId {
fn from(chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId) -> Self {
Self(chain_id as _)
}
}
};
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for ChainId {
fn from_sql(
bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
FromSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::from_sql(bytes).map(Self)
}
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for ChainId {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
out.set_value(*self as i32);
Ok(IsNull::No)
}
}
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err("Expected Integer for KeyType".into());
};
let discriminant = bytes.read_long();
KeyType::from_repr(discriminant as i32)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("Unknown KeyType discriminant: {discriminant}").into())
ToSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::to_sql(&self.0, out)
}
}
}
@@ -229,7 +241,6 @@ pub struct ProgramClientMetadataHistory {
#[diesel(table_name = schema::program_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProgramClient {
pub id: i32,
pub nonce: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub metadata_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
@@ -240,11 +251,9 @@ pub struct ProgramClient {
#[diesel(table_name = schema::useragent_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct UseragentClient {
pub id: i32,
pub nonce: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub key_type: KeyType,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
@@ -272,7 +281,7 @@ pub struct EvmEtherTransferLimit {
pub struct EvmBasicGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub wallet_access_id: i32, // references evm_wallet_access.id
pub chain_id: i32,
pub chain_id: ChainId,
pub valid_from: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub valid_until: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
@@ -295,7 +304,7 @@ pub struct EvmTransactionLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub wallet_access_id: i32,
pub chain_id: i32,
pub chain_id: ChainId,
pub eth_value: Vec<u8>,
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
@@ -370,7 +379,7 @@ pub struct EvmTokenTransferLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub log_id: i32,
pub chain_id: i32,
pub chain_id: ChainId,
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
pub recipient_address: Vec<u8>,
pub value: Vec<u8>,

View File

@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ diesel::table! {
diesel::table! {
program_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
nonce -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
metadata_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
@@ -189,9 +188,7 @@ diesel::table! {
diesel::table! {
useragent_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
nonce -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
key_type -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}

View File

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ sol! {
sol! {
/// Permit2 — Uniswap's canonical token approval manager.
/// Replaces per-contract ERC-20 approve() with a single approval hub.
/// Replaces per-contract ERC-20 `approve()` with a single approval hub.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IPermit2 {
struct TokenPermissions {

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,6 @@
pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer;
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{TxKind, U256},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
crypto::integrity::{self, Verified, VerifiedEntity, verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor},
actors::vault::Vault,
crypto::integrity,
db::{
self, DatabaseError,
models::{
@@ -27,6 +15,18 @@ use crate::{
},
};
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{TxKind, U256},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer;
pub mod policies;
mod utils;
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ mod utils;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum PolicyError {
#[error("Database error")]
Database(#[from] crate::db::DatabaseError),
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Transaction violates policy: {0:?}")]
Violations(Vec<EvalViolation>),
#[error("No matching grant found")]
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ pub enum AnalyzeError {
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ListError {
#[error("Database error")]
Database(#[from] crate::db::DatabaseError),
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Integrity verification failed for grant")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ async fn check_shared_constraints(
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
if count >= rate_limit.count as i64 {
if count >= rate_limit.count.into() {
violations.push(EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded);
}
}
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ async fn check_shared_constraints(
// Supporting only EIP-1559 transactions for now, but we can easily extend this to support legacy transactions if needed
pub struct Engine {
db: db::DatabasePool,
keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
}
impl Engine {
@@ -153,39 +153,12 @@ impl Engine {
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let verified_settings =
match integrity::lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, |conn| {
let context = context.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or_else(|| DatabaseError::from(diesel::result::Error::NotFound))?;
Ok::<_, DatabaseError>((grant.common_settings_id, grant.settings))
})
})
.await
{
Ok(verified) => verified,
Err(integrity::Error::Database(DatabaseError::Connection(
diesel::result::Error::NotFound,
))) => return Err(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant),
Err(err) => return Err(PolicyError::Integrity(err)),
};
let mut grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant)?;
// IMPORTANT: policy evaluation uses extra non-integrity fields from Grant
// (e.g., per-policy ids), so we currently reload Grant after the query-native
// integrity check over canonicalized settings.
grant.settings = verified_settings
.inherit()
.entity
.drop_verification_provenance();
integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &self.vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
let mut violations = check_shared_constraints(
&context,
@@ -212,7 +185,7 @@ impl Engine {
.values(&NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: grant.common_settings_id,
wallet_access_id: context.target.id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
chain_id: context.chain.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(context.value).to_vec(),
signed_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
@@ -234,28 +207,34 @@ impl Engine {
}
impl Engine {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>) -> Self {
Self { db, keyholder }
pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, vault: ActorRef<Vault>) -> Self {
Self { db, vault }
}
pub async fn create_grant<P: Policy>(
&self,
full_grant: CombinedSettings<P::Settings>,
) -> Result<Verified<i32>, DatabaseError>
) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError>
where
P::Settings: Clone,
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let keyholder = self.keyholder.clone();
let vault = self.vault.clone();
let id = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use schema::evm_basic_grant;
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #86"
)]
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmBasicGrant {
chain_id: full_grant.shared.chain as i32,
chain_id: full_grant.shared.chain.into(),
wallet_access_id: full_grant.shared.wallet_access_id,
valid_from: full_grant.shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: full_grant.shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
@@ -285,23 +264,22 @@ impl Engine {
P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await?;
let verified_entity_id =
integrity::sign_entity(conn, &keyholder, &full_grant, basic_grant.id)
.await
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
integrity::sign_entity(conn, &vault, &full_grant, basic_grant.id)
.await
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
QueryResult::Ok(verified_entity_id)
QueryResult::Ok(basic_grant.id)
})
})
.await?;
Ok(id.unqualify_origin())
Ok(id)
}
async fn list_one_kind<Kind: Policy, Y>(
&self,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> Result<Vec<Grant<Y>>, ListError>
) -> Result<impl Iterator<Item = Grant<Y>>, ListError>
where
Y: From<Kind::Settings>,
{
@@ -309,32 +287,16 @@ impl Engine {
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let mut verified_grants = Vec::with_capacity(all_grants.len());
// Verify integrity of all grants before returning any results.
for grant in all_grants {
let VerifiedEntity {
entity: verified_settings,
entity_id: _,
} = integrity::verify_entity(
conn,
&self.keyholder,
grant.settings,
grant.common_settings_id,
)
.await?
.inherit();
verified_grants.push(Grant {
id: grant.id,
common_settings_id: grant.common_settings_id,
settings: verified_settings
.drop_verification_provenance()
.generalize(),
});
// Verify integrity of all grants before returning any results
for grant in &all_grants {
integrity::verify_entity(conn, &self.vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
}
Ok(verified_grants)
Ok(all_grants.into_iter().map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
common_settings_id: g.common_settings_id,
settings: g.settings.generalize(),
}))
}
pub async fn list_all_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, ListError> {
@@ -357,7 +319,7 @@ impl Engine {
let TxKind::Call(to) = transaction.to else {
return Err(VetError::ContractCreationNotSupported);
};
let context = policies::EvalContext {
let context = EvalContext {
target,
chain: transaction.chain_id,
to,
@@ -448,10 +410,16 @@ mod tests {
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
shared: &SharedGrantSettings,
) -> EvmBasicGrant {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #86"
)]
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: shared.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: shared.chain as i32,
chain_id: shared.chain.into(),
valid_from: shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: shared
@@ -615,7 +583,7 @@ mod tests {
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: basic_grant.id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: super::utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::ZERO).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
use std::fmt::Display;
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
db::models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess},
evm::utils,
};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, ChainId, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
@@ -6,15 +10,9 @@ use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, result::QueryResult, sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use std::fmt::Display;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
db::models::{self, EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess},
evm::utils,
};
pub mod ether_transfer;
pub mod token_transfers;
@@ -87,10 +85,10 @@ pub trait Policy: Sized {
// Create a new grant in the database based on the provided grant details, and return its ID
fn create_grant(
basic: &models::EvmBasicGrant,
basic: &EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = QueryResult<DatabaseID>> + Send;
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<DatabaseID>> + Send;
// Try to find an existing grant that matches the transaction context, and return its details if found
// Additionally, return ID of basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
@@ -127,19 +125,19 @@ pub enum SpecificMeaning {
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Meaning),
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct TransactionRateLimit {
pub count: u32,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct VolumeRateLimit {
pub max_volume: U256,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
pub wallet_access_id: i32,
pub chain: ChainId,
@@ -157,7 +155,7 @@ impl SharedGrantSettings {
pub(crate) fn try_from_model(model: EvmBasicGrant) -> QueryResult<Self> {
Ok(Self {
wallet_access_id: model.wallet_access_id,
chain: model.chain_id as u64, // safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants
chain: model.chain_id.into(),
valid_from: model.valid_from.map(Into::into),
valid_until: model.valid_until.map(Into::into),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: model
@@ -168,10 +166,11 @@ impl SharedGrantSettings {
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))
.transpose()?,
#[expect(clippy::cast_sign_loss, clippy::as_conversions, reason = "fixme! #86")]
rate_limit: match (model.rate_limit_count, model.rate_limit_window_secs) {
(Some(count), Some(window_secs)) => Some(TransactionRateLimit {
count: count as u32,
window: Duration::seconds(window_secs as i64),
window: Duration::seconds(window_secs.into()),
}),
_ => None,
},
@@ -181,7 +180,7 @@ impl SharedGrantSettings {
pub async fn query_by_id(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
id: i32,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<Self> {
) -> QueryResult<Self> {
use crate::db::schema::evm_basic_grant;
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = evm_basic_grant::table
@@ -200,7 +199,7 @@ pub enum SpecificGrant {
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[derive(Debug, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct CombinedSettings<PolicyGrant> {
pub shared: SharedGrantSettings,
pub specific: PolicyGrant,
@@ -219,38 +218,3 @@ impl<P: Integrable> Integrable for CombinedSettings<P> {
const KIND: &'static str = P::KIND;
const VERSION: i32 = P::VERSION;
}
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
impl Hashable for TransactionRateLimit {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.count.hash(hasher);
self.window.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl Hashable for VolumeRateLimit {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.max_volume.hash(hasher);
self.window.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl Hashable for SharedGrantSettings {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.wallet_access_id.hash(hasher);
self.chain.hash(hasher);
self.valid_from.hash(hasher);
self.valid_until.hash(hasher);
self.max_gas_fee_per_gas.hash(hasher);
self.max_priority_fee_per_gas.hash(hasher);
self.rate_limit.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl<P: Hashable> Hashable for CombinedSettings<P> {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.shared.hash(hasher);
self.specific.hash(hasher);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,30 +1,32 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fmt::Display;
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, JoinOnDsl, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable;
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, EvmEtherTransferLimit,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_transaction_log};
use crate::evm::policies::{
CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, EvmEtherTransferLimit,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
},
db::schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_transaction_log},
db::{
models::{self, NewEvmEtherTransferGrant, NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget},
models::{NewEvmEtherTransferGrant, NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget},
schema::{evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target},
},
evm::policies::{
CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
evm::{policies::Policy, utils},
};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{
dsl::{auto_type, insert_into},
prelude::*,
sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use std::{collections::HashMap, fmt::Display};
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
evm_ether_transfer_grant::table.inner_join(
@@ -32,8 +34,6 @@ fn grant_join() -> _ {
)
}
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
// Plain ether transfer
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {
@@ -46,13 +46,13 @@ impl Display for Meaning {
}
}
impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
fn from(val: Meaning) -> SpecificMeaning {
SpecificMeaning::EtherTransfer(val)
fn from(val: Meaning) -> Self {
Self::EtherTransfer(val)
}
}
// A grant for ether transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct Settings {
pub target: Vec<Address>,
pub limit: VolumeRateLimit,
@@ -61,18 +61,9 @@ impl Integrable for Settings {
const KIND: &'static str = "EtherTransfer";
}
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
impl Hashable for Settings {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.target.hash(hasher);
self.limit.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(val)
fn from(val: Settings) -> Self {
Self::EtherTransfer(val)
}
}
@@ -83,9 +74,7 @@ async fn query_relevant_past_transaction(
) -> QueryResult<Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)>> {
let past_transactions: Vec<(Vec<u8>, SqliteTimestamp)> = evm_transaction_log::table
.filter(evm_transaction_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id))
.filter(
evm_transaction_log::signed_at.ge(SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() - longest_window)),
)
.filter(evm_transaction_log::signed_at.ge(SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now() - longest_window)))
.select((
evm_transaction_log::eth_value,
evm_transaction_log::signed_at,
@@ -110,10 +99,9 @@ async fn check_rate_limits(
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let window = grant.settings.specific.limit.window;
let past_transaction =
query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.common_settings_id, window, db).await?;
let past_transaction = query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.id, window, db).await?;
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - grant.settings.specific.limit.window;
let window_start = Utc::now() - grant.settings.specific.limit.window;
let prospective_cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transaction
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
@@ -163,10 +151,15 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
}
async fn create_grant(
basic: &models::EvmBasicGrant,
basic: &EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<DatabaseID> {
) -> QueryResult<DatabaseID> {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #86"
)]
let limit_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_limit::table)
.values(NewEvmEtherTransferLimit {
window_secs: grant.limit.window.num_seconds() as i32,
@@ -201,7 +194,7 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
async fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
) -> QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let target_bytes = context.to.to_vec();
// Find a grant where:
@@ -250,20 +243,21 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
})
.collect();
let settings = Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume)
.map_err(|err| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err)))?,
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs.into()),
},
};
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: grant.id,
common_settings_id: grant.basic_grant_id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
specific: Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(|err| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
})?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
},
},
specific: settings,
},
}))
}
@@ -274,7 +268,7 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
_log_id: i32,
_grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
_conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<()> {
) -> QueryResult<()> {
// Basic log is sufficient
Ok(())
@@ -327,7 +321,7 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
.map(|(basic, specific)| {
let targets: Vec<Address> = targets_by_grant
.get(&specific.id)
.map(|v| v.as_slice())
.map(Vec::as_slice)
.unwrap_or_default()
.iter()
.filter_map(|t| {
@@ -351,7 +345,7 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(
|e| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(e)),
)?,
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs.into()),
},
},
},

View File

@@ -1,27 +1,28 @@
use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
use crate::{
db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
},
evm::{
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
},
};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::{
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
const WALLET_ACCESS_ID: i32 = 1;
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const CHAIN_ID: alloy::primitives::ChainId = 1;
const ALLOWED: Address = address!("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111");
const OTHER: Address = address!("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222");
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicG
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
@@ -160,7 +161,7 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_when_volume_within_limit() {
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(500u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_000u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(900u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
@@ -340,7 +341,7 @@ proptest::proptest! {
) {
use rand::{SeedableRng, seq::SliceRandom};
use sha2::Digest;
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
let addrs: Vec<Address> = raw_addrs.iter().map(|b| Address::from(*b)).collect();
let mut shuffled = addrs.clone();

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,4 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use crate::db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::Integrable,
db::models::{
@@ -18,20 +6,33 @@ use crate::{
NewEvmTokenTransferGrant, NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
SqliteTimestamp,
},
db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
},
evm::policies::CombinedSettings,
evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
},
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, U256},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, prelude::*};
use diesel::{
dsl::{auto_type, insert_into},
prelude::*,
sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use std::collections::HashMap;
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
@@ -56,13 +57,13 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for Meaning {
}
}
impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
fn from(val: Meaning) -> SpecificMeaning {
SpecificMeaning::TokenTransfer(val)
fn from(val: Meaning) -> Self {
Self::TokenTransfer(val)
}
}
// A grant for token transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct Settings {
pub token_contract: Address,
pub target: Option<Address>,
@@ -72,19 +73,9 @@ impl Integrable for Settings {
const KIND: &'static str = "TokenTransfer";
}
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
impl Hashable for Settings {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.token_contract.hash(hasher);
self.target.hash(hasher);
self.volume_limits.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(val)
fn from(val: Settings) -> Self {
Self::TokenTransfer(val)
}
}
@@ -95,10 +86,7 @@ async fn query_relevant_past_transfers(
) -> QueryResult<Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)>> {
let past_logs: Vec<(Vec<u8>, SqliteTimestamp)> = evm_token_transfer_log::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id))
.filter(
evm_token_transfer_log::created_at
.ge(SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() - longest_window)),
)
.filter(evm_token_transfer_log::created_at.ge(SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now() - longest_window)))
.select((
evm_token_transfer_log::value,
evm_token_transfer_log::created_at,
@@ -138,7 +126,7 @@ async fn check_volume_rate_limits(
let past_transfers = query_relevant_past_transfers(grant.id, longest_window, db).await?;
for limit in &grant.settings.specific.volume_limits {
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - limit.window;
let window_start = Utc::now() - limit.window;
let prospective_cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transfers
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
@@ -214,6 +202,11 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
.await?;
for limit in &grant.volume_limits {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #86"
)]
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
grant_id,
@@ -263,7 +256,7 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(|err| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
})?,
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs.into()),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
@@ -286,16 +279,18 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
}
};
let settings = Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
};
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: token_grant.id,
common_settings_id: token_grant.basic_grant_id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
specific: Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
},
specific: settings,
},
}))
}
@@ -311,7 +306,7 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id: grant.id,
log_id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
chain_id: context.chain.into(),
token_contract: context.to.to_vec(),
recipient_address: meaning.to.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(meaning.value).to_vec(),
@@ -360,7 +355,7 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
.map(|(basic, specific)| {
let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = limits_by_grant
.get(&specific.id)
.map(|v| v.as_slice())
.map(Vec::as_slice)
.unwrap_or_default()
.iter()
.map(|row| {
@@ -368,7 +363,7 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(|e| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(e))
})?,
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs.into()),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;

View File

@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use alloy::sol_types::SolCall;
use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
use crate::{
db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::evm_basic_grant,
},
evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
},
};
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::evm_basic_grant,
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
// DAI on Ethereum mainnet — present in the static token registry
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const DAI: Address = address!("6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F");
@@ -59,7 +62,7 @@ async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicG
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
@@ -238,12 +241,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_volume_at_exact_limit() {
.unwrap();
// Record a past transfer of 900, with current transfer 100 => exactly 1000 limit
use crate::db::{models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog, schema::evm_token_transfer_log};
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
insert_into(db::schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(db::models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(900u64)).to_vec(),
@@ -283,12 +285,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
.await
.unwrap();
use crate::db::{models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog, schema::evm_token_transfer_log};
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
insert_into(db::schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(db::models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_000u64)).to_vec(),
@@ -419,7 +420,7 @@ proptest::proptest! {
) {
use rand::{SeedableRng, seq::SliceRandom};
use sha2::Digest;
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
let limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = raw_limits
.iter()

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::{TxSigner, TxSignerSync},
@@ -9,6 +8,7 @@ use alloy::{
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use k256::ecdsa::{self, RecoveryId, SigningKey, signature::hazmat::PrehashSigner};
use std::sync::Mutex;
/// An Ethereum signer that stores its secp256k1 secret key inside a
/// hardware-protected [`MemSafe`] cell.
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ impl SafeSigner {
})
}
#[expect(clippy::significant_drop_tightening, reason = "false positive")]
fn sign_hash_inner(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
let mut cell = self.key.lock().expect("SafeSigner mutex poisoned");
let reader = cell.read();
let sig: (ecdsa::Signature, RecoveryId) = reader.sign_prehash(hash.as_ref())?;
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ impl SafeSigner {
{
return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
signer: chain_id,
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
tx: tx.chain_id().expect("Chain ID is guaranteed to be set"),
});
}

View File

@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@ use alloy::primitives::U256;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
#[error("Expected {expected} bytes but got {actual} bytes")]
pub struct LengthError {
pub expected: usize,
pub actual: usize,
pub(super) struct LengthError {
pub(super) expected: usize,
pub(super) actual: usize,
}
pub fn u256_to_bytes(value: U256) -> [u8; 32] {
pub const fn u256_to_bytes(value: U256) -> [u8; 32] {
value.to_le_bytes()
}
pub fn bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<U256> {
pub(super) fn bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().ok()?;
Some(U256::from_le_bytes(bytes))
}
pub fn try_bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<U256> {
pub(super) fn try_bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(LengthError {
expected: 32,

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
use crate::{
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::client::{ClientConnection, session::ClientSession},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::client::{
ClientRequest, ClientResponse, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
@@ -5,15 +9,11 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
transport::{Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::client::{ClientConnection, session::ClientSession},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
mod auth;
mod evm;
mod inbound;
@@ -98,8 +98,7 @@ pub async fn start(mut conn: ClientConnection, mut bi: GrpcBi<ClientRequest, Cli
Err(err) => {
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::unauthenticated(format!(
"Authentication failed: {}",
err
"Authentication failed: {err}",
))))
.await;
warn!(error = ?err, "Client authentication failed");

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{Convert, request_tracker::RequestTracker},
peers::client::{ClientConnection, auth},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
proto::{
@@ -16,23 +21,18 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::client::{self, ClientConnection, auth},
crypto::integrity::Verified,
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub(super) struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub fn new(
pub(super) const fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
) -> Self {
@@ -42,40 +42,6 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
}
}
fn response_to_proto(response: auth::Outbound) -> AuthResponsePayload {
match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
nonce,
})
}
auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess => {
AuthResponsePayload::Result(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into())
}
}
}
fn error_to_proto(error: auth::Error) -> AuthResponsePayload {
AuthResponsePayload::Result(
match error {
auth::Error::InvalidChallengeSolution => ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature,
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Denied) => {
ProtoAuthResult::ApprovalDenied
}
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Upstream(
crate::actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected,
)) => ProtoAuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline,
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Internal)
| auth::Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
| auth::Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
| auth::Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
| auth::Error::Transport => ProtoAuthResult::Internal,
}
.into(),
)
}
async fn send_client_response(
&mut self,
payload: AuthResponsePayload,
@@ -103,8 +69,8 @@ impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
item: Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let payload = match item {
Ok(message) => AuthTransportAdapter::response_to_proto(message),
Err(err) => AuthTransportAdapter::error_to_proto(err),
Ok(message) => message.convert(),
Err(err) => err.convert(),
};
self.send_client_response(payload).await
@@ -161,21 +127,17 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
.await;
return None;
};
let Ok(pubkey) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(pubkey) else {
let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
return None;
};
let Ok(pubkey) = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey) else {
let Ok(pubkey) = authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey.as_slice()) else {
let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
return None;
};
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
metadata: client_metadata_from_proto(client_info),
metadata: client_info.convert(),
})
}
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => {
let Ok(signature) = ed25519_dalek::Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) else {
let Ok(signature) = authn::Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) else {
let _ = self
.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature)
.await;
@@ -189,19 +151,69 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
fn client_metadata_from_proto(metadata: ProtoClientInfo) -> ClientMetadata {
ClientMetadata {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
version: metadata.version,
impl Convert for ProtoClientInfo {
type Output = ClientMetadata;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
ClientMetadata {
name: self.name,
description: self.description,
version: self.version,
}
}
}
pub async fn start(
impl Convert for auth::Error {
type Output = AuthResponsePayload;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
use auth::Error::{
ApproveError, DatabaseOperationFailed, DatabasePoolUnavailable, IntegrityCheckFailed,
InvalidChallengeSolution, Transport,
};
AuthResponsePayload::Result(
match self {
InvalidChallengeSolution => ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature,
ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Denied) => ProtoAuthResult::ApprovalDenied,
ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Upstream(
crate::actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected,
)) => ProtoAuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline,
ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Internal)
| DatabasePoolUnavailable
| DatabaseOperationFailed
| IntegrityCheckFailed
| Transport => ProtoAuthResult::Internal,
}
.into(),
)
}
}
impl Convert for auth::Outbound {
type Output = AuthResponsePayload;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
match self {
Self::AuthChallenge { challenge } => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
timestamp_nanos: challenge
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("timestamp within range")
as u64,
random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
})
}
Self::AuthSuccess => AuthResponsePayload::Result(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into()),
}
}
}
pub(super) async fn start(
conn: &mut ClientConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
) -> Result<Verified<i32>, auth::Error> {
) -> Result<i32, auth::Error> {
let mut transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
client::auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await
auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
peers::client::session::{ClientSession, HandleSignTransaction, SignTransactionRpcError},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
@@ -11,19 +18,12 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult,
},
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::client::session::{ClientSession, HandleSignTransaction, SignTransactionRpcError},
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
};
fn wrap_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> ClientResponsePayload {
const fn wrap_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> ClientResponsePayload {
ClientResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
peers::client::session::{ClientSession, Error, HandleQueryVaultState},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
@@ -8,15 +12,11 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
},
shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
};
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::actors::{
client::session::{ClientSession, Error, HandleQueryVaultState},
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
};
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
actor: &ActorRef<ClientSession>,
req: proto_vault::Request,
@@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
};
match payload {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(_) => {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(()) => {
let state = match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(VaultState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(Error::Internal)) => ProtoVaultState::Error,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
pub mod inbound;
pub mod outbound;
pub(super) mod inbound;
pub(super) mod outbound;

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, rlp::Decodable as _};
use crate::grpc::TryConvert;
pub struct RawEvmAddress(pub Vec<u8>);
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, rlp::Decodable as _};
pub(in crate::grpc) struct RawEvmAddress(pub(in crate::grpc) Vec<u8>);
impl TryConvert for RawEvmAddress {
type Output = Address;
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ impl TryConvert for RawEvmAddress {
}
}
pub struct RawEvmTransaction(pub Vec<u8>);
pub(in crate::grpc) struct RawEvmTransaction(pub(in crate::grpc) Vec<u8>);
impl TryConvert for RawEvmTransaction {
type Output = TxEip1559;

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
use alloy::primitives::U256;
use crate::{
evm::{
PolicyError, VetError,
policies::{EvalViolation, SpecificMeaning},
},
grpc::Convert,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm::{
EvmError as ProtoEvmError,
@@ -14,13 +20,7 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
},
};
use crate::{
evm::{
PolicyError, VetError,
policies::{EvalViolation, SpecificMeaning},
},
grpc::Convert,
};
use alloy::primitives::U256;
fn u256_to_proto_bytes(value: U256) -> Vec<u8> {
value.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec()
@@ -31,16 +31,16 @@ impl Convert for SpecificMeaning {
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
let kind = match self {
SpecificMeaning::EtherTransfer(meaning) => ProtoSpecificMeaningKind::EtherTransfer(
Self::EtherTransfer(meaning) => ProtoSpecificMeaningKind::EtherTransfer(
arbiter_proto::proto::shared::evm::EtherTransferMeaning {
to: meaning.to.to_vec(),
value: u256_to_proto_bytes(meaning.value),
},
),
SpecificMeaning::TokenTransfer(meaning) => ProtoSpecificMeaningKind::TokenTransfer(
Self::TokenTransfer(meaning) => ProtoSpecificMeaningKind::TokenTransfer(
arbiter_proto::proto::shared::evm::TokenTransferMeaning {
token: Some(ProtoTokenInfo {
symbol: meaning.token.symbol.to_string(),
symbol: meaning.token.symbol.to_owned(),
address: meaning.token.contract.to_vec(),
chain_id: meaning.token.chain,
}),
@@ -61,25 +61,21 @@ impl Convert for EvalViolation {
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
let kind = match self {
EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target } => {
Self::InvalidTarget { target } => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTarget(target.to_vec())
}
EvalViolation::GasLimitExceeded {
Self::GasLimitExceeded {
max_gas_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas,
} => ProtoEvalViolationKind::GasLimitExceeded(GasLimitExceededViolation {
max_gas_fee_per_gas: max_gas_fee_per_gas.map(u256_to_proto_bytes),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: max_priority_fee_per_gas.map(u256_to_proto_bytes),
}),
EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded => ProtoEvalViolationKind::RateLimitExceeded(()),
EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::VolumetricLimitExceeded(())
}
EvalViolation::InvalidTime => ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTime(()),
EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTransactionType(())
}
EvalViolation::MismatchingChainId { expected, actual } => {
Self::RateLimitExceeded => ProtoEvalViolationKind::RateLimitExceeded(()),
Self::VolumetricLimitExceeded => ProtoEvalViolationKind::VolumetricLimitExceeded(()),
Self::InvalidTime => ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTime(()),
Self::InvalidTransactionType => ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTransactionType(()),
Self::MismatchingChainId { expected, actual } => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::ChainIdMismatch(proto_eval_violation::ChainIdMismatch {
expected,
actual,
@@ -96,13 +92,13 @@ impl Convert for VetError {
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
let kind = match self {
VetError::ContractCreationNotSupported => {
Self::ContractCreationNotSupported => {
ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind::ContractCreationNotSupported(())
}
VetError::UnsupportedTransactionType => {
Self::UnsupportedTransactionType => {
ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind::UnsupportedTransactionType(())
}
VetError::Evaluated(meaning, policy_error) => match policy_error {
Self::Evaluated(meaning, policy_error) => match policy_error {
PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant => {
ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind::NoMatchingGrant(NoMatchingGrantError {
meaning: Some(meaning.convert()),

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
use crate::peers::{client::ClientConnection, user_agent::UserAgentConnection};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{
client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse},
@@ -5,15 +6,11 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
transport::grpc::GrpcBi,
};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::{Request, Response, Status, async_trait};
use tracing::info;
use crate::{
actors::{client::ClientConnection, user_agent::UserAgentConnection},
grpc::user_agent::start,
};
mod request_tracker;
pub mod client;
@@ -63,7 +60,7 @@ impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for super::Ser
let (bi, rx) = GrpcBi::from_bi_stream(req_stream);
tokio::spawn(start(
tokio::spawn(user_agent::start(
UserAgentConnection {
db: self.context.db.clone(),
actors: self.context.actors.clone(),

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
use tonic::Status;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct RequestTracker {
pub(super) struct RequestTracker {
next_request_id: i32,
}
impl RequestTracker {
pub fn request(&mut self, id: i32) -> Result<i32, Status> {
pub(super) fn request(&mut self, id: i32) -> Result<i32, Status> {
if id < self.next_request_id {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Duplicate request id"));
}
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ impl RequestTracker {
// This is used to set the response id for auth responses, which need to match the request id of the auth challenge request.
// -1 offset is needed because request() increments the next_request_id after returning the current request id.
pub fn current_request_id(&self) -> i32 {
pub(super) const fn current_request_id(&self) -> i32 {
self.next_request_id - 1
}
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use crate::{
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentSession},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
@@ -8,22 +10,20 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
transport::{Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentSession},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
mod auth;
mod evm;
mod inbound;
mod outbound;
mod sdk_client;
mod vault;
mod vault_gate;
pub struct OutOfBandAdapter(mpsc::Sender<OutOfBand>);
@@ -124,21 +124,22 @@ pub async fn start(
) {
let mut request_tracker = RequestTracker::default();
let pubkey = match auth::start(&mut conn, &mut bi, &mut request_tracker).await {
Ok(pubkey) => pubkey,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "Authentication failed");
return;
}
};
let (oob_sender, oob_receiver) = mpsc::channel(16);
let oob_adapter = OutOfBandAdapter(oob_sender);
let actor = UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new(conn, Box::new(oob_adapter)));
let actor_for_cleanup = actor.clone();
let actor = {
let transport = auth::AuthTransportAdapter::new(&mut bi, &mut request_tracker);
match crate::peers::user_agent::start(&mut conn, transport, Box::new(oob_adapter)).await {
Ok(actor) => actor,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "User agent connection failed");
return;
}
}
};
info!(?pubkey, "User authenticated successfully");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor, oob_receiver, request_tracker).await;
actor_for_cleanup.kill();
info!("User agent session established");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor.clone(), oob_receiver, request_tracker).await;
actor.kill();
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
use crate::{grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker, peers::user_agent::auth};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
@@ -5,31 +7,25 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
self as proto_auth, AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge,
AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
AuthChallengeSolution as ProtoAuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult,
KeyType as ProtoKeyType, request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload,
response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload, response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
},
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth},
db::models::KeyType,
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
pub(super) struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub(super) bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
pub(super) request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub fn new(
pub(super) const fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
) -> Self {
@@ -39,19 +35,35 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
}
}
async fn send_user_agent_response(
pub(super) const fn bi_mut(&mut self) -> &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse> {
self.bi
}
pub(super) const fn tracker_mut(&mut self) -> &mut RequestTracker {
self.request_tracker
}
pub(super) async fn send_response_payload(
&mut self,
payload: AuthResponsePayload,
payload: UserAgentResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.bi
.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
id: Some(self.request_tracker.current_request_id()),
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::Auth(proto_auth::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})),
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
}
async fn send_user_agent_response(
&mut self,
payload: AuthResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.send_response_payload(UserAgentResponsePayload::Auth(proto_auth::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
}
}
#[async_trait]
@@ -62,8 +74,15 @@ impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
use auth::{Error, Outbound};
let payload = match item {
Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }) => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge { nonce })
Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
timestamp_nanos: challenge
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("timestamp within range")
as u64,
random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
})
}
Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {
AuthResponsePayload::Result(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into())
@@ -141,28 +160,8 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(ProtoAuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
key_type,
}) => {
let Ok(key_type) = ProtoKeyType::try_from(key_type) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid key type",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
let key_type = match key_type {
ProtoKeyType::Ed25519 => KeyType::Ed25519,
ProtoKeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
ProtoKeyType::Rsa => KeyType::Rsa,
ProtoKeyType::Unspecified => {
warn!(
event = "received request with unspecified key type",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
}
};
let Ok(pubkey) = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, pubkey)) else {
let Ok(pubkey) = authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey.as_slice()) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid public key",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
@@ -183,12 +182,3 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
}
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
pub async fn start(
conn: &mut UserAgentConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, auth::Error> {
let transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
auth::authenticate(conn, transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
peers::user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::handlers::{
GrantMutationError, HandleEvmWalletCreate, HandleEvmWalletList, HandleGrantCreate,
HandleGrantDelete, HandleGrantList, HandleSignTransaction,
SignTransactionError as SessionSignTransactionError,
},
},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm::{
EvmError as ProtoEvmError, EvmGrantCreateRequest, EvmGrantCreateResponse,
@@ -18,26 +32,12 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
GrantMutationError, HandleEvmWalletCreate, HandleEvmWalletList, HandleGrantCreate,
HandleGrantDelete, HandleGrantList, HandleSignTransaction,
SignTransactionError as SessionSignTransactionError,
},
},
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
};
fn wrap_evm_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
const fn wrap_evm_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
};
match payload {
EvmRequestPayload::WalletCreate(_) => handle_wallet_create(actor).await,
EvmRequestPayload::WalletList(_) => handle_wallet_list(actor).await,
EvmRequestPayload::WalletCreate(()) => handle_wallet_create(actor).await,
EvmRequestPayload::WalletList(()) => handle_wallet_list(actor).await,
EvmRequestPayload::GrantCreate(req) => handle_grant_create(actor, req).await,
EvmRequestPayload::GrantDelete(req) => handle_grant_delete(actor, req).await,
EvmRequestPayload::GrantList(_) => handle_grant_list(actor).await,
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ async fn handle_wallet_create(
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleEvmWalletCreate {}).await {
Ok((wallet_id, address)) => WalletCreateResult::Wallet(WalletEntry {
id: wallet_id.drop_verification_provenance(),
id: wallet_id,
address: address.to_vec(),
}),
Err(err) => {
@@ -121,9 +121,6 @@ async fn handle_grant_list(
})
.collect(),
}),
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed)) => {
EvmGrantListResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::VaultSealed.into())
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to list EVM grants");
EvmGrantListResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
@@ -150,7 +147,7 @@ async fn handle_grant_create(
.try_convert()?;
let result = match actor.ask(HandleGrantCreate { basic, grant }).await {
Ok(grant_id) => EvmGrantCreateResult::GrantId(grant_id.drop_verification_provenance()),
Ok(grant_id) => EvmGrantCreateResult::GrantId(grant_id),
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed)) => {
EvmGrantCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::VaultSealed.into())
}

View File

@@ -1,32 +1,32 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use arbiter_proto::proto::evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
SpecificGrant as ProtoSpecificGrant, TokenTransferSettings as ProtoTokenTransferSettings,
TransactionRateLimit as ProtoTransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit as ProtoVolumeRateLimit,
specific_grant::Grant as ProtoSpecificGrantType,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::sdk_client::{
WalletAccess, WalletAccessEntry as SdkClientWalletAccess,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, TimeZone, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use tonic::Status;
use crate::db::models::{CoreEvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess};
use crate::grpc::Convert;
use crate::{
db::models::{CoreEvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess},
evm::policies::{
SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit, ether_transfer,
token_transfers,
},
grpc::Convert,
grpc::TryConvert,
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
SpecificGrant as ProtoSpecificGrant, TokenTransferSettings as ProtoTokenTransferSettings,
TransactionRateLimit as ProtoTransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit as ProtoVolumeRateLimit,
specific_grant::Grant as ProtoSpecificGrantType,
},
proto::user_agent::sdk_client::{WalletAccess, WalletAccessEntry as SdkClientWalletAccess},
};
fn address_from_bytes(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Address, Status> {
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, TimeZone, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use tonic::Status;
fn address_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Address, Status> {
if bytes.len() != 20 {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid EVM address"));
}
Ok(Address::from_slice(&bytes))
Ok(Address::from_slice(bytes))
}
fn u256_from_proto_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<U256, Status> {
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ impl TryConvert for ProtoTimestamp {
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<DateTime<Utc>, Status> {
Utc.timestamp_opt(self.seconds, self.nanos as u32)
Utc.timestamp_opt(self.seconds, self.nanos.try_into().unwrap_or_default())
.single()
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid timestamp"))
}
@@ -116,7 +116,8 @@ impl TryConvert for ProtoSpecificGrant {
limit,
})) => Ok(SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Settings {
target: targets
.into_iter()
.iter()
.map(Vec::as_slice)
.map(address_from_bytes)
.collect::<Result<_, _>>()?,
limit: limit
@@ -130,8 +131,10 @@ impl TryConvert for ProtoSpecificGrant {
target,
volume_limits,
})) => Ok(SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings {
token_contract: address_from_bytes(token_contract)?,
target: target.map(address_from_bytes).transpose()?,
token_contract: address_from_bytes(&token_contract)?,
target: target
.map(|target| address_from_bytes(&target))
.transpose()?,
volume_limits: volume_limits
.into_iter()
.map(ProtoVolumeRateLimit::try_convert)

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
use crate::{
db::models::EvmWalletAccess,
evm::policies::{SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit},
grpc::Convert,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
@@ -7,22 +12,17 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
},
user_agent::sdk_client::{WalletAccess, WalletAccessEntry as ProtoSdkClientWalletAccess},
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use crate::{
db::models::EvmWalletAccess,
evm::policies::{SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit},
grpc::Convert,
};
impl Convert for DateTime<Utc> {
type Output = ProtoTimestamp;
fn convert(self) -> ProtoTimestamp {
ProtoTimestamp {
seconds: self.timestamp(),
nanos: self.timestamp_subsec_nanos() as i32,
nanos: self.timestamp_subsec_nanos().try_into().unwrap_or(i32::MAX),
}
}
}
@@ -74,13 +74,13 @@ impl Convert for SpecificGrant {
fn convert(self) -> ProtoSpecificGrant {
let grant = match self {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(s) => {
Self::EtherTransfer(s) => {
ProtoSpecificGrantType::EtherTransfer(ProtoEtherTransferSettings {
targets: s.target.into_iter().map(|a| a.to_vec()).collect(),
limit: Some(s.limit.convert()),
})
}
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(s) => {
Self::TokenTransfer(s) => {
ProtoSpecificGrantType::TokenTransfer(ProtoTokenTransferSettings {
token_contract: s.token_contract.to_vec(),
target: s.target.map(|a| a.to_vec()),

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
use crate::{
db::models::NewEvmWalletAccess,
grpc::Convert,
peers::user_agent::{
OutOfBand, UserAgentSession,
session::handlers::{
HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess, HandleListWalletAccess, HandleNewClientApprove,
HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess, HandleSdkClientList,
},
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientMetadata,
user_agent::{
@@ -15,23 +27,12 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{
OutOfBand, UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess, HandleListWalletAccess, HandleNewClientApprove,
HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess, HandleSdkClientList,
},
},
db::models::NewEvmWalletAccess,
grpc::Convert,
};
fn wrap_sdk_client_response(payload: SdkClientResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
const fn wrap_sdk_client_response(payload: SdkClientResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClient(proto_sdk_client::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
match oob {
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionRequest { profile } => wrap_sdk_client_response(
SdkClientResponsePayload::ConnectionRequest(ProtoSdkClientConnectionRequest {
pubkey: profile.pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey: profile.pubkey.to_bytes(),
info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
name: profile.metadata.name,
description: profile.metadata.description,
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
),
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey } => wrap_sdk_client_response(
SdkClientResponsePayload::ConnectionCancel(ProtoSdkClientConnectionCancel {
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes(),
}),
),
}
@@ -74,14 +75,14 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
SdkClientRequestPayload::Revoke(_) => Err(Status::unimplemented(
"SdkClientRevoke is not yet implemented",
)),
SdkClientRequestPayload::List(_) => handle_list(actor).await,
SdkClientRequestPayload::List(()) => handle_list(actor).await,
SdkClientRequestPayload::GrantWalletAccess(req) => {
handle_grant_wallet_access(actor, req).await
}
SdkClientRequestPayload::RevokeWalletAccess(req) => {
handle_revoke_wallet_access(actor, req).await
}
SdkClientRequestPayload::ListWalletAccess(_) => handle_list_wallet_access(actor).await,
SdkClientRequestPayload::ListWalletAccess(()) => handle_list_wallet_access(actor).await,
}
}
@@ -89,10 +90,8 @@ async fn handle_connection_response(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
resp: ProtoSdkClientConnectionResponse,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let pubkey_bytes = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(resp.pubkey)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid Ed25519 public key length"))?;
let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey_bytes)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid Ed25519 public key"))?;
let pubkey = authn::PublicKey::try_from(resp.pubkey.as_slice())
.map_err(|()| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid ML-DSA public key"))?;
actor
.ask(HandleNewClientApprove {
@@ -117,12 +116,17 @@ async fn handle_list(
.into_iter()
.map(|(client, metadata)| ProtoSdkClientEntry {
id: client.id,
pubkey: client.public_key,
pubkey: client.public_key.clone(),
info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
version: metadata.version,
}),
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #84"
)]
created_at: client.created_at.0.timestamp() as i32,
})
.collect(),
@@ -143,7 +147,7 @@ async fn handle_grant_wallet_access(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: ProtoSdkClientGrantWalletAccess,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess> = req.accesses.into_iter().map(|a| a.convert()).collect();
let entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess> = req.accesses.into_iter().map(Convert::convert).collect();
match actor.ask(HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess { entries }).await {
Ok(()) => {
info!("Successfully granted wallet access");
@@ -183,7 +187,7 @@ async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
match actor.ask(HandleListWalletAccess {}).await {
Ok(accesses) => Ok(Some(wrap_sdk_client_response(
SdkClientResponsePayload::ListWalletAccess(ListWalletAccessResponse {
accesses: accesses.into_iter().map(|a| a.convert()).collect(),
accesses: accesses.into_iter().map(Convert::convert).collect(),
}),
))),
Err(err) => {

View File

@@ -1,54 +1,28 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState;
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault,
bootstrap::{
self as proto_bootstrap, BootstrapEncryptedKey as ProtoBootstrapEncryptedKey,
BootstrapResult as ProtoBootstrapResult,
},
request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload,
unseal::{
self as proto_unseal, UnsealEncryptedKey as ProtoUnsealEncryptedKey,
UnsealResult as ProtoUnsealResult, UnsealStart,
request::Payload as UnsealRequestPayload, response::Payload as UnsealResponsePayload,
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
peers::user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::handlers::HandleQueryVaultState},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
proto::user_agent::{
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault, request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload,
},
},
};
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::actors::{
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
BootstrapError, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleQueryVaultState,
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest, UnsealError,
},
},
};
fn wrap_vault_response(payload: VaultResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
const fn wrap_vault_response(payload: VaultResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::Vault(proto_vault::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
}
fn wrap_unseal_response(payload: UnsealResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Unseal(proto_unseal::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
}))
}
fn wrap_bootstrap_response(result: ProtoBootstrapResult) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Bootstrap(proto_bootstrap::Response {
result: result.into(),
}))
}
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: proto_vault::Request,
@@ -58,117 +32,22 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
};
match payload {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(_) => handle_query_vault_state(actor).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(req) => dispatch_unseal_request(actor, req).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(req) => handle_bootstrap_request(actor, req).await,
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(()) => handle_query_vault_state(actor).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(_) | VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(_) => {
Err(Status::permission_denied(
"Vault is already unsealed; unseal/bootstrap not permitted in session",
))
}
}
}
async fn dispatch_unseal_request(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: proto_unseal::Request,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let Some(payload) = req.payload else {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing unseal request payload"));
};
match payload {
UnsealRequestPayload::Start(req) => handle_unseal_start(actor, req).await,
UnsealRequestPayload::EncryptedKey(req) => handle_unseal_encrypted_key(actor, req).await,
}
}
async fn handle_unseal_start(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: UnsealStart,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let client_pubkey = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(req.client_pubkey)
.map(x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid X25519 public key"))?;
let response = actor
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest { client_pubkey })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle unseal start request");
Status::internal("Failed to start unseal flow")
})?;
Ok(Some(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Start(
proto_unseal::UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: response.server_pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
))))
}
async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: ProtoUnsealEncryptedKey,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: req.nonce,
ciphertext: req.ciphertext,
associated_data: req.associated_data,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(UnsealError::InvalidKey)) => ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle unseal request");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault"));
}
};
Ok(Some(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Result(
result.into(),
))))
}
async fn handle_bootstrap_request(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: proto_bootstrap::Request,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let encrypted_key = req
.encrypted_key
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing bootstrap encrypted key"))?;
handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(actor, encrypted_key).await
}
async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: ProtoBootstrapEncryptedKey,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor
.ask(HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce: req.nonce,
ciphertext: req.ciphertext,
associated_data: req.associated_data,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::InvalidKey
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle bootstrap request");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to bootstrap vault"));
}
};
Ok(Some(wrap_bootstrap_response(result)))
}
async fn handle_query_vault_state(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let state = match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(VaultState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");
ProtoVaultState::Error

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
use super::auth::AuthTransportAdapter;
use crate::{
grpc::TryConvert,
peers::user_agent::vault_gate::{self as vault_gate},
};
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
mod inbound;
mod outbound;
#[async_trait]
impl Receiver<vault_gate::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<vault_gate::Inbound> {
let request = match self.bi_mut().recv().await? {
Ok(request) => request,
Err(error) => {
warn!(
?error,
"Failed to receive user agent request during vault gate"
);
return None;
}
};
if let Err(err) = self.tracker_mut().request(request.id) {
let _ = self.bi_mut().send(Err(err)).await;
return None;
}
let Some(payload) = request.payload else {
let _ = self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing request payload")))
.await;
return None;
};
match payload.try_convert() {
Ok(inbound) => Some(inbound),
Err(status) => {
let _ = self.bi_mut().send(Err(status)).await;
None
}
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let outbound = match item {
Ok(outbound) => outbound,
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "vault gate produced transport-level error");
return self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::internal(err.to_string())))
.await;
}
};
match outbound.try_convert() {
Ok(payload) => self.send_response_payload(payload).await,
Err(status) => self.bi_mut().send(Err(status)).await,
}
}
}
impl Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>>
for AuthTransportAdapter<'_>
{
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{Convert, TryConvert},
peers::user_agent::vault_gate::{
self as vault_gate, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleHandshake, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey,
},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault,
bootstrap::{self as proto_bootstrap},
request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
unseal::{self as proto_unseal, request::Payload as UnsealRequestPayload},
},
};
use tonic::Status;
impl TryConvert for UserAgentRequestPayload {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
match self {
Self::Vault(req) => req.try_convert(),
_ => Err(Status::permission_denied(
"Only vault operations are permitted before unsealing",
)),
}
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_vault::Request {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
self.payload
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing vault request payload"))?
.try_convert()
}
}
impl TryConvert for VaultRequestPayload {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
match self {
Self::QueryState(()) => Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleVaultState),
Self::Unseal(req) => req.try_convert(),
Self::Bootstrap(req) => req.try_convert(),
}
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_unseal::Request {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
self.payload
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing unseal request payload"))?
.try_convert()
}
}
impl TryConvert for UnsealRequestPayload {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
match self {
Self::Start(start) => start.try_convert(),
Self::EncryptedKey(key) => Ok(key.convert()),
}
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_unseal::UnsealStart {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
let bytes = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(self.client_pubkey)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid X25519 public key"))?;
Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleHandshake(HandleHandshake {
client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from(bytes),
}))
}
}
impl Convert for proto_unseal::UnsealEncryptedKey {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
fn convert(self) -> vault_gate::Inbound {
vault_gate::Inbound::HandleUnsealEncryptedKey(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: self.nonce,
ciphertext: self.ciphertext,
associated_data: self.associated_data,
})
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_bootstrap::Request {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
self.encrypted_key
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing bootstrap encrypted key"))?
.try_convert()
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_bootstrap::BootstrapEncryptedKey {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey(
HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce: self.nonce,
ciphertext: self.ciphertext,
associated_data: self.associated_data,
},
))
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
grpc::{Convert, TryConvert},
peers::user_agent::vault_gate::{self as vault_gate},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
user_agent::{
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault,
bootstrap::{self as proto_bootstrap, BootstrapResult as ProtoBootstrapResult},
response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload,
unseal::{
self as proto_unseal, UnsealResult as ProtoUnsealResult,
response::Payload as UnsealResponsePayload,
},
},
},
};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
const fn wrap_vault_response(payload: VaultResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::Vault(proto_vault::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
}
const fn wrap_unseal_response(payload: UnsealResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Unseal(proto_unseal::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
}))
}
fn wrap_bootstrap_response(result: ProtoBootstrapResult) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Bootstrap(proto_bootstrap::Response {
result: result.into(),
}))
}
impl Convert for VaultState {
type Output = UserAgentResponsePayload;
fn convert(self) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
let proto_state = match self {
Self::Unbootstrapped => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Self::Sealed => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Self::Unsealed => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
};
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::State(proto_state.into()))
}
}
impl Convert for vault_gate::HandshakeResponse {
type Output = UserAgentResponsePayload;
fn convert(self) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Start(
proto_unseal::UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: self.server_pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
))
}
}
impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
type Output = UserAgentResponsePayload;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<UserAgentResponsePayload, Status> {
match self {
Self::HandleVaultState(result) => result
.map_err(|err| {
warn!(?err, "vault state query failed");
Status::internal("Failed to query vault state")
})
.map(VaultState::convert),
Self::HandleHandshake(result) => result
.map_err(|err| {
warn!(?err, "handshake failed");
Status::internal("Failed to start unseal flow")
})
.map(vault_gate::HandshakeResponse::convert),
Self::HandleUnsealEncryptedKey(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Err(vault_gate::Error::InvalidKey) => ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey,
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "unseal failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault"));
}
};
Ok(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Result(
proto_result.into(),
)))
}
Self::HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Err(vault_gate::Error::InvalidKey) => ProtoBootstrapResult::InvalidKey,
Err(vault_gate::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "bootstrap failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to bootstrap vault"));
}
};
Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
use crate::context::ServerContext;
#[macro_use]
extern crate macro_rules_attribute;
pub mod actors;
pub mod context;
pub mod crypto;
pub mod db;
pub mod evm;
pub mod grpc;
pub mod safe_cell;
pub mod peers;
pub mod utils;
pub struct Server {
@@ -17,7 +14,7 @@ pub struct Server {
}
impl Server {
pub fn new(context: ServerContext) -> Self {
pub const fn new(context: ServerContext) -> Self {
Self { context }
}
}

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use anyhow::anyhow;
use arbiter_proto::{proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterServiceServer, url::ArbiterUrl};
use arbiter_server::{Server, actors::bootstrap::GetToken, context::ServerContext, db};
use anyhow::anyhow;
use rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use tonic::transport::{Identity, ServerTlsConfig};
use tracing::info;

View File

@@ -1,30 +1,31 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
dsl::insert_into, update,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tracing::error;
use super::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, ClientProfile};
use crate::{
actors::{
client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, ClientProfile},
GlobalActors,
flow_coordinator::{self, RequestClientApproval},
keyholder::KeyHolder,
vault::Vault,
},
crypto::integrity::{self, Verified, verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor},
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
db::{
self,
models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::program_client,
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
dsl::insert_into, update,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tracing::error;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Error {
@@ -62,35 +63,33 @@ pub enum ApproveError {
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: Signature,
signature: authn::Signature,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge { pubkey: VerifyingKey, nonce: i32 },
AuthChallenge { challenge: AuthChallenge },
AuthSuccess,
}
/// Returns the current nonce and client ID for a registered client.
/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
async fn get_client_id(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
) -> Result<Option<(i32, i32)>, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<Option<i32>, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(&mut conn)
.select(program_client::id)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
@@ -99,56 +98,44 @@ async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
})
}
/// Atomically increments the nonce and re-signs the integrity envelope.
/// Returns the new nonce, which is used as the challenge nonce.
async fn create_nonce(
async fn verify_integrity(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(program_client::table)
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.set(program_client::nonce.eq(program_client::nonce + 1))
.returning((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
let id = get_client_id(db, pubkey).await?.ok_or_else(|| {
error!("Client not found during integrity verification");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&keyholder,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: *pubkey,
nonce: new_nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity sign failed after nonce update");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?
.drop_verification_provenance();
Ok(new_nonce)
})
})
let attestation = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut db_conn,
vault,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
})?;
if attestation != AttestationStatus::Attested {
error!("Integrity attestation unavailable for client {id}");
return Err(Error::IntegrityCheckFailed);
}
Ok(())
}
async fn approve_new_client(
actors: &crate::actors::GlobalActors,
profile: ClientProfile,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
async fn approve_new_client(actors: &GlobalActors, profile: ClientProfile) -> Result<(), Error> {
let result = actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RequestClientApproval { client: profile })
@@ -170,11 +157,13 @@ async fn approve_new_client(
async fn insert_client(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<Verified<i32>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::client_metadata;
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
let metadata = metadata.clone();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
@@ -183,10 +172,9 @@ async fn insert_client(
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
let vault = vault.clone();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
@@ -199,21 +187,19 @@ async fn insert_client(
let client_id = insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
))
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.returning(program_client::id)
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
let verified_id = integrity::sign_entity(
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&keyholder,
&vault,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: *pubkey,
nonce: NONCE_START,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
},
client_id,
)
@@ -221,10 +207,9 @@ async fn insert_client(
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new client key");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?
.unqualify_origin();
})?;
Ok(verified_id)
Ok(client_id)
})
})
.await
@@ -303,14 +288,16 @@ async fn sync_client_metadata(
async fn challenge_client<T>(
transport: &mut T,
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
nonce: i32,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
challenge: AuthChallenge,
) -> Result<(), Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + ?Sized,
{
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce }))
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge {
challenge: challenge.clone(),
}))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
@@ -327,20 +314,15 @@ where
Error::Transport
})?;
let formatted = format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes());
pubkey.verify_strict(&formatted, &signature).map_err(|_| {
if !pubkey.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature) {
error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut ClientConnection,
transport: &mut T,
) -> Result<Verified<i32>, Error>
pub async fn authenticate<T>(props: &mut ClientConnection, transport: &mut T) -> Result<i32, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
@@ -348,45 +330,25 @@ where
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
// fixme! triage needed: probable regretion since in match->Some get_current_nonce_and_id called only once instead of twice
let client_id = match get_current_nonce_and_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
Some((nonce, id)) => {
let mut db_conn = props.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
integrity::verify_entity(
&mut db_conn,
&props.actors.key_holder,
ClientCredentials { pubkey, nonce },
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
})?
.inherit()
.entity_id
.unqualify_origin()
}
None => {
approve_new_client(
&props.actors,
ClientProfile {
pubkey,
metadata: metadata.clone(),
},
)
.await?;
insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
}
let client_id = if let Some(id) = get_client_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey).await?;
id
} else {
approve_new_client(
&props.actors,
ClientProfile {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
metadata: metadata.clone(),
},
)
.await?;
insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
};
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, *client_id, &metadata).await?;
let challenge_nonce = create_nonce(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge_nonce).await?;
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, client_id, &metadata).await?;
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge).await?;
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))

View File

@@ -1,42 +1,35 @@
use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors, crypto::integrity::Integrable, db, peers::client::session::ClientSession,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_macros::Hashable;
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, transport::Bi};
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::session::ClientSession},
crypto::integrity::{Integrable, hashing::Hashable},
db,
};
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ClientProfile {
pub pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub metadata: ClientMetadata,
}
#[derive(Hashable)]
pub struct ClientCredentials {
pub pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
pub nonce: i32,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
impl Integrable for ClientCredentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "client_credentials";
}
impl Hashable for ClientCredentials {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.pubkey.as_bytes());
self.nonce.hash(hasher);
}
}
pub struct ClientConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl ClientConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
@@ -48,7 +41,9 @@ pub async fn connect_client<T>(mut props: ClientConnection, transport: &mut T)
where
T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
match auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport).await {
let fut = auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport);
println!("authenticate future size: {}", size_of_val(&fut));
match fut.await {
Ok(client_id) => {
ClientSession::spawn(ClientSession::new(props, client_id));
info!("Client authenticated, session started");

View File

@@ -1,29 +1,26 @@
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use tracing::error;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use super::ClientConnection;
use crate::{
actors::{
client::ClientConnection,
GlobalActors,
evm::{ClientSignTransaction, SignTransactionError},
flow_coordinator::RegisterClient,
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
vault::VaultState,
},
crypto::integrity::Verified,
db,
evm::VetError,
};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::{actors::GlobalActors, db};
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use tracing::error;
pub struct ClientSession {
props: ClientConnection,
client_id: Verified<i32>,
client_id: i32,
}
impl ClientSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: Verified<i32>) -> Self {
pub(crate) const fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: i32) -> Self {
Self { props, client_id }
}
}
@@ -31,13 +28,13 @@ impl ClientSession {
#[messages]
impl ClientSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<VaultState, Error> {
use crate::actors::vault::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "client", "keyholder.query.failed");
error!(?err, actor = "client", "vault.query.failed");
return Err(Error::Internal);
}
};
@@ -56,7 +53,7 @@ impl ClientSession {
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id: *self.client_id,
client_id: self.client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
@@ -94,12 +91,11 @@ impl Actor for ClientSession {
}
impl ClientSession {
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
pub const fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
let props = ClientConnection::new(db, actors);
Self {
props,
client_id: Verified::new_unchecked(0),
client_id: 0,
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
pub mod client;
pub mod user_agent;

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
use super::{Credentials, UserAgentConnection};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use state::{
AuthContext, AuthError, AuthEvents, AuthStateMachine, AuthStates, ChallengeRequest,
ChallengeSolution,
};
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::user_agent::{
AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection,
auth::state::{AuthContext, AuthStateMachine},
};
mod state;
use state::*;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
@@ -30,32 +31,23 @@ pub enum Error {
}
impl Error {
#[track_caller]
pub(super) fn internal(details: impl Into<String>, err: &impl std::fmt::Debug) -> Self {
let details = details.into();
let caller = std::panic::Location::caller();
error!(
caller_file = %caller.file(),
caller_line = caller.line(),
caller_column = caller.column(),
details = %details,
error = ?err,
"Internal error"
);
Self::Internal { details }
fn internal(details: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self::Internal {
details: details.into(),
}
}
}
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
Self::internal("Database error", &e)
error!(?e, "Database error");
Self::internal("Database error")
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge { nonce: i32 },
AuthChallenge { challenge: AuthChallenge },
AuthSuccess,
}
@@ -63,12 +55,11 @@ fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
match payload {
Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: None,
} => AuthEvents::AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest { pubkey }),
Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
bootstrap_token,
} => AuthEvents::AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
} => AuthEvents::BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }),
bootstrap_token,
}),
Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => {
AuthEvents::ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution {
solution: signature,
@@ -79,21 +70,20 @@ fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut UserAgentConnection,
transport: T,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Error>
transport: &mut T,
) -> Result<Credentials, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send,
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
let mut state = AuthStateMachine::new(AuthContext::new(props, transport));
loop {
// `state` holds a mutable reference to `props` so we can't access it directly here
let Some(payload) = state.context_mut().transport.recv().await else {
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
match state.process_event(parse_auth_event(payload)).await {
Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(key)) => return Ok(key.clone()),
Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(result)) => return Ok(result.clone()),
Err(AuthError::ActionFailed(err)) => {
error!(?err, "State machine action failed");
return Err(err);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
use super::{
super::{Credentials, UserAgentConnection},
Error,
};
use crate::{
actors::bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
db::{DatabasePool, schema::useragent_client},
peers::user_agent::auth::Outbound,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use tracing::error;
pub(super) struct ChallengeRequest {
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
pub(super) struct ChallengeContext {
pub(super) challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
pub(super) struct ChallengeSolution {
pub(super) solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(Credentials),
}
);
async fn get_client_id(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<Option<i32>, Error> {
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
useragent_client::table
.filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
.select(useragent_client::id)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})
}
async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(useragent_client::table)
.values((useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),))
.returning(useragent_client::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
Ok(id)
}
pub(super) struct AuthContext<'a, T: ?Sized> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
pub(super) transport: &'a mut T,
}
impl<'a, T: ?Sized> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) const fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: &'a mut T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
type Error = Error;
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
}: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
// Verify pubkey is registered (unless bootstrapping)
if bootstrap_token.is_none() {
let id = get_client_id(&self.conn.db, &pubkey).await?;
if id.is_none() {
return Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey);
}
}
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge {
challenge: challenge.clone(),
}))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge,
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
challenge,
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<Credentials, Self::Error> {
let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!("Failed to decode signature in challenge solution");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
let valid = pubkey.verify(challenge, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature);
if !valid {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
// Resolve client id: bootstrap (consume token + register) or lookup
let id = match bootstrap_token {
Some(token) => {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
register_key(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await?
}
None => get_client_id(&self.conn.db, pubkey)
.await?
.ok_or(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey)?,
};
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(Credentials {
id,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
})
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{GetState, Vault},
},
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus, Integrable},
db::{DatabaseError, DatabasePool},
peers::client::ClientProfile,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_macros::Hashable;
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Sender};
use vault_gate::VaultGate;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tracing::{error, warn};
pub use auth::authenticate;
pub use session::UserAgentSession;
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub mod vault_gate;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hashable)]
pub struct Credentials {
pub id: i32,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
impl Integrable for Credentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "useragent_credentials";
}
// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: authn::PublicKey },
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
pub(crate) db: DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub const fn new(db: DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("authentication failed: {0:?}")]
Auth(auth::Error),
#[error("vault gate failed: {0}")]
VaultGate(#[from] vault_gate::Error),
#[error("transport closed unexpectedly")]
Transport,
#[error("database error: {0}")]
Database(DatabaseError),
#[error("internal: {0}")]
Internal(String),
}
impl From<auth::Error> for Error {
fn from(err: auth::Error) -> Self {
Self::Auth(err)
}
}
async fn verify_integrity(
db: &DatabasePool,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
credentials: &Credentials,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = db
.get()
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Internal("DB unavailable".into()))?;
match integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, vault, credentials, credentials.id).await {
Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested) => Ok(()),
Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable) => {
Err(Error::Internal("Vault sealed during promotion".into()))
}
Err(e) => {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed during unseal promotion");
Err(Error::Internal("Integrity check failed".into()))
}
}
}
async fn should_run_gate(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let vault_state = vault
.ask(GetState {})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Internal("Failed to contact the vault".into()))?;
Ok(!matches!(
vault_state,
crate::actors::vault::VaultState::Unsealed
))
}
async fn run_vault_gate<T>(
props: &UserAgentConnection,
transport: &mut T,
auth_creds: Credentials,
) -> Result<(), Error>
where
T: Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
let (promotion_tx, mut promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
let gate = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(
auth_creds,
props.actors.clone(),
props.db.clone(),
promotion_tx,
));
let result = loop {
tokio::select! {
promotion = &mut promotion_rx => {
break match promotion {
Ok(Ok(creds)) => Ok(creds),
Ok(Err(err)) => Err(Error::VaultGate(err)),
Err(_) => Err(Error::Internal(
"vault gate promotion channel closed".into(),
)),
};
}
inbound = transport.recv() => {
let Some(inbound) = inbound else {
break Err(Error::Transport);
};
match gate.ask(inbound).await {
Ok(outbound) => {
if transport.send(Ok(outbound)).await.is_err() {
break Err(Error::Transport);
}
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "VaultGate failed to handle message");
break Err(Error::Internal(format!(
"vault gate ask failed: {err:?}"
)));
}
}
}
}
};
gate.kill();
result
}
pub async fn start<T>(
props: &mut UserAgentConnection,
mut transport: T,
oob_sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
) -> Result<ActorRef<UserAgentSession>, Error>
where
T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send,
T: Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> + Send,
{
let creds = authenticate(props, &mut transport).await?;
// should run vault gate only if sealed / unbootstrapped
if should_run_gate(&props.actors.vault).await? {
run_vault_gate(props, &mut transport, creds.clone()).await?;
}
// checking the integrity
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &creds).await?;
Ok(UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new(
props.clone(),
oob_sender,
)))
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
use super::{Error, UserAgentSession};
use crate::{
actors::evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentListGrants,
},
actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
actors::vault::VaultState,
db::models::{EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata},
evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{error::SendError, messages, prelude::Context};
use tracing::error;
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum GrantMutationError {
#[error("Vault is sealed")]
VaultSealed,
#[error("Internal grant mutation error")]
Internal,
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<VaultState, Error> {
use crate::actors::vault::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "vault.query.failed");
return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => Ok(address),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
"EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
))),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
&mut self,
basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
grant: SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, GrantMutationError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
.await
{
Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) fn handle_grant_delete(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
// match self
// .props
// .actors
// .evm
// .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
// .await
// {
// Ok(()) => Ok(()),
// Err(err) => {
// error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
// Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
// }
// }
let _ = grant_id;
todo!()
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<i32>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(access_entries)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message(ctx)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
&mut self,
approved: bool,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Some(pending_approval) = self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey.to_bytes())
else {
error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
return Err(Error::internal("Unknown client in connection response"));
};
pending_approval
.controller
.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to send client approval response to controller"
);
Error::internal("Failed to send client approval response to controller")
})?;
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let clients = program_client::table
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
ProgramClient::as_select(),
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(clients)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,19 @@
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};
use super::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection};
use crate::{
actors::{
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
useragent_registry::ConnectUseragent,
},
peers::client::ClientProfile,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::{
client::ClientProfile,
flow_coordinator::{RegisterUserAgent, client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController},
user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection},
};
mod state;
use state::{DummyContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine};
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("State transition failed")]
@@ -47,52 +45,27 @@ impl Error {
}
pub struct PendingClientApproval {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
controller: ActorRef<ClientApprovalController>,
}
pub struct UserAgentSession {
props: UserAgentConnection,
state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<VerifyingKey, PendingClientApproval>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>,
}
pub mod connection;
pub mod handlers;
impl UserAgentSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: UserAgentConnection, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
Self {
props,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
sender,
pending_client_approvals: Default::default(),
}
}
pub fn new_test(db: crate::db::DatabasePool, actors: crate::actors::GlobalActors) -> Self {
struct DummySender;
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<OutOfBand> for DummySender {
async fn send(
&mut self,
_item: OutOfBand,
) -> Result<(), arbiter_proto::transport::Error> {
Ok(())
}
}
Self::new(UserAgentConnection::new(db, actors), Box::new(DummySender))
}
fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "State transition failed");
Error::State
})?;
Ok(())
}
}
#[messages]
@@ -118,8 +91,13 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
return;
}
self.pending_client_approvals
.insert(client.pubkey, PendingClientApproval { controller });
self.pending_client_approvals.insert(
client.pubkey.to_bytes(),
PendingClientApproval {
pubkey: client.pubkey,
controller,
},
);
}
}
@@ -128,23 +106,20 @@ impl Actor for UserAgentSession {
type Error = Error;
async fn on_start(
args: Self::Args,
this: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props
.actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RegisterUserAgent {
.useragent_registry
.ask(ConnectUseragent {
actor: this.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to register user agent connection with flow coordinator"
"Failed to register user agent connection with user agent registry"
);
Error::internal("Failed to register user agent connection with flow coordinator")
Error::internal("Failed to register user agent connection with user agent registry")
})?;
Ok(args)
}
@@ -158,14 +133,18 @@ impl Actor for UserAgentSession {
let cancelled_pubkey = self
.pending_client_approvals
.iter()
.find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(*k));
.find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(k.clone()));
if let Some(pubkey) = cancelled_pubkey {
self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey);
if let Some(pubkey_bytes) = cancelled_pubkey {
let Some(approval) = self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey_bytes) else {
return Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()));
};
if let Err(e) = self
.sender
.send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey })
.send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel {
pubkey: approval.pubkey,
})
.await
{
error!(

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
use super::Credentials;
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{self, Bootstrap, GetState, TryUnseal, VaultState, events},
},
crypto::integrity::{self},
db::DatabasePool,
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use state::State;
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce};
use kameo::{Actor, error::SendError, messages, prelude::Message};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::Register;
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey, SharedSecret};
pub mod state;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("State transition failed")]
State,
#[error("Internal error: {0}")]
Internal(String),
}
impl Error {
fn internal(message: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self::Internal(message.into())
}
}
pub struct HandshakeResponse {
pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
pub struct VaultGate {
pub auth_creds: Credentials,
pub promotion_tx: Option<oneshot::Sender<Result<(), Error>>>,
pub state: State,
pub actors: GlobalActors,
pub db: DatabasePool,
}
impl VaultGate {
pub fn new(
auth_creds: Credentials,
actors: GlobalActors,
db: DatabasePool,
promotion_tx: oneshot::Sender<Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
auth_creds,
state: State::default(),
actors,
db,
promotion_tx: Some(promotion_tx),
}
}
}
impl Actor for VaultGate {
type Args = Self;
type Error = ();
async fn on_start(
args: Self::Args,
actor_ref: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let _ = args
.actors
.events
.tell(Register(
actor_ref.clone().recipient::<events::Bootstrapped>(),
))
.await;
let _ = args
.actors
.events
.tell(Register(actor_ref.recipient::<events::Unsealed>()))
.await;
Ok(args)
}
}
impl VaultGate {
fn decrypt_key(
secret: &SharedSecret,
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(()) => Ok(key_buffer),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
}
}
}
}
#[messages(messages = Inbound, replies = Outbound)]
impl VaultGate {
#[message]
pub fn handle_handshake(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: PublicKey,
) -> Result<HandshakeResponse, Error> {
let ephemeral_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&ephemeral_secret);
let secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_pubkey);
self.state = State::ReadyForExchange {
server_key: public_key,
secret,
};
Ok(HandshakeResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key,
})
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else {
return Err(Error::State);
};
let Ok(seal_key_buffer) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data)
else {
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
};
match self
.actors
.vault
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::InvalidKey)) => Err(Error::InvalidKey),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Vault failed to unseal key");
Err(Error::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to vault");
Err(Error::internal("Vault actor error"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else {
return Err(Error::State);
};
let Ok(seal_key_buffer) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data)
else {
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
};
match self
.actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => {
info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Vault failed to bootstrap vault");
Err(Error::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to vault");
Err(Error::internal("Vault error"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<VaultState, Error> {
let answer = self
.actors
.vault
.ask(GetState {})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("failed to query vault"))?;
Ok(answer)
}
}
impl Message<events::Bootstrapped> for VaultGate {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_: events::Bootstrapped,
ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let result = async {
let mut conn = self
.db
.get()
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("DB unavailable"))?;
integrity::sign_entity(
&mut conn,
&self.actors.vault,
&self.auth_creds,
self.auth_creds.id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to sign integrity envelope on bootstrap");
Error::internal("Integrity sign failed")
})?;
Ok(())
}
.await;
if let Some(tx) = self.promotion_tx.take() {
let _ = tx.send(result);
}
ctx.stop();
}
}
impl Message<events::Unsealed> for VaultGate {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_: events::Unsealed,
ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
if let Some(tx) = self.promotion_tx.take() {
let _ = tx.send(Ok(()));
}
ctx.stop();
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, SharedSecret};
#[derive(Default)]
pub enum State {
#[default]
Idle,
ReadyForExchange {
server_key: PublicKey,
secret: SharedSecret,
},
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
use std::ops::Deref;
struct DeferClosure<F: FnOnce()> {
f: Option<F>,
}
@@ -16,19 +14,3 @@ impl<F: FnOnce()> Drop for DeferClosure<F> {
pub fn defer<F: FnOnce()>(f: F) -> impl Drop + Sized {
DeferClosure { f: Some(f) }
}
/// A trait for casting between two transparently wrapped types with identical memory layouts.
///
/// [`ReinterpretWrapper`] enables zero-cost conversions between two types (`Self` and `Counterpart`)
/// that wrap the same underlying data but differ in how that data is presented. Both types must
/// transparently wrap the same "deref target" and provide bidirectional `AsRef` conversions.
pub trait ReinterpretWrapper<Counterpart>
where
Self: Deref<Target = Self::Inner> + AsRef<Counterpart>,
Counterpart: Deref<Target = Self::Inner> + AsRef<Self>,
{
/// The shared target type that both `Self` and `Counterpart` transparently wrap.
type Inner;
/// Reinterprets `Self` as `Counterpart`.
fn reinterpret(self) -> Counterpart;
}

View File

@@ -1,20 +1,22 @@
use arbiter_proto::ClientMetadata;
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Receiver, Sender};
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn::{self, AuthChallenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT},
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
transport::{Receiver, Sender},
};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, auth, connect_client},
keyholder::Bootstrap,
},
actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Bootstrap},
crypto::integrity,
db::{self, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
peers::client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, auth, connect_client},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, NullableExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, SigningKey, VerifyingKey, signature::Keypair};
fn metadata(name: &str, description: Option<&str>, version: Option<&str>) -> ClientMetadata {
ClientMetadata {
@@ -24,10 +26,14 @@ fn metadata(name: &str, description: Option<&str>, version: Option<&str>) -> Cli
}
}
fn verifying_key(key: &SigningKey<MlDsa87>) -> VerifyingKey<MlDsa87> {
<SigningKey<MlDsa87> as Keypair>::verifying_key(key)
}
async fn insert_registered_client(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
actors: &GlobalActors,
pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
pubkey: VerifyingKey<MlDsa87>,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) {
use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
@@ -45,7 +51,7 @@ async fn insert_registered_client(
.unwrap();
let client_id: i32 = insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.encode().0.to_vec()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.returning(program_client::id)
@@ -53,28 +59,35 @@ async fn insert_registered_client(
.await
.unwrap();
let _ = integrity::sign_entity(
integrity::sign_entity(
&mut conn,
&actors.key_holder,
&ClientCredentials { pubkey, nonce: 1 },
&actors.vault,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.into(),
},
client_id,
)
.await
.unwrap();
}
fn sign_client_challenge(key: &SigningKey<MlDsa87>, challenge: &AuthChallenge) -> authn::Signature {
let challenge = challenge.format();
key.signing_key()
.sign_deterministic(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.unwrap()
.into()
}
async fn insert_bootstrap_sentinel_useragent(db: &db::DatabasePool) {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let sentinel_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng())
.verifying_key()
.to_bytes()
let sentinel_key = verifying_key(&MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng()))
.encode()
.0
.to_vec();
insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(sentinel_key),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
))
.values((schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(sentinel_key),))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -85,7 +98,7 @@ async fn spawn_test_actors(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> GlobalActors {
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.key_holder
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
@@ -96,7 +109,7 @@ async fn spawn_test_actors(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> GlobalActors {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
pub async fn unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
@@ -107,11 +120,11 @@ pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
metadata: metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
})
.await
@@ -123,18 +136,18 @@ pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
pub async fn challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
insert_registered_client(
Box::pin(insert_registered_client(
&db,
&actors,
new_key.verifying_key(),
verifying_key(&new_key),
&metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
)
))
.await;
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
@@ -147,7 +160,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
// Send challenge request
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
metadata: metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
})
.await
@@ -160,15 +173,14 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge } => challenge,
other @ auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
// Sign the challenge and send solution
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge.1, challenge.0.as_bytes());
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
let signature = sign_client_challenge(&new_key, &challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
@@ -191,13 +203,19 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
pub async fn metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let requested = metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0"));
insert_registered_client(&db, &actors, new_key.verifying_key(), &requested).await;
Box::pin(insert_registered_client(
&db,
&actors,
verifying_key(&new_key),
&requested,
))
.await;
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
@@ -209,18 +227,18 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
metadata: requested,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport.recv().await.unwrap().unwrap();
let (pubkey, nonce) = match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
let challenge = match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge } => challenge,
auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got AuthSuccess"),
};
let signature = new_key.sign(&arbiter_proto::format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes()));
let signature = sign_client_challenge(&new_key, &challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
.await
@@ -248,17 +266,17 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
insert_registered_client(
Box::pin(insert_registered_client(
&db,
&actors,
new_key.verifying_key(),
verifying_key(&new_key),
&metadata("client", Some("old"), Some("1.0.0")),
)
))
.await;
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
@@ -271,23 +289,23 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
metadata: metadata("client", Some("new"), Some("2.0.0")),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport.recv().await.unwrap().unwrap();
let (pubkey, nonce) = match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
let challenge = match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge } => challenge,
auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got AuthSuccess"),
};
let signature = new_key.sign(&arbiter_proto::format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes()));
let signature = sign_client_challenge(&new_key, &challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
.await
.unwrap();
let _ = test_transport.recv().await.unwrap();
drop(test_transport.recv().await.unwrap());
task.await.unwrap();
{
@@ -335,11 +353,11 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch() {
pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let requested = metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0"));
{
@@ -357,7 +375,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch() {
.unwrap();
insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::public_key.eq(verifying_key(&new_key).encode().0.to_vec()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
@@ -374,7 +392,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch() {
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
metadata: requested,
})
.await

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