28 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
hdbg
1b4369b1cb feat(transport): add domain error type to GrpcTransportActor
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2026-02-26 15:07:11 +01:00
hdbg
7bd37b3c4a refactor: introduce TransportActor abstraction 2026-02-25 21:44:01 +01:00
hdbg
fe8c5e1bd2 housekeeping(useragent): rename
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2026-02-21 13:54:47 +01:00
hdbg
cbbe1f8881 feat(proto): add URL parsing and TLS certificate management 2026-02-18 14:09:58 +01:00
hdbg
7438d62695 misc: create license and readme 2026-02-17 22:20:30 +01:00
hdbg
4236f2c36d refactor(server): reogranized actors, context, and db modules into <dir>/mod.rs structure
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2026-02-16 22:29:48 +01:00
hdbg
76ff535619 refactor(server::tests): moved integration-like tests into tests/ 2026-02-16 22:27:59 +01:00
hdbg
b3566c8af6 refactor(server): separated global actors into their own handle 2026-02-16 21:58:14 +01:00
hdbg
bdb9f01757 refactor(server): actors reorganization & linter fixes 2026-02-16 21:43:59 +01:00
hdbg
0805e7a846 feat(keyholder): add seal method and unseal integration tests 2026-02-16 21:38:29 +01:00
hdbg
eb9cbc88e9 feat(server::user-agent): Unseal implemented 2026-02-16 21:17:06 +01:00
hdbg
dd716da4cd test(keyholder): remove unused imports from test modules 2026-02-16 21:15:13 +01:00
hdbg
1545db7428 fix(ci): add protoc installation for lints
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2026-02-16 21:14:55 +01:00
hdbg
20ac84b60c fix(ci): add clippy installation in mise.toml
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2026-02-16 21:04:13 +01:00
hdbg
8f6dda871b refactor(actors): rename BootstrapActor to Bootstrapper 2026-02-16 21:01:53 +01:00
hdbg
47108ed8ad chore(supply-chain): update cargo-vet audits and trusted publishers
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2026-02-16 20:52:31 +01:00
hdbg
359df73c2e feat(server::key_holder): unique index on (root_key_id, nonce) to avoid nonce reuse 2026-02-16 20:45:15 +01:00
hdbg
ce03b7e15d feat(server::key_holder): ability to remotely get current state 2026-02-16 20:40:36 +01:00
hdbg
e4038d9188 refactor(keyholder): rename KeyHolderActor to KeyHolder and optimize db connection lifetime 2026-02-16 20:36:47 +01:00
hdbg
c82339d764 security(server::key_holder): replaced nonce-caching with exclusive transaction fetching nonce from the database 2026-02-16 18:23:25 +01:00
hdbg
c5b51f4b70 feat(server): UserAgent seal/unseal
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2026-02-16 14:00:23 +01:00
hdbg
6b8f8c9ff7 feat(unseal): add unseal protocol support for user agents 2026-02-15 13:04:55 +01:00
hdbg
8263bc6b6f feat(server): boot mechanism 2026-02-15 01:44:12 +01:00
hdbg
a6c849f268 ci: add server linting pipeline for Rust code quality checks 2026-02-14 23:44:16 +01:00
hdbg
d8d65da0b4 test(user-agent): add challenge-response auth flow test 2026-02-14 23:43:36 +01:00
hdbg
abdf4e3893 tests(server): UserAgent invalid bootstrap token 2026-02-14 19:48:37 +01:00
hdbg
4bac70a6e9 security(server): cargo-vet proper init
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2026-02-14 19:16:09 +01:00
hdbg
54a41743be housekeeping(server): trimmed-down dependencies 2026-02-14 19:04:50 +01:00
269 changed files with 2349 additions and 48391 deletions

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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---
name: Widget decomposition and provider subscriptions
description: Prefer splitting screens into multiple focused files/widgets; each widget subscribes to its own relevant providers
type: feedback
---
Split screens into multiple smaller widgets across multiple files. Each widget should subscribe only to the providers it needs (`ref.watch` at lowest possible level), rather than having one large screen widget that watches everything and passes data down as parameters.
**Why:** Reduces unnecessary rebuilds; improves readability; each file has one clear responsibility.
**How to apply:** When building a new screen, identify which sub-widgets need their own provider subscriptions and extract them into separate files (e.g., `widgets/grant_card.dart` watches enrichment providers itself, rather than the screen doing it and passing resolved strings down).

7
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -1,6 +1 @@
target/
scripts/__pycache__/
.DS_Store
.cargo/config.toml
.vscode/
docs/
target/

3
.vscode/settings.json vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
{
"git.enabled": false
}

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@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ steps:
- apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
- mise install rust
- mise install protoc
- mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all -- -D warnings
- mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings

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@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
when:
- event: pull_request
path:
include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**']
- event: push
branch: main
path:
include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**']
steps:
- name: analyze
image: jdxcode/mise:latest
commands:
- mise install flutter
- mise install protoc
# Reruns codegen to catch protocol drift
- mise codegen
- cd useragent/ && flutter analyze

128
AGENTS.md
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@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
# AGENTS.md
This file provides guidance to Codex (Codex.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Project Overview
Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
## Toolchain Setup
Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
```sh
mise install
```
Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
### Crates
| Crate | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
### Common Commands
```sh
cd server
# Build
cargo build
# Run the server daemon
cargo run -p arbiter-server
# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
cargo nextest run
# Run a single test
cargo nextest run <test_name>
# Lint
cargo clippy
# Security audit
cargo audit
# Check unused dependencies
cargo shear
# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
cargo insta review
```
### Architecture
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
**Cryptography:**
- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
- Password KDF: Argon2
- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
### Proto Regeneration
When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
```sh
cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
```
### Database Migrations
```sh
# Create a new migration
diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
```sh
cd useragent && rinf gen
```
### Common Commands
```sh
cd useragent
# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
flutter run
# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
rinf gen
# Analyze Dart code
flutter analyze
```
The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers:
- **User Agent** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies).
- **SDK Client** — A consumer of signing capabilities, typically an automation tool. In the future, this could include a browser-based wallet.
- **Recovery Operator** — A dormant recovery participant with narrowly scoped authority used only for custody recovery and operator replacement.
---
@@ -43,149 +42,7 @@ There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approve
---
## 3. Multi-Operator Governance
When more than one User Agent is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision.
### 3.1 Voting Rules
Voting is based on the total number of registered operators:
- **1 operator:** no vote is needed; the single operator decides directly.
- **2 operators:** full consensus is required; both operators must approve.
- **3 or more operators:** quorum is `floor(N / 2) + 1`.
For a decision to count, the operator's approval or rejection must be signed by that operator's associated key. Unsigned votes, or votes that fail signature verification, are ignored.
Examples:
- **3 operators:** 2 approvals required
- **4 operators:** 3 approvals required
### 3.2 Actions Requiring a Vote
In multi-operator mode, a successful vote is required for:
- approving new SDK clients
- granting an SDK client visibility to a wallet
- approving a one-off transaction
- approving creation of a persistent grant
- approving operator replacement
- approving server updates
- updating Shamir secret-sharing parameters
### 3.3 Special Rule for Key Rotation
Key rotation always requires full quorum, regardless of the normal voting threshold.
This is stricter than ordinary governance actions because rotating the root key requires every operator to participate in coordinated share refresh/update steps. The root key itself is not redistributed directly, but each operator's share material must be changed consistently.
### 3.4 Root Key Custody
When the vault has multiple operators, the vault root key is protected using Shamir secret sharing.
The vault root key is encrypted in a way that requires reconstruction from user-held shares rather than from a single shared password.
For ordinary operators, the Shamir threshold matches the ordinary governance quorum. For example:
- **2 operators:** `2-of-2`
- **3 operators:** `2-of-3`
- **4 operators:** `3-of-4`
In practice, the Shamir share set also includes Recovery Operator shares. This means the effective Shamir parameters are computed over the combined share pool while keeping the same threshold. For example:
- **3 ordinary operators + 2 recovery shares:** `2-of-5`
This ensures that the normal custody threshold follows the ordinary operator quorum, while still allowing dormant recovery shares to exist for break-glass recovery flows.
### 3.5 Recovery Operators
Recovery Operators are a separate peer type from ordinary vault operators.
Their role is intentionally narrow. They can only:
- participate in unsealing the vault
- vote for operator replacement
Recovery Operators do not participate in routine governance such as approving SDK clients, granting wallet visibility, approving transactions, creating grants, approving server updates, or changing Shamir parameters.
### 3.6 Sleeping and Waking Recovery Operators
By default, Recovery Operators are **sleeping** and do not participate in any active flow.
Any ordinary operator may request that Recovery Operators **wake up**.
Any ordinary operator may also cancel a pending wake-up request.
This creates a dispute window before recovery powers become active. The default wake-up delay is **14 days**.
Recovery Operators are therefore part of the break-glass recovery path rather than the normal operating quorum.
The high-level recovery flow is:
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Op as Ordinary Operator
participant Server
actor Other as Other Operator
actor Rec as Recovery Operator
Op->>Server: Request recovery wake-up
Server-->>Op: Wake-up pending
Note over Server: Default dispute window: 14 days
alt Wake-up cancelled during dispute window
Other->>Server: Cancel wake-up
Server-->>Op: Recovery cancelled
Server-->>Rec: Stay sleeping
else No cancellation for 14 days
Server-->>Rec: Wake up
Rec->>Server: Join recovery flow
critical Recovery authority
Rec->>Server: Participate in unseal
Rec->>Server: Vote on operator replacement
end
Server-->>Op: Recovery mode active
end
```
### 3.7 Committee Formation
There are two ways to form a multi-operator committee:
- convert an existing single-operator vault by adding new operators
- bootstrap an unbootstrapped vault directly into multi-operator mode
In both cases, committee formation is a coordinated process. Arbiter does not allow multi-operator custody to emerge implicitly from unrelated registrations.
### 3.8 Bootstrapping an Unbootstrapped Vault into Multi-Operator Mode
When an unbootstrapped vault is initialized as a multi-operator vault, the setup proceeds as follows:
1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using a User Agent and the bootstrap token.
2. During bootstrap setup, that operator declares:
- the total number of ordinary operators
- the total number of Recovery Operators
3. The vault enters **multi-bootstrap mode**.
4. While in multi-bootstrap mode:
- every ordinary operator must connect with a User Agent using the bootstrap token
- every Recovery Operator must also connect using the bootstrap token
- each participant is registered individually
- each participant's share is created and protected with that participant's credentials
5. The vault is considered fully bootstrapped only after all declared operator and recovery-share registrations have completed successfully.
This means the operator and recovery set is fixed at bootstrap completion time, based on the counts declared when multi-bootstrap mode was entered.
### 3.9 Special Bootstrap Constraint for Two-Operator Vaults
If a vault is declared with exactly **2 ordinary operators**, Arbiter requires at least **1 Recovery Operator** to be configured during bootstrap.
This prevents the worst-case custody failure in which a `2-of-2` operator set becomes permanently unrecoverable after loss of a single operator.
---
## 4. Server Identity
## 3. Server Identity
The server proves its identity using TLS with a self-signed certificate. The TLS private key is generated on first run and is long-term; no rotation mechanism exists yet due to the complexity of multi-peer coordination.
@@ -198,9 +55,9 @@ Peers verify the server by its **public key fingerprint**:
---
## 5. Key Management
## 4. Key Management
### 5.1 Key Hierarchy
### 4.1 Key Hierarchy
There are three layers of keys:
@@ -215,19 +72,19 @@ This layered design enables:
- **Password rotation** without re-encrypting every wallet key (only the root key is re-encrypted).
- **Root key rotation** without requiring the user to change their password.
### 5.2 Encryption at Rest
### 4.2 Encryption at Rest
The database stores everything in encrypted form using symmetric AEAD. The encryption scheme is versioned to support transparent migration — when the vault unseals, Arbiter automatically re-encrypts any entries that are behind the current scheme version. See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the specific scheme and versioning mechanism.
---
## 6. Vault Lifecycle
## 5. Vault Lifecycle
### 6.1 Sealed State
### 5.1 Sealed State
On boot, the root key is encrypted and the server cannot perform any signing operations. This state is called **Sealed**.
### 6.2 Unseal Flow
### 5.2 Unseal Flow
To transition to the **Unsealed** state, a User Agent must provide the password:
@@ -238,7 +95,7 @@ To transition to the **Unsealed** state, a User Agent must provide the password:
- **Success:** The root key is decrypted and placed into a hardened memory cell. The server transitions to `Unsealed`. Any entries pending encryption scheme migration are re-encrypted.
- **Failure:** The server returns an error indicating the password is incorrect.
### 6.3 Memory Protection
### 5.3 Memory Protection
Once unsealed, the root key must be protected in memory against:
@@ -250,9 +107,9 @@ See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the current and planned memory pr
---
## 7. Permission Engine
## 6. Permission Engine
### 7.1 Fundamental Rules
### 6.1 Fundamental Rules
- SDK clients have **no access by default**.
- Access is granted **explicitly** by a User Agent.
@@ -262,45 +119,11 @@ Each blockchain requires its own policy system due to differences in static tran
Arbiter is also responsible for ensuring that **transaction nonces are never reused**.
### 7.2 EVM Policies
### 6.2 EVM Policies
Every EVM grant is scoped to a specific **wallet** and **chain ID**.
#### 7.2.0 Transaction Signing Sequence
The high-level interaction order is:
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor SDK as SDK Client
participant Server
participant UA as User Agent
SDK->>Server: SignTransactionRequest
Server->>Server: Resolve wallet and wallet visibility
alt Visibility approval required
Server->>UA: Ask for wallet visibility approval
UA-->>Server: Vote result
end
Server->>Server: Evaluate transaction
Server->>Server: Load grant and limits context
alt Grant approval required
Server->>UA: Ask for execution / grant approval
UA-->>Server: Vote result
opt Create persistent grant
Server->>Server: Create and store grant
end
Server->>Server: Retry evaluation
end
critical Final authorization path
Server->>Server: Check limits and record execution
Server-->>Server: Signature or evaluation error
end
Server-->>SDK: Signature or error
```
#### 7.2.1 Transaction Sub-Grants
#### 6.2.1 Transaction Sub-Grants
Arbiter maintains an ever-expanding database of known contracts and their ABIs. Based on contract knowledge, transaction requests fall into three categories:
@@ -324,9 +147,9 @@ Available restrictions:
These transactions have no `calldata` and therefore cannot interact with contracts. They can be subject to the same volume and rate restrictions as above.
#### 7.2.2 Global Limits
#### 6.2.2 Global Limits
In addition to sub-grant-specific restrictions, the following limits can be applied across all grant types:
- **Gas limit** — Maximum gas per transaction.
- **Time-window restrictions** — e.g., signing allowed only 08:0020:00 on Mondays and Thursdays.
- **Time-window restrictions** — e.g., signing allowed only 08:0020:00 on Mondays and Thursdays.

128
CLAUDE.md
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@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
# CLAUDE.md
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Project Overview
Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
## Toolchain Setup
Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
```sh
mise install
```
Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
### Crates
| Crate | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
### Common Commands
```sh
cd server
# Build
cargo build
# Run the server daemon
cargo run -p arbiter-server
# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
cargo nextest run
# Run a single test
cargo nextest run <test_name>
# Lint
cargo clippy
# Security audit
cargo audit
# Check unused dependencies
cargo shear
# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
cargo insta review
```
### Architecture
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
**Cryptography:**
- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
- Password KDF: Argon2
- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
### Proto Regeneration
When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
```sh
cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
```
### Database Migrations
```sh
# Create a new migration
diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
```sh
cd useragent && rinf gen
```
### Common Commands
```sh
cd useragent
# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
flutter run
# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
rinf gen
# Analyze Dart code
flutter analyze
```
The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

View File

@@ -4,81 +4,10 @@ This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the archi
---
## Client Connection Flow
### Authentication Result Semantics
Authentication no longer uses an implicit success-only response shape. Both `client` and `user-agent` return explicit auth status enums over the wire.
- **Client:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `APPROVAL_DENIED`, `NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE`, or `INTERNAL`
- **User-agent:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED`, `TOKEN_INVALID`, or `INTERNAL`
This makes transport-level failures and actor/domain-level auth failures distinct:
- **Transport/protocol failures** are surfaced as stream/status errors
- **Authentication failures** are surfaced as successful protocol responses carrying an explicit auth status
Clients are expected to handle these status codes directly and present the concrete failure reason to the user.
### New Client Approval
When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected user agents are asked to approve the connection. The first agent to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest]
B --> C{pubkey in DB?}
C -- yes --> D[Read nonce\nIncrement nonce in DB]
D --> G
C -- no --> E[Ask all UserAgents:\nClientConnectionRequest]
E --> F{First response}
F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection])
F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nUserAgent requests]
F2 --> F3[INSERT client\nnonce = 1]
F3 --> G[Send AuthChallenge\nwith nonce]
G --> H[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
H --> I{Signature valid?}
I -- no --> Z
I -- yes --> J([Session started])
```
### Known Issue: Concurrent Registration Race (TOCTOU)
Two connections presenting the same previously-unknown public key can race through the approval flow simultaneously:
1. Both check the DB → neither is registered.
2. Both request approval from user agents → both receive approval.
3. Both `INSERT` the client record → the second insert silently overwrites the first, resetting the nonce.
This means the first connection's nonce is invalidated by the second, causing its challenge verification to fail. A fix requires either serialising new-client registration (e.g. an in-memory lock keyed on pubkey) or replacing the separate check + insert with an `INSERT OR IGNORE` / upsert guarded by a unique constraint on `public_key`.
### Nonce Semantics
The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it is always one ahead of the nonce last issued in a challenge.
- **New client:** inserted with `nonce = 1`; the first challenge is issued with `nonce = 0`.
- **Existing client:** the current DB value is read and used as the challenge nonce, then immediately incremented within the same exclusive transaction, preventing replay.
---
## Cryptography
### Authentication
- **Client protocol:** ed25519
### User-Agent Authentication
User-agent authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
- **Supported schemes:** RSA, Ed25519, ECDSA (secp256k1)
- **Why:** the user agent authenticates with keys backed by platform facilities, and those facilities differ by platform
- **Apple Silicon Secure Enclave / Secure Element:** ECDSA-only in practice
- **Windows Hello / TPM 2.0:** currently RSA-backed in our integration
This is why the user-agent auth protocol carries an explicit `KeyType`, while the SDK client protocol remains fixed to ed25519.
- **Signature scheme:** ed25519
### Encryption at Rest
- **Scheme:** Symmetric AEAD — currently **XChaCha20-Poly1305**
@@ -93,147 +22,14 @@ This is why the user-agent auth protocol carries an explicit `KeyType`, while th
## Communication
- **Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers
- **Request/response matching:** multiplexed over a single bidirectional stream using per-connection request IDs
- **Server identity distribution:** `ServerInfo` protobuf struct containing the TLS public key fingerprint
- **Future consideration:** grpc-web lacks bidirectional stream support, so a browser-based wallet may require protojson over WebSocket
### Request Multiplexing
Both `client` and `user-agent` connections support multiple in-flight requests over one gRPC bidi stream.
- Every request carries a monotonically increasing request ID
- Every normal response echoes the request ID it corresponds to
- Out-of-band server messages omit the response ID entirely
- The server rejects already-seen request IDs at the transport adapter boundary before business logic sees the message
This keeps request correlation entirely in transport/client connection code while leaving actor and domain handlers unaware of request IDs.
---
## EVM Policy Engine
### Overview
The EVM engine classifies incoming transactions, enforces grant constraints, and records executions. It is the sole path through which a wallet key is used for signing.
The central abstraction is the `Policy` trait. Each implementation handles one semantic transaction category and owns its own database tables for grant storage and transaction logging.
### Transaction Evaluation Flow
`Engine::evaluate_transaction` runs the following steps in order:
1. **Classify** — Each registered policy's `analyze(context)` inspects the transaction fields (`chain`, `to`, `value`, `calldata`). The first one returning `Some(meaning)` wins. If none match, the transaction is rejected as `UnsupportedTransactionType`.
2. **Find grant**`Policy::try_find_grant` queries for a non-revoked grant covering this wallet, client, chain, and target address.
3. **Check shared constraints**`check_shared_constraints` runs in the engine before any policy-specific logic. It enforces the validity window, gas fee caps, and transaction count rate limit (see below).
4. **Evaluate**`Policy::evaluate` checks the decoded meaning against the grant's policy-specific constraints and returns any violations.
5. **Record** — If `RunKind::Execution` and there are no violations, the engine writes to `evm_transaction_log` and calls `Policy::record_transaction` for any policy-specific logging (e.g., token transfer volume).
The detailed branch structure is shown below:
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A[SDK Client sends sign transaction request] --> B[Server resolves wallet]
B --> C{Wallet exists?}
C -- No --> Z1[Return wallet not found error]
C -- Yes --> D[Check SDK client wallet visibility]
D --> E{Wallet visible to SDK client?}
E -- No --> F[Start wallet visibility voting flow]
F --> G{Vote approved?}
G -- No --> Z2[Return wallet access denied error]
G -- Yes --> H[Persist wallet visibility]
E -- Yes --> I[Classify transaction meaning]
H --> I
I --> J{Meaning supported?}
J -- No --> Z3[Return unsupported transaction error]
J -- Yes --> K[Find matching grant]
K --> L{Grant exists?}
L -- Yes --> M[Check grant limits]
L -- No --> N[Start execution or grant voting flow]
N --> O{User-agent decision}
O -- Reject --> Z4[Return no matching grant error]
O -- Allow once --> M
O -- Create grant --> P[Create grant with user-selected limits]
P --> Q[Persist grant]
Q --> M
M --> R{Limits exceeded?}
R -- Yes --> Z5[Return evaluation error]
R -- No --> S[Record transaction in logs]
S --> T[Produce signature]
T --> U[Return signature to SDK client]
note1[Limit checks include volume, count, and gas constraints.]
note2[Grant lookup depends on classified meaning, such as ether transfer or token transfer.]
K -. uses .-> note2
M -. checks .-> note1
```
### Policy Trait
| Method | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `analyze` | Pure — classifies a transaction into a typed `Meaning`, or `None` if this policy doesn't apply |
| `evaluate` | Checks the `Meaning` against a `Grant`; returns a list of `EvalViolation`s |
| `create_grant` | Inserts policy-specific rows; returns the specific grant ID |
| `try_find_grant` | Finds a matching non-revoked grant for the given `EvalContext` |
| `find_all_grants` | Returns all non-revoked grants (used for listing) |
| `record_transaction` | Persists policy-specific data after execution |
`analyze` and `evaluate` are intentionally separate: classification is pure and cheap, while evaluation may involve DB queries (e.g., fetching past transfer volume).
### Registered Policies
**EtherTransfer** — plain ETH transfers (empty calldata)
- Grant requires: allowlist of recipient addresses + one volumetric rate limit (max ETH over a time window)
- Violations: recipient not in allowlist, cumulative ETH volume exceeded
**TokenTransfer** — ERC-20 `transfer(address,uint256)` calls
- Recognised by ABI-decoding the `transfer(address,uint256)` selector against a static registry of known token contracts (`arbiter_tokens_registry`)
- Grant requires: token contract address, optional recipient restriction, zero or more volumetric rate limits
- Violations: recipient mismatch, any volumetric limit exceeded
### Grant Model
Every grant has two layers:
- **Shared (`evm_basic_grant`)** — wallet, chain, validity period, gas fee caps, transaction count rate limit. One row per grant regardless of type.
- **Specific** — policy-owned tables (`evm_ether_transfer_grant`, `evm_token_transfer_grant`) holding type-specific configuration.
`find_all_grants` uses a `#[diesel::auto_type]` base join between the specific and shared tables, then batch-loads related rows (targets, volume limits) in two additional queries to avoid N+1.
The engine exposes `list_all_grants` which collects across all policy types into `Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>` via a blanket `From<Grant<S>> for Grant<SpecificGrant>` conversion.
### Shared Constraints (enforced by the engine)
These are checked centrally in `check_shared_constraints` before policy evaluation:
| Constraint | Fields | Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| Validity window | `valid_from`, `valid_until` | Emits `InvalidTime` if current time is outside the range |
| Gas fee cap | `max_gas_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas` | Emits `GasLimitExceeded` if either cap is breached |
| Tx count rate limit | `rate_limit` (`count` + `window`) | Counts rows in `evm_transaction_log` within the window; emits `RateLimitExceeded` if at or above the limit |
---
### Known Limitations
- **Only EIP-1559 transactions are supported.** Legacy and EIP-2930 types are rejected outright.
- **No opaque-calldata (unknown contract) grant type.** The architecture describes a category for unrecognised contracts, but no policy implements it yet. Any transaction that is not a plain ETH transfer or a known ERC-20 transfer is unconditionally rejected.
- **Token registry is static.** Tokens are recognised only if they appear in the hard-coded `arbiter_tokens_registry` crate. There is no mechanism to register additional contracts at runtime.
---
## Memory Protection
The unsealed root key must be held in a hardened memory cell resistant to dumps, page swaps, and hibernation.
- **Current:** A dedicated memory-protection abstraction is in place, with `memsafe` used behind that abstraction today
- **Planned:** Additional backends can be introduced behind the same abstraction, including a custom implementation based on `mlock` (Unix) and `VirtualProtect` (Windows)
- **Current:** Using the `memsafe` crate as an interim solution
- **Planned:** Custom implementation based on `mlock` (Unix) and `VirtualProtect` (Windows)

View File

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
Extension Discovery Cache
=========================
This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
packages that contains extensions for other packages.
DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
----------------------
* Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
* Do write to this folder.
If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
Use package `extension_discovery`
---------------------------------
If you want to access information from this folder.
Feel free to delete this folder
-------------------------------
Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
need to do please file a bug.

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{"version":2,"entries":[{"package":"app","rootUri":"../","packageUri":"lib/"}]}

115
mise.lock
View File

@@ -1,44 +1,10 @@
# @generated - this file is auto-generated by `mise lock` https://mise.jdx.dev/dev-tools/mise-lock.html
[[tools.ast-grep]]
version = "0.42.0"
backend = "aqua:ast-grep/ast-grep"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:5c830eae8456569e2f7212434ed9c238f58dca412d76045418ed6d394a755836"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:5c830eae8456569e2f7212434ed9c238f58dca412d76045418ed6d394a755836"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:e825a05603f0bcc4cd9076c4cc8c9abd6d008b7cd07d9aa3cc323ba4b8606651"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:e825a05603f0bcc4cd9076c4cc8c9abd6d008b7cd07d9aa3cc323ba4b8606651"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:fc300d5293b1c770a5aece03a8a193b92e71e87cec726c28096990691a582620"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-aarch64-apple-darwin.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:979ffe611327056f4730a1ae71b0209b3b830f58b22c6ed194cda34f55400db2"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-apple-darwin.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:55836fa1b2c65dc7d61615a4d9368622a0d2371a76d28b9a165e5a3ab6ae32a4"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-audit"]]
version = "0.22.1"
backend = "cargo:cargo-audit"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-edit"]]
version = "0.13.9"
backend = "cargo:cargo-edit"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-features"]]
version = "1.0.0"
backend = "cargo:cargo-features"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-features-manager"]]
version = "0.11.1"
@@ -53,13 +19,21 @@ version = "0.9.126"
backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-shear"]]
version = "1.11.2"
version = "1.9.1"
backend = "cargo:cargo-shear"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-vet"]]
version = "0.10.2"
backend = "cargo:cargo-vet"
[[tools."cargo:diesel-cli"]]
version = "2.3.6"
backend = "cargo:diesel-cli"
[tools."cargo:diesel-cli".options]
default-features = "false"
features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled"
[[tools."cargo:diesel_cli"]]
version = "2.3.6"
backend = "cargo:diesel_cli"
@@ -75,66 +49,11 @@ backend = "asdf:flutter"
[[tools.protoc]]
version = "29.6"
backend = "aqua:protocolbuffers/protobuf/protoc"
[tools.protoc."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:2594ff4fcae8cb57310d394d0961b236190ad9c5efbfdf1f597ea471d424fe79"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-aarch_64.zip"
[tools.protoc."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:2594ff4fcae8cb57310d394d0961b236190ad9c5efbfdf1f597ea471d424fe79"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-aarch_64.zip"
[tools.protoc."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:48785a926e73ffa3f68e2f22b14e7b849620c7a1d36809ac9249a5495e280323"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-x86_64.zip"
[tools.protoc."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:48785a926e73ffa3f68e2f22b14e7b849620c7a1d36809ac9249a5495e280323"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-x86_64.zip"
[tools.protoc."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:b9576b5fa1a1ef3fe13a8c91d9d8204b46545759bea5ae155cd6ba2ea4cdaeed"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-aarch_64.zip"
[tools.protoc."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:312f04713946921cc0187ef34df80241ddca1bab6f564c636885fd2cc90d3f88"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-x86_64.zip"
[tools.protoc."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f6f7"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"
[[tools.python]]
version = "3.14.3"
backend = "core:python"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:c43aecde4a663aebff99b9b83da0efec506479f1c3f98331442f33d2c43501f9"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:9ab41dbc2f100a2a45d1833b9c11165f51051c558b5213eda9a9731d5948a0c0"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[tools.python."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:bbe19034b35b0267176a7442575ae7dc6343480fd4d35598cb7700173d431e09"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
"platforms.linux-arm64" = { checksum = "sha256:2594ff4fcae8cb57310d394d0961b236190ad9c5efbfdf1f597ea471d424fe79", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-aarch_64.zip"}
"platforms.linux-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:48785a926e73ffa3f68e2f22b14e7b849620c7a1d36809ac9249a5495e280323", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-x86_64.zip"}
"platforms.macos-arm64" = { checksum = "sha256:b9576b5fa1a1ef3fe13a8c91d9d8204b46545759bea5ae155cd6ba2ea4cdaeed", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-aarch_64.zip"}
"platforms.macos-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:312f04713946921cc0187ef34df80241ddca1bab6f564c636885fd2cc90d3f88", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-x86_64.zip"}
"platforms.windows-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f6f7", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"}
[[tools.rust]]
version = "1.93.0"

View File

@@ -9,14 +9,3 @@ protoc = "29.6"
"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.46.3"
python = "3.14.3"
ast-grep = "0.42.0"
"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.9"
[tasks.codegen]
sources = ['protobufs/*.proto']
outputs = ['useragent/lib/proto/*']
run = '''
dart pub global activate protoc_plugin && \
protoc --dart_out=grpc:useragent/lib/proto --proto_path=protobufs/ protobufs/*.proto
'''

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter;
import "auth.proto";
import "client.proto";
import "user_agent.proto";
@@ -11,6 +12,6 @@ message ServerInfo {
}
service ArbiterService {
rpc Client(stream arbiter.client.ClientRequest) returns (stream arbiter.client.ClientResponse);
rpc UserAgent(stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentRequest) returns (stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentResponse);
rpc Client(stream ClientRequest) returns (stream ClientResponse);
rpc UserAgent(stream UserAgentRequest) returns (stream UserAgentResponse);
}

35
protobufs/auth.proto Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.auth;
import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
}
message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1;
int32 nonce = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {
bytes signature = 1;
}
message AuthOk {}
message ClientMessage {
oneof payload {
AuthChallengeRequest auth_challenge_request = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution auth_challenge_solution = 2;
}
}
message ServerMessage {
oneof payload {
AuthChallenge auth_challenge = 1;
AuthOk auth_ok = 2;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,65 +1,17 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.client;
package arbiter;
import "evm.proto";
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
message ClientInfo {
string name = 1;
optional string description = 2;
optional string version = 3;
}
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
ClientInfo client_info = 2;
}
message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1;
int32 nonce = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {
bytes signature = 1;
}
enum AuthResult {
AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
AUTH_RESULT_APPROVAL_DENIED = 4;
AUTH_RESULT_NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE = 5;
AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
}
enum VaultState {
VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
}
import "auth.proto";
message ClientRequest {
int32 request_id = 4;
oneof payload {
AuthChallengeRequest auth_challenge_request = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution auth_challenge_solution = 2;
google.protobuf.Empty query_vault_state = 3;
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest evm_sign_transaction = 5;
arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
}
}
message ClientResponse {
optional int32 request_id = 7;
oneof payload {
AuthChallenge auth_challenge = 1;
AuthResult auth_result = 2;
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse evm_sign_transaction = 3;
arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse evm_analyze_transaction = 4;
VaultState vault_state = 6;
arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.evm;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
enum EvmError {
EVM_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
EVM_ERROR_VAULT_SEALED = 1;
EVM_ERROR_INTERNAL = 2;
}
message WalletEntry {
int32 id = 1;
bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
}
message WalletList {
repeated WalletEntry wallets = 1;
}
message WalletCreateResponse {
oneof result {
WalletEntry wallet = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
message WalletListResponse {
oneof result {
WalletList wallets = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
// --- Grant types ---
message TransactionRateLimit {
uint32 count = 1;
int64 window_secs = 2;
}
message VolumeRateLimit {
bytes max_volume = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
int64 window_secs = 2;
}
message SharedSettings {
int32 wallet_access_id = 1;
uint64 chain_id = 2;
optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_from = 3;
optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_until = 4;
optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 5; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional TransactionRateLimit rate_limit = 7;
}
message EtherTransferSettings {
repeated bytes targets = 1; // list of 20-byte Ethereum addresses
VolumeRateLimit limit = 2;
}
message TokenTransferSettings {
bytes token_contract = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
optional bytes target = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address; absent means any recipient allowed
repeated VolumeRateLimit volume_limits = 3;
}
message SpecificGrant {
oneof grant {
EtherTransferSettings ether_transfer = 1;
TokenTransferSettings token_transfer = 2;
}
}
message EtherTransferMeaning {
bytes to = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes value = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
}
message TokenInfo {
string symbol = 1;
bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
uint64 chain_id = 3;
}
// Mirror of token_transfers::Meaning
message TokenTransferMeaning {
TokenInfo token = 1;
bytes to = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes value = 3; // U256 as big-endian bytes
}
// Mirror of policies::SpecificMeaning
message SpecificMeaning {
oneof meaning {
EtherTransferMeaning ether_transfer = 1;
TokenTransferMeaning token_transfer = 2;
}
}
// --- Eval error types ---
message GasLimitExceededViolation {
optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
}
message EvalViolation {
oneof kind {
bytes invalid_target = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
GasLimitExceededViolation gas_limit_exceeded = 2;
google.protobuf.Empty rate_limit_exceeded = 3;
google.protobuf.Empty volumetric_limit_exceeded = 4;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_time = 5;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_transaction_type = 6;
}
}
// Transaction was classified but no grant covers it
message NoMatchingGrantError {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
}
// Transaction was classified and a grant was found, but constraints were violated
message PolicyViolationsError {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
repeated EvalViolation violations = 2;
}
// top-level error returned when transaction evaluation fails
message TransactionEvalError {
oneof kind {
google.protobuf.Empty contract_creation_not_supported = 1;
google.protobuf.Empty unsupported_transaction_type = 2;
NoMatchingGrantError no_matching_grant = 3;
PolicyViolationsError policy_violations = 4;
}
}
// --- UserAgent grant management ---
message EvmGrantCreateRequest {
SharedSettings shared = 1;
SpecificGrant specific = 2;
}
message EvmGrantCreateResponse {
oneof result {
int32 grant_id = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
message EvmGrantDeleteRequest {
int32 grant_id = 1;
}
message EvmGrantDeleteResponse {
oneof result {
google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
// Basic grant info returned in grant listings
message GrantEntry {
int32 id = 1;
int32 wallet_access_id = 2;
SharedSettings shared = 3;
SpecificGrant specific = 4;
}
message EvmGrantListRequest {
optional int32 wallet_access_id = 1;
}
message EvmGrantListResponse {
oneof result {
EvmGrantList grants = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
message EvmGrantList {
repeated GrantEntry grants = 1;
}
// --- Client transaction operations ---
message EvmSignTransactionRequest {
bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction (unsigned)
}
// oneof because signing and evaluation happen atomically — a signing failure
// is always either an eval error or an internal error, never a partial success
message EvmSignTransactionResponse {
oneof result {
bytes signature = 1; // 65-byte signature: r[32] || s[32] || v[1]
TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
EvmError error = 3;
}
}
message EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest {
bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction
}
message EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse {
oneof result {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
EvmError error = 3;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,82 +1,10 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent;
package arbiter;
import "client.proto";
import "evm.proto";
import "auth.proto";
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
enum KeyType {
KEY_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 1;
KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1 = 2;
KEY_TYPE_RSA = 3;
}
// --- SDK client management ---
enum SdkClientError {
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS = 1;
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_NOT_FOUND = 2;
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_HAS_RELATED_DATA = 3; // hard-delete blocked by FK (client has grants or transaction logs)
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_INTERNAL = 4;
}
message SdkClientRevokeRequest {
int32 client_id = 1;
}
message SdkClientEntry {
int32 id = 1;
bytes pubkey = 2;
arbiter.client.ClientInfo info = 3;
int32 created_at = 4;
}
message SdkClientList {
repeated SdkClientEntry clients = 1;
}
message SdkClientRevokeResponse {
oneof result {
google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
SdkClientError error = 2;
}
}
message SdkClientListResponse {
oneof result {
SdkClientList clients = 1;
SdkClientError error = 2;
}
}
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
KeyType key_type = 3;
}
message AuthChallenge {
int32 nonce = 2;
reserved 1;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {
bytes signature = 1;
}
enum AuthResult {
AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
AUTH_RESULT_BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED = 4;
AUTH_RESULT_TOKEN_INVALID = 5;
AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
}
message UnsealStart {
bytes client_pubkey = 1;
}
@@ -90,12 +18,6 @@ message UnsealEncryptedKey {
bytes associated_data = 3;
}
message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
bytes nonce = 1;
bytes ciphertext = 2;
bytes associated_data = 3;
}
enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
@@ -103,13 +25,6 @@ enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
}
enum BootstrapResult {
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3;
}
enum VaultState {
VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
@@ -118,89 +33,19 @@ enum VaultState {
VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
}
message SdkClientConnectionRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
arbiter.client.ClientInfo info = 2;
}
message SdkClientConnectionResponse {
bool approved = 1;
bytes pubkey = 2;
}
message SdkClientConnectionCancel {
bytes pubkey = 1;
}
message WalletAccess {
int32 wallet_id = 1;
int32 sdk_client_id = 2;
}
message SdkClientWalletAccess {
int32 id = 1;
WalletAccess access = 2;
}
message SdkClientGrantWalletAccess {
repeated WalletAccess accesses = 1;
}
message SdkClientRevokeWalletAccess {
repeated int32 accesses = 1;
}
message ListWalletAccessResponse {
repeated SdkClientWalletAccess accesses = 1;
}
message UserAgentEvmSignTransactionRequest {
int32 client_id = 1;
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest request = 2;
}
message UserAgentRequest {
int32 id = 16;
oneof payload {
AuthChallengeRequest auth_challenge_request = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution auth_challenge_solution = 2;
UnsealStart unseal_start = 3;
UnsealEncryptedKey unseal_encrypted_key = 4;
google.protobuf.Empty query_vault_state = 5;
google.protobuf.Empty evm_wallet_create = 6;
google.protobuf.Empty evm_wallet_list = 7;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateRequest evm_grant_create = 8;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteRequest evm_grant_delete = 9;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListRequest evm_grant_list = 10;
SdkClientConnectionResponse sdk_client_connection_response = 11;
SdkClientRevokeRequest sdk_client_revoke = 12;
google.protobuf.Empty sdk_client_list = 13;
BootstrapEncryptedKey bootstrap_encrypted_key = 14;
SdkClientGrantWalletAccess grant_wallet_access = 15;
SdkClientRevokeWalletAccess revoke_wallet_access = 17;
google.protobuf.Empty list_wallet_access = 18;
UserAgentEvmSignTransactionRequest evm_sign_transaction = 19;
arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
UnsealStart unseal_start = 2;
UnsealEncryptedKey unseal_encrypted_key = 3;
google.protobuf.Empty query_vault_state = 4;
}
}
message UserAgentResponse {
optional int32 id = 16;
oneof payload {
AuthChallenge auth_challenge = 1;
AuthResult auth_result = 2;
UnsealStartResponse unseal_start_response = 3;
UnsealResult unseal_result = 4;
VaultState vault_state = 5;
arbiter.evm.WalletCreateResponse evm_wallet_create = 6;
arbiter.evm.WalletListResponse evm_wallet_list = 7;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateResponse evm_grant_create = 8;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteResponse evm_grant_delete = 9;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListResponse evm_grant_list = 10;
SdkClientConnectionRequest sdk_client_connection_request = 11;
SdkClientConnectionCancel sdk_client_connection_cancel = 12;
SdkClientRevokeResponse sdk_client_revoke_response = 13;
SdkClientListResponse sdk_client_list_response = 14;
BootstrapResult bootstrap_result = 15;
ListWalletAccessResponse list_wallet_access_response = 17;
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse evm_sign_transaction = 18;
arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
UnsealStartResponse unseal_start_response = 2;
UnsealResult unseal_result = 3;
VaultState vault_state = 4;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Fetch the Uniswap default token list and emit Rust `TokenInfo` statics.
Usage:
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py # fetch from IPFS
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json # local file
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json out.rs # custom output file
"""
import json
import re
import sys
import unicodedata
import urllib.request
UNISWAP_URL = "https://ipfs.io/ipns/tokens.uniswap.org"
SOLANA_CHAIN_ID = 501000101
IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+")
def load_tokens(source=None):
if source:
with open(source) as f:
return json.load(f)
req = urllib.request.Request(
UNISWAP_URL,
headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "gen_tokens/1.0"},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp:
return json.loads(resp.read())
def escape(s: str) -> str:
return s.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
def to_screaming_case(name: str) -> str:
normalized = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", name or "")
ascii_name = normalized.encode("ascii", "ignore").decode("ascii")
snake = IDENTIFIER_RE.sub("_", ascii_name).strip("_").upper()
if not snake:
snake = "TOKEN"
if snake[0].isdigit():
snake = f"TOKEN_{snake}"
return snake
def static_name_for_token(token: dict, used_names: set[str]) -> str:
base = to_screaming_case(token.get("name", ""))
if base not in used_names:
used_names.add(base)
return base
address = token["address"]
suffix = f"{token['chainId']}_{address[2:].upper()[-8:]}"
candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}"
i = 2
while candidate in used_names:
candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}_{i}"
i += 1
used_names.add(candidate)
return candidate
def main():
source = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
output = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "generated_tokens.rs"
data = load_tokens(source)
tokens = data["tokens"]
# Deduplicate by (chainId, address)
seen = set()
unique = []
for t in tokens:
key = (t["chainId"], t["address"].lower())
if key not in seen:
seen.add(key)
unique.append(t)
unique.sort(key=lambda t: (t["chainId"], t.get("symbol", "").upper()))
evm_tokens = [t for t in unique if t["chainId"] != SOLANA_CHAIN_ID]
ver = data["version"]
lines = []
w = lines.append
w(
f"// Auto-generated from Uniswap token list v{ver['major']}.{ver['minor']}.{ver['patch']}"
)
w(f"// {len(evm_tokens)} tokens")
w("// DO NOT EDIT - regenerate with gen_erc20_registry.py")
w("")
used_static_names = set()
token_statics = []
for t in evm_tokens:
static_name = static_name_for_token(t, used_static_names)
token_statics.append((static_name, t))
for static_name, t in token_statics:
addr = t["address"]
name = escape(t.get("name", ""))
symbol = escape(t.get("symbol", ""))
decimals = t.get("decimals", 18)
logo = t.get("logoURI")
chain = t["chainId"]
logo_val = f'Some("{escape(logo)}")' if logo else "None"
w(f"pub static {static_name}: TokenInfo = TokenInfo {{")
w(f' name: "{name}",')
w(f' symbol: "{symbol}",')
w(f" decimals: {decimals},")
w(f' contract: address!("{addr}"),')
w(f" chain: {chain},")
w(f" logo_uri: {logo_val},")
w("};")
w("")
w("pub static TOKENS: &[&TokenInfo] = &[")
for static_name, _ in token_statics:
w(f" &{static_name},")
w("];")
w("")
w("pub fn get_token(")
w(" chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId,")
w(" address: alloy::primitives::Address,")
w(") -> Option<&'static TokenInfo> {")
w(" match (chain_id, address) {")
for static_name, t in token_statics:
w(
f' ({t["chainId"]}, addr) if addr == address!("{t["address"]}") => Some(&{static_name}),'
)
w(" _ => None,")
w(" }")
w("}")
w("")
with open(output, "w") as f:
f.write("\n".join(lines))
print(f"Wrote {len(token_statics)} tokens to {output}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
[advisories]
# RUSTSEC-2023-0071: Marvin Attack timing side-channel in rsa crate.
# No fixed version is available upstream.
# RSA support is required for Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager
# (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.security.credentials.keycredentialmanager.requestcreateasync),
# which only issues RSA-2048 keys.
# Mitigations in place:
# - Signing uses BlindedSigningKey (PSS+SHA-256), which applies blinding to
# protect the private key from timing recovery during signing.
# - RSA decryption is never performed; we only verify public-key signatures.
# - The attack requires local, high-resolution timing access against the
# signing process, which is not exposed in our threat model.
ignore = ["RUSTSEC-2023-0071"]

2981
server/Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,45 +1,34 @@
[workspace]
members = [
"crates/*",
"crates/arbiter-client",
"crates/arbiter-proto",
"crates/arbiter-server",
"crates/arbiter-useragent",
]
resolver = "3"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
disallowed-methods = "deny"
[workspace.dependencies]
tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [
"deflate",
"gzip",
"tls-connect-info",
"zstd",
] }
tonic = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["deflate", "gzip", "tls-connect-info", "zstd"] }
tracing = "0.1.44"
tokio = { version = "1.50.0", features = ["full"] }
tokio = { version = "1.49.0", features = ["full"] }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
chrono = { version = "0.4.43", features = ["serde"] }
rand = "0.10.0"
rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
rustls = "0.23.36"
smlang = "0.8.0"
miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
thiserror = "2.0.18"
async-trait = "0.1.89"
futures = "0.3.32"
futures = "0.3.31"
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
kameo = "0.19.2"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
alloy = "1.7.3"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
"aws_lc_rs",
"pem",
"x509-parser",
"zeroize",
], default-features = false }
k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
sha2 = "0.10"
spki = "0.7"

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
disallowed-methods = [
# RSA decryption is forbidden: the rsa crate has RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack).
# We only use RSA for Windows Hello (KeyCredentialManager) public-key verification — decryption
# is never required and must not be introduced.
{ path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
{ path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt_blinded", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
{ path = "rsa::traits::Decryptor::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
{ path = "rsa::traits::RandomizedDecryptor::decrypt_with_rng", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt_with_rng() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
]

View File

@@ -5,22 +5,4 @@ edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
license = "Apache-2.0"
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
evm = ["dep:alloy"]
[dependencies]
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
tonic.workspace = true
tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
tokio.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
http = "1.4.0"
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.10", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
async-trait.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
proto::client::{
AuthChallengeRequest, AuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult, ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo,
ClientRequest, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
};
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use crate::{
storage::StorageError,
transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AuthError {
#[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
MissingAuthChallenge,
#[error("Client approval denied by User Agent")]
ApprovalDenied,
#[error("No User Agents online to approve client")]
NoUserAgentsOnline,
#[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
UnexpectedAuthResponse,
#[error("Signing key storage error")]
Storage(#[from] StorageError),
}
fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
match AuthResult::try_from(code).unwrap_or(AuthResult::Unspecified) {
AuthResult::ApprovalDenied => AuthError::ApprovalDenied,
AuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline => AuthError::NoUserAgentsOnline,
AuthResult::Unspecified
| AuthResult::Success
| AuthResult::InvalidKey
| AuthResult::InvalidSignature
| AuthResult::Internal => AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse,
}
}
async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
request_id: next_request_id(),
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
client_info: Some(ProtoClientInfo {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
version: metadata.version,
}),
},
)),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
}
async fn receive_auth_challenge(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<arbiter_proto::proto::client::AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
let response = transport
.recv()
.await
.map_err(|_| AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge)?;
let payload = response.payload.ok_or(AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge)?;
match payload {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(challenge) => Ok(challenge),
ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(result) => Err(map_auth_result(result)),
_ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
}
}
async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
challenge: arbiter_proto::proto::client::AuthChallenge,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let signature = key.sign(&challenge_payload).to_bytes().to_vec();
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
request_id: next_request_id(),
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(
AuthChallengeSolution { signature },
)),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
}
async fn receive_auth_confirmation(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
let response = transport
.recv()
.await
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?;
let payload = response
.payload
.ok_or(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?;
match payload {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(result)
if AuthResult::try_from(result).ok() == Some(AuthResult::Success) =>
{
Ok(())
}
ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(result) => Err(map_auth_result(result)),
_ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
}
}
pub(crate) async fn authenticate(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
send_auth_challenge_request(transport, metadata, key).await?;
let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?;
send_auth_challenge_solution(transport, key, challenge).await?;
receive_auth_confirmation(transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
use std::io::{self, Write};
use arbiter_client::ArbiterClient;
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, url::ArbiterUrl};
use tonic::ConnectError;
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
println!("Testing connection to Arbiter server...");
print!("Enter ArbiterUrl: ");
let _ = io::stdout().flush();
let mut input = String::new();
if let Err(err) = io::stdin().read_line(&mut input) {
eprintln!("Failed to read input: {err}");
return;
}
let input = input.trim();
if input.is_empty() {
eprintln!("ArbiterUrl cannot be empty");
return;
}
let url = match ArbiterUrl::try_from(input) {
Ok(url) => url,
Err(err) => {
eprintln!("Invalid ArbiterUrl: {err}");
return;
}
};
println!("{:#?}", url);
let metadata = ClientMetadata {
name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_string(),
description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_string()),
version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string()),
};
match ArbiterClient::connect(url, metadata).await {
Ok(_) => println!("Connected and authenticated successfully."),
Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {:#?}", err),
}
}

View File

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
use crate::{
StorageError, auth::{AuthError, authenticate}, storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage}, transport::{BUFFER_LENGTH, ClientTransport}
};
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("gRPC error")]
Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
#[error("Could not establish connection")]
Connection(#[from] tonic::transport::Error),
#[error("Invalid server URI")]
InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
#[error("Invalid CA certificate")]
InvalidCaCert(#[from] webpki::Error),
#[error("Authentication error")]
Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
#[error("Storage error")]
Storage(#[from] StorageError),
}
pub struct ArbiterClient {
#[allow(dead_code)]
transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
}
impl ArbiterClient {
pub async fn connect(url: ArbiterUrl, metadata: ClientMetadata) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::from_default_location()?;
Self::connect_with_storage(url, metadata, &storage).await
}
pub async fn connect_with_storage<S: SigningKeyStorage>(
url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
storage: &S,
) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let key = storage.load_or_create()?;
Self::connect_with_key(url, metadata, key).await
}
pub async fn connect_with_key(
url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned();
let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);
let channel = tonic::transport::Channel::from_shared(format!("https://{}:{}", url.host, url.port))?
.tls_config(tls)?
.connect()
.await?;
let mut client = ArbiterServiceClient::new(channel);
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(BUFFER_LENGTH);
let response_stream = client.client(ReceiverStream::new(rx)).await?.into_inner();
let mut transport = ClientTransport {
sender: tx,
receiver: response_stream,
};
authenticate(&mut transport, metadata, &key).await?;
Ok(Self {
transport: Arc::new(Mutex::new(transport)),
})
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, Error> {
todo!("fetch EVM wallet list from server")
}
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
mod auth;
mod client;
mod storage;
mod transport;
pub mod wallets;
pub fn add(left: u64, right: u64) -> u64 {
left + right
}
pub use auth::AuthError;
pub use client::{ArbiterClient, Error};
pub use storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub use wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
#[test]
fn it_works() {
let result = add(2, 2);
assert_eq!(result, 4);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::home_path;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum StorageError {
#[error("I/O error")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
#[error("Invalid signing key length in storage: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
InvalidKeyLength { expected: usize, actual: usize },
}
pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError>;
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage {
path: PathBuf,
}
impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ed25519.key";
pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
Self { path: path.into() }
}
pub fn from_default_location() -> std::result::Result<Self, StorageError> {
Ok(Self::new(home_path()?.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME)))
}
fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
let bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
let raw: [u8; 32] =
bytes
.try_into()
.map_err(|v: Vec<u8>| StorageError::InvalidKeyLength {
expected: 32,
actual: v.len(),
})?;
Ok(ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&raw))
}
}
impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
}
if self.path.exists() {
return Self::read_key(&self.path);
}
let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let raw_key = key.to_bytes();
// Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.create_new(true)
.write(true)
.open(&self.path)
{
Ok(mut file) => {
use std::io::Write as _;
file.write_all(&raw_key)?;
Ok(key)
}
Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => {
Self::read_key(&self.path)
}
Err(err) => Err(StorageError::Io(err)),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
fn unique_temp_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
let nanos = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("clock should be after unix epoch")
.as_nanos();
std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"arbiter-client-key-{}-{}.bin",
std::process::id(),
nanos
))
}
#[test]
fn file_storage_creates_and_reuses_key() {
let path = unique_temp_key_path();
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone());
let key_a = storage
.load_or_create()
.expect("first load_or_create should create key");
let key_b = storage
.load_or_create()
.expect("second load_or_create should read same key");
assert_eq!(key_a.to_bytes(), key_b.to_bytes());
assert!(path.exists());
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
}
#[test]
fn file_storage_rejects_invalid_key_length() {
let path = unique_temp_key_path();
std::fs::write(&path, [42u8; 31]).expect("should write invalid key file");
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone());
let err = storage
.load_or_create()
.expect_err("storage should reject non-32-byte key file");
match err {
StorageError::InvalidKeyLength { expected, actual } => {
assert_eq!(expected, 32);
assert_eq!(actual, 31);
}
other => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"),
}
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
}
}

View File

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
pub(crate) const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
static NEXT_REQUEST_ID: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(1);
pub(crate) fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
NEXT_REQUEST_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub(crate) enum ClientSignError {
#[error("Transport channel closed")]
ChannelClosed,
#[error("Connection closed by server")]
ConnectionClosed,
}
pub(crate) struct ClientTransport {
pub(crate) sender: mpsc::Sender<ClientRequest>,
pub(crate) receiver: tonic::Streaming<ClientResponse>,
}
impl ClientTransport {
pub(crate) async fn send(
&mut self,
request: ClientRequest,
) -> std::result::Result<(), ClientSignError> {
self.sender
.send(request)
.await
.map_err(|_| ClientSignError::ChannelClosed)
}
pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> std::result::Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
match self.receiver.message().await {
Ok(Some(resp)) => Ok(resp),
Ok(None) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::TxSigner,
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
ClientRequest, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
evm::evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult,
};
use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet {
transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
address: Address,
chain_id: Option<ChainId>,
}
impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
pub(crate) fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
Self {
transport,
address,
chain_id: None,
}
}
pub fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
pub fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
self.chain_id = Some(chain_id);
self
}
fn validate_chain_id(&self, tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>) -> Result<()> {
if let Some(chain_id) = self.chain_id
&& !tx.set_chain_id_checked(chain_id)
{
return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
signer: chain_id,
tx: tx.chain_id().unwrap(),
});
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Signer for ArbiterEvmWallet {
async fn sign_hash(&self, _hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
Err(Error::other(
"hash-only signing is not supported for ArbiterEvmWallet; use transaction signing",
))
}
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
fn chain_id(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
self.chain_id
}
fn set_chain_id(&mut self, chain_id: Option<ChainId>) {
self.chain_id = chain_id;
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl TxSigner<Signature> for ArbiterEvmWallet {
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
async fn sign_transaction(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
self.validate_chain_id(tx)?;
let mut transport = self.transport.lock().await;
let request_id = next_request_id();
let rlp_transaction = tx.encoded_for_signing();
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
request_id,
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::EvmSignTransaction(
arbiter_proto::proto::evm::EvmSignTransactionRequest {
wallet_address: self.address.to_vec(),
rlp_transaction,
},
)),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to send evm sign transaction request"))?;
let response = transport
.recv()
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to receive evm sign transaction response"))?;
if response.request_id != Some(request_id) {
return Err(Error::other(
"received mismatched response id for evm sign transaction",
));
}
let payload = response
.payload
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("missing evm sign transaction response payload"))?;
let ClientResponsePayload::EvmSignTransaction(response) = payload else {
return Err(Error::other(
"unexpected response payload for evm sign transaction request",
));
};
let result = response
.result
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("missing evm sign transaction result"))?;
match result {
EvmSignTransactionResult::Signature(signature) => {
Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice())
.map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid signature returned by server"))
}
EvmSignTransactionResult::EvalError(eval_error) => Err(Error::other(format!(
"transaction rejected by policy: {eval_error:?}"
))),
EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(code) => Err(Error::other(format!(
"server failed to sign transaction with error code {code}"
))),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub mod evm;

View File

@@ -9,8 +9,7 @@ license = "Apache-2.0"
tonic.workspace = true
tokio.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true
hex = "0.4.3"
tonic-prost = "0.14.5"
tonic-prost = "0.14.3"
prost = "0.14.3"
kameo.workspace = true
url = "2.5.8"
@@ -18,14 +17,11 @@ miette.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
base64 = "0.22.1"
prost-types.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
[build-dependencies]
tonic-prost-build = "0.14.5"
protoc-bin-vendored = "3"
tonic-prost-build = "0.14.3"
[dev-dependencies]
rstest.workspace = true
@@ -34,3 +30,5 @@ rcgen.workspace = true
[package.metadata.cargo-shear]
ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost", "kameo"]

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ use tonic_prost_build::configure;
static PROTOBUF_DIR: &str = "../../../protobufs";
fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={PROTOBUF_DIR}");
configure()
@@ -10,12 +11,11 @@ fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
.compile_protos(
&[
format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/user_agent.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/client.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/evm.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/auth.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
],
&[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()],
)
.unwrap();
Ok(())
}

View File

@@ -3,27 +3,14 @@ pub mod url;
use base64::{Engine, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
use crate::proto::auth::AuthChallenge;
pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");
pub mod user_agent {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent");
pub mod auth {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.auth");
}
pub mod client {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client");
}
pub mod evm {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.evm");
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ClientMetadata {
pub name: String,
pub description: Option<String>,
pub version: Option<String>,
}
pub static BOOTSTRAP_PATH: &str = "bootstrap_token";
@@ -41,7 +28,7 @@ pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
Ok(arbiter_home)
}
pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes()
pub fn format_challenge(challenge: &AuthChallenge) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", challenge.nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(&challenge.pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes().to_vec()
}

View File

@@ -1,163 +1,371 @@
//! Transport-facing abstractions shared by protocol/session code.
//! Transport abstraction layer for bridging gRPC bidirectional streaming with kameo actors.
//!
//! This module defines a small set of transport traits that actors and other
//! protocol code can depend on without knowing anything about the concrete
//! transport underneath.
//! This module provides a clean separation between the gRPC transport layer and business logic
//! by modeling the connection as two linked kameo actors:
//!
//! The abstraction is split into:
//! - [`Sender`] for outbound delivery
//! - [`Receiver`] for inbound delivery
//! - [`Bi`] as the combined duplex form (`Sender + Receiver`)
//! - A **transport actor** ([`GrpcTransportActor`]) that owns the gRPC stream and channel,
//! forwarding inbound messages to the business actor and outbound messages to the client.
//! - A **business logic actor** that receives inbound messages from the transport actor and
//! sends outbound messages back through the transport actor.
//!
//! This split lets code depend only on the half it actually needs. For
//! example, some actor/session code only sends out-of-band messages, while
//! auth/state-machine code may need full duplex access.
//! The [`wire()`] function sets up bidirectional linking between the two actors, ensuring
//! that if either actor dies, the other is notified and can shut down gracefully.
//!
//! [`Bi`] remains intentionally minimal and transport-agnostic:
//! - [`Receiver::recv`] yields inbound messages
//! - [`Sender::send`] accepts outbound messages
//! # Terminology
//!
//! Transport-specific adapters, including protobuf or gRPC bridges, live in the
//! crates that own those boundaries rather than in `arbiter-proto`.
//! - **InboundMessage**: a message received by the transport actor from the channel/socket
//! and forwarded to the business actor.
//! - **OutboundMessage**: a message produced by the business actor and sent to the transport
//! actor to be forwarded to the channel/socket.
//!
//! [`Bi`] deliberately does not model request/response correlation. Some
//! transports may carry multiplexed request/response traffic, some may emit
//! out-of-band messages, and some may be one-message-at-a-time state machines.
//! Correlation concerns such as request IDs, pending response maps, and
//! out-of-band routing belong in the adapter or connection layer built on top
//! of [`Bi`], not in this abstraction itself.
//! # Architecture
//!
//! # Generic Ordering Rule
//! ```text
//! gRPC Stream ──InboundMessage──▶ GrpcTransportActor ──tell(InboundMessage)──▶ BusinessActor
//! ▲ │
//! └─tell(Result<OutboundMessage, _>)────┘
//! │
//! mpsc::Sender ──▶ Client
//! ```
//!
//! This module consistently uses `Inbound` first and `Outbound` second in
//! generic parameter lists.
//! # Example
//!
//! For [`Receiver`], [`Sender`], and [`Bi`], this means:
//! - `Receiver<Inbound>`
//! - `Sender<Outbound>`
//! - `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>`
//! ```rust,ignore
//! let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(1000);
//! let context = server_context.clone();
//!
//! Concretely, for [`Bi`]:
//! - `recv() -> Option<Inbound>`
//! - `send(Outbound)`
//! wire(
//! |transport_ref| MyBusinessActor::new(context, transport_ref),
//! |business_recipient, business_id| GrpcTransportActor {
//! sender: tx,
//! receiver: grpc_stream,
//! business_logic_actor: business_recipient,
//! business_logic_actor_id: business_id,
//! },
//! ).await;
//!
//! [`expect_message`] is a small helper for linear protocol steps: it reads one
//! inbound message from a transport and extracts a typed value from it, failing
//! if the channel closes or the message shape is not what the caller expected.
//!
//! [`DummyTransport`] is a no-op implementation useful for tests and local
//! actor execution where no real stream exists.
//!
//! # Design Notes
//!
//! - [`Bi::send`] returns [`Error`] only for transport delivery failures, such
//! as a closed outbound channel.
//! - [`Bi::recv`] returns `None` when the underlying transport closes.
//! - Message translation is intentionally out of scope for this module.
//! Ok(Response::new(ReceiverStream::new(rx)))
//! ```
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use futures::{Stream, StreamExt};
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorRef, PreparedActor, Recipient, Spawn, WeakActorRef},
mailbox::Signal,
prelude::Message,
};
use tokio::{
select,
sync::mpsc::{self, error::SendError},
};
use tonic::{Status, Streaming};
use tracing::{debug, error};
use async_trait::async_trait;
/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Transport channel is closed")]
ChannelClosed,
#[error("Unexpected message received")]
UnexpectedMessage,
/// A bidirectional stream abstraction for sans-io testing.
///
/// Combines a [`Stream`] of incoming messages with the ability to [`send`](Bi::send)
/// outgoing responses. This trait allows business logic to be tested without a real
/// gRPC connection by swapping in an in-memory implementation.
///
/// # Type Parameters
/// - `T`: `InboundMessage` received from the channel/socket (e.g., `UserAgentRequest`)
/// - `U`: `OutboundMessage` sent to the channel/socket (e.g., `UserAgentResponse`)
pub trait Bi<T, U>: Stream<Item = Result<T, Status>> + Send + Sync + 'static {
type Error;
fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<U, Status>,
) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = Result<(), Self::Error>> + Send;
}
/// Receives one message from `transport` and extracts a value from it using
/// `extractor`. Returns [`Error::ChannelClosed`] if the transport closes and
/// [`Error::UnexpectedMessage`] if `extractor` returns `None`.
pub async fn expect_message<T, Inbound, Outbound, Target, F>(
transport: &mut T,
extractor: F,
) -> Result<Target, Error>
/// Concrete [`Bi`] implementation backed by a tonic gRPC [`Streaming`] and an [`mpsc::Sender`].
///
/// This is the production implementation used in gRPC service handlers. The `request_stream`
/// receives messages from the client, and `response_sender` sends responses back.
pub struct BiStream<T, U> {
pub request_stream: Streaming<T>,
pub response_sender: mpsc::Sender<Result<U, Status>>,
}
impl<T, U> Stream for BiStream<T, U>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
F: FnOnce(Inbound) -> Option<Target>,
T: Send + 'static,
U: Send + 'static,
{
let msg = transport.recv().await.ok_or(Error::ChannelClosed)?;
extractor(msg).ok_or(Error::UnexpectedMessage)
type Item = Result<T, Status>;
fn poll_next(
mut self: std::pin::Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut std::task::Context<'_>,
) -> std::task::Poll<Option<Self::Item>> {
self.request_stream.poll_next_unpin(cx)
}
}
#[async_trait]
pub trait Sender<Outbound>: Send + Sync {
async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error>;
impl<T, U> Bi<T, U> for BiStream<T, U>
where
T: Send + 'static,
U: Send + 'static,
{
type Error = SendError<Result<U, Status>>;
async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<U, Status>) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
self.response_sender.send(item).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound>;
}
/// Minimal bidirectional transport abstraction used by protocol code.
/// Marker trait for transport actors that can receive outbound messages of type `T`.
///
/// `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>` is the combined duplex form of [`Sender`] and
/// [`Receiver`].
/// Implement this on your transport actor to indicate it can handle outbound messages
/// produced by the business actor. Requires the actor to implement [`Message<Result<T, E>>`]
/// so business logic can forward responses via [`tell()`](ActorRef::tell).
///
/// It models a channel with:
/// - inbound items of type `Inbound` read via [`Bi::recv`]
/// - outbound items of type `Outbound` written via [`Bi::send`]
/// # Example
///
/// It does not imply request/response sequencing, one-at-a-time exchange, or
/// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items.
pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> {
type Sender: Sender<Outbound>;
type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>;
fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver);
fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self;
/// ```rust,ignore
/// #[derive(Actor)]
/// struct MyTransportActor { /* ... */ }
///
/// impl Message<Result<MyResponse, MyError>> for MyTransportActor {
/// type Reply = ();
/// async fn handle(&mut self, msg: Result<MyResponse, MyError>, _ctx: &mut Context<Self, Self::Reply>) -> Self::Reply {
/// // forward outbound message to channel/socket
/// }
/// }
///
/// impl TransportActor<MyResponse, MyError> for MyTransportActor {}
/// ```
pub trait TransportActor<Outbound: Send + 'static, DomainError: Send + 'static>:
Actor + Send + Message<Result<Outbound, DomainError>>
{
}
/// No-op [`Bi`] transport for tests and manual actor usage.
/// A kameo actor that bridges a gRPC bidirectional stream with a business logic actor.
///
/// `send` drops all items and succeeds. [`Bi::recv`] never resolves and therefore
/// does not busy-wait or spuriously close the stream.
pub struct DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
_marker: PhantomData<(Inbound, Outbound)>,
/// This actor owns the gRPC [`Streaming`] receiver and an [`mpsc::Sender`] for responses.
/// It multiplexes between its own mailbox (for outbound messages from the business actor)
/// and the gRPC stream (for inbound client messages) using [`tokio::select!`].
///
/// # Message Flow
///
/// - **Inbound**: Messages from the gRPC stream are forwarded to `business_logic_actor`
/// via [`tell()`](Recipient::tell).
/// - **Outbound**: The business actor sends `Result<Outbound, DomainError>` messages to this
/// actor, which forwards them through the `sender` channel to the gRPC response stream.
///
/// # Lifecycle
///
/// - If the business logic actor dies (detected via actor linking), this actor stops,
/// which closes the gRPC stream.
/// - If the gRPC stream closes or errors, this actor stops, which (via linking) notifies
/// the business actor.
/// - Error responses (`Err(DomainError)`) are forwarded to the client and then the actor stops,
/// closing the connection.
///
/// # Type Parameters
/// - `Outbound`: `OutboundMessage` sent to the client (e.g., `UserAgentResponse`)
/// - `Inbound`: `InboundMessage` received from the client (e.g., `UserAgentRequest`)
/// - `E`: The domain error type, must implement `Into<tonic::Status>` for gRPC conversion
pub struct GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, DomainError>
where
Outbound: Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
DomainError: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
{
sender: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
business_logic_actor: Recipient<Inbound>,
_error: std::marker::PhantomData<DomainError>,
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Default for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
fn default() -> Self {
impl<Outbound, Inbound, DomainError> GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, DomainError>
where
Outbound: Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
DomainError: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
{
pub fn new(
sender: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
business_logic_actor: Recipient<Inbound>,
) -> Self {
Self {
_marker: PhantomData,
sender,
receiver,
business_logic_actor,
_error: std::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
impl<Outbound, Inbound, E> Actor for GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, E>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
E: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, _item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
Ok(())
type Args = Self;
type Error = ();
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(args)
}
fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: kameo::prelude::ActorId,
_: kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason,
) -> impl Future<
Output = Result<std::ops::ControlFlow<kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason>, Self::Error>,
> + Send {
async move {
if id == self.business_logic_actor.id() {
error!("Business logic actor died, stopping GrpcTransportActor");
Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Break(
kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason::Normal,
))
} else {
debug!(
"Linked actor {} died, but it's not the business logic actor, ignoring",
id
);
Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
}
async fn next(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
mailbox_rx: &mut kameo::prelude::MailboxReceiver<Self>,
) -> Option<kameo::mailbox::Signal<Self>> {
select! {
msg = mailbox_rx.recv() => {
msg
}
recv_msg = self.receiver.next() => {
match recv_msg {
Some(Ok(msg)) => {
match self.business_logic_actor.tell(msg).await {
Ok(_) => None,
Err(e) => {
// TODO: this would probably require better error handling - or resending if backpressure is the issue
error!("Failed to send message to business logic actor: {}", e);
Some(Signal::Stop)
}
}
}
Some(Err(e)) => {
error!("Received error from stream: {}, stopping GrpcTransportActor", e);
Some(Signal::Stop)
}
None => {
error!("Receiver channel closed, stopping GrpcTransportActor");
Some(Signal::Stop)
}
}
}
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Inbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
impl<Outbound, Inbound, E> Message<Result<Outbound, E>> for GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, E>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
E: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
None
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
msg: Result<Outbound, E>,
ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let is_err = msg.is_err();
let grpc_msg = msg.map_err(Into::into);
match self.sender.send(grpc_msg).await {
Ok(_) => {
if is_err {
ctx.stop();
}
}
Err(e) => {
error!("Failed to send message: {}", e);
ctx.stop();
}
}
}
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
impl<Outbound, Inbound, E> TransportActor<Outbound, E> for GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, E>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
E: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
{
}
pub mod grpc;
/// Wires together a transport actor and a business logic actor with bidirectional linking.
///
/// This function handles the chicken-and-egg problem of two actors that need references
/// to each other at construction time. It uses kameo's [`PreparedActor`] to obtain
/// [`ActorRef`]s before spawning, then links both actors so that if either dies,
/// the other is notified via [`on_link_died`](Actor::on_link_died).
///
/// The business actor receives a type-erased [`Recipient<Result<Outbound, DomainError>>`] instead of an
/// `ActorRef<Transport>`, keeping it decoupled from the concrete transport implementation.
///
/// # Type Parameters
/// - `Transport`: The transport actor type (e.g., [`GrpcTransportActor`])
/// - `Inbound`: `InboundMessage` received by the business actor from the transport
/// - `Outbound`: `OutboundMessage` sent by the business actor back to the transport
/// - `Business`: The business logic actor
/// - `BusinessCtor`: Closure that receives a prepared business actor and transport recipient,
/// spawns the business actor, and returns its [`ActorRef`]
/// - `TransportCtor`: Closure that receives a prepared transport actor, a recipient for
/// inbound messages, and the business actor id, then spawns the transport actor
///
/// # Returns
/// A tuple of `(transport_ref, business_ref)` — actor references for both spawned actors.
pub async fn wire<
Transport,
Inbound,
Outbound,
DomainError,
Business,
BusinessCtor,
TransportCtor,
>(
business_ctor: BusinessCtor,
transport_ctor: TransportCtor,
) -> (ActorRef<Transport>, ActorRef<Business>)
where
Transport: TransportActor<Outbound, DomainError>,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
DomainError: Send + 'static,
Business: Actor + Message<Inbound> + Send + 'static,
BusinessCtor: FnOnce(PreparedActor<Business>, Recipient<Result<Outbound, DomainError>>),
TransportCtor:
FnOnce(PreparedActor<Transport>, Recipient<Inbound>),
{
let prepared_business: PreparedActor<Business> = Spawn::prepare();
let prepared_transport: PreparedActor<Transport> = Spawn::prepare();
let business_ref = prepared_business.actor_ref().clone();
let transport_ref = prepared_transport.actor_ref().clone();
transport_ref.link(&business_ref).await;
business_ref.link(&transport_ref).await;
let recipient = transport_ref.clone().recipient();
business_ctor(prepared_business, recipient);
let business_recipient = business_ref.clone().recipient();
transport_ctor(prepared_transport, business_recipient);
(transport_ref, business_ref)
}

View File

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
use async_trait::async_trait;
use futures::StreamExt;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
pub struct GrpcSender<Outbound> {
tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcSender<Outbound>
where
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> {
self.tx
.send(item)
.await
.map_err(|_| super::Error::ChannelClosed)
}
}
pub struct GrpcReceiver<Inbound> {
rx: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcReceiver<Inbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> {
self.rx.next().await
}
}
pub struct GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> {
sender: GrpcSender<Outbound>,
receiver: GrpcReceiver<Inbound>,
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound> GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
pub fn from_bi_stream(
receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
) -> (Self, ReceiverStream<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>) {
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(10);
let sender = GrpcSender { tx };
let receiver = GrpcReceiver { rx: receiver };
let bi = GrpcBi { sender, receiver };
(bi, ReceiverStream::new(rx))
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> {
self.sender.send(item).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> {
self.receiver.recv().await
}
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>
for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound>
super::SplittableBi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>
for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
type Sender = GrpcSender<Outbound>;
type Receiver = GrpcReceiver<Inbound>;
fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver) {
(self.sender, self.receiver)
}
fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self {
GrpcBi { sender, receiver }
}
}

View File

@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter";
const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert";
const BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY: &str = "bootstrap_token";
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ArbiterUrl {
pub host: String,
pub port: u16,
@@ -22,7 +20,7 @@ impl Display for ArbiterUrl {
"{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://{}:{}?{CERT_QUERY_KEY}={}",
self.host,
self.port,
BASE64_URL_SAFE.encode(&self.ca_cert)
BASE64_URL_SAFE.encode(self.ca_cert.to_vec())
);
if let Some(token) = &self.bootstrap_token {
base.push_str(&format!("&{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY}={}", token));

View File

@@ -5,12 +5,9 @@ edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
license = "Apache-2.0"
[lints]
workspace = true
[dependencies]
diesel = { version = "2.3.7", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
diesel-async = { version = "0.8.0", features = [
diesel = { version = "2.3.6", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
diesel-async = { version = "0.7.4", features = [
"bb8",
"migrations",
"sqlite",
@@ -27,7 +24,6 @@ rustls.workspace = true
smlang.workspace = true
miette.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
fatality = "0.1.1"
diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.1", features = ["sqlite"] }
async-trait.workspace = true
secrecy = "0.10.3"
@@ -44,15 +40,8 @@ x25519-dalek.workspace = true
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
restructed = "0.2.2"
strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
strum = { version = "0.27.2", features = ["derive"] }
pem = "3.0.6"
k256.workspace = true
rsa.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
spki.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
[dev-dependencies]
insta = "1.46.3"

View File

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ create table if not exists tls_history (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
cert text not null,
cert_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
ca_cert text not null,
ca_cert text not null,
ca_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
@@ -40,154 +40,20 @@ create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT
) STRICT;
insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
-- ensure singleton row exists
insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing; -- ensure singleton row exists
create table if not exists useragent_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
key_type integer not null default(1), -- 1=Ed25519, 2=ECDSA(secp256k1)
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_useragent_client_public_key on useragent_client (public_key, key_type);
create table if not exists client_metadata (
id integer not null primary key,
name text not null, -- human-readable name for the client
description text, -- optional description for the client
version text, -- client version for tracking and debugging
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
-- created to track history of changes
create table if not exists client_metadata_history (
id integer not null primary key,
metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_metadata_binding_client on client_metadata_history (client_id);
create table if not exists program_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists program_client_public_key_unique
on program_client (public_key);
create unique index if not exists uniq_program_client_public_key on program_client (public_key);
create table if not exists evm_wallet (
id integer not null primary key,
address blob not null, -- 20-byte Ethereum address
aead_encrypted_id integer not null references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_address on evm_wallet (address);
create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_aead on evm_wallet (aead_encrypted_id);
create table if not exists evm_wallet_access (
id integer not null primary key,
wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet (id) on delete cascade,
client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_wallet_access on evm_wallet_access (wallet_id, client_id);
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_limit (
id integer not null primary key,
window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
) STRICT;
-- Shared grant properties: client scope, timeframe, fee caps, and rate limit
create table if not exists evm_basic_grant (
id integer not null primary key,
wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
valid_from integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no lower bound
valid_until integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no upper bound
max_gas_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
max_priority_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
rate_limit_count integer, -- max transactions in window, null = unlimited
rate_limit_window_secs integer, -- window duration in seconds, null = unlimited
revoked_at integer, -- unix timestamp when revoked, null = still active
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
-- Shared transaction log for all EVM grants, used for rate limit tracking and auditing
create table if not exists evm_transaction_log (
id integer not null primary key,
wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
grant_id integer not null references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete restrict,
chain_id integer not null,
eth_value blob not null, -- always present on any EVM tx
signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create index if not exists idx_evm_basic_grant_access_chain on evm_basic_grant (wallet_access_id, chain_id);
-- ===============================
-- ERC20 token transfer grant
-- ===============================
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_grant (
id integer not null primary key,
basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete cascade,
token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
receiver blob -- 20-byte recipient address or null if every recipient allowed
) STRICT;
-- Per-window volume limits for token transfer grants
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant (id) on delete cascade,
window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
) STRICT;
-- Log table for token transfer grant usage
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_log (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant (id) on delete restrict,
log_id integer not null references evm_transaction_log (id) on delete restrict,
chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
recipient_address blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
value blob not null, -- big-endian 32-byte U256
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_grant on evm_token_transfer_log (grant_id);
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_log_id on evm_token_transfer_log (log_id);
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_chain on evm_token_transfer_log (chain_id);
-- ===============================
-- Ether transfer grant (uses base log)
-- ===============================
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant (
id integer not null primary key,
basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete cascade,
limit_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_limit (id) on delete restrict
) STRICT;
-- Specific recipient addresses for an ether transfer grant
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_grant (id) on delete cascade,
address blob not null -- 20-byte recipient address
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_ether_transfer_target on evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (grant_id, address);
) STRICT;

Binary file not shown.

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@ use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use miette::Diagnostic;
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use rand::{
RngExt,
distr::{Alphanumeric},
make_rng,
rngs::StdRng,
};
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
@@ -56,6 +61,7 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
drop(conn);
let token = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?;
Some(token)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse},
transport::Bi,
};
use crate::ServerContext;
pub(crate) async fn handle_client(
_context: ServerContext,
_bistream: impl Bi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
) {
}

View File

@@ -1,332 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
dsl::insert_into, update,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::{
client::{ClientConnection, ClientProfile},
flow_coordinator::{self, RequestClientApproval},
},
db::{
self,
models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::program_client,
},
};
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database pool unavailable")]
DatabasePoolUnavailable,
#[error("Database operation failed")]
DatabaseOperationFailed,
#[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
InvalidChallengeSolution,
#[error("Client approval request failed")]
ApproveError(#[from] ApproveError),
#[error("Transport error")]
Transport,
}
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ApproveError {
#[error("Internal error")]
Internal,
#[error("Client connection denied by user agents")]
Denied,
#[error("Upstream error: {0}")]
Upstream(flow_coordinator::ApprovalError),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: Signature,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge { pubkey: VerifyingKey, nonce: i32 },
AuthSuccess,
}
pub struct ClientInfo {
pub id: i32,
pub current_nonce: i32,
}
/// Atomically reads and increments the nonce for a known client.
/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
async fn get_client_and_nonce(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
) -> Result<Option<ClientInfo>, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let Some((client_id, current_nonce)) = program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
.await
.optional()?
else {
return Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(None);
};
update(program_client::table)
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.set(program_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Ok(Some(ClientInfo {
id: client_id,
current_nonce,
}))
})
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn approve_new_client(
actors: &crate::actors::GlobalActors,
profile: ClientProfile,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let result = actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RequestClientApproval { client: profile })
.await;
match result {
Ok(true) => Ok(()),
Ok(false) => Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Denied)),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(e)) => {
error!(error = ?e, "Approval upstream error");
Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Upstream(e)))
}
Err(e) => {
error!(error = ?e, "Approval request to flow coordinator failed");
Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Internal))
}
}
}
async fn insert_client(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to insert client metadata");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
let client_id = insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::nonce.eq(1), // pre-incremented; challenge uses 0
))
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.returning(program_client::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to insert client metadata");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
Ok(client_id)
}
async fn sync_client_metadata(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
client_id: i32,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history};
let now = SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now());
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let metadata = metadata.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let (current_metadata_id, current): (i32, ProgramClientMetadata) =
program_client::table
.find(client_id)
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
program_client::metadata_id,
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.first(conn)
.await?;
let unchanged = current.name == metadata.name
&& current.description == metadata.description
&& current.version == metadata.version;
if unchanged {
return Ok(());
}
insert_into(client_metadata_history::table)
.values((
client_metadata_history::metadata_id.eq(current_metadata_id),
client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id),
))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(program_client::table.find(client_id))
.set((
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Ok::<(), diesel::result::Error>(())
})
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn challenge_client<T>(
transport: &mut T,
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
nonce: i32,
) -> Result<(), Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + ?Sized,
{
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce }))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
let signature = expect_message(transport, |req: Inbound| match req {
Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => Some(signature),
_ => None,
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to receive challenge solution");
Error::Transport
})?;
let formatted = format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes());
pubkey.verify_strict(&formatted, &signature).map_err(|_| {
error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
Ok(())
}
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut ClientConnection,
transport: &mut T,
) -> Result<i32, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
let Some(Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { pubkey, metadata }) = transport.recv().await else {
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
let info = match get_client_and_nonce(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
Some(nonce) => nonce,
None => {
approve_new_client(
&props.actors,
ClientProfile {
pubkey,
metadata: metadata.clone(),
},
)
.await?;
let client_id = insert_client(&props.db, &pubkey, &metadata).await?;
ClientInfo {
id: client_id,
current_nonce: 0,
}
}
};
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, info.id, &metadata).await?;
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, info.current_nonce).await?;
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth success");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(info.id)
}

View File

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, transport::Bi};
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::session::ClientSession},
db,
};
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ClientProfile {
pub pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
pub metadata: ClientMetadata,
}
pub struct ClientConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl ClientConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self {
db,
actors,
}
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub async fn connect_client<T>(mut props: ClientConnection, transport: &mut T)
where
T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
match auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport).await {
Ok(client_id) => {
ClientSession::spawn(ClientSession::new(props, client_id));
info!("Client authenticated, session started");
}
Err(err) => {
let _ = transport.send(Err(err.clone())).await;
error!(?err, "Authentication failed, closing connection");
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use tracing::error;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
client::ClientConnection, flow_coordinator::RegisterClient,
evm::{ClientSignTransaction, SignTransactionError},
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
},
db,
evm::VetError,
};
pub struct ClientSession {
props: ClientConnection,
client_id: i32,
}
impl ClientSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: i32) -> Self {
Self { props, client_id }
}
}
#[messages]
impl ClientSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "client", "keyholder.query.failed");
return Err(Error::Internal);
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionRpcError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id: self.client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
Err(SignTransactionRpcError::Vet(vet_error))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to sign EVM transaction in client session");
Err(SignTransactionRpcError::Internal)
}
}
}
}
impl Actor for ClientSession {
type Args = Self;
type Error = Error;
async fn on_start(
args: Self::Args,
this: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props
.actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RegisterClient { actor: this })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::ConnectionRegistrationFailed)?;
Ok(args)
}
}
impl ClientSession {
pub fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
let props = ClientConnection::new(db, actors);
Self { props, client_id: 0 }
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Connection registration failed")]
ConnectionRegistrationFailed,
#[error("Internal error")]
Internal,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionRpcError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] VetError),
#[error("Internal error")]
Internal,
}

View File

@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
db::{
self, DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
models::{self, SqliteTimestamp},
schema,
},
evm::{
self, RunKind,
policies::{
FullGrant, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Wallet not found")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::wallet_not_found))]
WalletNotFound,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::database))]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::keyholder))]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::keyholder_send))]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Signing error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::signing))]
Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
#[error("Policy error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::vet))]
Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::keyholder))]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::keyholder_send))]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::database))]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct EvmActor {
pub keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub db: DatabasePool,
pub rng: StdRng,
pub engine: evm::Engine,
}
impl EvmActor {
pub fn new(keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
// is it safe to seed rng from system once?
// todo: audit
let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone());
Self {
keyholder,
db,
rng,
engine,
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl EvmActor {
#[message]
pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);
let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
let aead_id: i32 = self
.keyholder
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
})
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok((wallet_id, address))
}
#[message]
pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let rows: Vec<models::EvmWallet> = schema::evm_wallet::table
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
.load(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(rows
.into_iter()
.map(|w| (w.id, Address::from_slice(&w.address)))
.collect())
}
}
#[messages]
impl EvmActor {
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_create_grant(
&mut self,
basic: SharedGrantSettings,
grant: SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError> {
match grant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => {
self.engine
.create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(FullGrant {
basic,
specific: settings,
})
.await
}
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => {
self.engine
.create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(FullGrant {
basic,
specific: settings,
})
.await
}
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
.set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
Ok(self
.engine
.list_all_grants()
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?)
}
#[message]
pub async fn shared_analyze_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<SpecificMeaning, SignTransactionError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
drop(conn);
let meaning = self
.engine
.evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.await?;
Ok(meaning)
}
#[message]
pub async fn client_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
mut transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
drop(conn);
let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
.keyholder
.ask(Decrypt {
aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::KeyholderSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
self.engine
.evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.await?;
use alloy::network::TxSignerSync as _;
Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
use std::ops::ControlFlow;
use kameo::{
Actor, messages,
prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::ReplySender,
};
use crate::actors::{
client::ClientProfile,
flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
};
pub struct Args {
pub client: ClientProfile,
pub user_agents: Vec<ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
pub reply: ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>
}
pub struct ClientApprovalController {
/// Number of UAs that have not yet responded (approval or denial) or died.
pending: usize,
/// Number of approvals received so far.
approved: usize,
reply: Option<ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>,
}
impl ClientApprovalController {
fn send_reply(&mut self, result: Result<bool, ApprovalError>) {
if let Some(reply) = self.reply.take() {
reply.send(result);
}
}
}
impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
type Args = Args;
type Error = ();
async fn on_start(
Args { client, mut user_agents, reply }: Self::Args,
actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let this = Self {
pending: user_agents.len(),
approved: 0,
reply: Some(reply),
};
for user_agent in user_agents.drain(..) {
actor_ref.link(&user_agent).await;
let _ = user_agent
.tell(BeginNewClientApproval {
client: client.clone(),
controller: actor_ref.clone(),
})
.await;
}
Ok(this)
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
_: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
// A linked UA died before responding — counts as a non-approval.
self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
if self.pending == 0 {
// At least one UA didn't approve: deny.
self.send_reply(Ok(false));
return Ok(ControlFlow::Break(ActorStopReason::Normal));
}
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
#[messages]
impl ClientApprovalController {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
if !approved {
// Denial wins immediately regardless of other pending responses.
self.send_reply(Ok(false));
ctx.stop();
return;
}
self.approved += 1;
self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
if self.pending == 0 {
// Every connected UA approved.
self.send_reply(Ok(true));
ctx.stop();
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorId, ActorRef, Spawn},
messages,
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::DelegatedReply,
};
use tracing::info;
use crate::actors::{
client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
user_agent::session::UserAgentSession,
};
pub mod client_connect_approval;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct FlowCoordinator {
pub user_agents: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
}
impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
type Args = Self;
type Error = ();
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(args)
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.user_agents.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
event = "useragent.disconnected"
);
} else if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
event = "client.disconnected"
);
} else {
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
event = "unknown.actor.disconnected"
);
}
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum ApprovalError {
#[error("No user agents connected")]
NoUserAgentsConnected,
}
#[messages]
impl FlowCoordinator {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_user_agent(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "useragent.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.user_agents.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_client(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn request_client_approval(
&mut self,
client: ClientProfile,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>,
) -> DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>> {
let (reply, Some(reply_sender)) = ctx.reply_sender() else {
unreachable!("Expected `request_client_approval` to have callback channel");
};
let refs: Vec<_> = self.user_agents.values().cloned().collect();
if refs.is_empty() {
reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected));
return reply;
}
ClientApprovalController::spawn(client_connect_approval::Args {
client,
user_agents: refs,
reply: reply_sender,
});
reply
}
}

View File

@@ -5,13 +5,12 @@ use chacha20poly1305::{
AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload},
};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use rand::{
Rng as _, SeedableRng,
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
@@ -48,37 +47,40 @@ impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce {
}
}
pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
fn from(value: SafeCell<Key>) -> Self {
pub struct KeyCell(pub MemSafe<Key>);
impl From<MemSafe<Key>> for KeyCell {
fn from(value: MemSafe<Key>) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
impl TryFrom<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(mut value: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let value = value.read();
fn try_from(mut value: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let value = value.read().unwrap();
if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
return Err(());
}
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
});
let mut cell = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let mut cell_write = cell.write().unwrap();
let cell_slice: &mut [u8] = cell_write.as_mut();
cell_slice.copy_from_slice(&value);
}
Ok(Self(cell))
}
}
impl KeyCell {
pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
});
}
key.into()
}
@@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
associated_data: &[u8],
mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
@@ -100,13 +102,13 @@ impl KeyCell {
&mut self,
nonce: &Nonce,
associated_data: &[u8],
buffer: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
buffer: &mut MemSafe<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let mut buffer = buffer.write();
let mut buffer = buffer.write().unwrap();
let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
}
@@ -117,7 +119,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
associated_data: &[u8],
plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
@@ -137,10 +139,6 @@ pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
let mut salt = Salt::default();
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
salt
@@ -148,23 +146,19 @@ pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
/// User password might be of different length, have not enough entropy, etc...
/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
pub fn derive_seal_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
pub fn derive_seal_key(mut password: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
let params = argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap();
let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
password.read_inline(|password_source| {
let mut key_buffer = key.write();
let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let password_source = password.read().unwrap();
let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Better fail completely than return a weak key"
)]
hasher
.hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
.unwrap();
});
}
key.into()
}
@@ -172,20 +166,20 @@ pub fn derive_seal_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
#[test]
pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let password2 = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key1 = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
let mut key2 = derive_seal_key(password2, &salt);
let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
let key1_reader = key1.0.read().unwrap();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read().unwrap();
assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
}
@@ -193,11 +187,11 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
pub fn successful_derive() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
let key_reader = key.0.read();
let key_reader = key.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
@@ -206,7 +200,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
@@ -218,12 +212,12 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap();
assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
let mut buffer = SafeCell::new(buffer);
let mut buffer = MemSafe::new(buffer).unwrap();
key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
.unwrap();
let buffer = buffer.read();
let buffer = buffer.read().unwrap();
assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
}

View File

@@ -1,28 +1,24 @@
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
dsl::{insert_into, update},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
use crate::{
db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
},
safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
use crate::db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
};
use encryption::v1::{self, KeyCell, Nonce};
pub mod encryption;
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(KeyHolderState))]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
@@ -139,7 +135,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
}
@@ -151,15 +147,16 @@ impl KeyHolder {
let root_key_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
let data_encryption_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| {
let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = {
let root_key_reader = root_key.0.read().unwrap();
let root_key_reader = root_key_reader.as_slice();
seal_key
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
Error::Encryption(err)
})
})?;
})?
};
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
@@ -201,7 +198,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
#[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id,
} = &self.state
@@ -214,6 +211,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
.select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
.select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await?
@@ -226,7 +224,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
})?;
let mut seal_key = v1::derive_seal_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
let mut root_key = MemSafe::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(
|_| {
@@ -257,7 +255,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
// Decrypts the `aead_encrypted` entry with the given ID and returns the plaintext
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
@@ -280,14 +278,14 @@ impl KeyHolder {
);
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
let mut output = MemSafe::new(row.ciphertext).unwrap();
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
Ok(output)
}
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
@@ -300,7 +298,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
// Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write().unwrap();
let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
@@ -314,7 +312,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
schema_version: 1,
associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
created_at: Utc::now().into(),
created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() as i32,
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
@@ -324,7 +322,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
#[message]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> KeyHolderState {
pub fn get_state(&self) -> StateDiscriminants {
self.state.discriminant()
}
@@ -347,19 +345,17 @@ impl KeyHolder {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use diesel::SelectableHelper;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::{
db::{self},
safe_cell::SafeCell,
};
use crate::db::{self};
use super::*;
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
actor
}
@@ -394,7 +390,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table

View File

@@ -3,17 +3,12 @@ use miette::Diagnostic;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
keyholder::KeyHolder,
},
actors::{bootstrap::Bootstrapper, keyholder::KeyHolder},
db,
};
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod client;
mod evm;
pub mod flow_coordinator;
pub mod keyholder;
pub mod user_agent;
@@ -33,18 +28,13 @@ pub enum SpawnError {
pub struct GlobalActors {
pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
}
impl GlobalActors {
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let key_holder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?);
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
key_holder,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::default()),
key_holder: KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?),
})
}
}

View File

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::user_agent::{
AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection,
auth::state::{AuthContext, AuthStateMachine},
};
mod state;
use state::*;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: Vec<u8>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum Error {
UnregisteredPublicKey,
InvalidChallengeSolution,
InvalidBootstrapToken,
Internal { details: String },
Transport,
}
impl Error {
fn internal(details: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self::Internal {
details: details.into(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge { nonce: i32 },
AuthSuccess,
}
fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
match payload {
Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: None,
} => AuthEvents::AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest { pubkey }),
Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
} => AuthEvents::BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }),
Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => {
AuthEvents::ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution {
solution: signature,
})
}
}
}
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut UserAgentConnection,
transport: T,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
let mut state = AuthStateMachine::new(AuthContext::new(props, transport));
loop {
// `state` holds a mutable reference to `props` so we can't access it directly here
let Some(payload) = state.context_mut().transport.recv().await else {
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
match state.process_event(parse_auth_event(payload)).await {
Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(key)) => return Ok(key.clone()),
Err(AuthError::ActionFailed(err)) => {
error!(?err, "State machine action failed");
return Err(err);
}
Err(AuthError::GuardFailed(err)) => {
error!(?err, "State machine guard failed");
return Err(err);
}
Err(AuthError::InvalidEvent) => {
error!("Invalid event for current state");
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
Err(AuthError::TransitionsFailed) => {
error!("Invalid state transition");
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
_ => (),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,225 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use tracing::error;
use super::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth::Outbound},
},
db::schema,
};
pub struct ChallengeRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
pub token: String,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge_nonce: i32,
pub key: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct ChallengeSolution {
pub solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
}
);
async fn create_nonce(db: &crate::db::DatabasePool, pubkey_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.to_vec()))
.select(schema::useragent_client::nonce)
.first::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::useragent_client::table)
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.to_vec()))
.set(schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(current_nonce)
})
})
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?
.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(?pubkey_bytes, "Public key not found in database");
Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
})
}
async fn register_key(db: &crate::db::DatabasePool, pubkey: &AuthPublicKey) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let key_type = pubkey.key_type();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(1),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
Ok(())
}
pub struct AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
pub(super) transport: T,
}
impl<'a, T> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
type Error = Error;
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
let stored_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let nonce = create_nonce(&self.conn.db, &stored_bytes).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce: nonce,
key: pubkey,
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
register_key(&self.conn.db, &pubkey).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(pubkey)
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce,
key,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
let formatted = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(*challenge_nonce, &key.to_stored_bytes());
let valid = match key {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(vk) => {
let sig = solution.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid Ed25519 signature length");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify_strict(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(vk) => {
use k256::ecdsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let sig = k256::ecdsa::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid ECDSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(pk) => {
use rsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let verifying_key = rsa::pss::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha256>::new(pk.clone());
let sig = rsa::pss::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid RSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
verifying_key.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
};
if !valid {
error!("Invalid challenge solution signature");
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(key.clone())
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
use tonic::Status;
use crate::db;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum UserAgentError {
#[error("Missing payload in request")]
MissingPayload,
#[error("Invalid bootstrap token")]
InvalidBootstrapToken,
#[error("Public key not registered")]
PubkeyNotRegistered,
#[error("Invalid public key format")]
InvalidPubkey,
#[error("Invalid signature length")]
InvalidSignatureLength,
#[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
InvalidChallengeSolution,
#[error("Invalid state for operation")]
InvalidState,
#[error("Actor unavailable")]
ActorUnavailable,
#[error("Database error")]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Database pool error")]
DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
}
impl From<UserAgentError> for Status {
fn from(err: UserAgentError) -> Self {
match err {
UserAgentError::MissingPayload
| UserAgentError::InvalidBootstrapToken
| UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey
| UserAgentError::InvalidSignatureLength => Status::invalid_argument(err.to_string()),
UserAgentError::PubkeyNotRegistered | UserAgentError::InvalidChallengeSolution => {
Status::unauthenticated(err.to_string())
}
UserAgentError::InvalidState => Status::failed_precondition(err.to_string()),
UserAgentError::ActorUnavailable
| UserAgentError::Database(_)
| UserAgentError::DatabasePool(_) => Status::internal(err.to_string()),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,94 +1,401 @@
use std::{ops::DerefMut, sync::Mutex};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult, UnsealStart, UnsealStartResponse, UserAgentRequest,
UserAgentResponse,
auth::{
self, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk, ClientMessage as ClientAuthMessage,
ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage,
client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
},
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::Recipient, error::SendError, messages, prelude::Message};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile},
db::{self, models::KeyType},
ServerContext,
actors::{
GlobalActors,
bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
keyholder::{self, TryUnseal},
user_agent::state::{
ChallengeContext, DummyContext, UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine,
UserAgentStates,
},
},
db::{self, schema},
};
/// Abstraction over Ed25519 / ECDSA-secp256k1 / RSA public keys used during the auth handshake.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub enum AuthPublicKey {
Ed25519(ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey),
/// Compressed SEC1 public key; signature bytes are raw 64-byte (r||s).
EcdsaSecp256k1(k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey),
/// RSA-2048+ public key (Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager); signature bytes are PSS+SHA-256.
Rsa(rsa::RsaPublicKey),
mod error;
mod state;
pub use error::UserAgentError;
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct UserAgentActor {
db: db::DatabasePool,
actors: GlobalActors,
state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
transport: Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>>,
}
impl AuthPublicKey {
/// Canonical bytes stored in DB and echoed back in the challenge.
/// Ed25519: raw 32 bytes. ECDSA: SEC1 compressed 33 bytes. RSA: DER-encoded SPKI.
pub fn to_stored_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(k) => k.to_bytes().to_vec(),
// SEC1 compressed (33 bytes) is the natural compact format for secp256k1
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(k) => k.to_encoded_point(true).as_bytes().to_vec(),
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(k) => {
use rsa::pkcs8::EncodePublicKey as _;
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
k.to_public_key_der()
.expect("rsa SPKI encoding is infallible")
.to_vec()
impl UserAgentActor {
pub(crate) fn new(
context: ServerContext,
transport: Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
db: context.db.clone(),
actors: context.actors.clone(),
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
transport,
}
}
pub fn new_manual(
db: db::DatabasePool,
actors: GlobalActors,
transport: Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
db,
actors,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
transport,
}
}
async fn process_request(&mut self, req: UserAgentRequest) -> Output {
let msg = req.payload.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(actor = "useragent", "Received message with no payload");
UserAgentError::MissingPayload
})?;
match msg {
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientAuthMessage {
payload: Some(ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(req)),
}) => self.handle_auth_challenge_request(req).await,
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientAuthMessage {
payload: Some(ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(solution)),
}) => self.handle_auth_challenge_solution(solution).await,
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealStart(unseal_start) => {
self.handle_unseal_request(unseal_start).await
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealEncryptedKey(unseal_encrypted_key) => {
self.handle_unseal_encrypted_key(unseal_encrypted_key).await
}
_ => Err(UserAgentError::MissingPayload),
}
}
fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), UserAgentError> {
self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "State transition failed");
UserAgentError::InvalidState
})?;
Ok(())
}
async fn auth_with_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
token: String,
) -> Output {
let token_ok: bool = self
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken { token })
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?pubkey, "Failed to consume bootstrap token: {e}");
UserAgentError::ActorUnavailable
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!(?pubkey, "Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(UserAgentError::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(1),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBootstrapToken)?;
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
}
async fn auth_with_challenge(&mut self, pubkey: VerifyingKey, pubkey_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Output {
let nonce: Option<i32> = {
let mut db_conn = self.db.get().await?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
.filter(
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
)
.select(schema::useragent_client::nonce)
.first::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::useragent_client::table)
.filter(
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
)
.set(schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(current_nonce)
})
})
.await
.optional()?
};
let Some(nonce) = nonce else {
error!(?pubkey, "Public key not found in database");
return Err(UserAgentError::PubkeyNotRegistered);
};
let challenge = auth::AuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
nonce,
};
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::SentChallenge(ChallengeContext {
challenge: challenge.clone(),
key: pubkey,
}))?;
info!(
?pubkey,
?challenge,
"Sent authentication challenge to client"
);
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthChallenge(challenge)))
}
fn verify_challenge_solution(
&self,
solution: &auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<(bool, &ChallengeContext), UserAgentError> {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForChallengeSolution(challenge_context) = self.state.state()
else {
error!("Received challenge solution in invalid state");
return Err(UserAgentError::InvalidState);
};
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(&challenge_context.challenge);
let signature = solution.signature.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid signature length");
UserAgentError::InvalidSignatureLength
})?;
let valid = challenge_context
.key
.verify_strict(&formatted_challenge, &signature)
.is_ok();
Ok((valid, challenge_context))
}
}
type Output = Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>;
fn auth_response(payload: ServerAuthPayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(AuthServerMessage {
payload: Some(payload),
})),
}
}
fn unseal_response(payload: UserAgentResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(payload),
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentActor {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_request(&mut self, req: UnsealStart) -> Output {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
let client_pubkey_bytes: [u8; 32] = req
.client_pubkey
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey)?;
let client_public_key = PublicKey::from(client_pubkey_bytes);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
client_public_key,
}))?;
Ok(unseal_response(
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
}),
))
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(&mut self, req: UnsealEncryptedKey) -> Output {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received unseal encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(UserAgentError::InvalidState);
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
match secret {
Some(secret) => secret,
None => {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)));
}
}
};
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(&req.nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&unseal_context.client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut seal_key_buffer = MemSafe::new(req.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
let decryption_result = {
let mut write_handle = seal_key_buffer.write().unwrap();
let write_handle = write_handle.deref_mut();
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, &req.associated_data, write_handle)
};
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => {
match self
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::Success.into(),
)))
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)))
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UserAgentError::ActorUnavailable)
}
}
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)))
}
}
}
pub fn key_type(&self) -> KeyType {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(_) => KeyType::Ed25519,
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(_) => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(_) => KeyType::Rsa,
#[message]
pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_request(&mut self, req: AuthChallengeRequest) -> Output {
let pubkey = req
.pubkey
.as_array()
.ok_or(UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey)?;
let pubkey = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey).map_err(|_err| {
error!(?pubkey, "Failed to convert to VerifyingKey");
UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey
})?;
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::AuthRequest)?;
match req.bootstrap_token {
Some(token) => self.auth_with_bootstrap_token(pubkey, token).await,
None => self.auth_with_challenge(pubkey, req.pubkey).await,
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_solution(
&mut self,
solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
) -> Output {
let (valid, challenge_context) = self.verify_challenge_solution(&solution)?;
if valid {
info!(
?challenge_context,
"Client provided valid solution to authentication challenge"
);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedGoodSolution)?;
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
} else {
error!("Client provided invalid solution to authentication challenge");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBadSolution)?;
Err(UserAgentError::InvalidChallengeSolution)
}
}
}
impl TryFrom<(KeyType, Vec<u8>)> for AuthPublicKey {
type Error = &'static str;
impl Message<UserAgentRequest> for UserAgentActor {
type Reply = ();
fn try_from(value: (KeyType, Vec<u8>)) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let (key_type, bytes) = value;
match key_type {
KeyType::Ed25519 => {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| "invalid Ed25519 key length")?;
let key = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&bytes)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid Ed25519 key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(key))
}
KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => {
let point =
k256::EncodedPoint::from_bytes(&bytes).map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
let key = k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_encoded_point(&point)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(key))
}
KeyType::Rsa => {
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
let key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&bytes)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid RSA key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Rsa(key))
}
async fn handle(
&mut self,
msg: UserAgentRequest,
_ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let result = self.process_request(msg).await;
if let Err(e) = self.transport.tell(result).await {
error!(actor = "useragent", "Failed to send response to transport: {}", e);
}
}
}
// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey },
}
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub use auth::authenticate;
pub use session::UserAgentSession;

View File

@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::{
client::ClientProfile,
flow_coordinator::{RegisterUserAgent, client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController},
user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection},
};
mod state;
use state::{DummyContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine};
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("State transition failed")]
State,
#[error("Internal error: {message}")]
Internal { message: Cow<'static, str> },
}
impl From<crate::db::PoolError> for Error {
fn from(err: crate::db::PoolError) -> Self {
error!(?err, "Database pool error");
Self::internal("Database pool error")
}
}
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
fn from(err: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
error!(?err, "Database error");
Self::internal("Database error")
}
}
impl Error {
pub fn internal(message: impl Into<Cow<'static, str>>) -> Self {
Self::Internal {
message: message.into(),
}
}
}
pub struct PendingClientApproval {
controller: ActorRef<ClientApprovalController>,
}
pub struct UserAgentSession {
props: UserAgentConnection,
state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<VerifyingKey, PendingClientApproval>,
}
pub mod connection;
impl UserAgentSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: UserAgentConnection, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
Self {
props,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
sender,
pending_client_approvals: Default::default(),
}
}
pub fn new_test(db: crate::db::DatabasePool, actors: crate::actors::GlobalActors) -> Self {
struct DummySender;
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<OutOfBand> for DummySender {
async fn send(
&mut self,
_item: OutOfBand,
) -> Result<(), arbiter_proto::transport::Error> {
Ok(())
}
}
Self::new(UserAgentConnection::new(db, actors), Box::new(DummySender))
}
fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "State transition failed");
Error::State
})?;
Ok(())
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub async fn begin_new_client_approval(
&mut self,
client: ClientProfile,
controller: ActorRef<ClientApprovalController>,
) {
if let Err(e) = self
.sender
.send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionRequest {
profile: client.clone(),
})
.await
{
error!(
?e,
actor = "user_agent",
event = "failed to announce new client connection"
);
return;
}
self.pending_client_approvals
.insert(client.pubkey, PendingClientApproval { controller });
}
}
impl Actor for UserAgentSession {
type Args = Self;
type Error = Error;
async fn on_start(
args: Self::Args,
this: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props
.actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RegisterUserAgent {
actor: this.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to register user agent connection with flow coordinator"
);
Error::internal("Failed to register user agent connection with flow coordinator")
})?;
Ok(args)
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: kameo::prelude::WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: kameo::prelude::ActorId,
_: kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<std::ops::ControlFlow<kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
let cancelled_pubkey = self
.pending_client_approvals
.iter()
.find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(*k));
if let Some(pubkey) = cancelled_pubkey {
self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey);
if let Err(e) = self
.sender
.send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey })
.await
{
error!(
?e,
actor = "user_agent",
event = "failed to announce client connection cancellation"
);
}
}
Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}

View File

@@ -1,512 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::sql_types::ops::Add;
use diesel::{BoolExpressionMethods as _, ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use kameo::prelude::Context;
use kameo::{message, messages};
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer;
use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
use crate::actors::user_agent::session::Error;
use crate::db::models::{
CoreEvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
};
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
use crate::{
actors::{
evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentDeleteGrant, UseragentListGrants,
},
keyholder::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
user_agent::session::{
UserAgentSession,
state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
},
},
safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
};
impl UserAgentSession {
fn take_unseal_secret(&mut self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), Error> {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(Error::internal("Invalid state for unseal encrypted key"));
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Mutex poison is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
match secret {
Some(secret) => secret,
None => {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
return Err(Error::internal("Ephemeral secret already taken"));
}
}
};
Ok((ephemeral_secret, unseal_context.client_public_key))
}
fn decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret: EphemeralSecret,
client_public_key: PublicKey,
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => Ok(key_buffer),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
}
}
}
}
pub struct UnsealStartResponse {
pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum UnsealError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for unsealing")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Internal error during unsealing process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum BootstrapError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for bootstrapping")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Internal error during bootstrapping process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_request(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
) -> Result<UnsealStartResponse, Error> {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
client_public_key: client_pubkey,
}))?;
Ok(UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key,
})
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(_err) => {
return Err(Error::internal("Failed to take unseal secret").into());
}
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(Error::internal("Vault actor error").into())
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(err) => return Err(err.into()),
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to bootstrap vault");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::General(Error::internal(
"Vault actor error",
)))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "keyholder.query.failed");
return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => Ok(address),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
"EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
))),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
&mut self,
basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
.await
{
Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to create EVM grant"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to delete EVM grant"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<i32>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(access_entries)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message(ctx)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
&mut self,
approved: bool,
pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pending_approval = match self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey) {
Some(approval) => approval,
None => {
error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
return Err(Error::internal("Unknown client in connection response"));
}
};
pending_approval
.controller
.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to send client approval response to controller"
);
Error::internal("Failed to send client approval response to controller")
})?;
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let clients = program_client::table
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
ProgramClient::as_select(),
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(clients)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use arbiter_proto::proto::auth::AuthChallenge;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
/// Context for state machine with validated key and sent challenge
/// Challenge is then transformed to bytes using shared function and verified
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub key: VerifyingKey,
}
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest = ReceivedAuthRequest,
ReceivedAuthRequest + ReceivedBootstrapToken = Idle,
ReceivedAuthRequest + SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) / move_challenge = WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext),
WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedGoodSolution = Idle,
WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedBadSolution = AuthError, // block further transitions, but connection should close anyway
Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn move_challenge(&mut self, event_data: ChallengeContext) -> Result<ChallengeContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
use std::{net::IpAddr, string::FromUtf8Error};
use std::string::FromUtf8Error;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ use miette::Diagnostic;
use pem::Pem;
use rcgen::{
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose,
};
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
use rustls::pki_types::{pem::PemObject};
use thiserror::Error;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
@@ -59,7 +59,10 @@ pub enum InitError {
pub type PemCert = String;
pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer) -> PemCert {
pem::encode_config(&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()), ENCODE_CONFIG)
pem::encode_config(
&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()),
ENCODE_CONFIG,
)
}
#[allow(unused)]
@@ -91,10 +94,6 @@ impl TlsCa {
let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem();
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Broken cert couldn't bootstrap server anyway"
)]
let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(
&certified_issuer.pem(),
KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem.as_ref()).unwrap(),
@@ -114,11 +113,6 @@ impl TlsCa {
KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
KeyUsagePurpose::KeyEncipherment,
];
params
.subject_alt_names
.push(SanType::IpAddress(IpAddr::from([
127, 0, 0, 1,
])));
let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance Leaf");

View File

@@ -44,14 +44,6 @@ pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
Pool(#[from] PoolInitError),
}
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum DatabaseError {
#[error("Database connection error")]
Pool(#[from] PoolError),
#[error("Database query error")]
Connection(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
fn database_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, DatabaseSetupError> {
let arbiter_home = arbiter_proto::home_path().map_err(DatabaseSetupError::HomeDir)?;
@@ -100,7 +92,6 @@ fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
database_path()?
.to_str()
.expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
@@ -144,13 +135,11 @@ pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
let tempfile_name = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), 16);
let file = std::env::temp_dir().join(tempfile_name);
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
let url = file
.to_str()
.expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_string();
let url = format!(
"{}?mode=rwc",
file.to_str().expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
);
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
create_pool(Some(&url))
.await
.expect("Failed to create test database pool")

View File

@@ -1,113 +1,14 @@
#![allow(unused)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
use crate::db::schema::{
self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_transaction_log, evm_wallet,
root_key_history, tls_history,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use crate::db::schema::{self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, root_key_history, tls_history};
use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
use restructed::Models;
pub mod types {
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use diesel::{
deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow},
expression::AsExpression,
serialize::{IsNull, ToSql},
sql_types::Integer,
sqlite::{Sqlite, SqliteType},
};
#[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
pub struct SqliteTimestamp(pub DateTime<Utc>);
impl SqliteTimestamp {
pub fn now() -> Self {
SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())
}
}
impl From<chrono::DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from(dt: chrono::DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
SqliteTimestamp(dt)
}
}
impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for chrono::DateTime<Utc> {
fn from(ts: SqliteTimestamp) -> Self {
ts.0
}
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
let unix_timestamp = self.0.timestamp() as i32;
out.set_value(unix_timestamp);
Ok(IsNull::No)
}
}
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err(format!(
"Expected Integer type for SqliteTimestamp, got {:?}",
bytes.value_type()
)
.into());
};
let unix_timestamp = bytes.read_long();
let datetime =
DateTime::from_timestamp(unix_timestamp, 0).ok_or("Timestamp is out of bounds")?;
Ok(SqliteTimestamp(datetime))
}
}
/// Key algorithm stored in the `useragent_client.key_type` column.
/// Values must stay stable — they are persisted in the database.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, strum::FromRepr)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum KeyType {
Ed25519 = 1,
EcdsaSecp256k1 = 2,
Rsa = 3,
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
out.set_value(*self as i32);
Ok(IsNull::No)
}
}
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err("Expected Integer for KeyType".into());
};
let discriminant = bytes.read_long();
KeyType::from_repr(discriminant as i32)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("Unknown KeyType discriminant: {discriminant}").into())
}
}
pub struct SqliteTimestamp(DateTime<Utc>);
}
pub use types::*;
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[view(
@@ -124,7 +25,7 @@ pub struct AeadEncrypted {
pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub schema_version: i32,
pub associated_root_key_id: i32, // references root_key_history.id
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub created_at: i32,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
@@ -157,9 +58,9 @@ pub struct TlsHistory {
pub id: i32,
pub cert: String,
pub cert_key: String, // PEM Encoded private key
pub ca_cert: String, // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing
pub ca_key: String, // PEM Encoded public key for cert signing
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub ca_cert: String, // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing
pub ca_key: String, // PEM Encoded public key for cert signing
pub created_at: i32,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
@@ -167,212 +68,25 @@ pub struct TlsHistory {
pub struct ArbiterSettings {
pub id: i32,
pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references root_key_history.id
pub tls_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_history.id
pub tls_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_history.id
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_wallet, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmWallet,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmWallet {
pub id: i32,
pub address: Vec<u8>,
pub aead_encrypted_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable, Clone)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::evm_wallet_access, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmWalletAccess,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
#[view(
CoreEvmWalletAccess,
derive(Insertable),
omit(created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmWalletAccess {
pub id: i32,
pub wallet_id: i32,
pub client_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::client_metadata, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProgramClientMetadata {
pub id: i32,
pub name: String,
pub description: Option<String>,
pub version: Option<String>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::client_metadata_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProgramClientMetadataHistory {
pub id: i32,
pub metadata_id: i32,
pub client_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::program_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProgramClient {
pub id: i32,
pub nonce: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub metadata_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub nonce: i32,
pub created_at: i32,
pub updated_at: i32,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::useragent_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct UseragentClient {
pub id: i32,
pub nonce: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub key_type: KeyType,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferLimit {
pub id: i32,
pub window_secs: i32,
pub max_volume: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_basic_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmBasicGrant,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmBasicGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub wallet_access_id: i32, // references evm_wallet_access.id
pub chain_id: i32,
pub valid_from: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub valid_until: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub rate_limit_count: Option<i32>,
pub rate_limit_window_secs: Option<i32>,
pub revoked_at: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_transaction_log, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTransactionLog,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTransactionLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub wallet_access_id: i32,
pub chain_id: i32,
pub eth_value: Vec<u8>,
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmEtherTransferGrant,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub basic_grant_id: i32,
pub limit_id: i32, // references evm_ether_transfer_limit.id
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub address: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferGrant,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub basic_grant_id: i32,
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
pub receiver: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub window_secs: i32,
pub max_volume: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_log, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferLog,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub log_id: i32,
pub chain_id: i32,
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
pub recipient_address: Vec<u8>,
pub value: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub nonce: i32,
pub created_at: i32,
pub updated_at: i32,
}

View File

@@ -20,131 +20,11 @@ diesel::table! {
}
}
diesel::table! {
client_metadata (id) {
id -> Integer,
name -> Text,
description -> Nullable<Text>,
version -> Nullable<Text>,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
client_metadata_history (id) {
id -> Integer,
metadata_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_basic_grant (id) {
id -> Integer,
wallet_access_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer,
valid_from -> Nullable<Integer>,
valid_until -> Nullable<Integer>,
max_gas_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
max_priority_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
rate_limit_count -> Nullable<Integer>,
rate_limit_window_secs -> Nullable<Integer>,
revoked_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_grant (id) {
id -> Integer,
basic_grant_id -> Integer,
limit_id -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
address -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_limit (id) {
id -> Integer,
window_secs -> Integer,
max_volume -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_grant (id) {
id -> Integer,
basic_grant_id -> Integer,
token_contract -> Binary,
receiver -> Nullable<Binary>,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_log (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
log_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer,
token_contract -> Binary,
recipient_address -> Binary,
value -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
window_secs -> Integer,
max_volume -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_transaction_log (id) {
id -> Integer,
wallet_access_id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer,
eth_value -> Binary,
signed_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_wallet (id) {
id -> Integer,
address -> Binary,
aead_encrypted_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_wallet_access (id) {
id -> Integer,
wallet_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
program_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
nonce -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
metadata_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
@@ -178,7 +58,6 @@ diesel::table! {
id -> Integer,
nonce -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
key_type -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
@@ -187,38 +66,10 @@ diesel::table! {
diesel::joinable!(aead_encrypted -> root_key_history (associated_root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> root_key_history (root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_history (tls_id));
diesel::joinable!(client_metadata_history -> client_metadata (metadata_id));
diesel::joinable!(client_metadata_history -> program_client (client_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_basic_grant -> evm_wallet_access (wallet_access_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant -> evm_basic_grant (basic_grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant -> evm_ether_transfer_limit (limit_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target -> evm_ether_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_grant -> evm_basic_grant (basic_grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_log -> evm_token_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_log -> evm_transaction_log (log_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit -> evm_token_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_transaction_log -> evm_basic_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_transaction_log -> evm_wallet_access (wallet_access_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet -> aead_encrypted (aead_encrypted_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> evm_wallet (wallet_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> program_client (client_id));
diesel::joinable!(program_client -> client_metadata (metadata_id));
diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
aead_encrypted,
arbiter_settings,
client_metadata,
client_metadata_history,
evm_basic_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target,
evm_ether_transfer_limit,
evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
evm_transaction_log,
evm_wallet,
evm_wallet_access,
program_client,
root_key_history,
tls_history,

View File

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
use alloy::sol;
sol! {
interface IERC20 {
event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);
event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 value);
function totalSupply() external view returns (uint256);
function balanceOf(address account) external view returns (uint256);
function transfer(address to, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256);
function approve(address spender, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
}
}
sol! {
/// ERC-721: Non-Fungible Token Standard.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IERC721 {
event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 indexed tokenId);
event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed approved, uint256 indexed tokenId);
event ApprovalForAll(address indexed owner, address indexed operator, bool approved);
function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256 balance);
function ownerOf(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (address owner);
function safeTransferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function safeTransferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId, bytes calldata data) external;
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function approve(address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function setApprovalForAll(address operator, bool approved) external;
function getApproved(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (address operator);
function isApprovedForAll(address owner, address operator) external view returns (bool);
}
}
sol! {
/// Wrapped Ether — the only functions beyond ERC-20 that matter.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IWETH {
function deposit() external payable;
function withdraw(uint256 wad) external;
}
}
sol! {
/// Permit2 — Uniswap's canonical token approval manager.
/// Replaces per-contract ERC-20 approve() with a single approval hub.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IPermit2 {
struct TokenPermissions {
address token;
uint256 amount;
}
struct PermitSingle {
TokenPermissions details;
address spender;
uint256 sigDeadline;
}
struct PermitBatch {
TokenPermissions[] details;
address spender;
uint256 sigDeadline;
}
struct AllowanceTransferDetails {
address from;
address to;
uint160 amount;
address token;
}
function approve(address token, address spender, uint160 amount, uint48 expiration) external;
function permit(address owner, PermitSingle calldata permitSingle, bytes calldata signature) external;
function permit(address owner, PermitBatch calldata permitBatch, bytes calldata signature) external;
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint160 amount, address token) external;
function transferFrom(AllowanceTransferDetails[] calldata transferDetails) external;
function allowance(address user, address token, address spender)
external view returns (uint160 amount, uint48 expiration, uint48 nonce);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer;
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{TxKind, U256},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use tracing_subscriber::registry::Data;
use crate::{
db::{
self, DatabaseError,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{self, evm_transaction_log},
},
evm::policies::{
DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, FullGrant, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
};
pub mod policies;
mod utils;
/// Errors that can only occur once the transaction meaning is known (during policy evaluation)
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum PolicyError {
#[error("Database error")]
Database(#[from] crate::db::DatabaseError),
#[error("Transaction violates policy: {0:?}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::policy_error::violation))]
Violations(Vec<EvalViolation>),
#[error("No matching grant found")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::policy_error::no_matching_grant))]
NoMatchingGrant,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum VetError {
#[error("Contract creation transactions are not supported")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::vet_error::contract_creation_unsupported))]
ContractCreationNotSupported,
#[error("Engine can't classify this transaction")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::vet_error::unsupported))]
UnsupportedTransactionType,
#[error("Policy evaluation failed: {1}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::vet_error::evaluated))]
Evaluated(SpecificMeaning, #[source] PolicyError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum AnalyzeError {
#[error("Engine doesn't support granting permissions for contract creation")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::analyze_error::contract_creation_not_supported))]
ContractCreationNotSupported,
#[error("Unsupported transaction type")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::analyze_error::unsupported_transaction_type))]
UnsupportedTransactionType,
}
/// Controls whether a transaction should be executed or only validated
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RunKind {
/// Validate and record the transaction
Execution,
/// Validate only, do not record
CheckOnly,
}
async fn check_shared_constraints(
context: &EvalContext,
shared: &SharedGrantSettings,
shared_grant_id: DatabaseID,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let now = Utc::now();
// Validity window
if shared.valid_from.is_some_and(|t| now < t) || shared.valid_until.is_some_and(|t| now > t) {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTime);
}
// Gas fee caps
let fee_exceeded = shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.is_some_and(|cap| U256::from(context.max_fee_per_gas) > cap);
let priority_exceeded = shared
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.is_some_and(|cap| U256::from(context.max_priority_fee_per_gas) > cap);
if fee_exceeded || priority_exceeded {
violations.push(EvalViolation::GasLimitExceeded {
max_gas_fee_per_gas: shared.max_gas_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: shared.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
});
}
// Transaction count rate limit
if let Some(rate_limit) = &shared.rate_limit {
let window_start = SqliteTimestamp(now - rate_limit.window);
let count: i64 = evm_transaction_log::table
.filter(evm_transaction_log::grant_id.eq(shared_grant_id))
.filter(evm_transaction_log::signed_at.ge(window_start))
.count()
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
if count >= rate_limit.count as i64 {
violations.push(EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded);
}
}
Ok(violations)
}
// Supporting only EIP-1559 transactions for now, but we can easily extend this to support legacy transactions if needed
pub struct Engine {
db: db::DatabasePool,
}
impl Engine {
async fn vet_transaction<P: Policy>(
&self,
context: EvalContext,
meaning: &P::Meaning,
run_kind: RunKind,
) -> Result<(), PolicyError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant)?;
let mut violations =
check_shared_constraints(&context, &grant.shared, grant.shared_grant_id, &mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
violations.extend(
P::evaluate(&context, meaning, &grant, &mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?,
);
if !violations.is_empty() {
return Err(PolicyError::Violations(violations));
} else if run_kind == RunKind::Execution {
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let log_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(&NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: grant.shared_grant_id,
wallet_access_id: context.target.id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(context.value).to_vec(),
signed_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(evm_transaction_log::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
P::record_transaction(&context, meaning, log_id, &grant, conn).await?;
QueryResult::Ok(())
})
})
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl Engine {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Self {
Self { db }
}
pub async fn create_grant<P: Policy>(
&self,
full_grant: FullGrant<P::Settings>,
) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let id = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use schema::evm_basic_grant;
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmBasicGrant {
chain_id: full_grant.basic.chain as i32,
wallet_access_id: full_grant.basic.wallet_access_id,
valid_from: full_grant.basic.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: full_grant.basic.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.basic
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.basic
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
rate_limit_count: full_grant
.basic
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.count as i32),
rate_limit_window_secs: full_grant
.basic
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.window.num_seconds() as i32),
revoked_at: None,
})
.returning(evm_basic_grant::all_columns)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await
})
})
.await?;
Ok(id)
}
pub async fn list_all_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, DatabaseError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let mut grants: Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>> = Vec::new();
grants.extend(
EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut conn)
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
shared_grant_id: g.shared_grant_id,
shared: g.shared,
settings: SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(g.settings),
}),
);
grants.extend(
TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut conn)
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
shared_grant_id: g.shared_grant_id,
shared: g.shared,
settings: SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(g.settings),
}),
);
Ok(grants)
}
pub async fn evaluate_transaction(
&self,
target: EvmWalletAccess,
transaction: TxEip1559,
run_kind: RunKind,
) -> Result<SpecificMeaning, VetError> {
let TxKind::Call(to) = transaction.to else {
return Err(VetError::ContractCreationNotSupported);
};
let context = policies::EvalContext {
target,
chain: transaction.chain_id,
to,
value: transaction.value,
calldata: transaction.input.clone(),
max_fee_per_gas: transaction.max_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: transaction.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
};
if let Some(meaning) = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context) {
return match self
.vet_transaction::<EtherTransfer>(context, &meaning, run_kind)
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(meaning.into()),
Err(e) => Err(VetError::Evaluated(meaning.into(), e)),
};
}
if let Some(meaning) = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context) {
return match self
.vet_transaction::<TokenTransfer>(context, &meaning, run_kind)
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(meaning.into()),
Err(e) => Err(VetError::Evaluated(meaning.into(), e)),
};
}
Err(VetError::UnsupportedTransactionType)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
use std::fmt::Display;
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, ChainId, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, result::QueryResult, sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use miette::Diagnostic;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
db::models::{self, EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess},
evm::utils,
};
pub mod ether_transfer;
pub mod token_transfers;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct EvalContext {
// Which wallet is this transaction for and who requested it
pub target: EvmWalletAccess,
// The transaction data
pub chain: ChainId,
pub to: Address,
pub value: U256,
pub calldata: Bytes,
// Gas pricing (EIP-1559)
pub max_fee_per_gas: u128,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error, Diagnostic)]
pub enum EvalViolation {
#[error("This grant doesn't allow transactions to the target address {target}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::invalid_target))]
InvalidTarget { target: Address },
#[error("Gas limit exceeded for this grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::gas_limit_exceeded))]
GasLimitExceeded {
max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
},
#[error("Rate limit exceeded for this grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::rate_limit_exceeded))]
RateLimitExceeded,
#[error("Transaction exceeds volumetric limits of the grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::volumetric_limit_exceeded))]
VolumetricLimitExceeded,
#[error("Transaction is outside of the grant's validity period")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::invalid_time))]
InvalidTime,
#[error("Transaction type is not allowed by this grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::invalid_transaction_type))]
InvalidTransactionType,
}
pub type DatabaseID = i32;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Grant<PolicySettings> {
pub id: DatabaseID,
pub shared_grant_id: DatabaseID, // ID of the basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
pub shared: SharedGrantSettings,
pub settings: PolicySettings,
}
pub trait Policy: Sized {
type Settings: Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificGrant>;
type Meaning: Display + std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificMeaning>;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning>;
// Evaluate whether a transaction with the given meaning complies with the provided grant, and return any violations if not
// Empty vector means transaction is compliant with the grant
fn evaluate(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>>> + Send;
// Create a new grant in the database based on the provided grant details, and return its ID
fn create_grant(
basic: &models::EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = QueryResult<DatabaseID>> + Send;
// Try to find an existing grant that matches the transaction context, and return its details if found
// Additionally, return ID of basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>>> + Send;
// Return all non-revoked grants, eagerly loading policy-specific settings
fn find_all_grants(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Vec<Grant<Self::Settings>>>> + Send;
// Records, updates or deletes rate limits
// In other words, records grant-specific things after transaction is executed
fn record_transaction(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
log_id: i32,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<()>> + Send;
}
pub enum ReceiverTarget {
Specific(Vec<Address>), // only allow transfers to these addresses
Any, // allow transfers to any address
}
// Classification of what transaction does
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum SpecificMeaning {
EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Meaning),
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Meaning),
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct TransactionRateLimit {
pub count: u32,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct VolumeRateLimit {
pub max_volume: U256,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
pub wallet_access_id: i32,
pub chain: ChainId,
pub valid_from: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub valid_until: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
pub rate_limit: Option<TransactionRateLimit>,
}
impl SharedGrantSettings {
fn try_from_model(model: EvmBasicGrant) -> QueryResult<Self> {
Ok(Self {
wallet_access_id: model.wallet_access_id,
chain: model.chain_id as u64, // safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants
valid_from: model.valid_from.map(Into::into),
valid_until: model.valid_until.map(Into::into),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: model
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))
.transpose()?,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: model
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))
.transpose()?,
rate_limit: match (model.rate_limit_count, model.rate_limit_window_secs) {
(Some(count), Some(window_secs)) => Some(TransactionRateLimit {
count: count as u32,
window: Duration::seconds(window_secs as i64),
}),
_ => None,
},
})
}
pub async fn query_by_id(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
id: i32,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<Self> {
use crate::db::schema::evm_basic_grant;
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = evm_basic_grant::table
.select(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(id))
.first::<EvmBasicGrant>(conn)
.await?;
Self::try_from_model(basic_grant)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum SpecificGrant {
EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Settings),
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings),
}
pub struct FullGrant<PolicyGrant> {
pub basic: SharedGrantSettings,
pub specific: PolicyGrant,
}

View File

@@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fmt::Display;
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, JoinOnDsl, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, EvmEtherTransferLimit,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_transaction_log};
use crate::evm::policies::{
Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
};
use crate::{
db::{
models::{self, NewEvmEtherTransferGrant, NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget},
schema::{evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target},
},
evm::{policies::Policy, utils},
};
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
evm_ether_transfer_grant::table.inner_join(
evm_basic_grant::table.on(evm_ether_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(evm_basic_grant::id)),
)
}
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
// Plain ether transfer
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {
pub(crate) to: Address,
pub(crate) value: U256,
}
impl Display for Meaning {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "Ether transfer of {} to {}", self.value, self.to)
}
}
impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
fn from(val: Meaning) -> SpecificMeaning {
SpecificMeaning::EtherTransfer(val)
}
}
// A grant for ether transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Settings {
pub target: Vec<Address>,
pub limit: VolumeRateLimit,
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(val)
}
}
async fn query_relevant_past_transaction(
grant_id: i32,
longest_window: Duration,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)>> {
let past_transactions: Vec<(Vec<u8>, SqliteTimestamp)> = evm_transaction_log::table
.filter(evm_transaction_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id))
.filter(
evm_transaction_log::signed_at.ge(SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() - longest_window)),
)
.select((
evm_transaction_log::eth_value,
evm_transaction_log::signed_at,
))
.load(db)
.await?;
let past_transaction: Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)> = past_transactions
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(value_bytes, timestamp)| {
let value = utils::bytes_to_u256(&value_bytes)?;
Some((value, timestamp.0))
})
.collect();
Ok(past_transaction)
}
async fn check_rate_limits(
grant: &Grant<Settings>,
current_transfer_value: U256,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let window = grant.settings.limit.window;
let past_transaction = query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.id, window, db).await?;
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - grant.settings.limit.window;
let prospective_cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transaction
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
.fold(current_transfer_value, |acc, (value, _)| acc + *value);
if prospective_cumulative_volume > grant.settings.limit.max_volume {
violations.push(EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded);
}
Ok(violations)
}
pub struct EtherTransfer;
impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
type Settings = Settings;
type Meaning = Meaning;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning> {
if !context.calldata.is_empty() {
return None;
}
Some(Meaning {
to: context.to,
value: context.value,
})
}
async fn evaluate(
_: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
// Check if the target address is within the grant's allowed targets
if !grant.settings.target.contains(&meaning.to) {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target: meaning.to });
}
let rate_violations = check_rate_limits(grant, meaning.value, db).await?;
violations.extend(rate_violations);
Ok(violations)
}
async fn create_grant(
basic: &models::EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<DatabaseID> {
let limit_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_limit::table)
.values(NewEvmEtherTransferLimit {
window_secs: grant.limit.window.num_seconds() as i32,
max_volume: utils::u256_to_bytes(grant.limit.max_volume).to_vec(),
})
.returning(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmEtherTransferGrant {
basic_grant_id: basic.id,
limit_id,
})
.returning(evm_ether_transfer_grant::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
for target in &grant.target {
insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table)
.values(NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget {
grant_id,
address: target.to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Ok(grant_id)
}
async fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let target_bytes = context.to.to_vec();
// Find a grant where:
// 1. The basic grant's wallet_id and client_id match the context
// 2. Any of the grant's targets match the context's `to` address
let grant: Option<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant)> = evm_ether_transfer_grant::table
.inner_join(evm_basic_grant::table)
.inner_join(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table)
.filter(
evm_basic_grant::wallet_access_id
.eq(context.target.id)
.and(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.and(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::address.eq(&target_bytes)),
)
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmEtherTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.first(conn)
.await
.optional()?;
let Some((basic_grant, grant)) = grant else {
return Ok(None);
};
let target_bytes: Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget> = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
.select(EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget::as_select())
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq(grant.id))
.load(conn)
.await?;
let limit: EvmEtherTransferLimit = evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq(grant.limit_id))
.select(EvmEtherTransferLimit::as_select())
.first::<EvmEtherTransferLimit>(conn)
.await?;
// Convert bytes back to Address
let targets: Vec<Address> = target_bytes
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|target| {
// TODO: Handle invalid addresses more gracefully
let arr: [u8; 20] = target.address.try_into().ok()?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
})
.collect();
let settings = Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume)
.map_err(|err| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err)))?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
},
};
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: grant.id,
shared_grant_id: grant.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
settings,
}))
}
async fn record_transaction(
_context: &EvalContext,
_: &Self::Meaning,
_log_id: i32,
_grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
_conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<()> {
// Basic log is sufficient
Ok(())
}
async fn find_all_grants(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let grants: Vec<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant)> = grant_join()
.filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmEtherTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.load(conn)
.await?;
if grants.is_empty() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
let grant_ids: Vec<i32> = grants.iter().map(|(_, g)| g.id).collect();
let limit_ids: Vec<i32> = grants.iter().map(|(_, g)| g.limit_id).collect();
let all_targets: Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget> = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq_any(&grant_ids))
.select(EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let all_limits: Vec<EvmEtherTransferLimit> = evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq_any(&limit_ids))
.select(EvmEtherTransferLimit::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let mut targets_by_grant: HashMap<i32, Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget>> = HashMap::new();
for target in all_targets {
targets_by_grant
.entry(target.grant_id)
.or_default()
.push(target);
}
let limits_by_id: HashMap<i32, EvmEtherTransferLimit> =
all_limits.into_iter().map(|l| (l.id, l)).collect();
grants
.into_iter()
.map(|(basic, specific)| {
let targets: Vec<Address> = targets_by_grant
.get(&specific.id)
.map(|v| v.as_slice())
.unwrap_or_default()
.iter()
.filter_map(|t| {
let arr: [u8; 20] = t.address.clone().try_into().ok()?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
})
.collect();
let limit = limits_by_id
.get(&specific.limit_id)
.ok_or(diesel::result::Error::NotFound)?;
Ok(Grant {
id: specific.id,
shared_grant_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic)?,
settings: Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(
|e| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(e)),
)?,
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
},
},
})
})
.collect()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;

View File

@@ -1,386 +0,0 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::{
policies::{EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, VolumeRateLimit},
utils,
};
use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
const WALLET_ACCESS_ID: i32 = 1;
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const ALLOWED: Address = address!("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111");
const OTHER: Address = address!("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222");
fn ctx(to: Address, value: U256) -> EvalContext {
EvalContext {
target: EvmWalletAccess {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: 10,
client_id: 20,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
},
chain: CHAIN_ID,
to,
value,
calldata: Bytes::new(),
max_fee_per_gas: 0,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 0,
}
}
async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicGrant {
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit_count: None,
rate_limit_window_secs: None,
revoked_at: revoked.then(|| SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())),
})
.returning(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
fn make_settings(targets: Vec<Address>, max_volume: u64) -> Settings {
Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(max_volume),
window: Duration::hours(1),
},
}
}
fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
}
}
// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn analyze_matches_empty_calldata() {
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1_000u64))).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m.to, ALLOWED);
assert_eq!(m.value, U256::from(1_000u64));
}
#[test]
fn analyze_rejects_nonempty_calldata() {
let context = EvalContext {
calldata: Bytes::from(vec![0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]),
..ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64))
};
assert!(EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).is_none());
}
// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_for_allowed_target() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(v.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_disallowed_target() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
};
let context = ctx(OTHER, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { .. }))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_when_volume_within_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000);
let grant_id = EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(500u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000);
let grant_id = EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_000u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000);
let grant_id = EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// Exactly at the limit including current transfer — check is `>`, so this should not violate
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(900u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
// ── try_find_grant ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let found = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_some());
let g = found.unwrap();
assert_eq!(g.settings.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
assert_eq!(g.settings.limit.max_volume, U256::from(1_000_000u64));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_revoked_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let found = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_wrong_target_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let found = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(OTHER, U256::from(1u64)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(all.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_excludes_revoked() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
let active = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&active, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let revoked = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&revoked, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_multiple_targets() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED, OTHER], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.target.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.limit.max_volume, U256::from(1_000_000u64));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_multiple_grants() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic1 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic1, &make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 500), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let basic2 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic2, &make_settings(vec![OTHER], 1_000), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 2);
}

View File

@@ -1,386 +0,0 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, U256},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, NewEvmTokenTransferGrant,
NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
evm_token_transfer_grant::table.inner_join(
evm_basic_grant::table.on(evm_token_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(evm_basic_grant::id)),
)
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {
pub(crate) token: &'static TokenInfo,
pub(crate) to: Address,
pub(crate) value: U256,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for Meaning {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(
f,
"Transfer of {} {} to {}",
self.value, self.token.symbol, self.to
)
}
}
impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
fn from(val: Meaning) -> SpecificMeaning {
SpecificMeaning::TokenTransfer(val)
}
}
// A grant for token transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Settings {
pub token_contract: Address,
pub target: Option<Address>,
pub volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit>,
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(val)
}
}
async fn query_relevant_past_transfers(
grant_id: i32,
longest_window: Duration,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)>> {
let past_logs: Vec<(Vec<u8>, SqliteTimestamp)> = evm_token_transfer_log::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id))
.filter(
evm_token_transfer_log::created_at
.ge(SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() - longest_window)),
)
.select((
evm_token_transfer_log::value,
evm_token_transfer_log::created_at,
))
.load(db)
.await?;
let past_transfers: Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)> = past_logs
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(value_bytes, timestamp)| {
let value = utils::bytes_to_u256(&value_bytes)?;
Some((value, timestamp.0))
})
.collect();
Ok(past_transfers)
}
async fn check_volume_rate_limits(
grant: &Grant<Settings>,
current_transfer_value: U256,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let Some(longest_window) = grant.settings.volume_limits.iter().map(|l| l.window).max() else {
return Ok(violations);
};
let past_transfers = query_relevant_past_transfers(grant.id, longest_window, db).await?;
for limit in &grant.settings.volume_limits {
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - limit.window;
let prospective_cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transfers
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
.fold(current_transfer_value, |acc, (value, _)| acc + *value);
if prospective_cumulative_volume > limit.max_volume {
violations.push(EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded);
break;
}
}
Ok(violations)
}
pub struct TokenTransfer;
impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
type Settings = Settings;
type Meaning = Meaning;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning> {
let token = nonfungible::get_token(context.chain, context.to)?;
let decoded = transferCall::abi_decode_raw_validate(&context.calldata).ok()?;
Some(Meaning {
token,
to: decoded.to,
value: decoded.value,
})
}
async fn evaluate(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
// erc20 transfer shouldn't carry eth value
if !context.value.is_zero() {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType);
return Ok(violations);
}
if let Some(allowed) = grant.settings.target
&& allowed != meaning.to
{
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target: meaning.to });
}
let rate_violations = check_volume_rate_limits(grant, meaning.value, db).await?;
violations.extend(rate_violations);
Ok(violations)
}
async fn create_grant(
basic: &EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<DatabaseID> {
// Store the specific receiver as bytes (None means any receiver is allowed)
let receiver: Option<Vec<u8>> = grant.target.map(|addr| addr.to_vec());
let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_token_transfer_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferGrant {
basic_grant_id: basic.id,
token_contract: grant.token_contract.to_vec(),
receiver,
})
.returning(evm_token_transfer_grant::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
for limit in &grant.volume_limits {
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
grant_id,
window_secs: limit.window.num_seconds() as i32,
max_volume: utils::u256_to_bytes(limit.max_volume).to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Ok(grant_id)
}
async fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let token_contract_bytes = context.to.to_vec();
let grant: Option<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant)> = grant_join()
.filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.filter(evm_basic_grant::wallet_access_id.eq(context.target.id))
.filter(evm_token_transfer_grant::token_contract.eq(&token_contract_bytes))
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmTokenTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.first(conn)
.await
.optional()?;
let Some((basic_grant, token_grant)) = grant else {
return Ok(None);
};
let volume_limits_db: Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit> =
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq(token_grant.id))
.select(EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = volume_limits_db
.into_iter()
.map(|row| {
Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(|err| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
})?,
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
let token_contract: [u8; 20] = token_grant.token_contract.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid token contract address length".into(),
)
})?;
let target: Option<Address> = match token_grant.receiver {
None => None,
Some(bytes) => {
let arr: [u8; 20] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid receiver address length".into(),
)
})?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
}
};
let settings = Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
};
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: token_grant.id,
shared_grant_id: token_grant.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
settings,
}))
}
async fn record_transaction(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
log_id: i32,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id: grant.id,
log_id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
token_contract: context.to.to_vec(),
recipient_address: meaning.to.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(meaning.value).to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn find_all_grants(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let grants: Vec<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant)> = grant_join()
.filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmTokenTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.load(conn)
.await?;
if grants.is_empty() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
let grant_ids: Vec<i32> = grants.iter().map(|(_, g)| g.id).collect();
let all_volume_limits: Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit> =
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq_any(&grant_ids))
.select(EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let mut limits_by_grant: HashMap<i32, Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit>> = HashMap::new();
for limit in all_volume_limits {
limits_by_grant
.entry(limit.grant_id)
.or_default()
.push(limit);
}
grants
.into_iter()
.map(|(basic, specific)| {
let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = limits_by_grant
.get(&specific.id)
.map(|v| v.as_slice())
.unwrap_or_default()
.iter()
.map(|row| {
Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(|e| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(e))
})?,
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
let token_contract: [u8; 20] =
specific.token_contract.clone().try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid token contract address length".into(),
)
})?;
let target: Option<Address> = match &specific.receiver {
None => None,
Some(bytes) => {
let arr: [u8; 20] = bytes.clone().try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid receiver address length".into(),
)
})?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
}
};
Ok(Grant {
id: specific.id,
shared_grant_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic)?,
settings: Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
},
})
})
.collect()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;

View File

@@ -1,464 +0,0 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use alloy::sol_types::SolCall;
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::evm_basic_grant,
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, VolumeRateLimit},
utils,
};
use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
// DAI on Ethereum mainnet — present in the static token registry
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const DAI: Address = address!("6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F");
const WALLET_ACCESS_ID: i32 = 1;
const RECIPIENT: Address = address!("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa");
const OTHER: Address = address!("bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb");
const UNKNOWN_TOKEN: Address = address!("cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc");
/// Encode `transfer(to, value)` raw params (no 4-byte selector).
/// `abi_decode_raw_validate` expects exactly this format.
fn transfer_calldata(to: Address, value: U256) -> Bytes {
let mut raw = Vec::new();
transferCall { to, value }.abi_encode_raw(&mut raw);
Bytes::from(raw)
}
fn ctx(to: Address, calldata: Bytes) -> EvalContext {
EvalContext {
target: EvmWalletAccess {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: 10,
client_id: 20,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
},
chain: CHAIN_ID,
to,
value: U256::ZERO,
calldata,
max_fee_per_gas: 0,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 0,
}
}
async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicGrant {
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit_count: None,
rate_limit_window_secs: None,
revoked_at: revoked.then(|| SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())),
})
.returning(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
fn make_settings(target: Option<Address>, max_volume: Option<u64>) -> Settings {
Settings {
token_contract: DAI,
target,
volume_limits: max_volume
.map(|v| {
vec![VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(v),
window: Duration::hours(1),
}]
})
.unwrap_or_default(),
}
}
fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
}
}
// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn analyze_known_token_valid_calldata() {
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, calldata)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m.to, RECIPIENT);
assert_eq!(m.value, U256::from(100u64));
}
#[test]
fn analyze_unknown_token_returns_none() {
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(UNKNOWN_TOKEN, calldata)).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn analyze_invalid_calldata_returns_none() {
let calldata = Bytes::from(vec![0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]);
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, calldata)).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn analyze_empty_calldata_returns_none() {
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, Bytes::new())).is_none());
}
// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_nonzero_eth_value() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let mut context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
context.value = U256::from(1u64); // ETH attached to an ERC-20 call
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&EvalContext {
value: U256::ZERO,
..context.clone()
})
.unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_any_recipient_when_no_restriction() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(v.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_matching_restricted_recipient() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(v.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_wrong_restricted_recipient() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(OTHER, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { .. }))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_volume_at_exact_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(1_000));
let grant_id = TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// Record a past transfer of 900, with current transfer 100 => exactly 1000 limit
use crate::db::{models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog, schema::evm_token_transfer_log};
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(900u64)).to_vec(),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(1_000));
let grant_id = TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
use crate::db::{models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog, schema::evm_token_transfer_log};
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_000u64)).to_vec(),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(1u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_no_volume_limits_always_passes() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None), // no volume limits
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(u64::MAX));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
// ── try_find_grant ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), Some(5_000));
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let found = TokenTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(DAI, calldata), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_some());
let g = found.unwrap();
assert_eq!(g.settings.token_contract, DAI);
assert_eq!(g.settings.target, Some(RECIPIENT));
assert_eq!(g.settings.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(g.settings.volume_limits[0].max_volume, U256::from(5_000u64));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_revoked_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, None);
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(1u64));
let found = TokenTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(DAI, calldata), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_unknown_token_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, None);
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// Query with a different token contract
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(1u64));
let found = TokenTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(UNKNOWN_TOKEN, calldata), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(all.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_excludes_revoked() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(1_000));
let active = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&active, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let revoked = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&revoked, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_loads_volume_limits() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(9_999));
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
all[0].settings.volume_limits[0].max_volume,
U256::from(9_999u64)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_multiple_grants_batch_loaded() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let b1 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&b1, &make_settings(None, Some(1_000)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let b2 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(
&b2,
&make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), Some(2_000)),
&mut *conn,
)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 2);
}

View File

@@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::{TxSigner, TxSignerSync},
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer, SignerSync, utils::secret_key_to_address},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use k256::ecdsa::{self, RecoveryId, SigningKey, signature::hazmat::PrehashSigner};
/// An Ethereum signer that stores its secp256k1 secret key inside a
/// hardware-protected [`MemSafe`] cell.
///
/// The underlying memory page is kept non-readable/non-writable at rest.
/// Access is temporarily elevated only for the duration of each signing
/// operation, then immediately revoked.
///
/// Because [`MemSafe::read`] requires `&mut self` while the [`Signer`] trait
/// requires `&self`, the cell is wrapped in a [`Mutex`].
pub struct SafeSigner {
key: Mutex<SafeCell<SigningKey>>,
address: Address,
chain_id: Option<ChainId>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for SafeSigner {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("SafeSigner")
.field("address", &self.address)
.field("chain_id", &self.chain_id)
.finish()
}
}
/// Generates a secp256k1 secret key directly inside a [`MemSafe`] cell.
///
/// Random bytes are written in-place into protected memory, then validated
/// as a legal scalar on the secp256k1 curve (the scalar must be in
/// `[1, n)` where `n` is the curve order — roughly 1-in-2^128 chance of
/// rejection, but we retry to be correct).
///
/// Returns the protected key bytes and the derived Ethereum address.
pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::Rng) -> (SafeCell<[u8; 32]>, Address) {
loop {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|w: &mut [u8; 32]| {
rng.fill_bytes(w);
});
let reader = cell.read();
if let Ok(sk) = SigningKey::from_slice(reader.as_ref()) {
let address = secret_key_to_address(&sk);
drop(reader);
return (cell, address);
}
}
}
impl SafeSigner {
/// Reconstructs a `SafeSigner` from key material held in a [`MemSafe`] buffer.
///
/// The key bytes are read from protected memory, parsed as a secp256k1
/// scalar, and immediately moved into a new [`MemSafe`] cell. The raw
/// bytes are never exposed outside this function.
pub fn from_cell(mut cell: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self> {
let reader = cell.read();
let sk = SigningKey::from_slice(reader.as_slice()).map_err(Error::other)?;
drop(reader);
Self::new(sk)
}
/// Creates a new `SafeSigner` by moving the signing key into a protected
/// memory region.
pub fn new(key: SigningKey) -> Result<Self> {
let address = secret_key_to_address(&key);
let cell = SafeCell::new(key);
Ok(Self {
key: Mutex::new(cell),
address,
chain_id: None,
})
}
fn sign_hash_inner(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
let mut cell = self.key.lock().expect("SafeSigner mutex poisoned");
let reader = cell.read();
let sig: (ecdsa::Signature, RecoveryId) = reader.sign_prehash(hash.as_ref())?;
Ok(sig.into())
}
fn sign_tx_inner(&self, tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>) -> Result<Signature> {
if let Some(chain_id) = self.chain_id
&& !tx.set_chain_id_checked(chain_id)
{
return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
signer: chain_id,
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
tx: tx.chain_id().expect("Chain ID is guaranteed to be set"),
});
}
self.sign_hash_inner(&tx.signature_hash())
.map_err(Error::other)
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Signer for SafeSigner {
#[inline]
async fn sign_hash(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_hash_inner(hash)
}
#[inline]
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
#[inline]
fn chain_id(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
self.chain_id
}
#[inline]
fn set_chain_id(&mut self, chain_id: Option<ChainId>) {
self.chain_id = chain_id;
}
}
impl SignerSync for SafeSigner {
#[inline]
fn sign_hash_sync(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_hash_inner(hash)
}
#[inline]
fn chain_id_sync(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
self.chain_id
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl TxSigner<Signature> for SafeSigner {
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
async fn sign_transaction(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_tx_inner(tx)
}
}
impl TxSignerSync<Signature> for SafeSigner {
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
fn sign_transaction_sync(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_tx_inner(tx)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use alloy::signers::local::PrivateKeySigner;
#[test]
fn sign_and_recover() {
let pk = PrivateKeySigner::random();
let key = pk.into_credential();
let signer = SafeSigner::new(key).unwrap();
let message = b"hello arbiter";
let sig = signer.sign_message_sync(message).unwrap();
let recovered = sig.recover_address_from_msg(message).unwrap();
assert_eq!(recovered, Signer::address(&signer));
}
#[test]
fn chain_id_roundtrip() {
let pk = PrivateKeySigner::random();
let key = pk.into_credential();
let mut signer = SafeSigner::new(key).unwrap();
assert_eq!(Signer::chain_id(&signer), None);
signer.set_chain_id(Some(1337));
assert_eq!(Signer::chain_id(&signer), Some(1337));
}
}

View File

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
use alloy::primitives::U256;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
#[error("Expected {expected} bytes but got {actual} bytes")]
pub struct LengthError {
pub expected: usize,
pub actual: usize,
}
pub fn u256_to_bytes(value: U256) -> [u8; 32] {
value.to_le_bytes()
}
pub fn bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().ok()?;
Some(U256::from_le_bytes(bytes))
}
pub fn try_bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(LengthError {
expected: 32,
actual: bytes.len(),
}))
})?;
Ok(U256::from_le_bytes(bytes))
}

View File

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
use alloy::primitives::Address;
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{
client::{
ClientRequest, ClientResponse, VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
evm::{
EvmError as ProtoEvmError, EvmSignTransactionResponse,
evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult,
},
},
transport::{Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use kameo::{
actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _},
error::SendError,
};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::{
client::{
self, ClientConnection,
session::{
ClientSession, Error, HandleQueryVaultState, HandleSignTransaction,
SignTransactionRpcError,
},
},
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
},
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
request_tracker::RequestTracker,
},
};
mod auth;
mod inbound;
mod outbound;
async fn dispatch_loop(
mut bi: GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
mut request_tracker: RequestTracker,
) {
loop {
let Some(message) = bi.recv().await else {
return;
};
let conn = match message {
Ok(conn) => conn,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to receive client request");
return;
}
};
let request_id = match request_tracker.request(conn.request_id) {
Ok(id) => id,
Err(err) => {
let _ = bi.send(Err(err)).await;
return;
}
};
let Some(payload) = conn.payload else {
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Missing client request payload",
)))
.await;
return;
};
match dispatch_inner(&actor, payload).await {
Ok(response) => {
if bi
.send(Ok(ClientResponse {
request_id: Some(request_id),
payload: Some(response),
}))
.await
.is_err()
{
return;
}
}
Err(status) => {
let _ = bi.send(Err(status)).await;
return;
}
}
}
}
async fn dispatch_inner(
actor: &ActorRef<ClientSession>,
payload: ClientRequestPayload,
) -> Result<ClientResponsePayload, Status> {
match payload {
ClientRequestPayload::QueryVaultState(_) => {
let state = match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(Error::Internal)) => ProtoVaultState::Error,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");
ProtoVaultState::Error
}
};
Ok(ClientResponsePayload::VaultState(state.into()))
}
ClientRequestPayload::EvmSignTransaction(request) => {
let address: Address = RawEvmAddress(request.wallet_address).try_convert()?;
let transaction = RawEvmTransaction(request.rlp_transaction).try_convert()?;
let response = match actor
.ask(HandleSignTransaction {
wallet_address: address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Signature(
signature.as_bytes().to_vec(),
)),
},
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(SignTransactionRpcError::Vet(
vet_error,
))) => EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(vet_error.convert()),
},
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(SignTransactionRpcError::Internal)) => {
EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(
ProtoEvmError::Internal.into(),
)),
}
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to sign EVM transaction");
EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(
ProtoEvmError::Internal.into(),
)),
}
}
};
Ok(ClientResponsePayload::EvmSignTransaction(response))
}
payload => {
warn!(?payload, "Unsupported post-auth client request");
Err(Status::invalid_argument("Unsupported client request"))
}
}
}
pub async fn start(mut conn: ClientConnection, mut bi: GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>) {
let mut request_tracker = RequestTracker::default();
let client_id = match auth::start(&mut conn, &mut bi, &mut request_tracker).await {
Ok(id) => id,
Err(err) => {
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::unauthenticated(format!(
"Authentication failed: {}",
err
))))
.await;
warn!(error = ?err, "Client authentication failed");
return;
}
};
let actor = ClientSession::spawn(ClientSession::new(conn, client_id));
let actor_for_cleanup = actor.clone();
info!("Client authenticated successfully");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor, request_tracker).await;
actor_for_cleanup.kill();
}

View File

@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
proto::client::{
AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
AuthChallengeSolution as ProtoAuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult,
ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo, ClientRequest, ClientResponse,
client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::client::{self, ClientConnection, auth},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
) -> Self {
Self {
bi,
request_tracker,
}
}
fn response_to_proto(response: auth::Outbound) -> ClientResponsePayload {
match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
nonce,
})
}
auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess => {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into())
}
}
}
fn error_to_proto(error: auth::Error) -> ClientResponsePayload {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(
match error {
auth::Error::InvalidChallengeSolution => ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature,
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Denied) => {
ProtoAuthResult::ApprovalDenied
}
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Upstream(
crate::actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected,
)) => ProtoAuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline,
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Internal)
| auth::Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
| auth::Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
| auth::Error::Transport => ProtoAuthResult::Internal,
}
.into(),
)
}
async fn send_client_response(
&mut self,
payload: ClientResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.bi
.send(Ok(ClientResponse {
request_id: Some(self.request_tracker.current_request_id()),
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
}
async fn send_auth_result(&mut self, result: ProtoAuthResult) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.send_client_response(ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(result.into()))
.await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let payload = match item {
Ok(message) => AuthTransportAdapter::response_to_proto(message),
Err(err) => AuthTransportAdapter::error_to_proto(err),
};
self.send_client_response(payload).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<auth::Inbound> {
let request = match self.bi.recv().await? {
Ok(request) => request,
Err(error) => {
warn!(error = ?error, "grpc client recv failed; closing stream");
return None;
}
};
match self.request_tracker.request(request.request_id) {
Ok(request_id) => request_id,
Err(error) => {
let _ = self.bi.send(Err(error)).await;
return None;
}
};
let payload = request.payload?;
match payload {
ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(ProtoAuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
client_info,
}) => {
let Some(client_info) = client_info else {
let _ = self
.bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing client info")))
.await;
return None;
};
let Ok(pubkey) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(pubkey) else {
let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
return None;
};
let Ok(pubkey) = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey) else {
let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
return None;
};
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
metadata: client_metadata_from_proto(client_info),
})
}
ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution {
signature,
}) => {
let Ok(signature) = ed25519_dalek::Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) else {
let _ = self
.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature)
.await;
return None;
};
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
}
_ => {
let _ = self
.bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Unsupported client auth request",
)))
.await;
None
}
}
}
}
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
fn client_metadata_from_proto(metadata: ProtoClientInfo) -> ClientMetadata {
ClientMetadata {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
version: metadata.version,
}
}
pub async fn start(
conn: &mut ClientConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
) -> Result<i32, auth::Error> {
let mut transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
client::auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
pub mod inbound;
pub mod outbound;

View File

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, rlp::Decodable as _};
use crate::grpc::TryConvert;
pub struct RawEvmAddress(pub Vec<u8>);
impl TryConvert for RawEvmAddress {
type Output = Address;
type Error = tonic::Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<Self::Output, Self::Error> {
let wallet_address = match <[u8; 20]>::try_from(self.0.as_slice()) {
Ok(address) => Address::from(address),
Err(_) => {
return Err(tonic::Status::invalid_argument(
"Invalid EVM wallet address",
));
}
};
Ok(wallet_address)
}
}
pub struct RawEvmTransaction(pub Vec<u8>);
impl TryConvert for RawEvmTransaction {
type Output = TxEip1559;
type Error = tonic::Status;
fn try_convert(mut self) -> Result<Self::Output, Self::Error> {
let tx = TxEip1559::decode(&mut self.0.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
tonic::Status::invalid_argument("Invalid EVM transaction format")
})?;
Ok(tx)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
use alloy::primitives::U256;
use arbiter_proto::proto::evm::{
EvalViolation as ProtoEvalViolation, EvmError as ProtoEvmError, GasLimitExceededViolation,
NoMatchingGrantError, PolicyViolationsError, SpecificMeaning as ProtoSpecificMeaning,
TokenInfo as ProtoTokenInfo, TransactionEvalError as ProtoTransactionEvalError,
eval_violation::Kind as ProtoEvalViolationKind,
evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult,
specific_meaning::Meaning as ProtoSpecificMeaningKind,
transaction_eval_error::Kind as ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind,
};
use crate::{
evm::{
PolicyError, VetError,
policies::{EvalViolation, SpecificMeaning},
},
grpc::Convert,
};
fn u256_to_proto_bytes(value: U256) -> Vec<u8> {
value.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec()
}
impl Convert for SpecificMeaning {
type Output = ProtoSpecificMeaning;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
let kind = match self {
SpecificMeaning::EtherTransfer(meaning) => ProtoSpecificMeaningKind::EtherTransfer(
arbiter_proto::proto::evm::EtherTransferMeaning {
to: meaning.to.to_vec(),
value: u256_to_proto_bytes(meaning.value),
},
),
SpecificMeaning::TokenTransfer(meaning) => ProtoSpecificMeaningKind::TokenTransfer(
arbiter_proto::proto::evm::TokenTransferMeaning {
token: Some(ProtoTokenInfo {
symbol: meaning.token.symbol.to_string(),
address: meaning.token.contract.to_vec(),
chain_id: meaning.token.chain,
}),
to: meaning.to.to_vec(),
value: u256_to_proto_bytes(meaning.value),
},
),
};
ProtoSpecificMeaning {
meaning: Some(kind),
}
}
}
impl Convert for EvalViolation {
type Output = ProtoEvalViolation;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
let kind = match self {
EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target } => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTarget(target.to_vec())
}
EvalViolation::GasLimitExceeded {
max_gas_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas,
} => ProtoEvalViolationKind::GasLimitExceeded(GasLimitExceededViolation {
max_gas_fee_per_gas: max_gas_fee_per_gas.map(u256_to_proto_bytes),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: max_priority_fee_per_gas.map(u256_to_proto_bytes),
}),
EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded => ProtoEvalViolationKind::RateLimitExceeded(()),
EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::VolumetricLimitExceeded(())
}
EvalViolation::InvalidTime => ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTime(()),
EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTransactionType(())
}
};
ProtoEvalViolation { kind: Some(kind) }
}
}
impl Convert for VetError {
type Output = EvmSignTransactionResult;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
let kind = match self {
VetError::ContractCreationNotSupported => {
ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind::ContractCreationNotSupported(())
}
VetError::UnsupportedTransactionType => {
ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind::UnsupportedTransactionType(())
}
VetError::Evaluated(meaning, policy_error) => match policy_error {
PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant => {
ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind::NoMatchingGrant(NoMatchingGrantError {
meaning: Some(meaning.convert()),
})
}
PolicyError::Violations(violations) => {
ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind::PolicyViolations(PolicyViolationsError {
meaning: Some(meaning.convert()),
violations: violations.into_iter().map(Convert::convert).collect(),
})
}
PolicyError::Database(_) => {
return EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into());
}
},
};
EvmSignTransactionResult::EvalError(ProtoTransactionEvalError { kind: Some(kind) }.into())
}
}

View File

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{
client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse},
user_agent::{UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
},
transport::grpc::GrpcBi,
};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::{Request, Response, Status, async_trait};
use tracing::info;
use crate::{
actors::{client::ClientConnection, user_agent::UserAgentConnection},
grpc::user_agent::start,
};
mod request_tracker;
pub mod client;
pub mod user_agent;
mod common;
pub trait Convert {
type Output;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output;
}
pub trait TryConvert {
type Output;
type Error;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<Self::Output, Self::Error>;
}
#[async_trait]
impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for super::Server {
type UserAgentStream = ReceiverStream<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>;
type ClientStream = ReceiverStream<Result<ClientResponse, Status>>;
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
async fn client(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<ClientRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::ClientStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (bi, rx) = GrpcBi::from_bi_stream(req_stream);
let props = ClientConnection::new(self.context.db.clone(), self.context.actors.clone());
tokio::spawn(client::start(props, bi));
info!(event = "connection established", "grpc.client");
Ok(Response::new(rx))
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
async fn user_agent(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<UserAgentRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::UserAgentStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (bi, rx) = GrpcBi::from_bi_stream(req_stream);
tokio::spawn(start(
UserAgentConnection {
db: self.context.db.clone(),
actors: self.context.actors.clone(),
},
bi,
));
info!(event = "connection established", "grpc.user_agent");
Ok(Response::new(rx))
}
}

View File

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
use tonic::Status;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct RequestTracker {
next_request_id: i32,
}
impl RequestTracker {
pub fn request(&mut self, id: i32) -> Result<i32, Status> {
if id < self.next_request_id {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Duplicate request id"));
}
self.next_request_id = id
.checked_add(1)
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid request id"))?;
Ok(id)
}
// This is used to set the response id for auth responses, which need to match the request id of the auth challenge request.
// -1 offset is needed because request() increments the next_request_id after returning the current request id.
pub fn current_request_id(&self) -> i32 {
self.next_request_id - 1
}
}

View File

@@ -1,514 +0,0 @@
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{
client::ClientInfo as ProtoClientMetadata,
evm::{
EvmError as ProtoEvmError, EvmGrantCreateRequest, EvmGrantCreateResponse,
EvmGrantDeleteRequest, EvmGrantDeleteResponse, EvmGrantList, EvmGrantListResponse,
EvmSignTransactionResponse, GrantEntry, WalletCreateResponse, WalletEntry, WalletList,
WalletListResponse, evm_grant_create_response::Result as EvmGrantCreateResult,
evm_grant_delete_response::Result as EvmGrantDeleteResult,
evm_grant_list_response::Result as EvmGrantListResult,
evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult,
wallet_create_response::Result as WalletCreateResult,
wallet_list_response::Result as WalletListResult,
},
user_agent::{
BootstrapEncryptedKey as ProtoBootstrapEncryptedKey,
BootstrapResult as ProtoBootstrapResult, ListWalletAccessResponse,
SdkClientConnectionCancel as ProtoSdkClientConnectionCancel,
SdkClientConnectionRequest as ProtoSdkClientConnectionRequest,
SdkClientEntry as ProtoSdkClientEntry, SdkClientError as ProtoSdkClientError,
SdkClientGrantWalletAccess, SdkClientList as ProtoSdkClientList,
SdkClientListResponse as ProtoSdkClientListResponse, SdkClientRevokeWalletAccess,
SdkClientWalletAccess, UnsealEncryptedKey as ProtoUnsealEncryptedKey,
UnsealResult as ProtoUnsealResult, UnsealStart, UserAgentEvmSignTransactionRequest,
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse, VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
sdk_client_list_response::Result as ProtoSdkClientListResult,
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
},
transport::{Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::{
actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _},
error::SendError,
};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::{
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
user_agent::{
OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
BootstrapError, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleEvmWalletCreate,
HandleEvmWalletList, HandleGrantCreate, HandleGrantDelete,
HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess, HandleGrantList, HandleListWalletAccess,
HandleNewClientApprove, HandleQueryVaultState, HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess,
HandleSdkClientList, HandleSignTransaction, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey,
HandleUnsealRequest, SignTransactionError as SessionSignTransactionError,
UnsealError,
},
},
},
db::models::{CoreEvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess},
evm::{PolicyError, VetError, policies::EvalViolation},
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
request_tracker::RequestTracker,
},
};
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{Address, U256},
rlp::Decodable,
};
mod auth;
mod inbound;
mod outbound;
pub struct OutOfBandAdapter(mpsc::Sender<OutOfBand>);
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<OutOfBand> for OutOfBandAdapter {
async fn send(&mut self, item: OutOfBand) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.0.send(item).await.map_err(|e| {
warn!(error = ?e, "Failed to send out-of-band message");
TransportError::ChannelClosed
})
}
}
async fn dispatch_loop(
mut bi: GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
mut receiver: mpsc::Receiver<OutOfBand>,
mut request_tracker: RequestTracker,
) {
loop {
tokio::select! {
oob = receiver.recv() => {
let Some(oob) = oob else {
warn!("Out-of-band message channel closed");
return;
};
let payload = match oob {
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionRequest { profile } => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientConnectionRequest(ProtoSdkClientConnectionRequest {
pubkey: profile.pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
name: profile.metadata.name,
description: profile.metadata.description,
version: profile.metadata.version,
}),
})
}
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey } => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientConnectionCancel(ProtoSdkClientConnectionCancel {
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
})
}
};
if bi.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse { id: None, payload: Some(payload) })).await.is_err() {
return;
}
}
message = bi.recv() => {
let Some(message) = message else { return; };
let conn = match message {
Ok(conn) => conn,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to receive user agent request");
return;
}
};
let request_id = match request_tracker.request(conn.id) {
Ok(id) => id,
Err(err) => {
let _ = bi.send(Err(err)).await;
return;
}
};
let Some(payload) = conn.payload else {
let _ = bi.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing user-agent request payload"))).await;
return;
};
match dispatch_inner(&actor, payload).await {
Ok(Some(response)) => {
if bi.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
id: Some(request_id),
payload: Some(response),
})).await.is_err() {
return;
}
}
Ok(None) => {}
Err(status) => {
error!(?status, "Failed to process user agent request");
let _ = bi.send(Err(status)).await;
return;
}
}
}
}
}
}
async fn dispatch_inner(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
payload: UserAgentRequestPayload,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let response = match payload {
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealStart(UnsealStart { client_pubkey }) => {
let client_pubkey = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(client_pubkey)
.map(x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid X25519 public key"))?;
let response = actor
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest { client_pubkey })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle unseal start request");
Status::internal("Failed to start unseal flow")
})?;
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(
arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: response.server_pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
)
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealEncryptedKey(ProtoUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce,
ciphertext,
associated_data,
}) => {
let result = match actor
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce,
ciphertext,
associated_data,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(UnsealError::InvalidKey)) => {
ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle unseal request");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault"));
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(result.into())
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::BootstrapEncryptedKey(ProtoBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce,
ciphertext,
associated_data,
}) => {
let result = match actor
.ask(HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce,
ciphertext,
associated_data,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::InvalidKey
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle bootstrap request");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to bootstrap vault"));
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::BootstrapResult(result.into())
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::QueryVaultState(_) => {
let state = match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");
ProtoVaultState::Error
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::VaultState(state.into())
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmWalletCreate(_) => {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleEvmWalletCreate {}).await {
Ok((wallet_id, address)) => WalletCreateResult::Wallet(WalletEntry {
id: wallet_id,
address: address.to_vec(),
}),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to create EVM wallet");
WalletCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmWalletCreate(WalletCreateResponse {
result: Some(result),
})
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmWalletList(_) => {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleEvmWalletList {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => WalletListResult::Wallets(WalletList {
wallets: wallets
.into_iter()
.map(|(id, address)| WalletEntry {
address: address.to_vec(),
id,
})
.collect(),
}),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to list EVM wallets");
WalletListResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmWalletList(WalletListResponse {
result: Some(result),
})
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmGrantList(_) => {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleGrantList {}).await {
Ok(grants) => EvmGrantListResult::Grants(EvmGrantList {
grants: grants
.into_iter()
.map(|grant| GrantEntry {
id: grant.id,
wallet_access_id: grant.shared.wallet_access_id,
shared: Some(grant.shared.convert()),
specific: Some(grant.settings.convert()),
})
.collect(),
}),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to list EVM grants");
EvmGrantListResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmGrantList(EvmGrantListResponse {
result: Some(result),
})
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmGrantCreate(EvmGrantCreateRequest { shared, specific }) => {
let basic = shared
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing shared grant settings"))?
.try_convert()?;
let grant = specific
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing specific grant settings"))?
.try_convert()?;
let result = match actor.ask(HandleGrantCreate { basic, grant }).await {
Ok(grant_id) => EvmGrantCreateResult::GrantId(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to create EVM grant");
EvmGrantCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmGrantCreate(EvmGrantCreateResponse {
result: Some(result),
})
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmGrantDelete(EvmGrantDeleteRequest { grant_id }) => {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleGrantDelete { grant_id }).await {
Ok(()) => EvmGrantDeleteResult::Ok(()),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to delete EVM grant");
EvmGrantDeleteResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmGrantDelete(EvmGrantDeleteResponse {
result: Some(result),
})
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientConnectionResponse(resp) => {
let pubkey_bytes = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(resp.pubkey)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid Ed25519 public key length"))?;
let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey_bytes)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid Ed25519 public key"))?;
actor
.ask(HandleNewClientApprove {
approved: resp.approved,
pubkey,
})
.await
.map_err(|err| {
warn!(?err, "Failed to process client connection response");
Status::internal("Failed to process response")
})?;
return Ok(None);
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientRevoke(_) => todo!(),
UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientList(_) => {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleSdkClientList {}).await {
Ok(clients) => ProtoSdkClientListResult::Clients(ProtoSdkClientList {
clients: clients
.into_iter()
.map(|(client, metadata)| ProtoSdkClientEntry {
id: client.id,
pubkey: client.public_key,
info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
version: metadata.version,
}),
created_at: client.created_at.0.timestamp() as i32,
})
.collect(),
}),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to list SDK clients");
ProtoSdkClientListResult::Error(ProtoSdkClientError::Internal.into())
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientListResponse(ProtoSdkClientListResponse {
result: Some(result),
})
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::GrantWalletAccess(SdkClientGrantWalletAccess { accesses }) => {
let entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess> =
accesses.into_iter().map(|a| a.convert()).collect();
match actor.ask(HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess { entries }).await {
Ok(()) => {
info!("Successfully granted wallet access");
return Ok(None);
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to grant wallet access");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to grant wallet access"));
}
}
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::RevokeWalletAccess(SdkClientRevokeWalletAccess { accesses }) => {
match actor
.ask(HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess { entries: accesses })
.await
{
Ok(()) => {
info!("Successfully revoked wallet access");
return Ok(None);
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to revoke wallet access");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to revoke wallet access"));
}
}
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::ListWalletAccess(_) => {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleListWalletAccess {}).await {
Ok(accesses) => ListWalletAccessResponse {
accesses: accesses.into_iter().map(|a| a.convert()).collect(),
},
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to list wallet access");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to list wallet access"));
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::ListWalletAccessResponse(result)
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(..)
| UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(..) => {
warn!(?payload, "Unsupported post-auth user agent request");
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Unsupported user-agent request"));
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmSignTransaction(UserAgentEvmSignTransactionRequest {
client_id,
request,
}) => {
let Some(request) = request else {
warn!("Missing transaction signing request");
return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Missing transaction signing request",
));
};
let address: Address = RawEvmAddress(request.wallet_address).try_convert()?;
let transaction = RawEvmTransaction(request.rlp_transaction).try_convert()?;
let response = match actor
.ask(HandleSignTransaction {
client_id,
wallet_address: address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Signature(
signature.as_bytes().to_vec(),
)),
},
Err(SendError::HandlerError(SessionSignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
EvmSignTransactionResponse { result: Some(vet_error.convert()) }
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(SessionSignTransactionError::Internal)) => {
EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(
ProtoEvmError::Internal.into(),
)),
}
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to sign EVM transaction via user-agent");
EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(
ProtoEvmError::Internal.into(),
)),
}
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmSignTransaction(response)
}
};
Ok(Some(response))
}
pub async fn start(
mut conn: UserAgentConnection,
mut bi: GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
) {
let mut request_tracker = RequestTracker::default();
let pubkey = match auth::start(&mut conn, &mut bi, &mut request_tracker).await {
Ok(pubkey) => pubkey,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "Authentication failed");
return;
}
};
let (oob_sender, oob_receiver) = mpsc::channel(16);
let oob_adapter = OutOfBandAdapter(oob_sender);
let actor = UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new(conn, Box::new(oob_adapter)));
let actor_for_cleanup = actor.clone();
info!(?pubkey, "User authenticated successfully");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor, oob_receiver, request_tracker).await;
actor_for_cleanup.kill();
}

View File

@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{
AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
AuthChallengeSolution as ProtoAuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult,
KeyType as ProtoKeyType, UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth},
db::models::KeyType,
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
) -> Self {
Self {
bi,
request_tracker,
}
}
async fn send_user_agent_response(
&mut self,
payload: UserAgentResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.bi
.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
id: Some(self.request_tracker.current_request_id()),
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
use auth::{Error, Outbound};
let payload = match item {
Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(ProtoAuthChallenge { nonce })
}
Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthResult(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into())
}
Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthResult(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey.into())
}
Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthResult(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature.into())
}
Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthResult(ProtoAuthResult::TokenInvalid.into())
}
Err(Error::Internal { details }) => {
return self.bi.send(Err(Status::internal(details))).await;
}
Err(Error::Transport) => {
return self
.bi
.send(Err(Status::unavailable("transport error")))
.await;
}
};
self.send_user_agent_response(payload).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<auth::Inbound> {
let request = match self.bi.recv().await? {
Ok(request) => request,
Err(error) => {
warn!(error = ?error, "Failed to receive user agent auth request");
return None;
}
};
match self.request_tracker.request(request.id) {
Ok(request_id) => request_id,
Err(error) => {
let _ = self.bi.send(Err(error)).await;
return None;
}
};
let Some(payload) = request.payload else {
warn!(
event = "received request with empty payload",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
match payload {
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(ProtoAuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
key_type,
}) => {
let Ok(key_type) = ProtoKeyType::try_from(key_type) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid key type",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
let key_type = match key_type {
ProtoKeyType::Ed25519 => KeyType::Ed25519,
ProtoKeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
ProtoKeyType::Rsa => KeyType::Rsa,
ProtoKeyType::Unspecified => {
warn!(
event = "received request with unspecified key type",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
}
};
let Ok(pubkey) = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, pubkey)) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid public key",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
})
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution {
signature,
}) => Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature }),
_ => {
let _ = self
.bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Unsupported user-agent auth request",
)))
.await;
None
}
}
}
}
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
pub async fn start(
conn: &mut UserAgentConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, auth::Error> {
let transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
auth::authenticate(conn, transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use arbiter_proto::proto::evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
SpecificGrant as ProtoSpecificGrant, TokenTransferSettings as ProtoTokenTransferSettings,
TransactionRateLimit as ProtoTransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit as ProtoVolumeRateLimit,
specific_grant::Grant as ProtoSpecificGrantType,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{SdkClientWalletAccess, WalletAccess};
use chrono::{DateTime, TimeZone, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use tonic::Status;
use crate::db::models::{CoreEvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWallet, NewEvmWalletAccess};
use crate::grpc::Convert;
use crate::{
evm::policies::{
SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit, ether_transfer,
token_transfers,
},
grpc::TryConvert,
};
fn address_from_bytes(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Address, Status> {
if bytes.len() != 20 {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid EVM address"));
}
Ok(Address::from_slice(&bytes))
}
fn u256_from_proto_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<U256, Status> {
if bytes.len() > 32 {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid U256 byte length"));
}
Ok(U256::from_be_slice(bytes))
}
impl TryConvert for ProtoTimestamp {
type Output = DateTime<Utc>;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<DateTime<Utc>, Status> {
Utc.timestamp_opt(self.seconds, self.nanos as u32)
.single()
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid timestamp"))
}
}
impl TryConvert for ProtoTransactionRateLimit {
type Output = TransactionRateLimit;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<TransactionRateLimit, Status> {
Ok(TransactionRateLimit {
count: self.count,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(self.window_secs),
})
}
}
impl TryConvert for ProtoVolumeRateLimit {
type Output = VolumeRateLimit;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<VolumeRateLimit, Status> {
Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: u256_from_proto_bytes(&self.max_volume)?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(self.window_secs),
})
}
}
impl TryConvert for ProtoSharedSettings {
type Output = SharedGrantSettings;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<SharedGrantSettings, Status> {
Ok(SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_access_id: self.wallet_access_id,
chain: self.chain_id,
valid_from: self
.valid_from
.map(ProtoTimestamp::try_convert)
.transpose()?,
valid_until: self
.valid_until
.map(ProtoTimestamp::try_convert)
.transpose()?,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: self
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.as_deref()
.map(u256_from_proto_bytes)
.transpose()?,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: self
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.as_deref()
.map(u256_from_proto_bytes)
.transpose()?,
rate_limit: self
.rate_limit
.map(ProtoTransactionRateLimit::try_convert)
.transpose()?,
})
}
}
impl TryConvert for ProtoSpecificGrant {
type Output = SpecificGrant;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<SpecificGrant, Status> {
match self.grant {
Some(ProtoSpecificGrantType::EtherTransfer(ProtoEtherTransferSettings {
targets,
limit,
})) => Ok(SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Settings {
target: targets
.into_iter()
.map(address_from_bytes)
.collect::<Result<_, _>>()?,
limit: limit
.ok_or_else(|| {
Status::invalid_argument("Missing ether transfer volume rate limit")
})?
.try_convert()?,
})),
Some(ProtoSpecificGrantType::TokenTransfer(ProtoTokenTransferSettings {
token_contract,
target,
volume_limits,
})) => Ok(SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings {
token_contract: address_from_bytes(token_contract)?,
target: target.map(address_from_bytes).transpose()?,
volume_limits: volume_limits
.into_iter()
.map(ProtoVolumeRateLimit::try_convert)
.collect::<Result<_, _>>()?,
})),
None => Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing specific grant kind")),
}
}
}
impl Convert for WalletAccess {
type Output = NewEvmWalletAccess;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: self.wallet_id,
client_id: self.sdk_client_id,
}
}
}
impl TryConvert for SdkClientWalletAccess {
type Output = CoreEvmWalletAccess;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<CoreEvmWalletAccess, Status> {
let Some(access) = self.access else {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing wallet access entry"));
};
Ok(CoreEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: access.wallet_id,
client_id: access.sdk_client_id,
id: self.id,
})
}
}

View File

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
SpecificGrant as ProtoSpecificGrant, TokenTransferSettings as ProtoTokenTransferSettings,
TransactionRateLimit as ProtoTransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit as ProtoVolumeRateLimit,
specific_grant::Grant as ProtoSpecificGrantType,
},
user_agent::{SdkClientWalletAccess as ProtoSdkClientWalletAccess, WalletAccess},
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use crate::{
db::models::EvmWalletAccess,
evm::policies::{SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit},
grpc::Convert,
};
impl Convert for DateTime<Utc> {
type Output = ProtoTimestamp;
fn convert(self) -> ProtoTimestamp {
ProtoTimestamp {
seconds: self.timestamp(),
nanos: self.timestamp_subsec_nanos() as i32,
}
}
}
impl Convert for TransactionRateLimit {
type Output = ProtoTransactionRateLimit;
fn convert(self) -> ProtoTransactionRateLimit {
ProtoTransactionRateLimit {
count: self.count,
window_secs: self.window.num_seconds(),
}
}
}
impl Convert for VolumeRateLimit {
type Output = ProtoVolumeRateLimit;
fn convert(self) -> ProtoVolumeRateLimit {
ProtoVolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: self.max_volume.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec(),
window_secs: self.window.num_seconds(),
}
}
}
impl Convert for SharedGrantSettings {
type Output = ProtoSharedSettings;
fn convert(self) -> ProtoSharedSettings {
ProtoSharedSettings {
wallet_access_id: self.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: self.chain,
valid_from: self.valid_from.map(DateTime::convert),
valid_until: self.valid_until.map(DateTime::convert),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: self
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|value| value.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: self
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|value| value.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec()),
rate_limit: self.rate_limit.map(TransactionRateLimit::convert),
}
}
}
impl Convert for SpecificGrant {
type Output = ProtoSpecificGrant;
fn convert(self) -> ProtoSpecificGrant {
let grant = match self {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(s) => {
ProtoSpecificGrantType::EtherTransfer(ProtoEtherTransferSettings {
targets: s.target.into_iter().map(|a| a.to_vec()).collect(),
limit: Some(s.limit.convert()),
})
}
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(s) => {
ProtoSpecificGrantType::TokenTransfer(ProtoTokenTransferSettings {
token_contract: s.token_contract.to_vec(),
target: s.target.map(|a| a.to_vec()),
volume_limits: s
.volume_limits
.into_iter()
.map(VolumeRateLimit::convert)
.collect(),
})
}
};
ProtoSpecificGrant { grant: Some(grant) }
}
}
impl Convert for EvmWalletAccess {
type Output = ProtoSdkClientWalletAccess;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
Self::Output {
id: self.id,
access: Some(WalletAccess {
wallet_id: self.wallet_id,
sdk_client_id: self.client_id,
}),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,28 @@
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
use crate::context::ServerContext;
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse, UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
transport::{BiStream, GrpcTransportActor, wire},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::actor::PreparedActor;
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tonic::{Request, Response, Status};
use crate::{
actors::{
client::handle_client,
user_agent::UserAgentActor,
},
context::ServerContext,
};
pub mod actors;
pub mod context;
pub mod db;
pub mod evm;
pub mod grpc;
pub mod safe_cell;
pub mod utils;
const DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE: usize = 1000;
pub struct Server {
context: ServerContext,
@@ -18,3 +33,51 @@ impl Server {
Self { context }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for Server {
type UserAgentStream = ReceiverStream<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>;
type ClientStream = ReceiverStream<Result<ClientResponse, Status>>;
async fn client(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<ClientRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::ClientStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE);
tokio::spawn(handle_client(
self.context.clone(),
BiStream {
request_stream: req_stream,
response_sender: tx,
},
));
Ok(Response::new(ReceiverStream::new(rx)))
}
async fn user_agent(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<UserAgentRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::UserAgentStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE);
let context = self.context.clone();
wire(
|prepared: PreparedActor<UserAgentActor>, recipient| {
prepared.spawn(UserAgentActor::new(context, recipient));
},
|prepared: PreparedActor<GrpcTransportActor<_, _, _>>, business_recipient| {
prepared.spawn(GrpcTransportActor::new(
tx,
req_stream,
business_recipient,
));
},
)
.await;
Ok(Response::new(ReceiverStream::new(rx)))
}
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ use std::net::SocketAddr;
use arbiter_proto::{proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterServiceServer, url::ArbiterUrl};
use arbiter_server::{Server, actors::bootstrap::GetToken, context::ServerContext, db};
use miette::miette;
use rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs;
use tonic::transport::{Identity, ServerTlsConfig};
use tracing::info;
@@ -11,8 +10,6 @@ const PORT: u16 = 50051;
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> miette::Result<()> {
aws_lc_rs::default_provider().install_default().unwrap();
tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(
tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()

View File

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
use std::{any::type_name, fmt};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
type CellRead<'a>: Deref<Target = T>
where
Self: 'a,
T: 'a;
type CellWrite<'a>: Deref<Target = T> + DerefMut<Target = T>
where
Self: 'a,
T: 'a;
fn new(value: T) -> Self
where
Self: Sized;
fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_>;
fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_>;
fn new_inline<F>(f: F) -> Self
where
Self: Sized,
T: Default,
F: for<'a> FnOnce(&'a mut T),
{
let mut cell = Self::new(T::default());
{
let mut handle = cell.write();
f(handle.deref_mut());
}
cell
}
#[inline(always)]
fn read_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
where
F: FnOnce(&T) -> R,
{
f(&*self.read())
}
#[inline(always)]
fn write_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
where
F: FnOnce(&mut T) -> R,
{
f(&mut *self.write())
}
}
pub struct MemSafeCell<T>(MemSafe<T>);
impl<T> fmt::Debug for MemSafeCell<T> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("MemSafeCell")
.field("inner", &format_args!("<protected {}>", type_name::<T>()))
.finish()
}
}
impl<T> SafeCellHandle<T> for MemSafeCell<T> {
type CellRead<'a>
= memsafe::MemSafeRead<'a, T>
where
Self: 'a,
T: 'a;
type CellWrite<'a>
= memsafe::MemSafeWrite<'a, T>
where
Self: 'a,
T: 'a;
fn new(value: T) -> Self {
match MemSafe::new(value) {
Ok(inner) => Self(inner),
Err(err) => {
// If protected memory cannot be allocated, process integrity is compromised.
abort_memory_breach("safe cell allocation", &err)
}
}
}
#[inline(always)]
fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_> {
match self.0.read() {
Ok(inner) => inner,
Err(err) => abort_memory_breach("safe cell read", &err),
}
}
#[inline(always)]
fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_> {
match self.0.write() {
Ok(inner) => inner,
Err(err) => {
// If protected memory becomes unwritable here, treat it as a fatal memory breach.
abort_memory_breach("safe cell write", &err)
}
}
}
}
fn abort_memory_breach(action: &str, err: &memsafe::error::MemoryError) -> ! {
eprintln!("fatal {action}: {err}");
std::process::abort();
}
pub type SafeCell<T> = MemSafeCell<T>;

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
struct DeferClosure<F: FnOnce()> {
f: Option<F>,
}
impl<F: FnOnce()> Drop for DeferClosure<F> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if let Some(f) = self.f.take() {
f();
}
}
}
// Run some code when a scope is exited, similar to Go's defer statement
pub fn defer<F: FnOnce()>(f: F) -> impl Drop + Sized {
DeferClosure { f: Some(f) }
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
mod common;
#[path = "client/auth.rs"]
mod auth;

View File

@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::ClientMetadata;
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::actors::GlobalActors;
use arbiter_server::{
actors::client::{ClientConnection, auth, connect_client},
db,
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, NullableExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
fn metadata(name: &str, description: Option<&str>, version: Option<&str>) -> ClientMetadata {
ClientMetadata {
name: name.to_owned(),
description: description.map(str::to_owned),
version: version.map(str::to_owned),
}
}
async fn insert_registered_client(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: Vec<u8>,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) {
use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut server_transport = server_transport;
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
metadata: metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Auth fails, connect_client returns, transport drops
task.await.unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
insert_registered_client(
&db,
pubkey_bytes.clone(),
&metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
)
.await;
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut server_transport = server_transport;
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
// Send challenge request
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
metadata: metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Read the challenge response
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
// Sign the challenge and send solution
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge.1, challenge.0.as_bytes());
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive auth success");
match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {}
Ok(other) => panic!("Expected AuthSuccess, got {other:?}"),
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
}
// Auth completes, session spawned
task.await.unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let requested = metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0"));
{
use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&requested.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&requested.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&requested.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut server_transport = server_transport;
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
metadata: requested,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport.recv().await.unwrap().unwrap();
let (pubkey, nonce) = match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
};
let signature = new_key.sign(&arbiter_proto::format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes()));
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
.await
.unwrap();
let _ = test_transport.recv().await.unwrap();
task.await.unwrap();
{
use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history};
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let metadata_count: i64 = client_metadata::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let history_count: i64 = client_metadata_history::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(metadata_count, 1);
assert_eq!(history_count, 0);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
{
use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq("client"),
client_metadata::description.eq(Some("old")),
client_metadata::version.eq(Some("1.0.0")),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut server_transport = server_transport;
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
metadata: metadata("client", Some("new"), Some("2.0.0")),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport.recv().await.unwrap().unwrap();
let (pubkey, nonce) = match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
};
let signature = new_key.sign(&arbiter_proto::format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes()));
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
.await
.unwrap();
let _ = test_transport.recv().await.unwrap();
task.await.unwrap();
{
use arbiter_server::db::schema::{
client_metadata, client_metadata_history, program_client,
};
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let metadata_count: i64 = client_metadata::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let history_count: i64 = client_metadata_history::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let metadata_id = program_client::table
.select(program_client::metadata_id)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let current = client_metadata::table
.find(metadata_id)
.select((
client_metadata::name,
client_metadata::description.nullable(),
client_metadata::version.nullable(),
))
.first::<(String, Option<String>, Option<String>)>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(metadata_count, 2);
assert_eq!(history_count, 1);
assert_eq!(
current,
(
"client".to_owned(),
Some("new".to_owned()),
Some("2.0.0".to_owned())
)
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,19 +1,16 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Error, Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
db::{self, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actor
.bootstrap(SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()))
.bootstrap(MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
actor
@@ -29,59 +26,3 @@ pub async fn root_key_history_id(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> i32 {
.unwrap();
id.expect("root_key_id should be set after bootstrap")
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub struct ChannelTransport<T, Y> {
receiver: mpsc::Receiver<T>,
sender: mpsc::Sender<Y>,
}
impl<T, Y> ChannelTransport<T, Y> {
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn new() -> (Self, ChannelTransport<Y, T>) {
let (tx1, rx1) = mpsc::channel(10);
let (tx2, rx2) = mpsc::channel(10);
(
Self {
receiver: rx1,
sender: tx2,
},
ChannelTransport {
receiver: rx2,
sender: tx1,
},
)
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Y> Sender<Y> for ChannelTransport<T, Y>
where
T: Send + Sync + 'static,
Y: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Y) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.sender
.send(item)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::ChannelClosed)
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Y> Receiver<T> for ChannelTransport<T, Y>
where
T: Send + Sync + 'static,
Y: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<T> {
self.receiver.recv().await
}
}
impl<T, Y> Bi<T, Y> for ChannelTransport<T, Y>
where
T: Send + Sync + 'static,
Y: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
}

View File

@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Error, KeyHolder},
db::{self, models, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::sql_query};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use tokio::task::JoinSet;
use crate::common;
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ async fn write_concurrently(
let plaintext = format!("{prefix}-{i}").into_bytes();
let id = actor
.ask(CreateNew {
plaintext: SafeCell::new(plaintext.clone()),
plaintext: MemSafe::new(plaintext.clone()).unwrap(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
drop(conn);
let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"should fail".to_vec()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"should fail".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::DatabaseTransaction(_)));
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
let mut decryptor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
decryptor
.try_unseal(SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()))
.try_unseal(MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
for (id, plaintext) in expected {
let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{Error, KeyHolder},
db::{self, models, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::common;
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ async fn test_bootstrap() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let seal_key2 = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let seal_key2 = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::AlreadyBootstrapped));
}
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"data".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
@@ -91,17 +91,17 @@ async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -112,20 +112,20 @@ async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let plaintext = b"important data";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let bad_key = SafeCell::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec());
let bad_key = MemSafe::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec()).unwrap();
let err = actor.try_unseal(bad_key).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidKey));
let good_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let good_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}

View File

@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ use std::collections::HashSet;
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{Error, encryption::v1},
db::{self, models, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::common;
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
let plaintext = b"same content";
let id1 = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let id2 = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1).await.unwrap();
let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*d1.read(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d2.read(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d1.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d2.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ async fn test_nonce_never_reused() {
let n = 5;
for i in 0..n {
actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
}
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
drop(conn);
let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"must fail".to_vec()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"must fail".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()))
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,30 @@
mod common;
use arbiter_proto::proto::UserAgentResponse;
use arbiter_server::actors::user_agent::UserAgentError;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::Recipient, actor::Spawn, prelude::Message};
/// A no-op actor that discards any messages it receives.
#[derive(Actor)]
struct NullSink;
impl Message<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>> for NullSink {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_msg: Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>,
_ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
}
}
/// Creates a `Recipient` that silently discards all messages.
fn null_recipient() -> Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>> {
let actor_ref = NullSink::spawn(NullSink);
actor_ref.recipient()
}
#[path = "user_agent/auth.rs"]
mod auth;
#[path = "user_agent/unseal.rs"]

View File

@@ -1,51 +1,57 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UserAgentResponse,
auth::{self, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk},
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
bootstrap::GetToken,
user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth},
user_agent::{HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution, UserAgentActor},
},
db::{self, schema},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let db =db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
});
let user_agent =
UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
},
})
.await
.unwrap();
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive auth result");
match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {}
other => panic!("Expected AuthSuccess, got {other:?}"),
}
task.await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(
result,
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
AuthOk {},
)),
},
)),
}
);
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let stored_pubkey: Vec<u8> = schema::useragent_client::table
@@ -60,174 +66,106 @@ pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
});
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let user_agent =
UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_string()),
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_string()),
},
})
.await
.unwrap();
.await;
assert!(matches!(
task.await.unwrap(),
Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
));
// Verify no key was registered
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let count: i64 = schema::useragent_client::table
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 0);
match result {
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
assert!(
matches!(err, arbiter_server::actors::user_agent::UserAgentError::InvalidBootstrapToken),
"Expected InvalidBootstrapToken, got {err:?}"
);
}
Err(other) => {
panic!("Expected SendError::HandlerError, got {other:?}");
}
Ok(_) => {
panic!("Expected error due to invalid bootstrap token, but got success");
}
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let user_agent =
UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
// Pre-register key with key_type
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
))
.values(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
});
// Send challenge request
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
bootstrap_token: None,
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: None,
},
})
.await
.unwrap();
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
// Read the challenge response
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce } => nonce,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
let UserAgentResponse {
payload:
Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload:
Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthChallenge(challenge)),
})),
} = result
else {
panic!("Expected auth challenge response, got {result:?}");
};
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge, &pubkey_bytes);
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(&challenge);
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
let serialized_signature = signature.to_bytes().to_vec();
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeSolution {
solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: serialized_signature,
},
})
.await
.unwrap();
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive auth result");
match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {}
other => panic!("Expected AuthSuccess, got {other:?}"),
}
task.await.unwrap().unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
// Pre-register key with key_type
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
});
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
bootstrap_token: None,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce } => nonce,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
// Sign a different challenge value so signature format is valid but verification must fail.
let wrong_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge + 1, &pubkey_bytes);
let signature = new_key.sign(&wrong_challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
task.await.unwrap(),
Err(auth::Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
));
assert_eq!(
result,
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
AuthOk {},
)),
},
)),
}
);
}

View File

@@ -1,55 +1,81 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult, UnsealStart, auth::AuthChallengeRequest,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
bootstrap::GetToken,
keyholder::{Bootstrap, Seal},
user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::connection::{
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest, UnsealError,
}},
user_agent::{
HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest,
UserAgentActor,
},
},
db,
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
async fn setup_sealed_user_agent(
async fn setup_authenticated_user_agent(
seal_key: &[u8],
) -> (db::DatabasePool, kameo::actor::ActorRef<UserAgentSession>) {
) -> (arbiter_server::db::DatabasePool, ActorRef<UserAgentActor>) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.key_holder
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(seal_key.to_vec()),
seal_key_raw: MemSafe::new(seal_key.to_vec()).unwrap(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actors.key_holder.ask(Seal).await.unwrap();
let session = UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new_test(db.clone(), actors));
let user_agent =
UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors.clone(), super::null_recipient());
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
(db, session)
}
async fn client_dh_encrypt(
user_agent: &kameo::actor::ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
key_to_send: &[u8],
) -> HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
let response = user_agent
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
client_pubkey: client_public,
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
let auth_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: auth_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
},
})
.await
.unwrap();
let server_pubkey = response.server_pubkey;
(db, user_agent_ref)
}
let shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&server_pubkey);
async fn client_dh_encrypt(
user_agent_ref: &ActorRef<UserAgentActor>,
key_to_send: &[u8],
) -> UnsealEncryptedKey {
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
let response = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
req: UnsealStart {
client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
})
.await
.unwrap();
let server_pubkey = match response.payload.unwrap() {
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(resp) => resp.server_pubkey,
other => panic!("Expected UnsealStartResponse, got {other:?}"),
};
let server_public = PublicKey::from(<[u8; 32]>::try_from(server_pubkey.as_slice()).unwrap());
let shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&server_public);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let nonce = XNonce::from([0u8; 24]);
let associated_data = b"unseal";
@@ -58,7 +84,7 @@ async fn client_dh_encrypt(
.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut ciphertext)
.unwrap();
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
UnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
ciphertext,
associated_data: associated_data.to_vec(),
@@ -69,83 +95,136 @@ async fn client_dh_encrypt(
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_success() {
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(seal_key).await;
let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, seal_key).await;
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(())));
let response = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::Success.into()),
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(b"correct-key").await;
let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(b"correct-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, b"wrong-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, b"wrong-key").await;
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(
response,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
UnsealError::InvalidKey
))
));
let response = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(b"test-key").await;
let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(b"test-key").await;
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
user_agent
user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
client_pubkey: client_public,
req: UnsealStart {
client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = user_agent
let response = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
associated_data: vec![],
req: UnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
associated_data: vec![],
},
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_start_without_auth_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let user_agent =
UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
req: UnsealStart {
client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
})
.await;
assert!(matches!(
response,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
UnsealError::InvalidKey
))
));
match result {
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
assert!(
matches!(err, arbiter_server::actors::user_agent::UserAgentError::InvalidState),
"Expected InvalidState, got {err:?}"
);
}
other => panic!("Expected state machine error, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {
let seal_key = b"real-seal-key";
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(seal_key).await;
let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(seal_key).await;
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, b"wrong-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, b"wrong-key").await;
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(
response,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
UnsealError::InvalidKey
))
));
let response = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
);
}
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, seal_key).await;
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(())));
let response = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::Success.into()),
);
}
}

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