feat(transport): add domain error type to GrpcTransportActor

.vscode/settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+{
+    "git.enabled": false
+}

.woodpecker/server-audit.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ when:
       include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
 
 steps:
-  - name: test
+  - name: audit
     image: jdxcode/mise:latest
     directory: server
     environment:

.woodpecker/server-lint.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+when:
+  - event: pull_request
+    path:
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+  - event: push
+    branch: main
+    path:
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+
+steps:
+  - name: lint
+    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
+    directory: server
+    environment:
+      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
+      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
+    volumes:
+      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
+      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
+    commands:
+      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
+      - mise install rust 
+      - mise install protoc
+      - mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings

.woodpecker/server-vet.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ when:
       include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
 
 steps:
-  - name: test
+  - name: vet
     image: jdxcode/mise:latest
     directory: server
     environment:

ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 Arbiter is a permissioned signing service for cryptocurrency wallets. It runs as a background service on the user's machine with an optional client application for vault management.
 
 **Core principle:** The vault NEVER exposes key material. It only produces signatures when a request satisfies the configured policies.
-
 ---
 
 ## 1. Peer Types

LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+                                 Apache License
+                           Version 2.0, January 2004
+                        http://www.apache.org/licenses/
+
+   TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION
+
+   1. Definitions.
+
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+      and distribution as defined by Sections 1 through 9 of this document.
+
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+
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+      direction or management of such entity, whether by contract or
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+
+      "You" (or "Your") shall mean an individual or Legal Entity
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+   5. Submission of Contributions. Unless You explicitly state otherwise,
+      any Contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the Work
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+      this License, without any additional terms or conditions.
+      Notwithstanding the above, nothing herein shall supersede or modify
+      the terms of any separate license agreement you may have executed
+      with Licensor regarding such Contributions.
+
+   6. Trademarks. This License does not grant permission to use the trade
+      names, trademarks, service marks, or product names of the Licensor,
+      except as required for reasonable and customary use in describing the
+      origin of the Work and reproducing the content of the NOTICE file.
+
+   7. Disclaimer of Warranty. Unless required by applicable law or
+      agreed to in writing, Licensor provides the Work (and each
+      Contributor provides its Contributions) on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+      WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or
+      implied, including, without limitation, any warranties or conditions
+      of TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, or FITNESS FOR A
+      PARTICULAR PURPOSE. You are solely responsible for determining the
+      appropriateness of using or redistributing the Work and assume any
+      risks associated with Your exercise of permissions under this License.
+
+   8. Limitation of Liability. In no event and under no legal theory,
+      whether in tort (including negligence), contract, or otherwise,
+      unless required by applicable law (such as deliberate and grossly
+      negligent acts) or agreed to in writing, shall any Contributor be
+      liable to You for damages, including any direct, indirect, special,
+      incidental, or consequential damages of any character arising as a
+      result of this License or out of the use or inability to use the
+      Work (including but not limited to damages for loss of goodwill,
+      work stoppage, computer failure or malfunction, or any and all
+      other commercial damages or losses), even if such Contributor
+      has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
+
+   9. Accepting Warranty or Additional Liability. While redistributing
+      the Work or Derivative Works thereof, You may choose to offer,
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+      on Your own behalf and on Your sole responsibility, not on behalf
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+      defend, and hold each Contributor harmless for any liability
+      incurred by, or claims asserted against, such Contributor by reason
+      of your accepting any such warranty or additional liability.
+
+   END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
+
+   Copyright 2026 MarketTakers
+
+   Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+   you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+   You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+       http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+   Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+   distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+   WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+   See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+   limitations under the License.

README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Arbiter
+> Policy-first multi-client wallet daemon, allowing permissioned transactions across blockchains
+
+## Security warning
+Arbiter can't meaningfully protect against host compromise. Potential attack flow:
+- Attacker steals TLS keys from database
+- Pretends to be server; just accepts user agent challenge solutions
+- Pretend to be in sealed state and performing DH with client
+- Steals user password and derives seal key
+
+While this attack is highly targetive, it's still possible. 
+
+> This software is experimental. Do not use with funds you cannot afford to lose.

app/.dart_tool/package_config.json

@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@
       "packageUri": "lib/",
       "languageVersion": "3.4"
     },
+    {
+      "name": "cupertino_icons",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/cupertino_icons-1.0.8",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
     {
       "name": "fake_async",
       "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/fake_async-1.3.3",
@@ -158,7 +164,7 @@
       "languageVersion": "3.5"
     },
     {
-      "name": "arbiter",
+      "name": "app",
       "rootUri": "../",
       "packageUri": "lib/",
       "languageVersion": "3.10"

app/.dart_tool/package_graph.json

@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 {
   "roots": [
-    "arbiter"
+    "app"
   ],
   "packages": [
     {
-      "name": "arbiter",
-      "version": "0.1.0",
+      "name": "app",
+      "version": "1.0.0+1",
       "dependencies": [
+        "cupertino_icons",
         "flutter"
       ],
       "devDependencies": [
@@ -39,6 +40,11 @@
         "vector_math"
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "name": "cupertino_icons",
+      "version": "1.0.8",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
     {
       "name": "flutter",
       "version": "0.0.0",

app/macos/Flutter/ephemeral/Flutter-Generated.xcconfig

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 // This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
 FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable
-FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/useragent
+FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app
 COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true
 FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build
-FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=0.1.0
-FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=0.1.0
+FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0
+FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1
 DART_OBFUSCATION=false
 TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true
 TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false

app/macos/Flutter/ephemeral/flutter_export_environment.sh

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
 export "FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable"
-export "FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/useragent"
+export "FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app"
 export "COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true"
 export "FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build"
-export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=0.1.0"
-export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=0.1.0"
+export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0"
+export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1"
 export "DART_OBFUSCATION=false"
 export "TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true"
 export "TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false"

app/pubspec.yaml

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-name: app
-description: "A new Flutter project."
-# The following line prevents the package from being accidentally published to
-# pub.dev using `flutter pub publish`. This is preferred for private packages.
-publish_to: 'none' # Remove this line if you wish to publish to pub.dev
-
-# The following defines the version and build number for your application.
-# A version number is three numbers separated by dots, like 1.2.43
-# followed by an optional build number separated by a +.
-# Both the version and the builder number may be overridden in flutter
-# build by specifying --build-name and --build-number, respectively.
-# In Android, build-name is used as versionName while build-number used as versionCode.
-# Read more about Android versioning at https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/versioning
-# In iOS, build-name is used as CFBundleShortVersionString while build-number is used as CFBundleVersion.
-# Read more about iOS versioning at
-# https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/CoreFoundationKeys.html
-# In Windows, build-name is used as the major, minor, and patch parts
-# of the product and file versions while build-number is used as the build suffix.
-version: 1.0.0+1
-
-environment:
-  sdk: ^3.10.8
-
-# Dependencies specify other packages that your package needs in order to work.
-# To automatically upgrade your package dependencies to the latest versions
-# consider running `flutter pub upgrade --major-versions`. Alternatively,
-# dependencies can be manually updated by changing the version numbers below to
-# the latest version available on pub.dev. To see which dependencies have newer
-# versions available, run `flutter pub outdated`.
-dependencies:
-  flutter:
-    sdk: flutter
-
-  # The following adds the Cupertino Icons font to your application.
-  # Use with the CupertinoIcons class for iOS style icons.
-  cupertino_icons: ^1.0.8
-
-dev_dependencies:
-  flutter_test:
-    sdk: flutter
-
-  # The "flutter_lints" package below contains a set of recommended lints to
-  # encourage good coding practices. The lint set provided by the package is
-  # activated in the `analysis_options.yaml` file located at the root of your
-  # package. See that file for information about deactivating specific lint
-  # rules and activating additional ones.
-  flutter_lints: ^6.0.0
-
-# For information on the generic Dart part of this file, see the
-# following page: https://dart.dev/tools/pub/pubspec
-
-# The following section is specific to Flutter packages.
-flutter:
-
-  # The following line ensures that the Material Icons font is
-  # included with your application, so that you can use the icons in
-  # the material Icons class.
-  uses-material-design: true
-
-  # To add assets to your application, add an assets section, like this:
-  # assets:
-  #   - images/a_dot_burr.jpeg
-  #   - images/a_dot_ham.jpeg
-
-  # An image asset can refer to one or more resolution-specific "variants", see
-  # https://flutter.dev/to/resolution-aware-images
-
-  # For details regarding adding assets from package dependencies, see
-  # https://flutter.dev/to/asset-from-package
-
-  # To add custom fonts to your application, add a fonts section here,
-  # in this "flutter" section. Each entry in this list should have a
-  # "family" key with the font family name, and a "fonts" key with a
-  # list giving the asset and other descriptors for the font. For
-  # example:
-  # fonts:
-  #   - family: Schyler
-  #     fonts:
-  #       - asset: fonts/Schyler-Regular.ttf
-  #       - asset: fonts/Schyler-Italic.ttf
-  #         style: italic
-  #   - family: Trajan Pro
-  #     fonts:
-  #       - asset: fonts/TrajanPro.ttf
-  #       - asset: fonts/TrajanPro_Bold.ttf
-  #         weight: 700
-  #
-  # For details regarding fonts from package dependencies,
-  # see https://flutter.dev/to/font-from-package

mise.lock

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ backend = "cargo:cargo-features"
 version = "0.11.1"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
 
+[[tools."cargo:cargo-insta"]]
+version = "1.46.3"
+backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
+
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
 version = "0.9.126"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"

mise.toml

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
 "cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.6", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = false }
 "cargo:cargo-audit" = "0.22.1"
 "cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
-
 flutter = "3.38.9-stable"
 protoc = "29.6"
-rust = "1.93.1"
+"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy"}
 "cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.11.1"
 "cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
 "cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
+"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.46.3"

protobufs/arbiter.proto

@@ -3,111 +3,14 @@ syntax = "proto3";
 package arbiter;
 
 import "auth.proto";
-
-message ClientRequest {
-  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
-    CertRotationAck cert_rotation_ack = 2;
-  }
-}
-
-message ClientResponse {
-  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
-    CertRotationNotification cert_rotation_notification = 2;
-  }
-}
-
-message UserAgentRequest {
-  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
-    CertRotationAck cert_rotation_ack = 2;
-    UnsealRequest unseal_request = 3;
-  }
-}
-message UserAgentResponse {
-  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
-    CertRotationNotification cert_rotation_notification = 2;
-    UnsealResponse unseal_response = 3;
-  }
-}
+import "client.proto";
+import "user_agent.proto";
 
 message ServerInfo {
   string version = 1;
   bytes cert_public_key = 2;
 }
 
-// TLS Certificate Rotation Protocol
-message CertRotationNotification {
-  // New public certificate (DER-encoded)
-  bytes new_cert = 1;
-
-  // Unix timestamp when rotation will be executed (if all ACKs received)
-  int64 rotation_scheduled_at = 2;
-
-  // Unix timestamp deadline for ACK (7 days from now)
-  int64 ack_deadline = 3;
-
-  // Rotation ID for tracking
-  int32 rotation_id = 4;
-}
-
-message CertRotationAck {
-  // Rotation ID (from CertRotationNotification)
-  int32 rotation_id = 1;
-
-  // Client public key for identification
-  bytes client_public_key = 2;
-
-  // Confirmation that client saved the new certificate
-  bool cert_saved = 3;
-}
-
-// Vault Unseal Protocol (X25519 ECDH + ChaCha20Poly1305)
-message UnsealRequest {
-  oneof payload {
-    EphemeralKeyRequest ephemeral_key_request = 1;
-    SealedPassword sealed_password = 2;
-  }
-}
-
-message UnsealResponse {
-  oneof payload {
-    EphemeralKeyResponse ephemeral_key_response = 1;
-    UnsealResult unseal_result = 2;
-  }
-}
-
-message EphemeralKeyRequest {}
-
-message EphemeralKeyResponse {
-  // Server's X25519 ephemeral public key (32 bytes)
-  bytes server_pubkey = 1;
-
-  // Unix timestamp when this key expires (60 seconds from generation)
-  int64 expires_at = 2;
-}
-
-message SealedPassword {
-  // Client's X25519 ephemeral public key (32 bytes)
-  bytes client_pubkey = 1;
-
-  // ChaCha20Poly1305 encrypted password (ciphertext + tag)
-  bytes encrypted_password = 2;
-
-  // 12-byte nonce for ChaCha20Poly1305
-  bytes nonce = 3;
-}
-
-message UnsealResult {
-  // Whether unseal was successful
-  bool success = 1;
-
-  // Error message if unseal failed
-  optional string error_message = 2;
-}
-
 service ArbiterService {
   rpc Client(stream ClientRequest) returns (stream ClientResponse);
   rpc UserAgent(stream UserAgentRequest) returns (stream UserAgentResponse);

protobufs/client.proto

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+syntax = "proto3";
+
+package arbiter;
+
+import "auth.proto";
+
+message ClientRequest {
+  oneof payload {
+    arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
+  }
+}
+
+message ClientResponse {
+  oneof payload {
+    arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
+  }
+}

protobufs/google/protobuf/timestamp.proto

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-// Protocol Buffers - Google's data interchange format
-// Copyright 2008 Google Inc.  All rights reserved.
-//
-// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
-// met:
-//
-//     * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-//     * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
-// copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
-// in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-// distribution.
-//     * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
-// contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
-// this software without specific prior written permission.
-
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package google.protobuf;
-
-option csharp_namespace = "Google.Protobuf.WellKnownTypes";
-option cc_enable_arenas = true;
-option go_package = "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb";
-option java_package = "com.google.protobuf";
-option java_outer_classname = "TimestampProto";
-option java_multiple_files = true;
-option objc_class_prefix = "GPB";
-
-// A Timestamp represents a point in time independent of any time zone or local
-// calendar, encoded as a count of seconds and fractions of seconds at
-// nanosecond resolution. The count is relative to an epoch at UTC midnight on
-// January 1, 1970, in the proleptic Gregorian calendar which extends the
-// Gregorian calendar backwards to year one.
-message Timestamp {
-  // Represents seconds of UTC time since Unix epoch
-  // 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z. Must be from 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z to
-  // 9999-12-31T23:59:59Z inclusive.
-  int64 seconds = 1;
-
-  // Non-negative fractions of a second at nanosecond resolution. Negative
-  // second values with fractions must still have non-negative nanos values
-  // that count forward in time. Must be from 0 to 999,999,999
-  // inclusive.
-  int32 nanos = 2;
-}

protobufs/unseal.proto

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package arbiter.unseal;
-
-message UserAgentKeyRequest {}
-
-message ServerKeyResponse {
-  bytes pubkey = 1;
-}
-message UserAgentSealedKey {
-  bytes sealed_key = 1;
-  bytes pubkey = 2;
-  bytes nonce = 3;
-}

protobufs/user_agent.proto

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+syntax = "proto3";
+
+package arbiter;
+
+import "auth.proto";
+import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
+
+message UnsealStart {
+  bytes client_pubkey = 1;
+}
+
+message UnsealStartResponse {
+  bytes server_pubkey = 1;
+}
+message UnsealEncryptedKey {
+  bytes nonce = 1;
+  bytes ciphertext = 2;
+  bytes associated_data = 3;
+}
+
+enum UnsealResult {
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
+}
+
+enum VaultState {
+  VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
+  VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
+  VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
+  VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
+}
+
+message UserAgentRequest {
+  oneof payload {
+    arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
+    UnsealStart unseal_start = 2;
+    UnsealEncryptedKey unseal_encrypted_key = 3;
+    google.protobuf.Empty query_vault_state = 4;
+  }
+}
+message UserAgentResponse {
+  oneof payload {
+    arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
+    UnsealStartResponse unseal_start_response = 2;
+    UnsealResult unseal_result = 3;
+    VaultState vault_state = 4;
+  }
+}

server/Cargo.toml

@@ -23,4 +23,12 @@ async-trait = "0.1.89"
 futures = "0.3.31"
 tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
 kameo = "0.19.2"
-prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
+x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
+rstest = "0.26.1"
+rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
+rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
+    "aws_lc_rs",
+    "pem",
+    "x509-parser",
+    "zeroize",
+], default-features = false }

server/crates/arbiter-client/Cargo.toml

@@ -3,5 +3,6 @@ name = "arbiter-client"
 version = "0.1.0"
 edition = "2024"
 repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
+license = "Apache-2.0"
 
 [dependencies]

server/crates/arbiter-proto/Cargo.toml

@@ -3,20 +3,32 @@ name = "arbiter-proto"
 version = "0.1.0"
 edition = "2024"
 repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
+license = "Apache-2.0"
 
 [dependencies]
 tonic.workspace = true
 tokio.workspace = true
 futures.workspace = true
-hex = "0.4.3"
 tonic-prost = "0.14.3"
 prost = "0.14.3"
 kameo.workspace = true
-prost-types.workspace = true
+url = "2.5.8"
+miette.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
+rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
+base64 = "0.22.1"
+tracing.workspace = true
+
 
 [build-dependencies]
-prost-build = "0.14.3"
-serde_json = "1"
 tonic-prost-build = "0.14.3"
 
+[dev-dependencies]
+rstest.workspace = true
+rand.workspace = true
+rcgen.workspace = true
+
+[package.metadata.cargo-shear]
+ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost", "kameo"]
+
 

server/crates/arbiter-proto/build.rs

@@ -1,15 +1,21 @@
+use tonic_prost_build::configure;
+
 static PROTOBUF_DIR: &str = "../../../protobufs";
 
 fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-    let proto_files = vec![
-        format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
-        format!("{}/auth.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
-    ];
 
-    // Компилируем protobuf (tonic-prost-build автоматически использует prost_types для google.protobuf)
-    tonic_prost_build::configure()
+    println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={PROTOBUF_DIR}");
+
+    configure()
         .message_attribute(".", "#[derive(::kameo::Reply)]")
-        .compile_protos(&proto_files, &[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()])?;
-
+        .compile_protos(
+            &[
+                format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
+                format!("{}/auth.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
+            ],
+            &[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()],
+        )
+        
+        .unwrap();
     Ok(())
 }

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+pub mod transport;
+pub mod url;
+
+use base64::{Engine, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
+
 use crate::proto::auth::AuthChallenge;
 
 pub mod proto {
@@ -8,9 +13,7 @@ pub mod proto {
     }
 }
 
-pub mod transport;
-
-pub static BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH: &str = "bootstrap_token";
+pub static BOOTSTRAP_PATH: &str = "bootstrap_token";
 
 pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
     static ARBITER_HOME: &str = ".arbiter";
@@ -26,6 +29,6 @@ pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
 }
 
 pub fn format_challenge(challenge: &AuthChallenge) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", challenge.nonce, hex::encode(&challenge.pubkey));
+    let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", challenge.nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(&challenge.pubkey));
     concat_form.into_bytes().to_vec()
 }

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/transport.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,75 @@
+//! Transport abstraction layer for bridging gRPC bidirectional streaming with kameo actors.
+//!
+//! This module provides a clean separation between the gRPC transport layer and business logic
+//! by modeling the connection as two linked kameo actors:
+//!
+//! - A **transport actor** ([`GrpcTransportActor`]) that owns the gRPC stream and channel,
+//!   forwarding inbound messages to the business actor and outbound messages to the client.
+//! - A **business logic actor** that receives inbound messages from the transport actor and
+//!   sends outbound messages back through the transport actor.
+//!
+//! The [`wire()`] function sets up bidirectional linking between the two actors, ensuring
+//! that if either actor dies, the other is notified and can shut down gracefully.
+//!
+//! # Terminology
+//!
+//! - **InboundMessage**: a message received by the transport actor from the channel/socket
+//!   and forwarded to the business actor.
+//! - **OutboundMessage**: a message produced by the business actor and sent to the transport
+//!   actor to be forwarded to the channel/socket.
+//!
+//! # Architecture
+//!
+//! ```text
+//! gRPC Stream ──InboundMessage──▶ GrpcTransportActor ──tell(InboundMessage)──▶ BusinessActor
+//!                                 ▲                                    │
+//!                                 └─tell(Result<OutboundMessage, _>)────┘
+//!                                 │
+//!                          mpsc::Sender ──▶ Client
+//! ```
+//!
+//! # Example
+//!
+//! ```rust,ignore
+//! let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(1000);
+//! let context = server_context.clone();
+//!
+//! wire(
+//!     |transport_ref| MyBusinessActor::new(context, transport_ref),
+//!     |business_recipient, business_id| GrpcTransportActor {
+//!         sender: tx,
+//!         receiver: grpc_stream,
+//!         business_logic_actor: business_recipient,
+//!         business_logic_actor_id: business_id,
+//!     },
+//! ).await;
+//!
+//! Ok(Response::new(ReceiverStream::new(rx)))
+//! ```
+
 use futures::{Stream, StreamExt};
-use tokio::sync::mpsc::{self, error::SendError};
+use kameo::{
+    Actor,
+    actor::{ActorRef, PreparedActor, Recipient, Spawn, WeakActorRef},
+    mailbox::Signal,
+    prelude::Message,
+};
+use tokio::{
+    select,
+    sync::mpsc::{self, error::SendError},
+};
 use tonic::{Status, Streaming};
+use tracing::{debug, error};
 
-
-// Abstraction for stream for sans-io capabilities
+/// A bidirectional stream abstraction for sans-io testing.
+///
+/// Combines a [`Stream`] of incoming messages with the ability to [`send`](Bi::send)
+/// outgoing responses. This trait allows business logic to be tested without a real
+/// gRPC connection by swapping in an in-memory implementation.
+///
+/// # Type Parameters
+/// - `T`: `InboundMessage` received from the channel/socket (e.g., `UserAgentRequest`)
+/// - `U`: `OutboundMessage` sent to the channel/socket (e.g., `UserAgentResponse`)
 pub trait Bi<T, U>: Stream<Item = Result<T, Status>> + Send + Sync + 'static {
     type Error;
     fn send(
@@ -12,7 +78,10 @@ pub trait Bi<T, U>: Stream<Item = Result<T, Status>> + Send + Sync + 'static {
     ) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = Result<(), Self::Error>> + Send;
 }
 
-// Bi-directional stream abstraction for handling gRPC streaming requests and responses
+/// Concrete [`Bi`] implementation backed by a tonic gRPC [`Streaming`] and an [`mpsc::Sender`].
+///
+/// This is the production implementation used in gRPC service handlers. The `request_stream`
+/// receives messages from the client, and `response_sender` sends responses back.
 pub struct BiStream<T, U> {
     pub request_stream: Streaming<T>,
     pub response_sender: mpsc::Sender<Result<U, Status>>,
@@ -44,3 +113,259 @@ where
         self.response_sender.send(item).await
     }
 }
+
+/// Marker trait for transport actors that can receive outbound messages of type `T`.
+///
+/// Implement this on your transport actor to indicate it can handle outbound messages
+/// produced by the business actor. Requires the actor to implement [`Message<Result<T, E>>`]
+/// so business logic can forward responses via [`tell()`](ActorRef::tell).
+///
+/// # Example
+///
+/// ```rust,ignore
+/// #[derive(Actor)]
+/// struct MyTransportActor { /* ... */ }
+///
+/// impl Message<Result<MyResponse, MyError>> for MyTransportActor {
+///     type Reply = ();
+///     async fn handle(&mut self, msg: Result<MyResponse, MyError>, _ctx: &mut Context<Self, Self::Reply>) -> Self::Reply {
+///         // forward outbound message to channel/socket
+///     }
+/// }
+///
+/// impl TransportActor<MyResponse, MyError> for MyTransportActor {}
+/// ```
+pub trait TransportActor<Outbound: Send + 'static, DomainError: Send + 'static>:
+    Actor + Send + Message<Result<Outbound, DomainError>>
+{
+}
+
+/// A kameo actor that bridges a gRPC bidirectional stream with a business logic actor.
+///
+/// This actor owns the gRPC [`Streaming`] receiver and an [`mpsc::Sender`] for responses.
+/// It multiplexes between its own mailbox (for outbound messages from the business actor)
+/// and the gRPC stream (for inbound client messages) using [`tokio::select!`].
+///
+/// # Message Flow
+///
+/// - **Inbound**: Messages from the gRPC stream are forwarded to `business_logic_actor`
+///   via [`tell()`](Recipient::tell).
+/// - **Outbound**: The business actor sends `Result<Outbound, DomainError>` messages to this
+///   actor, which forwards them through the `sender` channel to the gRPC response stream.
+///
+/// # Lifecycle
+///
+/// - If the business logic actor dies (detected via actor linking), this actor stops,
+///   which closes the gRPC stream.
+/// - If the gRPC stream closes or errors, this actor stops, which (via linking) notifies
+///   the business actor.
+/// - Error responses (`Err(DomainError)`) are forwarded to the client and then the actor stops,
+///   closing the connection.
+///
+/// # Type Parameters
+/// - `Outbound`: `OutboundMessage` sent to the client (e.g., `UserAgentResponse`)
+/// - `Inbound`: `InboundMessage` received from the client (e.g., `UserAgentRequest`)
+/// - `E`: The domain error type, must implement `Into<tonic::Status>` for gRPC conversion
+pub struct GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, DomainError>
+where
+    Outbound: Send + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + 'static,
+    DomainError: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
+{
+    sender: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
+    receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
+    business_logic_actor: Recipient<Inbound>,
+    _error: std::marker::PhantomData<DomainError>,
+}
+
+impl<Outbound, Inbound, DomainError> GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, DomainError>
+where
+    Outbound: Send + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + 'static,
+    DomainError: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
+{
+    pub fn new(
+        sender: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
+        receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
+        business_logic_actor: Recipient<Inbound>,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            sender,
+            receiver,
+            business_logic_actor,
+            _error: std::marker::PhantomData,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<Outbound, Inbound, E> Actor for GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, E>
+where
+    Outbound: Send + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + 'static,
+    E: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
+{
+    type Args = Self;
+
+    type Error = ();
+
+    async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        Ok(args)
+    }
+
+    fn on_link_died(
+        &mut self,
+        _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
+        id: kameo::prelude::ActorId,
+        _: kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason,
+    ) -> impl Future<
+        Output = Result<std::ops::ControlFlow<kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason>, Self::Error>,
+    > + Send {
+        async move {
+            if id == self.business_logic_actor.id() {
+                error!("Business logic actor died, stopping GrpcTransportActor");
+                Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Break(
+                    kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason::Normal,
+                ))
+            } else {
+                debug!(
+                    "Linked actor {} died, but it's not the business logic actor, ignoring",
+                    id
+                );
+                Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn next(
+        &mut self,
+        _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
+        mailbox_rx: &mut kameo::prelude::MailboxReceiver<Self>,
+    ) -> Option<kameo::mailbox::Signal<Self>> {
+        select! {
+            msg = mailbox_rx.recv() => {
+                msg
+            }
+            recv_msg = self.receiver.next() => {
+                match recv_msg {
+                    Some(Ok(msg)) => {
+                        match self.business_logic_actor.tell(msg).await {
+                            Ok(_) => None,
+                            Err(e) => {
+                                // TODO: this would probably require better error handling - or resending if backpressure is the issue
+                                error!("Failed to send message to business logic actor: {}", e);
+                                Some(Signal::Stop)
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Some(Err(e)) => {
+                        error!("Received error from stream: {}, stopping GrpcTransportActor", e);
+                        Some(Signal::Stop)
+                    }
+                    None => {
+                        error!("Receiver channel closed, stopping GrpcTransportActor");
+                        Some(Signal::Stop)
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<Outbound, Inbound, E> Message<Result<Outbound, E>> for GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, E>
+where
+    Outbound: Send + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + 'static,
+    E: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
+{
+    type Reply = ();
+
+    async fn handle(
+        &mut self,
+        msg: Result<Outbound, E>,
+        ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
+    ) -> Self::Reply {
+        let is_err = msg.is_err();
+        let grpc_msg = msg.map_err(Into::into);
+        match self.sender.send(grpc_msg).await {
+            Ok(_) => {
+                if is_err {
+                    ctx.stop();
+                }
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                error!("Failed to send message: {}", e);
+                ctx.stop();
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<Outbound, Inbound, E> TransportActor<Outbound, E> for GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, E>
+where
+    Outbound: Send + 'static,
+    Inbound: Send + 'static,
+    E: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
+{
+}
+
+/// Wires together a transport actor and a business logic actor with bidirectional linking.
+///
+/// This function handles the chicken-and-egg problem of two actors that need references
+/// to each other at construction time. It uses kameo's [`PreparedActor`] to obtain
+/// [`ActorRef`]s before spawning, then links both actors so that if either dies,
+/// the other is notified via [`on_link_died`](Actor::on_link_died).
+///
+/// The business actor receives a type-erased [`Recipient<Result<Outbound, DomainError>>`] instead of an
+/// `ActorRef<Transport>`, keeping it decoupled from the concrete transport implementation.
+///
+/// # Type Parameters
+/// - `Transport`: The transport actor type (e.g., [`GrpcTransportActor`])
+/// - `Inbound`: `InboundMessage` received by the business actor from the transport
+/// - `Outbound`: `OutboundMessage` sent by the business actor back to the transport
+/// - `Business`: The business logic actor
+/// - `BusinessCtor`: Closure that receives a prepared business actor and transport recipient,
+///   spawns the business actor, and returns its [`ActorRef`]
+/// - `TransportCtor`: Closure that receives a prepared transport actor, a recipient for
+///   inbound messages, and the business actor id, then spawns the transport actor
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// A tuple of `(transport_ref, business_ref)` — actor references for both spawned actors.
+pub async fn wire<
+    Transport,
+    Inbound,
+    Outbound,
+    DomainError,
+    Business,
+    BusinessCtor,
+    TransportCtor,
+>(
+    business_ctor: BusinessCtor,
+    transport_ctor: TransportCtor,
+) -> (ActorRef<Transport>, ActorRef<Business>)
+where
+    Transport: TransportActor<Outbound, DomainError>,
+    Inbound: Send + 'static,
+    Outbound: Send + 'static,
+    DomainError: Send + 'static,
+    Business: Actor + Message<Inbound> + Send + 'static,
+    BusinessCtor: FnOnce(PreparedActor<Business>, Recipient<Result<Outbound, DomainError>>),
+    TransportCtor:
+        FnOnce(PreparedActor<Transport>, Recipient<Inbound>),
+{
+    let prepared_business: PreparedActor<Business> = Spawn::prepare();
+    let prepared_transport: PreparedActor<Transport> = Spawn::prepare();
+
+    let business_ref = prepared_business.actor_ref().clone();
+    let transport_ref = prepared_transport.actor_ref().clone();
+
+    transport_ref.link(&business_ref).await;
+    business_ref.link(&transport_ref).await;
+
+    let recipient = transport_ref.clone().recipient();
+    business_ctor(prepared_business, recipient);
+    let business_recipient = business_ref.clone().recipient();
+    transport_ctor(prepared_transport, business_recipient);
+
+
+    (transport_ref, business_ref)
+}

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/url.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+use std::fmt::Display;
+
+use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_URL_SAFE};
+use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
+
+const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter";
+const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert";
+const BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY: &str = "bootstrap_token";
+
+pub struct ArbiterUrl {
+    pub host: String,
+    pub port: u16,
+    pub ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
+    pub bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl Display for ArbiterUrl {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        let mut base = format!(
+            "{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://{}:{}?{CERT_QUERY_KEY}={}",
+            self.host,
+            self.port,
+            BASE64_URL_SAFE.encode(self.ca_cert.to_vec())
+        );
+        if let Some(token) = &self.bootstrap_token {
+            base.push_str(&format!("&{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY}={}", token));
+        }
+        f.write_str(&base)
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("Invalid URL scheme, expected '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")]
+    #[diagnostic(
+        code(arbiter::url::invalid_scheme),
+        help("The URL must start with '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")
+    )]
+    InvalidScheme,
+    #[error("Missing host in URL")]
+    #[diagnostic(
+        code(arbiter::url::missing_host),
+        help("The URL must include a host, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:<port>'")
+    )]
+    MissingHost,
+    #[error("Missing port in URL")]
+    #[diagnostic(
+        code(arbiter::url::missing_port),
+        help("The URL must include a port, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:1234'")
+    )]
+    MissingPort,
+    #[error("Missing 'cert' query parameter in URL")]
+    #[diagnostic(
+        code(arbiter::url::missing_cert),
+        help("The URL must include a 'cert' query parameter")
+    )]
+    MissingCert,
+    #[error("Invalid base64 in 'cert' query parameter: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::url::invalid_cert_base64))]
+    InvalidCertBase64(#[from] base64::DecodeError),
+}
+
+impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a str> for ArbiterUrl {
+    type Error = Error;
+
+    fn try_from(value: &'a str) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        let url = url::Url::parse(value).map_err(|_| Error::InvalidScheme)?;
+
+        if url.scheme() != ARBITER_URL_SCHEME {
+            return Err(Error::InvalidScheme);
+        }
+
+        let host = url.host_str().ok_or(Error::MissingHost)?.to_string();
+        let port = url.port().ok_or(Error::MissingPort)?;
+        let cert_str = url
+            .query_pairs()
+            .find(|(k, _)| k == CERT_QUERY_KEY)
+            .ok_or(Error::MissingCert)?
+            .1;
+
+        let cert = BASE64_URL_SAFE.decode(cert_str.as_ref())?;
+        let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&cert).into_owned();
+
+        let bootstrap_token = url
+            .query_pairs()
+            .find(|(k, _)| k == BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY)
+            .map(|(_, v)| v.to_string());
+
+        Ok(ArbiterUrl {
+            host,
+            port,
+            ca_cert: cert,
+            bootstrap_token,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed;
+    use rstest::rstest;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[rstest]
+
+    fn test_parsing_correctness(
+        #[values("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "192.168.1.1", "some.domain.com")] host: &str,
+
+        #[values(None, Some("token123".to_string()))] bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
+    ) {
+        let cert = generate_simple_self_signed(&["Arbiter CA".into()]).unwrap();
+        let cert = cert.cert.der();
+
+        let url = ArbiterUrl {
+            host: host.to_string(),
+            port: 1234,
+            ca_cert: cert.clone().into_owned(),
+            bootstrap_token,
+        };
+        let url_str = url.to_string();
+        let parsed_url = ArbiterUrl::try_from(url_str.as_str()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(url.host, parsed_url.host);
+        assert_eq!(url.port, parsed_url.port);
+        assert_eq!(url.ca_cert.to_vec(), parsed_url.ca_cert.to_vec());
+        assert_eq!(url.bootstrap_token, parsed_url.bootstrap_token);
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/Cargo.toml

@@ -3,15 +3,10 @@ name = "arbiter-server"
 version = "0.1.0"
 edition = "2024"
 repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
+license = "Apache-2.0"
 
 [dependencies]
-diesel = { version = "2.3.6", features = [
-    "sqlite",
-    "uuid",
-    "time",
-    "chrono",
-    "serde_json",
-] }
+diesel = { version = "2.3.6", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
 diesel-async = { version = "0.7.4", features = [
     "bb8",
     "migrations",
@@ -21,7 +16,9 @@ diesel-async = { version = "0.7.4", features = [
 ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
 arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
 tracing.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
 tonic.workspace = true
+tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
 tokio.workspace = true
 rustls.workspace = true
 smlang.workspace = true
@@ -34,20 +31,18 @@ futures.workspace = true
 tokio-stream.workspace = true
 dashmap = "6.1.0"
 rand.workspace = true
-rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
-    "aws_lc_rs",
-    "pem",
-    "x509-parser",
-    "zeroize",
-], default-features = false }
+rcgen.workspace = true
 chrono.workspace = true
 memsafe = "0.4.0"
 zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
-argon2 = { version = "0.5", features = ["std"] }
 kameo.workspace = true
-hex = "0.4.3"
-chacha20poly1305 = "0.10.1"
-x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0", features = ["static_secrets"] }
+x25519-dalek.workspace = true
+chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
+argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
+restructed = "0.2.2"
+strum = { version = "0.27.2", features = ["derive"] }
+pem = "3.0.6"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
+insta = "1.46.3"
 test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-13-155546-0000_add_tls_rotation/down.sql

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
--- Rollback TLS rotation tables
-
--- Удалить добавленную колонку из arbiter_settings
-ALTER TABLE arbiter_settings DROP COLUMN current_cert_id;
-
--- Удалить таблицы в обратном порядке
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tls_rotation_history;
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rotation_client_acks;
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tls_rotation_state;
-DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_tls_certificates_active;
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tls_certificates;

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-13-155546-0000_add_tls_rotation/up.sql

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
--- История всех сертификатов
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_certificates (
-    id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    cert BLOB NOT NULL,              -- DER-encoded
-    cert_key BLOB NOT NULL,          -- PEM-encoded
-    not_before INTEGER NOT NULL,     -- Unix timestamp
-    not_after INTEGER NOT NULL,      -- Unix timestamp
-    created_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT(unixepoch('now')),
-    is_active BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0  -- Только один active=1
-) STRICT;
-
-CREATE INDEX idx_tls_certificates_active ON tls_certificates(is_active, not_after);
-
--- Tracking процесса ротации
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_rotation_state (
-    id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY CHECK(id = 1),  -- Singleton
-    state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT('normal') CHECK(state IN ('normal', 'initiated', 'waiting_acks', 'ready')),
-    new_cert_id INTEGER REFERENCES tls_certificates(id),
-    initiated_at INTEGER,
-    timeout_at INTEGER  -- Таймаут для ожидания ACKs (initiated_at + 7 дней)
-) STRICT;
-
--- Tracking ACKs от клиентов
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rotation_client_acks (
-    rotation_id INTEGER NOT NULL,    -- Ссылка на new_cert_id
-    client_key TEXT NOT NULL,        -- Публичный ключ клиента (hex)
-    ack_received_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT(unixepoch('now')),
-    PRIMARY KEY (rotation_id, client_key)
-) STRICT;
-
--- Audit trail событий ротации
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_rotation_history (
-    id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    cert_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES tls_certificates(id),
-    event_type TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(event_type IN ('created', 'rotation_initiated', 'acks_complete', 'activated', 'timeout')),
-    timestamp INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT(unixepoch('now')),
-    details TEXT  -- JSON с доп. информацией
-) STRICT;
-
--- Миграция существующего сертификата
-INSERT INTO tls_certificates (id, cert, cert_key, not_before, not_after, is_active, created_at)
-SELECT
-    1,
-    cert,
-    cert_key,
-    unixepoch('now') as not_before,
-    unixepoch('now') + (90 * 24 * 60 * 60) as not_after,  -- 90 дней
-    1 as is_active,
-    unixepoch('now')
-FROM arbiter_settings WHERE id = 1;
-
--- Инициализация rotation_state
-INSERT INTO tls_rotation_state (id, state) VALUES (1, 'normal');
-
--- Добавить ссылку на текущий сертификат
-ALTER TABLE arbiter_settings ADD COLUMN current_cert_id INTEGER REFERENCES tls_certificates(id);
-UPDATE arbiter_settings SET current_cert_id = 1 WHERE id = 1;

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-14-171124-0000_init/up.sql

@@ -1,22 +1,50 @@
-create table if not exists aead_encrypted (
+create table if not exists root_key_history (
     id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
-    current_nonce integer not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
+    -- root key stored as aead encrypted artifact, with only difference that it's decrypted by unseal key (derived from user password)
+    root_key_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented. Used for encrypting root key
+    data_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- nonce used for encrypting with key itself
     ciphertext blob not null,
     tag blob not null,
-    schema_version integer not null default(1) -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
+    schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
+    salt blob not null -- for key deriviation 
+) STRICT;
+
+create table if not exists aead_encrypted (
+    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
+    current_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
+    ciphertext blob not null,
+    tag blob not null,
+    schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
+    associated_root_key_id integer not null references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT,
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+) STRICT;
+
+create unique index if not exists uniq_nonce_per_root_key on aead_encrypted (
+    current_nonce,
+    associated_root_key_id
+);
+
+create table if not exists tls_history (
+    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
+    cert text not null,
+    cert_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
+    ca_cert text not null, 
+    ca_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
 ) STRICT;
 
 -- This is a singleton
 create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
     id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1
-    root_key_id integer references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
-    cert_key blob not null,
-    cert blob not null
+    root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
+    tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT
 ) STRICT;
 
+insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing; -- ensure singleton row exists
+
 create table if not exists useragent_client (
     id integer not null primary key,
-    nonce integer not null default (1), -- used for auth challenge
+    nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
     public_key blob not null,
     created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
     updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
@@ -24,7 +52,7 @@ create table if not exists useragent_client (
 
 create table if not exists program_client (
     id integer not null primary key,
-    nonce integer not null default (1), -- used for auth challenge
+    nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
     public_key blob not null,
     created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
     updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-16-160000-0000_add_argon2_salt/down.sql

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
--- Remove argon2_salt column
-ALTER TABLE aead_encrypted DROP COLUMN argon2_salt;

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-16-160000-0000_add_argon2_salt/up.sql

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
--- Add argon2_salt column to store password derivation salt
-ALTER TABLE aead_encrypted ADD COLUMN argon2_salt TEXT;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors.rs

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-pub mod user_agent;
-pub mod client;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/bootstrap.rs

@@ -1,40 +1,37 @@
-use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH, home_path};
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, QueryDsl};
+use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
+use diesel::QueryDsl;
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 use kameo::{Actor, messages};
-use memsafe::MemSafe;
 use miette::Diagnostic;
-use rand::{RngExt, distr::StandardUniform, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
-use secrecy::SecretString;
-use thiserror::Error;
-use tracing::info;
-use zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};
-
-use crate::{
-    context::{self, ServerContext},
-    db::{self, DatabasePool, schema},
+use rand::{
+    RngExt,
+    distr::{Alphanumeric},
+    make_rng,
+    rngs::StdRng,
 };
+use thiserror::Error;
 
+use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
 const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
 
 pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
     let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
 
-    let token: String = rng
-        .sample_iter::<char, _>(StandardUniform)
-        .take(TOKEN_LENGTH)
-        .fold(Default::default(), |mut accum, char| {
+    let token: String = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
+        Default::default(),
+        |mut accum, char| {
             accum += char.to_string().as_str();
             accum
-        });
+        },
+    );
 
-    tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
+    tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
 
     Ok(token)
 }
 
 #[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum BootstrapError {
+pub enum Error {
     #[error("Database error: {0}")]
     #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::bootstrap::database))]
     Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
@@ -49,12 +46,12 @@ pub enum BootstrapError {
 }
 
 #[derive(Actor)]
-pub struct BootstrapActor {
+pub struct Bootstrapper {
     token: Option<String>,
 }
 
-impl BootstrapActor {
-    pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, BootstrapError> {
+impl Bootstrapper {
+    pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
         let mut conn = db.get().await?;
 
         let row_count: i64 = schema::useragent_client::table
@@ -64,10 +61,9 @@ impl BootstrapActor {
 
         drop(conn);
 
+
         let token = if row_count == 0 {
             let token = generate_token().await?;
-            info!(%token, "Generated bootstrap token");
-            tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
             Some(token)
         } else {
             None
@@ -75,15 +71,10 @@ impl BootstrapActor {
 
         Ok(Self { token })
     }
-
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
-        self.token.clone()
-    }
 }
 
 #[messages]
-impl BootstrapActor {
+impl Bootstrapper {
     #[message]
     pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
         match &self.token {
@@ -102,3 +93,11 @@ impl BootstrapActor {
         }
     }
 }
+
+#[messages]
+impl Bootstrapper {
+    #[message]
+    pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
+        self.token.clone()
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/keyholder/encryption.rs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+pub mod v1;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/keyholder/encryption/v1.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+use std::ops::Deref as _;
+
+use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2, password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt};
+use chacha20poly1305::{
+    AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
+    aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload},
+};
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+use rand::{
+    Rng as _, SeedableRng,
+    rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
+};
+
+pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
+pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
+
+pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct Nonce([u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
+impl Nonce {
+    pub fn increment(&mut self) {
+        for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
+            if self.0[i] == 0xFF {
+                self.0[i] = 0;
+            } else {
+                self.0[i] += 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        self.0.to_vec()
+    }
+}
+impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce {
+    type Error = ();
+
+    fn try_from(value: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        if value.len() != NONCE_LENGTH {
+            return Err(());
+        }
+        let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LENGTH];
+        nonce.copy_from_slice(value);
+        Ok(Self(nonce))
+    }
+}
+
+pub struct KeyCell(pub MemSafe<Key>);
+impl From<MemSafe<Key>> for KeyCell {
+    fn from(value: MemSafe<Key>) -> Self {
+        Self(value)
+    }
+}
+impl TryFrom<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
+    type Error = ();
+
+    fn try_from(mut value: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        let value = value.read().unwrap();
+        if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
+            return Err(());
+        }
+        let mut cell = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
+        {
+            let mut cell_write = cell.write().unwrap();
+            let cell_slice: &mut [u8] = cell_write.as_mut();
+            cell_slice.copy_from_slice(&value);
+        }
+        Ok(Self(cell))
+    }
+}
+
+impl KeyCell {
+    pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
+        let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
+        {
+            let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
+            let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
+
+            let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
+            rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
+        }
+
+        key.into()
+    }
+
+    pub fn encrypt_in_place(
+        &mut self,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        associated_data: &[u8],
+        mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
+        let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
+        cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
+    }
+    pub fn decrypt_in_place(
+        &mut self,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        associated_data: &[u8],
+        buffer: &mut MemSafe<Vec<u8>>,
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
+        let mut buffer = buffer.write().unwrap();
+        let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
+        cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
+    }
+
+    pub fn encrypt(
+        &mut self,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        associated_data: &[u8],
+        plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
+        let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+        let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
+
+        let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
+            nonce,
+            Payload {
+                msg: plaintext.as_ref(),
+                aad: associated_data,
+            },
+        )?;
+        Ok(ciphertext)
+    }
+}
+
+pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
+
+pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
+    let mut salt = Salt::default();
+    let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
+    salt
+}
+
+/// User password might be of different length, have not enough entropy, etc...
+/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
+pub fn derive_seal_key(mut password: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
+    let params = argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap();
+    let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
+    let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
+    {
+        let password_source = password.read().unwrap();
+        let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
+        let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
+
+        hasher
+            .hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
+            .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    key.into()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use memsafe::MemSafe;
+
+    #[test]
+    pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
+        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
+        let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        let password2 = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        let salt = generate_salt();
+
+        let mut key1 = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
+        let mut key2 = derive_seal_key(password2, &salt);
+
+        let key1_reader = key1.0.read().unwrap();
+        let key2_reader = key2.0.read().unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    pub fn successful_derive() {
+        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
+        let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        let salt = generate_salt();
+
+        let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
+        let key_reader = key.0.read().unwrap();
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+
+        assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
+        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
+        let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        let salt = generate_salt();
+
+        let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
+        let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
+        let associated_data = b"associated data";
+        let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();
+
+        key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
+
+        let mut buffer = MemSafe::new(buffer).unwrap();
+
+        key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let buffer = buffer.read().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    // We should fuzz this
+    pub fn test_nonce_increment() {
+        let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
+        nonce.increment();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            nonce.0,
+            [
+                0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/keyholder/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+use diesel::{
+    ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
+    dsl::{insert_into, update},
+};
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
+use tracing::{error, info};
+
+use crate::db::{
+    self,
+    models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
+    schema::{self},
+};
+use encryption::v1::{self, KeyCell, Nonce};
+
+pub mod encryption;
+
+#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
+#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub))]
+enum State {
+    #[default]
+    Unbootstrapped,
+    Sealed {
+        root_key_history_id: i32,
+    },
+    Unsealed {
+        root_key_history_id: i32,
+        root_key: KeyCell,
+    },
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::already_bootstrapped))]
+    AlreadyBootstrapped,
+    #[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::not_bootstrapped))]
+    NotBootstrapped,
+    #[error("Invalid key provided")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::invalid_key))]
+    InvalidKey,
+
+    #[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::aead_not_found))]
+    NotFound,
+
+    #[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::encryption_error))]
+    Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
+
+    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::database_error))]
+    DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
+
+    #[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::database_transaction_error))]
+    DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+
+    #[error("Broken database")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::broken_database))]
+    BrokenDatabase,
+}
+
+/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
+/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
+/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
+#[derive(Actor)]
+pub struct KeyHolder {
+    db: db::DatabasePool,
+    state: State,
+}
+
+#[messages]
+impl KeyHolder {
+    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
+        let state = {
+            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
+
+            let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
+                .left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                .select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
+                .get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            match root_key_history {
+                Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
+                    root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id,
+                },
+                None => State::Unbootstrapped,
+            }
+        };
+
+        Ok(Self { db, state })
+    }
+
+    // Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple keyholders write
+    // additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
+    async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
+
+        let nonce = conn
+            .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
+                Box::pin(async move {
+                    let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
+                        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
+                        .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
+                        .first(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    let mut nonce =
+                        v1::Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+                            error!(
+                                "Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
+                                root_key_id
+                            );
+                            Error::BrokenDatabase
+                        })?;
+                    nonce.increment();
+
+                    update(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
+                        .set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    Result::<_, Error>::Ok(nonce)
+                })
+            })
+            .await?;
+
+        Ok(nonce)
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
+            return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
+        }
+        let salt = v1::generate_salt();
+        let mut seal_key = v1::derive_seal_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
+        let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
+
+        // Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
+        let root_key_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
+        let data_encryption_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
+
+        let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = {
+            let root_key_reader = root_key.0.read().unwrap();
+            let root_key_reader = root_key_reader.as_slice();
+            seal_key
+                .encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
+                .map_err(|err| {
+                    error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
+                    Error::Encryption(err)
+                })?
+        };
+
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+
+        let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
+        let root_key_history_id = conn
+            .transaction(|conn| {
+                Box::pin(async move {
+                    let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                        .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
+                            ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext,
+                            tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
+                            root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
+                            data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes,
+                            schema_version: 1,
+                            salt: salt.to_vec(),
+                        })
+                        .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
+                        .get_result(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
+                        .set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id)
+                })
+            })
+            .await?;
+
+        self.state = State::Unsealed {
+            root_key,
+            root_key_history_id,
+        };
+
+        info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully");
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let State::Sealed {
+            root_key_history_id,
+        } = &self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        // We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
+        let current_key = {
+            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+            schema::root_key_history::table
+                .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
+                .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
+                .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+                .first(&mut conn)
+                .await?
+        };
+
+        let salt = &current_key.salt;
+        let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+            error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
+            Error::BrokenDatabase
+        })?;
+        let mut seal_key = v1::derive_seal_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
+
+        let mut root_key = MemSafe::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
+
+        let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(
+            |_| {
+                error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
+                Error::BrokenDatabase
+            },
+        )?;
+
+        seal_key
+            .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
+            .map_err(|err| {
+                error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
+                Error::InvalidKey
+            })?;
+
+        self.state = State::Unsealed {
+            root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
+            root_key: v1::KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
+                error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
+                Error::BrokenDatabase
+            })?,
+        };
+
+        info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully");
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    // Decrypts the `aead_encrypted` entry with the given ID and returns the plaintext
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
+            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+            schema::aead_encrypted::table
+                .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+                .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
+                .first(&mut conn)
+                .await
+                .optional()?
+                .ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
+        };
+
+        let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+            error!(
+                "Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
+                aead_id
+            );
+            Error::BrokenDatabase
+        })?;
+        let mut output = MemSafe::new(row.ciphertext).unwrap();
+        root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
+        Ok(output)
+    }
+
+    // Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed {
+            root_key,
+            root_key_history_id,
+        } = &mut self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        // Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
+        // Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
+        let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
+
+        let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write().unwrap();
+        let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
+        root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
+
+        let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
+
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+        let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
+            .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
+                ciphertext,
+                tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
+                current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
+                schema_version: 1,
+                associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
+                created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() as i32,
+            })
+            .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .await?;
+
+        Ok(aead_id)
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub fn get_state(&self) -> StateDiscriminants {
+        self.state.discriminant()
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed {
+            root_key_history_id,
+            ..
+        } = &self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+        self.state = State::Sealed {
+            root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
+        };
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use diesel::SelectableHelper;
+    
+    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+    use memsafe::MemSafe;
+
+    use crate::db::{self};
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
+        let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+        let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
+        actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
+        actor
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    #[test_log::test]
+    async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
+        let root_key_history_id = match actor.state {
+            State::Unsealed {
+                root_key_history_id,
+                ..
+            } => root_key_history_id,
+            _ => panic!("expected unsealed state"),
+        };
+
+        let n1 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let n2 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
+
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+        let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
+            .select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+            .first(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
+
+        let id = actor
+            .create_new(MemSafe::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()).unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+            .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id))
+            .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+            .first(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(),
+            "next write must advance nonce"
+        );
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
+use miette::Diagnostic;
+use thiserror::Error;
+
+use crate::{
+    actors::{bootstrap::Bootstrapper, keyholder::KeyHolder},
+    db,
+};
+
+pub mod bootstrap;
+pub mod client;
+pub mod keyholder;
+pub mod user_agent;
+
+#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
+pub enum SpawnError {
+    #[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(SpawnError::Bootstrapper))]
+    Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
+
+    #[error("Failed to spawn KeyHolder actor")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(SpawnError::KeyHolder))]
+    KeyHolder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
+}
+
+/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct GlobalActors {
+    pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
+}
+
+impl GlobalActors {
+    pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
+            key_holder: KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?),
+        })
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent.rs

@@ -1,498 +0,0 @@
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use arbiter_proto::{
-    proto::{
-        UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
-        auth::{
-            self, AuthChallengeRequest, ClientMessage, ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage,
-            client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
-            server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
-        },
-        user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
-        user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
-    },
-    transport::Bi,
-};
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, dsl::update};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
-use futures::StreamExt;
-use kameo::{
-    Actor,
-    actor::{ActorRef, Spawn},
-    error::SendError,
-    messages,
-    prelude::Context,
-};
-use tokio::sync::mpsc;
-use tokio::sync::mpsc::Sender;
-use tonic::{Status, transport::Server};
-use tracing::{debug, error, info};
-
-use crate::{
-    ServerContext,
-    actors::user_agent::auth::AuthChallenge,
-    context::bootstrap::{BootstrapActor, ConsumeToken},
-    db::{self, schema},
-    errors::GrpcStatusExt,
-};
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct ChallengeContext {
-    challenge: AuthChallenge,
-    key: VerifyingKey,
-}
-
-// Request context with deserialized public key for state machine.
-// This intermediate struct is needed because the state machine branches depending on presence of bootstrap token,
-// but we want to have the deserialized key in both branches.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct AuthRequestContext {
-    pubkey: VerifyingKey,
-    bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
-}
-
-smlang::statemachine!(
-    name: UserAgent,
-    derive_states: [Debug],
-    custom_error: false,
-    transitions: {
-        *Init + AuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) / auth_request_context =  ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext),
-        ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) + ReceivedBootstrapToken = Authenticated,
-
-        ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) + SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) / move_challenge = WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext),
-
-        WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedGoodSolution = Authenticated,
-        WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedBadSolution = AuthError, // block further transitions, but connection should close anyway
-    }
-);
-
-pub struct DummyContext;
-impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
-    #[allow(missing_docs)]
-    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
-    fn move_challenge(
-        &mut self,
-        state_data: &AuthRequestContext,
-        event_data: ChallengeContext,
-    ) -> Result<ChallengeContext, ()> {
-        Ok(event_data)
-    }
-
-    #[allow(missing_docs)]
-    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
-    fn auth_request_context(
-        &mut self,
-        event_data: AuthRequestContext,
-    ) -> Result<AuthRequestContext, ()> {
-        Ok(event_data)
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Actor)]
-pub struct UserAgentActor {
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-    bootstapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
-    state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
-    tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
-    context: ServerContext,
-    ephemeral_key: Option<crate::context::unseal::EphemeralKeyPair>,
-}
-
-impl UserAgentActor {
-    pub(crate) fn new(
-        context: ServerContext,
-        tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
-    ) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            db: context.db.clone(),
-            bootstapper: context.bootstrapper.clone(),
-            state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
-            tx,
-            context,
-            ephemeral_key: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn new_manual(
-        db: db::DatabasePool,
-        bootstapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
-        context: ServerContext,
-        tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
-    ) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            db,
-            bootstapper,
-            state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
-            tx,
-            context,
-            ephemeral_key: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), Status> {
-        self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
-            error!(?e, "State transition failed");
-            Status::internal("State machine error")
-        })?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn auth_with_bootstrap_token(
-        &mut self,
-        pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
-        token: String,
-    ) -> Result<UserAgentResponse, Status> {
-        let token_ok: bool = self
-            .bootstapper
-            .ask(ConsumeToken { token })
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| {
-                error!(?pubkey, "Failed to consume bootstrap token: {e}");
-                Status::internal("Bootstrap token consumption failed")
-            })?;
-
-        if !token_ok {
-            error!(?pubkey, "Invalid bootstrap token provided");
-            return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid bootstrap token"));
-        }
-
-        {
-            let mut conn = self.db.get().await.to_status()?;
-
-            diesel::insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
-                .values((
-                    schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
-                    schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(1),
-                ))
-                .execute(&mut conn)
-                .await
-                .to_status()?;
-        }
-
-        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBootstrapToken)?;
-
-        Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(auth::AuthOk {})))
-    }
-
-    async fn auth_with_challenge(&mut self, pubkey: VerifyingKey, pubkey_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Output {
-        let nonce: Option<i32> = {
-            let mut db_conn = self.db.get().await.to_status()?;
-            db_conn
-                .transaction(|conn| {
-                    Box::pin(async move {
-                        let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
-                            .filter(
-                                schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
-                            )
-                            .select(schema::useragent_client::nonce)
-                            .first::<i32>(conn)
-                            .await?;
-
-                        update(schema::useragent_client::table)
-                            .filter(
-                                schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
-                            )
-                            .set(schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
-                            .execute(conn)
-                            .await?;
-
-                        Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(current_nonce)
-                    })
-                })
-                .await
-                .optional()
-                .to_status()?
-        };
-
-        let Some(nonce) = nonce else {
-            error!(?pubkey, "Public key not found in database");
-            return Err(Status::unauthenticated("Public key not registered"));
-        };
-
-        let challenge = auth::AuthChallenge {
-            pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
-            nonce,
-        };
-
-        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::SentChallenge(ChallengeContext {
-            challenge: challenge.clone(),
-            key: pubkey,
-        }))?;
-
-        info!(
-            ?pubkey,
-            ?challenge,
-            "Sent authentication challenge to client"
-        );
-
-        Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthChallenge(challenge)))
-    }
-
-    fn verify_challenge_solution(
-        &self,
-        solution: &auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
-    ) -> Result<(bool, &ChallengeContext), Status> {
-        let UserAgentStates::WaitingForChallengeSolution(challenge_context) = self.state.state()
-        else {
-            error!("Received challenge solution in invalid state");
-            return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
-                "Invalid state for challenge solution",
-            ));
-        };
-        let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(&challenge_context.challenge);
-
-        let signature = solution.signature.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
-            error!(?solution, "Invalid signature length");
-            Status::invalid_argument("Invalid signature length")
-        })?;
-
-        let valid = challenge_context
-            .key
-            .verify_strict(&formatted_challenge, &signature)
-            .is_ok();
-
-        Ok((valid, challenge_context))
-    }
-}
-
-type Output = Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>;
-
-fn auth_response(payload: ServerAuthPayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
-    UserAgentResponse {
-        payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(AuthServerMessage {
-            payload: Some(payload),
-        })),
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl UserAgentActor {
-    #[message(ctx)]
-    pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_request(
-        &mut self,
-        req: AuthChallengeRequest,
-        ctx: &mut Context<Self, Output>,
-    ) -> Output {
-        let pubkey = req.pubkey.as_array().ok_or(Status::invalid_argument(
-            "Expected pubkey to have specific length",
-        ))?;
-        let pubkey = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey).map_err(|err| {
-            error!(?pubkey, "Failed to convert to VerifyingKey");
-            Status::invalid_argument("Failed to convert pubkey to VerifyingKey")
-        })?;
-
-        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::AuthRequest(AuthRequestContext {
-            pubkey,
-            bootstrap_token: req.bootstrap_token.clone(),
-        }))?;
-
-        match req.bootstrap_token {
-            Some(token) => self.auth_with_bootstrap_token(pubkey, token).await,
-            None => self.auth_with_challenge(pubkey, req.pubkey).await,
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[message(ctx)]
-    pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_solution(
-        &mut self,
-        solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
-        ctx: &mut Context<Self, Output>,
-    ) -> Output {
-        let (valid, challenge_context) = self.verify_challenge_solution(&solution)?;
-
-        if valid {
-            info!(
-                ?challenge_context,
-                "Client provided valid solution to authentication challenge"
-            );
-            self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedGoodSolution)?;
-            Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(auth::AuthOk {})))
-        } else {
-            error!("Client provided invalid solution to authentication challenge");
-            self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBadSolution)?;
-            Err(Status::unauthenticated("Invalid challenge solution"))
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[message(ctx)]
-    pub async fn handle_unseal_request(
-        &mut self,
-        request: arbiter_proto::proto::UnsealRequest,
-        ctx: &mut Context<Self, Output>,
-    ) -> Output {
-        use arbiter_proto::proto::{
-            EphemeralKeyResponse, SealedPassword, UnsealResponse, UnsealResult,
-            unseal_request::Payload as ReqPayload,
-            unseal_response::Payload as RespPayload,
-        };
-
-        match request.payload {
-            Some(ReqPayload::EphemeralKeyRequest(_)) => {
-                // Generate new ephemeral keypair
-                let keypair = crate::context::unseal::EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
-                let expires_at = keypair.expires_at() as i64;
-                let public_bytes = keypair.public_bytes();
-
-                // Store for later use
-                self.ephemeral_key = Some(keypair);
-
-                info!("Generated ephemeral X25519 keypair for unseal, expires at {}", expires_at);
-
-                Ok(UserAgentResponse {
-                    payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResponse(UnsealResponse {
-                        payload: Some(RespPayload::EphemeralKeyResponse(EphemeralKeyResponse {
-                            server_pubkey: public_bytes,
-                            expires_at,
-                        })),
-                    })),
-                })
-            }
-
-            Some(ReqPayload::SealedPassword(sealed)) => {
-                // Get and consume ephemeral key
-                let keypair = self
-                    .ephemeral_key
-                    .take()
-                    .ok_or_else(|| Status::failed_precondition("No ephemeral key generated"))?;
-
-                // Check expiration
-                if keypair.is_expired() {
-                    error!("Ephemeral key expired before sealed password was received");
-                    return Err(Status::deadline_exceeded("Ephemeral key expired"));
-                }
-
-                // Perform ECDH
-                let shared_secret = keypair
-                    .perform_dh(&sealed.client_pubkey)
-                    .map_err(|e| Status::invalid_argument(format!("Invalid client pubkey: {}", e)))?;
-
-                // Decrypt password
-                let nonce: [u8; 12] = sealed
-                    .nonce
-                    .as_slice()
-                    .try_into()
-                    .map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Nonce must be 12 bytes"))?;
-
-                let password_bytes = crate::crypto::aead::decrypt(
-                    &sealed.encrypted_password,
-                    &shared_secret,
-                    &nonce,
-                )
-                .map_err(|e| {
-                    error!("Failed to decrypt password: {}", e);
-                    Status::internal(format!("Decryption failed: {}", e))
-                })?;
-
-                let password = String::from_utf8(password_bytes).map_err(|_| {
-                    error!("Password is not valid UTF-8");
-                    Status::invalid_argument("Password must be UTF-8")
-                })?;
-
-                // Call unseal on context
-                info!("Attempting to unseal vault with decrypted password");
-                let result = self.context.unseal(&password).await;
-
-                match result {
-                    Ok(()) => {
-                        info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
-                        Ok(UserAgentResponse {
-                            payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResponse(
-                                UnsealResponse {
-                                    payload: Some(RespPayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult {
-                                        success: true,
-                                        error_message: None,
-                                    })),
-                                },
-                            )),
-                        })
-                    }
-                    Err(e) => {
-                        error!("Unseal failed: {}", e);
-                        Ok(UserAgentResponse {
-                            payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResponse(
-                                UnsealResponse {
-                                    payload: Some(RespPayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult {
-                                        success: false,
-                                        error_message: Some(e.to_string()),
-                                    })),
-                                },
-                            )),
-                        })
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-
-            None => {
-                error!("Received empty unseal request");
-                Err(Status::invalid_argument("Empty unseal request"))
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use arbiter_proto::proto::{
-        UserAgentResponse,
-        auth::{AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk},
-        user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
-    };
-    use kameo::actor::Spawn;
-
-    use crate::{
-        actors::user_agent::HandleAuthChallengeRequest, context::bootstrap::BootstrapActor, db,
-    };
-
-    use super::UserAgentActor;
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    #[test_log::test]
-    pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        // explicitly not installing any user_agent pubkeys
-        let bootstrapper = BootstrapActor::new(&db).await.unwrap(); // this will create bootstrap token
-        let token = bootstrapper.get_token().unwrap();
-
-        let bootstrapper_ref = BootstrapActor::spawn(bootstrapper);
-        let context = crate::ServerContext::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
-        let user_agent = UserAgentActor::new_manual(
-            db.clone(),
-            bootstrapper_ref,
-            context,
-            tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0, // dummy channel, we won't actually send responses in this test
-        );
-        let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
-
-        // simulate client sending auth request with bootstrap token
-        let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
-        let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
-
-        let result = user_agent_ref
-            .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
-                req: AuthChallengeRequest {
-                    pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
-                    bootstrap_token: Some(token),
-                },
-            })
-            .await
-            .expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
-
-        // auth succeeded
-        assert_eq!(
-            result,
-            UserAgentResponse {
-                payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
-                    arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
-                        payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
-                            AuthOk {},
-                        )),
-                    },
-                )),
-            }
-        );
-    }
-}
-
-mod transport;
-pub(crate) use transport::handle_user_agent;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/error.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+use tonic::Status;
+
+use crate::db;
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum UserAgentError {
+    #[error("Missing payload in request")]
+    MissingPayload,
+
+    #[error("Invalid bootstrap token")]
+    InvalidBootstrapToken,
+
+    #[error("Public key not registered")]
+    PubkeyNotRegistered,
+
+    #[error("Invalid public key format")]
+    InvalidPubkey,
+
+    #[error("Invalid signature length")]
+    InvalidSignatureLength,
+
+    #[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
+    InvalidChallengeSolution,
+
+    #[error("Invalid state for operation")]
+    InvalidState,
+
+    #[error("Actor unavailable")]
+    ActorUnavailable,
+
+    #[error("Database error")]
+    Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+
+    #[error("Database pool error")]
+    DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
+}
+
+impl From<UserAgentError> for Status {
+    fn from(err: UserAgentError) -> Self {
+        match err {
+            UserAgentError::MissingPayload
+            | UserAgentError::InvalidBootstrapToken
+            | UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey
+            | UserAgentError::InvalidSignatureLength => Status::invalid_argument(err.to_string()),
+
+            UserAgentError::PubkeyNotRegistered | UserAgentError::InvalidChallengeSolution => {
+                Status::unauthenticated(err.to_string())
+            }
+
+            UserAgentError::InvalidState => Status::failed_precondition(err.to_string()),
+
+            UserAgentError::ActorUnavailable
+            | UserAgentError::Database(_)
+            | UserAgentError::DatabasePool(_) => Status::internal(err.to_string()),
+        }
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+use std::{ops::DerefMut, sync::Mutex};
+
+use arbiter_proto::proto::{
+    UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult, UnsealStart, UnsealStartResponse, UserAgentRequest,
+    UserAgentResponse,
+    auth::{
+        self, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk, ClientMessage as ClientAuthMessage,
+        ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage,
+        client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
+        server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
+    },
+    user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
+    user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
+};
+use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, dsl::update};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
+use kameo::{Actor, actor::Recipient, error::SendError, messages, prelude::Message};
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+use tracing::{error, info};
+use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
+
+use crate::{
+    ServerContext,
+    actors::{
+        GlobalActors,
+        bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
+        keyholder::{self, TryUnseal},
+        user_agent::state::{
+            ChallengeContext, DummyContext, UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine,
+            UserAgentStates,
+        },
+    },
+    db::{self, schema},
+};
+
+mod error;
+mod state;
+
+pub use error::UserAgentError;
+
+#[derive(Actor)]
+pub struct UserAgentActor {
+    db: db::DatabasePool,
+    actors: GlobalActors,
+    state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
+    transport: Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>>,
+}
+
+impl UserAgentActor {
+    pub(crate) fn new(
+        context: ServerContext,
+        transport: Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>>,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            db: context.db.clone(),
+            actors: context.actors.clone(),
+            state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
+            transport,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn new_manual(
+        db: db::DatabasePool,
+        actors: GlobalActors,
+        transport: Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>>,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            db,
+            actors,
+            state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
+            transport,
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn process_request(&mut self, req: UserAgentRequest) -> Output {
+        let msg = req.payload.ok_or_else(|| {
+            error!(actor = "useragent", "Received message with no payload");
+            UserAgentError::MissingPayload
+        })?;
+
+        match msg {
+            UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientAuthMessage {
+                payload: Some(ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(req)),
+            }) => self.handle_auth_challenge_request(req).await,
+            UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientAuthMessage {
+                payload: Some(ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(solution)),
+            }) => self.handle_auth_challenge_solution(solution).await,
+            UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealStart(unseal_start) => {
+                self.handle_unseal_request(unseal_start).await
+            }
+            UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealEncryptedKey(unseal_encrypted_key) => {
+                self.handle_unseal_encrypted_key(unseal_encrypted_key).await
+            }
+            _ => Err(UserAgentError::MissingPayload),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), UserAgentError> {
+        self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
+            error!(?e, "State transition failed");
+            UserAgentError::InvalidState
+        })?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    async fn auth_with_bootstrap_token(
+        &mut self,
+        pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
+        token: String,
+    ) -> Output {
+        let token_ok: bool = self
+            .actors
+            .bootstrapper
+            .ask(ConsumeToken { token })
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                error!(?pubkey, "Failed to consume bootstrap token: {e}");
+                UserAgentError::ActorUnavailable
+            })?;
+
+        if !token_ok {
+            error!(?pubkey, "Invalid bootstrap token provided");
+            return Err(UserAgentError::InvalidBootstrapToken);
+        }
+
+        {
+            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+
+            diesel::insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
+                .values((
+                    schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
+                    schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(1),
+                ))
+                .execute(&mut conn)
+                .await?;
+        }
+
+        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBootstrapToken)?;
+
+        Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
+    }
+
+    async fn auth_with_challenge(&mut self, pubkey: VerifyingKey, pubkey_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Output {
+        let nonce: Option<i32> = {
+            let mut db_conn = self.db.get().await?;
+            db_conn
+                .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
+                    Box::pin(async move {
+                        let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
+                            .filter(
+                                schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
+                            )
+                            .select(schema::useragent_client::nonce)
+                            .first::<i32>(conn)
+                            .await?;
+
+                        update(schema::useragent_client::table)
+                            .filter(
+                                schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
+                            )
+                            .set(schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
+                            .execute(conn)
+                            .await?;
+
+                        Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(current_nonce)
+                    })
+                })
+                .await
+                .optional()?
+        };
+
+        let Some(nonce) = nonce else {
+            error!(?pubkey, "Public key not found in database");
+            return Err(UserAgentError::PubkeyNotRegistered);
+        };
+
+        let challenge = auth::AuthChallenge {
+            pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
+            nonce,
+        };
+
+        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::SentChallenge(ChallengeContext {
+            challenge: challenge.clone(),
+            key: pubkey,
+        }))?;
+
+        info!(
+            ?pubkey,
+            ?challenge,
+            "Sent authentication challenge to client"
+        );
+
+        Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthChallenge(challenge)))
+    }
+
+    fn verify_challenge_solution(
+        &self,
+        solution: &auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
+    ) -> Result<(bool, &ChallengeContext), UserAgentError> {
+        let UserAgentStates::WaitingForChallengeSolution(challenge_context) = self.state.state()
+        else {
+            error!("Received challenge solution in invalid state");
+            return Err(UserAgentError::InvalidState);
+        };
+        let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(&challenge_context.challenge);
+
+        let signature = solution.signature.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
+            error!(?solution, "Invalid signature length");
+            UserAgentError::InvalidSignatureLength
+        })?;
+
+        let valid = challenge_context
+            .key
+            .verify_strict(&formatted_challenge, &signature)
+            .is_ok();
+
+        Ok((valid, challenge_context))
+    }
+}
+
+type Output = Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>;
+
+fn auth_response(payload: ServerAuthPayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
+    UserAgentResponse {
+        payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(AuthServerMessage {
+            payload: Some(payload),
+        })),
+    }
+}
+
+fn unseal_response(payload: UserAgentResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
+    UserAgentResponse {
+        payload: Some(payload),
+    }
+}
+
+#[messages]
+impl UserAgentActor {
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn handle_unseal_request(&mut self, req: UnsealStart) -> Output {
+        let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
+        let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
+
+        let client_pubkey_bytes: [u8; 32] = req
+            .client_pubkey
+            .try_into()
+            .map_err(|_| UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey)?;
+
+        let client_public_key = PublicKey::from(client_pubkey_bytes);
+
+        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
+            secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
+            client_public_key,
+        }))?;
+
+        Ok(unseal_response(
+            UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(UnsealStartResponse {
+                server_pubkey: public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+            }),
+        ))
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(&mut self, req: UnsealEncryptedKey) -> Output {
+        let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
+            error!("Received unseal encrypted key in invalid state");
+            return Err(UserAgentError::InvalidState);
+        };
+        let ephemeral_secret = {
+            let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
+            let secret = secret_lock.take();
+            match secret {
+                Some(secret) => secret,
+                None => {
+                    drop(secret_lock);
+                    error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
+                    self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                    return Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
+                        UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
+                    )));
+                }
+            }
+        };
+
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(&req.nonce);
+
+        let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&unseal_context.client_public_key);
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
+
+        let mut seal_key_buffer = MemSafe::new(req.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
+
+        let decryption_result = {
+            let mut write_handle = seal_key_buffer.write().unwrap();
+            let write_handle = write_handle.deref_mut();
+            cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, &req.associated_data, write_handle)
+        };
+
+        match decryption_result {
+            Ok(_) => {
+                match self
+                    .actors
+                    .key_holder
+                    .ask(TryUnseal {
+                        seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
+                    })
+                    .await
+                {
+                    Ok(_) => {
+                        info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
+                        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
+                        Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
+                            UnsealResult::Success.into(),
+                        )))
+                    }
+                    Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
+                        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                        Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
+                            UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
+                        )))
+                    }
+                    Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
+                        error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
+                        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                        Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
+                            UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
+                        )))
+                    }
+                    Err(err) => {
+                        error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
+                        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                        Err(UserAgentError::ActorUnavailable)
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt unseal key");
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
+                    UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
+                )))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_request(&mut self, req: AuthChallengeRequest) -> Output {
+        let pubkey = req
+            .pubkey
+            .as_array()
+            .ok_or(UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey)?;
+        let pubkey = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey).map_err(|_err| {
+            error!(?pubkey, "Failed to convert to VerifyingKey");
+            UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey
+        })?;
+
+        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::AuthRequest)?;
+
+        match req.bootstrap_token {
+            Some(token) => self.auth_with_bootstrap_token(pubkey, token).await,
+            None => self.auth_with_challenge(pubkey, req.pubkey).await,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_solution(
+        &mut self,
+        solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
+    ) -> Output {
+        let (valid, challenge_context) = self.verify_challenge_solution(&solution)?;
+
+        if valid {
+            info!(
+                ?challenge_context,
+                "Client provided valid solution to authentication challenge"
+            );
+            self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedGoodSolution)?;
+            Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
+        } else {
+            error!("Client provided invalid solution to authentication challenge");
+            self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBadSolution)?;
+            Err(UserAgentError::InvalidChallengeSolution)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Message<UserAgentRequest> for UserAgentActor {
+    type Reply = ();
+
+    async fn handle(
+        &mut self,
+        msg: UserAgentRequest,
+        _ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
+    ) -> Self::Reply {
+        let result = self.process_request(msg).await;
+        if let Err(e) = self.transport.tell(result).await {
+            error!(actor = "useragent", "Failed to send response to transport: {}", e);
+        }
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/state.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+
+use arbiter_proto::proto::auth::AuthChallenge;
+use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
+use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
+
+/// Context for state machine with validated key and sent challenge
+/// Challenge is then transformed to bytes using shared function and verified
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct ChallengeContext {
+    pub challenge: AuthChallenge,
+    pub key: VerifyingKey,
+}
+
+pub struct UnsealContext {
+    pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
+    pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
+}
+
+smlang::statemachine!(
+    name: UserAgent,
+    custom_error: false,
+    transitions: {
+        *Init + AuthRequest =  ReceivedAuthRequest,
+        ReceivedAuthRequest + ReceivedBootstrapToken = Idle,
+
+        ReceivedAuthRequest + SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) / move_challenge = WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext),
+
+        WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedGoodSolution = Idle,
+        WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedBadSolution = AuthError, // block further transitions, but connection should close anyway
+
+        Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
+        WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
+        WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
+    }
+);
+
+pub struct DummyContext;
+impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
+    #[allow(missing_docs)]
+    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
+    fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
+        Ok(event_data)
+    }
+
+    #[allow(missing_docs)]
+    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
+    fn move_challenge(&mut self, event_data: ChallengeContext) -> Result<ChallengeContext, ()> {
+        Ok(event_data)
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/transport.rs

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-use super::UserAgentActor;
-use arbiter_proto::proto::{
-    UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
-    auth::{
-        self, AuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk, ClientMessage,
-        ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage, client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
-        server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
-    },
-    user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
-    user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
-};
-use futures::StreamExt;
-use kameo::{
-    actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _},
-    error::SendError,
-};
-use tokio::sync::mpsc;
-use tonic::Status;
-use tracing::error;
-
-use crate::{
-    actors::user_agent::{HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution},
-    context::ServerContext,
-};
-
-pub(crate) async fn handle_user_agent(
-    context: ServerContext,
-    mut req_stream: tonic::Streaming<UserAgentRequest>,
-    tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
-) {
-    let actor = UserAgentActor::spawn(UserAgentActor::new(context, tx.clone()));
-
-    while let Some(Ok(req)) = req_stream.next().await
-        && actor.is_alive()
-    {
-        match process_message(&actor, req).await {
-            Ok(resp) => {
-                if tx.send(Ok(resp)).await.is_err() {
-                    error!(actor = "useragent", "Failed to send response to client");
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-            Err(status) => {
-                let _ = tx.send(Err(status)).await;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    actor.kill();
-}
-
-async fn process_message(
-    actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentActor>,
-    req: UserAgentRequest,
-) -> Result<UserAgentResponse, Status> {
-    let msg = req.payload.ok_or_else(|| {
-        error!(actor = "useragent", "Received message with no payload");
-        Status::invalid_argument("Expected message with payload")
-    })?;
-
-    let UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientMessage {
-        payload: Some(client_message),
-    }) = msg
-    else {
-        error!(
-            actor = "useragent",
-            "Received unexpected message type during authentication"
-        );
-        return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
-            "Expected AuthMessage with ClientMessage payload",
-        ));
-    };
-
-    match client_message {
-        ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(req) => actor
-            .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest { req })
-            .await
-            .map_err(into_status),
-        ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(solution) => actor
-            .ask(HandleAuthChallengeSolution { solution })
-            .await
-            .map_err(into_status),
-    }
-}
-
-fn into_status<M>(e: SendError<M, Status>) -> Status {
-    match e {
-        SendError::HandlerError(status) => status,
-        _ => {
-            error!(actor = "useragent", "Failed to send message to actor");
-            Status::internal("session failure")
-        }
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context.rs

@@ -1,403 +0,0 @@
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use std::time::Duration;
-
-use diesel::OptionalExtension as _;
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
-use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
-use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
-use miette::Diagnostic;
-use rand::rngs::StdRng;
-use secrecy::{ExposeSecret, SecretBox};
-use smlang::statemachine;
-use thiserror::Error;
-use tokio::sync::{watch, RwLock};
-use zeroize::Zeroizing;
-
-use crate::{
-    context::{
-        bootstrap::{BootstrapActor, generate_token},
-        lease::LeaseHandler,
-        tls::{RotationState, RotationTask, TlsDataRaw, TlsManager},
-    },
-    db::{
-        self,
-        models::ArbiterSetting,
-        schema::{self, arbiter_settings},
-    },
-};
-
-pub(crate) mod bootstrap;
-pub(crate) mod lease;
-pub(crate) mod tls;
-pub(crate) mod unseal;
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum InitError {
-    #[error("Database setup failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_setup))]
-    DatabaseSetup(#[from] db::DatabaseSetupError),
-
-    #[error("Connection acquire failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_pool))]
-    DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
-
-    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_query))]
-    DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-
-    #[error("TLS initialization failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::tls_init))]
-    Tls(#[from] tls::TlsInitError),
-
-    #[error("Bootstrap token generation failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::bootstrap_token))]
-    BootstrapToken(#[from] bootstrap::BootstrapError),
-
-    #[error("I/O Error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::io))]
-    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
-}
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum UnsealError {
-    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::database_pool))]
-    Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
-
-    #[error("Query error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::database_query))]
-    Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-
-    #[error("Decryption failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::decryption))]
-    DecryptionFailed(#[from] crate::crypto::CryptoError),
-
-    #[error("Invalid state for unseal")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::invalid_state))]
-    InvalidState,
-
-    #[error("Missing salt in database")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::missing_salt))]
-    MissingSalt,
-
-    #[error("No root key configured in database")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::no_root_key))]
-    NoRootKey,
-}
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum SealError {
-    #[error("Invalid state for seal")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::seal::invalid_state))]
-    InvalidState,
-}
-
-/// Secure in-memory storage for root encryption key
-///
-/// Uses `secrecy` crate for automatic zeroization on drop to prevent key material
-/// from remaining in memory after use. SecretBox provides heap-allocated secret
-/// storage that implements Send + Sync for safe use in async contexts.
-pub struct KeyStorage {
-    /// 32-byte root key protected by SecretBox
-    key: SecretBox<[u8; 32]>,
-}
-
-impl KeyStorage {
-    /// Create new KeyStorage from a 32-byte root key
-    pub fn new(key: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            key: SecretBox::new(Box::new(key)),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Access the key for cryptographic operations
-    pub fn key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
-        self.key.expose_secret()
-    }
-}
-
-// Drop автоматически реализован через secrecy::Zeroize
-// который зануляет память при освобождении
-
-statemachine! {
-    name: Server,
-    transitions: {
-        *NotBootstrapped + Bootstrapped = Sealed,
-        Sealed + Unsealed(KeyStorage) / move_key = Ready(KeyStorage),
-        Ready(KeyStorage) + Sealed / dispose_key = Sealed,
-    }
-}
-pub struct _Context;
-impl ServerStateMachineContext for _Context {
-    /// Move key from unseal event into Ready state
-    fn move_key(&mut self, event_data: KeyStorage) -> Result<KeyStorage, ()> {
-        // Просто перемещаем KeyStorage из event в state
-        // Без клонирования - event data consumed
-        Ok(event_data)
-    }
-
-    /// Securely dispose of key when sealing
-    #[allow(missing_docs)]
-    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
-    fn dispose_key(&mut self, _state_data: &KeyStorage) -> Result<(), ()> {
-        // KeyStorage будет dropped после state transition
-        // secrecy::Zeroize зануляет память автоматически
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-pub(crate) struct _ServerContextInner {
-    pub db: db::DatabasePool,
-    pub state: RwLock<ServerStateMachine<_Context>>,
-    pub rng: StdRng,
-    pub tls: Arc<TlsManager>,
-    pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
-    pub rotation_state: RwLock<RotationState>,
-    pub rotation_acks: Arc<RwLock<HashSet<VerifyingKey>>>,
-    pub user_agent_leases: LeaseHandler<VerifyingKey>,
-    pub client_leases: LeaseHandler<VerifyingKey>,
-}
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub(crate) struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
-
-impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
-    type Target = _ServerContextInner;
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        &self.0
-    }
-}
-
-impl ServerContext {
-    /// Check if all active clients have acknowledged the rotation
-    pub async fn check_rotation_ready(&self) -> bool {
-        // TODO: Implement proper rotation readiness check
-        // For now, return false as placeholder
-        false
-    }
-
-    async fn load_tls(
-        db: &db::DatabasePool,
-        settings: Option<&ArbiterSetting>,
-    ) -> Result<TlsManager, InitError> {
-        match settings {
-            Some(s) if s.current_cert_id.is_some() => {
-                // Load active certificate from tls_certificates table
-                Ok(TlsManager::load_from_db(
-                    db.clone(),
-                    s.current_cert_id.unwrap(),
-                )
-                .await?)
-            }
-            Some(s) => {
-                // Legacy migration: extract validity and save to new table
-                let tls_data_raw = TlsDataRaw {
-                    cert: s.cert.clone(),
-                    key: s.cert_key.clone(),
-                };
-
-                // For legacy certificates, use current time as not_before
-                // and current time + 90 days as not_after
-                let not_before = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
-                let not_after = not_before + (90 * 24 * 60 * 60); // 90 days
-
-                Ok(TlsManager::new_from_legacy(
-                    db.clone(),
-                    tls_data_raw,
-                    not_before,
-                    not_after,
-                )
-                .await?)
-            }
-            None => {
-                // First startup - generate new certificate
-                Ok(TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-        let rng = rand::make_rng();
-
-        let settings = arbiter_settings::table
-            .first::<ArbiterSetting>(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .optional()?;
-
-        drop(conn);
-
-        // Load TLS manager
-        let tls = Self::load_tls(&db, settings.as_ref()).await?;
-
-        // Load rotation state from database
-        let rotation_state = RotationState::load_from_db(&db)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_or(RotationState::Normal);
-
-        let bootstrap_token = generate_token().await?;
-
-        let mut state = ServerStateMachine::new(_Context);
-
-        if let Some(settings) = &settings
-            && settings.root_key_id.is_some()
-        {
-            // TODO: pass the encrypted root key to the state machine and let it handle decryption and transition to Sealed
-            let _ = state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped);
-        }
-
-        // Create shutdown channel for rotation task
-        let (rotation_shutdown_tx, rotation_shutdown_rx) = watch::channel(false);
-
-        // Initialize bootstrap actor
-        let bootstrapper = BootstrapActor::spawn(BootstrapActor::new(&db).await?);
-
-        let context = Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
-            db: db.clone(),
-            rng,
-            tls: Arc::new(tls),
-            state: RwLock::new(state),
-            bootstrapper,
-            rotation_state: RwLock::new(rotation_state),
-            rotation_acks: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashSet::new())),
-            user_agent_leases: Default::default(),
-            client_leases: Default::default(),
-        });
-
-        Ok(Self(context))
-    }
-
-    /// Unseal vault with password
-    pub async fn unseal(&self, password: &str) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
-        use crate::crypto::root_key;
-        use diesel::QueryDsl as _;
-
-        // 1. Get root_key_id from settings
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
-        let settings: db::models::ArbiterSetting = schema::arbiter_settings::table
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let root_key_id = settings.root_key_id.ok_or(UnsealError::NoRootKey)?;
-
-        // 2. Load encrypted root key
-        let encrypted: db::models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
-            .find(root_key_id)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let salt = encrypted
-            .argon2_salt
-            .as_ref()
-            .ok_or(UnsealError::MissingSalt)?;
-
-        drop(conn);
-
-        // 3. Decrypt root key using password
-        let root_key = root_key::decrypt_root_key(&encrypted, password, salt)
-            .map_err(UnsealError::DecryptionFailed)?;
-
-        // 4. Create secure storage
-        let key_storage = KeyStorage::new(root_key);
-
-        // 5. Transition state machine
-        let mut state = self.state.write().await;
-        state
-            .process_event(ServerEvents::Unsealed(key_storage))
-            .map_err(|_| UnsealError::InvalidState)?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Seal the server (lock the key)
-    pub async fn seal(&self) -> Result<(), SealError> {
-        let mut state = self.state.write().await;
-        state
-            .process_event(ServerEvents::Sealed)
-            .map_err(|_| SealError::InvalidState)?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_keystorage_creation() {
-        let key = [42u8; 32];
-        let storage = KeyStorage::new(key);
-        assert_eq!(storage.key()[0], 42);
-        assert_eq!(storage.key().len(), 32);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_keystorage_zeroization() {
-        let key = [99u8; 32];
-        {
-            let _storage = KeyStorage::new(key);
-            // storage будет dropped здесь
-        }
-        // После drop SecretBox должен зануляеть память
-        // Это проверяется автоматически через secrecy::Zeroize
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_state_machine_transitions() {
-        let mut state = ServerStateMachine::new(_Context);
-
-        // Начальное состояние
-        assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::NotBootstrapped));
-
-        // Bootstrapped transition
-        state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::Sealed));
-
-        // Unsealed transition
-        let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([1u8; 32]);
-        state
-            .process_event(ServerEvents::Unsealed(key_storage))
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::Ready(_)));
-
-        // Sealed transition
-        state.process_event(ServerEvents::Sealed).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::Sealed));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_move_key_callback() {
-        let mut ctx = _Context;
-        let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([7u8; 32]);
-        let result = ctx.move_key(key_storage);
-        assert!(result.is_ok());
-        assert_eq!(result.unwrap().key()[0], 7);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_dispose_key_callback() {
-        let mut ctx = _Context;
-        let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([13u8; 32]);
-        let result = ctx.dispose_key(&key_storage);
-        assert!(result.is_ok());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_invalid_state_transitions() {
-        let mut state = ServerStateMachine::new(_Context);
-
-        // Попытка unseal без bootstrap
-        let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([1u8; 32]);
-        let result = state.process_event(ServerEvents::Unsealed(key_storage));
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-
-        // Правильный путь
-        state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped).unwrap();
-
-        // Попытка повторного bootstrap
-        let result = state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped);
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/lease.rs

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use dashmap::DashSet;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Default)]
-struct LeaseStorage<T: Eq + std::hash::Hash>(Arc<DashSet<T>>);
-
-// A lease that automatically releases the item when dropped
-pub struct Lease<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> {
-    item: T,
-    storage: LeaseStorage<T>,
-}
-impl<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> Drop for Lease<T> {
-    fn drop(&mut self) {
-        self.storage.0.remove(&self.item);
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Default)]
-pub struct LeaseHandler<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> {
-    storage: LeaseStorage<T>,
-}
-
-impl<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> LeaseHandler<T> {
-    pub fn new() -> Self {
-        Self {
-            storage: LeaseStorage(Arc::new(DashSet::new())),
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn acquire(&self, item: T) -> Result<Lease<T>, ()> {
-        if self.storage.0.insert(item.clone()) {
-            Ok(Lease {
-                item,
-                storage: self.storage.clone(),
-            })
-        } else {
-            Err(())
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Get all currently leased items
-    pub fn get_all(&self) -> Vec<T> {
-        self.storage.0.iter().map(|entry| entry.clone()).collect()
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use miette::Diagnostic;
+use thiserror::Error;
+
+use crate::{
+    actors::GlobalActors,
+    context::tls::TlsManager,
+    db::{self},
+};
+
+pub mod tls;
+
+#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
+pub enum InitError {
+    #[error("Database setup failed: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_setup))]
+    DatabaseSetup(#[from] db::DatabaseSetupError),
+
+    #[error("Connection acquire failed: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_pool))]
+    DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
+
+    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_query))]
+    DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+
+    #[error("TLS initialization failed: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::tls_init))]
+    Tls(#[from] tls::InitError),
+
+    #[error("Actor spawn failed: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::actor_spawn))]
+    ActorSpawn(#[from] crate::actors::SpawnError),
+
+    #[error("I/O Error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::io))]
+    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
+}
+
+pub struct _ServerContextInner {
+    pub db: db::DatabasePool,
+    pub tls: TlsManager,
+    pub actors: GlobalActors,
+}
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
+
+impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
+    type Target = _ServerContextInner;
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        &self.0
+    }
+}
+
+impl ServerContext {
+    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+        Ok(Self(Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
+            actors: GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await?,
+            tls: TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?,
+            db,
+        })))
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/tls.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+use std::string::FromUtf8Error;
+
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+use miette::Diagnostic;
+use pem::Pem;
+use rcgen::{
+    BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
+    IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose,
+};
+use rustls::pki_types::{pem::PemObject};
+use thiserror::Error;
+use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
+
+use crate::db::{
+    self,
+    models::{NewTlsHistory, TlsHistory},
+    schema::{
+        arbiter_settings,
+        tls_history::{self},
+    },
+};
+
+const ENCODE_CONFIG: pem::EncodeConfig = {
+    let line_ending = match cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
+        true => pem::LineEnding::CRLF,
+        false => pem::LineEnding::LF,
+    };
+    pem::EncodeConfig::new().set_line_ending(line_ending)
+};
+
+#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
+pub enum InitError {
+    #[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_generation))]
+    KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
+
+    #[error("Key invalid format: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_invalid_format))]
+    KeyInvalidFormat(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
+
+    #[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_deserialization))]
+    KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
+
+    #[error("Database error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::database_error))]
+    DatabaseError(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+
+    #[error("Pem deserialization error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::pem_deserialization))]
+    PemDeserializationError(#[from] rustls::pki_types::pem::Error),
+
+    #[error("Database pool acquire error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::database_pool_acquire))]
+    DatabasePoolAcquire(#[from] db::PoolError),
+}
+
+pub type PemCert = String;
+
+pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer) -> PemCert {
+    pem::encode_config(
+        &Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()),
+        ENCODE_CONFIG,
+    )
+}
+
+#[allow(unused)]
+struct SerializedTls {
+    cert_pem: PemCert,
+    cert_key_pem: String,
+}
+
+struct TlsCa {
+    issuer: Issuer<'static, KeyPair>,
+    cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
+}
+
+impl TlsCa {
+    fn generate() -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+        let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
+        let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance CA".into()])?;
+        params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
+        params.key_usages = vec![
+            KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign,
+            KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign,
+            KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
+        ];
+
+        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance CA");
+        params.distinguished_name = dn;
+        let certified_issuer = CertifiedIssuer::self_signed(params, keypair)?;
+
+        let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem();
+
+        let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(
+            &certified_issuer.pem(),
+            KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem.as_ref()).unwrap(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            issuer,
+            cert: certified_issuer.der().clone(),
+        })
+    }
+    fn generate_leaf(&self) -> Result<TlsCert, InitError> {
+        let cert_key = KeyPair::generate()?;
+        let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance Leaf".into()])?;
+        params.is_ca = IsCa::NoCa;
+        params.key_usages = vec![
+            KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
+            KeyUsagePurpose::KeyEncipherment,
+        ];
+
+        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
+        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance Leaf");
+        params.distinguished_name = dn;
+
+        let new_cert = params.signed_by(&cert_key, &self.issuer)?;
+
+        Ok(TlsCert {
+            cert: new_cert,
+            cert_key,
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[allow(unused)]
+    fn serialize(&self) -> Result<SerializedTls, InitError> {
+        let cert_key_pem = self.issuer.key().serialize_pem();
+        Ok(SerializedTls {
+            cert_pem: encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert),
+            cert_key_pem,
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[allow(unused)]
+    fn try_deserialize(cert_pem: &str, cert_key_pem: &str) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+        let keypair =
+            KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem).map_err(InitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
+        let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(cert_pem, keypair)?;
+        Ok(Self {
+            issuer,
+            cert: CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(cert_pem.as_bytes())?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+struct TlsCert {
+    cert: Certificate,
+    cert_key: KeyPair,
+}
+
+// TODO: Implement cert rotation
+pub struct TlsManager {
+    cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
+    keypair: KeyPair,
+    ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
+    _db: db::DatabasePool,
+}
+
+impl TlsManager {
+    pub async fn generate_new(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+        let ca = TlsCa::generate()?;
+        let new_cert = ca.generate_leaf()?;
+
+        {
+            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
+            conn.transaction(|conn| {
+                Box::pin(async {
+                    let new_tls_history = NewTlsHistory {
+                        cert: new_cert.cert.pem(),
+                        cert_key: new_cert.cert_key.serialize_pem(),
+                        ca_cert: encode_cert_to_pem(&ca.cert),
+                        ca_key: ca.issuer.key().serialize_pem(),
+                    };
+
+                    let inserted_tls_history: i32 = diesel::insert_into(tls_history::table)
+                        .values(&new_tls_history)
+                        .returning(tls_history::id)
+                        .get_result(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    diesel::update(arbiter_settings::table)
+                        .set(arbiter_settings::tls_id.eq(inserted_tls_history))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(())
+                })
+            })
+            .await?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            cert: new_cert.cert.der().clone(),
+            keypair: new_cert.cert_key,
+            ca_cert: ca.cert,
+            _db: db.clone(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+        let cert_data: Option<TlsHistory> = {
+            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
+            arbiter_settings::table
+                .left_join(tls_history::table)
+                .select(Option::<TlsHistory>::as_select())
+                .first(&mut conn)
+                .await?
+        };
+
+        match cert_data {
+            Some(data) => {
+                let try_load = || -> Result<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+                    let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&data.cert_key)?;
+                    let cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.cert.as_bytes())?;
+                    let ca_cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.ca_cert.as_bytes())?;
+                    Ok(Self {
+                        cert,
+                        keypair,
+                        ca_cert,
+                        _db: db.clone(),
+                    })
+                };
+                match try_load() {
+                    Ok(manager) => Ok(manager),
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        eprintln!("Failed to load existing TLS certs: {e}. Generating new ones.");
+                        Self::generate_new(&db).await
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            None => Self::generate_new(&db).await,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
+        &self.cert
+    }
+    pub fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
+        &self.ca_cert
+    }
+
+    pub fn cert_pem(&self) -> PemCert {
+        encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert)
+    }
+    pub fn key_pem(&self) -> String {
+        self.keypair.serialize_pem()
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/tls/mod.rs

@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use std::string::FromUtf8Error;
-
-use miette::Diagnostic;
-use rcgen::{Certificate, KeyPair};
-use rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer;
-use thiserror::Error;
-use tokio::sync::RwLock;
-
-use crate::db;
-
-pub mod rotation;
-
-pub use rotation::{RotationError, RotationState, RotationTask};
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-#[expect(clippy::enum_variant_names)]
-pub enum TlsInitError {
-    #[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_generation))]
-    KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
-
-    #[error("Key invalid format: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_invalid_format))]
-    KeyInvalidFormat(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
-
-    #[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_deserialization))]
-    KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
-}
-
-pub struct TlsData {
-    pub cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
-    pub keypair: KeyPair,
-}
-
-pub struct TlsDataRaw {
-    pub cert: Vec<u8>,
-    pub key: Vec<u8>,
-}
-impl TlsDataRaw {
-    pub fn serialize(cert: &TlsData) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            cert: cert.cert.as_ref().to_vec(),
-            key: cert.keypair.serialize_pem().as_bytes().to_vec(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn deserialize(&self) -> Result<TlsData, TlsInitError> {
-        let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&self.cert).into_owned();
-
-        let key =
-            String::from_utf8(self.key.clone()).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyInvalidFormat)?;
-
-        let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&key).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
-
-        Ok(TlsData { cert, keypair })
-    }
-}
-
-/// Metadata about a certificate including validity period
-pub struct CertificateMetadata {
-    pub cert_id: i32,
-    pub cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
-    pub keypair: Arc<KeyPair>,
-    pub not_before: i64,
-    pub not_after: i64,
-    pub created_at: i64,
-}
-
-pub(crate) fn generate_cert(key: &KeyPair) -> Result<(Certificate, i64, i64), rcgen::Error> {
-    let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(vec![
-        "arbiter.local".to_string(),
-        "localhost".to_string(),
-    ])?;
-
-    // Set validity period: 90 days from now
-    let not_before = chrono::Utc::now();
-    let not_after = not_before + chrono::Duration::days(90);
-
-    // Note: rcgen doesn't directly expose not_before/not_after setting in all versions
-    // For now, we'll generate the cert and track validity separately
-    let cert = params.self_signed(key)?;
-
-    Ok((cert, not_before.timestamp(), not_after.timestamp()))
-}
-
-// Certificate rotation enabled
-pub(crate) struct TlsManager {
-    // Current active certificate (atomic replacement via RwLock)
-    current_cert: Arc<RwLock<CertificateMetadata>>,
-
-    // Database pool for persistence
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-}
-
-impl TlsManager {
-    /// Create new TlsManager with a generated certificate
-    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
-        let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
-        let (cert, not_before, not_after) = generate_cert(&keypair)?;
-        let cert_der = cert.der().clone();
-
-        // For initial creation, cert_id will be set after DB insert
-        let metadata = CertificateMetadata {
-            cert_id: 0, // Temporary, will be updated after DB insert
-            cert: cert_der,
-            keypair: Arc::new(keypair),
-            not_before,
-            not_after,
-            created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
-        };
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            current_cert: Arc::new(RwLock::new(metadata)),
-            db,
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Load TlsManager from database with specific certificate ID
-    pub async fn load_from_db(db: db::DatabasePool, cert_id: i32) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
-        // TODO: Load certificate from database
-        // For now, return error - will be implemented when database access is ready
-        Err(TlsInitError::KeyGeneration(rcgen::Error::CouldNotParseCertificate))
-    }
-
-    /// Create from legacy TlsDataRaw format
-    pub async fn new_from_legacy(
-        db: db::DatabasePool,
-        data: TlsDataRaw,
-        not_before: i64,
-        not_after: i64,
-    ) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
-        let tls_data = data.deserialize()?;
-
-        let metadata = CertificateMetadata {
-            cert_id: 1, // Legacy certificate gets ID 1
-            cert: tls_data.cert,
-            keypair: Arc::new(tls_data.keypair),
-            not_before,
-            not_after,
-            created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
-        };
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            current_cert: Arc::new(RwLock::new(metadata)),
-            db,
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Get current certificate data
-    pub async fn get_certificate(&self) -> (CertificateDer<'static>, Arc<KeyPair>) {
-        let cert = self.current_cert.read().await;
-        (cert.cert.clone(), cert.keypair.clone())
-    }
-
-    /// Replace certificate atomically
-    pub async fn replace_certificate(&self, new_cert: CertificateMetadata) -> Result<(), TlsInitError> {
-        let mut cert = self.current_cert.write().await;
-        *cert = new_cert;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Check if certificate is expiring soon
-    pub async fn check_expiration(&self, threshold_secs: i64) -> bool {
-        let cert = self.current_cert.read().await;
-        let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
-        cert.not_after - now < threshold_secs
-    }
-
-    /// Get certificate metadata for rotation logic
-    pub async fn get_certificate_metadata(&self) -> CertificateMetadata {
-        let cert = self.current_cert.read().await;
-        CertificateMetadata {
-            cert_id: cert.cert_id,
-            cert: cert.cert.clone(),
-            keypair: cert.keypair.clone(),
-            not_before: cert.not_before,
-            not_after: cert.not_after,
-            created_at: cert.created_at,
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn bytes(&self) -> TlsDataRaw {
-        // This method is now async-compatible but we keep sync interface
-        // TODO: Make this async or remove if not needed
-        TlsDataRaw {
-            cert: vec![],
-            key: vec![],
-        }
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/tls/rotation.rs

@@ -1,552 +0,0 @@
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use std::time::Duration;
-
-use diesel::prelude::*;
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
-use miette::Diagnostic;
-use rcgen::KeyPair;
-use thiserror::Error;
-use tokio::sync::watch;
-use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
-
-use crate::context::ServerContext;
-use crate::db::models::{NewRotationClientAck, NewTlsCertificate, NewTlsRotationHistory};
-use crate::db::schema::{rotation_client_acks, tls_certificates, tls_rotation_history, tls_rotation_state};
-use crate::db::DatabasePool;
-
-use super::{generate_cert, CertificateMetadata, TlsInitError};
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum RotationError {
-    #[error("Certificate generation failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::cert_generation))]
-    CertGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
-
-    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::database))]
-    Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-
-    #[error("TLS initialization error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::tls_init))]
-    TlsInit(#[from] TlsInitError),
-
-    #[error("Invalid rotation state: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::invalid_state))]
-    InvalidState(String),
-
-    #[error("No active certificate found")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::no_active_cert))]
-    NoActiveCertificate,
-}
-
-/// Состояние процесса ротации сертификата
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub enum RotationState {
-    /// Обычная работа, ротация не требуется
-    Normal,
-
-    /// Ротация инициирована, новый сертификат сгенерирован
-    RotationInitiated {
-        initiated_at: i64,
-        new_cert_id: i32,
-    },
-
-    /// Ожидание подтверждений (ACKs) от клиентов
-    WaitingForAcks {
-        new_cert_id: i32,
-        initiated_at: i64,
-        timeout_at: i64,
-    },
-
-    /// Все ACK получены или таймаут истёк, готов к ротации
-    ReadyToRotate {
-        new_cert_id: i32,
-    },
-}
-
-impl RotationState {
-    /// Загрузить состояние из базы данных
-    pub async fn load_from_db(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_rotation_state::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        let state_record: (i32, String, Option<i32>, Option<i32>, Option<i32>) =
-            tls_rotation_state
-                .select((id, state, new_cert_id, initiated_at, timeout_at))
-                .filter(id.eq(1))
-                .first(&mut conn)
-                .await?;
-
-        let rotation_state = match state_record.1.as_str() {
-            "normal" => RotationState::Normal,
-            "initiated" => {
-                let cert_id = state_record.2.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("Initiated state missing new_cert_id".into())
-                })?;
-                let init_at = state_record.3.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("Initiated state missing initiated_at".into())
-                })?;
-                RotationState::RotationInitiated {
-                    initiated_at: init_at as i64,
-                    new_cert_id: cert_id,
-                }
-            }
-            "waiting_acks" => {
-                let cert_id = state_record.2.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("WaitingForAcks state missing new_cert_id".into())
-                })?;
-                let init_at = state_record.3.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("WaitingForAcks state missing initiated_at".into())
-                })?;
-                let timeout = state_record.4.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("WaitingForAcks state missing timeout_at".into())
-                })?;
-                RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
-                    new_cert_id: cert_id,
-                    initiated_at: init_at as i64,
-                    timeout_at: timeout as i64,
-                }
-            }
-            "ready" => {
-                let cert_id = state_record.2.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("Ready state missing new_cert_id".into())
-                })?;
-                RotationState::ReadyToRotate {
-                    new_cert_id: cert_id,
-                }
-            }
-            other => {
-                return Err(RotationError::InvalidState(format!(
-                    "Unknown state: {}",
-                    other
-                )))
-            }
-        };
-
-        Ok(rotation_state)
-    }
-
-    /// Сохранить состояние в базу данных
-    pub async fn save_to_db(&self, db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_rotation_state::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        let (state_str, cert_id, init_at, timeout) = match self {
-            RotationState::Normal => ("normal", None, None, None),
-            RotationState::RotationInitiated {
-                initiated_at: init,
-                new_cert_id: cert,
-            } => ("initiated", Some(*cert), Some(*init as i32), None),
-            RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
-                new_cert_id: cert,
-                initiated_at: init,
-                timeout_at: timeout_val,
-            } => (
-                "waiting_acks",
-                Some(*cert),
-                Some(*init as i32),
-                Some(*timeout_val as i32),
-            ),
-            RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id: cert } => ("ready", Some(*cert), None, None),
-        };
-
-        diesel::update(tls_rotation_state.filter(id.eq(1)))
-            .set((
-                state.eq(state_str),
-                new_cert_id.eq(cert_id),
-                initiated_at.eq(init_at),
-                timeout_at.eq(timeout),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-/// Фоновый таск для автоматической ротации сертификатов
-pub struct RotationTask {
-    context: Arc<crate::context::_ServerContextInner>,
-    check_interval: Duration,
-    rotation_threshold: Duration,
-    ack_timeout: Duration,
-    shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
-}
-
-impl RotationTask {
-    /// Создать новый rotation task
-    pub fn new(
-        context: Arc<crate::context::_ServerContextInner>,
-        check_interval: Duration,
-        rotation_threshold: Duration,
-        ack_timeout: Duration,
-        shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
-    ) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            context,
-            check_interval,
-            rotation_threshold,
-            ack_timeout,
-            shutdown_rx,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Запустить фоновый таск мониторинга и ротации
-    pub async fn run(mut self) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        info!("Starting TLS certificate rotation task");
-
-        loop {
-            tokio::select! {
-                _ = tokio::time::sleep(self.check_interval) => {
-                    if let Err(e) = self.check_and_process().await {
-                        error!("Rotation task error: {}", e);
-                    }
-                }
-                _ = self.shutdown_rx.changed() => {
-                    info!("Rotation task shutting down");
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Проверить текущее состояние и выполнить необходимые действия
-    async fn check_and_process(&self) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        let state = self.context.rotation_state.read().await.clone();
-
-        match state {
-            RotationState::Normal => {
-                // Проверить, нужна ли ротация
-                self.check_expiration_and_initiate().await?;
-            }
-            RotationState::RotationInitiated { new_cert_id, .. } => {
-                // Автоматически перейти в WaitingForAcks
-                self.transition_to_waiting_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
-            }
-            RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
-                new_cert_id,
-                timeout_at,
-                ..
-            } => {
-                self.handle_waiting_for_acks(new_cert_id, timeout_at).await?;
-            }
-            RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id } => {
-                self.execute_rotation(new_cert_id).await?;
-            }
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Проверить срок действия сертификата и инициировать ротацию если нужно
-    async fn check_expiration_and_initiate(&self) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        let threshold_secs = self.rotation_threshold.as_secs() as i64;
-
-        if self.context.tls.check_expiration(threshold_secs).await {
-            info!("Certificate expiring soon, initiating rotation");
-            self.initiate_rotation().await?;
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Инициировать ротацию: сгенерировать новый сертификат и сохранить в БД
-    pub async fn initiate_rotation(&self) -> Result<i32, RotationError> {
-        info!("Initiating certificate rotation");
-
-        // 1. Генерация нового сертификата
-        let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
-        let (cert, not_before, not_after) = generate_cert(&keypair)?;
-        let cert_der = cert.der().clone();
-
-        // 2. Сохранение в БД (is_active = false, пока не активирован)
-        let new_cert_id = self
-            .save_new_certificate(&cert_der, &keypair, not_before, not_after)
-            .await?;
-
-        info!(new_cert_id, "New certificate generated and saved");
-
-        // 3. Обновление rotation_state
-        let new_state = RotationState::RotationInitiated {
-            initiated_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
-            new_cert_id,
-        };
-        *self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
-        new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
-
-        // 4. Логирование в audit trail
-        self.log_rotation_event(new_cert_id, "rotation_initiated", None)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(new_cert_id)
-    }
-
-    /// Перейти в состояние WaitingForAcks и разослать уведомления
-    async fn transition_to_waiting_acks(&self, new_cert_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        info!(new_cert_id, "Transitioning to WaitingForAcks state");
-
-        let initiated_at = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
-        let timeout_at = initiated_at + self.ack_timeout.as_secs() as i64;
-
-        // Обновить состояние
-        let new_state = RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
-            new_cert_id,
-            initiated_at,
-            timeout_at,
-        };
-        *self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
-        new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
-
-        // TODO: Broadcast уведомлений клиентам
-        // self.broadcast_rotation_notification(new_cert_id, timeout_at).await?;
-
-        info!(timeout_at, "Rotation notifications sent, waiting for ACKs");
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Обработка состояния WaitingForAcks: проверка ACKs и таймаута
-    async fn handle_waiting_for_acks(
-        &self,
-        new_cert_id: i32,
-        timeout_at: i64,
-    ) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
-
-        // Проверить таймаут
-        if now > timeout_at {
-            let missing = self.get_missing_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
-            warn!(
-                missing_count = missing.len(),
-                "Rotation ACK timeout reached, proceeding with rotation"
-            );
-
-            // Переход в ReadyToRotate
-            let new_state = RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id };
-            *self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
-            new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
-
-            self.log_rotation_event(
-                new_cert_id,
-                "timeout",
-                Some(format!("Missing ACKs from {} clients", missing.len())),
-            )
-            .await?;
-
-            return Ok(());
-        }
-
-        // Проверить, все ли ACK получены
-        let missing = self.get_missing_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
-
-        if missing.is_empty() {
-            info!("All clients acknowledged, ready to rotate");
-
-            let new_state = RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id };
-            *self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
-            new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
-
-            self.log_rotation_event(new_cert_id, "acks_complete", None)
-                .await?;
-        } else {
-            let time_remaining = timeout_at - now;
-            debug!(
-                missing_count = missing.len(),
-                time_remaining,
-                "Waiting for rotation ACKs"
-            );
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Выполнить атомарную ротацию сертификата
-    async fn execute_rotation(&self, new_cert_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        info!(new_cert_id, "Executing certificate rotation");
-
-        // 1. Загрузить новый сертификат из БД
-        let new_cert = self.load_certificate(new_cert_id).await?;
-
-        // 2. Атомарная замена в TlsManager
-        self.context
-            .tls
-            .replace_certificate(new_cert)
-            .await
-            .map_err(RotationError::TlsInit)?;
-
-        // 3. Обновить БД: старый is_active=false, новый is_active=true
-        self.activate_certificate(new_cert_id).await?;
-
-        // 4. TODO: Отключить всех клиентов
-        // self.disconnect_all_clients().await?;
-
-        // 5. Очистить rotation_state
-        let new_state = RotationState::Normal;
-        *self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
-        new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
-
-        // 6. Очистить ACKs
-        self.context.rotation_acks.write().await.clear();
-        self.clear_rotation_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
-
-        // 7. Логирование
-        self.log_rotation_event(new_cert_id, "activated", None)
-            .await?;
-
-        info!(new_cert_id, "Certificate rotation completed successfully");
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Сохранить новый сертификат в БД
-    async fn save_new_certificate(
-        &self,
-        cert_der: &[u8],
-        keypair: &KeyPair,
-        cert_not_before: i64,
-        cert_not_after: i64,
-    ) -> Result<i32, RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_certificates::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        let new_cert = NewTlsCertificate {
-            cert: cert_der.to_vec(),
-            cert_key: keypair.serialize_pem().as_bytes().to_vec(),
-            not_before: cert_not_before as i32,
-            not_after: cert_not_after as i32,
-            is_active: false,
-        };
-
-        diesel::insert_into(tls_certificates)
-            .values(&new_cert)
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        // Получить ID последней вставленной записи
-        let cert_id: i32 = diesel::select(diesel::dsl::sql::<diesel::sql_types::Integer>(
-            "last_insert_rowid()",
-        ))
-        .first(&mut conn)
-        .await?;
-
-        self.log_rotation_event(cert_id, "created", None).await?;
-
-        Ok(cert_id)
-    }
-
-    /// Загрузить сертификат из БД
-    async fn load_certificate(&self, cert_id: i32) -> Result<CertificateMetadata, RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_certificates::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        let cert_record: (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, i32, i32, i32) = tls_certificates
-            .select((cert, cert_key, not_before, not_after, created_at))
-            .filter(id.eq(cert_id))
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let cert_der = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(cert_record.0);
-        let key_pem = String::from_utf8(cert_record.1)
-            .map_err(|e| RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Invalid key encoding: {}", e)))?;
-        let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&key_pem)?;
-
-        Ok(CertificateMetadata {
-            cert_id,
-            cert: cert_der,
-            keypair: Arc::new(keypair),
-            not_before: cert_record.2 as i64,
-            not_after: cert_record.3 as i64,
-            created_at: cert_record.4 as i64,
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Активировать сертификат (установить is_active=true)
-    async fn activate_certificate(&self, cert_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_certificates::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        // Деактивировать все сертификаты
-        diesel::update(tls_certificates)
-            .set(is_active.eq(false))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        // Активировать новый
-        diesel::update(tls_certificates.filter(id.eq(cert_id)))
-            .set(is_active.eq(true))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Получить список клиентов, которые ещё не отправили ACK
-    async fn get_missing_acks(&self, rotation_id: i32) -> Result<Vec<VerifyingKey>, RotationError> {
-        // TODO: Реализовать получение списка всех активных клиентов
-        // и вычитание тех, кто уже отправил ACK
-
-        // Пока возвращаем пустой список
-        Ok(Vec::new())
-    }
-
-    /// Очистить ACKs для данной ротации из БД
-    async fn clear_rotation_acks(&self, rotation_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::rotation_client_acks::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        diesel::delete(rotation_client_acks.filter(rotation_id.eq(rotation_id)))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Записать событие в audit trail
-    async fn log_rotation_event(
-        &self,
-        history_cert_id: i32,
-        history_event_type: &str,
-        history_details: Option<String>,
-    ) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_rotation_history::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        let new_history = NewTlsRotationHistory {
-            cert_id: history_cert_id,
-            event_type: history_event_type.to_string(),
-            details: history_details,
-        };
-
-        diesel::insert_into(tls_rotation_history)
-            .values(&new_history)
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/unseal.rs

@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
-use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
-
-use miette::Diagnostic;
-use secrecy::{ExposeSecret, SecretBox};
-use thiserror::Error;
-use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
-
-const EPHEMERAL_KEY_LIFETIME_SECS: u64 = 60;
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum UnsealError {
-    #[error("Invalid public key")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::invalid_pubkey))]
-    InvalidPublicKey,
-}
-
-/// Ephemeral X25519 keypair for secure password transmission
-///
-/// Generated on-demand when client requests unseal. Expires after 60 seconds.
-/// Uses StaticSecret stored in SecretBox for automatic zeroization on drop.
-pub struct EphemeralKeyPair {
-    /// Secret key stored securely
-    secret: SecretBox<StaticSecret>,
-    public: PublicKey,
-    expires_at: u64,
-}
-
-impl EphemeralKeyPair {
-    /// Generate new ephemeral X25519 keypair
-    pub fn generate() -> Self {
-        // Generate random 32 bytes
-        let secret_bytes = rand::random::<[u8; 32]>();
-        let secret = StaticSecret::from(secret_bytes);
-        let public = PublicKey::from(&secret);
-
-        let now = SystemTime::now()
-            .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
-            .expect("System time before UNIX epoch")
-            .as_secs();
-
-        Self {
-            secret: SecretBox::new(Box::new(secret)),
-            public,
-            expires_at: now + EPHEMERAL_KEY_LIFETIME_SECS,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Check if this ephemeral key has expired
-    pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
-        let now = SystemTime::now()
-            .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
-            .expect("System time before UNIX epoch")
-            .as_secs();
-
-        now > self.expires_at
-    }
-
-    /// Get expiration timestamp (Unix epoch seconds)
-    pub fn expires_at(&self) -> u64 {
-        self.expires_at
-    }
-
-    /// Get public key as bytes for transmission to client
-    pub fn public_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.public.as_bytes().to_vec()
-    }
-
-    /// Perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange with client's public key
-    ///
-    /// Returns 32-byte shared secret for ChaCha20Poly1305 encryption
-    pub fn perform_dh(&self, client_pubkey: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 32], UnsealError> {
-        // Parse client public key
-        let client_public = PublicKey::from(
-            <[u8; 32]>::try_from(client_pubkey).map_err(|_| UnsealError::InvalidPublicKey)?,
-        );
-
-        // Perform ECDH
-        let shared_secret = self.secret.expose_secret().diffie_hellman(&client_public);
-
-        Ok(shared_secret.to_bytes())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_ephemeral_keypair_generation() {
-        let keypair = EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
-
-        // Public key should be 32 bytes
-        assert_eq!(keypair.public_bytes().len(), 32);
-
-        // Should not be expired immediately
-        assert!(!keypair.is_expired());
-
-        // Expiration should be ~60 seconds in future
-        let now = SystemTime::now()
-            .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
-            .unwrap()
-            .as_secs();
-        let time_until_expiry = keypair.expires_at() - now;
-        assert!((59..=61).contains(&time_until_expiry));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_perform_dh_with_valid_key() {
-        let server_keypair = EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
-        let client_secret_bytes = rand::random::<[u8; 32]>();
-        let client_secret = StaticSecret::from(client_secret_bytes);
-        let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
-
-        // Server performs DH
-        let server_shared_secret = server_keypair
-            .perform_dh(client_public.as_bytes())
-            .expect("DH should succeed");
-
-        // Client performs DH
-        let client_shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&server_keypair.public);
-
-        // Shared secrets should match
-        assert_eq!(server_shared_secret, client_shared_secret.to_bytes());
-        assert_eq!(server_shared_secret.len(), 32);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_perform_dh_with_invalid_key() {
-        let keypair = EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
-
-        // Try with invalid length
-        let invalid_key = vec![1, 2, 3];
-        let result = keypair.perform_dh(&invalid_key);
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-
-        // Try with wrong length (not 32 bytes)
-        let invalid_key = vec![0u8; 16];
-        let result = keypair.perform_dh(&invalid_key);
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_different_keypairs_produce_different_shared_secrets() {
-        let server_keypair1 = EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
-        let server_keypair2 = EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
-
-        let client_secret_bytes = rand::random::<[u8; 32]>();
-        let client_secret = StaticSecret::from(client_secret_bytes);
-        let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
-
-        let shared1 = server_keypair1
-            .perform_dh(client_public.as_bytes())
-            .unwrap();
-        let shared2 = server_keypair2
-            .perform_dh(client_public.as_bytes())
-            .unwrap();
-
-        // Different server keys should produce different shared secrets
-        assert_ne!(shared1, shared2);
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/aead.rs

@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-use chacha20poly1305::{
-    aead::{Aead, KeyInit},
-    ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce,
-};
-
-use super::CryptoError;
-
-/// Encrypt plaintext with AEAD (ChaCha20Poly1305)
-///
-/// Returns (ciphertext, tag) on success
-pub fn encrypt(
-    plaintext: &[u8],
-    key: &[u8; 32],
-    nonce: &[u8; 12],
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
-    let cipher_key = Key::from_slice(key);
-    let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(cipher_key);
-    let nonce_array = Nonce::from_slice(nonce);
-
-    cipher
-        .encrypt(nonce_array, plaintext)
-        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::AeadEncryption(e.to_string()))
-}
-
-/// Decrypt ciphertext with AEAD (ChaCha20Poly1305)
-///
-/// The ciphertext должен содержать tag (последние 16 bytes)
-pub fn decrypt(
-    ciphertext_with_tag: &[u8],
-    key: &[u8; 32],
-    nonce: &[u8; 12],
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
-    let cipher_key = Key::from_slice(key);
-    let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(cipher_key);
-    let nonce_array = Nonce::from_slice(nonce);
-
-    cipher
-        .decrypt(nonce_array, ciphertext_with_tag)
-        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::AeadDecryption(e.to_string()))
-}
-
-/// Generate nonce from counter
-///
-/// Converts i32 counter to 12-byte nonce (big-endian encoding)
-pub fn nonce_from_counter(counter: i32) -> [u8; 12] {
-    let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
-    nonce[8..12].copy_from_slice(&counter.to_be_bytes());
-    nonce
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_aead_encrypt_decrypt_round_trip() {
-        let plaintext = b"Hello, World! This is a secret message.";
-        let key = [42u8; 32];
-        let nonce = nonce_from_counter(1);
-
-        // Encrypt
-        let ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Verify ciphertext is different from plaintext
-        assert_ne!(ciphertext.as_slice(), plaintext);
-
-        // Decrypt
-        let decrypted = decrypt(&ciphertext, &key, &nonce).expect("Decryption failed");
-
-        // Verify round-trip
-        assert_eq!(decrypted.as_slice(), plaintext);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_aead_decrypt_with_wrong_key() {
-        let plaintext = b"Secret data";
-        let key = [1u8; 32];
-        let wrong_key = [2u8; 32];
-        let nonce = nonce_from_counter(1);
-
-        let ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Attempt decrypt with wrong key
-        let result = decrypt(&ciphertext, &wrong_key, &nonce);
-
-        // Should fail
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_aead_decrypt_with_wrong_nonce() {
-        let plaintext = b"Secret data";
-        let key = [1u8; 32];
-        let nonce = nonce_from_counter(1);
-        let wrong_nonce = nonce_from_counter(2);
-
-        let ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Attempt decrypt with wrong nonce
-        let result = decrypt(&ciphertext, &key, &wrong_nonce);
-
-        // Should fail
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_nonce_generation_from_counter() {
-        let nonce1 = nonce_from_counter(1);
-        let nonce2 = nonce_from_counter(2);
-        let nonce_max = nonce_from_counter(i32::MAX);
-
-        // Verify nonces are different
-        assert_ne!(nonce1, nonce2);
-
-        // Verify nonce format (first 8 bytes should be zero, last 4 contain counter)
-        assert_eq!(&nonce1[0..8], &[0u8; 8]);
-        assert_eq!(&nonce1[8..12], &1i32.to_be_bytes());
-
-        assert_eq!(&nonce_max[8..12], &i32::MAX.to_be_bytes());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_aead_tampered_ciphertext() {
-        let plaintext = b"Important message";
-        let key = [7u8; 32];
-        let nonce = nonce_from_counter(5);
-
-        let mut ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Tamper with ciphertext (flip a bit)
-        if let Some(byte) = ciphertext.get_mut(5) {
-            *byte ^= 0x01;
-        }
-
-        // Attempt decrypt - should fail due to authentication tag mismatch
-        let result = decrypt(&ciphertext, &key, &nonce);
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-pub mod aead;
-pub mod root_key;
-
-use miette::Diagnostic;
-use thiserror::Error;
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum CryptoError {
-    #[error("AEAD encryption failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::aead_encryption))]
-    AeadEncryption(String),
-
-    #[error("AEAD decryption failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::aead_decryption))]
-    AeadDecryption(String),
-
-    #[error("Key derivation failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::key_derivation))]
-    KeyDerivation(String),
-
-    #[error("Invalid nonce: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::invalid_nonce))]
-    InvalidNonce(String),
-
-    #[error("Invalid key format: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::invalid_key))]
-    InvalidKey(String),
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/root_key.rs

@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
-use argon2::{
-    password_hash::{rand_core::OsRng, PasswordHasher, SaltString},
-    Argon2, PasswordHash, PasswordVerifier,
-};
-
-use crate::db::models::AeadEncrypted;
-
-use super::{aead, CryptoError};
-
-/// Encrypt root key with user password
-///
-/// Uses Argon2id for password derivation and ChaCha20Poly1305 for encryption
-pub fn encrypt_root_key(
-    root_key: &[u8; 32],
-    password: &str,
-    nonce_counter: i32,
-) -> Result<(AeadEncrypted, String), CryptoError> {
-    // Derive key from password using Argon2
-    let (derived_key, salt) = derive_key_from_password(password)?;
-
-    // Generate nonce from counter
-    let nonce = aead::nonce_from_counter(nonce_counter);
-
-    // Encrypt root key
-    let ciphertext_with_tag = aead::encrypt(root_key, &derived_key, &nonce)?;
-
-    // Extract tag (last 16 bytes)
-    let tag_start = ciphertext_with_tag
-        .len()
-        .checked_sub(16)
-        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::AeadEncryption("Ciphertext too short".into()))?;
-
-    let ciphertext = ciphertext_with_tag[..tag_start].to_vec();
-    let tag = ciphertext_with_tag[tag_start..].to_vec();
-
-    let aead_encrypted = AeadEncrypted {
-        id: 1, // Will be set by database
-        current_nonce: nonce_counter,
-        ciphertext,
-        tag,
-        schema_version: 1, // Current version
-        argon2_salt: Some(salt.clone()),
-    };
-
-    Ok((aead_encrypted, salt))
-}
-
-/// Decrypt root key with user password
-///
-/// Verifies password hash and decrypts using ChaCha20Poly1305
-pub fn decrypt_root_key(
-    encrypted: &AeadEncrypted,
-    password: &str,
-    salt: &str,
-) -> Result<[u8; 32], CryptoError> {
-    // Derive key from password using stored salt
-    let derived_key = derive_key_with_salt(password, salt)?;
-
-    // Generate nonce from counter
-    let nonce = aead::nonce_from_counter(encrypted.current_nonce);
-
-    // Reconstruct ciphertext with tag
-    let mut ciphertext_with_tag = encrypted.ciphertext.clone();
-    ciphertext_with_tag.extend_from_slice(&encrypted.tag);
-
-    // Decrypt
-    let plaintext = aead::decrypt(&ciphertext_with_tag, &derived_key, &nonce)?;
-
-    // Verify length
-    if plaintext.len() != 32 {
-        return Err(CryptoError::InvalidKey(format!(
-            "Expected 32 bytes, got {}",
-            plaintext.len()
-        )));
-    }
-
-    // Convert to fixed-size array
-    let mut root_key = [0u8; 32];
-    root_key.copy_from_slice(&plaintext);
-
-    Ok(root_key)
-}
-
-/// Derive 32-byte key from password using Argon2id
-///
-/// Generates new random salt and returns (derived_key, salt_string)
-fn derive_key_from_password(password: &str) -> Result<([u8; 32], String), CryptoError> {
-    let salt = SaltString::generate(&mut OsRng);
-
-    let argon2 = Argon2::default();
-
-    let password_hash = argon2
-        .hash_password(password.as_bytes(), &salt)
-        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyDerivation(e.to_string()))?;
-
-    // Extract hash output (32 bytes)
-    let hash_output = password_hash
-        .hash
-        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::KeyDerivation("No hash output".into()))?;
-
-    let hash_bytes = hash_output.as_bytes();
-
-    if hash_bytes.len() != 32 {
-        return Err(CryptoError::KeyDerivation(format!(
-            "Expected 32 bytes, got {}",
-            hash_bytes.len()
-        )));
-    }
-
-    let mut key = [0u8; 32];
-    key.copy_from_slice(hash_bytes);
-
-    Ok((key, salt.to_string()))
-}
-
-/// Derive 32-byte key from password using existing salt
-fn derive_key_with_salt(password: &str, salt_str: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], CryptoError> {
-    let argon2 = Argon2::default();
-
-    // Parse salt
-    let salt =
-        SaltString::from_b64(salt_str).map_err(|e| CryptoError::InvalidKey(e.to_string()))?;
-
-    let password_hash = argon2
-        .hash_password(password.as_bytes(), &salt)
-        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyDerivation(e.to_string()))?;
-
-    // Extract hash output
-    let hash_output = password_hash
-        .hash
-        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::KeyDerivation("No hash output".into()))?;
-
-    let hash_bytes = hash_output.as_bytes();
-
-    if hash_bytes.len() != 32 {
-        return Err(CryptoError::KeyDerivation(format!(
-            "Expected 32 bytes, got {}",
-            hash_bytes.len()
-        )));
-    }
-
-    let mut key = [0u8; 32];
-    key.copy_from_slice(hash_bytes);
-
-    Ok(key)
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_root_key_encrypt_decrypt_round_trip() {
-        let root_key = [42u8; 32];
-        let password = "super_secret_password_123";
-        let nonce_counter = 1;
-
-        // Encrypt
-        let (encrypted, salt) =
-            encrypt_root_key(&root_key, password, nonce_counter).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Verify structure
-        assert_eq!(encrypted.current_nonce, nonce_counter);
-        assert_eq!(encrypted.schema_version, 1);
-        assert_eq!(encrypted.tag.len(), 16); // AEAD tag size
-
-        // Decrypt
-        let decrypted =
-            decrypt_root_key(&encrypted, password, &salt).expect("Decryption failed");
-
-        // Verify round-trip
-        assert_eq!(decrypted, root_key);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_decrypt_with_wrong_password() {
-        let root_key = [99u8; 32];
-        let correct_password = "correct_password";
-        let wrong_password = "wrong_password";
-        let nonce_counter = 1;
-
-        // Encrypt with correct password
-        let (encrypted, salt) =
-            encrypt_root_key(&root_key, correct_password, nonce_counter).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Attempt decrypt with wrong password
-        let result = decrypt_root_key(&encrypted, wrong_password, &salt);
-
-        // Should fail due to authentication tag mismatch
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_password_derivation_different_salts() {
-        let password = "same_password";
-
-        // Derive key twice - should produce different salts
-        let (key1, salt1) = derive_key_from_password(password).expect("Derivation 1 failed");
-        let (key2, salt2) = derive_key_from_password(password).expect("Derivation 2 failed");
-
-        // Salts should be different (randomly generated)
-        assert_ne!(salt1, salt2);
-
-        // Keys should be different (due to different salts)
-        assert_ne!(key1, key2);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_password_derivation_with_same_salt() {
-        let password = "test_password";
-
-        // Generate key and salt
-        let (key1, salt) = derive_key_from_password(password).expect("Derivation failed");
-
-        // Derive key again with same salt
-        let key2 = derive_key_with_salt(password, &salt).expect("Re-derivation failed");
-
-        // Keys should be identical
-        assert_eq!(key1, key2);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_different_nonce_produces_different_ciphertext() {
-        let root_key = [77u8; 32];
-        let password = "password123";
-
-        let (encrypted1, salt1) = encrypt_root_key(&root_key, password, 1).expect("Encryption 1 failed");
-        let (encrypted2, salt2) = encrypt_root_key(&root_key, password, 2).expect("Encryption 2 failed");
-
-        // Different nonces should produce different ciphertexts
-        assert_ne!(encrypted1.ciphertext, encrypted2.ciphertext);
-
-        // But both should decrypt correctly
-        let decrypted1 = decrypt_root_key(&encrypted1, password, &salt1).expect("Decryption 1 failed");
-        let decrypted2 = decrypt_root_key(&encrypted2, password, &salt2).expect("Decryption 2 failed");
-
-        assert_eq!(decrypted1, root_key);
-        assert_eq!(decrypted2, root_key);
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/mod.rs

@@ -1,12 +1,7 @@
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use diesel::{
-    Connection as _, SqliteConnection,
-    connection::{SimpleConnection as _, TransactionManager},
-};
+use diesel::{Connection as _, SqliteConnection, connection::SimpleConnection as _};
 use diesel_async::{
     AsyncConnection, SimpleAsyncConnection,
-    pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig, RecyclingMethod},
+    pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig},
     sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
 };
 use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
@@ -29,23 +24,23 @@ const MIGRATIONS: EmbeddedMigrations = embed_migrations!("migrations");
 #[derive(Error, Diagnostic, Debug)]
 pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
     #[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::home_dir_error))]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::home_dir))]
     HomeDir(std::io::Error),
 
     #[error(transparent)]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::connection_error))]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::connection))]
     Connection(diesel::ConnectionError),
 
     #[error(transparent)]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::concurrency_error))]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::concurrency))]
     ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
 
     #[error(transparent)]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::migration_error))]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::migration))]
     Migration(Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>),
 
     #[error(transparent)]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::pool_error))]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::pool))]
     Pool(#[from] PoolInitError),
 }
 
@@ -96,12 +91,12 @@ fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
 
 #[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
 pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
-    let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(format!(
-        "{}?mode=rwc",
-        (database_path()?
+    let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
+        database_path()?
             .to_str()
-            .expect("database path is not valid UTF-8"))
-    ));
+            .expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
+            .to_string(),
+    );
 
     initialize_database(&database_url)?;
 
@@ -134,7 +129,6 @@ pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetu
     Ok(pool)
 }
 
-#[cfg(test)]
 pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
     use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/models.rs

@@ -1,33 +1,74 @@
 #![allow(unused)]
 #![allow(clippy::all)]
 
-use crate::db::schema::{self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings};
+use crate::db::schema::{self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, root_key_history, tls_history};
 use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
+use restructed::Models;
 
 pub mod types {
     use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
     pub struct SqliteTimestamp(DateTime<Utc>);
 }
 
-#[derive(Queryable, Selectable, Debug, Insertable)]
+#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
+#[view(
+    NewAeadEncrypted,
+    derive(Insertable),
+    omit(id),
+    attributes_with = "deriveless"
+)]
 #[diesel(table_name = aead_encrypted, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
 pub struct AeadEncrypted {
     pub id: i32,
-    pub current_nonce: i32,
     pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
     pub tag: Vec<u8>,
+    pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>,
     pub schema_version: i32,
-    pub argon2_salt: Option<String>,
+    pub associated_root_key_id: i32, // references root_key_history.id
+    pub created_at: i32,
 }
 
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = arbiter_settings, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct ArbiterSetting {
+#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
+#[diesel(table_name = root_key_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
+#[view(
+    NewRootKeyHistory,
+    derive(Insertable),
+    omit(id),
+    attributes_with = "deriveless"
+)]
+pub struct RootKeyHistory {
     pub id: i32,
-    pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references aead_encrypted.id
-    pub cert_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub cert: Vec<u8>,
-    pub current_cert_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_certificates.id
+    pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
+    pub tag: Vec<u8>,
+    pub root_key_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
+    pub data_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
+    pub schema_version: i32,
+    pub salt: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
+#[diesel(table_name = tls_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
+#[view(
+    NewTlsHistory,
+    derive(Insertable),
+    omit(id, created_at),
+    attributes_with = "deriveless"
+)]
+pub struct TlsHistory {
+    pub id: i32,
+    pub cert: String,
+    pub cert_key: String, // PEM Encoded private key
+    pub ca_cert: String, // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing
+    pub ca_key: String, // PEM Encoded public key for cert signing
+    pub created_at: i32,
+}
+
+#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
+#[diesel(table_name = arbiter_settings, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
+pub struct ArbiterSettings {
+    pub id: i32,
+    pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references root_key_history.id
+    pub tls_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_history.id
 }
 
 #[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
@@ -49,70 +90,3 @@ pub struct UseragentClient {
     pub created_at: i32,
     pub updated_at: i32,
 }
-
-// TLS Certificate Rotation Models
-
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_certificates, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct TlsCertificate {
-    pub id: i32,
-    pub cert: Vec<u8>,
-    pub cert_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub not_before: i32,
-    pub not_after: i32,
-    pub created_at: i32,
-    pub is_active: bool,
-}
-
-#[derive(Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_certificates)]
-pub struct NewTlsCertificate {
-    pub cert: Vec<u8>,
-    pub cert_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub not_before: i32,
-    pub not_after: i32,
-    pub is_active: bool,
-}
-
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_rotation_state, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct TlsRotationState {
-    pub id: i32,
-    pub state: String,
-    pub new_cert_id: Option<i32>,
-    pub initiated_at: Option<i32>,
-    pub timeout_at: Option<i32>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::rotation_client_acks, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct RotationClientAck {
-    pub rotation_id: i32,
-    pub client_key: String,
-    pub ack_received_at: i32,
-}
-
-#[derive(Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::rotation_client_acks)]
-pub struct NewRotationClientAck {
-    pub rotation_id: i32,
-    pub client_key: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_rotation_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct TlsRotationHistory {
-    pub id: i32,
-    pub cert_id: i32,
-    pub event_type: String,
-    pub timestamp: i32,
-    pub details: Option<String>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_rotation_history)]
-pub struct NewTlsRotationHistory {
-    pub cert_id: i32,
-    pub event_type: String,
-    pub details: Option<String>,
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/schema.rs

@@ -3,11 +3,12 @@
 diesel::table! {
     aead_encrypted (id) {
         id -> Integer,
-        current_nonce -> Integer,
+        current_nonce -> Binary,
         ciphertext -> Binary,
         tag -> Binary,
         schema_version -> Integer,
-        argon2_salt -> Nullable<Text>,
+        associated_root_key_id -> Integer,
+        created_at -> Integer,
     }
 }
 
@@ -15,9 +16,7 @@ diesel::table! {
     arbiter_settings (id) {
         id -> Integer,
         root_key_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
-        cert_key -> Binary,
-        cert -> Binary,
-        current_cert_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
+        tls_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
     }
 }
 
@@ -31,6 +30,29 @@ diesel::table! {
     }
 }
 
+diesel::table! {
+    root_key_history (id) {
+        id -> Integer,
+        root_key_encryption_nonce -> Binary,
+        data_encryption_nonce -> Binary,
+        ciphertext -> Binary,
+        tag -> Binary,
+        schema_version -> Integer,
+        salt -> Binary,
+    }
+}
+
+diesel::table! {
+    tls_history (id) {
+        id -> Integer,
+        cert -> Text,
+        cert_key -> Text,
+        ca_cert -> Text,
+        ca_key -> Text,
+        created_at -> Integer,
+    }
+}
+
 diesel::table! {
     useragent_client (id) {
         id -> Integer,
@@ -41,59 +63,15 @@ diesel::table! {
     }
 }
 
-diesel::table! {
-    tls_certificates (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        cert -> Binary,
-        cert_key -> Binary,
-        not_before -> Integer,
-        not_after -> Integer,
-        created_at -> Integer,
-        is_active -> Bool,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    tls_rotation_state (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        state -> Text,
-        new_cert_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
-        initiated_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
-        timeout_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    rotation_client_acks (rotation_id, client_key) {
-        rotation_id -> Integer,
-        client_key -> Text,
-        ack_received_at -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    tls_rotation_history (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        cert_id -> Integer,
-        event_type -> Text,
-        timestamp -> Integer,
-        details -> Nullable<Text>,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> aead_encrypted (root_key_id));
-diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_certificates (current_cert_id));
-diesel::joinable!(tls_rotation_state -> tls_certificates (new_cert_id));
-diesel::joinable!(rotation_client_acks -> tls_certificates (rotation_id));
-diesel::joinable!(tls_rotation_history -> tls_certificates (cert_id));
+diesel::joinable!(aead_encrypted -> root_key_history (associated_root_key_id));
+diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> root_key_history (root_key_id));
+diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_history (tls_id));
 
 diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
     aead_encrypted,
     arbiter_settings,
     program_client,
+    root_key_history,
+    tls_history,
     useragent_client,
-    tls_certificates,
-    tls_rotation_state,
-    rotation_client_acks,
-    tls_rotation_history,
 );

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/errors.rs

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-use tonic::Status;
-use tracing::error;
-
-pub trait GrpcStatusExt<T> {
-    fn to_status(self) -> Result<T, Status>;
-}
-
-impl<T> GrpcStatusExt<T> for Result<T, diesel::result::Error> {
-    fn to_status(self) -> Result<T, Status> {
-         self.map_err(|e| {
-            error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
-            Status::internal("Database error")
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T> GrpcStatusExt<T> for Result<T, crate::db::PoolError> {
-    fn to_status(self) -> Result<T, Status> {
-        self.map_err(|e| {
-            error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-            Status::internal("Database pool error")
-        })
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,27 +1,26 @@
-#![allow(unused)]
-
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
+#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
 use arbiter_proto::{
     proto::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse, UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
-    transport::BiStream,
+    transport::{BiStream, GrpcTransportActor, wire},
 };
 use async_trait::async_trait;
+use kameo::actor::PreparedActor;
 use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
 
 use tokio::sync::mpsc;
 use tonic::{Request, Response, Status};
 
 use crate::{
-    actors::{client::handle_client, user_agent::handle_user_agent},
+    actors::{
+        client::handle_client,
+        user_agent::UserAgentActor,
+    },
     context::ServerContext,
 };
 
 pub mod actors;
-mod context;
-mod crypto;
-mod db;
-mod errors;
+pub mod context;
+pub mod db;
 
 const DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE: usize = 1000;
 
@@ -29,6 +28,12 @@ pub struct Server {
     context: ServerContext,
 }
 
+impl Server {
+    pub fn new(context: ServerContext) -> Self {
+        Self { context }
+    }
+}
+
 #[async_trait]
 impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for Server {
     type UserAgentStream = ReceiverStream<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>;
@@ -57,7 +62,22 @@ impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for Server {
     ) -> Result<Response<Self::UserAgentStream>, Status> {
         let req_stream = request.into_inner();
         let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE);
-        tokio::spawn(handle_user_agent(self.context.clone(), req_stream, tx));
+        let context = self.context.clone();
+
+        wire(
+            |prepared: PreparedActor<UserAgentActor>, recipient| {
+                prepared.spawn(UserAgentActor::new(context, recipient));
+            },
+            |prepared: PreparedActor<GrpcTransportActor<_, _, _>>, business_recipient| {
+                prepared.spawn(GrpcTransportActor::new(
+                    tx,
+                    req_stream,
+                    business_recipient,
+                ));
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
+
         Ok(Response::new(ReceiverStream::new(rx)))
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/main.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+
+use arbiter_proto::{proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterServiceServer, url::ArbiterUrl};
+use arbiter_server::{Server, actors::bootstrap::GetToken, context::ServerContext, db};
+use miette::miette;
+use tonic::transport::{Identity, ServerTlsConfig};
+use tracing::info;
+
+const PORT: u16 = 50051;
+
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> miette::Result<()> {
+    tracing_subscriber::fmt()
+        .with_env_filter(
+            tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("info")),
+        )
+        .init();
+
+    info!("Starting arbiter server");
+
+    let db = db::create_pool(None).await?;
+    info!("Database ready");
+
+    let context = ServerContext::new(db).await?;
+
+    let addr: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{PORT}").parse().expect("valid address");
+    info!(%addr, "Starting gRPC server");
+
+    let url = ArbiterUrl {
+        host: addr.ip().to_string(),
+        port: addr.port(),
+        ca_cert: context.tls.ca_cert().clone().into_owned(),
+        bootstrap_token: context.actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap(),
+    };
+
+    info!(%url, "Server URL");
+
+    let tls = ServerTlsConfig::new().identity(Identity::from_pem(
+        context.tls.cert_pem(),
+        context.tls.key_pem(),
+    ));
+
+    tonic::transport::Server::builder()
+        .tls_config(tls)
+        .map_err(|err| miette!("Faild to setup TLS: {err}"))?
+        .add_service(ArbiterServiceServer::new(Server::new(context)))
+        .serve(addr)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| miette::miette!("gRPC server error: {e}"))?;
+
+    unreachable!("gRPC server should run indefinitely");
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/common/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
+    db::{self, schema},
+};
+use diesel::QueryDsl;
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    actor
+        .bootstrap(MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    actor
+}
+
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub async fn root_key_history_id(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> i32 {
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let id = schema::arbiter_settings::table
+        .select(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
+        .first::<Option<i32>>(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    id.expect("root_key_id should be set after bootstrap")
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+mod common;
+
+#[path = "keyholder/concurrency.rs"]
+mod concurrency;
+#[path = "keyholder/lifecycle.rs"]
+mod lifecycle;
+#[path = "keyholder/storage.rs"]
+mod storage;

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/concurrency.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
+
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Error, KeyHolder},
+    db::{self, models, schema},
+};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::sql_query};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+use tokio::task::JoinSet;
+
+use crate::common;
+
+async fn write_concurrently(
+    actor: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    prefix: &'static str,
+    count: usize,
+) -> Vec<(i32, Vec<u8>)> {
+    let mut set = JoinSet::new();
+    for i in 0..count {
+        let actor = actor.clone();
+        set.spawn(async move {
+            let plaintext = format!("{prefix}-{i}").into_bytes();
+            let id = actor
+                .ask(CreateNew {
+                    plaintext: MemSafe::new(plaintext.clone()).unwrap(),
+                })
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            (id, plaintext)
+        });
+    }
+
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(count);
+    while let Some(res) = set.join_next().await {
+        out.push(res.unwrap());
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn concurrent_create_new_no_duplicate_nonces_() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
+
+    let writes = write_concurrently(actor, "nonce-unique", 32).await;
+    assert_eq!(writes.len(), 32);
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let rows: Vec<models::AeadEncrypted> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+        .load(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(rows.len(), 32);
+
+    let nonces: Vec<&Vec<u8>> = rows.iter().map(|r| &r.current_nonce).collect();
+    let unique: HashSet<&Vec<u8>> = nonces.iter().copied().collect();
+    assert_eq!(nonces.len(), unique.len(), "all nonces must be unique");
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn concurrent_create_new_root_nonce_never_moves_backward() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
+
+    write_concurrently(actor, "root-max", 24).await;
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let rows: Vec<models::AeadEncrypted> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+        .load(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let max_nonce = rows
+        .iter()
+        .map(|r| r.current_nonce.clone())
+        .max()
+        .expect("at least one row");
+
+    let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
+        .select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, max_nonce);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let root_key_history_id = common::root_key_history_id(&db).await;
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let before_count: i64 = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let before_root_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
+        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
+        .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    sql_query(
+        "CREATE TRIGGER fail_aead_insert BEFORE INSERT ON aead_encrypted BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'forced test failure'); END;",
+    )
+    .execute(&mut conn)
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+    drop(conn);
+
+    let err = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(b"should fail".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::DatabaseTransaction(_)));
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    sql_query("DROP TRIGGER fail_aead_insert;")
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let after_count: i64 = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        before_count, after_count,
+        "failed insert must not create row"
+    );
+
+    let after_root_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
+        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
+        .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        after_root_nonce > before_root_nonce,
+        "current behavior allows nonce gap on failed insert"
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
+
+    let writes = write_concurrently(actor, "roundtrip", 40).await;
+    let expected: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>> = writes.into_iter().collect();
+
+    let mut decryptor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    decryptor
+        .try_unseal(MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    for (id, plaintext) in expected {
+        let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/lifecycle.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::keyholder::{Error, KeyHolder},
+    db::{self, models, schema},
+};
+use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+
+use crate::common;
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_bootstrap() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+
+    let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
+    actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
+        .select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(row.schema_version, 1);
+    assert_eq!(
+        row.tag,
+        arbiter_server::actors::keyholder::encryption::v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG
+    );
+    assert!(!row.ciphertext.is_empty());
+    assert!(!row.salt.is_empty());
+    assert_eq!(
+        row.data_encryption_nonce,
+        arbiter_server::actors::keyholder::encryption::v1::Nonce::default().to_vec()
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let seal_key2 = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
+    let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::AlreadyBootstrapped));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
+
+    let err = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(b"data".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
+
+    let err = actor.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    drop(actor);
+
+    let mut actor2 = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
+    let err = actor2.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
+    let aead_id = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    drop(actor);
+
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
+    actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
+
+    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let plaintext = b"important data";
+    let aead_id = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    drop(actor);
+
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+
+    let bad_key = MemSafe::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec()).unwrap();
+    let err = actor.try_unseal(bad_key).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidKey));
+
+    let good_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
+    actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
+
+    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/storage.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+use std::collections::HashSet;
+
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::keyholder::{Error, encryption::v1},
+    db::{self, models, schema},
+};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+
+use crate::common;
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
+    let aead_id = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let err = actor.decrypt(9999).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotFound));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let plaintext = b"same content";
+    let id1 = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let id2 = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let row1: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id1))
+        .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let row2: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id2))
+        .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_ne!(row1.ciphertext, row2.ciphertext);
+
+    let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1).await.unwrap();
+    let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(*d1.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+    assert_eq!(*d2.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_nonce_never_reused() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let n = 5;
+    for i in 0..n {
+        actor
+            .create_new(MemSafe::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()).unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let rows: Vec<models::AeadEncrypted> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+        .load(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(rows.len(), n);
+
+    let nonces: Vec<&Vec<u8>> = rows.iter().map(|r| &r.current_nonce).collect();
+    let unique: HashSet<&Vec<u8>> = nonces.iter().copied().collect();
+    assert_eq!(nonces.len(), unique.len(), "all nonces must be unique");
+
+    for (i, row) in rows.iter().enumerate() {
+        let mut expected = v1::Nonce::default();
+        for _ in 0..=i {
+            expected.increment();
+        }
+        assert_eq!(row.current_nonce, expected.to_vec(), "nonce {i} mismatch");
+    }
+
+    let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
+        .select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let last_nonce = &rows.last().unwrap().current_nonce;
+    assert_eq!(&root_row.data_encryption_nonce, last_nonce);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let root_key_history_id = common::root_key_history_id(&db).await;
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    update(
+        schema::root_key_history::table
+            .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id)),
+    )
+    .set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(vec![1, 2, 3]))
+    .execute(&mut conn)
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+    drop(conn);
+
+    let err = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(b"must fail".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
+
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let id = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    update(schema::aead_encrypted::table.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id)))
+        .set(schema::aead_encrypted::current_nonce.eq(vec![7, 8]))
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    drop(conn);
+
+    let err = actor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+mod common;
+
+use arbiter_proto::proto::UserAgentResponse;
+use arbiter_server::actors::user_agent::UserAgentError;
+use kameo::{Actor, actor::Recipient, actor::Spawn, prelude::Message};
+
+/// A no-op actor that discards any messages it receives.
+#[derive(Actor)]
+struct NullSink;
+
+impl Message<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>> for NullSink {
+    type Reply = ();
+
+    async fn handle(
+        &mut self,
+        _msg: Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>,
+        _ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
+    ) -> Self::Reply {
+    }
+}
+
+/// Creates a `Recipient` that silently discards all messages.
+fn null_recipient() -> Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>> {
+    let actor_ref = NullSink::spawn(NullSink);
+    actor_ref.recipient()
+}
+
+#[path = "user_agent/auth.rs"]
+mod auth;
+#[path = "user_agent/unseal.rs"]
+mod unseal;

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent/auth.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+use arbiter_proto::proto::{
+    UserAgentResponse,
+    auth::{self, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk},
+    user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
+};
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::{
+        GlobalActors,
+        bootstrap::GetToken,
+        user_agent::{HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution, UserAgentActor},
+    },
+    db::{self, schema},
+};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, insert_into};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
+use kameo::actor::Spawn;
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
+    let db =db::create_test_pool().await;
+
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
+    let user_agent =
+        UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
+    let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
+
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
+
+    let result = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
+            req: AuthChallengeRequest {
+                pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
+                bootstrap_token: Some(token),
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        result,
+        UserAgentResponse {
+            payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
+                arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
+                    payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
+                        AuthOk {},
+                    )),
+                },
+            )),
+        }
+    );
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let stored_pubkey: Vec<u8> = schema::useragent_client::table
+        .select(schema::useragent_client::public_key)
+        .first::<Vec<u8>>(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(stored_pubkey, new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec());
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let user_agent =
+        UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
+    let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
+
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
+
+    let result = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
+            req: AuthChallengeRequest {
+                pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
+                bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_string()),
+            },
+        })
+        .await;
+
+    match result {
+        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
+            assert!(
+                matches!(err, arbiter_server::actors::user_agent::UserAgentError::InvalidBootstrapToken),
+                "Expected InvalidBootstrapToken, got {err:?}"
+            );
+        }
+        Err(other) => {
+            panic!("Expected SendError::HandlerError, got {other:?}");
+        }
+        Ok(_) => {
+            panic!("Expected error due to invalid bootstrap token, but got success");
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let user_agent =
+        UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
+    let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
+
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
+
+    {
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+        insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
+            .values(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()))
+            .execute(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    let result = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
+            req: AuthChallengeRequest {
+                pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
+                bootstrap_token: None,
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
+
+    let UserAgentResponse {
+        payload:
+            Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
+                payload:
+                    Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthChallenge(challenge)),
+            })),
+    } = result
+    else {
+        panic!("Expected auth challenge response, got {result:?}");
+    };
+
+    let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(&challenge);
+    let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
+    let serialized_signature = signature.to_bytes().to_vec();
+
+    let result = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleAuthChallengeSolution {
+            solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution {
+                signature: serialized_signature,
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        result,
+        UserAgentResponse {
+            payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
+                arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
+                    payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
+                        AuthOk {},
+                    )),
+                },
+            )),
+        }
+    );
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent/unseal.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+use arbiter_proto::proto::{
+    UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult, UnsealStart, auth::AuthChallengeRequest,
+    user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
+};
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::{
+        GlobalActors,
+        bootstrap::GetToken,
+        keyholder::{Bootstrap, Seal},
+        user_agent::{
+            HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest,
+            UserAgentActor,
+        },
+    },
+    db,
+};
+use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
+use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
+
+async fn setup_authenticated_user_agent(
+    seal_key: &[u8],
+) -> (arbiter_server::db::DatabasePool, ActorRef<UserAgentActor>) {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    actors
+        .key_holder
+        .ask(Bootstrap {
+            seal_key_raw: MemSafe::new(seal_key.to_vec()).unwrap(),
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    actors.key_holder.ask(Seal).await.unwrap();
+
+    let user_agent =
+        UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors.clone(), super::null_recipient());
+    let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
+
+    let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
+    let auth_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
+            req: AuthChallengeRequest {
+                pubkey: auth_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
+                bootstrap_token: Some(token),
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    (db, user_agent_ref)
+}
+
+async fn client_dh_encrypt(
+    user_agent_ref: &ActorRef<UserAgentActor>,
+    key_to_send: &[u8],
+) -> UnsealEncryptedKey {
+    let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
+    let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
+
+    let response = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
+            req: UnsealStart {
+                client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let server_pubkey = match response.payload.unwrap() {
+        UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(resp) => resp.server_pubkey,
+        other => panic!("Expected UnsealStartResponse, got {other:?}"),
+    };
+    let server_public = PublicKey::from(<[u8; 32]>::try_from(server_pubkey.as_slice()).unwrap());
+
+    let shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&server_public);
+    let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
+    let nonce = XNonce::from([0u8; 24]);
+    let associated_data = b"unseal";
+    let mut ciphertext = key_to_send.to_vec();
+    cipher
+        .encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut ciphertext)
+        .unwrap();
+
+    UnsealEncryptedKey {
+        nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
+        ciphertext,
+        associated_data: associated_data.to_vec(),
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_unseal_success() {
+    let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
+    let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(seal_key).await;
+
+    let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, seal_key).await;
+
+    let response = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        response.payload.unwrap(),
+        UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::Success.into()),
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
+    let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(b"correct-key").await;
+
+    let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, b"wrong-key").await;
+
+    let response = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        response.payload.unwrap(),
+        UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
+    let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(b"test-key").await;
+
+    let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
+    let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
+
+    user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
+            req: UnsealStart {
+                client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let response = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
+            req: UnsealEncryptedKey {
+                nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
+                ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
+                associated_data: vec![],
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        response.payload.unwrap(),
+        UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_unseal_start_without_auth_fails() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let user_agent =
+        UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
+    let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
+
+    let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
+    let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
+
+    let result = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
+            req: UnsealStart {
+                client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+            },
+        })
+        .await;
+
+    match result {
+        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
+            assert!(
+                matches!(err, arbiter_server::actors::user_agent::UserAgentError::InvalidState),
+                "Expected InvalidState, got {err:?}"
+            );
+        }
+        other => panic!("Expected state machine error, got {other:?}"),
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {
+    let seal_key = b"real-seal-key";
+    let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(seal_key).await;
+
+    {
+        let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, b"wrong-key").await;
+
+        let response = user_agent_ref
+            .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            response.payload.unwrap(),
+            UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
+        );
+    }
+
+    {
+        let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, seal_key).await;
+
+        let response = user_agent_ref
+            .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            response.payload.unwrap(),
+            UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::Success.into()),
+        );
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-useragent/Cargo.toml

@@ -2,5 +2,14 @@
 name = "arbiter-useragent"
 version = "0.1.0"
 edition = "2024"
+license = "Apache-2.0"
 
 [dependencies]
+arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
+kameo.workspace = true
+tokio = {workspace = true, features = ["net"]}
+tonic.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
+ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
+smlang.workspace = true
+x25519-dalek.workspace = true

server/crates/arbiter-useragent/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,14 +1,66 @@
-pub fn add(left: u64, right: u64) -> u64 {
-    left + right
+use arbiter_proto::{proto::UserAgentRequest, transport::TransportActor};
+use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+use kameo::{
+    Actor, Reply,
+    actor::{ActorRef, WeakActorRef},
+    prelude::Message,
+};
+use smlang::statemachine;
+use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
+use tracing::{debug, error};
+
+struct Storage {
+    pub identity: SigningKey,
+    pub server_ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
 }
 
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum InitError {
+    StorageError,
+    Other(String),
+}
 
-    #[test]
-    fn it_works() {
-        let result = add(2, 2);
-        assert_eq!(result, 4);
+statemachine! {
+    name: UserAgentStateMachine,
+    custom_error: false,
+    transitions: {
+        *Init + SendAuthChallenge = WaitingForAuthSolution
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+pub struct UserAgentActor<A: TransportActor<UserAgentRequest>> {
+    key: SigningKey,
+    server_ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
+    sender: ActorRef<A>,
+}
+impl<A: TransportActor<UserAgentRequest>> Actor for UserAgentActor<A> {
+    type Args = Self;
+
+    type Error = InitError;
+
+    async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        todo!()
+    }
+
+    async fn on_link_died(
+        &mut self,
+        _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
+        id: kameo::prelude::ActorId,
+        _: kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason,
+    ) -> Result<std::ops::ControlFlow<kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
+        if id == self.sender.id() {
+            error!("Transport actor died, stopping UserAgentActor");
+            Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Break(
+                kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason::Normal,
+            ))
+        } else {
+            debug!(
+                "Linked actor {} died, but it's not the transport actor, ignoring",
+                id
+            );
+            Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()))
+        }
     }
 }

server/supply-chain/audits.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 
 # cargo-vet audits file
 
+[[audits.similar]]
+who = "hdbg <httpdebugger@protonmail.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "2.2.1"
+
 [[audits.test-log]]
 who = "hdbg <httpdebugger@protonmail.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -11,6 +16,12 @@ who = "hdbg <httpdebugger@protonmail.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.2.18 -> 0.2.19"
 
+[[trusted.cc]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 55123 # rust-lang-owner
+start = "2022-10-29"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
 [[trusted.h2]]
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 user-id = 359 # Sean McArthur (seanmonstar)
@@ -29,6 +40,12 @@ user-id = 359 # Sean McArthur (seanmonstar)
 start = "2022-01-15"
 end = "2027-02-14"
 
+[[trusted.libc]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 55123 # rust-lang-owner
+start = "2024-08-15"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
 [[trusted.rustix]]
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 user-id = 6825 # Dan Gohman (sunfishcode)
@@ -46,3 +63,33 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 user-id = 3618 # David Tolnay (dtolnay)
 start = "2019-03-01"
 end = "2027-02-14"
+
+[[trusted.thread_local]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 2915 # Amanieu d'Antras (Amanieu)
+start = "2019-09-07"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
+[[trusted.toml]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 6743 # Ed Page (epage)
+start = "2022-12-14"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
+[[trusted.toml_parser]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 6743 # Ed Page (epage)
+start = "2025-07-08"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
+[[trusted.tonic-build]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 10
+start = "2019-09-10"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
+[[trusted.windows-sys]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 64539 # Kenny Kerr (kennykerr)
+start = "2021-11-15"
+end = "2027-02-16"

server/supply-chain/config.toml

@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/supply-chain/main/audits.toml"
 [imports.mozilla]
 url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mozilla/supply-chain/main/audits.toml"
 
+[imports.zcash]
+url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/rust-ecosystem/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
 [[exemptions.addr2line]]
 version = "0.25.1"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -41,10 +44,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.1.89"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.autocfg]]
-version = "1.5.0"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.aws-lc-rs]]
 version = "1.15.4"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -193,10 +192,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.2.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.dunce]]
-version = "1.0.5"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.dyn-clone]]
 version = "1.0.20"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -209,10 +204,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "3.0.0-pre.6"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.errno]]
-version = "0.3.14"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.fiat-crypto]]
 version = "0.3.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -261,10 +252,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "1.4.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.http-body]]
-version = "1.0.1"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.http-body-util]]
 version = "0.1.3"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -329,10 +316,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.19.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.libc]]
-version = "0.2.181"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.libsqlite3-sys]]
 version = "0.35.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -525,10 +508,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.1.27"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.rustc_version]]
-version = "0.4.1"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.rusticata-macros]]
 version = "4.1.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -545,10 +524,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.103.9"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.rustversion]]
-version = "1.0.22"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.scoped-futures]]
 version = "0.1.4"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -653,10 +628,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "2.0.18"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.thread_local]]
-version = "1.1.9"
-criteria = "safe-to-run"
-
 [[exemptions.time]]
 version = "0.3.47"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -689,14 +660,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.7.18"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.toml]]
-version = "0.9.11+spec-1.1.0"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
-[[exemptions.toml_parser]]
-version = "1.0.6+spec-1.1.0"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.tonic]]
 version = "0.14.3"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -741,10 +704,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.3.22"
 criteria = "safe-to-run"
 
-[[exemptions.try-lock]]
-version = "0.2.5"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.typenum]]
 version = "1.19.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -769,10 +728,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "1.20.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.want]]
-version = "0.3.1"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.wasi]]
 version = "0.11.1+wasi-snapshot-preview1"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -817,10 +772,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.59.3"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.windows-link]]
-version = "0.2.1"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.windows-result]]
 version = "0.4.1"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -829,18 +780,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.5.1"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.windows-sys]]
-version = "0.52.0"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
-[[exemptions.windows-sys]]
-version = "0.60.2"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
-[[exemptions.windows-sys]]
-version = "0.61.2"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.windows-targets]]
 version = "0.52.6"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -925,10 +864,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.5.2"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.zeroize]]
-version = "1.8.2"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.zmij]]
 version = "1.0.20"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"

server/supply-chain/imports.lock

@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ user-id = 359
 user-login = "seanmonstar"
 user-name = "Sean McArthur"
 
+[[publisher.libc]]
+version = "0.2.182"
+when = "2026-02-13"
+user-id = 55123
+user-login = "rust-lang-owner"
+
 [[publisher.rustix]]
 version = "1.1.3"
 when = "2025-12-23"
@@ -63,12 +69,33 @@ user-login = "dtolnay"
 user-name = "David Tolnay"
 
 [[publisher.syn]]
-version = "2.0.114"
-when = "2026-01-07"
+version = "2.0.115"
+when = "2026-02-12"
 user-id = 3618
 user-login = "dtolnay"
 user-name = "David Tolnay"
 
+[[publisher.thread_local]]
+version = "1.1.9"
+when = "2025-06-12"
+user-id = 2915
+user-login = "Amanieu"
+user-name = "Amanieu d'Antras"
+
+[[publisher.toml]]
+version = "0.9.12+spec-1.1.0"
+when = "2026-02-10"
+user-id = 6743
+user-login = "epage"
+user-name = "Ed Page"
+
+[[publisher.toml_parser]]
+version = "1.0.8+spec-1.1.0"
+when = "2026-02-12"
+user-id = 6743
+user-login = "epage"
+user-name = "Ed Page"
+
 [[publisher.unicode-width]]
 version = "0.1.14"
 when = "2024-09-19"
@@ -120,6 +147,34 @@ version = "0.244.0"
 when = "2026-01-06"
 trusted-publisher = "github:bytecodealliance/wasm-tools"
 
+[[publisher.windows-sys]]
+version = "0.52.0"
+when = "2023-11-15"
+user-id = 64539
+user-login = "kennykerr"
+user-name = "Kenny Kerr"
+
+[[publisher.windows-sys]]
+version = "0.59.0"
+when = "2024-07-30"
+user-id = 64539
+user-login = "kennykerr"
+user-name = "Kenny Kerr"
+
+[[publisher.windows-sys]]
+version = "0.60.2"
+when = "2025-06-12"
+user-id = 64539
+user-login = "kennykerr"
+user-name = "Kenny Kerr"
+
+[[publisher.windows-sys]]
+version = "0.61.2"
+when = "2025-10-06"
+user-id = 64539
+user-login = "kennykerr"
+user-name = "Kenny Kerr"
+
 [[publisher.wit-bindgen]]
 version = "0.51.0"
 when = "2026-01-12"
@@ -265,6 +320,12 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "1.1.2"
 notes = "Contains `unsafe` code but it's well-documented and scoped to what it's intended to be doing. Otherwise a well-focused and straightforward crate."
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.cipher]]
+who = "Andrew Brown <andrew.brown@intel.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.4.4"
+notes = "Most unsafe is hidden by `inout` dependency; only remaining unsafe is raw-splitting a slice and an unreachable hint. Older versions of this regularly reach ~150k daily downloads."
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.core-foundation-sys]]
 who = "Dan Gohman <dev@sunfishcode.online>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -279,6 +340,23 @@ who = "Nick Fitzgerald <fitzgen@gmail.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.2.4 -> 0.2.5"
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.errno]]
+who = "Dan Gohman <dev@sunfishcode.online>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.3.0"
+notes = "This crate uses libc and windows-sys APIs to get and set the raw OS error value."
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.errno]]
+who = "Dan Gohman <dev@sunfishcode.online>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.0 -> 0.3.1"
+notes = "Just a dependency version bump and a bug fix for redox"
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.errno]]
+who = "Dan Gohman <dev@sunfishcode.online>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.9 -> 0.3.10"
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.fastrand]]
 who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -385,11 +463,28 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.4.1 -> 0.5.0"
 notes = "Minor changes for a `no_std` upgrade but otherwise everything looks as expected."
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.http-body]]
+who = "Pat Hickey <phickey@fastly.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.http-body]]
+who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.0-rc.2 -> 1.0.0"
+notes = "Only minor changes made for a stable release."
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.iana-time-zone-haiku]]
 who = "Dan Gohman <dev@sunfishcode.online>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.1.2"
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.inout]]
+who = "Andrew Brown <andrew.brown@intel.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.1.3"
+notes = "A part of RustCrypto/utils, this crate is designed to handle unsafe buffers and carefully documents the safety concerns throughout. Older versions of this tally up to ~130k daily downloads."
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.leb128fmt]]
 who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -443,6 +538,24 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.8.5 -> 0.8.9"
 notes = "No new unsafe code, just refactorings."
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.nu-ansi-term]]
+who = "Pat Hickey <phickey@fastly.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.46.0"
+notes = "one use of unsafe to call windows specific api to get console handle."
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.nu-ansi-term]]
+who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.46.0 -> 0.50.1"
+notes = "Lots of stylistic/rust-related chanegs, plus new features, but nothing out of the ordrinary."
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.nu-ansi-term]]
+who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.50.1 -> 0.50.3"
+notes = "CI changes, Rust changes, nothing out of the ordinary."
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.num-traits]]
 who = "Andrew Brown <andrew.brown@intel.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -537,12 +650,38 @@ criteria = "safe-to-run"
 delta = "0.2.16 -> 0.2.18"
 notes = "Standard macro changes, nothing out of place"
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.tracing-log]]
+who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.1.3"
+notes = """
+This is a standard adapter between the `log` ecosystem and the `tracing`
+ecosystem. There's one `unsafe` block in this crate and it's well-scoped.
+"""
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.tracing-log]]
+who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.1.3 -> 0.2.0"
+notes = "Nothing out of the ordinary, a typical major version update and nothing awry."
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.try-lock]]
+who = "Pat Hickey <phickey@fastly.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.2.4"
+notes = "Implements a concurrency primitive with atomics, and is not obviously incorrect"
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.vcpkg]]
 who = "Pat Hickey <phickey@fastly.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.2.15"
 notes = "no build.rs, no macros, no unsafe. It reads the filesystem and makes copies of DLLs into OUT_DIR."
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.want]]
+who = "Pat Hickey <phickey@fastly.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.3.0"
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.wasm-metadata]]
 who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -591,6 +730,13 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.243.0 -> 0.244.0"
 notes = "The Bytecode Alliance is the author of this crate"
 
+[[audits.google.audits.autocfg]]
+who = "Manish Goregaokar <manishearth@google.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.4.0"
+notes = "Contains no unsafe"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
 [[audits.google.audits.base64]]
 who = "amarjotgill <amarjotgill@google.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -719,6 +865,89 @@ delta = "0.2.9 -> 0.2.13"
 notes = "Audited at https://fxrev.dev/946396"
 aggregated-from = "https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/fuchsia/+/refs/heads/main/third_party/rust_crates/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
 
+[[audits.google.audits.proc-macro-error-attr]]
+who = "George Burgess IV <gbiv@google.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.0.4"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/third_party/rust_crates/+/refs/heads/main/cargo-vet/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rand_core]]
+who = "Lukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.6.4"
+notes = """
+For more detailed unsafe review notes please see https://crrev.com/c/6362797
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Lukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.0.14"
+notes = """
+Grepped for `-i cipher`, `-i crypto`, `'\bfs\b'``, `'\bnet\b'``, `'\bunsafe\b'``
+and there were no hits except for:
+
+* Using trivially-safe `unsafe` in test code:
+
+    ```
+    tests/test_const.rs:unsafe fn _unsafe() {}
+    tests/test_const.rs:const _UNSAFE: () = unsafe { _unsafe() };
+    ```
+
+* Using `unsafe` in a string:
+
+    ```
+    src/constfn.rs:            "unsafe" => Qualifiers::Unsafe,
+    ```
+
+* Using `std::fs` in `build/build.rs` to write `${OUT_DIR}/version.expr`
+  which is later read back via `include!` used in `src/lib.rs`.
+
+Version `1.0.6` of this crate has been added to Chromium in
+https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/28841c33c77833cc30b286f9ae24c97e7a8f4057
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Adrian Taylor <adetaylor@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.14 -> 1.0.15"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "danakj <danakj@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.15 -> 1.0.16"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Dustin J. Mitchell <djmitche@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.16 -> 1.0.17"
+notes = "Just updates windows compat"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Liza Burakova <liza@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.17 -> 1.0.18"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Dustin J. Mitchell <djmitche@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.18 -> 1.0.19"
+notes = "No unsafe, just doc changes"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.19 -> 1.0.20"
+notes = "Only minor updates to documentation and the mock today used for testing."
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
 [[audits.google.audits.smallvec]]
 who = "Manish Goregaokar <manishearth@google.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -736,6 +965,28 @@ Previously reviewed during security review and the audit is grandparented in.
 """
 aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
 
+[[audits.google.audits.strum]]
+who = "danakj@chromium.org"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.25.0"
+notes = """
+Reviewed in https://crrev.com/c/5171063
+
+Previously reviewed during security review and the audit is grandparented in.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.strum_macros]]
+who = "danakj@chromium.org"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.25.3"
+notes = """
+Reviewed in https://crrev.com/c/5171063
+
+Previously reviewed during security review and the audit is grandparented in.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
 [[audits.mozilla.wildcard-audits.core-foundation-sys]]
 who = "Bobby Holley <bobbyholley@gmail.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -812,6 +1063,12 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.2.3 -> 0.2.4"
 aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
 
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.errno]]
+who = "Mike Hommey <mh+mozilla@glandium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.1 -> 0.3.3"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
 [[audits.mozilla.audits.fastrand]]
 who = "Mike Hommey <mh+mozilla@glandium.org>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -929,6 +1186,16 @@ yet, but it's all valid. Otherwise it's a pretty simple crate.
 """
 aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
 
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.rustc_version]]
+who = "Nika Layzell <nika@thelayzells.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.4.0"
+notes = """
+Use of powerful capabilities is limited to invoking `rustc -vV` to get version
+information for parsing version information.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mozilla/cargo-vet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
 [[audits.mozilla.audits.serde_spanned]]
 who = "Ben Dean-Kawamura <bdk@mozilla.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -955,6 +1222,12 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "1.1.0 -> 1.3.0"
 aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
 
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.similar]]
+who = "Nika Layzell <nika@thelayzells.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "2.2.1 -> 2.7.0"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mozilla/cargo-vet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
 [[audits.mozilla.audits.smallvec]]
 who = "Erich Gubler <erichdongubler@gmail.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -967,6 +1240,30 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.10.0 -> 0.11.1"
 aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
 
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.strum]]
+who = "Teodor Tanasoaia <ttanasoaia@mozilla.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.25.0 -> 0.26.3"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.strum]]
+who = "Erich Gubler <erichdongubler@gmail.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.26.3 -> 0.27.1"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.strum_macros]]
+who = "Teodor Tanasoaia <ttanasoaia@mozilla.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.25.3 -> 0.26.4"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.strum_macros]]
+who = "Erich Gubler <erichdongubler@gmail.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.26.4 -> 0.27.1"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
 [[audits.mozilla.audits.synstructure]]
 who = "Nika Layzell <nika@thelayzells.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -1038,3 +1335,153 @@ who = "Jan-Erik Rediger <jrediger@mozilla.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.1.5"
 aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mozilla/glean/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.windows-link]]
+who = "Mark Hammond <mhammond@skippinet.com.au>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.1.1"
+notes = "A microsoft crate allowing unsafe calls to windows apis."
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.windows-link]]
+who = "Erich Gubler <erichdongubler@gmail.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.1.1 -> 0.2.0"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.zeroize]]
+who = "Benjamin Beurdouche <beurdouche@mozilla.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.8.1"
+notes = """
+This code DOES contain unsafe code required to internally call volatiles
+for deleting data. This is expected and documented behavior.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.autocfg]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.4.0 -> 1.5.0"
+notes = "Filesystem change is to remove the generated LLVM IR output file after probing."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.dunce]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.0.5"
+notes = """
+Does what it says on the tin. No `unsafe`, and the only IO is `std::fs::canonicalize`.
+Path and string handling looks plausibly correct.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.errno]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.3 -> 0.3.8"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.errno]]
+who = "Daira-Emma Hopwood <daira@jacaranda.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.8 -> 0.3.9"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.errno]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.10 -> 0.3.11"
+notes = "The `__errno` location for vxworks and cygwin looks correct from a quick search."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/wallet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.errno]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.11 -> 0.3.13"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.errno]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.13 -> 0.3.14"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.http-body]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.0 -> 1.0.1"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.inout]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.1.3 -> 0.1.4"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/wallet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.rustc_version]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.4.0 -> 0.4.1"
+notes = "Changes to `Command` usage are to add support for `RUSTC_WRAPPER`."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.20 -> 1.0.21"
+notes = "Build script change is to fix building with `-Zfmt-debug=none`."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.21 -> 1.0.22"
+notes = "Changes to generated code are to prepend a clippy annotation."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/wallet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.strum]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.27.1 -> 0.27.2"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.strum_macros]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.27.1 -> 0.27.2"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.try-lock]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.2.4 -> 0.2.5"
+notes = "Bumps MSRV to remove unsafe code block."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.want]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.0 -> 0.3.1"
+notes = """
+Migrates to `try-lock 0.2.4` to replace some unsafe APIs that were not marked
+`unsafe` (but that were being used safely).
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.windows-link]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.2.0 -> 0.2.1"
+notes = "No code changes at all."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.zeroize]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.8.1 -> 1.8.2"
+notes = """
+Changes to `unsafe` code are to alter how `core::mem::size_of` is named; no actual changes
+to the `unsafe` logic.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/wallet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"

useragent/.dart_tool/extension_discovery/README.md

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-Extension Discovery Cache
-=========================
-
-This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
-packages that contains extensions for other packages.
-
-DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
-----------------------
-
- * Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
- * Do write to this folder.
-
-If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
-API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
-
-If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
-contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
-
-Use package `extension_discovery`
----------------------------------
-
-If you want to access information from this folder.
-
-Feel free to delete this folder
--------------------------------
-
-Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
-are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
-
-Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
-need to do please file a bug.

useragent/.dart_tool/extension_discovery/vs_code.json

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":2,"entries":[{"package":"arbiter","rootUri":"../","packageUri":"lib/"}]}