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86 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
CleverWild
6f270ef0c4 housekepping: add fixme for start_bootstrap's operator_id
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2026-06-12 22:01:17 +02:00
CleverWild
0098c3c08a refactor(server::crypto): use fixed-size [u8; 32] and KeyCell throughout seal key API
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2026-06-12 21:15:07 +02:00
CleverWild
a3b98ca024 fix(server::tests): tighten unseal test seal_key params to &[u8; 32] 2026-06-12 21:11:48 +02:00
CleverWild
0d364d1951 feat(server::grpc): wire Shamir committee bootstrap and unseal proto messages
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Adds DeclareCommittee and ContributePassphrase variants to bootstrap.proto,
ContributePassphrase to unseal.proto, and AwaitingContributions result codes
to both. Implements corresponding inbound converters and outbound reply
mappings. VaultGate handlers delegate to VaultCoordinator.
2026-06-12 19:43:17 +02:00
CleverWild
6f65c907a3 feat(server): introduce VaultCoordinator for multi-operator Shamir bootstrap/unseal
VaultCoordinator collects operator passphrases, splits the seal key into
Shamir shares on bootstrap (encrypting each share with the operator's
passphrase via Argon2 + XChaCha20-Poly1305), and reconstructs the seal
key from threshold shares on unseal. Adds vsss-rs 5.4.0 and rand_core 0.6
dependencies.
2026-06-12 19:43:09 +02:00
CleverWild
9764b0d5ce refactor(server::actors::vault): clean up Bootstrap/TryUnseal, remove Bootstrapping state
Bootstrap and TryUnseal now accept a SafeCell<Vec<u8>> seal key directly.
The Bootstrapping intermediate state is removed — multi-operator coordination
is the responsibility of VaultCoordinator, which calls Bootstrap atomically
once all shares are collected.
2026-06-12 19:43:02 +02:00
CleverWild
50fe18d6ce feat(server::crypto): add Shamir secret sharing utilities
Wraps vsss_rs Gf256::split_array / combine_array into thin split_key /
combine_shares helpers. Also widens derive_key salt parameter from &[u8;16]
to &[u8] to accommodate the 32-byte share salts.
2026-06-12 19:42:56 +02:00
CleverWild
3e5f0cb3df feat(server::db): add share_salt column to operator table
Each operator row now stores a 32-byte random salt used to derive the
per-operator share encryption key from their passphrase (Argon2 KDF).
2026-06-12 19:42:49 +02:00
CleverWild
34850137df feat(server::actors::evm): implement operator_delete_grant
Sets revoked_at on the evm_basic_grant row; returns NotFound if the grant
does not exist. Wires the handler in OperatorSession replacing the todo!().
2026-06-12 19:42:43 +02:00
CleverWild
d1b96c8409 fix(server::peers::operator::auth): make ChallengeContext pub for smlang state machine
smlang generates a public state enum whose variants contain ChallengeContext,
requiring the type itself to be fully public. Also tightens the wildcard arm
in client auth to an exhaustive match.
2026-06-12 19:42:37 +02:00
Skipper
9dbb18ae82 WIP: some things
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2026-05-20 21:04:16 +02:00
Skipper
a773255935 refactor(server::db): introduced newtype wrappers for entity id's in database 2026-05-04 19:35:27 +02:00
Skipper
3f801abdff housekeeping(server): deps upgrade + diesel migration to AsyncFnOnce
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2026-05-01 11:22:40 +02:00
Skipper
2b44570ab4 fix(server): MacOS build version
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2026-04-19 13:47:47 +02:00
Skipper
1f9b253433 housekeeping(server): removed unused deps 2026-04-19 13:46:49 +02:00
Skipper
a1c3ffd2d1 refactor: rename to to better reflect meaning
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2026-04-19 13:41:50 +02:00
Skipper
fd25de32a1 docs: move to folder and update to new challenge payload 2026-04-18 15:17:18 +02:00
Skipper
9ab074170b merge: feat-lints into main
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2026-04-18 15:04:33 +02:00
18b8a3bbf5 Merge pull request 'refactor-integrity-check' (#90) from refactor-integrity-check into main
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Reviewed-on: #90
2026-04-18 11:54:30 +00:00
Skipper
38cf1b98b9 housekeeping(server): clippy warns fix
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2026-04-18 13:53:11 +02:00
Skipper
9cf87b2058 merge: refactor-integrity-check into main
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2026-04-18 13:46:28 +02:00
Skipper
929d50b589 housekeeping(server): clean too-broad visibility markers and organize imports
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2026-04-18 13:30:09 +02:00
Skipper
70acfc99b5 merge: refactor-integrity-check into main 2026-04-18 13:19:13 +02:00
28f84d03ab Merge pull request 'housekeeping(server): dependencies upgrade' (#89) from push-zmvtzuwrnyyv into main
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Reviewed-on: #89
2026-04-17 19:20:50 +00:00
Skipper
4a8e51ef32 docs: updated to new auth challenge format and removed stale TOCTOU race condition note
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2026-04-17 18:25:55 +02:00
Skipper
9ee86afc19 fix(useragent): now using new challenge format 2026-04-17 18:19:51 +02:00
Skipper
790026e93b fix(server::tests): api surface of auth challenge changed 2026-04-17 17:58:22 +02:00
Skipper
0e09afda5d refactor(server::{useragent::auth, client::auth}): use random based + timestamp nonce instead of monotonic counter in database 2026-04-17 17:44:42 +02:00
Skipper
51e6571d80 refactor(server): now keeps track of useragents, instead of 2026-04-17 00:00:43 +02:00
Skipper
3b828d5874 refactor(server::grpc::vault_gate): standard approach using / traits 2026-04-16 22:15:18 +02:00
Skipper
a6f94e3115 fix(server): sending fixed vault state when on stage 2026-04-16 19:36:41 +02:00
hdbg
f49e995c2f WIP: kameo::messages wiring for transport generalization
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2026-04-16 17:18:46 +02:00
Skipper
e88df432fb housekeeping(server): dependencies upgrade
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2026-04-14 19:10:07 +02:00
hdbg
87ee0fe87b feat(user-agent): add VaultGate for sealed vault authentication 2026-04-12 11:53:05 +02:00
CleverWild
41b3fc5d39 fix(lints): remove unstable ones
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2026-04-10 01:00:21 +02:00
CleverWild
f6a0c32b9d feat: rustc and clippy linting
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2026-04-10 00:42:43 +02:00
hdbg
205227a3df fix(server::integrity): vault now differentias between expected/unexpected states for commands more granularly 2026-04-08 18:21:48 +02:00
hdbg
a4070e7df7 fix(useragent): unsafe, but working implementation of ml-dsa 2026-04-08 17:43:51 +02:00
hdbg
6b8da567dd fix(server::user_agent): useragents now self-sign themselves on bootstrap 2026-04-08 17:40:45 +02:00
hdbg
1585f90cae refactor(server): reorganized client/user_agent actors into separate module peers and added event MessageBus 2026-04-08 12:34:16 +02:00
62dff3f810 Merge pull request 'refactor(hashing): introduce Hashable derive macro and migrate server types' (#82) from hashing-proc-macro into main
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Reviewed-on: #82
Reviewed-by: Stas <business@jexter.tech>
2026-04-08 00:18:40 +00:00
CleverWild
6e22f368c9 refactor(hashing): introduce Hashable derive macro and migrate server types
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2026-04-08 01:32:59 +02:00
f3cf6a9438 Merge pull request 'Post-quantum crypto and better useragent security' (#80) from push-xrxykvkuxpsv into main
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Reviewed-on: #80
2026-04-07 19:26:54 +00:00
hdbg
a9f9fc2a9d housekeeping(server): fixed clippy warns
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2026-04-07 16:28:47 +02:00
hdbg
d22ab49e3d refactor(server): moved shared module crypto into arbiter-crypto 2026-04-07 16:24:51 +02:00
hdbg
a845181ef6 docs: ml-dsa scheme everywhere
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2026-04-07 15:02:32 +02:00
hdbg
0d424f3afc refactor(server): migrated auth to ml-dsa 2026-04-07 14:55:31 +02:00
hdbg
1497884ce6 fix(server::bootsrapper): token compare is now constant-time
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2026-04-06 18:33:47 +02:00
hdbg
b3464cf8a6 tests(server::client::auth): integrity envelope insertion for valid paths
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2026-04-06 18:24:13 +02:00
hdbg
46d1318b6f feat(server): add integrity verification for client keys 2026-04-06 18:13:11 +02:00
9c80d51d45 Merge pull request 'fix(server): replaced postcard-based integrity fingerprint with custom trait providing order-independent hashing' (#77) from push-opwuyuwxknyo into main
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Reviewed-on: #77
2026-04-06 15:42:47 +00:00
hdbg
33456a644d tests(server): property-based testing for ordering independency for hash
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2026-04-06 17:40:41 +02:00
hdbg
5bc0c42cc7 fix(server): replaced postcard-based integrity fingerprint with custom trait providing order-independent hashing 2026-04-06 16:25:32 +02:00
hdbg
f6b62ab884 fix(server): added chain_id check and covered check_shared_constraints with unit tests
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2026-04-06 12:57:18 +02:00
hdbg
2dd5a3f32f tests(server): initial cargo-mutants
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2026-04-06 12:03:56 +02:00
hdbg
1aca9d4007 fix(server): simplify hash function for debug profile 2026-04-05 22:50:28 +02:00
5ee1b49c43 Merge pull request 'feat(server): integrity envelope engine for EVM grants with HMAC verification' (#51) from integrity-envelope into main
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Reviewed-on: #51
2026-04-05 16:26:51 +00:00
hdbg
00745bb381 tests(server): fixed for new integrity checks
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2026-04-05 14:49:02 +02:00
hdbg
b122aa464c refactor(server): rework envelopes and integrity check
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2026-04-05 14:17:00 +02:00
hdbg
9fab945a00 fix(server): remove stale mentions of miette
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2026-04-05 10:45:24 +02:00
CleverWild
aeed664e9a chore: inline integrity proto types
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2026-04-05 10:44:21 +02:00
CleverWild
4057c1fc12 feat(server): integrity envelope engine for EVM grants with HMAC verification 2026-04-05 10:44:21 +02:00
hdbg
f5eb51978d docs: add recovery operators and multi-operator details 2026-04-05 08:27:24 +00:00
hdbg
d997e0f843 docs: add multi-operator governance section 2026-04-05 08:27:24 +00:00
hdbg
7aca281a81 merge: @main into client-integrity-verification
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2026-04-05 10:25:46 +02:00
hdbg
01b12515bd housekeeping(server): fixed clippy warns
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2026-04-04 14:33:48 +02:00
hdbg
4a50daa7ea refactor(user-agent): remove backfill pubkey integrity tags
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2026-04-04 14:32:00 +02:00
hdbg
352ee3ee63 fix(server): previously, user agent auth accepted invalid signatures
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2026-04-04 14:28:07 +02:00
hdbg
dd51d756da refactor(server): separate crypto by purpose and moved outside of actor into separate module 2026-04-04 14:21:52 +02:00
CleverWild
0bb6e596ac feat(auth): implement attestation status verification for public keys
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2026-04-04 12:10:45 +02:00
CleverWild
881f16bb1a fix(keyholder): comment drift 2026-04-04 12:02:50 +02:00
CleverWild
78895bca5b refactor(keyholder): generalize derive_useragent_integrity_key and compute_useragent_pubkey_integrity_tag corespondenly to derive_integrity_key and compute_integrity_tag 2026-04-04 12:00:39 +02:00
CleverWild
a02ef68a70 feat(auth): add seal-key-derived pubkey integrity tags with auth enforcement and unseal backfill
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2026-03-30 00:17:04 +02:00
hdbg
e5be55e141 style(dashboard): format code and add title margin
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2026-03-29 10:54:02 +02:00
hdbg
8f0eb7130b feat(grants-create): add configurable grant authorization fields 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
94fe04a6a4 refactor(useragent::evm::grants): split into more files & flutter_form_builder usage 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
976c11902c fix(useragent::dashboard): screen pushed twice due to improper listen hook 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
c8d2662a36 refactor(grants): wrap grant list in SingleChildScrollView 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
ac5fedddd1 style(dashboard): remove const from _CalloutBell and add title to nav rail 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
0c2d4986a2 refactor(useragent): moved shared CreamPanel and StatePanel into generic widgets 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
a3203936d2 feat(evm): add EVM grants screen with create UI and list 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
fb1c0ec130 refactor(proto): restructure wallet access messages for improved data organization 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
2a21758369 refactor(server::evm): removed repetetive errors and error variants 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
1abb5fa006 refactor(useragent::evm::table): broke down into more widgets 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
e1b1c857fa refactor(useragent::evm): moved out header into general widget 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
hdbg
4216007af3 feat(useragent): vibe-coded access list 2026-03-29 00:37:58 +01:00
72 changed files with 3615 additions and 2920 deletions

109
AGENTS.md
View File

@@ -1,16 +1,13 @@
# AGENTS.md
Guidance for coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, …) working in this repository.
This file provides guidance to Codex (Codex.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Project Overview
Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets:
Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
- **`useragent/`** — Flutter app (desktop + mobile + web targets) with a Rust core via `flutter_rust_bridge`
- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and clients
- **`docs/`** — `ARCHITECTURE.md` (peer types, flows, threat model) and `IMPLEMENTATION.md`; treat them as the design source of truth and update them when behaviour changes
- **`scripts/`** — helper scripts, e.g. `gen_erc20_registry.py`
- **`operator/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
@@ -21,7 +18,7 @@ Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
mise install
```
Key versions live in `mise.toml` (currently Rust 1.95.0 with clippy, Flutter 3.41.7-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.7 with `sqlite-bundled`, Python 3.14). Also provided there: `cargo-nextest`, `cargo-audit`, `cargo-vet`, `cargo-shear`, `cargo-mutants`, `cargo-features-manager`, `cargo-edit`, `ast-grep`, `flutter_rust_bridge_codegen`.
Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
@@ -29,14 +26,10 @@ Key versions live in `mise.toml` (currently Rust 1.95.0 with clippy, Flutter 3.4
| Crate | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types (`tonic-prost-build`); also `ArbiterUrl`, `home_path()`, `BOOTSTRAP_PATH` |
| `arbiter-crypto` | Shared crypto primitives: `authn` (ML-DSA), `safecell` (hardened memory), `hashing::Hashable`, re-exported `x-wing` |
| `arbiter-macros` | `#[derive(Hashable)]` — canonical hashing of structs for the DB integrity layer |
| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, peers, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients (`ArbiterClient`, EVM wallet, key storage) |
| `arbiter-tokens-registry` | Generated ERC-20 token registry used by token-transfer policies |
Workspace lints (`server/Cargo.toml`) are strict: most of clippy `pedantic`/`nursery` plus a large restriction set. `as` casts, indexing/slicing, `dbg!`, float arithmetic and undocumented `unsafe` are denied or warned — expect to add an `#[expect(..., reason = "...")]` rather than to silence a lint globally.
| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
| `arbiter-operator` | Rust client library for the operator side of the gRPC protocol |
| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
### Common Commands
@@ -49,78 +42,54 @@ cargo build
# Run the server daemon
cargo run -p arbiter-server
# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test; CI uses --all-features)
# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
cargo nextest run
# Run a single test
cargo nextest run <test_name>
# Lint (CI runs it with -D warnings)
cargo clippy --all -- -D warnings
# Lint
cargo clippy
# Security audit
cargo audit
# Supply-chain review (config in server/supply-chain/)
cargo vet
# Check unused dependencies
cargo shear
# Mutation testing
cargo mutants
# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
cargo insta review
```
### CI
Woodpecker pipelines in `.woodpecker/` run on `server/**` changes: `server-lint` (clippy), `server-test` (nextest, `--all-features`), `server-audit`, `server-vet`, plus `useragent-analyze` for the Flutter app.
### Architecture
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. Long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors` (`src/actors/mod.rs`):
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — one-time bootstrap token, written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run
- **`Vault`** — encrypted root key and the Sealed/Unsealed state machine; on unseal decrypts the root key into a `memsafe`-backed `SafeCell`
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — cross-connection flow between operators and SDK clients
- **`OperatorRegistry`** — tracks currently connected operators
- **`EvmActor`** — EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing
- **`events`** — a `kameo_actors::MessageBus` (`DeliveryStrategy::Guaranteed`) for cross-actor notifications
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between operators and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
Per-connection state lives under **`src/peers/`**, not `actors/`: `peers/client/` and `peers/operator/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response) and `session` (post-auth) sub-modules; the operator side additionally has `vault_gate/` for the unseal handshake.
Per-connection actors live under `actors/operator/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
The gRPC surface lives in **`src/grpc/`**, split per peer (`client/`, `operator/`, `common/`) and per direction (`inbound.rs` — requests to the daemon, `outbound.rs` — server-initiated streams), with `request_tracker.rs` correlating the two.
EVM logic is in `src/evm/`: `policies/ether_transfer/`, `policies/token_transfers/`, `abi.rs`, `safe_signer.rs`.
**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8`. Schema in `src/db/schema.rs`, models in `src/db/models.rs`, embedded migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`; tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
Entity ids are newtypes generated by the `declare_id!` macro in `db::models` (`OperatorId`, `ChainId`, …), each a `#[repr(transparent)]` wrapper over `i32` with `to_raw`/`from_raw`. Pass these around instead of bare `i32`.
**Row integrity:** sensitive rows are covered by an HMAC-SHA256 envelope (`src/crypto/integrity/`, table `integrity_envelope`), keyed from the vault root key. A struct becomes coverable by deriving `arbiter_macros::Hashable` and implementing `Integrable` (`KIND` + `VERSION`). When adding or changing a covered entity, keep the derive and the payload version in sync — a mismatch surfaces as `PayloadVersionMismatch` or `MacMismatch` at runtime.
**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
**Cryptography:**
- Authentication: **ML-DSA-87** (post-quantum, `arbiter-crypto::authn::v1`), challenge-response with per-peer nonce tracking
- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305, versioned modules (`crypto/encryption/v1.rs`) with a `schema_version` column for transparent migration on unseal
- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
- Password KDF: Argon2
- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange (`peers/operator/vault_gate/`); `x-wing` (hybrid PQ KEM) is available via `arbiter-crypto`
- TLS: self-signed certificate (rustls + aws-lc-rs, `prefer-post-quantum`), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
Crypto modules are versioned by convention: `mod.rs` re-exports the current `vN`. Add a `v(N+1)` rather than editing an existing version in place.
**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. `ArbiterUrl` encodes host, port, CA cert and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
### Proto Regeneration
`arbiter-proto/build.rs` compiles `arbiter.proto`, `operator.proto`, `client.proto` and `evm.proto` (with their `shared/`, `operator/`, `client/` includes) on build:
When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
```sh
cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
```
Dart protobuf stubs are generated separately, from the repo root:
```sh
mise run codegen # protoc --dart_out=grpc:useragent/lib/proto
```
### Database Migrations
```sh
@@ -131,8 +100,6 @@ diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migration
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
Pre-release policy: there is a single `init` migration and no deployed databases yet, so schema changes are made by editing that migration directly instead of stacking new ones. Regenerate `src/db/schema.rs` after changing it.
### Code Conventions
**`#[must_use]` Attribute:**
@@ -154,23 +121,29 @@ pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool
This forces callers to either use the return value or explicitly ignore it with `let _ = ...;`, preventing silent failures.
## User Agent (Flutter + flutter_rust_bridge at `useragent/`)
## Operator (Flutter + Rinf at `operator/`)
The Flutter app calls Rust through [flutter_rust_bridge](https://cjycode.com/flutter_rust_bridge/) 2.12.0. The Rust side is the `rust_lib_arbiter` crate at `useragent/rust/`; everything exposed to Dart is declared in `useragent/rust/src/api/` and lands in `useragent/lib/src/rust/` (see `useragent/flutter_rust_bridge.yaml`). Dart UI code is organised as `lib/features/`, `lib/screens/`, `lib/widgets/`, `lib/providers/`, `lib/theme/`, with routing in `lib/router.dart` (`router.gr.dart` is generated).
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `operator/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-operator` for the gRPC client.
Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `operator/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
```sh
cd operator && rinf gen
```
### Common Commands
```sh
cd useragent
cd operator
# Run the app
# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
flutter run
# Regenerate Rust↔Dart bindings after editing rust/src/api/
mise run codegen # flutter_rust_bridge_codegen generate
# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
rinf gen
# Analyze Dart code (also run in CI)
# Analyze Dart code
flutter analyze
```
Note: `app/` contains only stale generated Flutter artifacts and is not the application source.
The Rinf Rust entry point is `operator/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `operator/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
Extension Discovery Cache
=========================
This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
packages that contains extensions for other packages.
DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
----------------------
* Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
* Do write to this folder.
If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
Use package `extension_discovery`
---------------------------------
If you want to access information from this folder.
Feel free to delete this folder
-------------------------------
Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
need to do please file a bug.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{"version":2,"entries":[{"package":"app","rootUri":"../","packageUri":"lib/"}]}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
{
"configVersion": 2,
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}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
{
"roots": [
"app"
],
"packages": [
{
"name": "app",
"version": "1.0.0+1",
"dependencies": [
"cupertino_icons",
"flutter"
],
"devDependencies": [
"flutter_lints",
"flutter_test"
]
},
{
"name": "flutter_lints",
"version": "6.0.0",
"dependencies": [
"lints"
]
},
{
"name": "flutter_test",
"version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": [
"clock",
"collection",
"fake_async",
"flutter",
"leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
"matcher",
"meta",
"path",
"stack_trace",
"stream_channel",
"test_api",
"vector_math"
]
},
{
"name": "cupertino_icons",
"version": "1.0.8",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "flutter",
"version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": [
"characters",
"collection",
"material_color_utilities",
"meta",
"sky_engine",
"vector_math"
]
},
{
"name": "lints",
"version": "6.1.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "stream_channel",
"version": "2.1.4",
"dependencies": [
"async"
]
},
{
"name": "meta",
"version": "1.17.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "collection",
"version": "1.19.1",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
"version": "3.0.10",
"dependencies": [
"flutter",
"leak_tracker",
"leak_tracker_testing",
"matcher",
"meta"
]
},
{
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"version": "2.2.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
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"version": "1.12.1",
"dependencies": [
"path"
]
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{
"name": "clock",
"version": "1.1.2",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "fake_async",
"version": "1.3.3",
"dependencies": [
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]
},
{
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"collection",
"meta",
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"dependencies": [
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]
},
{
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"version": "1.10.2",
"dependencies": [
"collection",
"path",
"term_glyph"
]
},
{
"name": "boolean_selector",
"version": "2.1.2",
"dependencies": [
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"string_scanner"
]
},
{
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"version": "15.0.2",
"dependencies": []
}
],
"configVersion": 1
}

1
app/.dart_tool/version Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
3.38.9

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

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@@ -0,0 +1,821 @@
# Grant Grid View Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Add an "EVM Grants" dashboard tab that displays all grants as enriched cards (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with per-card revoke support.
**Architecture:** A new `walletAccessListProvider` fetches wallet accesses with their DB row IDs. The screen (`grants.dart`) watches only `evmGrantsProvider` for top-level state. Each `GrantCard` widget (its own file) watches enrichment providers (`walletAccessListProvider`, `evmProvider`, `sdkClientsProvider`) and the revoke mutation directly — keeping rebuilds scoped to the card. The screen is registered as a dashboard tab in `AdaptiveScaffold`.
**Tech Stack:** Flutter, Riverpod (`riverpod_annotation` + `build_runner` codegen), `sizer` (adaptive sizing), `auto_route`, Protocol Buffers (Dart), `Palette` design tokens.
---
## File Map
| File | Action | Responsibility |
|---|---|---|
| `operator/lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify | Add `Palette.token` (indigo accent for token-transfer cards) |
| `operator/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart` | Modify | Add `listAllWalletAccesses()` function |
| `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create | `WalletAccessListProvider` — fetches full wallet access list with IDs |
| `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart` | Create | `GrantCard` widget — watches enrichment providers + revoke mutation; one card per grant |
| `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create | `EvmGrantsScreen` — watches `evmGrantsProvider`; handles loading/error/empty/data states; renders `GrantCard` list |
| `operator/lib/router.dart` | Modify | Register `EvmGrantsRoute` in dashboard children |
| `operator/lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify | Add Grants entry to `routes` list and `NavigationDestination` list |
---
## Task 1: Add `Palette.token`
**Files:**
- Modify: `operator/lib/theme/palette.dart`
- [ ] **Step 1: Add the color**
Replace the contents of `operator/lib/theme/palette.dart` with:
```dart
import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
class Palette {
static const ink = Color(0xFF15263C);
static const coral = Color(0xFFE26254);
static const cream = Color(0xFFFFFAF4);
static const line = Color(0x1A15263C);
static const token = Color(0xFF5C6BC0);
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
```sh
cd operator && flutter analyze lib/theme/palette.dart
```
Expected: no issues.
- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
```sh
jj describe -m "feat(theme): add Palette.token for token-transfer grant cards"
jj new
```
---
## Task 2: Add `listAllWalletAccesses` feature function
**Files:**
- Modify: `operator/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart`
`readClientWalletAccess` (existing) filters the list to one client's wallet IDs and returns `Set<int>`. This new function returns the complete unfiltered list with row IDs so the grant cards can resolve wallet_access_id → wallet + client.
- [ ] **Step 1: Append function**
Add at the bottom of `operator/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart`:
```dart
Future<List<SdkClientWalletAccess>> listAllWalletAccesses(
Connection connection,
) async {
final response = await connection.ask(
OperatorRequest(listWalletAccess: Empty()),
);
if (!response.hasListWalletAccessResponse()) {
throw Exception(
'Expected list wallet access response, got ${response.whichPayload()}',
);
}
return response.listWalletAccessResponse.accesses.toList(growable: false);
}
```
Each returned `SdkClientWalletAccess` has:
- `.id` — the `evm_wallet_access` row ID (same value as `wallet_access_id` in a `GrantEntry`)
- `.access.walletId` — the EVM wallet DB ID
- `.access.sdkClientId` — the SDK client DB ID
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
```sh
cd operator && flutter analyze lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart
```
Expected: no issues.
- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
```sh
jj describe -m "feat(evm): add listAllWalletAccesses feature function"
jj new
```
---
## Task 3: Create `WalletAccessListProvider`
**Files:**
- Create: `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
- Generated: `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.g.dart`
Mirrors the structure of `EvmGrants` in `providers/evm/evm_grants.dart` — class-based `@riverpod` with a `refresh()` method.
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the provider**
Create `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`:
```dart
import 'package:arbiter/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/proto/operator.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/connection/connection_manager.dart';
import 'package:mtcore/markettakers.dart';
import 'package:riverpod_annotation/riverpod_annotation.dart';
part 'wallet_access_list.g.dart';
@riverpod
class WalletAccessList extends _$WalletAccessList {
@override
Future<List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?> build() async {
final connection = await ref.watch(connectionManagerProvider.future);
if (connection == null) {
return null;
}
try {
return await listAllWalletAccesses(connection);
} catch (e, st) {
talker.handle(e, st);
rethrow;
}
}
Future<void> refresh() async {
final connection = await ref.read(connectionManagerProvider.future);
if (connection == null) {
state = const AsyncData(null);
return;
}
state = const AsyncLoading();
state = await AsyncValue.guard(() => listAllWalletAccesses(connection));
}
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run code generation**
```sh
cd operator && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
```
Expected: `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.g.dart` created. No errors.
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify**
```sh
cd operator && flutter analyze lib/providers/sdk_clients/
```
Expected: no issues.
- [ ] **Step 4: Commit**
```sh
jj describe -m "feat(providers): add WalletAccessListProvider"
jj new
```
---
## Task 4: Create `GrantCard` widget
**Files:**
- Create: `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart`
This widget owns all per-card logic: enrichment lookups, revoke action, and rebuild scope. The screen only passes it a `GrantEntry` — the card fetches everything else itself.
**Key types:**
- `GrantEntry` (from `proto/evm.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.shared.walletAccessId`, `.shared.chainId`, `.specific.whichGrant()`
- `SpecificGrant_Grant.etherTransfer` / `.tokenTransfer` — enum values for the oneof
- `SdkClientWalletAccess` (from `proto/operator.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
- `WalletEntry` (from `proto/evm.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.address` (List<int>)
- `SdkClientEntry` (from `proto/operator.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.info.name`
- `revokeEvmGrantMutation``Mutation<void>` (global; all revoke buttons disable together while any revoke is in flight)
- `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: int)``Future<void>`
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the widget**
Create `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart`:
```dart
import 'package:arbiter/proto/evm.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/proto/operator.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm_grants.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/list.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/theme/palette.dart';
import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/experimental/mutation.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:sizer/sizer.dart';
String _shortAddress(List<int> bytes) {
final hex = bytes.map((b) => b.toRadixString(16).padLeft(2, '0')).join();
return '0x${hex.substring(0, 6)}...${hex.substring(hex.length - 4)}';
}
String _formatError(Object error) {
final message = error.toString();
if (message.startsWith('Exception: ')) {
return message.substring('Exception: '.length);
}
return message;
}
class GrantCard extends ConsumerWidget {
const GrantCard({super.key, required this.grant});
final GrantEntry grant;
@override
Widget build(BuildContext context, WidgetRef ref) {
// Enrichment lookups — each watch scopes rebuilds to this card only
final walletAccesses =
ref.watch(walletAccessListProvider).asData?.value ?? const [];
final wallets = ref.watch(evmProvider).asData?.value ?? const [];
final clients = ref.watch(sdkClientsProvider).asData?.value ?? const [];
final revoking = ref.watch(revokeEvmGrantMutation) is MutationPending;
final isEther =
grant.specific.whichGrant() == SpecificGrant_Grant.etherTransfer;
final accent = isEther ? Palette.coral : Palette.token;
final typeLabel = isEther ? 'Ether' : 'Token';
final theme = Theme.of(context);
final muted = Palette.ink.withValues(alpha: 0.62);
// Resolve wallet_access_id → wallet address + client name
final accessById = <int, SdkClientWalletAccess>{
for (final a in walletAccesses) a.id: a,
};
final walletById = <int, WalletEntry>{
for (final w in wallets) w.id: w,
};
final clientNameById = <int, String>{
for (final c in clients) c.id: c.info.name,
};
final accessId = grant.shared.walletAccessId;
final access = accessById[accessId];
final wallet = access != null ? walletById[access.access.walletId] : null;
final walletLabel = wallet != null
? _shortAddress(wallet.address)
: 'Access #$accessId';
final clientLabel = () {
if (access == null) return '';
final name = clientNameById[access.access.sdkClientId] ?? '';
return name.isEmpty ? 'Client #${access.access.sdkClientId}' : name;
}();
void showError(String message) {
if (!context.mounted) return;
ScaffoldMessenger.of(context).showSnackBar(
SnackBar(content: Text(message), behavior: SnackBarBehavior.floating),
);
}
Future<void> revoke() async {
try {
await executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: grant.id);
} catch (e) {
showError(_formatError(e));
}
}
return Container(
decoration: BoxDecoration(
borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(24),
color: Palette.cream.withValues(alpha: 0.92),
border: Border.all(color: Palette.line),
),
child: IntrinsicHeight(
child: Row(
crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.stretch,
children: [
// Accent strip
Container(
width: 0.8.w,
decoration: BoxDecoration(
color: accent,
borderRadius: const BorderRadius.horizontal(
left: Radius.circular(24),
),
),
),
// Card body
Expanded(
child: Padding(
padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
horizontal: 1.6.w,
vertical: 1.4.h,
),
child: Column(
crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.start,
children: [
// Row 1: type badge · chain · spacer · revoke button
Row(
children: [
Container(
padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
horizontal: 1.w,
vertical: 0.4.h,
),
decoration: BoxDecoration(
color: accent.withValues(alpha: 0.15),
borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(8),
),
child: Text(
typeLabel,
style: theme.textTheme.labelSmall?.copyWith(
color: accent,
fontWeight: FontWeight.w800,
),
),
),
SizedBox(width: 1.w),
Container(
padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
horizontal: 1.w,
vertical: 0.4.h,
),
decoration: BoxDecoration(
color: Palette.ink.withValues(alpha: 0.06),
borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(8),
),
child: Text(
'Chain ${grant.shared.chainId}',
style: theme.textTheme.labelSmall?.copyWith(
color: muted,
fontWeight: FontWeight.w700,
),
),
),
const Spacer(),
if (revoking)
SizedBox(
width: 1.8.h,
height: 1.8.h,
child: CircularProgressIndicator(
strokeWidth: 2,
color: Palette.coral,
),
)
else
OutlinedButton.icon(
onPressed: revoke,
style: OutlinedButton.styleFrom(
foregroundColor: Palette.coral,
side: BorderSide(
color: Palette.coral.withValues(alpha: 0.4),
),
padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
horizontal: 1.w,
vertical: 0.6.h,
),
shape: RoundedRectangleBorder(
borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(10),
),
),
icon: const Icon(Icons.block_rounded, size: 16),
label: const Text('Revoke'),
),
],
),
SizedBox(height: 0.8.h),
// Row 2: wallet address · client name
Row(
children: [
Text(
walletLabel,
style: theme.textTheme.bodySmall?.copyWith(
color: Palette.ink,
fontFamily: 'monospace',
),
),
Padding(
padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(horizontal: 0.8.w),
child: Text(
'·',
style: theme.textTheme.bodySmall
?.copyWith(color: muted),
),
),
Expanded(
child: Text(
clientLabel,
maxLines: 1,
overflow: TextOverflow.ellipsis,
style: theme.textTheme.bodySmall
?.copyWith(color: muted),
),
),
],
),
],
),
),
),
],
),
),
);
}
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
```sh
cd operator && flutter analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart
```
Expected: no issues.
- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
```sh
jj describe -m "feat(grants): add GrantCard widget with self-contained enrichment"
jj new
```
---
## Task 5: Create `EvmGrantsScreen`
**Files:**
- Create: `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
The screen watches only `evmGrantsProvider` for top-level state (loading / error / no connection / empty / data). When there is data it renders a list of `GrantCard` widgets — each card manages its own enrichment subscriptions.
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the screen**
Create `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`:
```dart
import 'package:arbiter/proto/evm.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm_grants.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/router.gr.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/theme/palette.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/widgets/page_header.dart';
import 'package:auto_route/auto_route.dart';
import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:sizer/sizer.dart';
String _formatError(Object error) {
final message = error.toString();
if (message.startsWith('Exception: ')) {
return message.substring('Exception: '.length);
}
return message;
}
// ─── State panel ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class _StatePanel extends StatelessWidget {
const _StatePanel({
required this.icon,
required this.title,
required this.body,
this.actionLabel,
this.onAction,
this.busy = false,
});
final IconData icon;
final String title;
final String body;
final String? actionLabel;
final Future<void> Function()? onAction;
final bool busy;
@override
Widget build(BuildContext context) {
final theme = Theme.of(context);
return Container(
decoration: BoxDecoration(
borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(24),
color: Palette.cream.withValues(alpha: 0.92),
border: Border.all(color: Palette.line),
),
child: Padding(
padding: EdgeInsets.all(2.8.h),
child: Column(
crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.start,
children: [
if (busy)
SizedBox(
width: 2.8.h,
height: 2.8.h,
child: const CircularProgressIndicator(strokeWidth: 2.5),
)
else
Icon(icon, size: 34, color: Palette.coral),
SizedBox(height: 1.8.h),
Text(
title,
style: theme.textTheme.headlineSmall?.copyWith(
color: Palette.ink,
fontWeight: FontWeight.w800,
),
),
SizedBox(height: 1.h),
Text(
body,
style: theme.textTheme.bodyLarge?.copyWith(
color: Palette.ink.withValues(alpha: 0.72),
height: 1.5,
),
),
if (actionLabel != null && onAction != null) ...[
SizedBox(height: 2.h),
OutlinedButton.icon(
onPressed: () => onAction!(),
icon: const Icon(Icons.refresh),
label: Text(actionLabel!),
),
],
],
),
),
);
}
}
// ─── Grant list ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class _GrantList extends StatelessWidget {
const _GrantList({required this.grants});
final List<GrantEntry> grants;
@override
Widget build(BuildContext context) {
return Column(
children: [
for (var i = 0; i < grants.length; i++)
Padding(
padding: EdgeInsets.only(
bottom: i == grants.length - 1 ? 0 : 1.8.h,
),
child: GrantCard(grant: grants[i]),
),
],
);
}
}
// ─── Screen ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@RoutePage()
class EvmGrantsScreen extends ConsumerWidget {
const EvmGrantsScreen({super.key});
@override
Widget build(BuildContext context, WidgetRef ref) {
// Screen watches only the grant list for top-level state decisions
final grantsAsync = ref.watch(evmGrantsProvider);
Future<void> refresh() async {
await Future.wait([
ref.read(evmGrantsProvider.notifier).refresh(),
ref.read(walletAccessListProvider.notifier).refresh(),
]);
}
void showMessage(String message) {
if (!context.mounted) return;
ScaffoldMessenger.of(context).showSnackBar(
SnackBar(content: Text(message), behavior: SnackBarBehavior.floating),
);
}
Future<void> safeRefresh() async {
try {
await refresh();
} catch (e) {
showMessage(_formatError(e));
}
}
final grantsState = grantsAsync.asData?.value;
final grants = grantsState?.grants;
final content = switch (grantsAsync) {
AsyncLoading() when grantsState == null => const _StatePanel(
icon: Icons.hourglass_top,
title: 'Loading grants',
body: 'Pulling grant registry from Arbiter.',
busy: true,
),
AsyncError(:final error) => _StatePanel(
icon: Icons.sync_problem,
title: 'Grant registry unavailable',
body: _formatError(error),
actionLabel: 'Retry',
onAction: safeRefresh,
),
AsyncData(:final value) when value == null => _StatePanel(
icon: Icons.portable_wifi_off,
title: 'No active server connection',
body: 'Reconnect to Arbiter to list EVM grants.',
actionLabel: 'Refresh',
onAction: safeRefresh,
),
_ when grants != null && grants.isEmpty => _StatePanel(
icon: Icons.policy_outlined,
title: 'No grants yet',
body: 'Create a grant to allow SDK clients to sign transactions.',
actionLabel: 'Create grant',
onAction: () => context.router.push(const CreateEvmGrantRoute()),
),
_ => _GrantList(grants: grants ?? const []),
};
return Scaffold(
body: SafeArea(
child: RefreshIndicator.adaptive(
color: Palette.ink,
backgroundColor: Colors.white,
onRefresh: safeRefresh,
child: ListView(
physics: const BouncingScrollPhysics(
parent: AlwaysScrollableScrollPhysics(),
),
padding: EdgeInsets.fromLTRB(2.4.w, 2.4.h, 2.4.w, 3.2.h),
children: [
PageHeader(
title: 'EVM Grants',
isBusy: grantsAsync.isLoading,
actions: [
FilledButton.icon(
onPressed: () =>
context.router.push(const CreateEvmGrantRoute()),
icon: const Icon(Icons.add_rounded),
label: const Text('Create grant'),
),
SizedBox(width: 1.w),
OutlinedButton.icon(
onPressed: safeRefresh,
style: OutlinedButton.styleFrom(
foregroundColor: Palette.ink,
side: BorderSide(color: Palette.line),
padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
horizontal: 1.4.w,
vertical: 1.2.h,
),
shape: RoundedRectangleBorder(
borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(14),
),
),
icon: const Icon(Icons.refresh, size: 18),
label: const Text('Refresh'),
),
],
),
SizedBox(height: 1.8.h),
content,
],
),
),
),
);
}
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
```sh
cd operator && flutter analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/
```
Expected: no issues.
- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
```sh
jj describe -m "feat(grants): add EvmGrantsScreen"
jj new
```
---
## Task 6: Wire router and dashboard tab
**Files:**
- Modify: `operator/lib/router.dart`
- Modify: `operator/lib/screens/dashboard.dart`
- Regenerated: `operator/lib/router.gr.dart`
- [ ] **Step 1: Add route to `router.dart`**
Replace the contents of `operator/lib/router.dart` with:
```dart
import 'package:auto_route/auto_route.dart';
import 'router.gr.dart';
@AutoRouterConfig(generateForDir: ['lib/screens'])
class Router extends RootStackRouter {
@override
List<AutoRoute> get routes => [
AutoRoute(page: Bootstrap.page, path: '/bootstrap', initial: true),
AutoRoute(page: ServerInfoSetupRoute.page, path: '/server-info'),
AutoRoute(page: ServerConnectionRoute.page, path: '/server-connection'),
AutoRoute(page: VaultSetupRoute.page, path: '/vault'),
AutoRoute(page: ClientDetailsRoute.page, path: '/clients/:clientId'),
AutoRoute(page: CreateEvmGrantRoute.page, path: '/evm-grants/create'),
AutoRoute(
page: DashboardRouter.page,
path: '/dashboard',
children: [
AutoRoute(page: EvmRoute.page, path: 'evm'),
AutoRoute(page: ClientsRoute.page, path: 'clients'),
AutoRoute(page: EvmGrantsRoute.page, path: 'grants'),
AutoRoute(page: AboutRoute.page, path: 'about'),
],
),
];
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Update `dashboard.dart`**
In `operator/lib/screens/dashboard.dart`, replace the `routes` constant:
```dart
final routes = [
const EvmRoute(),
const ClientsRoute(),
const EvmGrantsRoute(),
const AboutRoute(),
];
```
And replace the `destinations` list inside `AdaptiveScaffold`:
```dart
destinations: const [
NavigationDestination(
icon: Icon(Icons.account_balance_wallet_outlined),
selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.account_balance_wallet),
label: 'Wallets',
),
NavigationDestination(
icon: Icon(Icons.devices_other_outlined),
selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.devices_other),
label: 'Clients',
),
NavigationDestination(
icon: Icon(Icons.policy_outlined),
selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.policy),
label: 'Grants',
),
NavigationDestination(
icon: Icon(Icons.info_outline),
selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.info),
label: 'About',
),
],
```
- [ ] **Step 3: Regenerate router**
```sh
cd operator && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
```
Expected: `lib/router.gr.dart` updated, `EvmGrantsRoute` now available, no errors.
- [ ] **Step 4: Full project verify**
```sh
cd operator && flutter analyze
```
Expected: no issues.
- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
```sh
jj describe -m "feat(nav): add Grants dashboard tab"
jj new
```

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
# Grant Grid View — Design Spec
**Date:** 2026-03-28
## Overview
Add a "Grants" dashboard tab to the Flutter operator app that displays all EVM grants as a card-based grid. Each card shows a compact summary (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with a revoke action. The tab integrates into the existing `AdaptiveScaffold` navigation alongside Wallets, Clients, and About.
## Scope
- New `walletAccessListProvider` for fetching wallet access entries with their DB row IDs
- New `EvmGrantsScreen` as a dashboard tab
- Grant card widget with enriched display (type, chain, wallet, client)
- Revoke action wired to existing `executeRevokeEvmGrant` mutation
- Dashboard tab bar and router updated
- New token-transfer accent color added to `Palette`
**Out of scope:** Fixing grant creation (separate task).
---
## Data Layer
### `walletAccessListProvider`
**File:** `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
- `@riverpod` class, watches `connectionManagerProvider.future`
- Returns `List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?` (null when not connected)
- Each entry: `.id` (wallet_access_id), `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
- Exposes a `refresh()` method following the same pattern as `EvmGrants.refresh()`
### Enrichment at render time (Approach A)
The `EvmGrantsScreen` watches four providers:
1. `evmGrantsProvider` — the grant list
2. `walletAccessListProvider` — to resolve wallet_access_id → (wallet_id, sdk_client_id)
3. `evmProvider` — to resolve wallet_id → wallet address
4. `sdkClientsProvider` — to resolve sdk_client_id → client name
All lookups are in-memory Maps built inside the build method; no extra model class needed.
Fallbacks:
- Wallet address not found → `"Access #N"` where N is the wallet_access_id
- Client name not found → `"Client #N"` where N is the sdk_client_id
---
## Route Structure
```
/dashboard
/evm ← existing (Wallets tab)
/clients ← existing (Clients tab)
/grants ← NEW (Grants tab)
/about ← existing
/evm-grants/create ← existing push route (unchanged)
```
### Changes to `router.dart`
Add inside dashboard children:
```dart
AutoRoute(page: EvmGrantsRoute.page, path: 'grants'),
```
### Changes to `dashboard.dart`
Add to `routes` list:
```dart
const EvmGrantsRoute()
```
Add `NavigationDestination`:
```dart
NavigationDestination(
icon: Icon(Icons.policy_outlined),
selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.policy),
label: 'Grants',
),
```
---
## Screen: `EvmGrantsScreen`
**File:** `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
```
Scaffold
└─ SafeArea
└─ RefreshIndicator.adaptive (refreshes evmGrantsProvider + walletAccessListProvider)
└─ ListView (BouncingScrollPhysics + AlwaysScrollableScrollPhysics)
├─ PageHeader
│ title: 'EVM Grants'
│ isBusy: evmGrantsProvider.isLoading
│ actions: [CreateGrantButton, RefreshButton]
├─ SizedBox(height: 1.8.h)
└─ <content>
```
### State handling
Matches the pattern from `EvmScreen` and `ClientsScreen`:
| State | Display |
|---|---|
| Loading (no data yet) | `_StatePanel` with spinner, "Loading grants" |
| Error | `_StatePanel` with coral icon, error message, Retry button |
| No connection | `_StatePanel`, "No active server connection" |
| Empty list | `_StatePanel`, "No grants yet", with Create Grant shortcut |
| Data | Column of `_GrantCard` widgets |
### Header actions
**CreateGrantButton:** `FilledButton.icon` with `Icons.add_rounded`, pushes `CreateEvmGrantRoute()` via `context.router.push(...)`.
**RefreshButton:** `OutlinedButton.icon` with `Icons.refresh`, calls `ref.read(evmGrantsProvider.notifier).refresh()`.
---
## Grant Card: `_GrantCard`
**Layout:**
```
Container (rounded 24, Palette.cream bg, Palette.line border)
└─ IntrinsicHeight > Row
├─ Accent strip (0.8.w wide, full height, rounded left)
└─ Padding > Column
├─ Row 1: TypeBadge + ChainChip + Spacer + RevokeButton
└─ Row 2: WalletText + "·" + ClientText
```
**Accent color by grant type:**
- Ether transfer → `Palette.coral`
- Token transfer → `Palette.token` (new entry in `Palette` — indigo, e.g. `Color(0xFF5C6BC0)`)
**TypeBadge:** Small pill container with accent color background at 15% opacity, accent-colored text. Label: `'Ether'` or `'Token'`.
**ChainChip:** Small container: `'Chain ${grant.shared.chainId}'`, muted ink color.
**WalletText:** Short hex address (`0xabc...def`) from wallet lookup, `bodySmall`, monospace font family.
**ClientText:** Client name from `sdkClientsProvider` lookup, or fallback string. `bodySmall`, muted ink.
**RevokeButton:**
- `OutlinedButton` with `Icons.block_rounded` icon, label `'Revoke'`
- `foregroundColor: Palette.coral`, `side: BorderSide(color: Palette.coral.withValues(alpha: 0.4))`
- Disabled (replaced with `CircularProgressIndicator`) while `revokeEvmGrantMutation` is pending — note: this is a single global mutation, so all revoke buttons disable while any revoke is in flight
- On press: calls `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: grant.id)`; shows `SnackBar` on error
---
## Adaptive Sizing
All sizing uses `sizer` units (`1.h`, `1.w`, etc.). No hardcoded pixel values.
---
## Files to Create / Modify
| File | Action |
|---|---|
| `lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify — add `Palette.token` color |
| `lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create |
| `lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create |
| `lib/router.dart` | Modify — add grants route to dashboard children |
| `lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify — add tab to routes list and NavigationDestinations |

View File

@@ -152,8 +152,5 @@ url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20
provenance = "github-attestations"
[[tools.rust]]
version = "1.98.1"
version = "1.95.0"
backend = "core:rust"
[tools.rust.options]
components = "clippy,rust-analyzer"

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
"cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
flutter = "3.41.7-stable"
protoc = "29.6"
rust = { version = "latest", components = "clippy,rust-analyzer" }
rust = { version = "1.95.0", components = "clippy,rust-analyzer" }
"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.12.0"
"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.133"
"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"

View File

@@ -4,28 +4,25 @@ package arbiter.operator;
import "operator/auth.proto";
import "operator/evm.proto";
import "operator/governance.proto";
import "operator/sdk_client.proto";
import "operator/vault/vault.proto";
message OperatorRequest {
int32 id = 16;
oneof payload {
auth.Request auth = 1;
vault.Request vault = 2;
evm.Request evm = 3;
sdk_client.Request sdk_client = 4;
governance.Request governance = 5;
auth.Request auth = 1;
vault.Request vault = 2;
evm.Request evm = 3;
sdk_client.Request sdk_client = 4;
}
}
message OperatorResponse {
optional int32 id = 16;
oneof payload {
auth.Response auth = 1;
vault.Response vault = 2;
evm.Response evm = 3;
sdk_client.Response sdk_client = 4;
governance.Response governance = 5;
auth.Response auth = 1;
vault.Response vault = 2;
evm.Response evm = 3;
sdk_client.Response sdk_client = 4;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.operator.governance;
message Request {
oneof payload {
CreateProposalRequest create = 1;
CastVoteRequest vote = 2;
QueryPendingRequest query = 3;
}
}
message CreateProposalRequest {
oneof kind {
ApproveSdkClientPayload approve_sdk_client = 1;
GrantWalletAccessPayload grant_wallet_access = 3;
ApproveServerUpdatePayload approve_server_update = 4;
ReplaceOperatorPayload replace_operator = 5;
UpdateShamirParametersPayload update_shamir_parameters = 6;
ApprovePersistentGrantPayload approve_persistent_grant = 7;
ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload approve_one_off_transaction = 8;
}
optional uint32 ttl_secs = 2;
}
message ReplaceOperatorPayload {
int32 old_operator_id = 1;
bytes new_pubkey = 2;
}
message UpdateShamirParametersPayload {
uint32 new_n = 1;
}
message ApproveServerUpdatePayload {}
message ApproveSdkClientPayload {
int32 client_id = 1;
}
message GrantWalletAccessPayload {
int32 wallet_id = 1;
int32 client_id = 2;
}
message CastVoteRequest {
int32 proposal_id = 1;
bool approve = 2;
bytes signature = 3;
}
message QueryPendingRequest {}
message Response {
oneof payload {
CreateProposalResponse created = 1;
VoteResponse voted = 2;
QueryPendingResponse pending = 3;
}
}
message CreateProposalResponse {
int32 proposal_id = 1;
}
message VoteResponse {
VoteOutcome outcome = 1;
}
enum VoteOutcome {
VOTE_OUTCOME_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
VOTE_OUTCOME_PENDING = 1;
VOTE_OUTCOME_APPROVED = 2;
VOTE_OUTCOME_REJECTED = 3;
}
message ProposalSummary {
int32 id = 1;
string kind = 2;
int32 initiator_id = 3;
int64 expires_at = 4;
int64 approve_count = 5;
int64 reject_count = 6;
}
message QueryPendingResponse {
repeated ProposalSummary proposals = 1;
}
message TransactionRateLimitProto {
uint32 count = 1;
int64 window_secs = 2;
}
message VolumeLimitProto {
bytes max_volume = 1;
int64 window_secs = 2;
}
message EtherTransferSpecProto {
repeated bytes targets = 1;
VolumeLimitProto limit = 2;
}
message TokenTransferSpecProto {
bytes token_contract = 1;
optional bytes target = 2;
repeated VolumeLimitProto volume_limits = 3;
}
message ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload {
int32 client_id = 1;
bytes wallet_address = 2;
uint64 chain_id = 3;
uint64 nonce = 4;
uint64 gas_limit = 5;
bytes max_fee_per_gas = 6;
bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 7;
bytes to = 8;
bytes value = 9;
bytes input = 10;
}
message ApprovePersistentGrantPayload {
int32 wallet_access_id = 1;
uint64 chain_id = 2;
optional int64 valid_from_secs = 3;
optional int64 valid_until_secs = 4;
optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 5;
optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6;
optional TransactionRateLimitProto rate_limit = 7;
oneof specific {
EtherTransferSpecProto ether_transfer = 8;
TokenTransferSpecProto token_transfer = 9;
}
}

View File

@@ -9,19 +9,13 @@ message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
}
message DeclareCommittee {
uint32 count = 1;
uint32 recovery_count = 2;
uint32 count = 1;
}
message ContributePassphrase {
bytes passphrase = 1;
}
message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
bytes passphrase = 2;
}
enum BootstrapResult {
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
@@ -32,10 +26,9 @@ enum BootstrapResult {
message Request {
oneof payload {
BootstrapEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
DeclareCommittee declare_committee = 3;
ContributePassphrase contribute_passphrase = 4;
ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase = 5;
BootstrapEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
DeclareCommittee declare_committee = 3;
ContributePassphrase contribute_passphrase = 4;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.operator.vault.rekey;
message ContributePassphrase {
bytes passphrase = 1;
}
message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
bytes passphrase = 2;
}
enum RekeyResult {
REKEY_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
REKEY_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
REKEY_RESULT_AWAITING_CONTRIBUTIONS = 2;
REKEY_RESULT_NOT_IN_PROGRESS = 3;
}
message Request {
oneof payload {
ContributePassphrase contribute_passphrase = 1;
ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase = 2;
}
}
message Response {
RekeyResult result = 1;
}

View File

@@ -19,11 +19,6 @@ message ContributePassphrase {
bytes passphrase = 1;
}
message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
bytes passphrase = 2;
}
enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
@@ -34,10 +29,9 @@ enum UnsealResult {
message Request {
oneof payload {
UnsealStart start = 1;
UnsealEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
ContributePassphrase contribute_passphrase = 3;
ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase = 4;
UnsealStart start = 1;
UnsealEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
ContributePassphrase contribute_passphrase = 3;
}
}

View File

@@ -5,23 +5,20 @@ package arbiter.operator.vault;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
import "shared/vault.proto";
import "operator/vault/bootstrap.proto";
import "operator/vault/rekey.proto";
import "operator/vault/unseal.proto";
message Request {
oneof payload {
google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
unseal.Request unseal = 2;
bootstrap.Request bootstrap = 3;
rekey.Request rekey = 4;
unseal.Request unseal = 2;
bootstrap.Request bootstrap = 3;
}
}
message Response {
oneof payload {
arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
unseal.Response unseal = 2;
bootstrap.Response bootstrap = 3;
rekey.Response rekey = 4;
arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
unseal.Response unseal = 2;
bootstrap.Response bootstrap = 3;
}
}

Binary file not shown.

323
server/Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"auto_impl",
"either",
"elliptic-curve 0.13.8",
"elliptic-curve",
"k256",
"thiserror",
]
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ dependencies = [
"proptest",
"prost-types",
"rand 0.10.1",
"rand_core 0.10.1",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"rcgen",
"restructed",
"rstest",
@@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ dependencies = [
"ark-serialize 0.3.0",
"ark-std 0.3.0",
"derivative",
"num-bigint 0.4.6",
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"paste",
"rustc_version 0.3.3",
@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ dependencies = [
"derivative",
"digest 0.10.7",
"itertools 0.10.5",
"num-bigint 0.4.6",
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"paste",
"rustc_version 0.4.1",
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ dependencies = [
"digest 0.10.7",
"educe",
"itertools 0.13.0",
"num-bigint 0.4.6",
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"paste",
"zeroize",
@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ version = "0.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "db2fd794a08ccb318058009eefdf15bcaaaaf6f8161eb3345f907222bac38b20"
dependencies = [
"num-bigint 0.4.6",
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"quote",
"syn 1.0.109",
@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ version = "0.4.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7abe79b0e4288889c4574159ab790824d0033b9fdcb2a112a3182fac2e514565"
dependencies = [
"num-bigint 0.4.6",
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ version = "0.5.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "09be120733ee33f7693ceaa202ca41accd5653b779563608f1234f78ae07c4b3"
dependencies = [
"num-bigint 0.4.6",
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ checksum = "adb7b85a02b83d2f22f89bd5cac66c9c89474240cb6207cb1efc16d098e822a5"
dependencies = [
"ark-std 0.4.0",
"digest 0.10.7",
"num-bigint 0.4.6",
"num-bigint",
]
[[package]]
@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ dependencies = [
"ark-std 0.5.0",
"arrayvec",
"digest 0.10.7",
"num-bigint 0.4.6",
"num-bigint",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1197,12 +1197,6 @@ version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4c7f02d4ea65f2c1853089ffd8d2787bdbc63de2f0d29dedbcf8ccdfa0ccd4cf"
[[package]]
name = "base16ct"
version = "1.0.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "fd307490d624467aa6f74b0eabb77633d1f758a7b25f12bceb0b22e08d9726f6"
[[package]]
name = "base64"
version = "0.22.1"
@@ -1560,12 +1554,6 @@ version = "0.8.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "773648b94d0e5d620f64f280777445740e61fe701025087ec8b57f45c791888b"
[[package]]
name = "cpubits"
version = "0.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "15b85f9c39137c3a891689859392b1bd49812121d0d61c9caf00d46ed5ce06ae"
[[package]]
name = "cpufeatures"
version = "0.2.17"
@@ -1628,22 +1616,20 @@ checksum = "0dc92fb57ca44df6db8059111ab3af99a63d5d0f8375d9972e319a379c6bab76"
dependencies = [
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"serdect 0.2.0",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "crypto-bigint"
version = "0.7.5"
version = "0.6.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1a52aa3fcda4e6302a9f48734f234d35d4721b96f8fe07d073f07ce9df4f0271"
checksum = "96272c2ff28b807e09250b180ad1fb7889a3258f7455759b5c3c58b719467130"
dependencies = [
"cpubits",
"ctutils",
"hybrid-array",
"num-traits",
"rand_core 0.10.1",
"serdect 0.4.3",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"serdect 0.3.0",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
@@ -1676,7 +1662,6 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7d5515a3834141de9eafb9717ad39eea8247b5674e6066c404e8c4b365d2a29e"
dependencies = [
"cmov",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1839,7 +1824,7 @@ dependencies = [
"asn1-rs",
"displaydoc",
"nom",
"num-bigint 0.4.6",
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"rusticata-macros",
]
@@ -2036,7 +2021,7 @@ checksum = "ee27f32b5c5292967d2d4a9d7f1e0b0aed2c15daded5a60300e4abb9d8020bca"
dependencies = [
"der 0.7.10",
"digest 0.10.7",
"elliptic-curve 0.13.8",
"elliptic-curve",
"rfc6979",
"serdect 0.2.0",
"signature 2.2.0",
@@ -2070,50 +2055,34 @@ version = "0.13.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b5e6043086bf7973472e0c7dff2142ea0b680d30e18d9cc40f267efbf222bd47"
dependencies = [
"base16ct 0.2.0",
"base16ct",
"crypto-bigint 0.5.5",
"digest 0.10.7",
"ff 0.13.1",
"ff",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"group 0.13.0",
"group",
"hkdf",
"pkcs8 0.10.2",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"sec1 0.7.3",
"sec1",
"serdect 0.2.0",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "elliptic-curve"
version = "0.14.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9d65aa39b3a5c1c9c1b745c9a019234bb7a21b77abcb4f4d266d706e2d577d65"
dependencies = [
"base16ct 1.0.0",
"crypto-bigint 0.7.5",
"crypto-common 0.2.1",
"ff 0.14.0",
"group 0.14.0",
"hybrid-array",
"pkcs8 0.11.0",
"rand_core 0.10.1",
"sec1 0.8.1",
"serdect 0.4.3",
"subtle",
"tap",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "elliptic-curve-tools"
version = "0.3.0"
version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7a0d5e534f103b079a71ef1d66c6e62c89413f1b62709ca11f744429b4afe5b4"
checksum = "1de2b6fae800f08032a6ea32995b52925b1d451bff9d445c8ab2932323277faf"
dependencies = [
"elliptic-curve 0.14.1",
"elliptic-curve",
"heapless",
"hex",
"multiexp",
"serde",
"serdect 0.4.3",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
@@ -2186,20 +2155,11 @@ version = "0.13.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c0b50bfb653653f9ca9095b427bed08ab8d75a137839d9ad64eb11810d5b6393"
dependencies = [
"bitvec",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "ff"
version = "0.14.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a1f686ab92a9fb0eaf188f6c6c87b89490baa6fdb0db4544ba4dc47f7942489f"
dependencies = [
"rand_core 0.10.1",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "fiat-crypto"
version = "0.2.9"
@@ -2398,9 +2358,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "generic-array"
version = "1.4.2"
version = "1.4.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "fb130435a959a8d525e6bca66ff6c40981a300ee96d70e3ef56f046556d614a3"
checksum = "dab9e9188e97a93276e1fe7b56401b851e2b45a46d045ca658100c1303ada649"
dependencies = [
"rustversion",
"serde_core",
@@ -2466,22 +2426,11 @@ version = "0.13.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f0f9ef7462f7c099f518d754361858f86d8a07af53ba9af0fe635bbccb151a63"
dependencies = [
"ff 0.13.1",
"ff",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "group"
version = "0.14.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7fd1a1c7a5206c5b7a3f5a0d7ccd3ff85d0c8f5133d62a02680255b0004af5f4"
dependencies = [
"ff 0.14.0",
"rand_core 0.10.1",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "h2"
version = "0.4.13"
@@ -2552,9 +2501,9 @@ checksum = "4f467dd6dccf739c208452f8014c75c18bb8301b050ad1cfb27153803edb0f51"
[[package]]
name = "heapless"
version = "0.9.3"
version = "0.8.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "25ba4bd83f9415b58b4ed8dc5714c76e626a105be4646c02630ad730ad3b5aa4"
checksum = "0bfb9eb618601c89945a70e254898da93b13be0388091d42117462b265bb3fad"
dependencies = [
"hash32",
"stable_deref_trait",
@@ -2587,6 +2536,15 @@ dependencies = [
"arrayvec",
]
[[package]]
name = "hkdf"
version = "0.12.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7b5f8eb2ad728638ea2c7d47a21db23b7b58a72ed6a38256b8a1849f15fbbdf7"
dependencies = [
"hmac 0.12.1",
]
[[package]]
name = "hmac"
version = "0.12.1"
@@ -2652,13 +2610,12 @@ checksum = "df3b46402a9d5adb4c86a0cf463f42e19994e3ee891101b1841f30a545cb49a9"
[[package]]
name = "hybrid-array"
version = "0.4.15"
version = "0.4.11"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "27f864f10dfb56725ce5ce5472bc52252c8f93a4ab86327122cebf62c5f59a17"
checksum = "08d46837a0ed51fe95bd3b05de33cd64a1ee88fc797477ca48446872504507c5"
dependencies = [
"ctutils",
"serde",
"subtle",
"typenum",
"zeroize",
]
@@ -3061,7 +3018,7 @@ checksum = "f6e3919bbaa2945715f0bb6d3934a173d1e9a59ac23767fbaaef277265a7411b"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
"ecdsa",
"elliptic-curve 0.13.8",
"elliptic-curve",
"once_cell",
"serdect 0.2.0",
"sha2 0.10.9",
@@ -3070,8 +3027,8 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "kameo"
version = "0.22.2"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=3bbebac#3bbebac9f2a943be75588d80826e6bea45079d5f"
version = "0.20.0"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=3e18ba2#3e18ba24023d0422034e60ff2ea1ecd49e8c3c93"
dependencies = [
"downcast-rs",
"dyn-clone",
@@ -3084,8 +3041,8 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "kameo_actors"
version = "0.8.1"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=3bbebac#3bbebac9f2a943be75588d80826e6bea45079d5f"
version = "0.5.0"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=3e18ba2#3e18ba24023d0422034e60ff2ea1ecd49e8c3c93"
dependencies = [
"futures",
"glob",
@@ -3096,13 +3053,13 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "kameo_macros"
version = "0.21.1"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=3bbebac#3bbebac9f2a943be75588d80826e6bea45079d5f"
version = "0.20.0"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=3e18ba2#3e18ba24023d0422034e60ff2ea1ecd49e8c3c93"
dependencies = [
"heck",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 3.0.5",
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
@@ -3405,6 +3362,20 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "multiexp"
version = "0.4.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7ec2ce93a6f06ac6cae04c1da3f2a6a24fcfc1f0eb0b4e0f3d302f0df45326cb"
dependencies = [
"ff",
"group",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"rustversion",
"std-shims",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "multimap"
version = "0.10.1"
@@ -3436,6 +3407,20 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "num"
version = "0.4.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "35bd024e8b2ff75562e5f34e7f4905839deb4b22955ef5e73d2fea1b9813cb23"
dependencies = [
"num-bigint",
"num-complex",
"num-integer",
"num-iter",
"num-rational",
"num-traits",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-bigint"
version = "0.4.6"
@@ -3444,16 +3429,18 @@ checksum = "a5e44f723f1133c9deac646763579fdb3ac745e418f2a7af9cd0c431da1f20b9"
dependencies = [
"num-integer",
"num-traits",
"rand 0.8.6",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-bigint"
version = "0.5.1"
name = "num-complex"
version = "0.4.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "93e7820bc0a80a0238e650327316f929ba18d5be054b647490a3a6a339f3e7c0"
checksum = "73f88a1307638156682bada9d7604135552957b7818057dcef22705b4d509495"
dependencies = [
"num-integer",
"num-traits",
"rand 0.8.6",
"serde",
]
@@ -3472,6 +3459,29 @@ dependencies = [
"num-traits",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-iter"
version = "0.1.45"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1429034a0490724d0075ebb2bc9e875d6503c3cf69e235a8941aa757d83ef5bf"
dependencies = [
"autocfg",
"num-integer",
"num-traits",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-rational"
version = "0.4.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f83d14da390562dca69fc84082e73e548e1ad308d24accdedd2720017cb37824"
dependencies = [
"num-bigint",
"num-integer",
"num-traits",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-traits"
version = "0.2.19"
@@ -4351,7 +4361,7 @@ dependencies = [
"bytes",
"fastrlp 0.3.1",
"fastrlp 0.4.0",
"num-bigint 0.4.6",
"num-bigint",
"num-integer",
"num-traits",
"parity-scale-codec",
@@ -4578,7 +4588,7 @@ version = "0.7.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d3e97a565f76233a6003f9f5c54be1d9c5bdfa3eccfb189469f11ec4901c47dc"
dependencies = [
"base16ct 0.2.0",
"base16ct",
"der 0.7.10",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"pkcs8 0.10.2",
@@ -4587,21 +4597,6 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "sec1"
version = "0.8.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d56d437c2f19203ce5f7122e507831de96f3d2d4d3be5af44a0b0a09d8a80e4d"
dependencies = [
"base16ct 1.0.0",
"ctutils",
"der 0.8.0",
"hybrid-array",
"serdect 0.4.3",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "secp256k1"
version = "0.30.0"
@@ -4759,17 +4754,17 @@ version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a84f14a19e9a014bb9f4512488d9829a68e04ecabffb0f9904cd1ace94598177"
dependencies = [
"base16ct 0.2.0",
"base16ct",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "serdect"
version = "0.4.3"
version = "0.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "66cf8fedced2fcf12406bcb34223dffb92eaf34908ede12fed414c82b7f00b3e"
checksum = "f42f67da2385b51a5f9652db9c93d78aeaf7610bf5ec366080b6de810604af53"
dependencies = [
"base16ct 1.0.0",
"base16ct",
"serde",
]
@@ -4815,17 +4810,6 @@ dependencies = [
"keccak 0.2.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "sha3"
version = "0.12.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "bc9bad02c26382724b2d2692c6f179285e4b54eeecd7968f52a50059c3c11759"
dependencies = [
"digest 0.11.2",
"keccak 0.2.0",
"sponge-cursor",
]
[[package]]
name = "sha3-asm"
version = "0.1.6"
@@ -4836,17 +4820,6 @@ dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
]
[[package]]
name = "shake"
version = "0.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "09057cb2149ad4cbd2da1e26b351f9a4c354219421229c69c3063e6f61947c4a"
dependencies = [
"digest 0.11.2",
"keccak 0.2.0",
"sponge-cursor",
]
[[package]]
name = "sharded-slab"
version = "0.1.7"
@@ -4960,6 +4933,12 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "spin"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d5fe4ccb98d9c292d56fec89a5e07da7fc4cf0dc11e156b41793132775d3e591"
[[package]]
name = "spki"
version = "0.7.3"
@@ -4980,12 +4959,6 @@ dependencies = [
"der 0.8.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "sponge-cursor"
version = "0.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3a0219bd7d979d58245a4f41f695e1ac9f8befdffadd7f61f1bae9e39abc6620"
[[package]]
name = "sqlite-wasm-rs"
version = "0.5.3"
@@ -5010,6 +4983,17 @@ version = "1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a2eb9349b6444b326872e140eb1cf5e7c522154d69e7a0ffb0fb81c06b37543f"
[[package]]
name = "std-shims"
version = "0.1.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "227c4f8561598188d0df96dbe749824576174bba278b5b6bb2eacff1066067d0"
dependencies = [
"hashbrown 0.16.1",
"rustversion",
"spin",
]
[[package]]
name = "string_morph"
version = "0.1.0"
@@ -5113,17 +5097,6 @@ dependencies = [
"unicode-ident",
]
[[package]]
name = "syn"
version = "3.0.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "12df2e0110f65b775f769bb17ef989067a1d931b2eb822bd4346631eeada89f9"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"unicode-ident",
]
[[package]]
name = "syn-solidity"
version = "1.5.7"
@@ -5766,23 +5739,21 @@ checksum = "0b928f33d975fc6ad9f86c8f283853ad26bdd5b10b7f1542aa2fa15e2289105a"
[[package]]
name = "vsss-rs"
version = "6.0.1"
version = "5.4.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d6bfc736cfd88115aedb95ba84bc2d428fe351e92a56f69fce090af301402d91"
checksum = "6ec751bdcc8bda099e269b24cc6b4ad14f9ce8b0490c1599174070e792ecd70c"
dependencies = [
"crypto-bigint 0.7.5",
"elliptic-curve 0.14.1",
"crypto-bigint 0.5.5",
"crypto-bigint 0.6.1",
"elliptic-curve",
"elliptic-curve-tools",
"ff 0.14.0",
"generic-array 1.4.2",
"generic-array 1.4.1",
"hex",
"hybrid-array",
"num-bigint 0.5.1",
"num-traits",
"rand_core 0.10.1",
"num",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"serde",
"sha3 0.12.0",
"shake",
"sha3 0.10.9",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
@@ -6474,18 +6445,18 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "zeroize"
version = "1.9.0"
version = "1.8.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e13c156562582aa81c60cb29407084cdb54c4164760106ab78e6c5b0858cf64e"
checksum = "b97154e67e32c85465826e8bcc1c59429aaaf107c1e4a9e53c8d8ccd5eff88d0"
dependencies = [
"zeroize_derive",
]
[[package]]
name = "zeroize_derive"
version = "1.5.0"
version = "1.4.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3c50655cbb0fe3fc43170059e702f1ce5e19b84cec58dc87b037a09935c2f328"
checksum = "85a5b4158499876c763cb03bc4e49185d3cccbabb15b33c627f7884f43db852e"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",

View File

@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ base64 = "0.22.1"
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
futures = "0.3.32"
k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "3bbebac"}
kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "3bbebac"}
kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "3e18ba2"}
kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "3e18ba2"}
hmac = "0.13.0"
miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.9", features = ["zeroize"] }
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ mutants = "0.0.4"
prost = "0.14.3"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
rand = "0.10.1"
rand_core = "0.10.1"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs", "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false }
rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls = { version = "0.23.40", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
@@ -77,8 +76,6 @@ needless_pass_by_ref_mut = "allow"
pub_underscore_fields = "allow"
redundant_pub_crate = "allow"
uninhabited_references = "allow" # safe with unsafe_code = "forbid" and standard uninhabited pattern (match *self {})
too-many-lines = "allow" # this is a very common pattern in server code, and it's not always possible to break it down into smaller modules without hurting readability
unused_async_trait_impl = "allow" # too pedantic
# restriction lints
alloc_instead_of_core = "warn"
@@ -109,7 +106,6 @@ indexing_slicing = "warn"
infinite_loop = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_att_syntax = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_intel_syntax = "warn"
integer_division = "warn"
large_include_file = "warn"
lossy_float_literal = "warn"
map_with_unused_argument_over_ranges = "warn"

View File

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
key: &SigningKey,
challenge: AuthChallenge,
) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos.cast_signed());
let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos as i64);
let challenge = authn::AuthChallenge {
nonce: *challenge
.random

View File

@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "false positive")]
pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, ArbiterClientError> {
todo!("fetch EVM wallet list from server")
}

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_>;
fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_>;
fn new_inline<F>(f: F) -> Self
fn new_inline_default<F>(f: F) -> Self
where
Self: Sized,
T: Default,
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
cell
}
fn new_inline<F>(f: Box<F>) -> Self
where
Self: Sized,
F: for<'a> FnOnce() -> T,
{
Self::new(f())
}
#[inline(always)]
fn read_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
where

View File

@@ -23,10 +23,6 @@ pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.evm");
}
pub mod governance {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.governance");
}
pub mod sdk_client {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.sdk_client");
}
@@ -38,10 +34,6 @@ pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap");
}
pub mod rekey {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.rekey");
}
pub mod unseal {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.unseal");
}

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.2", features = ["sqlite"] }
async-trait.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
rand_core.workspace = true
rcgen.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
kameo.workspace = true
@@ -51,7 +50,8 @@ subtle = "2.6.1"
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
k256.workspace = true
kameo_actors.workspace = true
vsss-rs = "6.0.1"
vsss-rs = "5.4.0"
rand_core = "0.6"
[dev-dependencies]
proptest = "1.11.0"

View File

@@ -37,8 +37,7 @@ create table if not exists tls_history (
create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1
root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT,
shamir_threshold integer
tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT
) STRICT;
insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
@@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ create table if not exists operator (
share blob not null,
share_nonce blob not null,
share_salt blob not null,
share_salt blob not null default (randomblob(32)),
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))

View File

@@ -1,164 +1,98 @@
use crate::{
actors::vault::events,
db::{self, schema},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::ActorRef,
messages,
prelude::{Context, Message},
};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Register};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, rngs::SysRng};
use rand_core::UnwrapErr;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
use tracing::warn;
use thiserror::Error;
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
async fn write_token_file(path: &Path, content: &str) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(parent).await?;
}
tokio::fs::write(path, content.as_bytes()).await?;
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
tokio::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).await?;
}
Ok(())
pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
let token = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
String::default(),
|mut accum, char| {
accum += char.to_string().as_str();
accum
},
);
tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
Ok(token)
}
async fn remove_token_file(path: &Path) {
match tokio::fs::remove_file(path).await {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {}
Err(error) => warn!(?error, ?path, "Failed to remove bootstrap token file"),
}
}
async fn generate_token(path: &Path) -> Result<SafeCell<[u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]>, std::io::Error> {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new([0u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]);
{
let mut buf = cell.write();
for (slot, byte) in buf
.iter_mut()
.zip(UnwrapErr(SysRng).sample_iter(Alphanumeric))
{
*slot = byte;
}
}
let token = cell.read_inline(|buf| String::from_utf8_lossy(buf.as_ref()).into_owned());
write_token_file(path, &token).await?;
Ok(cell)
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("I/O error: {0}")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
/// Custodian of the one-time bootstrap token.
///
/// The token authorises registering operator identities before the vault
/// exists. A Shamir committee needs every member registered before it can be
/// declared, so the token stays valid across several registrations and is
/// retired by the `Bootstrapped` event rather than by first use, whichever
/// bootstrap path fired it.
///
/// Every daemon start mints a fresh token and overwrites the file: a token
/// handed out by an earlier run is dead.
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct Bootstrapper {
token: Option<SafeCell<[u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]>>,
token_path: Option<PathBuf>,
events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
impl Actor for Bootstrapper {
type Args = Self;
type Error = std::convert::Infallible;
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let _ = args
.events
.tell(Register(actor_ref.recipient::<events::Bootstrapped>()))
.await;
Ok(args)
}
token: Option<String>,
}
impl Bootstrapper {
pub async fn new(db: &db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let path = home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH);
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let row_count: i64 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let bootstrapped = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.select(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
.first::<Option<i32>>(&mut conn)
.await?
.is_some();
if bootstrapped {
// A token file can outlive the bootstrap that made it obsolete:
// the daemon may have been killed before the event was handled.
remove_token_file(&path).await;
return Ok(Self {
token: None,
token_path: None,
events,
});
}
schema::operator::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?
};
Ok(Self {
token: Some(generate_token(&path).await?),
token_path: Some(path),
events,
})
}
let token = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?;
Some(token)
} else {
None
};
async fn forget(&mut self) {
self.token = None;
if let Some(path) = self.token_path.take() {
remove_token_file(&path).await;
}
Ok(Self { token })
}
}
impl Message<events::Bootstrapped> for Bootstrapper {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_: events::Bootstrapped,
_ctx: &mut Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
self.forget().await;
}
}
#[messages]
impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn verify_token(&mut self, token: Vec<u8>) -> bool {
self.token.as_mut().is_some_and(|expected| {
expected.read_inline(|bytes| bool::from(bytes.as_ref().ct_eq(token.as_slice())))
pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| {
let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
bool::from(choice)
})
}
#[message]
pub fn get_token(&mut self) -> Option<String> {
self.token
.as_mut()
.map(|cell| cell.read_inline(|buf| String::from_utf8_lossy(buf.as_ref()).into_owned()))
pub fn consume_token(&mut self, token: String) -> bool {
if self.is_correct_token(token) {
self.token = None;
true
} else {
false
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
self.token.clone()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
use crate::{
actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
crypto::integrity::{self, Integrable},
crypto::integrity,
db::{
DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
models::{self, EvmWalletId},
@@ -25,35 +25,14 @@ use diesel::{
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use tracing::error;
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
/// Integrity guard that binds a wallet's encrypted key ID to its Ethereum address.
/// Both fields are included in the HMAC — swapping `aead_encrypted_id` in the DB
/// invalidates the envelope MAC, and the AEAD ciphertext is also bound to `address`
/// as AAD, so decryption fails too.
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
struct EvmWalletIntegrity {
aead_encrypted_id: i32,
address: Address,
}
impl Integrable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
const KIND: &'static str = "evm_wallet";
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Wallet not found")]
WalletNotFound,
#[error("Decrypted key does not match requested wallet address")]
KeyAddressMismatch,
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
@@ -85,12 +64,6 @@ pub enum Error {
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
Self::Database(DatabaseError::from(e))
}
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct EvmActor {
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
@@ -124,39 +97,20 @@ impl EvmActor {
let aead_id: i32 = self
.vault
.ask(CreateNew {
plaintext,
aad: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
})
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet_id = conn
.exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
let wallet_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
})
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)
.map_err(Error::Database)?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&self.vault,
&EvmWalletIntegrity { address, aead_encrypted_id: aead_id },
wallet_id,
)
.await
.map_err(Error::Integrity)?;
Ok::<i32, Error>(wallet_id)
let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
})
.await?;
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok((wallet_id, address))
}
@@ -206,14 +160,23 @@ impl EvmActor {
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(
&mut self,
grant_id: i32,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.engine
.revoke_grant(grant_id)
pub async fn operator_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let affected = diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
.set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(Error::from)
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
if affected == 0 {
return Err(Error::Database(DatabaseError::from(
diesel::result::Error::NotFound,
)));
}
Ok(())
}
#[message]
@@ -287,51 +250,16 @@ impl EvmActor {
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
drop(conn);
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let attestation = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut conn,
&self.vault,
&EvmWalletIntegrity {
address: wallet_address,
aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
},
wallet.id.to_raw(),
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, ?wallet.id, "EVM wallet integrity check failed");
SignTransactionError::Internal
})?;
drop(conn);
if attestation != integrity::AttestationStatus::Attested {
error!(
?wallet.id,
"EVM wallet integrity unavailable; refusing to sign"
);
return Err(SignTransactionError::Internal);
}
let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
.vault
.ask(Decrypt {
aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
aad: wallet.address.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
if signer.address() != wallet_address {
error!(
expected = %wallet_address,
actual = %signer.address(),
"Decrypted private key address does not match requested wallet"
);
return Err(SignTransactionError::KeyAddressMismatch);
}
self.engine
.evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.await?;

View File

@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ use kameo::{
prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::ReplySender,
};
use std::{ops::ControlFlow, time::Duration};
const APPROVAL_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
use std::ops::ControlFlow;
pub struct Args {
pub client: ClientProfile,
@@ -66,14 +64,6 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
.await;
}
let weak = actor_ref.downgrade();
tokio::spawn(async move {
tokio::time::sleep(APPROVAL_TIMEOUT).await;
if let Some(r) = weak.upgrade() {
let _ = r.tell(OnApprovalTimeout {}).await;
}
});
Ok(this)
}
@@ -114,14 +104,4 @@ impl ClientApprovalController {
ctx.stop();
}
}
/// Fired after `APPROVAL_TIMEOUT` elapses. Any operator that hasn't responded
/// by then is treated as a denial to prevent zombie sessions from blocking the flow.
#[message(ctx)]
pub fn on_approval_timeout(&mut self, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
if self.pending > 0 {
self.send_reply(Ok(false));
ctx.stop();
}
}
}

View File

@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ pub mod client_connect_approval;
pub struct FlowCoordinator {
pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
/// Maps DB `client_id` → `ActorId` for fast connected-client lookup.
client_ids: HashMap<i32, ActorId>,
operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
}
@@ -29,7 +27,6 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
pub fn new(operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>) -> Self {
Self {
clients: HashMap::default(),
client_ids: HashMap::default(),
operator_registry,
}
}
@@ -51,7 +48,6 @@ impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
self.client_ids.retain(|_, actor_id| *actor_id != id);
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
@@ -79,28 +75,14 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_client(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), client_id, actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.client_ids.insert(client_id, actor.id());
self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message]
pub fn is_client_connected(&self, client_id: i32) -> bool {
self.client_ids.contains_key(&client_id)
}
/// Returns the DB `client_ids` of all currently connected SDK clients.
/// Used by operator sessions on startup to seed their approved-client set.
#[message]
pub fn get_connected_client_ids(&self) -> Vec<i32> {
self.client_ids.keys().copied().collect()
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn request_client_approval(
&mut self,

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
operator_registry::OperatorRegistry, vault::Vault, vault_coordinator::VaultCoordinator,
operator_registry::OperatorRegistry, vault::Vault,
vault_coordinator::VaultCoordinator,
},
db,
};
@@ -21,17 +22,17 @@ pub mod vault_coordinator;
pub enum SpawnError {
#[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn Vault actor")]
Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn VaultCoordinator actor")]
VaultCoordinator(#[from] vault_coordinator::Error),
}
/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct GlobalActors {
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub vault_coordinator: ActorRef<VaultCoordinator>,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
pub vault_coordinator: ActorRef<VaultCoordinator>,
pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
pub operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
@@ -44,22 +45,22 @@ impl GlobalActors {
}
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let events = Self::spawn_message_bus();
let vault = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), events.clone()).await?);
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db, events.clone()).await?);
let vault_coordinator =
VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault.clone()));
let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
let operator_registry = OperatorRegistry::spawn(OperatorRegistry::default());
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper,
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(vault.clone(), db.clone())),
vault,
vault_coordinator,
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db.clone())),
vault_coordinator: VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(
db,
key_holder.clone(),
)),
vault: key_holder,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::new(
operator_registry.clone(),
)),
operator_registry,
events,
events: message_bus,
})
}
}

View File

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ impl Actor for OperatorRegistry {
type Error = Infallible;
fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> impl Future<Output = Result<Self, Self::Error>> {
std::future::ready(Ok(args))
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(args)
}
async fn on_link_died(

View File

@@ -6,12 +6,10 @@ use crate::{
},
db::{
self,
custody::CustodyRecord,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory, RootKeyHistoryId},
schema::{self},
schema,
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use chrono::Utc;
@@ -24,7 +22,7 @@ use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use tracing::{error, info};
pub mod events {
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
@@ -47,8 +45,6 @@ pub enum Error {
Sealed,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault locked: too many failed unseal attempts")]
LockedOut,
#[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
NotFound,
@@ -62,14 +58,8 @@ pub enum Error {
#[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Custody storage error: {0}")]
Custody(#[from] db::custody::Error),
#[error("Broken database")]
BrokenDatabase,
#[error("Integrity key version mismatch: envelope uses key {envelope:?}, current key is {current:?}")]
KeyVersionMismatch { envelope: RootKeyHistoryId, current: RootKeyHistoryId },
}
struct Unsealed {
@@ -89,8 +79,6 @@ enum State {
Unsealed(Unsealed),
}
const MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 5;
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
///
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
@@ -100,10 +88,8 @@ pub struct Vault {
db: db::DatabasePool,
state: State,
events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
unseal_failures: u32,
}
#[messages]
impl Vault {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let state = {
@@ -123,15 +109,10 @@ impl Vault {
}
};
Ok(Self {
db,
state,
events,
unseal_failures: 0,
})
Ok(Self { db, state, events })
}
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race conditions if multiple vaults write
// additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
async fn get_new_nonce(
pool: &db::DatabasePool,
@@ -176,36 +157,37 @@ impl Vault {
State::Sealed { .. } => Err(Error::Sealed),
}
}
}
/// Create the root key and take the vault into the unsealed state.
#[messages]
impl Vault {
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(
&mut self,
mut seal_key: KeyCell,
custody: Option<CustodyRecord>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, mut seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(&self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
}
let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
// Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default();
let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| {
let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice();
// Generate salt (kept for schema compat)
let root_key_salt = v1::generate_salt();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|rk| {
seal_key
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, rk.as_slice())
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
Error::Encryption(err)
})
})?;
let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
let root_key_history_id = conn
.transaction(async |conn| {
let root_key_history_id = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
@@ -215,7 +197,7 @@ impl Vault {
root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes.clone(),
schema_version: 1,
salt: v1::generate_salt().to_vec(),
salt: root_key_salt.to_vec(),
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(&mut *conn)
@@ -226,11 +208,9 @@ impl Vault {
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
if let Some(record) = custody.as_ref() {
db::custody::write_record(&mut *conn, record).await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(RootKeyHistoryId::from_raw(root_key_history_id))
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(RootKeyHistoryId::from_raw(
root_key_history_id,
))
})
.await?;
@@ -247,62 +227,46 @@ impl Vault {
#[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, mut seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
if self.unseal_failures >= MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS {
return Err(Error::LockedOut);
}
let State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id,
} = &self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let root_key_history_id = *root_key_history_id;
// We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
// We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive work
let current_key = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await?
};
let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
let nonce =
Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
if seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
.is_err()
{
self.unseal_failures += 1;
if self.unseal_failures >= MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS {
error!(
attempts = self.unseal_failures,
"Vault locked: maximum failed unseal attempts reached"
);
} else {
warn!(
attempts = self.unseal_failures,
remaining = MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS - self.unseal_failures,
"Failed unseal attempt"
);
}
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
}
let mut root_key_bytes = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key_bytes)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
Error::InvalidKey
})?;
let root_key = KeyCell::try_from(root_key_bytes).map_err(|()| {
error!("Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
self.unseal_failures = 0;
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?,
root_key,
});
info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
@@ -311,10 +275,26 @@ impl Vault {
Ok(())
}
/// Decrypts an AEAD entry. The `aad` must match the value used at encryption time;
/// a mismatch causes authentication failure, preventing cross-wallet key swaps.
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32, aad: Vec<u8>) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
};
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
}
// Server-side cryptographic operations
#[messages]
impl Vault {
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
@@ -336,15 +316,13 @@ impl Vault {
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut output)?;
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
Ok(output)
}
/// Creates a new `aead_encrypted` entry and returns its ID.
/// The `aad` is bound into the ciphertext and must be reproduced exactly at decryption time.
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, aad: Vec<u8>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
@@ -356,7 +334,7 @@ impl Vault {
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
@@ -416,10 +394,7 @@ impl Vault {
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
return Err(Error::KeyVersionMismatch {
envelope: key_version,
current: *root_key_history_id,
});
return Ok(false);
}
let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
@@ -431,25 +406,12 @@ impl Vault {
Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
}
#[message]
pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
};
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::actors::GlobalActors;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::SafeCellHandle as _;
use super::*;
@@ -457,8 +419,7 @@ mod tests {
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let seal_key = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
actor.bootstrap(seal_key, None).await.unwrap();
actor.bootstrap(KeyCell::from([0u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
actor
}
@@ -467,13 +428,12 @@ mod tests {
async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
}) = actor.state
else {
panic!("expected unsealed state")
panic!("expected unsealed state");
};
let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
@@ -493,7 +453,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()), b"test-aad".to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table

View File

@@ -1,107 +1,59 @@
//! Coordinates the multi-operator ceremonies that create and open the vault.
//!
//! The coordinator collects one passphrase per committee member, then hands the
//! assembled material to [`Vault`] in a single message. It owns no Diesel code:
//! everything it reads or writes goes through the [`db::custody`] functions.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use argon2::RECOMMENDED_SALT_LEN;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, error::SendError, messages};
use rand::rngs::SysRng;
use rand_core::{Rng as _, UnwrapErr};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore as _};
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::vault::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal, Vault},
actors::vault::{Bootstrap, TryUnseal, Vault},
crypto::{KeyCell, derive_key, encryption::v1::Nonce, shamir},
db::{
self,
custody::{CustodyRecord, EncryptedShare},
models::OperatorId,
},
db::{self, models, schema},
};
const SHARE_AAD: &[u8] = b"arbiter/shamir-share/v1";
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("An ordinary committee is already being coordinated")]
#[error("Already coordinating a bootstrap")]
AlreadyBootstrapping,
#[error("An unseal is already being coordinated")]
#[error("Already coordinating an unseal")]
AlreadyUnsealing,
#[error("Bootstrap is not in progress")]
#[error("Bootstrap not in progress")]
NotBootstrapping,
#[error("The operator already contributed")]
#[error("Unseal not in progress")]
NotUnsealing,
#[error("Operator already contributed")]
DuplicateContribution,
#[error("The ordinary committee cannot be empty")]
EmptyCommittee,
#[error("Two-operator committees are unsupported")]
UnsupportedCommittee,
#[error(
"The ordinary committee cannot exceed {} members",
shamir::MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE
)]
CommitteeTooLarge,
#[error("Invalid passphrase")]
#[error("Operator not found in database")]
OperatorNotFound,
#[error("Invalid passphrase (decryption failed)")]
InvalidPassphrase,
#[error("Broken database")]
BrokenDatabase,
#[error("Shamir error: {0}")]
Shamir(String),
#[error("Database connection error: {0}")]
DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Custody storage error: {0}")]
Custody(#[from] db::custody::Error),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Encryption error")]
Encryption,
#[error("The vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Vault error")]
Vault,
}
/// Passphrases gathered so far, in contribution order.
///
/// A `Vec` rather than a map because [`SafeCell`] values are neither cloneable
/// nor hashable, and a committee holds at most
/// [`shamir::MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE`] of them.
#[derive(Default)]
struct Contributions(Vec<(OperatorId, SafeCell<Vec<u8>>)>);
impl Contributions {
fn contains(&self, operator_id: OperatorId) -> bool {
self.0.iter().any(|(id, _)| *id == operator_id)
}
fn put(&mut self, operator_id: OperatorId, passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) {
match self.0.iter_mut().find(|(id, _)| *id == operator_id) {
Some(slot) => slot.1 = passphrase,
None => self.0.push((operator_id, passphrase)),
}
}
const fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.0.len()
}
fn operators(&self) -> Vec<OperatorId> {
self.0.iter().map(|(id, _)| *id).collect()
}
VaultError,
#[error("Broken database")]
BrokenDatabase,
}
// Passphrases stored as plain Vec<u8> (not SafeCell) so CoordinatorState is Sync.
// They are ephemeral and dropped immediately after use.
enum CoordinatorState {
Idle,
Bootstrapping {
/// The operator that declared the committee. Only they may re-declare
/// it, which is the way out of a ceremony the others never finish.
declarer: OperatorId,
declared_count: usize,
contributions: Contributions,
retryable: bool,
passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
},
Unsealing {
threshold: usize,
contributions: Contributions,
retryable: bool,
passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
},
}
@@ -122,257 +74,239 @@ impl VaultCoordinator {
}
}
/// Explain why a committee size was rejected.
const fn committee_error(declared_count: usize) -> Error {
match declared_count {
0 => Error::EmptyCommittee,
2 => Error::UnsupportedCommittee,
_ => Error::CommitteeTooLarge,
const SHARE_AAD: &[u8] = b"arbiter/shamir-share/v1";
const fn shamir_threshold(n: usize) -> usize {
match n {
0 => panic!("No operators"),
1 => 1,
2 => 2,
n => n / 2 + 1,
}
}
fn encrypt_share(
passphrase: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
share: &[u8],
) -> Result<EncryptedShare, Error> {
let mut salt = [0u8; RECOMMENDED_SALT_LEN];
UnwrapErr(SysRng).fill_bytes(&mut salt);
let nonce = Nonce::default();
let ciphertext = derive_key(passphrase, &salt)
.encrypt(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, share)
.map_err(|_| Error::Encryption)?;
Ok(EncryptedShare {
ciphertext,
nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
salt: salt.to_vec(),
})
}
fn decrypt_share(
passphrase: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
share: EncryptedShare,
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(share.nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| Error::BrokenDatabase)?;
let mut buffer = SafeCell::new(share.ciphertext);
derive_key(passphrase, &share.salt)
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, &mut buffer)
.map_err(|_| Error::InvalidPassphrase)?;
Ok(buffer)
}
const fn bootstrap_error(error: &SendError<Bootstrap, vault::Error>) -> Error {
match error {
SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped) => Error::AlreadyBootstrapped,
_ => Error::Vault,
}
}
/// Build the custody record and hand it to the vault, which stores it in the
/// same transaction as the root key.
async fn finalize_bootstrap(
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
contributions: &mut Contributions,
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let total = contributions.len();
let threshold = shamir::shamir_threshold(total).ok_or_else(|| committee_error(total))?;
let total = passphrases.len();
let threshold = shamir_threshold(total);
let mut seal_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
let mut shares = shamir::split_key(threshold, total, &mut seal_key, UnwrapErr(SysRng))
.map_err(|error| Error::Shamir(error.to_string()))?;
// Generate random 32-byte seal key
let mut seal_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut seal_key_bytes);
if shares.len() < total {
return Err(Error::Shamir("missing share for operator".to_owned()));
}
// Split seal key into shares using Shamir (OsRng from rand_core 0.6, compatible with vsss-rs)
let shares = shamir::split_key(threshold, total, &seal_key_bytes, OsRng)
.map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?;
let mut encrypted = Vec::with_capacity(total);
for ((operator_id, passphrase), share) in contributions.0.iter_mut().zip(shares.iter_mut()) {
let share = share.read_inline(|share| encrypt_share(passphrase, share))?;
encrypted.push((*operator_id, share));
let seal_key = KeyCell::from(seal_key_bytes);
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
for ((operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes), share) in passphrases.into_iter().zip(shares) {
// Generate a fresh share_salt for this operator
let mut share_salt = vec![0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut share_salt);
// Derive share encryption key from passphrase + salt
let mut passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase_bytes);
let mut share_seal_key = derive_key(&mut passphrase_cell, &share_salt);
// Encrypt this operator's share
let nonce = Nonce::default();
let encrypted_share = share_seal_key
.encrypt(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, &share)
.map_err(|_| Error::Encryption)?;
let nonce_bytes = nonce.to_vec();
diesel::replace_into(schema::operator::table)
.values((
schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)),
schema::operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
schema::operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
schema::operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
schema::operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key,
custody: Some(CustodyRecord {
threshold,
shares: encrypted,
}),
})
.ask(Bootstrap { seal_key })
.await
.map_err(|error| bootstrap_error(&error))
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Vault bootstrap failed");
Error::VaultError
})?;
Ok(())
}
/// Reconstruct the seal key from the contributed passphrases and unseal.
async fn finalize_unseal(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
threshold: usize,
contributions: &mut Contributions,
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let stored = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
db::custody::shares(&mut conn, &contributions.operators()).await?
};
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let mut shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
let mut plaintext = Vec::with_capacity(stored.len());
for ((_, passphrase), share) in contributions.0.iter_mut().zip(stored) {
plaintext.push(decrypt_share(passphrase, share)?);
for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in passphrases {
let (encrypted_share, share_nonce_bytes, share_salt): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) =
schema::operator::table
.filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)))
.select((
schema::operator::share,
schema::operator::share_nonce,
schema::operator::share_salt,
))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::OperatorNotFound)?;
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(share_nonce_bytes.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!(operator_id = operator_id_raw, "Invalid nonce in DB");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase_bytes);
let mut share_seal_key = derive_key(&mut passphrase_cell, &share_salt);
let mut share_buffer = SafeCell::new(encrypted_share);
share_seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, &mut share_buffer)
.map_err(|_| Error::InvalidPassphrase)?;
let decrypted_share = share_buffer.read().clone();
shares.push(decrypted_share);
}
let seal_key = shamir::combine_shares(threshold, &mut plaintext)
.map_err(|error| Error::Shamir(error.to_string()))?;
let seal_key_bytes =
shamir::combine_shares(&shares).map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?;
let seal_key = KeyCell::from(seal_key_bytes);
vault
.ask(TryUnseal { seal_key })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Vault)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Vault unseal failed");
Error::VaultError
})?;
Ok(())
}
#[messages]
impl VaultCoordinator {
/// Announce how many operators will contribute to the bootstrap.
///
/// The declaring operator may re-declare to restart the ceremony; that is
/// the only way to release a committee whose members never all show up.
/// Phase 1 of multi-operator bootstrap: declare the committee size.
#[message]
pub fn start_bootstrap(
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "kameo requires messages to be async")]
pub async fn start_bootstrap(
&mut self,
operator_id: OperatorId,
operator_id: i32,
declared_count: usize,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
if shamir::shamir_threshold(declared_count).is_none() {
return Err(committee_error(declared_count));
let _ = operator_id; // fixme!: any authenticated operator may announce the committee size. the first call wins
if !matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping);
}
match &self.state {
CoordinatorState::Unsealing { .. } => return Err(Error::AlreadyUnsealing),
CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping { declarer, .. } if *declarer != operator_id => {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping);
}
CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping { .. } | CoordinatorState::Idle => {}
}
self.state = CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
declarer: operator_id,
declared_count,
contributions: Contributions::default(),
retryable: false,
passphrases: HashMap::new(),
};
Ok(())
}
/// Phase 2 of multi-operator bootstrap: contribute a passphrase.
/// Returns Ok(true) when all operators contributed and bootstrap finalized.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_bootstrap(
&mut self,
operator_id: OperatorId,
passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
declared_count,
contributions,
retryable,
..
passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapping);
};
if contributions.contains(operator_id) && !*retryable {
if passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
contributions.put(operator_id, passphrase);
*retryable = false;
if contributions.len() < *declared_count {
// Extract bytes immediately so state stays Sync
let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
if passphrases.len() < *declared_count {
return Ok(false);
}
let state = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle);
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
declarer,
declared_count,
mut contributions,
..
} = state
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping { passphrases, .. } =
std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
else {
unreachable!("state was matched as Bootstrapping above")
unreachable!()
};
match finalize_bootstrap(&self.vault, &mut contributions).await {
Ok(()) => Ok(true),
Err(error) => {
self.state = CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
declarer,
declared_count,
contributions,
retryable: true,
};
Err(error)
}
}
finalize_bootstrap(self.db.clone(), self.vault.clone(), passphrases).await?;
Ok(true)
}
/// Contribute a passphrase for vault unseal.
/// Returns Ok(true) when threshold reached and vault is unsealed.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_unseal(
&mut self,
operator_id: OperatorId,
passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
if matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
let threshold = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
db::custody::threshold(&mut conn).await?
};
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let count: i64 = schema::operator::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
let threshold = shamir_threshold(usize::try_from(count).unwrap_or_default());
self.state = CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
threshold,
contributions: Contributions::default(),
retryable: false,
passphrases: HashMap::new(),
};
}
let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
threshold,
contributions,
retryable,
passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping);
return Err(Error::NotUnsealing);
};
if contributions.contains(operator_id) && !*retryable {
if passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
contributions.put(operator_id, passphrase);
*retryable = false;
if contributions.len() < *threshold {
let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
if passphrases.len() < *threshold {
return Ok(false);
}
let state = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle);
let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
threshold,
mut contributions,
..
} = state
let CoordinatorState::Unsealing { passphrases, .. } =
std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
else {
unreachable!("state was matched as Unsealing above")
unreachable!()
};
match finalize_unseal(&self.db, &self.vault, threshold, &mut contributions).await {
Ok(()) => Ok(true),
Err(error) => {
self.state = CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
threshold,
contributions,
retryable: true,
};
Err(error)
}
}
finalize_unseal(self.db.clone(), self.vault.clone(), passphrases).await?;
Ok(true)
}
}

View File

@@ -62,10 +62,11 @@ mod tests {
fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let mut password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key1 = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
let mut key2 = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
let mut key2 = derive_key(&mut password2, &salt);
let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read();

View File

@@ -192,9 +192,7 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
}),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(
vault::Error::Sealed | vault::Error::KeyVersionMismatch { .. },
)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
}
}
@@ -215,10 +213,8 @@ mod tests {
GlobalActors,
vault::{Bootstrap, Vault},
},
crypto::KeyCell,
db::{self, schema},
};
use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
#[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
struct DummyEntity {
@@ -237,8 +233,7 @@ mod tests {
);
actor
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
custody: None,
seal_key: crate::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -334,47 +329,4 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn key_version_mismatch_returns_unavailable_not_mac_mismatch() {
use crate::db::schema::integrity_envelope;
use super::AttestationStatus;
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-rotation-test";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
// Simulate key rotation: update the stored key_version to a stale value.
// After real rotation the vault's root_key_history_id would advance, but
// here we achieve the same mismatch by back-dating the envelope's key_version.
diesel::update(integrity_envelope::table)
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.set(integrity_envelope::key_version.eq(0))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// Must NOT error — version mismatch is Unavailable, not tampered.
let status = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.expect("key version mismatch must not be treated as an error");
assert_eq!(
status,
AttestationStatus::Unavailable,
"stale key_version must yield Unavailable, not MacMismatch"
);
}
}

View File

@@ -21,10 +21,9 @@ impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
Self(value)
}
}
impl From<[u8; 32]> for KeyCell {
fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|key: &mut Key| {
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|key: &mut Key| {
key.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
});
Self(cell)
@@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
return Err(());
}
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
});
Ok(Self(cell))
@@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
impl KeyCell {
pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
let key = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng)
.expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
@@ -69,7 +68,6 @@ impl KeyCell {
let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
}
pub fn decrypt_in_place(
&mut self,
nonce: &Nonce,
@@ -105,10 +103,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
}
}
/// Derive a fixed-length key from a passphrase using Argon2id.
///
/// The passphrase is borrowed so that callers can keep it in protected memory
/// and reuse it across retries instead of handing over a copy.
/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
pub fn derive_key(password: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &[u8]) -> KeyCell {
let params = {
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
@@ -151,7 +146,7 @@ mod tests {
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233");
let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
let associated_data = b"associated data";
let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();

View File

@@ -1,221 +1,29 @@
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use rand_core::CryptoRng;
use vsss_rs::Gf256;
use crate::crypto::KeyCell;
/// GF(256) addresses shares by a non-zero byte, so no committee can exceed 255.
pub const MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE: usize = 255;
/// Errors returned by Shamir split/combine operations.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ShamirError {
#[error("failed to split key: {0}")]
#[error("Failed to split key: {0}")]
Split(String),
#[error("failed to combine shares: {0}")]
#[error("Failed to combine shares: {0}")]
Combine(String),
}
/// Return the required threshold for a Shamir share pool of `committee_size`.
///
/// A pool of two is rejected: a majority of two is two, which gives each holder
/// a veto over every unseal without giving either one recovery. That rejects no
/// supported committee, because a two-operator vault must carry at least one
/// recovery share and so never splits into a pool of two -- see
/// `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` 3.9.
#[expect(
clippy::integer_division,
reason = "majority thresholds use integer arithmetic"
)]
#[must_use]
pub const fn shamir_threshold(committee_size: usize) -> Option<usize> {
match committee_size {
0 | 2 => None,
size if size > MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE => None,
1 => Some(1),
size => Some(size / 2 + 1),
}
}
/// Split a seal key into `total` shares, `threshold` of which reconstruct it.
/// Split `key` into `total` shares where any `threshold` shares can reconstruct it.
/// Each returned Vec<u8> is a share with format [`identifier_byte`, `value_bytes`...].
pub fn split_key(
threshold: usize,
total: usize,
key: &mut KeyCell,
rng: impl CryptoRng,
) -> Result<Vec<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>>, ShamirError> {
if total == 0 || threshold == 0 || threshold > total || total == 2 || total > MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE
{
return Err(ShamirError::Split(
"unsupported committee parameters".to_owned(),
));
}
// Nothing to interpolate when one share suffices.
if threshold == 1 {
return Ok(key.0.read_inline(|key| {
std::iter::repeat_with(|| SafeCell::new(key.as_slice().to_vec()))
.take(total)
.collect()
}));
}
key.0.read_inline(|key| {
let key: &[u8; 32] = key
.as_slice()
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| ShamirError::Split("unexpected seal key length".to_owned()))?;
Gf256::split_array(threshold, total, key, rng)
.map(|shares| shares.into_iter().map(SafeCell::new).collect())
.map_err(|error| ShamirError::Split(format!("{error:?}")))
})
key: &[u8; 32],
rng: impl rand_core::RngCore + rand_core::CryptoRng,
) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, ShamirError> {
Gf256::split_array(threshold, total, key.as_slice(), rng)
.map_err(|e| ShamirError::Split(format!("{e:?}")))
}
/// Combine shares back into the seal key.
///
/// `threshold` comes from storage rather than from the shapes of the shares:
/// a one-of-one committee stores the key verbatim, and telling that apart by
/// share length alone would misread any Shamir share that happened to be key
/// sized.
pub fn combine_shares(
threshold: usize,
shares: &mut [SafeCell<Vec<u8>>],
) -> Result<KeyCell, ShamirError> {
if threshold == 0 {
return Err(ShamirError::Combine("threshold is zero".to_owned()));
}
if shares.len() < threshold {
return Err(ShamirError::Combine(
"not enough shares supplied".to_owned(),
));
}
// Mirror of the one-of-one case in [`split_key`]: the share is the key.
if threshold == 1 {
let share = shares
.first_mut()
.ok_or_else(|| ShamirError::Combine("no shares supplied".to_owned()))?;
return reconstructed_key(share.read_inline(|share| SafeCell::new(share.clone())));
}
let mut gathered = SafeCell::new(Vec::with_capacity(shares.len()));
for share in shares.iter_mut() {
share.read_inline(|share| {
gathered.write_inline(|gathered| gathered.push(share.clone()));
});
}
let combined = gathered.read_inline(|gathered| {
Gf256::combine_array(gathered.as_slice())
.map(SafeCell::new)
.map_err(|error| ShamirError::Combine(format!("{error:?}")))
})?;
reconstructed_key(combined)
}
fn reconstructed_key(bytes: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<KeyCell, ShamirError> {
KeyCell::try_from(bytes)
.map_err(|()| ShamirError::Combine("unexpected reconstructed key length".to_owned()))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE, combine_shares, shamir_threshold, split_key};
use crate::crypto::KeyCell;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use rand::rngs::SysRng;
use rand_core::UnwrapErr;
use rstest::rstest;
fn key_bytes(mut key: KeyCell) -> [u8; 32] {
key.0.read_inline(|key| {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
bytes.copy_from_slice(key.as_slice());
bytes
})
}
fn select(shares: &mut [SafeCell<Vec<u8>>], indexes: &[usize]) -> Vec<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> {
indexes
.iter()
.filter_map(|index| {
shares
.get_mut(*index)
.map(|share| share.read_inline(|share| SafeCell::new(share.clone())))
})
.collect()
}
#[rstest]
#[case(&[0, 1])]
#[case(&[0, 2])]
#[case(&[1, 2])]
fn threshold_shares_reconstruct_fixed_key(#[case] indexes: &[usize]) {
let expected = [9_u8; 32];
let mut key = KeyCell::from(expected);
let rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
let mut shares = split_key(2, 3, &mut key, rng).expect("split should succeed");
let mut selected = select(&mut shares, indexes);
let combined = combine_shares(2, &mut selected).expect("combine should succeed");
assert_eq!(key_bytes(combined), expected);
}
#[test]
fn one_of_one_round_trips_a_fixed_size_key() {
let expected = [7_u8; 32];
let mut key = KeyCell::from(expected);
let rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
let mut shares = split_key(1, 1, &mut key, rng).expect("split should succeed");
let combined = combine_shares(1, &mut shares).expect("combine should succeed");
assert_eq!(key_bytes(combined), expected);
}
#[test]
fn fewer_shares_than_threshold_is_rejected() {
let mut key = KeyCell::from([3_u8; 32]);
let rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
let mut shares = split_key(3, 5, &mut key, rng).expect("split should succeed");
let mut selected = select(&mut shares, &[0, 1]);
assert!(
combine_shares(3, &mut selected).is_err(),
"two of three shares must not reconstruct the key"
);
}
#[rstest]
#[case(0, None)]
#[case(1, Some(1))]
#[case(2, None)]
#[case(3, Some(2))]
#[case(4, Some(3))]
#[case(MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE, Some(128))]
#[case(MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE + 1, None)]
fn committee_threshold_is_a_majority(
#[case] committee_size: usize,
#[case] expected: Option<usize>,
) {
assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(committee_size), expected);
}
#[test]
fn oversized_committee_is_rejected_by_split() {
let mut key = KeyCell::from([1_u8; 32]);
let rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
assert!(
split_key(129, MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE + 1, &mut key, rng).is_err(),
"committees above the GF(256) share limit must be rejected"
);
}
#[test]
fn two_operator_committee_is_explicitly_unsupported() {
let mut key = KeyCell::from([7_u8; 32]);
let rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
assert!(
split_key(2, 2, &mut key, rng).is_err(),
"two-operator committees must be rejected"
);
}
/// Reconstruct the secret from `threshold` or more shares.
pub fn combine_shares(shares: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ShamirError> {
let bytes = Gf256::combine_array(shares)
.map_err(|e| ShamirError::Combine(format!("{e:?}")))?;
<[u8; 32]>::try_from(bytes.as_slice())
.map_err(|_| ShamirError::Combine("unexpected reconstructed key length".to_owned()))
}

View File

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
//! Storage for Shamir custody material: the reconstruction threshold and the
//! per-operator encrypted shares of the vault seal key.
//!
//! Every query lives here so that the actors above hold no Diesel code of their
//! own. The functions borrow the caller's connection instead of taking one from
//! the pool, which lets the vault write custody material inside the same
//! transaction that stores the root key.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::db::{
models::{OperatorId, SqliteTimestamp},
schema,
};
/// One Shamir share, encrypted under a key derived from its operator's passphrase.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct EncryptedShare {
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
pub nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub salt: Vec<u8>,
}
/// Everything a bootstrap persists about custody, written as a single unit.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct CustodyRecord {
pub threshold: usize,
pub shares: Vec<(OperatorId, EncryptedShare)>,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Stored committee threshold is missing or out of range")]
BrokenThreshold,
#[error("Custody settings row is missing")]
MissingSettings,
#[error("No share stored for operator {0:?}")]
MissingShare(OperatorId),
}
/// Persist threshold and shares on the caller's connection, joining any
/// transaction the caller has already opened.
pub async fn write_record(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
record: &CustodyRecord,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let threshold = i32::try_from(record.threshold).map_err(|_| Error::BrokenThreshold)?;
let now = SqliteTimestamp::now();
for (operator_id, share) in &record.shares {
diesel::replace_into(schema::operator::table)
.values((
schema::operator::id.eq(Some(*operator_id)),
schema::operator::share.eq(&share.ciphertext),
schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(&share.nonce),
schema::operator::share_salt.eq(&share.salt),
schema::operator::created_at.eq(now.clone()),
schema::operator::updated_at.eq(now.clone()),
))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
}
let updated = diesel::update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
.set(schema::arbiter_settings::shamir_threshold.eq(Some(threshold)))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
if updated != 1 {
return Err(Error::MissingSettings);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Number of shares required to reconstruct the seal key.
pub async fn threshold(conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>) -> Result<usize, Error> {
let stored: Option<i32> = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.select(schema::arbiter_settings::shamir_threshold)
.first(conn)
.await?;
stored
.and_then(|value| usize::try_from(value).ok())
.filter(|threshold| *threshold > 0)
.ok_or(Error::BrokenThreshold)
}
/// One row of the share query: operator id, ciphertext, nonce, salt.
type ShareRow = (Option<OperatorId>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>);
/// Load the shares of `operators` in one query, in the order requested.
pub async fn shares(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
operators: &[OperatorId],
) -> Result<Vec<EncryptedShare>, Error> {
let wanted: Vec<Option<OperatorId>> = operators.iter().copied().map(Some).collect();
let rows: Vec<ShareRow> = schema::operator::table
.filter(schema::operator::id.eq_any(wanted))
.select((
schema::operator::id,
schema::operator::share,
schema::operator::share_nonce,
schema::operator::share_salt,
))
.load(conn)
.await?;
let mut found: HashMap<OperatorId, EncryptedShare> = rows
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(id, ciphertext, nonce, salt)| {
id.map(|id| {
(
id,
EncryptedShare {
ciphertext,
nonce,
salt,
},
)
})
})
.collect();
operators
.iter()
.map(|id| found.remove(id).ok_or(Error::MissingShare(*id)))
.collect()
}

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::info;
pub mod custody;
pub mod models;
pub mod schema;
@@ -155,39 +154,3 @@ pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
.await
.expect("Failed to create test database pool")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, result::DatabaseErrorKind};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use super::*;
#[tokio::test]
async fn operator_share_salt_must_be_supplied_by_application() {
let pool = create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.expect("pool connection");
let operator_id = diesel::insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![1]))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.expect("insert operator identity");
let error = diesel::insert_into(schema::operator::table)
.values((
schema::operator::id.eq(operator_id),
schema::operator::share.eq(vec![2]),
schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(vec![3]),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.expect_err("operator insert without an application-generated salt must fail");
assert!(matches!(
error,
diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(DatabaseErrorKind::NotNullViolation, _)
));
}
}

View File

@@ -110,18 +110,6 @@ pub mod types {
ToSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::to_sql(&self.0, out)
}
}
impl arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable for $name {
fn hash<H: arbiter_crypto::hashing::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable::hash(&self.0, hasher);
}
}
impl crate::crypto::integrity::v1::IntoId for $name {
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
crate::crypto::integrity::v1::IntoId::into_id(self.0)
}
}
};
}
@@ -215,7 +203,6 @@ pub struct ArbiterSettings {
pub id: i32,
pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references root_key_history.id
pub tls_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_history.id
pub shamir_threshold: Option<i32>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ diesel::table! {
id -> Integer,
root_key_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
tls_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
shamir_threshold -> Nullable<Integer>,
}
}

View File

@@ -1,34 +1,28 @@
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use crate::{
actors::vault::Vault,
crypto::integrity,
db::{
self, DatabaseError,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget,
EvmEtherTransferLimit, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{self, evm_transaction_log},
},
evm::policies::{
CombinedSettings, DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy,
SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
};
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{Address, TxKind, U256},
primitives::{TxKind, U256},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, SelectableHelper,
insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite, update,
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer;
@@ -278,151 +272,6 @@ impl Engine {
Ok(id)
}
pub async fn revoke_grant(
&self,
basic_grant_id: i32,
) -> Result<(), DatabaseError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let vault = self.vault.clone();
conn.transaction(async move |conn| {
use crate::db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target,
evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
};
update(evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(basic_grant_id))
.set(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = evm_basic_grant::table
.filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(basic_grant_id))
.select(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.first(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let shared = SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?;
if let Some(ether_grant) = evm_ether_transfer_grant::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(basic_grant_id))
.select(EvmEtherTransferGrant::as_select())
.first(&mut *conn)
.await
.optional()?
{
let target_rows: Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget> =
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq(ether_grant.id))
.select(EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget::as_select())
.load(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let targets: Vec<Address> = target_rows
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|target| {
let arr: [u8; 20] = target.address.try_into().ok()?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
})
.collect();
let limit: EvmEtherTransferLimit = evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq(ether_grant.limit_id))
.select(EvmEtherTransferLimit::as_select())
.first(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let settings = CombinedSettings {
shared: shared.clone(),
specific: policies::ether_transfer::Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(
|err| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
},
)?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs.into()),
},
},
};
integrity::sign_entity(&mut *conn, &vault, &settings, basic_grant_id)
.await
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
return QueryResult::Ok(());
}
if let Some(token_grant) = evm_token_transfer_grant::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(basic_grant_id))
.select(EvmTokenTransferGrant::as_select())
.first(&mut *conn)
.await
.optional()?
{
let volume_limit_rows: Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit> =
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq(token_grant.id))
.select(EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit::as_select())
.load(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = volume_limit_rows
.into_iter()
.map(|row| {
Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(
|err| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
},
)?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(row.window_secs.into()),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
let target: Option<Address> = match token_grant.receiver {
None => None,
Some(bytes) => {
let arr: [u8; 20] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid receiver address length".into(),
)
})?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
}
};
let token_contract: [u8; 20] =
token_grant.token_contract.clone().try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid token contract address length".into(),
)
})?;
let settings = CombinedSettings {
shared,
specific: policies::token_transfers::Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
},
};
integrity::sign_entity(&mut *conn, &vault, &settings, basic_grant_id)
.await
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
return QueryResult::Ok(());
}
Err(diesel::result::Error::NotFound)
})
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)
}
async fn list_one_kind<Kind: Policy, Y>(
&self,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
@@ -505,12 +354,8 @@ mod tests {
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
use rstest::rstest;
use crate::actors::{GlobalActors, vault::{Bootstrap, Vault}};
use crate::crypto::KeyCell;
use crate::crypto::integrity;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{
@@ -519,10 +364,8 @@ mod tests {
},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::policies::ether_transfer::EtherTransfer;
use crate::evm::policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit,
EvalContext, EvalViolation, SharedGrantSettings, TransactionRateLimit,
};
use super::check_shared_constraints;
@@ -554,7 +397,6 @@ mod tests {
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
revoked_at: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
@@ -763,116 +605,4 @@ mod tests {
assert!(violations.is_empty());
}
}
async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
let actor = Vault::spawn(
Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap(),
);
actor
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
custody: None,
})
.await
.unwrap();
actor
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoke_grant_preserves_revoked_integrity() {
use crate::db::schema::evm_basic_grant;
use diesel::ExpressionMethods as _;
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let engine = super::Engine::new(db.clone(), vault.clone());
let full_grant = CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
revoked_at: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
},
specific: super::policies::ether_transfer::Settings {
target: vec![RECIPIENT],
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(100u64),
window: Duration::hours(1),
},
},
};
let grant_id = engine
.create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(full_grant)
.await
.unwrap();
engine.revoke_grant(grant_id).await.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
diesel::update(evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
.set(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq::<Option<SqliteTimestamp>>(None))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let wallet_access = EvmWalletAccess {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(10),
client_id: 20,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
};
let context = EvalContext {
target: wallet_access,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
to: RECIPIENT,
value: U256::ONE,
calldata: Bytes::new(),
max_fee_per_gas: 1,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 1,
};
let grant = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(
&context, &mut conn,
)
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
let result =
integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await;
assert!(matches!(
result,
Err(integrity::Error::MacMismatch { .. })
));
}
#[test]
fn shared_settings_hash_changes_when_revoked_at_changes() {
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
use sha2::Digest;
let active = shared_settings();
let revoked = SharedGrantSettings {
revoked_at: Some(Utc::now()),
..shared_settings()
};
let mut active_hash = sha2::Sha256::new();
active.hash(&mut active_hash);
let mut revoked_hash = sha2::Sha256::new();
revoked.hash(&mut revoked_hash);
assert_ne!(active_hash.finalize(), revoked_hash.finalize());
}
}

View File

@@ -144,7 +144,6 @@ pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
pub valid_from: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub valid_until: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub revoked_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
@@ -159,7 +158,6 @@ impl SharedGrantSettings {
chain: model.chain_id.into(),
valid_from: model.valid_from.map(Into::into),
valid_until: model.valid_until.map(Into::into),
revoked_at: model.revoked_at.map(Into::into),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: model
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))

View File

@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
revoked_at: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,

View File

@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
revoked_at: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,

View File

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for SafeSigner {
/// Returns the protected key bytes and the derived Ethereum address.
pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::Rng) -> (SafeCell<[u8; 32]>, Address) {
loop {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|w: &mut [u8; 32]| {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|w: &mut [u8; 32]| {
rng.fill_bytes(w);
});

View File

@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ impl Convert for auth::Outbound {
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("timestamp within range")
.cast_unsigned(),
as u64,
random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
})
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
use crate::{
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::operator::{OperatorConnection, OperatorSession, OutOfBand},
peers::operator::{OutOfBand, OperatorConnection, OperatorSession},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::operator::{
OperatorRequest, OperatorResponse, operator_request::Payload as OperatorRequestPayload,
OperatorRequest, OperatorResponse,
operator_request::Payload as OperatorRequestPayload,
operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
},
transport::{Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
@@ -110,9 +111,6 @@ async fn dispatch_inner(
OperatorRequestPayload::Vault(req) => vault::dispatch(actor, req).await,
OperatorRequestPayload::Evm(req) => evm::dispatch(actor, req).await,
OperatorRequestPayload::SdkClient(req) => sdk_client::dispatch(actor, req).await,
OperatorRequestPayload::Governance(_) => {
Err(Status::permission_denied(stringify!(Governance)))
}
OperatorRequestPayload::Auth(..) => {
warn!("Unsupported post-auth operator auth request");
Err(Status::invalid_argument("Unsupported operator request"))

View File

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("timestamp within range")
.cast_unsigned(),
as u64,
random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
})
}
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: bootstrap_token.map(String::into_bytes),
bootstrap_token,
})
}
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => {

View File

@@ -217,11 +217,6 @@ async fn handle_sign_transaction(
result: Some(vet_error.convert()),
}
}
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
SessionSignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected,
)) => {
return Err(Status::permission_denied("client not connected"));
}
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(SessionSignTransactionError::Internal)) => {
EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(

View File

@@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ impl TryConvert for ProtoSharedSettings {
.valid_until
.map(ProtoTimestamp::try_convert)
.transpose()?,
revoked_at: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: self
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.as_deref()

View File

@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
match payload {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(()) => handle_query_vault_state(actor).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(_)
| VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(_)
| VaultRequestPayload::Rekey(_) => Err(Status::permission_denied(
"Vault is already unsealed; unseal/bootstrap not permitted in session",
)),
VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(_) | VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(_) => {
Err(Status::permission_denied(
"Vault is already unsealed; unseal/bootstrap not permitted in session",
))
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
use crate::{
crypto::shamir,
grpc::{Convert, TryConvert},
peers::operator::vault_gate::{
self as vault_gate, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase,
@@ -53,7 +52,6 @@ impl TryConvert for VaultRequestPayload {
Self::QueryState(()) => Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleVaultState),
Self::Unseal(req) => req.try_convert(),
Self::Bootstrap(req) => req.try_convert(),
Self::Rekey(_) => Err(Status::unimplemented("Vault re-key is not available")),
}
}
}
@@ -77,16 +75,13 @@ impl TryConvert for UnsealRequestPayload {
match self {
Self::Start(start) => start.try_convert(),
Self::EncryptedKey(key) => Ok(key.convert()),
Self::ContributePassphrase(passphrase) => {
Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase(
Self::ContributePassphrase(cp) => Ok(
vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase(
HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase {
passphrase: passphrase.passphrase,
passphrase: cp.passphrase,
},
))
}
Self::ContributeRecoveryPassphrase(_) => Err(Status::unimplemented(
"Recovery operator contributions are not available",
)),
),
),
}
}
}
@@ -134,35 +129,18 @@ impl TryConvert for BootstrapRequestPayload {
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
match self {
Self::EncryptedKey(key) => key.try_convert(),
Self::DeclareCommittee(dc) => {
if dc.recovery_count != 0 {
return Err(Status::unimplemented(
"Recovery operator contributions are not available",
));
}
let count = usize::try_from(dc.count)
.ok()
.filter(|count| *count <= shamir::MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE)
.ok_or_else(|| {
Status::invalid_argument(format!(
"Committee count must not exceed {}",
shamir::MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE
))
})?;
Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleDeclareCommittee(
HandleDeclareCommittee { count },
))
}
Self::ContributePassphrase(cp) => {
Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase(
Self::DeclareCommittee(dc) => Ok(
vault_gate::Inbound::HandleDeclareCommittee(HandleDeclareCommittee {
count: dc.count as usize,
}),
),
Self::ContributePassphrase(cp) => Ok(
vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase(
HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase {
passphrase: cp.passphrase,
},
))
}
Self::ContributeRecoveryPassphrase(_) => Err(Status::unimplemented(
"Recovery operator contributions are not available",
)),
),
),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
use crate::{
actors::{vault::VaultState, vault_coordinator},
actors::vault::VaultState,
grpc::{Convert, TryConvert},
peers::operator::vault_gate::{self as vault_gate},
};
@@ -34,26 +34,6 @@ const fn wrap_unseal_response(payload: UnsealResponsePayload) -> OperatorRespons
}))
}
/// Ceremony errors are the operator's own doing far more often than ours, so
/// they travel back as a specific status instead of a blanket internal error.
fn ceremony_status(error: &vault_coordinator::Error) -> Status {
match error {
vault_coordinator::Error::AlreadyBootstrapping
| vault_coordinator::Error::AlreadyUnsealing
| vault_coordinator::Error::NotBootstrapping
| vault_coordinator::Error::DuplicateContribution => {
Status::failed_precondition(error.to_string())
}
vault_coordinator::Error::EmptyCommittee
| vault_coordinator::Error::UnsupportedCommittee
| vault_coordinator::Error::CommitteeTooLarge => {
Status::invalid_argument(error.to_string())
}
vault_coordinator::Error::InvalidPassphrase => Status::unauthenticated(error.to_string()),
_ => Status::internal("Vault ceremony failed"),
}
}
fn wrap_bootstrap_response(result: ProtoBootstrapResult) -> OperatorResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Bootstrap(proto_bootstrap::Response {
result: result.into(),
@@ -132,14 +112,7 @@ impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
}
Self::HandleDeclareCommittee(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::AwaitingContributions,
Err(vault_gate::Error::Ceremony(
vault_coordinator::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped,
)) => ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped,
Err(vault_gate::Error::Ceremony(err)) => {
warn!(?err, "declare committee failed");
return Err(ceremony_status(&err));
}
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "declare committee failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to declare committee"));
@@ -151,18 +124,9 @@ impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(true) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Ok(false) => ProtoBootstrapResult::AwaitingContributions,
Err(vault_gate::Error::Ceremony(
vault_coordinator::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped,
)) => ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped,
Err(vault_gate::Error::Ceremony(err)) => {
warn!(?err, "contribute bootstrap passphrase failed");
return Err(ceremony_status(&err));
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "contribute bootstrap passphrase failed");
return Err(Status::internal(
"Failed to contribute bootstrap passphrase",
));
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to contribute bootstrap passphrase"));
}
};
Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use crate::{
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
db::{
self,
models::ProgramClientMetadata,
models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::program_client,
},
};
@@ -18,13 +18,14 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
dsl::insert_into,
dsl::insert_into, update,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tracing::{error, warn};
use tracing::error;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Error {
@@ -210,47 +211,71 @@ async fn insert_client(
.await
}
/// Compares stored metadata against what a reconnecting client presents.
/// Metadata is frozen after initial operator approval and must not be silently
/// overwritten. Doing so would let an approved client forge its displayed
/// identity in later approval prompts. Drift is logged and ignored.
async fn check_metadata_drift(
async fn sync_client_metadata(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
client_id: i32,
presented: &ClientMetadata,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
use crate::db::schema::client_metadata;
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history};
let now = SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now());
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
let current: ProgramClientMetadata = program_client::table
.find(client_id)
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select(ProgramClientMetadata::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
let (current_metadata_id, current): (i32, ProgramClientMetadata) = program_client::table
.find(client_id)
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
program_client::metadata_id,
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.first(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let changed = current.name != presented.name
|| current.description != presented.description
|| current.version != presented.version;
let unchanged = current.name == metadata.name
&& current.description == metadata.description
&& current.version == metadata.version;
if unchanged {
return Ok(());
}
if changed {
warn!(
client_id,
stored_name = %current.name,
presented_name = %presented.name,
"reconnecting client presented different metadata; ignoring - metadata is frozen after operator approval"
);
}
insert_into(client_metadata_history::table)
.values((
client_metadata_history::metadata_id.eq(current_metadata_id),
client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id),
))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut *conn)
.await?;
update(program_client::table.find(client_id))
.set((
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Ok::<(), diesel::result::Error>(())
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn challenge_client<T>(
@@ -299,7 +324,6 @@ where
let client_id = if let Some(id) = get_client_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey).await?;
check_metadata_drift(&props.db, id, &metadata).await?;
id
} else {
approve_new_client(
@@ -313,6 +337,8 @@ where
insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
};
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, client_id, &metadata).await?;
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge).await?;

View File

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ impl Actor for ClientSession {
args.props
.actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RegisterClient { client_id: args.client_id, actor: this })
.ask(RegisterClient { actor: this })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::ConnectionRegistrationFailed)?;
Ok(args)

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ mod state;
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: Vec<u8>,

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ use super::{
Error,
};
use crate::{
actors::bootstrap::VerifyToken,
db::{DatabasePool, models::OperatorId, schema::operator_identity},
actors::bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
db::{DatabasePool, schema::operator_identity},
peers::operator::auth::Outbound,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT};
@@ -14,18 +14,19 @@ use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use tracing::error;
pub(super) struct ChallengeRequest {
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub(crate) struct ChallengeRequest {
pub(crate) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(crate) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub(super) challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
pub(super) struct ChallengeSolution {
pub(super) solution: Vec<u8>,
pub(crate) struct ChallengeSolution {
pub(crate) solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
@@ -37,10 +38,7 @@ smlang::statemachine!(
}
);
async fn get_client_id(
db: &DatabasePool,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorId>, Error> {
async fn get_client_id(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<Option<i32>, Error> {
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
@@ -49,7 +47,7 @@ async fn get_client_id(
operator_identity::table
.filter(operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
.select(operator_identity::id)
.first::<OperatorId>(&mut conn)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
@@ -58,14 +56,14 @@ async fn get_client_id(
})
}
async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<OperatorId, Error> {
async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let id: OperatorId = diesel::insert_into(operator_identity::table)
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(operator_identity::table)
.values((operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),))
.returning(operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
@@ -81,16 +79,11 @@ async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<Op
pub(super) struct AuthContext<'a, T: ?Sized> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut OperatorConnection,
pub(super) transport: &'a mut T,
bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
impl<'a, T: ?Sized> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) const fn new(conn: &'a mut OperatorConnection, transport: &'a mut T) -> Self {
Self {
conn,
transport,
bootstrap_token: None,
}
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
@@ -115,8 +108,6 @@ where
}
}
self.bootstrap_token = bootstrap_token;
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
self.transport
@@ -129,12 +120,20 @@ where
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext { challenge, pubkey })
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge,
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
})
}
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext { challenge, pubkey }: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeContext {
challenge,
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<Credentials, Self::Error> {
let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
@@ -153,13 +152,15 @@ where
}
// Resolve client id: bootstrap (consume token + register) or lookup
let id = match self.bootstrap_token.take() {
let id = match bootstrap_token {
Some(token) => {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(VerifyToken { token })
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use crate::{
vault::{GetState, Vault},
},
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus, Integrable},
db::{DatabaseError, DatabasePool, models::OperatorId},
db::{DatabaseError, DatabasePool},
peers::client::ClientProfile,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ pub mod vault_gate;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hashable)]
pub struct Credentials {
pub id: OperatorId,
pub id: i32,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}

View File

@@ -2,17 +2,14 @@ use super::{Error, OperatorSession};
use crate::{
actors::{
evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, OperatorCreateGrant, OperatorListGrants,
SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, OperatorCreateGrant, OperatorDeleteGrant,
OperatorListGrants, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
},
flow_coordinator::{IsClientConnected, client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer},
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
vault::VaultState,
},
db::{
models::{
EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
},
schema::program_client,
db::models::{
EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
},
evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant},
};
@@ -22,16 +19,13 @@ use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{error::SendError, messages, prelude::Context};
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use tracing::error;
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Client not connected")]
ClientNotConnected,
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
@@ -128,22 +122,23 @@ impl OperatorSession {
}
#[message]
pub(crate) fn handle_grant_delete(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
// match self
// .props
// .actors
// .evm
// .ask(OperatorDeleteGrant { grant_id })
// .await
// {
// Ok(()) => Ok(()),
// Err(err) => {
// error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
// Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
// }
// }
let _ = grant_id;
todo!()
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(
&mut self,
grant_id: i32,
) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(OperatorDeleteGrant { grant_id })
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
@@ -153,30 +148,6 @@ impl OperatorSession {
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
if !self.approved_client_ids.contains(&client_id) {
warn!(
client_id,
"operator attempted to sign for client not in its approved set"
);
return Err(SignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected);
}
let connected = self
.props
.actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(IsClientConnected { client_id })
.await
.unwrap_or(false);
if !connected {
self.approved_client_ids.remove(&client_id);
warn!(client_id, "operator attempted to sign for disconnected client");
return Err(SignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected);
}
info!(client_id, event = "sign_transaction", "operator.sign_transaction");
match self
.props
.actors
@@ -232,7 +203,7 @@ impl OperatorSession {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry))
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
}
@@ -247,8 +218,9 @@ impl OperatorSession {
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let access_entries = crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access::table
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
@@ -285,30 +257,6 @@ impl OperatorSession {
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
if approved {
let pubkey_bytes = pending_approval.pubkey.to_bytes();
match self.props.db.get().await {
Ok(mut conn) => {
match program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.as_slice()))
.select(program_client::id)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
{
Ok(client_id) => {
self.approved_client_ids.insert(client_id);
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to look up client_id for approved pubkey");
}
}
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "DB pool error after client approval");
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -331,142 +279,3 @@ impl OperatorSession {
Ok(clients)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::db::{self, models::{EvmWalletId, NewEvmWalletAccess}, schema::evm_wallet_access};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
/// Regression test: revocation must delete by access-entry `id`, not by `wallet_id`.
///
/// Before the fix, revoking `entry_id=1` would delete all rows where `wallet_id=1`,
/// wiping out every client's access to wallet #1.
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoke_deletes_by_entry_id_not_wallet_id() {
use crate::db::models::EvmWalletAccess;
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.expect("pool connection");
// Insert two access entries for the same wallet but different clients.
// entry A: id will be 1, wallet_id=1, client_id=10
// entry B: id will be 2, wallet_id=1, client_id=20
let entry_a = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(1),
client_id: 10,
})
.returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert entry A");
let entry_b = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(1),
client_id: 20,
})
.returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert entry B");
// Revoke only entry A by its primary key id.
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_a.id))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
})
.await
.expect("revoke entry A");
// Entry A must be gone.
let gone = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_a.id))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count entry A");
assert_eq!(gone, 0, "revoked entry must be deleted");
// Entry B (same wallet, different client) must still exist.
let still_there = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_b.id))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count entry B");
assert_eq!(still_there, 1, "unrelated entry must not be deleted");
}
/// Regression test: when `entry_id` and `wallet_id` differ, only the correct row is removed.
///
/// This specifically catches the case where `entry.id=5` and `wallet_id=1` are different values;
/// the old bug would delete by `wallet_id`, potentially matching a completely different entry.
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoke_with_mismatched_wallet_and_entry_ids() {
use crate::db::models::EvmWalletAccess;
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.expect("pool connection");
// Insert entries to force auto-increment IDs to diverge from wallet_ids.
// We'll insert 5 placeholder entries first so that the real entry gets id=6.
for i in 1_i32..=5 {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(99),
client_id: i,
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert placeholder");
}
// Real target: wallet_id=1, will get id=6.
let target = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(1),
client_id: 1,
})
.returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert target");
// Sanity: target.id != target.wallet_id
assert_ne!(
target.id, target.wallet_id.to_raw(),
"test prerequisite: id and wallet_id must differ"
);
// Revoke by entry id.
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(target.id))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
})
.await
.expect("revoke target");
let remaining = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(target.id))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count target");
assert_eq!(remaining, 0, "target must be deleted by its entry id");
// Placeholders for wallet_id=99 must be untouched.
let placeholders = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(99))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count placeholders");
assert_eq!(placeholders, 5, "unrelated entries must survive");
}
}

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
use super::{OutOfBand, OperatorConnection};
use crate::{
actors::{
flow_coordinator::{GetConnectedClientIds, client_connect_approval::{ClientApprovalAnswer, ClientApprovalController}}, operator_registry::ConnectOperator,
}, peers::client::ClientProfile,
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
operator_registry::ConnectOperator,
},
peers::client::ClientProfile,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::{HashMap, HashSet}};
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::error;
@@ -52,10 +54,6 @@ pub struct OperatorSession {
sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>,
/// DB `client_ids` this operator session is allowed to sign for.
/// Seeded from currently-connected clients on start, then updated as
/// approvals are granted or denied during the session lifetime.
approved_client_ids: HashSet<i32>,
}
pub mod handlers;
@@ -66,7 +64,6 @@ impl OperatorSession {
props,
sender,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap::default(),
approved_client_ids: HashSet::default(),
}
}
}
@@ -91,7 +88,6 @@ impl OperatorSession {
actor = "operator",
event = "failed to announce new client connection"
);
let _ = controller.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved: false }).await;
return;
}
@@ -110,7 +106,7 @@ impl Actor for OperatorSession {
type Error = Error;
async fn on_start(mut args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props
.actors
.operator_registry
@@ -125,16 +121,6 @@ impl Actor for OperatorSession {
);
Error::internal("Failed to register operator connection with operator registry")
})?;
// Seed approved set with clients already connected when this session starts.
// New clients will be added via handle_new_client_approve as they are approved.
match args.props.actors.flow_coordinator.ask(GetConnectedClientIds {}).await {
Ok(ids) => args.approved_client_ids.extend(ids),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to fetch connected client IDs on operator session start");
}
}
Ok(args)
}

View File

@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{self, Bootstrap, GetState, TryUnseal, VaultState, events},
vault_coordinator::{self, ContributeBootstrap, ContributeUnseal, StartBootstrap},
vault_coordinator::{ContributeBootstrap, ContributeUnseal, StartBootstrap},
},
crypto::{KeyCell, integrity},
crypto::{KeyCell, integrity::{self}},
db::DatabasePool,
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey, SharedSecret};
pub use VaultGateMessage as Inbound;
pub use VaultGateMessageReply as Outbound;
pub mod state;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -26,29 +29,17 @@ pub enum Error {
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault locked: too many failed unseal attempts")]
LockedOut,
#[error("State transition failed")]
State,
#[error("Vault ceremony failed: {0}")]
Ceremony(#[from] vault_coordinator::Error),
#[error("Internal error: {0}")]
Internal(String),
}
impl Error {
fn internal(message: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self::Internal(message.into())
}
/// Preserve the coordinator's own error so the operator learns why a
/// ceremony was refused instead of reading "internal error".
fn ceremony<M>(error: SendError<M, vault_coordinator::Error>) -> Self {
match error {
SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Self::Ceremony(inner),
_ => Self::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"),
}
}
}
pub struct HandshakeResponse {
@@ -82,6 +73,7 @@ impl VaultGate {
impl Actor for VaultGate {
type Args = Self;
type Error = ();
async fn on_start(
@@ -110,29 +102,28 @@ impl VaultGate {
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
) -> Result<KeyCell, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(()) => Ok(key_buffer),
Ok(()) => KeyCell::try_from(key_buffer).map_err(|()| {
error!("Decrypted key material has unexpected length");
}),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
}
}
}
fn key_cell(buffer: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<KeyCell, Error> {
KeyCell::try_from(buffer).map_err(|()| Error::InvalidKey)
}
}
#[messages]
#[messages(enum)]
impl VaultGate {
#[message]
pub fn handle_handshake(
@@ -141,11 +132,14 @@ impl VaultGate {
) -> Result<HandshakeResponse, Error> {
let ephemeral_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&ephemeral_secret);
let secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_pubkey);
self.state = State::ReadyForExchange {
server_key: public_key,
secret,
};
Ok(HandshakeResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key,
})
@@ -161,17 +155,22 @@ impl VaultGate {
let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else {
return Err(Error::State);
};
let seal_key = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data)
.map_err(|()| Error::InvalidKey)
.and_then(Self::key_cell)?;
match self.actors.vault.ask(TryUnseal { seal_key }).await {
let Ok(seal_key) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data) else {
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
};
match self
.actors
.vault
.ask(TryUnseal { seal_key })
.await
{
Ok(()) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::InvalidKey)) => Err(Error::InvalidKey),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::LockedOut)) => Err(Error::LockedOut),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Vault failed to unseal key");
Err(Error::InvalidKey)
@@ -193,17 +192,15 @@ impl VaultGate {
let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else {
return Err(Error::State);
};
let seal_key = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data)
.map_err(|()| Error::InvalidKey)
.and_then(Self::key_cell)?;
let Ok(seal_key) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data) else {
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
};
match self
.actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key,
custody: None,
})
.ask(Bootstrap { seal_key })
.await
{
Ok(()) => {
@@ -226,11 +223,14 @@ impl VaultGate {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<VaultState, Error> {
self.actors
let answer = self
.actors
.vault
.ask(GetState {})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("failed to query vault"))
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("failed to query vault"))?;
Ok(answer)
}
#[message]
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ impl VaultGate {
declared_count: count,
})
.await
.map_err(Error::ceremony)
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
}
#[message]
@@ -250,14 +250,15 @@ impl VaultGate {
&mut self,
passphrase: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase);
self.actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeBootstrap {
operator_id: self.auth_creds.id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(passphrase),
passphrase: passphrase_cell,
})
.await
.map_err(Error::ceremony)
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
}
#[message]
@@ -265,14 +266,15 @@ impl VaultGate {
&mut self,
passphrase: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase);
self.actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeUnseal {
operator_id: self.auth_creds.id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(passphrase),
passphrase: passphrase_cell,
})
.await
.map_err(Error::ceremony)
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
}
}
@@ -326,75 +328,3 @@ impl Message<events::Unsealed> for VaultGate {
ctx.stop();
}
}
pub enum Inbound {
HandleHandshake(HandleHandshake),
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey),
HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey(HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey),
HandleVaultState,
HandleDeclareCommittee(HandleDeclareCommittee),
HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase(HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase),
HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase(HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase),
}
pub enum Outbound {
HandleHandshake(Result<HandshakeResponse, Error>),
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey(Result<(), Error>),
HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey(Result<(), Error>),
HandleVaultState(Result<VaultState, Error>),
HandleDeclareCommittee(Result<(), Error>),
HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase(Result<bool, Error>),
HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase(Result<bool, Error>),
}
impl Message<Inbound> for VaultGate {
type Reply = Result<Outbound, Error>;
async fn handle(
&mut self,
msg: Inbound,
_ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
match msg {
Inbound::HandleHandshake(message) => Ok(Outbound::HandleHandshake(
self.handle_handshake(message.client_pubkey),
)),
Inbound::HandleUnsealEncryptedKey(message) => Ok(Outbound::HandleUnsealEncryptedKey(
self.handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
message.nonce,
message.ciphertext,
message.associated_data,
)
.await,
)),
Inbound::HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey(message) => {
Ok(Outbound::HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey(
self.handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
message.nonce,
message.ciphertext,
message.associated_data,
)
.await,
))
}
Inbound::HandleVaultState => {
Ok(Outbound::HandleVaultState(self.handle_vault_state().await))
}
Inbound::HandleDeclareCommittee(message) => Ok(Outbound::HandleDeclareCommittee(
self.handle_declare_committee(message.count).await,
)),
Inbound::HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase(message) => {
Ok(Outbound::HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase(
self.handle_contribute_bootstrap_passphrase(message.passphrase)
.await,
))
}
Inbound::HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase(message) => {
Ok(Outbound::HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase(
self.handle_contribute_unseal_passphrase(message.passphrase)
.await,
))
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Bootstrap},
crypto::{KeyCell, integrity},
crypto::integrity,
db::{self, schema},
peers::client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, auth, connect_client},
};
@@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ async fn spawn_test_actors(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> GlobalActors {
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
custody: None,
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -264,7 +263,7 @@ pub async fn metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn metadata_frozen_after_approval_ignores_reconnect_changes() {
pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
@@ -285,7 +284,6 @@ pub async fn metadata_frozen_after_approval_ignores_reconnect_changes() {
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
// Reconnect presenting different metadata — must be silently ignored.
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
@@ -312,7 +310,6 @@ pub async fn metadata_frozen_after_approval_ignores_reconnect_changes() {
client_metadata, client_metadata_history, program_client,
};
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
// Metadata is frozen: no new row, no history entry.
let metadata_count: i64 = client_metadata::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
@@ -338,19 +335,15 @@ pub async fn metadata_frozen_after_approval_ignores_reconnect_changes() {
.first::<(String, Option<String>, Option<String>)>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
metadata_count, 1,
"frozen: no new metadata row on reconnect"
);
assert_eq!(history_count, 0, "frozen: no history entry on reconnect");
assert_eq!(metadata_count, 2);
assert_eq!(history_count, 1);
assert_eq!(
current,
(
"client".to_owned(),
Some("old".to_owned()),
Some("1.0.0".to_owned())
),
"frozen: original metadata must be preserved"
Some("new".to_owned()),
Some("2.0.0".to_owned())
)
);
}
}

View File

@@ -2,11 +2,9 @@
dead_code,
reason = "Common test utilities that may not be used in every test"
)]
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Error, Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Vault},
crypto::KeyCell,
db::{self, schema},
};
@@ -20,7 +18,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
.await
.unwrap();
actor
.bootstrap(KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]), None)
.bootstrap(arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]))
.await
.unwrap();
actor

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{GlobalActors, bootstrap::GetToken, vault::Bootstrap},
crypto::{KeyCell, integrity},
db::{self, models::OperatorId, schema},
crypto::integrity,
db::{self, schema},
peers::operator::{self, Credentials, OperatorConnection, auth, vault_gate},
};
@@ -151,6 +151,13 @@ impl Sender<auth::Inbound> for StartTestTransport {
pub async fn bootstrap_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
@@ -164,7 +171,7 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_token_auth() {
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some(token.into_bytes()),
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -221,7 +228,7 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some(b"invalid_token".to_vec()),
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_owned()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -265,8 +272,7 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth() {
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
custody: None,
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -276,10 +282,10 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth() {
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let id: OperatorId = insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
let id: i32 = insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values((schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result::<OperatorId>(&mut conn)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
integrity::sign_entity(
@@ -352,8 +358,7 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed() {
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
custody: None,
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -392,7 +397,7 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed() {
let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge } => challenge,
other @ auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
@@ -426,8 +431,7 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
custody: None,
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -437,10 +441,10 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let id: OperatorId = insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
let id: i32 = insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values((schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result::<OperatorId>(&mut conn)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
integrity::sign_entity(
@@ -499,92 +503,3 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
Err(auth::Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
));
}
/// The bootstrap token authorises registering committee members *before* the
/// vault exists. Once any bootstrap path succeeds it must stop working, or its
/// holder could keep minting operator identities until the next restart.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn bootstrap_token_rejected_after_bootstrap() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
custody: None,
})
.await
.unwrap();
// `Bootstrapped` travels through the message bus, so the token disappears
// a couple of actor turns after the bootstrap call returns.
let mut retired = false;
for _ in 0..100 {
if actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().is_none() {
retired = true;
break;
}
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
assert!(
retired,
"the bootstrap token must be retired once the vault is bootstrapped"
);
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some(token.into_bytes()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
};
let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&new_key, &challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive auth result");
assert!(
matches!(response, Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)),
"a spent bootstrap token must not authorise a new identity, got {response:?}"
);
assert!(task.await.unwrap().is_err(), "authentication must fail");
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let registered: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
registered, 0,
"no identity may be registered after the bootstrap"
);
}

View File

@@ -4,8 +4,7 @@ use arbiter_server::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{Bootstrap, Seal},
},
crypto::KeyCell,
db::{self, models::OperatorId},
db,
peers::operator::{
Credentials,
vault_gate::{
@@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
async fn setup_sealed_gate(
seal_key: [u8; 32],
seal_key: &[u8; 32],
) -> (
db::DatabasePool,
kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
@@ -32,8 +31,7 @@ async fn setup_sealed_gate(
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: KeyCell::from(seal_key),
custody: None,
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from(*seal_key),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -41,10 +39,7 @@ async fn setup_sealed_gate(
let (promotion_tx, promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
let pubkey = authn::SigningKey::generate().public_key();
let auth_creds = Credentials {
id: OperatorId::from_raw(1),
pubkey,
};
let auth_creds = Credentials { id: 1, pubkey };
let gate = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(auth_creds, actors, db.clone(), promotion_tx));
(db, gate, promotion_rx)
@@ -52,7 +47,7 @@ async fn setup_sealed_gate(
async fn client_dh_encrypt(
gate: &kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
key_to_send: &[u8],
key_to_send: &[u8; 32],
) -> HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
@@ -85,10 +80,10 @@ async fn client_dh_encrypt(
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn unseal_success() {
let seal_key = [7u8; 32];
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, &seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, seal_key).await;
let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(())));
@@ -97,10 +92,10 @@ pub async fn unseal_success() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
let seal_key = [7u8; 32];
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, &[8u8; 32]).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key-padded-to-32-bytes!!!!").await;
let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(
@@ -114,7 +109,7 @@ pub async fn unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
let seal_key = [7u8; 32];
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
@@ -145,11 +140,11 @@ pub async fn unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {
let seal_key = [9u8; 32];
let seal_key = b"real-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, &[8u8; 32]).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key-padded-to-32-bytes!!!!").await;
let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(
@@ -161,7 +156,7 @@ pub async fn unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {
}
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, &seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, seal_key).await;
let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(())));

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ mod common;
#[path = "vault/concurrency.rs"]
mod concurrency;
#[path = "vault/custody.rs"]
mod custody;
#[path = "vault/lifecycle.rs"]
mod lifecycle;
#[path = "vault/storage.rs"]

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ use arbiter_server::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{CreateNew, Error, Vault},
},
crypto::KeyCell,
db::{self, models, schema},
};
@@ -15,8 +14,6 @@ use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use tokio::task::JoinSet;
const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
async fn write_concurrently(
actor: ActorRef<Vault>,
prefix: &'static str,
@@ -30,7 +27,6 @@ async fn write_concurrently(
let id = actor
.ask(CreateNew {
plaintext: SafeCell::new(plaintext.clone()),
aad: TEST_AAD.to_vec(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -124,7 +120,7 @@ async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
drop(conn);
let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"should fail".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"should fail".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::DatabaseTransaction(_)));
@@ -170,12 +166,12 @@ async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
.await
.unwrap();
decryptor
.try_unseal(KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]))
.try_unseal(arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]))
.await
.unwrap();
for (id, plaintext) in expected {
let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,387 +0,0 @@
//! End-to-end coverage for the Shamir custody ceremonies.
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{Bootstrap, Error as VaultError, GetState, Seal, Vault, VaultState},
vault_coordinator::{ContributeBootstrap, ContributeUnseal, StartBootstrap},
},
crypto::{KeyCell, shamir},
db::{
self,
custody::{CustodyRecord, EncryptedShare},
models::OperatorId,
schema,
},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
/// Register `count` operator identities so committee members satisfy the
/// foreign key from `operator` to `operator_identity`.
async fn register_operators(db: &db::DatabasePool, count: usize) -> Vec<OperatorId> {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let mut ids = Vec::with_capacity(count);
for index in 0..count {
let pubkey = vec![u8::try_from(index).unwrap(); 32];
let id: OperatorId = diesel::insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values((schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey),))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
ids.push(id);
}
ids
}
async fn stored_share_count(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> i64 {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
schema::operator::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
async fn stored_threshold(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Option<i32> {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
schema::arbiter_settings::table
.select(schema::arbiter_settings::shamir_threshold)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
fn passphrase(seed: u8) -> SafeCell<Vec<u8>> {
SafeCell::new(vec![seed; 16])
}
/// The happy path: three operators bootstrap, and any two of them reopen the
/// vault after it is sealed.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn committee_of_three_unseals_with_two_passphrases() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let operators = register_operators(&db, 3).await;
actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[0],
declared_count: 3,
})
.await
.unwrap();
for (index, operator_id) in operators.iter().enumerate() {
let finished = actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeBootstrap {
operator_id: *operator_id,
passphrase: passphrase(u8::try_from(index).unwrap()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
finished,
index == 2,
"the ceremony finishes only on the last contribution"
);
}
assert_eq!(
actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap(),
VaultState::Unsealed
);
assert_eq!(stored_share_count(&db).await, 3);
assert_eq!(stored_threshold(&db).await, Some(2));
actors.vault.ask(Seal {}).await.unwrap();
let first = actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeUnseal {
operator_id: operators[0],
passphrase: passphrase(0),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(!first, "one of two shares must not unseal");
let second = actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeUnseal {
operator_id: operators[2],
passphrase: passphrase(2),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(second, "the threshold contribution should unseal the vault");
assert_eq!(
actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap(),
VaultState::Unsealed
);
}
/// Shares that describe a seal key the vault never adopted would make the vault
/// permanently un-unsealable, so a refused bootstrap must leave the table empty.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn refused_bootstrap_stores_no_shares() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let operators = register_operators(&db, 1).await;
// Another path bootstraps the vault first; the ceremony now has nowhere to go.
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: KeyCell::from([4u8; 32]),
custody: None,
})
.await
.unwrap();
actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[0],
declared_count: 1,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let error = actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[0],
passphrase: passphrase(1),
})
.await
.expect_err("bootstrapping an already bootstrapped vault must fail");
assert!(
format!("{error:?}").contains("AlreadyBootstrapped"),
"expected AlreadyBootstrapped, got {error:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
stored_share_count(&db).await,
0,
"a refused bootstrap must not leave shares behind"
);
assert_eq!(
stored_threshold(&db).await,
None,
"a refused bootstrap must not leave a threshold behind"
);
}
/// A failing custody write must take the whole bootstrap down with it: a vault
/// that kept its root key but lost the shares could never be unsealed again.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn custody_write_failure_rolls_back_bootstrap() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let operators = register_operators(&db, 1).await;
let record = CustodyRecord {
threshold: 1,
shares: operators
.into_iter()
.map(|operator_id| {
(
operator_id,
EncryptedShare {
ciphertext: vec![1; 32],
nonce: vec![2; 24],
salt: vec![3; 16],
},
)
})
.collect(),
};
let mut vault = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
// The threshold update is the last statement of the custody write, so the
// trigger fails the transaction once the share row is already in place.
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
diesel::sql_query(
"CREATE TRIGGER fail_custody_threshold BEFORE UPDATE OF shamir_threshold ON arbiter_settings BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'forced custody failure'); END;",
)
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let error = vault
.bootstrap(KeyCell::from([4u8; 32]), Some(record))
.await
.expect_err("a failing custody write must fail the bootstrap");
assert!(
matches!(error, VaultError::Custody(_)),
"expected a custody error, got {error:?}"
);
assert_eq!(vault.get_state(), VaultState::Unbootstrapped);
assert_eq!(stored_share_count(&db).await, 0);
assert_eq!(stored_threshold(&db).await, None);
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let root_count: i64 = schema::root_key_history::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let root_key_id: Option<i32> = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.select(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(root_count, 0, "the root key write must roll back as well");
assert_eq!(root_key_id, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn oversized_and_degenerate_committees_are_rejected() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let operators = register_operators(&db, 1).await;
for (count, expected) in [
(0_usize, "EmptyCommittee"),
(2, "UnsupportedCommittee"),
(shamir::MAX_COMMITTEE_SIZE + 1, "CommitteeTooLarge"),
(usize::MAX, "CommitteeTooLarge"),
] {
let error = actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[0],
declared_count: count,
})
.await
.expect_err("committee size must be rejected");
assert!(
format!("{error:?}").contains(expected),
"expected {expected} for count {count}, got {error:?}"
);
}
}
/// A committee whose members never all show up would otherwise wedge the
/// coordinator until restart. Only the operator that declared it may reset it.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn only_the_declarer_may_restart_a_stalled_committee() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let operators = register_operators(&db, 3).await;
actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[0],
declared_count: 3,
})
.await
.unwrap();
actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[0],
passphrase: passphrase(0),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let error = actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[1],
declared_count: 3,
})
.await
.expect_err("a bystander must not reset someone else's ceremony");
assert!(
format!("{error:?}").contains("AlreadyBootstrapping"),
"expected AlreadyBootstrapping, got {error:?}"
);
actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[0],
declared_count: 1,
})
.await
.expect("the declarer may restart the ceremony");
let finished = actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[0],
passphrase: passphrase(0),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
finished,
"the restarted one-operator ceremony should complete"
);
assert_eq!(stored_share_count(&db).await, 1);
}
/// A wrong passphrase must not unseal, and the operator must be able to retry.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn wrong_passphrase_is_rejected_and_retryable() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let operators = register_operators(&db, 1).await;
actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[0],
declared_count: 1,
})
.await
.unwrap();
actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeBootstrap {
operator_id: operators[0],
passphrase: passphrase(7),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actors.vault.ask(Seal {}).await.unwrap();
let error = actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeUnseal {
operator_id: operators[0],
passphrase: passphrase(8),
})
.await
.expect_err("a wrong passphrase must not unseal");
assert!(
format!("{error:?}").contains("InvalidPassphrase"),
"expected InvalidPassphrase, got {error:?}"
);
let unsealed = actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeUnseal {
operator_id: operators[0],
passphrase: passphrase(7),
})
.await
.expect("the operator may retry with the correct passphrase");
assert!(unsealed, "the retry should unseal the vault");
}

View File

@@ -5,28 +5,23 @@ use arbiter_server::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{Error, Vault},
},
crypto::{
KeyCell,
encryption::v1::{Nonce, ROOT_KEY_TAG},
},
crypto::{KeyCell, encryption::v1::{Nonce, ROOT_KEY_TAG}},
db::{self, models, schema},
};
use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn bootstrap() {
async fn test_bootstrap() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let seal_key = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
actor.bootstrap(seal_key, None).await.unwrap();
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
@@ -44,25 +39,25 @@ async fn bootstrap() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn bootstrap_rejects_double() {
async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let seal_key2 = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2, None).await.unwrap_err();
let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::AlreadyBootstrapped));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
@@ -70,19 +65,19 @@ async fn create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
async fn test_decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let err = actor.decrypt(1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
let err = actor.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn new_restores_sealed_state() {
async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
drop(actor);
@@ -90,19 +85,19 @@ async fn new_restores_sealed_state() {
let mut actor2 = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let err = actor2.decrypt(1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
let err = actor2.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::Sealed));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn unseal_correct_password() {
async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
@@ -113,19 +108,19 @@ async fn unseal_correct_password() {
let seal_key = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"important data";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
@@ -141,6 +136,6 @@ async fn unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let good_key = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}

View File

@@ -10,47 +10,45 @@ use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use std::collections::HashSet;
const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
async fn test_decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let err = actor.decrypt(9999, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
let err = actor.decrypt(9999).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotFound));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"same content";
let id1 = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let id2 = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -70,22 +68,22 @@ async fn ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
assert_ne!(row1.ciphertext, row2.ciphertext);
let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1).await.unwrap();
let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*d1.read(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d2.read(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn nonce_never_reused() {
async fn test_nonce_never_reused() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let n = 5;
for i in 0..n {
actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()))
.await
.unwrap();
}
@@ -139,7 +137,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
drop(conn);
let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"must fail".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"must fail".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
@@ -147,7 +145,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -158,6 +156,6 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let err = actor.decrypt(id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
let err = actor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
}