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41 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Clippy Bot
cc21036448 fix(clippy): apply auto-fixable linting suggestions 2026-06-23 18:47:23 +00:00
CleverWild
4fd75701c7 ci(clippy): add auto-fix bot pipeline 2026-06-23 20:41:41 +02:00
CleverWild
b843105533 fix(user-agent): zombie sessions #74
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2026-06-18 16:29:43 +02:00
a8e4a710f1 Merge pull request 'security(server): bind grant revocation state (revoked_at) to integrity hash' (#83) from security-hash-revoke_at into main
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Reviewed-on: #83
2026-06-11 09:44:28 +00:00
CleverWild
d99c87c473 fix: lints
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2026-06-09 21:07:01 +02:00
CleverWild
303120c9ac Merge branch 'main' into security-hash-revoke_at
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2026-06-09 20:58:20 +02:00
CleverWild
32f317384d security(evm): remove client-controlled wallet_access_id from grant revocation
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2026-06-09 19:36:44 +02:00
CleverWild
4bb2c062dc feat(evm): add wallet_access_id to grant deletion requests and revocation logic
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2026-06-09 19:16:21 +02:00
CleverWild
b0a3f37cea refactor(evm): implement revoke_grant method for grant revocation 2026-06-09 19:11:39 +02:00
CleverWild
58a72da46c Merge branch 'security-hash-revoke_at' of ssh://git.markettakers.org:22222/MarketTakers/arbiter into security-hash-revoke_at
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2026-06-09 19:10:57 +02:00
CleverWild
e287459b10 revert(server): bind grant revocation state (revoked_at) to integrity hash 2026-06-09 18:45:30 +02:00
CleverWild
3c482da917 fix(smlang::statemachine): macro invocation requires inner types to be public
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2026-06-08 18:00:52 +02:00
Skipper
3f801abdff housekeeping(server): deps upgrade + diesel migration to AsyncFnOnce
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2026-05-01 11:22:40 +02:00
Skipper
2b44570ab4 fix(server): MacOS build version
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2026-04-19 13:47:47 +02:00
Skipper
1f9b253433 housekeeping(server): removed unused deps 2026-04-19 13:46:49 +02:00
Skipper
a1c3ffd2d1 refactor: rename to to better reflect meaning
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2026-04-19 13:41:50 +02:00
Skipper
fd25de32a1 docs: move to folder and update to new challenge payload 2026-04-18 15:17:18 +02:00
Skipper
9ab074170b merge: feat-lints into main
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2026-04-18 15:04:33 +02:00
18b8a3bbf5 Merge pull request 'refactor-integrity-check' (#90) from refactor-integrity-check into main
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Reviewed-on: #90
2026-04-18 11:54:30 +00:00
Skipper
38cf1b98b9 housekeeping(server): clippy warns fix
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2026-04-18 13:53:11 +02:00
Skipper
9cf87b2058 merge: refactor-integrity-check into main
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2026-04-18 13:46:28 +02:00
Skipper
929d50b589 housekeeping(server): clean too-broad visibility markers and organize imports
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2026-04-18 13:30:09 +02:00
Skipper
70acfc99b5 merge: refactor-integrity-check into main 2026-04-18 13:19:13 +02:00
28f84d03ab Merge pull request 'housekeeping(server): dependencies upgrade' (#89) from push-zmvtzuwrnyyv into main
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Reviewed-on: #89
2026-04-17 19:20:50 +00:00
Skipper
4a8e51ef32 docs: updated to new auth challenge format and removed stale TOCTOU race condition note
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2026-04-17 18:25:55 +02:00
Skipper
9ee86afc19 fix(useragent): now using new challenge format 2026-04-17 18:19:51 +02:00
Skipper
790026e93b fix(server::tests): api surface of auth challenge changed 2026-04-17 17:58:22 +02:00
Skipper
0e09afda5d refactor(server::{useragent::auth, client::auth}): use random based + timestamp nonce instead of monotonic counter in database 2026-04-17 17:44:42 +02:00
Skipper
51e6571d80 refactor(server): now keeps track of useragents, instead of 2026-04-17 00:00:43 +02:00
Skipper
3b828d5874 refactor(server::grpc::vault_gate): standard approach using / traits 2026-04-16 22:15:18 +02:00
Skipper
a6f94e3115 fix(server): sending fixed vault state when on stage 2026-04-16 19:36:41 +02:00
hdbg
f49e995c2f WIP: kameo::messages wiring for transport generalization
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2026-04-16 17:18:46 +02:00
Skipper
e88df432fb housekeeping(server): dependencies upgrade
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2026-04-14 19:10:07 +02:00
hdbg
87ee0fe87b feat(user-agent): add VaultGate for sealed vault authentication 2026-04-12 11:53:05 +02:00
CleverWild
41b3fc5d39 fix(lints): remove unstable ones
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2026-04-10 01:00:21 +02:00
CleverWild
f6a0c32b9d feat: rustc and clippy linting
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2026-04-10 00:42:43 +02:00
hdbg
205227a3df fix(server::integrity): vault now differentias between expected/unexpected states for commands more granularly 2026-04-08 18:21:48 +02:00
hdbg
a4070e7df7 fix(useragent): unsafe, but working implementation of ml-dsa 2026-04-08 17:43:51 +02:00
hdbg
6b8da567dd fix(server::user_agent): useragents now self-sign themselves on bootstrap 2026-04-08 17:40:45 +02:00
hdbg
1585f90cae refactor(server): reorganized client/user_agent actors into separate module peers and added event MessageBus 2026-04-08 12:34:16 +02:00
CleverWild
5a34463228 security(server): bind grant revocation state (revoked_at) to integrity hash
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2026-04-08 12:09:54 +02:00
437 changed files with 79235 additions and 67175 deletions

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@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
--- ---
name: Widget decomposition and provider subscriptions name: Widget decomposition and provider subscriptions
description: Prefer splitting screens into multiple focused files/widgets; each widget subscribes to its own relevant providers description: Prefer splitting screens into multiple focused files/widgets; each widget subscribes to its own relevant providers
type: feedback type: feedback
--- ---
Split screens into multiple smaller widgets across multiple files. Each widget should subscribe only to the providers it needs (`ref.watch` at lowest possible level), rather than having one large screen widget that watches everything and passes data down as parameters. Split screens into multiple smaller widgets across multiple files. Each widget should subscribe only to the providers it needs (`ref.watch` at lowest possible level), rather than having one large screen widget that watches everything and passes data down as parameters.
**Why:** Reduces unnecessary rebuilds; improves readability; each file has one clear responsibility. **Why:** Reduces unnecessary rebuilds; improves readability; each file has one clear responsibility.
**How to apply:** When building a new screen, identify which sub-widgets need their own provider subscriptions and extract them into separate files (e.g., `widgets/grant_card.dart` watches enrichment providers itself, rather than the screen doing it and passing resolved strings down). **How to apply:** When building a new screen, identify which sub-widgets need their own provider subscriptions and extract them into separate files (e.g., `widgets/grant_card.dart` watches enrichment providers itself, rather than the screen doing it and passing resolved strings down).

12
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
target/ target/
scripts/__pycache__/ scripts/__pycache__/
.DS_Store .DS_Store
.cargo/config.toml .cargo/config.toml
.vscode/ .vscode/
docs/ docs/superpowers

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@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
when: when:
- event: pull_request - event: pull_request
path: path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**'] include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
- event: push - event: push
branch: main branch: main
path: path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**'] include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
steps: steps:
- name: audit - name: audit
image: jdxcode/mise:latest image: jdxcode/mise:latest
directory: server directory: server
environment: environment:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
volumes: volumes:
- cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
- cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
commands: commands:
- apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
# Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI # Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI
- mise install rust - mise install rust
- mise install cargo:cargo-audit - mise install cargo:cargo-audit
- mise exec cargo:cargo-audit -- cargo audit - mise exec cargo:cargo-audit -- cargo audit

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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
when:
- event: push
branch: main
path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
steps:
- name: clippy-fix
image: jdxcode/mise:latest
directory: server
environment:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
GITEA_TOKEN:
from_secret: GITEA_TOKEN
GITEA_URL:
from_secret: GITEA_URL
volumes:
- cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
- cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
commands:
- apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config curl
- mise install rust
- mise install protoc
- mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --fix --allow-dirty --all
- |
cd ..
if git diff --quiet HEAD; then
echo "No machine-applicable clippy fixes found, nothing to do."
exit 0
fi
git config user.email "bot@arbiter"
git config user.name "Clippy Bot"
git add -A
git commit -m "fix(clippy): apply auto-fixable linting suggestions"
git config http.extraHeader "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}"
git push --force origin HEAD:refs/heads/bot/clippy-fixes
HTTP_STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${CI_REPO}/pulls" \
-H "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"title\":\"fix(clippy): apply auto-fixable linting suggestions\",\"head\":\"bot/clippy-fixes\",\"base\":\"main\",\"body\":\"Automated clippy fixes generated by CI bot.\"}")
echo "Gitea API response: ${HTTP_STATUS}"
[ "$HTTP_STATUS" = "201" ] || [ "$HTTP_STATUS" = "409" ] || [ "$HTTP_STATUS" = "422" ] || exit 1

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@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
when: when:
- event: pull_request - event: pull_request
path: path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**'] include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
- event: push - event: push
branch: main branch: main
path: path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**'] include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
steps: steps:
- name: lint - name: lint
image: jdxcode/mise:latest image: jdxcode/mise:latest
directory: server directory: server
environment: environment:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
volumes: volumes:
- cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
- cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
commands: commands:
- apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
- mise install rust - mise install rust
- mise install protoc - mise install protoc
- mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all -- -D warnings - mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all -- -D warnings

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@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
when: when:
- event: pull_request - event: pull_request
path: path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**'] include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
- event: push - event: push
branch: main branch: main
path: path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**'] include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
steps: steps:
- name: test - name: test
image: jdxcode/mise:latest image: jdxcode/mise:latest
directory: server directory: server
environment: environment:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
volumes: volumes:
- cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
- cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
commands: commands:
- apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
# Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI # Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI
- mise install rust - mise install rust
- mise install protoc - mise install protoc
- mise install cargo:cargo-nextest - mise install cargo:cargo-nextest
- mise exec cargo:cargo-nextest -- cargo nextest run --no-fail-fast --all-features - mise exec cargo:cargo-nextest -- cargo nextest run --no-fail-fast --all-features

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@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
when: when:
- event: pull_request - event: pull_request
path: path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**'] include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
- event: push - event: push
branch: main branch: main
path: path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**'] include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
steps: steps:
- name: vet - name: vet
image: jdxcode/mise:latest image: jdxcode/mise:latest
directory: server directory: server
environment: environment:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
volumes: volumes:
- cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
- cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
commands: commands:
- apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
# Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI # Install only the necessary Rust toolchain and test runner to speed up the CI
- mise install rust - mise install rust
- mise install cargo:cargo-vet - mise install cargo:cargo-vet
- mise exec cargo:cargo-vet -- cargo vet - mise exec cargo:cargo-vet -- cargo vet

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@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
when: when:
- event: pull_request - event: pull_request
path: path:
include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**'] include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**']
- event: push - event: push
branch: main branch: main
path: path:
include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**'] include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**']
steps: steps:
- name: analyze - name: analyze
image: jdxcode/mise:latest image: jdxcode/mise:latest
commands: commands:
- mise install flutter - mise install flutter
- mise install protoc - mise install protoc
# Reruns codegen to catch protocol drift # Reruns codegen to catch protocol drift
- mise codegen - mise codegen
- cd useragent/ && flutter analyze - cd useragent/ && flutter analyze

277
AGENTS.md
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@@ -1,128 +1,149 @@
# AGENTS.md # AGENTS.md
This file provides guidance to Codex (Codex.ai/code) when working with code in this repository. This file provides guidance to Codex (Codex.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Project Overview ## Project Overview
Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of: Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies - **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf - **`operator/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client - **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies. The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
## Toolchain Setup ## Toolchain Setup
Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools: Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
```sh ```sh
mise install mise install
``` ```
Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite). Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`) ## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
### Crates ### Crates
| Crate | Purpose | | Crate | Purpose |
|---|---| |---|---|
| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` | | `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation | | `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol | | `arbiter-operator` | Rust client library for the operator side of the gRPC protocol |
| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients | | `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
### Common Commands ### Common Commands
```sh ```sh
cd server cd server
# Build # Build
cargo build cargo build
# Run the server daemon # Run the server daemon
cargo run -p arbiter-server cargo run -p arbiter-server
# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test) # Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
cargo nextest run cargo nextest run
# Run a single test # Run a single test
cargo nextest run <test_name> cargo nextest run <test_name>
# Lint # Lint
cargo clippy cargo clippy
# Security audit # Security audit
cargo audit cargo audit
# Check unused dependencies # Check unused dependencies
cargo shear cargo shear
# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots # Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
cargo insta review cargo insta review
``` ```
### Architecture ### Architecture
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`: The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run. - **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell. - **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients. - **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between operators and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing. - **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules. Per-connection actors live under `actors/operator/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`. **Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
**Cryptography:** **Cryptography:**
- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer) - Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal) - Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
- Password KDF: Argon2 - Password KDF: Argon2
- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange - Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl` - TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run). **Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
### Proto Regeneration ### Proto Regeneration
When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate: When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
```sh ```sh
cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
``` ```
### Database Migrations ### Database Migrations
```sh ```sh
# Create a new migration # Create a new migration
diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup) # Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
``` ```
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`) ### Code Conventions
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client. **`#[must_use]` Attribute:**
Apply the `#[must_use]` attribute to return types of functions where the return value is critical and should not be accidentally ignored. This is commonly used for:
Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
- Methods that return `bool` indicating success/failure or validation state
```sh - Any function where ignoring the return value indicates a logic error
cd useragent && rinf gen
``` Do not apply `#[must_use]` redundantly to items (types or functions) that are already annotated with `#[must_use]`.
### Common Commands Example:
```sh ```rust
cd useragent #[must_use]
pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
# Run the app (macOS or Windows) // verification logic
flutter run }
```
# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
rinf gen This forces callers to either use the return value or explicitly ignore it with `let _ = ...;`, preventing silent failures.
# Analyze Dart code ## Operator (Flutter + Rinf at `operator/`)
flutter analyze
``` The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `operator/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-operator` for the gRPC client.
The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals. Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `operator/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
```sh
cd operator && rinf gen
```
### Common Commands
```sh
cd operator
# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
flutter run
# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
rinf gen
# Analyze Dart code
flutter analyze
```
The Rinf Rust entry point is `operator/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `operator/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

129
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@@ -1,128 +1 @@
# CLAUDE.md Refer to @AGENTS.md for instructions.
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Project Overview
Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
## Toolchain Setup
Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
```sh
mise install
```
Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
### Crates
| Crate | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
### Common Commands
```sh
cd server
# Build
cargo build
# Run the server daemon
cargo run -p arbiter-server
# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
cargo nextest run
# Run a single test
cargo nextest run <test_name>
# Lint
cargo clippy
# Security audit
cargo audit
# Check unused dependencies
cargo shear
# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
cargo insta review
```
### Architecture
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
**Cryptography:**
- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
- Password KDF: Argon2
- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
### Proto Regeneration
When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
```sh
cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
```
### Database Migrations
```sh
# Create a new migration
diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
```sh
cd useragent && rinf gen
```
### Common Commands
```sh
cd useragent
# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
flutter run
# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
rinf gen
# Analyze Dart code
flutter analyze
```
The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

380
LICENSE
View File

@@ -1,190 +1,190 @@
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Copyright 2026 MarketTakers Copyright 2026 MarketTakers
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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limitations under the License. limitations under the License.

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
# Arbiter # Arbiter
> Policy-first multi-client wallet daemon, allowing permissioned transactions across blockchains > Policy-first multi-client wallet daemon, allowing permissioned transactions across blockchains
## Security warning ## Security warning
Arbiter can't meaningfully protect against host compromise. Potential attack flow: Arbiter can't meaningfully protect against host compromise. Potential attack flow:
- Attacker steals TLS keys from database - Attacker steals TLS keys from database
- Pretends to be server; just accepts user agent challenge solutions - Pretends to be server; just accepts operator challenge solutions
- Pretend to be in sealed state and performing DH with client - Pretend to be in sealed state and performing DH with client
- Steals user password and derives seal key - Steals user password and derives seal key
While this attack is highly targetive, it's still possible. While this attack is highly targetive, it's still possible.
> This software is experimental. Do not use with funds you cannot afford to lose. > This software is experimental. Do not use with funds you cannot afford to lose.

View File

@@ -1,31 +1,31 @@
Extension Discovery Cache Extension Discovery Cache
========================= =========================
This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
packages that contains extensions for other packages. packages that contains extensions for other packages.
DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
---------------------- ----------------------
* Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder. * Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
* Do write to this folder. * Do write to this folder.
If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information. API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable. contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
Use package `extension_discovery` Use package `extension_discovery`
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
If you want to access information from this folder. If you want to access information from this folder.
Feel free to delete this folder Feel free to delete this folder
------------------------------- -------------------------------
Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`. are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
need to do please file a bug. need to do please file a bug.

View File

@@ -1,178 +1,178 @@
{ {
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"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
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"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
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{ {
"name": "sky_engine", "name": "sky_engine",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/bin/cache/pkg/sky_engine", "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/bin/cache/pkg/sky_engine",
"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8" "languageVersion": "3.8"
}, },
{ {
"name": "source_span", "name": "source_span",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/source_span-1.10.2", "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/source_span-1.10.2",
"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1" "languageVersion": "3.1"
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"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stack_trace-1.12.1", "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stack_trace-1.12.1",
"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4" "languageVersion": "3.4"
}, },
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"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stream_channel-2.1.4", "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stream_channel-2.1.4",
"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.3" "languageVersion": "3.3"
}, },
{ {
"name": "string_scanner", "name": "string_scanner",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/string_scanner-1.4.1", "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/string_scanner-1.4.1",
"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1" "languageVersion": "3.1"
}, },
{ {
"name": "term_glyph", "name": "term_glyph",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/term_glyph-1.2.2", "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/term_glyph-1.2.2",
"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1" "languageVersion": "3.1"
}, },
{ {
"name": "test_api", "name": "test_api",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/test_api-0.7.7", "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/test_api-0.7.7",
"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.5" "languageVersion": "3.5"
}, },
{ {
"name": "vector_math", "name": "vector_math",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vector_math-2.2.0", "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vector_math-2.2.0",
"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1" "languageVersion": "3.1"
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{ {
"name": "vm_service", "name": "vm_service",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vm_service-15.0.2", "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vm_service-15.0.2",
"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.5" "languageVersion": "3.5"
}, },
{ {
"name": "app", "name": "app",
"rootUri": "../", "rootUri": "../",
"packageUri": "lib/", "packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.10" "languageVersion": "3.10"
} }
], ],
"generator": "pub", "generator": "pub",
"generatorVersion": "3.10.8", "generatorVersion": "3.10.8",
"flutterRoot": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable", "flutterRoot": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable",
"flutterVersion": "3.38.9", "flutterVersion": "3.38.9",
"pubCache": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache" "pubCache": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache"
} }

View File

@@ -1,230 +1,230 @@
{ {
"roots": [ "roots": [
"app" "app"
], ],
"packages": [ "packages": [
{ {
"name": "app", "name": "app",
"version": "1.0.0+1", "version": "1.0.0+1",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"cupertino_icons", "cupertino_icons",
"flutter" "flutter"
], ],
"devDependencies": [ "devDependencies": [
"flutter_lints", "flutter_lints",
"flutter_test" "flutter_test"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "flutter_lints", "name": "flutter_lints",
"version": "6.0.0", "version": "6.0.0",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"lints" "lints"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "flutter_test", "name": "flutter_test",
"version": "0.0.0", "version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"clock", "clock",
"collection", "collection",
"fake_async", "fake_async",
"flutter", "flutter",
"leak_tracker_flutter_testing", "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
"matcher", "matcher",
"meta", "meta",
"path", "path",
"stack_trace", "stack_trace",
"stream_channel", "stream_channel",
"test_api", "test_api",
"vector_math" "vector_math"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "cupertino_icons", "name": "cupertino_icons",
"version": "1.0.8", "version": "1.0.8",
"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
}, },
{ {
"name": "flutter", "name": "flutter",
"version": "0.0.0", "version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"characters", "characters",
"collection", "collection",
"material_color_utilities", "material_color_utilities",
"meta", "meta",
"sky_engine", "sky_engine",
"vector_math" "vector_math"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "lints", "name": "lints",
"version": "6.1.0", "version": "6.1.0",
"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
}, },
{ {
"name": "stream_channel", "name": "stream_channel",
"version": "2.1.4", "version": "2.1.4",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"async" "async"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "meta", "name": "meta",
"version": "1.17.0", "version": "1.17.0",
"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
}, },
{ {
"name": "collection", "name": "collection",
"version": "1.19.1", "version": "1.19.1",
"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
}, },
{ {
"name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing", "name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
"version": "3.0.10", "version": "3.0.10",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"flutter", "flutter",
"leak_tracker", "leak_tracker",
"leak_tracker_testing", "leak_tracker_testing",
"matcher", "matcher",
"meta" "meta"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "vector_math", "name": "vector_math",
"version": "2.2.0", "version": "2.2.0",
"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
}, },
{ {
"name": "stack_trace", "name": "stack_trace",
"version": "1.12.1", "version": "1.12.1",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"path" "path"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "clock", "name": "clock",
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"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
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{ {
"name": "fake_async", "name": "fake_async",
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"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"clock", "clock",
"collection" "collection"
] ]
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{ {
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"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
}, },
{ {
"name": "matcher", "name": "matcher",
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"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"async", "async",
"meta", "meta",
"stack_trace", "stack_trace",
"term_glyph", "term_glyph",
"test_api" "test_api"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "test_api", "name": "test_api",
"version": "0.7.7", "version": "0.7.7",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"async", "async",
"boolean_selector", "boolean_selector",
"collection", "collection",
"meta", "meta",
"source_span", "source_span",
"stack_trace", "stack_trace",
"stream_channel", "stream_channel",
"string_scanner", "string_scanner",
"term_glyph" "term_glyph"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "sky_engine", "name": "sky_engine",
"version": "0.0.0", "version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
}, },
{ {
"name": "material_color_utilities", "name": "material_color_utilities",
"version": "0.11.1", "version": "0.11.1",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"collection" "collection"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "characters", "name": "characters",
"version": "1.4.0", "version": "1.4.0",
"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
}, },
{ {
"name": "async", "name": "async",
"version": "2.13.0", "version": "2.13.0",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"collection", "collection",
"meta" "meta"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "leak_tracker_testing", "name": "leak_tracker_testing",
"version": "3.0.2", "version": "3.0.2",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"leak_tracker", "leak_tracker",
"matcher", "matcher",
"meta" "meta"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "leak_tracker", "name": "leak_tracker",
"version": "11.0.2", "version": "11.0.2",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"clock", "clock",
"collection", "collection",
"meta", "meta",
"path", "path",
"vm_service" "vm_service"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "term_glyph", "name": "term_glyph",
"version": "1.2.2", "version": "1.2.2",
"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
}, },
{ {
"name": "string_scanner", "name": "string_scanner",
"version": "1.4.1", "version": "1.4.1",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"source_span" "source_span"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "source_span", "name": "source_span",
"version": "1.10.2", "version": "1.10.2",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"collection", "collection",
"path", "path",
"term_glyph" "term_glyph"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "boolean_selector", "name": "boolean_selector",
"version": "2.1.2", "version": "2.1.2",
"dependencies": [ "dependencies": [
"source_span", "source_span",
"string_scanner" "string_scanner"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"name": "vm_service", "name": "vm_service",
"version": "15.0.2", "version": "15.0.2",
"dependencies": [] "dependencies": []
} }
], ],
"configVersion": 1 "configVersion": 1
} }

View File

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
// This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control. // This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable
FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app
COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true
FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build
FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0 FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0
FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1 FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1
DART_OBFUSCATION=false DART_OBFUSCATION=false
TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true
TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false
PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
#!/bin/sh #!/bin/sh
# This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control. # This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
export "FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable" export "FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable"
export "FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app" export "FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app"
export "COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true" export "COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true"
export "FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build" export "FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build"
export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0" export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0"
export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1" export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1"
export "DART_OBFUSCATION=false" export "DART_OBFUSCATION=false"
export "TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true" export "TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true"
export "TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false" export "TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false"
export "PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json" export "PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json"

View File

@@ -1,332 +1,334 @@
# Arbiter # Arbiter
Arbiter is a permissioned signing service for cryptocurrency wallets. It runs as a background service on the user's machine with an optional client application for vault management. Arbiter is a permissioned signing service for cryptocurrency wallets. It runs as a background service on the user's machine with an optional client application for vault management.
**Core principle:** The vault NEVER exposes key material. It only produces signatures when a request satisfies the configured policies. **Core principle:** The vault NEVER exposes key material. It only produces signatures when a request satisfies the configured policies.
--- ---
## 1. Peer Types ## 1. Peer Types
Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers: Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers:
- **User Agent** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies). - **Operator** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies).
- **SDK Client** — A consumer of signing capabilities, typically an automation tool. In the future, this could include a browser-based wallet. - **SDK Client** — A consumer of signing capabilities, typically an automation tool. In the future, this could include a browser-based wallet.
- **Recovery Operator** — A dormant recovery participant with narrowly scoped authority used only for custody recovery and operator replacement. - **Recovery Operator** — A dormant recovery participant with narrowly scoped authority used only for custody recovery and operator replacement.
--- ---
## 2. Authentication ## 2. Authentication
### 2.1 Challenge-Response ### 2.1 Challenge-Response
All peers authenticate via public-key cryptography using a challenge-response protocol: All peers authenticate via public-key cryptography using a challenge-response protocol:
1. The peer sends its public key and requests a challenge. 1. The peer sends its public key and requests a challenge.
2. The server looks up the key in its database. If found, it increments the nonce and returns a challenge (replay-attack protection). 2. The server looks up the key in its database. If found, it generates a fresh challenge from random bytes plus the current timestamp.
3. The peer signs the challenge with its private key and sends the signature back. 3. The peer signs the canonical challenge payload with its private key and sends the signature back.
4. The server verifies the signature: 4. The server verifies the signature:
- **Pass:** The connection is considered authenticated. - **Pass:** The connection is considered authenticated.
- **Fail:** The server closes the connection. - **Fail:** The server closes the connection.
### 2.2 User Agent Bootstrap Authentication challenges are per-connection, ephemeral values. They are not persisted in the peer tables, and peer records store no challenge state.
On first run — when no User Agents are registered — the server generates a one-time bootstrap token. It is made available in two ways: ### 2.2 Operator Bootstrap
- **Local setup:** Written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` for automatic discovery by a co-located User Agent. On first run — when no Operators are registered — the server generates a one-time bootstrap token. It is made available in two ways:
- **Remote setup:** Printed to the server's console output.
- **Local setup:** Written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` for automatic discovery by a co-located Operator.
The first User Agent must present this token alongside the standard challenge-response to complete registration. - **Remote setup:** Printed to the server's console output.
### 2.3 SDK Client Registration The first Operator must present this token alongside the standard challenge-response to complete registration.
There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approved by an already-registered User Agent. ### 2.3 SDK Client Registration
--- There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approved by an already-registered Operator.
## 3. Multi-Operator Governance ---
When more than one User Agent is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision. ## 3. Multi-Operator Governance
### 3.1 Voting Rules When more than one Operator is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision.
Voting is based on the total number of registered operators: ### 3.1 Voting Rules
- **1 operator:** no vote is needed; the single operator decides directly. Voting is based on the total number of registered operators:
- **2 operators:** full consensus is required; both operators must approve.
- **3 or more operators:** quorum is `floor(N / 2) + 1`. - **1 operator:** no vote is needed; the single operator decides directly.
- **2 operators:** full consensus is required; both operators must approve.
For a decision to count, the operator's approval or rejection must be signed by that operator's associated key. Unsigned votes, or votes that fail signature verification, are ignored. - **3 or more operators:** quorum is `floor(N / 2) + 1`.
Examples: For a decision to count, the operator's approval or rejection must be signed by that operator's associated key. Unsigned votes, or votes that fail signature verification, are ignored.
- **3 operators:** 2 approvals required Examples:
- **4 operators:** 3 approvals required
- **3 operators:** 2 approvals required
### 3.2 Actions Requiring a Vote - **4 operators:** 3 approvals required
In multi-operator mode, a successful vote is required for: ### 3.2 Actions Requiring a Vote
- approving new SDK clients In multi-operator mode, a successful vote is required for:
- granting an SDK client visibility to a wallet
- approving a one-off transaction - approving new SDK clients
- approving creation of a persistent grant - granting an SDK client visibility to a wallet
- approving operator replacement - approving a one-off transaction
- approving server updates - approving creation of a persistent grant
- updating Shamir secret-sharing parameters - approving operator replacement
- approving server updates
### 3.3 Special Rule for Key Rotation - updating Shamir secret-sharing parameters
Key rotation always requires full quorum, regardless of the normal voting threshold. ### 3.3 Special Rule for Key Rotation
This is stricter than ordinary governance actions because rotating the root key requires every operator to participate in coordinated share refresh/update steps. The root key itself is not redistributed directly, but each operator's share material must be changed consistently. Key rotation always requires full quorum, regardless of the normal voting threshold.
### 3.4 Root Key Custody This is stricter than ordinary governance actions because rotating the root key requires every operator to participate in coordinated share refresh/update steps. The root key itself is not redistributed directly, but each operator's share material must be changed consistently.
When the vault has multiple operators, the vault root key is protected using Shamir secret sharing. ### 3.4 Root Key Custody
The vault root key is encrypted in a way that requires reconstruction from user-held shares rather than from a single shared password. When the vault has multiple operators, the vault root key is protected using Shamir secret sharing.
For ordinary operators, the Shamir threshold matches the ordinary governance quorum. For example: The vault root key is encrypted in a way that requires reconstruction from user-held shares rather than from a single shared password.
- **2 operators:** `2-of-2` For ordinary operators, the Shamir threshold matches the ordinary governance quorum. For example:
- **3 operators:** `2-of-3`
- **4 operators:** `3-of-4` - **2 operators:** `2-of-2`
- **3 operators:** `2-of-3`
In practice, the Shamir share set also includes Recovery Operator shares. This means the effective Shamir parameters are computed over the combined share pool while keeping the same threshold. For example: - **4 operators:** `3-of-4`
- **3 ordinary operators + 2 recovery shares:** `2-of-5` In practice, the Shamir share set also includes Recovery Operator shares. This means the effective Shamir parameters are computed over the combined share pool while keeping the same threshold. For example:
This ensures that the normal custody threshold follows the ordinary operator quorum, while still allowing dormant recovery shares to exist for break-glass recovery flows. - **3 ordinary operators + 2 recovery shares:** `2-of-5`
### 3.5 Recovery Operators This ensures that the normal custody threshold follows the ordinary operator quorum, while still allowing dormant recovery shares to exist for break-glass recovery flows.
Recovery Operators are a separate peer type from ordinary vault operators. ### 3.5 Recovery Operators
Their role is intentionally narrow. They can only: Recovery Operators are a separate peer type from ordinary vault operators.
- participate in unsealing the vault Their role is intentionally narrow. They can only:
- vote for operator replacement
- participate in unsealing the vault
Recovery Operators do not participate in routine governance such as approving SDK clients, granting wallet visibility, approving transactions, creating grants, approving server updates, or changing Shamir parameters. - vote for operator replacement
### 3.6 Sleeping and Waking Recovery Operators Recovery Operators do not participate in routine governance such as approving SDK clients, granting wallet visibility, approving transactions, creating grants, approving server updates, or changing Shamir parameters.
By default, Recovery Operators are **sleeping** and do not participate in any active flow. ### 3.6 Sleeping and Waking Recovery Operators
Any ordinary operator may request that Recovery Operators **wake up**. By default, Recovery Operators are **sleeping** and do not participate in any active flow.
Any ordinary operator may also cancel a pending wake-up request. Any ordinary operator may request that Recovery Operators **wake up**.
This creates a dispute window before recovery powers become active. The default wake-up delay is **14 days**. Any ordinary operator may also cancel a pending wake-up request.
Recovery Operators are therefore part of the break-glass recovery path rather than the normal operating quorum. This creates a dispute window before recovery powers become active. The default wake-up delay is **14 days**.
The high-level recovery flow is: Recovery Operators are therefore part of the break-glass recovery path rather than the normal operating quorum.
```mermaid The high-level recovery flow is:
sequenceDiagram
autonumber ```mermaid
actor Op as Ordinary Operator sequenceDiagram
participant Server autonumber
actor Other as Other Operator actor Op as Ordinary Operator
actor Rec as Recovery Operator participant Server
actor Other as Other Operator
Op->>Server: Request recovery wake-up actor Rec as Recovery Operator
Server-->>Op: Wake-up pending
Note over Server: Default dispute window: 14 days Op->>Server: Request recovery wake-up
Server-->>Op: Wake-up pending
alt Wake-up cancelled during dispute window Note over Server: Default dispute window: 14 days
Other->>Server: Cancel wake-up
Server-->>Op: Recovery cancelled alt Wake-up cancelled during dispute window
Server-->>Rec: Stay sleeping Other->>Server: Cancel wake-up
else No cancellation for 14 days Server-->>Op: Recovery cancelled
Server-->>Rec: Wake up Server-->>Rec: Stay sleeping
Rec->>Server: Join recovery flow else No cancellation for 14 days
critical Recovery authority Server-->>Rec: Wake up
Rec->>Server: Participate in unseal Rec->>Server: Join recovery flow
Rec->>Server: Vote on operator replacement critical Recovery authority
end Rec->>Server: Participate in unseal
Server-->>Op: Recovery mode active Rec->>Server: Vote on operator replacement
end end
``` Server-->>Op: Recovery mode active
end
### 3.7 Committee Formation ```
There are two ways to form a multi-operator committee: ### 3.7 Committee Formation
- convert an existing single-operator vault by adding new operators There are two ways to form a multi-operator committee:
- bootstrap an unbootstrapped vault directly into multi-operator mode
- convert an existing single-operator vault by adding new operators
In both cases, committee formation is a coordinated process. Arbiter does not allow multi-operator custody to emerge implicitly from unrelated registrations. - bootstrap an unbootstrapped vault directly into multi-operator mode
### 3.8 Bootstrapping an Unbootstrapped Vault into Multi-Operator Mode In both cases, committee formation is a coordinated process. Arbiter does not allow multi-operator custody to emerge implicitly from unrelated registrations.
When an unbootstrapped vault is initialized as a multi-operator vault, the setup proceeds as follows: ### 3.8 Bootstrapping an Unbootstrapped Vault into Multi-Operator Mode
1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using a User Agent and the bootstrap token. When an unbootstrapped vault is initialized as a multi-operator vault, the setup proceeds as follows:
2. During bootstrap setup, that operator declares:
- the total number of ordinary operators 1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using an Operator and the bootstrap token.
- the total number of Recovery Operators 2. During bootstrap setup, that operator declares:
3. The vault enters **multi-bootstrap mode**. - the total number of ordinary operators
4. While in multi-bootstrap mode: - the total number of Recovery Operators
- every ordinary operator must connect with a User Agent using the bootstrap token 3. The vault enters **multi-bootstrap mode**.
- every Recovery Operator must also connect using the bootstrap token 4. While in multi-bootstrap mode:
- each participant is registered individually - every ordinary operator must connect with an Operator using the bootstrap token
- each participant's share is created and protected with that participant's credentials - every Recovery Operator must also connect using the bootstrap token
5. The vault is considered fully bootstrapped only after all declared operator and recovery-share registrations have completed successfully. - each participant is registered individually
- each participant's share is created and protected with that participant's credentials
This means the operator and recovery set is fixed at bootstrap completion time, based on the counts declared when multi-bootstrap mode was entered. 5. The vault is considered fully bootstrapped only after all declared operator and recovery-share registrations have completed successfully.
### 3.9 Special Bootstrap Constraint for Two-Operator Vaults This means the operator and recovery set is fixed at bootstrap completion time, based on the counts declared when multi-bootstrap mode was entered.
If a vault is declared with exactly **2 ordinary operators**, Arbiter requires at least **1 Recovery Operator** to be configured during bootstrap. ### 3.9 Special Bootstrap Constraint for Two-Operator Vaults
This prevents the worst-case custody failure in which a `2-of-2` operator set becomes permanently unrecoverable after loss of a single operator. If a vault is declared with exactly **2 ordinary operators**, Arbiter requires at least **1 Recovery Operator** to be configured during bootstrap.
--- This prevents the worst-case custody failure in which a `2-of-2` operator set becomes permanently unrecoverable after loss of a single operator.
## 4. Server Identity ---
The server proves its identity using TLS with a self-signed certificate. The TLS private key is generated on first run and is long-term; no rotation mechanism exists yet due to the complexity of multi-peer coordination. ## 4. Server Identity
Peers verify the server by its **public key fingerprint**: The server proves its identity using TLS with a self-signed certificate. The TLS private key is generated on first run and is long-term; no rotation mechanism exists yet due to the complexity of multi-peer coordination.
- **User Agent (local):** Receives the fingerprint automatically through the bootstrap token. Peers verify the server by its **public key fingerprint**:
- **User Agent (remote) / SDK Client:** Must receive the fingerprint out-of-band.
- **Operator (local):** Receives the fingerprint automatically through the bootstrap token.
> A streamlined setup mechanism using a single connection string is planned but not yet implemented. - **Operator (remote) / SDK Client:** Must receive the fingerprint out-of-band.
--- > A streamlined setup mechanism using a single connection string is planned but not yet implemented.
## 5. Key Management ---
### 5.1 Key Hierarchy ## 5. Key Management
There are three layers of keys: ### 5.1 Key Hierarchy
| Key | Encrypts | Encrypted by | There are three layers of keys:
|---|---|---|
| **User key** (password) | Root key | — (derived from user input) | | Key | Encrypts | Encrypted by |
| **Root key** | Wallet keys | User key | |---|---|---|
| **Wallet keys** | — (used for signing) | Root key | | **User key** (password) | Root key | — (derived from user input) |
| **Root key** | Wallet keys | User key |
This layered design enables: | **Wallet keys** | — (used for signing) | Root key |
- **Password rotation** without re-encrypting every wallet key (only the root key is re-encrypted). This layered design enables:
- **Root key rotation** without requiring the user to change their password.
- **Password rotation** without re-encrypting every wallet key (only the root key is re-encrypted).
### 5.2 Encryption at Rest - **Root key rotation** without requiring the user to change their password.
The database stores everything in encrypted form using symmetric AEAD. The encryption scheme is versioned to support transparent migration — when the vault unseals, Arbiter automatically re-encrypts any entries that are behind the current scheme version. See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the specific scheme and versioning mechanism. ### 5.2 Encryption at Rest
--- The database stores everything in encrypted form using symmetric AEAD. The encryption scheme is versioned to support transparent migration — when the vault unseals, Arbiter automatically re-encrypts any entries that are behind the current scheme version. See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the specific scheme and versioning mechanism.
## 6. Vault Lifecycle ---
### 6.1 Sealed State ## 6. Vault Lifecycle
On boot, the root key is encrypted and the server cannot perform any signing operations. This state is called **Sealed**. ### 6.1 Sealed State
### 6.2 Unseal Flow On boot, the root key is encrypted and the server cannot perform any signing operations. This state is called **Sealed**.
To transition to the **Unsealed** state, a User Agent must provide the password: ### 6.2 Unseal Flow
1. The User Agent initiates an unseal request. To transition to the **Unsealed** state, an Operator must provide the password:
2. The server generates a one-time key pair and returns the public key.
3. The User Agent encrypts the user's password with this one-time public key and sends the ciphertext to the server. 1. The Operator initiates an unseal request.
4. The server decrypts and verifies the password: 2. The server generates a one-time key pair and returns the public key.
- **Success:** The root key is decrypted and placed into a hardened memory cell. The server transitions to `Unsealed`. Any entries pending encryption scheme migration are re-encrypted. 3. The Operator encrypts the user's password with this one-time public key and sends the ciphertext to the server.
- **Failure:** The server returns an error indicating the password is incorrect. 4. The server decrypts and verifies the password:
- **Success:** The root key is decrypted and placed into a hardened memory cell. The server transitions to `Unsealed`. Any entries pending encryption scheme migration are re-encrypted.
### 6.3 Memory Protection - **Failure:** The server returns an error indicating the password is incorrect.
Once unsealed, the root key must be protected in memory against: ### 6.3 Memory Protection
- Memory dumps Once unsealed, the root key must be protected in memory against:
- Page swaps to disk
- Hibernation files - Memory dumps
- Page swaps to disk
See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the current and planned memory protection approaches. - Hibernation files
--- See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the current and planned memory protection approaches.
## 7. Permission Engine ---
### 7.1 Fundamental Rules ## 7. Permission Engine
- SDK clients have **no access by default**. ### 7.1 Fundamental Rules
- Access is granted **explicitly** by a User Agent.
- Grants are scoped to **specific wallets** and governed by **policies**. - SDK clients have **no access by default**.
- Access is granted **explicitly** by an Operator.
Each blockchain requires its own policy system due to differences in static transaction analysis. Currently, only EVM is supported; Solana support is planned. - Grants are scoped to **specific wallets** and governed by **policies**.
Arbiter is also responsible for ensuring that **transaction nonces are never reused**. Each blockchain requires its own policy system due to differences in static transaction analysis. Currently, only EVM is supported; Solana support is planned.
### 7.2 EVM Policies Arbiter is also responsible for ensuring that **transaction nonces are never reused**.
Every EVM grant is scoped to a specific **wallet** and **chain ID**. ### 7.2 EVM Policies
#### 7.2.0 Transaction Signing Sequence Every EVM grant is scoped to a specific **wallet** and **chain ID**.
The high-level interaction order is: #### 7.2.0 Transaction Signing Sequence
```mermaid The high-level interaction order is:
sequenceDiagram
autonumber ```mermaid
actor SDK as SDK Client sequenceDiagram
participant Server autonumber
participant UA as User Agent actor SDK as SDK Client
participant Server
SDK->>Server: SignTransactionRequest participant operator as Operator
Server->>Server: Resolve wallet and wallet visibility
alt Visibility approval required SDK->>Server: SignTransactionRequest
Server->>UA: Ask for wallet visibility approval Server->>Server: Resolve wallet and wallet visibility
UA-->>Server: Vote result alt Visibility approval required
end Server->>operator: Ask for wallet visibility approval
Server->>Server: Evaluate transaction operator-->>Server: Vote result
Server->>Server: Load grant and limits context end
alt Grant approval required Server->>Server: Evaluate transaction
Server->>UA: Ask for execution / grant approval Server->>Server: Load grant and limits context
UA-->>Server: Vote result alt Grant approval required
opt Create persistent grant Server->>operator: Ask for execution / grant approval
Server->>Server: Create and store grant operator-->>Server: Vote result
end opt Create persistent grant
Server->>Server: Retry evaluation Server->>Server: Create and store grant
end end
critical Final authorization path Server->>Server: Retry evaluation
Server->>Server: Check limits and record execution end
Server-->>Server: Signature or evaluation error critical Final authorization path
end Server->>Server: Check limits and record execution
Server-->>SDK: Signature or error Server-->>Server: Signature or evaluation error
``` end
Server-->>SDK: Signature or error
#### 7.2.1 Transaction Sub-Grants ```
Arbiter maintains an ever-expanding database of known contracts and their ABIs. Based on contract knowledge, transaction requests fall into three categories: #### 7.2.1 Transaction Sub-Grants
**1. Known contract (ABI available)** Arbiter maintains an ever-expanding database of known contracts and their ABIs. Based on contract knowledge, transaction requests fall into three categories:
The transaction can be decoded and presented with semantic meaning. For example: *"Client X wants to transfer Y USDT to address Z."* **1. Known contract (ABI available)**
Available restrictions: The transaction can be decoded and presented with semantic meaning. For example: *"Client X wants to transfer Y USDT to address Z."*
- Volume limits (e.g., "no more than 10,000 tokens ever")
- Rate limits (e.g., "no more than 100 tokens per hour") Available restrictions:
- Volume limits (e.g., "no more than 10,000 tokens ever")
**2. Unknown contract (no ABI)** - Rate limits (e.g., "no more than 100 tokens per hour")
The transaction cannot be decoded, so its effects are opaque — it could do anything, including draining all tokens. The user is warned, and if approved, access is granted to all interactions with the contract (matched by the `to` field). **2. Unknown contract (no ABI)**
Available restrictions: The transaction cannot be decoded, so its effects are opaque — it could do anything, including draining all tokens. The user is warned, and if approved, access is granted to all interactions with the contract (matched by the `to` field).
- Transaction count limits (e.g., "no more than 100 transactions ever")
- Rate limits (e.g., "no more than 5 transactions per hour") Available restrictions:
- Transaction count limits (e.g., "no more than 100 transactions ever")
**3. Plain ether transfer (no calldata)** - Rate limits (e.g., "no more than 5 transactions per hour")
These transactions have no `calldata` and therefore cannot interact with contracts. They can be subject to the same volume and rate restrictions as above. **3. Plain ether transfer (no calldata)**
#### 7.2.2 Global Limits These transactions have no `calldata` and therefore cannot interact with contracts. They can be subject to the same volume and rate restrictions as above.
In addition to sub-grant-specific restrictions, the following limits can be applied across all grant types: #### 7.2.2 Global Limits
- **Gas limit** — Maximum gas per transaction. In addition to sub-grant-specific restrictions, the following limits can be applied across all grant types:
- **Time-window restrictions** — e.g., signing allowed only 08:0020:00 on Mondays and Thursdays.
- **Gas limit** — Maximum gas per transaction.
- **Time-window restrictions** — e.g., signing allowed only 08:0020:00 on Mondays and Thursdays.

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@@ -1,235 +1,226 @@
# Implementation Details # Implementation Details
This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the architectural design, see [ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md). This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the architectural design, see [ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md).
--- ---
## Client Connection Flow ## Client Connection Flow
### Authentication Result Semantics ### Authentication Result Semantics
Authentication no longer uses an implicit success-only response shape. Both `client` and `user-agent` return explicit auth status enums over the wire. Authentication no longer uses an implicit success-only response shape. Both `client` and `operator` return explicit auth status enums over the wire.
- **Client:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `APPROVAL_DENIED`, `NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE`, or `INTERNAL` - **Client:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `APPROVAL_DENIED`, `NO_OPERATORS_ONLINE`, or `INTERNAL`
- **User-agent:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED`, `TOKEN_INVALID`, or `INTERNAL` - **Operator:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED`, `TOKEN_INVALID`, or `INTERNAL`
This makes transport-level failures and actor/domain-level auth failures distinct: This makes transport-level failures and actor/domain-level auth failures distinct:
- **Transport/protocol failures** are surfaced as stream/status errors - **Transport/protocol failures** are surfaced as stream/status errors
- **Authentication failures** are surfaced as successful protocol responses carrying an explicit auth status - **Authentication failures** are surfaced as successful protocol responses carrying an explicit auth status
Clients are expected to handle these status codes directly and present the concrete failure reason to the user. Clients are expected to handle these status codes directly and present the concrete failure reason to the user.
### New Client Approval ### New Client Approval
When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected user agents are asked to approve the connection. The first agent to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel. When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected operators are asked to approve the connection. The first operator to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel.
```mermaid ```mermaid
flowchart TD flowchart TD
A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest] A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest]
B --> C{pubkey in DB?} B --> C{pubkey in DB?}
C -- yes --> D[Read nonce\nIncrement nonce in DB] C -- yes --> G[Generate AuthChallenge]
D --> G
C -- no --> E[Ask all Operators:\nClientConnectionRequest]
C -- no --> E[Ask all UserAgents:\nClientConnectionRequest] E --> F{First response}
E --> F{First response} F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection])
F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection]) F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nOperator requests]
F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nUserAgent requests] F2 --> F3[INSERT client]
F2 --> F3[INSERT client\nnonce = 1] F3 --> G
F3 --> G[Send AuthChallenge\nwith nonce]
G --> H[Send AuthChallenge\ntimestamp + random bytes]
G --> H[Receive AuthChallengeSolution] H --> I[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
H --> I{Signature valid?} I --> K{Signature valid?}
I -- no --> Z K -- no --> Z
I -- yes --> J([Session started]) K -- yes --> J([Session started])
``` ```
### Known Issue: Concurrent Registration Race (TOCTOU) Auth challenges are generated from fresh random bytes plus a nanosecond timestamp. The server keeps the issued challenge only in the in-flight authentication state for that connection, then verifies the signature against the same canonical challenge payload.
Two connections presenting the same previously-unknown public key can race through the approval flow simultaneously: The authentication schema stores peer identity, not replay counters:
1. Both check the DB → neither is registered. - `program_client` stores the SDK client's public key, metadata binding, and timestamps.
2. Both request approval from user agents → both receive approval. - `operator_client` stores the Operator public key and timestamps.
3. Both `INSERT` the client record → the second insert silently overwrites the first, resetting the nonce. - Neither table stores an authentication nonce, and challenge generation does not update either table.
This means the first connection's nonce is invalidated by the second, causing its challenge verification to fail. A fix requires either serialising new-client registration (e.g. an in-memory lock keyed on pubkey) or replacing the separate check + insert with an `INSERT OR IGNORE` / upsert guarded by a unique constraint on `public_key`. ---
### Nonce Semantics ## Cryptography
The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it is always one ahead of the nonce last issued in a challenge. ### Authentication
- **Client protocol:** ML-DSA
- **New client:** inserted with `nonce = 1`; the first challenge is issued with `nonce = 0`.
- **Existing client:** the current DB value is read and used as the challenge nonce, then immediately incremented within the same exclusive transaction, preventing replay. ### User-Agent Authentication
--- Operator authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
## Cryptography - **Supported schemes:** ML-DSA
- **Why:** Secure Enclave (MacOS) support them natively, on other platforms we could emulate while they roll-out
### Authentication
- **Client protocol:** ML-DSA ### Encryption at Rest
- **Scheme:** Symmetric AEAD — currently **XChaCha20-Poly1305**
### User-Agent Authentication - **Version tracking:** Each `aead_encrypted` database entry carries a `scheme` field denoting the version, enabling transparent migration on unseal
User-agent authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware. ### Server Identity
- **Transport:** TLS with a self-signed certificate
- **Supported schemes:** ML-DSA - **Key type:** Generated on first run; long-term (no rotation mechanism yet)
- **Why:** Secure Enclave (MacOS) support them natively, on other platforms we could emulate while they roll-out
---
### Encryption at Rest
- **Scheme:** Symmetric AEAD — currently **XChaCha20-Poly1305** ## Communication
- **Version tracking:** Each `aead_encrypted` database entry carries a `scheme` field denoting the version, enabling transparent migration on unseal
- **Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers
### Server Identity - **Request/response matching:** multiplexed over a single bidirectional stream using per-connection request IDs
- **Transport:** TLS with a self-signed certificate - **Server identity distribution:** `ServerInfo` protobuf struct containing the TLS public key fingerprint
- **Key type:** Generated on first run; long-term (no rotation mechanism yet) - **Future consideration:** grpc-web lacks bidirectional stream support, so a browser-based wallet may require protojson over WebSocket
--- ### Request Multiplexing
## Communication Both `client` and `operator` connections support multiple in-flight requests over one gRPC bidi stream.
- **Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers - Every request carries a monotonically increasing request ID
- **Request/response matching:** multiplexed over a single bidirectional stream using per-connection request IDs - Every normal response echoes the request ID it corresponds to
- **Server identity distribution:** `ServerInfo` protobuf struct containing the TLS public key fingerprint - Out-of-band server messages omit the response ID entirely
- **Future consideration:** grpc-web lacks bidirectional stream support, so a browser-based wallet may require protojson over WebSocket - The server rejects already-seen request IDs at the transport adapter boundary before business logic sees the message
### Request Multiplexing This keeps request correlation entirely in transport/client connection code while leaving actor and domain handlers unaware of request IDs.
Both `client` and `user-agent` connections support multiple in-flight requests over one gRPC bidi stream. ---
- Every request carries a monotonically increasing request ID ## EVM Policy Engine
- Every normal response echoes the request ID it corresponds to
- Out-of-band server messages omit the response ID entirely ### Overview
- The server rejects already-seen request IDs at the transport adapter boundary before business logic sees the message
The EVM engine classifies incoming transactions, enforces grant constraints, and records executions. It is the sole path through which a wallet key is used for signing.
This keeps request correlation entirely in transport/client connection code while leaving actor and domain handlers unaware of request IDs.
The central abstraction is the `Policy` trait. Each implementation handles one semantic transaction category and owns its own database tables for grant storage and transaction logging.
---
### Transaction Evaluation Flow
## EVM Policy Engine
`Engine::evaluate_transaction` runs the following steps in order:
### Overview
1. **Classify** — Each registered policy's `analyze(context)` inspects the transaction fields (`chain`, `to`, `value`, `calldata`). The first one returning `Some(meaning)` wins. If none match, the transaction is rejected as `UnsupportedTransactionType`.
The EVM engine classifies incoming transactions, enforces grant constraints, and records executions. It is the sole path through which a wallet key is used for signing. 2. **Find grant**`Policy::try_find_grant` queries for a non-revoked grant covering this wallet, client, chain, and target address.
3. **Check shared constraints**`check_shared_constraints` runs in the engine before any policy-specific logic. It enforces the validity window, gas fee caps, and transaction count rate limit (see below).
The central abstraction is the `Policy` trait. Each implementation handles one semantic transaction category and owns its own database tables for grant storage and transaction logging. 4. **Evaluate**`Policy::evaluate` checks the decoded meaning against the grant's policy-specific constraints and returns any violations.
5. **Record** — If `RunKind::Execution` and there are no violations, the engine writes to `evm_transaction_log` and calls `Policy::record_transaction` for any policy-specific logging (e.g., token transfer volume).
### Transaction Evaluation Flow
The detailed branch structure is shown below:
`Engine::evaluate_transaction` runs the following steps in order:
```mermaid
1. **Classify** — Each registered policy's `analyze(context)` inspects the transaction fields (`chain`, `to`, `value`, `calldata`). The first one returning `Some(meaning)` wins. If none match, the transaction is rejected as `UnsupportedTransactionType`. flowchart TD
2. **Find grant**`Policy::try_find_grant` queries for a non-revoked grant covering this wallet, client, chain, and target address. A[SDK Client sends sign transaction request] --> B[Server resolves wallet]
3. **Check shared constraints**`check_shared_constraints` runs in the engine before any policy-specific logic. It enforces the validity window, gas fee caps, and transaction count rate limit (see below). B --> C{Wallet exists?}
4. **Evaluate**`Policy::evaluate` checks the decoded meaning against the grant's policy-specific constraints and returns any violations.
5. **Record** — If `RunKind::Execution` and there are no violations, the engine writes to `evm_transaction_log` and calls `Policy::record_transaction` for any policy-specific logging (e.g., token transfer volume). C -- No --> Z1[Return wallet not found error]
C -- Yes --> D[Check SDK client wallet visibility]
The detailed branch structure is shown below:
D --> E{Wallet visible to SDK client?}
```mermaid E -- No --> F[Start wallet visibility voting flow]
flowchart TD F --> G{Vote approved?}
A[SDK Client sends sign transaction request] --> B[Server resolves wallet] G -- No --> Z2[Return wallet access denied error]
B --> C{Wallet exists?} G -- Yes --> H[Persist wallet visibility]
E -- Yes --> I[Classify transaction meaning]
C -- No --> Z1[Return wallet not found error] H --> I
C -- Yes --> D[Check SDK client wallet visibility]
I --> J{Meaning supported?}
D --> E{Wallet visible to SDK client?} J -- No --> Z3[Return unsupported transaction error]
E -- No --> F[Start wallet visibility voting flow] J -- Yes --> K[Find matching grant]
F --> G{Vote approved?}
G -- No --> Z2[Return wallet access denied error] K --> L{Grant exists?}
G -- Yes --> H[Persist wallet visibility] L -- Yes --> M[Check grant limits]
E -- Yes --> I[Classify transaction meaning] L -- No --> N[Start execution or grant voting flow]
H --> I
N --> O{Operator decision}
I --> J{Meaning supported?} O -- Reject --> Z4[Return no matching grant error]
J -- No --> Z3[Return unsupported transaction error] O -- Allow once --> M
J -- Yes --> K[Find matching grant] O -- Create grant --> P[Create grant with user-selected limits]
P --> Q[Persist grant]
K --> L{Grant exists?} Q --> M
L -- Yes --> M[Check grant limits]
L -- No --> N[Start execution or grant voting flow] M --> R{Limits exceeded?}
R -- Yes --> Z5[Return evaluation error]
N --> O{User-agent decision} R -- No --> S[Record transaction in logs]
O -- Reject --> Z4[Return no matching grant error] S --> T[Produce signature]
O -- Allow once --> M T --> U[Return signature to SDK client]
O -- Create grant --> P[Create grant with user-selected limits]
P --> Q[Persist grant] note1[Limit checks include volume, count, and gas constraints.]
Q --> M note2[Grant lookup depends on classified meaning, such as ether transfer or token transfer.]
M --> R{Limits exceeded?} K -. uses .-> note2
R -- Yes --> Z5[Return evaluation error] M -. checks .-> note1
R -- No --> S[Record transaction in logs] ```
S --> T[Produce signature]
T --> U[Return signature to SDK client] ### Policy Trait
note1[Limit checks include volume, count, and gas constraints.] | Method | Purpose |
note2[Grant lookup depends on classified meaning, such as ether transfer or token transfer.] |---|---|
| `analyze` | Pure — classifies a transaction into a typed `Meaning`, or `None` if this policy doesn't apply |
K -. uses .-> note2 | `evaluate` | Checks the `Meaning` against a `Grant`; returns a list of `EvalViolation`s |
M -. checks .-> note1 | `create_grant` | Inserts policy-specific rows; returns the specific grant ID |
``` | `try_find_grant` | Finds a matching non-revoked grant for the given `EvalContext` |
| `find_all_grants` | Returns all non-revoked grants (used for listing) |
### Policy Trait | `record_transaction` | Persists policy-specific data after execution |
| Method | Purpose | `analyze` and `evaluate` are intentionally separate: classification is pure and cheap, while evaluation may involve DB queries (e.g., fetching past transfer volume).
|---|---|
| `analyze` | Pure — classifies a transaction into a typed `Meaning`, or `None` if this policy doesn't apply | ### Registered Policies
| `evaluate` | Checks the `Meaning` against a `Grant`; returns a list of `EvalViolation`s |
| `create_grant` | Inserts policy-specific rows; returns the specific grant ID | **EtherTransfer** — plain ETH transfers (empty calldata)
| `try_find_grant` | Finds a matching non-revoked grant for the given `EvalContext` |
| `find_all_grants` | Returns all non-revoked grants (used for listing) | - Grant requires: allowlist of recipient addresses + one volumetric rate limit (max ETH over a time window)
| `record_transaction` | Persists policy-specific data after execution | - Violations: recipient not in allowlist, cumulative ETH volume exceeded
`analyze` and `evaluate` are intentionally separate: classification is pure and cheap, while evaluation may involve DB queries (e.g., fetching past transfer volume). **TokenTransfer** — ERC-20 `transfer(address,uint256)` calls
### Registered Policies - Recognised by ABI-decoding the `transfer(address,uint256)` selector against a static registry of known token contracts (`arbiter_tokens_registry`)
- Grant requires: token contract address, optional recipient restriction, zero or more volumetric rate limits
**EtherTransfer** — plain ETH transfers (empty calldata) - Violations: recipient mismatch, any volumetric limit exceeded
- Grant requires: allowlist of recipient addresses + one volumetric rate limit (max ETH over a time window) ### Grant Model
- Violations: recipient not in allowlist, cumulative ETH volume exceeded
Every grant has two layers:
**TokenTransfer** — ERC-20 `transfer(address,uint256)` calls
- **Shared (`evm_basic_grant`)** — wallet, chain, validity period, gas fee caps, transaction count rate limit. One row per grant regardless of type.
- Recognised by ABI-decoding the `transfer(address,uint256)` selector against a static registry of known token contracts (`arbiter_tokens_registry`) - **Specific** — policy-owned tables (`evm_ether_transfer_grant`, `evm_token_transfer_grant`) holding type-specific configuration.
- Grant requires: token contract address, optional recipient restriction, zero or more volumetric rate limits
- Violations: recipient mismatch, any volumetric limit exceeded `find_all_grants` uses a `#[diesel::auto_type]` base join between the specific and shared tables, then batch-loads related rows (targets, volume limits) in two additional queries to avoid N+1.
### Grant Model The engine exposes `list_all_grants` which collects across all policy types into `Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>` via a blanket `From<Grant<S>> for Grant<SpecificGrant>` conversion.
Every grant has two layers: ### Shared Constraints (enforced by the engine)
- **Shared (`evm_basic_grant`)** — wallet, chain, validity period, gas fee caps, transaction count rate limit. One row per grant regardless of type. These are checked centrally in `check_shared_constraints` before policy evaluation:
- **Specific** — policy-owned tables (`evm_ether_transfer_grant`, `evm_token_transfer_grant`) holding type-specific configuration.
| Constraint | Fields | Behaviour |
`find_all_grants` uses a `#[diesel::auto_type]` base join between the specific and shared tables, then batch-loads related rows (targets, volume limits) in two additional queries to avoid N+1. |---|---|---|
| Validity window | `valid_from`, `valid_until` | Emits `InvalidTime` if current time is outside the range |
The engine exposes `list_all_grants` which collects across all policy types into `Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>` via a blanket `From<Grant<S>> for Grant<SpecificGrant>` conversion. | Gas fee cap | `max_gas_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas` | Emits `GasLimitExceeded` if either cap is breached |
| Tx count rate limit | `rate_limit` (`count` + `window`) | Counts rows in `evm_transaction_log` within the window; emits `RateLimitExceeded` if at or above the limit |
### Shared Constraints (enforced by the engine)
---
These are checked centrally in `check_shared_constraints` before policy evaluation:
### Known Limitations
| Constraint | Fields | Behaviour |
|---|---|---| - **Only EIP-1559 transactions are supported.** Legacy and EIP-2930 types are rejected outright.
| Validity window | `valid_from`, `valid_until` | Emits `InvalidTime` if current time is outside the range | - **No opaque-calldata (unknown contract) grant type.** The architecture describes a category for unrecognised contracts, but no policy implements it yet. Any transaction that is not a plain ETH transfer or a known ERC-20 transfer is unconditionally rejected.
| Gas fee cap | `max_gas_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas` | Emits `GasLimitExceeded` if either cap is breached | - **Token registry is static.** Tokens are recognised only if they appear in the hard-coded `arbiter_tokens_registry` crate. There is no mechanism to register additional contracts at runtime.
| Tx count rate limit | `rate_limit` (`count` + `window`) | Counts rows in `evm_transaction_log` within the window; emits `RateLimitExceeded` if at or above the limit |
---
---
## Memory Protection
### Known Limitations
The unsealed root key must be held in a hardened memory cell resistant to dumps, page swaps, and hibernation.
- **Only EIP-1559 transactions are supported.** Legacy and EIP-2930 types are rejected outright.
- **No opaque-calldata (unknown contract) grant type.** The architecture describes a category for unrecognised contracts, but no policy implements it yet. Any transaction that is not a plain ETH transfer or a known ERC-20 transfer is unconditionally rejected. - **Current:** A dedicated memory-protection abstraction is in place, with `memsafe` used behind that abstraction today
- **Token registry is static.** Tokens are recognised only if they appear in the hard-coded `arbiter_tokens_registry` crate. There is no mechanism to register additional contracts at runtime. - **Planned:** Additional backends can be introduced behind the same abstraction, including a custom implementation based on `mlock` (Unix) and `VirtualProtect` (Windows)
---
## Memory Protection
The unsealed root key must be held in a hardened memory cell resistant to dumps, page swaps, and hibernation.
- **Current:** A dedicated memory-protection abstraction is in place, with `memsafe` used behind that abstraction today
- **Planned:** Additional backends can be introduced behind the same abstraction, including a custom implementation based on `mlock` (Unix) and `VirtualProtect` (Windows)

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# Grant Grid View — Design Spec # Grant Grid View — Design Spec
**Date:** 2026-03-28 **Date:** 2026-03-28
## Overview ## Overview
Add a "Grants" dashboard tab to the Flutter user-agent app that displays all EVM grants as a card-based grid. Each card shows a compact summary (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with a revoke action. The tab integrates into the existing `AdaptiveScaffold` navigation alongside Wallets, Clients, and About. Add a "Grants" dashboard tab to the Flutter operator app that displays all EVM grants as a card-based grid. Each card shows a compact summary (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with a revoke action. The tab integrates into the existing `AdaptiveScaffold` navigation alongside Wallets, Clients, and About.
## Scope ## Scope
- New `walletAccessListProvider` for fetching wallet access entries with their DB row IDs - New `walletAccessListProvider` for fetching wallet access entries with their DB row IDs
- New `EvmGrantsScreen` as a dashboard tab - New `EvmGrantsScreen` as a dashboard tab
- Grant card widget with enriched display (type, chain, wallet, client) - Grant card widget with enriched display (type, chain, wallet, client)
- Revoke action wired to existing `executeRevokeEvmGrant` mutation - Revoke action wired to existing `executeRevokeEvmGrant` mutation
- Dashboard tab bar and router updated - Dashboard tab bar and router updated
- New token-transfer accent color added to `Palette` - New token-transfer accent color added to `Palette`
**Out of scope:** Fixing grant creation (separate task). **Out of scope:** Fixing grant creation (separate task).
--- ---
## Data Layer ## Data Layer
### `walletAccessListProvider` ### `walletAccessListProvider`
**File:** `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` **File:** `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
- `@riverpod` class, watches `connectionManagerProvider.future` - `@riverpod` class, watches `connectionManagerProvider.future`
- Returns `List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?` (null when not connected) - Returns `List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?` (null when not connected)
- Each entry: `.id` (wallet_access_id), `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId` - Each entry: `.id` (wallet_access_id), `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
- Exposes a `refresh()` method following the same pattern as `EvmGrants.refresh()` - Exposes a `refresh()` method following the same pattern as `EvmGrants.refresh()`
### Enrichment at render time (Approach A) ### Enrichment at render time (Approach A)
The `EvmGrantsScreen` watches four providers: The `EvmGrantsScreen` watches four providers:
1. `evmGrantsProvider` — the grant list 1. `evmGrantsProvider` — the grant list
2. `walletAccessListProvider` — to resolve wallet_access_id → (wallet_id, sdk_client_id) 2. `walletAccessListProvider` — to resolve wallet_access_id → (wallet_id, sdk_client_id)
3. `evmProvider` — to resolve wallet_id → wallet address 3. `evmProvider` — to resolve wallet_id → wallet address
4. `sdkClientsProvider` — to resolve sdk_client_id → client name 4. `sdkClientsProvider` — to resolve sdk_client_id → client name
All lookups are in-memory Maps built inside the build method; no extra model class needed. All lookups are in-memory Maps built inside the build method; no extra model class needed.
Fallbacks: Fallbacks:
- Wallet address not found → `"Access #N"` where N is the wallet_access_id - Wallet address not found → `"Access #N"` where N is the wallet_access_id
- Client name not found → `"Client #N"` where N is the sdk_client_id - Client name not found → `"Client #N"` where N is the sdk_client_id
--- ---
## Route Structure ## Route Structure
``` ```
/dashboard /dashboard
/evm ← existing (Wallets tab) /evm ← existing (Wallets tab)
/clients ← existing (Clients tab) /clients ← existing (Clients tab)
/grants ← NEW (Grants tab) /grants ← NEW (Grants tab)
/about ← existing /about ← existing
/evm-grants/create ← existing push route (unchanged) /evm-grants/create ← existing push route (unchanged)
``` ```
### Changes to `router.dart` ### Changes to `router.dart`
Add inside dashboard children: Add inside dashboard children:
```dart ```dart
AutoRoute(page: EvmGrantsRoute.page, path: 'grants'), AutoRoute(page: EvmGrantsRoute.page, path: 'grants'),
``` ```
### Changes to `dashboard.dart` ### Changes to `dashboard.dart`
Add to `routes` list: Add to `routes` list:
```dart ```dart
const EvmGrantsRoute() const EvmGrantsRoute()
``` ```
Add `NavigationDestination`: Add `NavigationDestination`:
```dart ```dart
NavigationDestination( NavigationDestination(
icon: Icon(Icons.policy_outlined), icon: Icon(Icons.policy_outlined),
selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.policy), selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.policy),
label: 'Grants', label: 'Grants',
), ),
``` ```
--- ---
## Screen: `EvmGrantsScreen` ## Screen: `EvmGrantsScreen`
**File:** `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` **File:** `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
``` ```
Scaffold Scaffold
└─ SafeArea └─ SafeArea
└─ RefreshIndicator.adaptive (refreshes evmGrantsProvider + walletAccessListProvider) └─ RefreshIndicator.adaptive (refreshes evmGrantsProvider + walletAccessListProvider)
└─ ListView (BouncingScrollPhysics + AlwaysScrollableScrollPhysics) └─ ListView (BouncingScrollPhysics + AlwaysScrollableScrollPhysics)
├─ PageHeader ├─ PageHeader
│ title: 'EVM Grants' │ title: 'EVM Grants'
│ isBusy: evmGrantsProvider.isLoading │ isBusy: evmGrantsProvider.isLoading
│ actions: [CreateGrantButton, RefreshButton] │ actions: [CreateGrantButton, RefreshButton]
├─ SizedBox(height: 1.8.h) ├─ SizedBox(height: 1.8.h)
└─ <content> └─ <content>
``` ```
### State handling ### State handling
Matches the pattern from `EvmScreen` and `ClientsScreen`: Matches the pattern from `EvmScreen` and `ClientsScreen`:
| State | Display | | State | Display |
|---|---| |---|---|
| Loading (no data yet) | `_StatePanel` with spinner, "Loading grants" | | Loading (no data yet) | `_StatePanel` with spinner, "Loading grants" |
| Error | `_StatePanel` with coral icon, error message, Retry button | | Error | `_StatePanel` with coral icon, error message, Retry button |
| No connection | `_StatePanel`, "No active server connection" | | No connection | `_StatePanel`, "No active server connection" |
| Empty list | `_StatePanel`, "No grants yet", with Create Grant shortcut | | Empty list | `_StatePanel`, "No grants yet", with Create Grant shortcut |
| Data | Column of `_GrantCard` widgets | | Data | Column of `_GrantCard` widgets |
### Header actions ### Header actions
**CreateGrantButton:** `FilledButton.icon` with `Icons.add_rounded`, pushes `CreateEvmGrantRoute()` via `context.router.push(...)`. **CreateGrantButton:** `FilledButton.icon` with `Icons.add_rounded`, pushes `CreateEvmGrantRoute()` via `context.router.push(...)`.
**RefreshButton:** `OutlinedButton.icon` with `Icons.refresh`, calls `ref.read(evmGrantsProvider.notifier).refresh()`. **RefreshButton:** `OutlinedButton.icon` with `Icons.refresh`, calls `ref.read(evmGrantsProvider.notifier).refresh()`.
--- ---
## Grant Card: `_GrantCard` ## Grant Card: `_GrantCard`
**Layout:** **Layout:**
``` ```
Container (rounded 24, Palette.cream bg, Palette.line border) Container (rounded 24, Palette.cream bg, Palette.line border)
└─ IntrinsicHeight > Row └─ IntrinsicHeight > Row
├─ Accent strip (0.8.w wide, full height, rounded left) ├─ Accent strip (0.8.w wide, full height, rounded left)
└─ Padding > Column └─ Padding > Column
├─ Row 1: TypeBadge + ChainChip + Spacer + RevokeButton ├─ Row 1: TypeBadge + ChainChip + Spacer + RevokeButton
└─ Row 2: WalletText + "·" + ClientText └─ Row 2: WalletText + "·" + ClientText
``` ```
**Accent color by grant type:** **Accent color by grant type:**
- Ether transfer → `Palette.coral` - Ether transfer → `Palette.coral`
- Token transfer → `Palette.token` (new entry in `Palette` — indigo, e.g. `Color(0xFF5C6BC0)`) - Token transfer → `Palette.token` (new entry in `Palette` — indigo, e.g. `Color(0xFF5C6BC0)`)
**TypeBadge:** Small pill container with accent color background at 15% opacity, accent-colored text. Label: `'Ether'` or `'Token'`. **TypeBadge:** Small pill container with accent color background at 15% opacity, accent-colored text. Label: `'Ether'` or `'Token'`.
**ChainChip:** Small container: `'Chain ${grant.shared.chainId}'`, muted ink color. **ChainChip:** Small container: `'Chain ${grant.shared.chainId}'`, muted ink color.
**WalletText:** Short hex address (`0xabc...def`) from wallet lookup, `bodySmall`, monospace font family. **WalletText:** Short hex address (`0xabc...def`) from wallet lookup, `bodySmall`, monospace font family.
**ClientText:** Client name from `sdkClientsProvider` lookup, or fallback string. `bodySmall`, muted ink. **ClientText:** Client name from `sdkClientsProvider` lookup, or fallback string. `bodySmall`, muted ink.
**RevokeButton:** **RevokeButton:**
- `OutlinedButton` with `Icons.block_rounded` icon, label `'Revoke'` - `OutlinedButton` with `Icons.block_rounded` icon, label `'Revoke'`
- `foregroundColor: Palette.coral`, `side: BorderSide(color: Palette.coral.withValues(alpha: 0.4))` - `foregroundColor: Palette.coral`, `side: BorderSide(color: Palette.coral.withValues(alpha: 0.4))`
- Disabled (replaced with `CircularProgressIndicator`) while `revokeEvmGrantMutation` is pending — note: this is a single global mutation, so all revoke buttons disable while any revoke is in flight - Disabled (replaced with `CircularProgressIndicator`) while `revokeEvmGrantMutation` is pending — note: this is a single global mutation, so all revoke buttons disable while any revoke is in flight
- On press: calls `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: grant.id)`; shows `SnackBar` on error - On press: calls `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: grant.id)`; shows `SnackBar` on error
--- ---
## Adaptive Sizing ## Adaptive Sizing
All sizing uses `sizer` units (`1.h`, `1.w`, etc.). No hardcoded pixel values. All sizing uses `sizer` units (`1.h`, `1.w`, etc.). No hardcoded pixel values.
--- ---
## Files to Create / Modify ## Files to Create / Modify
| File | Action | | File | Action |
|---|---| |---|---|
| `lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify — add `Palette.token` color | | `lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify — add `Palette.token` color |
| `lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create | | `lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create |
| `lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create | | `lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create |
| `lib/router.dart` | Modify — add grants route to dashboard children | | `lib/router.dart` | Modify — add grants route to dashboard children |
| `lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify — add tab to routes list and NavigationDestinations | | `lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify — add tab to routes list and NavigationDestinations |

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@@ -1,51 +1,51 @@
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backend = "cargo:cargo-edit" backend = "cargo:cargo-edit"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-features-manager"]] [[tools."cargo:cargo-features-manager"]]
version = "0.11.1" version = "0.12.0"
backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager" backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-insta"]] [[tools."cargo:cargo-insta"]]
version = "1.46.3" version = "1.47.2"
backend = "cargo:cargo-insta" backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-mutants"]] [[tools."cargo:cargo-mutants"]]
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ version = "27.0.0"
backend = "cargo:cargo-mutants" backend = "cargo:cargo-mutants"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]] [[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
version = "0.9.126" version = "0.9.133"
backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest" backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-shear"]] [[tools."cargo:cargo-shear"]]
@@ -65,15 +65,19 @@ version = "0.10.2"
backend = "cargo:cargo-vet" backend = "cargo:cargo-vet"
[[tools."cargo:diesel_cli"]] [[tools."cargo:diesel_cli"]]
version = "2.3.6" version = "2.3.7"
backend = "cargo:diesel_cli" backend = "cargo:diesel_cli"
[tools."cargo:diesel_cli".options] [tools."cargo:diesel_cli".options]
default-features = "false" default-features = "false"
features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled" features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled"
[[tools."cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"]]
version = "2.12.0"
backend = "cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"
[[tools.flutter]] [[tools.flutter]]
version = "3.38.9-stable" version = "3.41.7-stable"
backend = "asdf:flutter" backend = "asdf:flutter"
[[tools.protoc]] [[tools.protoc]]
@@ -109,44 +113,44 @@ checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip" url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"
[[tools.python]] [[tools.python]]
version = "3.14.3" version = "3.14.4"
backend = "core:python" backend = "core:python"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64"] [tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be" checksum = "sha256:b8b597fdb2f8dccdc502c11947b60a4b65eb6bce79cfa60c7ccf9b6e8352c60a"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz" url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations" provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"] [tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be" checksum = "sha256:b8b597fdb2f8dccdc502c11947b60a4b65eb6bce79cfa60c7ccf9b6e8352c60a"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz" url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations" provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"] [tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39" checksum = "sha256:fe9a9c32d13870af632cbac3dfc7528ae53597e94472aa4c7d6a42e8166136cd"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz" url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations" provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"] [tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39" checksum = "sha256:fe9a9c32d13870af632cbac3dfc7528ae53597e94472aa4c7d6a42e8166136cd"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz" url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations" provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"] [tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:c43aecde4a663aebff99b9b83da0efec506479f1c3f98331442f33d2c43501f9" checksum = "blake3:0314ec66e0f33ec04959583b5900bc8edae371a396aa96b8874e750d1fe936e6"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz" url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations" provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-x64"] [tools.python."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:9ab41dbc2f100a2a45d1833b9c11165f51051c558b5213eda9a9731d5948a0c0" checksum = "sha256:d51250a32fa5d9f0799c7bcb71720c27b10a3afd4a7de288120f96085d508a5a"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz" url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations" provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.windows-x64"] [tools.python."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:bbe19034b35b0267176a7442575ae7dc6343480fd4d35598cb7700173d431e09" checksum = "sha256:a976991dcd085c1bb5d9a8084823a6bc8b7f9b079d8c432574a6ddd68c3a6fe1"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz" url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations" provenance = "github-attestations"
[[tools.rust]] [[tools.rust]]
version = "1.93.0" version = "1.95.0"
backend = "core:rust" backend = "core:rust"

View File

@@ -1,23 +1,24 @@
[tools] [tools]
"cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.6", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = false } "cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.7", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = "false" }
"cargo:cargo-audit" = "0.22.1" "cargo:cargo-audit" = "0.22.1"
"cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2" "cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
flutter = "3.38.9-stable" flutter = "3.41.7-stable"
protoc = "29.6" protoc = "29.6"
"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy"} rust = { version = "1.95.0", components = "clippy,rust-analyzer" }
"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.11.1" "cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.12.0"
"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126" "cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.133"
"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest" "cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.46.3" "cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.47.2"
python = "3.14.3" python = "3.14.4"
ast-grep = "0.42.0" ast-grep = "0.42.1"
"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.9" "cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.10"
"cargo:cargo-mutants" = "27.0.0" "cargo:cargo-mutants" = "27.0.0"
"cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen" = "2.12.0"
[tasks.codegen]
sources = ['protobufs/*.proto', 'protobufs/**/*.proto'] [tasks.codegen]
outputs = ['useragent/lib/proto/**'] sources = ['protobufs/*.proto', 'protobufs/**/*.proto']
run = ''' outputs = ['useragent/lib/proto/**']
dart pub global activate protoc_plugin && \ run = '''
protoc --dart_out=grpc:useragent/lib/proto --proto_path=protobufs/ $(find protobufs -name '*.proto' | sort) dart pub global activate protoc_plugin && \
''' protoc --dart_out=grpc:useragent/lib/proto --proto_path=protobufs/ $(find protobufs -name '*.proto' | sort)
'''

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter; package arbiter;
import "client.proto"; import "client.proto";
import "user_agent.proto"; import "operator.proto";
message ServerInfo { message ServerInfo {
string version = 1; string version = 1;
bytes cert_public_key = 2; bytes cert_public_key = 2;
} }
service ArbiterService { service ArbiterService {
rpc Client(stream arbiter.client.ClientRequest) returns (stream arbiter.client.ClientResponse); rpc Client(stream arbiter.client.ClientRequest) returns (stream arbiter.client.ClientResponse);
rpc UserAgent(stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentRequest) returns (stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentResponse); rpc Operator(stream arbiter.operator.OperatorRequest) returns (stream arbiter.operator.OperatorResponse);
} }

View File

@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.client; package arbiter.client;
import "client/auth.proto"; import "client/auth.proto";
import "client/evm.proto"; import "client/evm.proto";
import "client/vault.proto"; import "client/vault.proto";
message ClientRequest { message ClientRequest {
int32 request_id = 4; int32 request_id = 4;
oneof payload { oneof payload {
auth.Request auth = 1; auth.Request auth = 1;
vault.Request vault = 2; vault.Request vault = 2;
evm.Request evm = 3; evm.Request evm = 3;
} }
} }
message ClientResponse { message ClientResponse {
optional int32 request_id = 7; optional int32 request_id = 7;
oneof payload { oneof payload {
auth.Response auth = 1; auth.Response auth = 1;
vault.Response vault = 2; vault.Response vault = 2;
evm.Response evm = 3; evm.Response evm = 3;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,43 +1,43 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.client.auth; package arbiter.client.auth;
import "shared/client.proto"; import "shared/client.proto";
message AuthChallengeRequest { message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1; bytes pubkey = 1;
arbiter.shared.ClientInfo client_info = 2; arbiter.shared.ClientInfo client_info = 2;
} }
message AuthChallenge { message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1; uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
int32 nonce = 2; bytes random = 2;
} }
message AuthChallengeSolution { message AuthChallengeSolution {
bytes signature = 1; bytes signature = 1;
} }
enum AuthResult { enum AuthResult {
AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0; AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1; AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2; AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3; AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
AUTH_RESULT_APPROVAL_DENIED = 4; AUTH_RESULT_APPROVAL_DENIED = 4;
AUTH_RESULT_NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE = 5; AUTH_RESULT_NO_OPERATORS_ONLINE = 5;
AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6; AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
} }
message Request { message Request {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
AuthChallengeRequest challenge_request = 1; AuthChallengeRequest challenge_request = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution challenge_solution = 2; AuthChallengeSolution challenge_solution = 2;
} }
} }
message Response { message Response {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
AuthChallenge challenge = 1; AuthChallenge challenge = 1;
AuthResult result = 2; AuthResult result = 2;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.client.evm; package arbiter.client.evm;
import "evm.proto"; import "evm.proto";
message Request { message Request {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest sign_transaction = 1; arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest sign_transaction = 1;
arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest analyze_transaction = 2; arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest analyze_transaction = 2;
} }
} }
message Response { message Response {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse sign_transaction = 1; arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse sign_transaction = 1;
arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse analyze_transaction = 2; arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse analyze_transaction = 2;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.client.vault; package arbiter.client.vault;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto"; import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
import "shared/vault.proto"; import "shared/vault.proto";
message Request { message Request {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1; google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
} }
} }
message Response { message Response {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1; arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,153 +1,153 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.evm; package arbiter.evm;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto"; import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto"; import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
import "shared/evm.proto"; import "shared/evm.proto";
enum EvmError { enum EvmError {
EVM_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0; EVM_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
EVM_ERROR_VAULT_SEALED = 1; EVM_ERROR_VAULT_SEALED = 1;
EVM_ERROR_INTERNAL = 2; EVM_ERROR_INTERNAL = 2;
} }
message WalletEntry { message WalletEntry {
int32 id = 1; int32 id = 1;
bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
} }
message WalletList { message WalletList {
repeated WalletEntry wallets = 1; repeated WalletEntry wallets = 1;
} }
message WalletCreateResponse { message WalletCreateResponse {
oneof result { oneof result {
WalletEntry wallet = 1; WalletEntry wallet = 1;
EvmError error = 2; EvmError error = 2;
} }
} }
message WalletListResponse { message WalletListResponse {
oneof result { oneof result {
WalletList wallets = 1; WalletList wallets = 1;
EvmError error = 2; EvmError error = 2;
} }
} }
// --- Grant types --- // --- Grant types ---
message TransactionRateLimit { message TransactionRateLimit {
uint32 count = 1; uint32 count = 1;
int64 window_secs = 2; int64 window_secs = 2;
} }
message VolumeRateLimit { message VolumeRateLimit {
bytes max_volume = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes bytes max_volume = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
int64 window_secs = 2; int64 window_secs = 2;
} }
message SharedSettings { message SharedSettings {
int32 wallet_access_id = 1; int32 wallet_access_id = 1;
uint64 chain_id = 2; uint64 chain_id = 2;
optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_from = 3; optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_from = 3;
optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_until = 4; optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_until = 4;
optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 5; // U256 as big-endian bytes optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 5; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6; // U256 as big-endian bytes optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional TransactionRateLimit rate_limit = 7; optional TransactionRateLimit rate_limit = 7;
} }
message EtherTransferSettings { message EtherTransferSettings {
repeated bytes targets = 1; // list of 20-byte Ethereum addresses repeated bytes targets = 1; // list of 20-byte Ethereum addresses
VolumeRateLimit limit = 2; VolumeRateLimit limit = 2;
} }
message TokenTransferSettings { message TokenTransferSettings {
bytes token_contract = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address bytes token_contract = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
optional bytes target = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address; absent means any recipient allowed optional bytes target = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address; absent means any recipient allowed
repeated VolumeRateLimit volume_limits = 3; repeated VolumeRateLimit volume_limits = 3;
} }
message SpecificGrant { message SpecificGrant {
oneof grant { oneof grant {
EtherTransferSettings ether_transfer = 1; EtherTransferSettings ether_transfer = 1;
TokenTransferSettings token_transfer = 2; TokenTransferSettings token_transfer = 2;
} }
} }
// --- UserAgent grant management --- // --- Operator grant management ---
message EvmGrantCreateRequest { message EvmGrantCreateRequest {
SharedSettings shared = 1; SharedSettings shared = 1;
SpecificGrant specific = 2; SpecificGrant specific = 2;
} }
message EvmGrantCreateResponse { message EvmGrantCreateResponse {
oneof result { oneof result {
int32 grant_id = 1; int32 grant_id = 1;
EvmError error = 2; EvmError error = 2;
} }
} }
message EvmGrantDeleteRequest { message EvmGrantDeleteRequest {
int32 grant_id = 1; int32 grant_id = 1;
} }
message EvmGrantDeleteResponse { message EvmGrantDeleteResponse {
oneof result { oneof result {
google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1; google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
EvmError error = 2; EvmError error = 2;
} }
} }
// Basic grant info returned in grant listings // Basic grant info returned in grant listings
message GrantEntry { message GrantEntry {
int32 id = 1; int32 id = 1;
int32 wallet_access_id = 2; int32 wallet_access_id = 2;
SharedSettings shared = 3; SharedSettings shared = 3;
SpecificGrant specific = 4; SpecificGrant specific = 4;
} }
message EvmGrantListRequest { message EvmGrantListRequest {
optional int32 wallet_access_id = 1; optional int32 wallet_access_id = 1;
} }
message EvmGrantListResponse { message EvmGrantListResponse {
oneof result { oneof result {
EvmGrantList grants = 1; EvmGrantList grants = 1;
EvmError error = 2; EvmError error = 2;
} }
} }
message EvmGrantList { message EvmGrantList {
repeated GrantEntry grants = 1; repeated GrantEntry grants = 1;
} }
// --- Client transaction operations --- // --- Client transaction operations ---
message EvmSignTransactionRequest { message EvmSignTransactionRequest {
bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction (unsigned) bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction (unsigned)
} }
// oneof because signing and evaluation happen atomically — a signing failure // oneof because signing and evaluation happen atomically — a signing failure
// is always either an eval error or an internal error, never a partial success // is always either an eval error or an internal error, never a partial success
message EvmSignTransactionResponse { message EvmSignTransactionResponse {
oneof result { oneof result {
bytes signature = 1; // 65-byte signature: r[32] || s[32] || v[1] bytes signature = 1; // 65-byte signature: r[32] || s[32] || v[1]
arbiter.shared.evm.TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2; arbiter.shared.evm.TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
EvmError error = 3; EvmError error = 3;
} }
} }
message EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest { message EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest {
bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction
} }
message EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse { message EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse {
oneof result { oneof result {
arbiter.shared.evm.SpecificMeaning meaning = 1; arbiter.shared.evm.SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
arbiter.shared.evm.TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2; arbiter.shared.evm.TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
EvmError error = 3; EvmError error = 3;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,28 +1,28 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent; package arbiter.operator;
import "user_agent/auth.proto"; import "operator/auth.proto";
import "user_agent/evm.proto"; import "operator/evm.proto";
import "user_agent/sdk_client.proto"; import "operator/sdk_client.proto";
import "user_agent/vault/vault.proto"; import "operator/vault/vault.proto";
message UserAgentRequest { message OperatorRequest {
int32 id = 16; int32 id = 16;
oneof payload { oneof payload {
auth.Request auth = 1; auth.Request auth = 1;
vault.Request vault = 2; vault.Request vault = 2;
evm.Request evm = 3; evm.Request evm = 3;
sdk_client.Request sdk_client = 4; sdk_client.Request sdk_client = 4;
} }
} }
message UserAgentResponse { message OperatorResponse {
optional int32 id = 16; optional int32 id = 16;
oneof payload { oneof payload {
auth.Response auth = 1; auth.Response auth = 1;
vault.Response vault = 2; vault.Response vault = 2;
evm.Response evm = 3; evm.Response evm = 3;
sdk_client.Response sdk_client = 4; sdk_client.Response sdk_client = 4;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,48 +1,41 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.auth; package arbiter.operator.auth;
enum KeyType { message AuthChallengeRequest {
KEY_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED = 0; bytes pubkey = 1;
KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 1; optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1 = 2; }
KEY_TYPE_RSA = 3;
} message AuthChallenge {
uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
message AuthChallengeRequest { bytes random = 2;
bytes pubkey = 1; }
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
KeyType key_type = 3; message AuthChallengeSolution {
} bytes signature = 1;
}
message AuthChallenge {
int32 nonce = 1; enum AuthResult {
} AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
message AuthChallengeSolution { AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
bytes signature = 1; AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
} AUTH_RESULT_BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED = 4;
AUTH_RESULT_TOKEN_INVALID = 5;
enum AuthResult { AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0; }
AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2; message Request {
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3; oneof payload {
AUTH_RESULT_BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED = 4; AuthChallengeRequest challenge_request = 1;
AUTH_RESULT_TOKEN_INVALID = 5; AuthChallengeSolution challenge_solution = 2;
AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6; }
} }
message Request { message Response {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
AuthChallengeRequest challenge_request = 1; AuthChallenge challenge = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution challenge_solution = 2; AuthResult result = 2;
} }
} }
message Response {
oneof payload {
AuthChallenge challenge = 1;
AuthResult result = 2;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,33 +1,33 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.evm; package arbiter.operator.evm;
import "evm.proto"; import "evm.proto";
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto"; import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
message SignTransactionRequest { message SignTransactionRequest {
int32 client_id = 1; int32 client_id = 1;
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest request = 2; arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest request = 2;
} }
message Request { message Request {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
google.protobuf.Empty wallet_create = 1; google.protobuf.Empty wallet_create = 1;
google.protobuf.Empty wallet_list = 2; google.protobuf.Empty wallet_list = 2;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateRequest grant_create = 3; arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateRequest grant_create = 3;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteRequest grant_delete = 4; arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteRequest grant_delete = 4;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListRequest grant_list = 5; arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListRequest grant_list = 5;
SignTransactionRequest sign_transaction = 6; SignTransactionRequest sign_transaction = 6;
} }
} }
message Response { message Response {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
arbiter.evm.WalletCreateResponse wallet_create = 1; arbiter.evm.WalletCreateResponse wallet_create = 1;
arbiter.evm.WalletListResponse wallet_list = 2; arbiter.evm.WalletListResponse wallet_list = 2;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateResponse grant_create = 3; arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateResponse grant_create = 3;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteResponse grant_delete = 4; arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteResponse grant_delete = 4;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListResponse grant_list = 5; arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListResponse grant_list = 5;
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse sign_transaction = 6; arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse sign_transaction = 6;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,100 +1,100 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.sdk_client; package arbiter.operator.sdk_client;
import "shared/client.proto"; import "shared/client.proto";
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto"; import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
enum Error { enum Error {
ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0; ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS = 1; ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS = 1;
ERROR_NOT_FOUND = 2; ERROR_NOT_FOUND = 2;
ERROR_HAS_RELATED_DATA = 3; // hard-delete blocked by FK (client has grants or transaction logs) ERROR_HAS_RELATED_DATA = 3; // hard-delete blocked by FK (client has grants or transaction logs)
ERROR_INTERNAL = 4; ERROR_INTERNAL = 4;
} }
message RevokeRequest { message RevokeRequest {
int32 client_id = 1; int32 client_id = 1;
} }
message Entry { message Entry {
int32 id = 1; int32 id = 1;
bytes pubkey = 2; bytes pubkey = 2;
arbiter.shared.ClientInfo info = 3; arbiter.shared.ClientInfo info = 3;
int32 created_at = 4; int32 created_at = 4;
} }
message List { message List {
repeated Entry clients = 1; repeated Entry clients = 1;
} }
message RevokeResponse { message RevokeResponse {
oneof result { oneof result {
google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1; google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
Error error = 2; Error error = 2;
} }
} }
message ListResponse { message ListResponse {
oneof result { oneof result {
List clients = 1; List clients = 1;
Error error = 2; Error error = 2;
} }
} }
message ConnectionRequest { message ConnectionRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1; bytes pubkey = 1;
arbiter.shared.ClientInfo info = 2; arbiter.shared.ClientInfo info = 2;
} }
message ConnectionResponse { message ConnectionResponse {
bool approved = 1; bool approved = 1;
bytes pubkey = 2; bytes pubkey = 2;
} }
message ConnectionCancel { message ConnectionCancel {
bytes pubkey = 1; bytes pubkey = 1;
} }
message WalletAccess { message WalletAccess {
int32 wallet_id = 1; int32 wallet_id = 1;
int32 sdk_client_id = 2; int32 sdk_client_id = 2;
} }
message WalletAccessEntry { message WalletAccessEntry {
int32 id = 1; int32 id = 1;
WalletAccess access = 2; WalletAccess access = 2;
} }
message GrantWalletAccess { message GrantWalletAccess {
repeated WalletAccess accesses = 1; repeated WalletAccess accesses = 1;
} }
message RevokeWalletAccess { message RevokeWalletAccess {
repeated int32 accesses = 1; repeated int32 accesses = 1;
} }
message ListWalletAccessResponse { message ListWalletAccessResponse {
repeated WalletAccessEntry accesses = 1; repeated WalletAccessEntry accesses = 1;
} }
message Request { message Request {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
ConnectionResponse connection_response = 1; ConnectionResponse connection_response = 1;
RevokeRequest revoke = 2; RevokeRequest revoke = 2;
google.protobuf.Empty list = 3; google.protobuf.Empty list = 3;
GrantWalletAccess grant_wallet_access = 4; GrantWalletAccess grant_wallet_access = 4;
RevokeWalletAccess revoke_wallet_access = 5; RevokeWalletAccess revoke_wallet_access = 5;
google.protobuf.Empty list_wallet_access = 6; google.protobuf.Empty list_wallet_access = 6;
} }
} }
message Response { message Response {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
ConnectionRequest connection_request = 1; ConnectionRequest connection_request = 1;
ConnectionCancel connection_cancel = 2; ConnectionCancel connection_cancel = 2;
RevokeResponse revoke = 3; RevokeResponse revoke = 3;
ListResponse list = 4; ListResponse list = 4;
ListWalletAccessResponse list_wallet_access = 5; ListWalletAccessResponse list_wallet_access = 5;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.vault.bootstrap; package arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap;
message BootstrapEncryptedKey { message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
bytes nonce = 1; bytes nonce = 1;
bytes ciphertext = 2; bytes ciphertext = 2;
bytes associated_data = 3; bytes associated_data = 3;
} }
enum BootstrapResult { enum BootstrapResult {
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0; BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1; BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2; BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3; BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3;
} }
message Request { message Request {
BootstrapEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2; BootstrapEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
} }
message Response { message Response {
BootstrapResult result = 1; BootstrapResult result = 1;
} }

View File

@@ -1,37 +1,37 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.vault.unseal; package arbiter.operator.vault.unseal;
message UnsealStart { message UnsealStart {
bytes client_pubkey = 1; bytes client_pubkey = 1;
} }
message UnsealStartResponse { message UnsealStartResponse {
bytes server_pubkey = 1; bytes server_pubkey = 1;
} }
message UnsealEncryptedKey { message UnsealEncryptedKey {
bytes nonce = 1; bytes nonce = 1;
bytes ciphertext = 2; bytes ciphertext = 2;
bytes associated_data = 3; bytes associated_data = 3;
} }
enum UnsealResult { enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0; UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1; UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2; UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3; UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
} }
message Request { message Request {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
UnsealStart start = 1; UnsealStart start = 1;
UnsealEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2; UnsealEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
} }
} }
message Response { message Response {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
UnsealStartResponse start = 1; UnsealStartResponse start = 1;
UnsealResult result = 2; UnsealResult result = 2;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.vault; package arbiter.operator.vault;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto"; import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
import "shared/vault.proto"; import "shared/vault.proto";
import "user_agent/vault/bootstrap.proto"; import "operator/vault/bootstrap.proto";
import "user_agent/vault/unseal.proto"; import "operator/vault/unseal.proto";
message Request { message Request {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1; google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
unseal.Request unseal = 2; unseal.Request unseal = 2;
bootstrap.Request bootstrap = 3; bootstrap.Request bootstrap = 3;
} }
} }
message Response { message Response {
oneof payload { oneof payload {
arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1; arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
unseal.Response unseal = 2; unseal.Response unseal = 2;
bootstrap.Response bootstrap = 3; bootstrap.Response bootstrap = 3;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.shared; package arbiter.shared;
message ClientInfo { message ClientInfo {
string name = 1; string name = 1;
optional string description = 2; optional string description = 2;
optional string version = 3; optional string version = 3;
} }

View File

@@ -1,74 +1,74 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.shared.evm; package arbiter.shared.evm;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto"; import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
message EtherTransferMeaning { message EtherTransferMeaning {
bytes to = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address bytes to = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes value = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes bytes value = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
} }
message TokenInfo { message TokenInfo {
string symbol = 1; string symbol = 1;
bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
uint64 chain_id = 3; uint64 chain_id = 3;
} }
// Mirror of token_transfers::Meaning // Mirror of token_transfers::Meaning
message TokenTransferMeaning { message TokenTransferMeaning {
TokenInfo token = 1; TokenInfo token = 1;
bytes to = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address bytes to = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes value = 3; // U256 as big-endian bytes bytes value = 3; // U256 as big-endian bytes
} }
// Mirror of policies::SpecificMeaning // Mirror of policies::SpecificMeaning
message SpecificMeaning { message SpecificMeaning {
oneof meaning { oneof meaning {
EtherTransferMeaning ether_transfer = 1; EtherTransferMeaning ether_transfer = 1;
TokenTransferMeaning token_transfer = 2; TokenTransferMeaning token_transfer = 2;
} }
} }
message GasLimitExceededViolation { message GasLimitExceededViolation {
optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
} }
message EvalViolation { message EvalViolation {
message ChainIdMismatch { message ChainIdMismatch {
uint64 expected = 1; uint64 expected = 1;
uint64 actual = 2; uint64 actual = 2;
} }
oneof kind { oneof kind {
bytes invalid_target = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address bytes invalid_target = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
GasLimitExceededViolation gas_limit_exceeded = 2; GasLimitExceededViolation gas_limit_exceeded = 2;
google.protobuf.Empty rate_limit_exceeded = 3; google.protobuf.Empty rate_limit_exceeded = 3;
google.protobuf.Empty volumetric_limit_exceeded = 4; google.protobuf.Empty volumetric_limit_exceeded = 4;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_time = 5; google.protobuf.Empty invalid_time = 5;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_transaction_type = 6; google.protobuf.Empty invalid_transaction_type = 6;
ChainIdMismatch chain_id_mismatch = 7; ChainIdMismatch chain_id_mismatch = 7;
} }
} }
// Transaction was classified but no grant covers it // Transaction was classified but no grant covers it
message NoMatchingGrantError { message NoMatchingGrantError {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1; SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
} }
// Transaction was classified and a grant was found, but constraints were violated // Transaction was classified and a grant was found, but constraints were violated
message PolicyViolationsError { message PolicyViolationsError {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1; SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
repeated EvalViolation violations = 2; repeated EvalViolation violations = 2;
} }
// top-level error returned when transaction evaluation fails // top-level error returned when transaction evaluation fails
message TransactionEvalError { message TransactionEvalError {
oneof kind { oneof kind {
google.protobuf.Empty contract_creation_not_supported = 1; google.protobuf.Empty contract_creation_not_supported = 1;
google.protobuf.Empty unsupported_transaction_type = 2; google.protobuf.Empty unsupported_transaction_type = 2;
NoMatchingGrantError no_matching_grant = 3; NoMatchingGrantError no_matching_grant = 3;
PolicyViolationsError policy_violations = 4; PolicyViolationsError policy_violations = 4;
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
syntax = "proto3"; syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.shared; package arbiter.shared;
enum VaultState { enum VaultState {
VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0; VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1; VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2; VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3; VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4; VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
} }

View File

@@ -1,150 +1,150 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3 #!/usr/bin/env python3
""" """
Fetch the Uniswap default token list and emit Rust `TokenInfo` statics. Fetch the Uniswap default token list and emit Rust `TokenInfo` statics.
Usage: Usage:
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py # fetch from IPFS python3 gen_erc20_registry.py # fetch from IPFS
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json # local file python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json # local file
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json out.rs # custom output file python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json out.rs # custom output file
""" """
import json import json
import re import re
import sys import sys
import unicodedata import unicodedata
import urllib.request import urllib.request
UNISWAP_URL = "https://ipfs.io/ipns/tokens.uniswap.org" UNISWAP_URL = "https://ipfs.io/ipns/tokens.uniswap.org"
SOLANA_CHAIN_ID = 501000101 SOLANA_CHAIN_ID = 501000101
IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+") IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+")
def load_tokens(source=None): def load_tokens(source=None):
if source: if source:
with open(source) as f: with open(source) as f:
return json.load(f) return json.load(f)
req = urllib.request.Request( req = urllib.request.Request(
UNISWAP_URL, UNISWAP_URL,
headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "gen_tokens/1.0"}, headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "gen_tokens/1.0"},
) )
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp: with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp:
return json.loads(resp.read()) return json.loads(resp.read())
def escape(s: str) -> str: def escape(s: str) -> str:
return s.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"') return s.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
def to_screaming_case(name: str) -> str: def to_screaming_case(name: str) -> str:
normalized = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", name or "") normalized = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", name or "")
ascii_name = normalized.encode("ascii", "ignore").decode("ascii") ascii_name = normalized.encode("ascii", "ignore").decode("ascii")
snake = IDENTIFIER_RE.sub("_", ascii_name).strip("_").upper() snake = IDENTIFIER_RE.sub("_", ascii_name).strip("_").upper()
if not snake: if not snake:
snake = "TOKEN" snake = "TOKEN"
if snake[0].isdigit(): if snake[0].isdigit():
snake = f"TOKEN_{snake}" snake = f"TOKEN_{snake}"
return snake return snake
def static_name_for_token(token: dict, used_names: set[str]) -> str: def static_name_for_token(token: dict, used_names: set[str]) -> str:
base = to_screaming_case(token.get("name", "")) base = to_screaming_case(token.get("name", ""))
if base not in used_names: if base not in used_names:
used_names.add(base) used_names.add(base)
return base return base
address = token["address"] address = token["address"]
suffix = f"{token['chainId']}_{address[2:].upper()[-8:]}" suffix = f"{token['chainId']}_{address[2:].upper()[-8:]}"
candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}" candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}"
i = 2 i = 2
while candidate in used_names: while candidate in used_names:
candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}_{i}" candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}_{i}"
i += 1 i += 1
used_names.add(candidate) used_names.add(candidate)
return candidate return candidate
def main(): def main():
source = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None source = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
output = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "generated_tokens.rs" output = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "generated_tokens.rs"
data = load_tokens(source) data = load_tokens(source)
tokens = data["tokens"] tokens = data["tokens"]
# Deduplicate by (chainId, address) # Deduplicate by (chainId, address)
seen = set() seen = set()
unique = [] unique = []
for t in tokens: for t in tokens:
key = (t["chainId"], t["address"].lower()) key = (t["chainId"], t["address"].lower())
if key not in seen: if key not in seen:
seen.add(key) seen.add(key)
unique.append(t) unique.append(t)
unique.sort(key=lambda t: (t["chainId"], t.get("symbol", "").upper())) unique.sort(key=lambda t: (t["chainId"], t.get("symbol", "").upper()))
evm_tokens = [t for t in unique if t["chainId"] != SOLANA_CHAIN_ID] evm_tokens = [t for t in unique if t["chainId"] != SOLANA_CHAIN_ID]
ver = data["version"] ver = data["version"]
lines = [] lines = []
w = lines.append w = lines.append
w( w(
f"// Auto-generated from Uniswap token list v{ver['major']}.{ver['minor']}.{ver['patch']}" f"// Auto-generated from Uniswap token list v{ver['major']}.{ver['minor']}.{ver['patch']}"
) )
w(f"// {len(evm_tokens)} tokens") w(f"// {len(evm_tokens)} tokens")
w("// DO NOT EDIT - regenerate with gen_erc20_registry.py") w("// DO NOT EDIT - regenerate with gen_erc20_registry.py")
w("") w("")
used_static_names = set() used_static_names = set()
token_statics = [] token_statics = []
for t in evm_tokens: for t in evm_tokens:
static_name = static_name_for_token(t, used_static_names) static_name = static_name_for_token(t, used_static_names)
token_statics.append((static_name, t)) token_statics.append((static_name, t))
for static_name, t in token_statics: for static_name, t in token_statics:
addr = t["address"] addr = t["address"]
name = escape(t.get("name", "")) name = escape(t.get("name", ""))
symbol = escape(t.get("symbol", "")) symbol = escape(t.get("symbol", ""))
decimals = t.get("decimals", 18) decimals = t.get("decimals", 18)
logo = t.get("logoURI") logo = t.get("logoURI")
chain = t["chainId"] chain = t["chainId"]
logo_val = f'Some("{escape(logo)}")' if logo else "None" logo_val = f'Some("{escape(logo)}")' if logo else "None"
w(f"pub static {static_name}: TokenInfo = TokenInfo {{") w(f"pub static {static_name}: TokenInfo = TokenInfo {{")
w(f' name: "{name}",') w(f' name: "{name}",')
w(f' symbol: "{symbol}",') w(f' symbol: "{symbol}",')
w(f" decimals: {decimals},") w(f" decimals: {decimals},")
w(f' contract: address!("{addr}"),') w(f' contract: address!("{addr}"),')
w(f" chain: {chain},") w(f" chain: {chain},")
w(f" logo_uri: {logo_val},") w(f" logo_uri: {logo_val},")
w("};") w("};")
w("") w("")
w("pub static TOKENS: &[&TokenInfo] = &[") w("pub static TOKENS: &[&TokenInfo] = &[")
for static_name, _ in token_statics: for static_name, _ in token_statics:
w(f" &{static_name},") w(f" &{static_name},")
w("];") w("];")
w("") w("")
w("pub fn get_token(") w("pub fn get_token(")
w(" chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId,") w(" chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId,")
w(" address: alloy::primitives::Address,") w(" address: alloy::primitives::Address,")
w(") -> Option<&'static TokenInfo> {") w(") -> Option<&'static TokenInfo> {")
w(" match (chain_id, address) {") w(" match (chain_id, address) {")
for static_name, t in token_statics: for static_name, t in token_statics:
w( w(
f' ({t["chainId"]}, addr) if addr == address!("{t["address"]}") => Some(&{static_name}),' f' ({t["chainId"]}, addr) if addr == address!("{t["address"]}") => Some(&{static_name}),'
) )
w(" _ => None,") w(" _ => None,")
w(" }") w(" }")
w("}") w("}")
w("") w("")
with open(output, "w") as f: with open(output, "w") as f:
f.write("\n".join(lines)) f.write("\n".join(lines))
print(f"Wrote {len(token_statics)} tokens to {output}") print(f"Wrote {len(token_statics)} tokens to {output}")
if __name__ == "__main__": if __name__ == "__main__":
main() main()

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
[advisories] [advisories]
# RUSTSEC-2023-0071: Marvin Attack timing side-channel in rsa crate. # RUSTSEC-2023-0071: Marvin Attack timing side-channel in rsa crate.
# No fixed version is available upstream. # No fixed version is available upstream.
# RSA support is required for Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager # RSA support is required for Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager
# (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.security.credentials.keycredentialmanager.requestcreateasync), # (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.security.credentials.keycredentialmanager.requestcreateasync),
# which only issues RSA-2048 keys. # which only issues RSA-2048 keys.
# Mitigations in place: # Mitigations in place:
# - Signing uses BlindedSigningKey (PSS+SHA-256), which applies blinding to # - Signing uses BlindedSigningKey (PSS+SHA-256), which applies blinding to
# protect the private key from timing recovery during signing. # protect the private key from timing recovery during signing.
# - RSA decryption is never performed; we only verify public-key signatures. # - RSA decryption is never performed; we only verify public-key signatures.
# - The attack requires local, high-resolution timing access against the # - The attack requires local, high-resolution timing access against the
# signing process, which is not exposed in our threat model. # signing process, which is not exposed in our threat model.
ignore = ["RUSTSEC-2023-0071"] ignore = ["RUSTSEC-2023-0071"]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
[env]
MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = "26.3"

View File

@@ -1 +1 @@
test_tool = "nextest" test_tool = "nextest"

2
server/.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
mutants.out/ mutants.out/
mutants.out.old/ mutants.out.old/

12643
server/Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,50 +1,171 @@
[workspace] [workspace]
members = [ members = [
"crates/*", "crates/*",
] ]
resolver = "3" resolver = "3"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
disallowed-methods = "deny" [workspace.dependencies]
alloy = "2.0.4"
async-trait = "0.1.89"
[workspace.dependencies] base64 = "0.22.1"
tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [ chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
"deflate", futures = "0.3.32"
"gzip", k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
"tls-connect-info", kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
"zstd", kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
] } hmac = "0.13.0"
tracing = "0.1.44" miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
tokio = { version = "1.50.0", features = ["full"] } ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.9", features = ["zeroize"] }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] } mutants = "0.0.4"
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] } prost = "0.14.3"
rand = "0.10.0" prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false } rand = "0.10.1"
smlang = "0.8.0" rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs", "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false }
thiserror = "2.0.18" rstest = "0.26.1"
async-trait = "0.1.89" rustls = { version = "0.23.40", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
futures = "0.3.32" rustls-pki-types = "1.14.1"
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] } sha2 = "0.11"
kameo = "0.19.2" smlang = "0.8.0"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] } thiserror = "2.0.18"
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] } tokio = { version = "1.52.1", features = ["full"] }
rstest = "0.26.1" tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0" tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [ "deflate", "gzip", "tls-connect-info", "zstd" ] }
alloy = "1.7.3" tracing = "0.1.44"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
"aws_lc_rs",
"pem", [workspace.lints.rust]
"x509-parser", missing_unsafe_on_extern = "deny"
"zeroize", unsafe_attr_outside_unsafe = "deny"
], default-features = false } unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn = "deny"
k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] } unstable_features = "deny"
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
sha2 = "0.10" deprecated_safe_2024 = "warn"
spki = "0.7" ffi_unwind_calls = "warn"
prost = "0.14.3" linker_messages = "warn"
miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
mutants = "0.0.4" elided_lifetimes_in_paths = "warn"
ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.8", features = ["zeroize"] } explicit_outlives_requirements = "warn"
base64 = "0.22.1" impl-trait-overcaptures = "warn"
hmac = "0.12.1" impl-trait-redundant-captures = "warn"
redundant_lifetimes = "warn"
single_use_lifetimes = "warn"
unused_lifetimes = "warn"
macro_use_extern_crate = "warn"
redundant_imports = "warn"
unused_import_braces = "warn"
unused_macro_rules = "warn"
unused_qualifications = "warn"
unit_bindings = "warn"
# missing_docs = "warn" # ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
unnameable_types = "warn"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
derive_partial_eq_without_eq = "allow"
future_not_send = "allow"
inconsistent_struct_constructor = "allow"
inline_always = "allow"
missing_errors_doc = "allow"
missing_fields_in_debug = "allow"
missing_panics_doc = "allow"
must_use_candidate = "allow"
needless_pass_by_ref_mut = "allow"
pub_underscore_fields = "allow"
redundant_pub_crate = "allow"
uninhabited_references = "allow" # safe with unsafe_code = "forbid" and standard uninhabited pattern (match *self {})
too-many-lines = "allow" # this is a very common pattern in server code, and it's not always possible to break it down into smaller modules without hurting readability
# restriction lints
alloc_instead_of_core = "warn"
allow_attributes_without_reason = "warn"
as_conversions = "warn"
assertions_on_result_states = "warn"
cfg_not_test = "warn"
clone_on_ref_ptr = "warn"
cognitive_complexity = "warn"
create_dir = "warn"
dbg_macro = "warn"
decimal_literal_representation = "warn"
default_union_representation = "warn"
deref_by_slicing = "warn"
disallowed_script_idents = "warn"
doc_include_without_cfg = "warn"
empty_drop = "warn"
empty_enum_variants_with_brackets = "warn"
empty_structs_with_brackets = "warn"
exit = "warn"
filetype_is_file = "warn"
float_arithmetic = "warn"
float_cmp_const = "warn"
fn_to_numeric_cast_any = "warn"
get_unwrap = "warn"
if_then_some_else_none = "warn"
indexing_slicing = "warn"
infinite_loop = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_att_syntax = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_intel_syntax = "warn"
integer_division = "warn"
large_include_file = "warn"
lossy_float_literal = "warn"
map_with_unused_argument_over_ranges = "warn"
mem_forget = "warn"
missing_assert_message = "warn"
mixed_read_write_in_expression = "warn"
modulo_arithmetic = "warn"
multiple_unsafe_ops_per_block = "warn"
mutex_atomic = "warn"
mutex_integer = "warn"
needless_raw_strings = "warn"
non_ascii_literal = "warn"
non_zero_suggestions = "warn"
pathbuf_init_then_push = "warn"
pointer_format = "warn"
precedence_bits = "warn"
pub_without_shorthand = "warn"
rc_buffer = "warn"
rc_mutex = "warn"
redundant_test_prefix = "warn"
redundant_type_annotations = "warn"
ref_patterns = "warn"
renamed_function_params = "warn"
rest_pat_in_fully_bound_structs = "warn"
return_and_then = "warn"
semicolon_inside_block = "warn"
str_to_string = "warn"
string_add = "warn"
string_lit_chars_any = "warn"
string_slice = "warn"
suspicious_xor_used_as_pow = "warn"
try_err = "warn"
undocumented_unsafe_blocks = "warn"
uninlined_format_args = "warn"
unnecessary_safety_comment = "warn"
unnecessary_safety_doc = "warn"
unnecessary_self_imports = "warn"
unneeded_field_pattern = "warn"
unused_result_ok = "warn"
verbose_file_reads = "warn"
# cargo lints
negative_feature_names = "warn"
redundant_feature_names = "warn"
wildcard_dependencies = "warn"
# ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
# todo = "warn"
# unimplemented = "warn"
# panic = "warn"
# panic_in_result_fn = "warn"
#
# cargo_common_metadata = "warn"
# multiple_crate_versions = "warn" # a controversial option since it's really difficult to maintain
disallowed_methods = "deny"
nursery = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
pedantic = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
type_repetition_in_bounds = "allow" # sometimes, it's better for readability this way

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,28 @@
disallowed-methods = [ disallowed-methods = [
# RSA decryption is forbidden: the rsa crate has RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack). # RSA decryption is forbidden: the rsa crate has RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack).
# We only use RSA for Windows Hello (KeyCredentialManager) public-key verification — decryption # We only use RSA for Windows Hello (KeyCredentialManager) public-key verification — decryption
# is never required and must not be introduced. # is never required and must not be introduced.
{ path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." }, { path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
{ path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt_blinded", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." }, { path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt_blinded", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
{ path = "rsa::traits::Decryptor::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." }, { path = "rsa::traits::Decryptor::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
{ path = "rsa::traits::RandomizedDecryptor::decrypt_with_rng", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt_with_rng() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." }, { path = "rsa::traits::RandomizedDecryptor::decrypt_with_rng", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt_with_rng() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
] ]
allow-indexing-slicing-in-tests = true
allow-panic-in-tests = true
check-inconsistent-struct-field-initializers = true
suppress-restriction-lint-in-const = true
allow-renamed-params-for = [
"core::convert::From",
"core::convert::TryFrom",
"core::str::FromStr",
"kameo::actor::Actor",
]
module-items-ordered-within-groupings = ["UPPER_SNAKE_CASE"]
source-item-ordering = ["enum"]
trait-assoc-item-kinds-order = [
"const",
"type",
"fn",
] # community tested standard

View File

@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
[package] [package]
name = "arbiter-client" name = "arbiter-client"
version = "0.1.0" version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024" edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter" repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
license = "Apache-2.0" license = "Apache-2.0"
[lints] [lints]
workspace = true workspace = true
[features] [features]
evm = ["dep:alloy"] evm = ["dep:alloy"]
[dependencies] [dependencies]
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto" arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto" arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true } alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
tonic.workspace = true tonic.workspace = true
tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"] tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
tokio.workspace = true tokio.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true tokio-stream.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true thiserror.workspace = true
http = "1.4.0" http = "1.4.0"
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.10", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] } rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.13", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
async-trait.workspace = true async-trait.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true chrono.workspace = true
[lib]
doctest = false

View File

@@ -1,152 +1,160 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey, format_challenge}; use crate::{
use arbiter_proto::{ storage::StorageError,
ClientMetadata, transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
proto::{ };
client::{ use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey};
ClientRequest, use arbiter_proto::{
auth::{ ClientMetadata,
self as proto_auth, AuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthChallengeSolution, proto::{
AuthResult, request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload, client::{
response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload, ClientRequest,
}, auth::{
client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload, self as proto_auth, AuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthChallengeSolution,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload, AuthResult, request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload,
}, response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo, },
}, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
}; client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
use crate::{ shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo,
storage::StorageError, },
transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id}, };
};
use chrono::DateTime;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AuthError { #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")] pub enum AuthError {
MissingAuthChallenge, #[error("Server sent invalid auth challenge")]
InvalidChallenge,
#[error("Client approval denied by User Agent")] #[error("Client approval denied by Operator")]
ApprovalDenied, ApprovalDenied,
#[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
#[error("No User Agents online to approve client")] MissingAuthChallenge,
NoUserAgentsOnline,
#[error("No Operators online to approve client")]
#[error("Unexpected auth response payload")] NoOperatorsOnline,
UnexpectedAuthResponse,
#[error("Signing key storage error")]
#[error("Signing key storage error")] Storage(#[from] StorageError),
Storage(#[from] StorageError),
} #[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
UnexpectedAuthResponse,
fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError { }
match AuthResult::try_from(code).unwrap_or(AuthResult::Unspecified) {
AuthResult::ApprovalDenied => AuthError::ApprovalDenied, fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
AuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline => AuthError::NoUserAgentsOnline, match AuthResult::try_from(code).unwrap_or(AuthResult::Unspecified) {
AuthResult::Unspecified AuthResult::ApprovalDenied => AuthError::ApprovalDenied,
| AuthResult::Success AuthResult::NoOperatorsOnline => AuthError::NoOperatorsOnline,
| AuthResult::InvalidKey AuthResult::Unspecified
| AuthResult::InvalidSignature | AuthResult::Success
| AuthResult::Internal => AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse, | AuthResult::InvalidKey
} | AuthResult::InvalidSignature
} | AuthResult::Internal => AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse,
}
async fn send_auth_challenge_request( }
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
metadata: ClientMetadata, async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
key: &SigningKey, transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> { metadata: ClientMetadata,
transport key: &SigningKey,
.send(ClientRequest { ) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
request_id: next_request_id(), transport
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request { .send(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest { request_id: next_request_id(),
pubkey: key.public_key().to_bytes(), payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
client_info: Some(ProtoClientInfo { payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest {
name: metadata.name, pubkey: key.public_key().to_bytes(),
description: metadata.description, client_info: Some(ProtoClientInfo {
version: metadata.version, name: metadata.name,
}), description: metadata.description,
})), version: metadata.version,
})), }),
}) })),
.await })),
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse) })
} .await
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
async fn receive_auth_challenge( }
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> { async fn receive_auth_challenge(
let response = transport transport: &mut ClientTransport,
.recv() ) -> Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
.await let response = transport
.map_err(|_| AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge)?; .recv()
.await
let payload = response.payload.ok_or(AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge)?; .map_err(|_| AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge)?;
match payload {
ClientResponsePayload::Auth(response) => match response.payload { let payload = response.payload.ok_or(AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge)?;
Some(AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(challenge)) => Ok(challenge), match payload {
Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result)) => Err(map_auth_result(result)), ClientResponsePayload::Auth(response) => match response.payload {
None => Err(AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge), Some(AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(challenge)) => Ok(challenge),
}, Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result)) => Err(map_auth_result(result)),
_ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse), None => Err(AuthError::MissingAuthChallenge),
} },
} _ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
}
async fn send_auth_challenge_solution( }
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
key: &SigningKey, async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
challenge: AuthChallenge, transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> { key: &SigningKey,
let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey); challenge: AuthChallenge,
let signature = key ) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
.sign_message(&challenge_payload, CLIENT_CONTEXT) let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos.cast_signed());
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)? let challenge = authn::AuthChallenge {
.to_bytes(); nonce: *challenge
.random
transport .as_array()
.send(ClientRequest { .ok_or(AuthError::InvalidChallenge)?,
request_id: next_request_id(), timestamp,
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request { };
payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution( let challenge_payload: Vec<u8> = challenge.format();
AuthChallengeSolution { signature }, let signature = key
)), .sign_message(&challenge_payload, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
})), .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?
}) .to_bytes();
.await
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse) transport
} .send(ClientRequest {
request_id: next_request_id(),
async fn receive_auth_confirmation( payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
transport: &mut ClientTransport, payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> { AuthChallengeSolution { signature },
let response = transport )),
.recv() })),
.await })
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?; .await
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
let payload = response.payload.ok_or(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?; }
match payload {
ClientResponsePayload::Auth(response) => match response.payload { async fn receive_auth_confirmation(transport: &mut ClientTransport) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result)) let response = transport
if AuthResult::try_from(result).ok() == Some(AuthResult::Success) => .recv()
{ .await
Ok(()) .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?;
}
Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result)) => Err(map_auth_result(result)), let payload = response.payload.ok_or(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?;
_ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse), match payload {
}, ClientResponsePayload::Auth(response) => match response.payload {
_ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse), Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result))
} if AuthResult::try_from(result).ok() == Some(AuthResult::Success) =>
} {
Ok(())
pub(crate) async fn authenticate( }
transport: &mut ClientTransport, Some(AuthResponsePayload::Result(result)) => Err(map_auth_result(result)),
metadata: ClientMetadata, _ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
key: &SigningKey, },
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> { _ => Err(AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
send_auth_challenge_request(transport, metadata, key).await?; }
let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?; }
send_auth_challenge_solution(transport, key, challenge).await?;
receive_auth_confirmation(transport).await pub async fn authenticate(
} transport: &mut ClientTransport,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: &SigningKey,
) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
send_auth_challenge_request(transport, metadata, key).await?;
let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?;
send_auth_challenge_solution(transport, key, challenge).await?;
receive_auth_confirmation(transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,44 +1,44 @@
use std::io::{self, Write}; use arbiter_client::ArbiterClient;
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, url::ArbiterUrl};
use arbiter_client::ArbiterClient;
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, url::ArbiterUrl}; use std::io::{self, Write};
#[tokio::main] #[tokio::main]
async fn main() { async fn main() {
println!("Testing connection to Arbiter server..."); println!("Testing connection to Arbiter server...");
print!("Enter ArbiterUrl: "); print!("Enter ArbiterUrl: ");
let _ = io::stdout().flush(); let _ = io::stdout().flush();
let mut input = String::new(); let mut input = String::new();
if let Err(err) = io::stdin().read_line(&mut input) { if let Err(err) = io::stdin().read_line(&mut input) {
eprintln!("Failed to read input: {err}"); eprintln!("Failed to read input: {err}");
return; return;
} }
let input = input.trim(); let input = input.trim();
if input.is_empty() { if input.is_empty() {
eprintln!("ArbiterUrl cannot be empty"); eprintln!("ArbiterUrl cannot be empty");
return; return;
} }
let url = match ArbiterUrl::try_from(input) { let url = match ArbiterUrl::try_from(input) {
Ok(url) => url, Ok(url) => url,
Err(err) => { Err(err) => {
eprintln!("Invalid ArbiterUrl: {err}"); eprintln!("Invalid ArbiterUrl: {err}");
return; return;
} }
}; };
println!("{:#?}", url); println!("{url:#?}");
let metadata = ClientMetadata { let metadata = ClientMetadata {
name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_string(), name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_owned(),
description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_string()), description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_owned()),
version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string()), version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_owned()),
}; };
match ArbiterClient::connect(url, metadata).await { match ArbiterClient::connect(url, metadata).await {
Ok(_) => println!("Connected and authenticated successfully."), Ok(_) => println!("Connected and authenticated successfully."),
Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {:#?}", err), Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {err:#?}"),
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,95 +1,101 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey; #[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use arbiter_proto::{ use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl, use crate::{
}; StorageError,
use std::sync::Arc; auth::{AuthError, authenticate},
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc}; storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage},
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream; transport::{BUFFER_LENGTH, ClientTransport},
use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig; };
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use crate::{ use arbiter_proto::{
StorageError, ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
auth::{AuthError, authenticate}, };
storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage},
transport::{BUFFER_LENGTH, ClientTransport}, use std::sync::Arc;
}; use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
#[cfg(feature = "evm")] use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)] pub enum ArbiterClientError {
pub enum Error { #[error("Authentication error")]
#[error("gRPC error")] Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
#[error("Could not establish connection")]
#[error("Could not establish connection")] Connection(#[from] tonic::transport::Error),
Connection(#[from] tonic::transport::Error),
#[error("gRPC error")]
#[error("Invalid server URI")] Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
#[error("Invalid CA certificate")]
#[error("Invalid CA certificate")] InvalidCaCert(#[from] webpki::Error),
InvalidCaCert(#[from] webpki::Error),
#[error("Invalid server URI")]
#[error("Authentication error")] InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
#[error("Storage error")]
#[error("Storage error")] Storage(#[from] StorageError),
Storage(#[from] StorageError), }
}
pub struct ArbiterClient {
pub struct ArbiterClient { #[expect(
#[allow(dead_code)] dead_code,
transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, reason = "transport will be used in future methods for sending requests and receiving responses"
} )]
transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
impl ArbiterClient { }
pub async fn connect(url: ArbiterUrl, metadata: ClientMetadata) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::from_default_location()?; impl ArbiterClient {
Self::connect_with_storage(url, metadata, &storage).await pub async fn connect(
} url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
pub async fn connect_with_storage<S: SigningKeyStorage>( ) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
url: ArbiterUrl, let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::from_default_location()?;
metadata: ClientMetadata, Self::connect_with_storage(url, metadata, &storage).await
storage: &S, }
) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let key = storage.load_or_create()?; pub async fn connect_with_storage<S: SigningKeyStorage>(
Self::connect_with_key(url, metadata, key).await url: ArbiterUrl,
} metadata: ClientMetadata,
storage: &S,
pub async fn connect_with_key( ) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
url: ArbiterUrl, let key = storage.load_or_create()?;
metadata: ClientMetadata, Self::connect_with_key(url, metadata, key).await
key: SigningKey, }
) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned(); pub async fn connect_with_key(
let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor); url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
let channel = key: SigningKey,
tonic::transport::Channel::from_shared(format!("https://{}:{}", url.host, url.port))? ) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
.tls_config(tls)? let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned();
.connect() let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);
.await?;
let channel =
let mut client = ArbiterServiceClient::new(channel); tonic::transport::Channel::from_shared(format!("https://{}:{}", url.host, url.port))?
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(BUFFER_LENGTH); .tls_config(tls)?
let response_stream = client.client(ReceiverStream::new(rx)).await?.into_inner(); .connect()
.await?;
let mut transport = ClientTransport {
sender: tx, let mut client = ArbiterServiceClient::new(channel);
receiver: response_stream, let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(BUFFER_LENGTH);
}; let response_stream = client.client(ReceiverStream::new(rx)).await?.into_inner();
authenticate(&mut transport, metadata, &key).await?; let mut transport = ClientTransport {
sender: tx,
Ok(Self { receiver: response_stream,
transport: Arc::new(Mutex::new(transport)), };
})
} authenticate(&mut transport, metadata, &key).await?;
#[cfg(feature = "evm")] Ok(Self {
pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, Error> { transport: Arc::new(Mutex::new(transport)),
todo!("fetch EVM wallet list from server") })
} }
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "false positive")]
pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, ArbiterClientError> {
todo!("fetch EVM wallet list from server")
}
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
mod auth; mod auth;
mod client; mod client;
mod storage; mod storage;
mod transport; mod transport;
pub mod wallets; pub mod wallets;
pub use auth::AuthError; pub use auth::AuthError;
pub use client::{ArbiterClient, Error}; pub use client::{ArbiterClient, ArbiterClientError};
pub use storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError}; pub use storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
#[cfg(feature = "evm")] #[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub use wallets::evm::{ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError, ArbiterEvmWallet}; pub use wallets::evm::{ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError, ArbiterEvmWallet};

View File

@@ -1,133 +1,134 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey; use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use arbiter_proto::home_path; use arbiter_proto::home_path;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum StorageError { #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("I/O error")] pub enum StorageError {
Io(#[from] std::io::Error), #[error("Invalid signing key length in storage: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
InvalidKeyLength { expected: usize, actual: usize },
#[error("Invalid signing key length in storage: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
InvalidKeyLength { expected: usize, actual: usize }, #[error("I/O error")]
} Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
}
pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<SigningKey, StorageError>; pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
} fn load_or_create(&self) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError>;
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage { #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
path: PathBuf, pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage {
} path: PathBuf,
}
impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ml_dsa.key"; impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ml_dsa.key";
pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
Self { path: path.into() } pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
} Self { path: path.into() }
}
pub fn from_default_location() -> std::result::Result<Self, StorageError> {
Ok(Self::new(home_path()?.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME))) pub fn from_default_location() -> Result<Self, StorageError> {
} Ok(Self::new(home_path()?.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME)))
}
fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
let bytes = std::fs::read(path)?; fn read_key(path: &Path) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
let raw: [u8; 32] = let bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
bytes let raw: [u8; 32] =
.try_into() bytes
.map_err(|v: Vec<u8>| StorageError::InvalidKeyLength { .try_into()
expected: 32, .map_err(|v: Vec<u8>| StorageError::InvalidKeyLength {
actual: v.len(), expected: 32,
})?; actual: v.len(),
Ok(SigningKey::from_seed(raw)) })?;
} Ok(SigningKey::from_seed(raw))
} }
}
impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<SigningKey, StorageError> { impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() { fn load_or_create(&self) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?; if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
} std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
}
if self.path.exists() {
return Self::read_key(&self.path); if self.path.exists() {
} return Self::read_key(&self.path);
}
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let raw_key = key.to_seed(); let key = SigningKey::generate();
let raw_key = key.to_seed();
// Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
match std::fs::OpenOptions::new() // Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
.create_new(true) match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.write(true) .create_new(true)
.open(&self.path) .write(true)
{ .open(&self.path)
Ok(mut file) => { {
use std::io::Write as _; Ok(mut file) => {
file.write_all(&raw_key)?; use std::io::Write as _;
Ok(key) file.write_all(&raw_key)?;
} Ok(key)
Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => { }
Self::read_key(&self.path) Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => {
} Self::read_key(&self.path)
Err(err) => Err(StorageError::Io(err)), }
} Err(err) => Err(StorageError::Io(err)),
} }
} }
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests { #[cfg(test)]
use super::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError}; mod tests {
use super::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
fn unique_temp_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
let nanos = std::time::SystemTime::now() fn unique_temp_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH) let nanos = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.expect("clock should be after unix epoch") .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.as_nanos(); .expect("clock should be after unix epoch")
std::env::temp_dir().join(format!( .as_nanos();
"arbiter-client-key-{}-{}.bin", std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
std::process::id(), "arbiter-client-key-{}-{}.bin",
nanos std::process::id(),
)) nanos
} ))
}
#[test]
fn file_storage_creates_and_reuses_key() { #[test]
let path = unique_temp_key_path(); fn file_storage_creates_and_reuses_key() {
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone()); let path = unique_temp_key_path();
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone());
let key_a = storage
.load_or_create() let key_a = storage
.expect("first load_or_create should create key"); .load_or_create()
let key_b = storage .expect("first load_or_create should create key");
.load_or_create() let key_b = storage
.expect("second load_or_create should read same key"); .load_or_create()
.expect("second load_or_create should read same key");
assert_eq!(key_a.to_seed(), key_b.to_seed());
assert!(path.exists()); assert_eq!(key_a.to_seed(), key_b.to_seed());
assert!(path.exists());
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
} std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
}
#[test]
fn file_storage_rejects_invalid_key_length() { #[test]
let path = unique_temp_key_path(); fn file_storage_rejects_invalid_key_length() {
std::fs::write(&path, [42u8; 31]).expect("should write invalid key file"); let path = unique_temp_key_path();
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone()); std::fs::write(&path, [42u8; 31]).expect("should write invalid key file");
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone());
let err = storage
.load_or_create() let err = storage
.expect_err("storage should reject non-32-byte key file"); .load_or_create()
.expect_err("storage should reject non-32-byte key file");
match err {
StorageError::InvalidKeyLength { expected, actual } => { match err {
assert_eq!(expected, 32); StorageError::InvalidKeyLength { expected, actual } => {
assert_eq!(actual, 31); assert_eq!(expected, 32);
} assert_eq!(actual, 31);
other => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"), }
} other @ StorageError::Io(_) => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"),
}
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
} std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
} }
}

View File

@@ -1,44 +1,41 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse}; use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering};
use tokio::sync::mpsc; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
pub(crate) const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
static NEXT_REQUEST_ID: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(1); pub const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
static NEXT_REQUEST_ID: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(1);
pub(crate) fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
NEXT_REQUEST_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) pub fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
} NEXT_REQUEST_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub(crate) enum ClientSignError { #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("Transport channel closed")] pub enum ClientSignError {
ChannelClosed, #[error("Transport channel closed")]
ChannelClosed,
#[error("Connection closed by server")]
ConnectionClosed, #[error("Connection closed by server")]
} ConnectionClosed,
}
pub(crate) struct ClientTransport {
pub(crate) sender: mpsc::Sender<ClientRequest>, pub struct ClientTransport {
pub(crate) receiver: tonic::Streaming<ClientResponse>, pub(crate) sender: mpsc::Sender<ClientRequest>,
} pub(crate) receiver: tonic::Streaming<ClientResponse>,
}
impl ClientTransport {
pub(crate) async fn send( impl ClientTransport {
&mut self, pub(crate) async fn send(&mut self, request: ClientRequest) -> Result<(), ClientSignError> {
request: ClientRequest, self.sender
) -> std::result::Result<(), ClientSignError> { .send(request)
self.sender .await
.send(request) .map_err(|_| ClientSignError::ChannelClosed)
.await }
.map_err(|_| ClientSignError::ChannelClosed)
} pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
match self.receiver.message().await {
pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> std::result::Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> { Ok(Some(resp)) => Ok(resp),
match self.receiver.message().await { Ok(None) | Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
Ok(Some(resp)) => Ok(resp), }
Ok(None) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed), }
Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed), }
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,192 +1,197 @@
use alloy::{ use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
consensus::SignableTransaction, use arbiter_proto::proto::{
network::TxSigner, client::{
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature}, ClientRequest,
signers::{Error, Result, Signer}, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
}; client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
use async_trait::async_trait; evm::{
use std::sync::Arc; self as proto_evm, request::Payload as EvmRequestPayload,
use tokio::sync::Mutex; response::Payload as EvmResponsePayload,
},
use arbiter_proto::proto::{ },
client::{ evm::{
ClientRequest, EvmSignTransactionRequest,
client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload, evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload, },
evm::{ shared::evm::TransactionEvalError,
self as proto_evm, request::Payload as EvmRequestPayload, };
response::Payload as EvmResponsePayload,
}, use alloy::{
}, consensus::SignableTransaction,
evm::{ network::TxSigner,
EvmSignTransactionRequest, primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult, signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
}, };
shared::evm::TransactionEvalError, use async_trait::async_trait;
}; use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
/// A typed error payload returned by [`ArbiterEvmWallet`] transaction signing.
/// A typed error payload returned by [`ArbiterEvmWallet`] transaction signing. ///
/// /// This is wrapped into `alloy::signers::Error::Other`, so consumers can downcast by [`TryFrom`] and
/// This is wrapped into `alloy::signers::Error::Other`, so consumers can downcast by [`TryFrom`] and /// interpret the concrete policy evaluation failure instead of parsing strings.
/// interpret the concrete policy evaluation failure instead of parsing strings. #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)] #[non_exhaustive]
#[non_exhaustive] pub enum ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError {
pub enum ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError { #[error("transaction rejected by policy: {0:?}")]
#[error("transaction rejected by policy: {0:?}")] PolicyEval(TransactionEvalError),
PolicyEval(TransactionEvalError), }
}
impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a Error> for &'a ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError {
impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a Error> for &'a ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError { type Error = ();
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: &'a Error) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
fn try_from(value: &'a Error) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { if let Error::Other(inner) = value
if let Error::Other(inner) = value && let Some(eval_error) = inner.downcast_ref()
&& let Some(eval_error) = inner.downcast_ref() {
{ Ok(eval_error)
Ok(eval_error) } else {
} else { Err(())
Err(()) }
} }
} }
}
pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet {
pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet { transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address,
address: Address, chain_id: Option<ChainId>,
chain_id: Option<ChainId>, }
}
impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
impl ArbiterEvmWallet { #[expect(
pub(crate) fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self { dead_code,
Self { reason = "new will be used in future methods for creating wallets with different parameters"
transport, )]
address, pub(crate) const fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
chain_id: None, Self {
} transport,
} address,
chain_id: None,
pub fn address(&self) -> Address { }
self.address }
}
pub const fn address(&self) -> Address {
pub fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self { self.address
self.chain_id = Some(chain_id); }
self
} #[must_use]
pub const fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
fn validate_chain_id(&self, tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>) -> Result<()> { self.chain_id = Some(chain_id);
if let Some(chain_id) = self.chain_id self
&& !tx.set_chain_id_checked(chain_id) }
{
return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch { fn validate_chain_id(&self, tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>) -> Result<()> {
signer: chain_id, if let Some(chain_id) = self.chain_id
tx: tx.chain_id().unwrap(), && !tx.set_chain_id_checked(chain_id)
}); {
} return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
signer: chain_id,
Ok(()) tx: tx.chain_id().unwrap(),
} });
} }
#[async_trait] Ok(())
impl Signer for ArbiterEvmWallet { }
async fn sign_hash(&self, _hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> { }
Err(Error::other(
"hash-only signing is not supported for ArbiterEvmWallet; use transaction signing", #[async_trait]
)) impl Signer for ArbiterEvmWallet {
} async fn sign_hash(&self, _hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
Err(Error::other(
fn address(&self) -> Address { "hash-only signing is not supported for ArbiterEvmWallet; use transaction signing",
self.address ))
} }
fn chain_id(&self) -> Option<ChainId> { fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.chain_id self.address
} }
fn set_chain_id(&mut self, chain_id: Option<ChainId>) { fn chain_id(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
self.chain_id = chain_id; self.chain_id
} }
}
fn set_chain_id(&mut self, chain_id: Option<ChainId>) {
#[async_trait] self.chain_id = chain_id;
impl TxSigner<Signature> for ArbiterEvmWallet { }
fn address(&self) -> Address { }
self.address
} #[async_trait]
impl TxSigner<Signature> for ArbiterEvmWallet {
async fn sign_transaction( fn address(&self) -> Address {
&self, self.address
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>, }
) -> Result<Signature> {
self.validate_chain_id(tx)?; async fn sign_transaction(
&self,
let mut transport = self.transport.lock().await; tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
let request_id = next_request_id(); ) -> Result<Signature> {
let rlp_transaction = tx.encoded_for_signing(); self.validate_chain_id(tx)?;
transport let mut transport = self.transport.lock().await;
.send(ClientRequest { let request_id = next_request_id();
request_id, let rlp_transaction = tx.encoded_for_signing();
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Evm(proto_evm::Request {
payload: Some(EvmRequestPayload::SignTransaction( transport
EvmSignTransactionRequest { .send(ClientRequest {
wallet_address: self.address.to_vec(), request_id,
rlp_transaction, payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Evm(proto_evm::Request {
}, payload: Some(EvmRequestPayload::SignTransaction(
)), EvmSignTransactionRequest {
})), wallet_address: self.address.to_vec(),
}) rlp_transaction,
.await },
.map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to send evm sign transaction request"))?; )),
})),
let response = transport })
.recv() .await
.await .map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to send evm sign transaction request"))?;
.map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to receive evm sign transaction response"))?;
let response = transport
if response.request_id != Some(request_id) { .recv()
return Err(Error::other( .await
"received mismatched response id for evm sign transaction", .map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to receive evm sign transaction response"))?;
)); drop(transport);
}
if response.request_id != Some(request_id) {
let payload = response return Err(Error::other(
.payload "received mismatched response id for evm sign transaction",
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("missing evm sign transaction response payload"))?; ));
}
let ClientResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
payload: Some(payload), let payload = response
}) = payload .payload
else { .ok_or_else(|| Error::other("missing evm sign transaction response payload"))?;
return Err(Error::other(
"unexpected response payload for evm sign transaction request", let ClientResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
)); payload: Some(payload),
}; }) = payload
else {
let EvmResponsePayload::SignTransaction(response) = payload else { return Err(Error::other(
return Err(Error::other( "unexpected response payload for evm sign transaction request",
"unexpected evm response payload for sign transaction request", ));
)); };
};
let EvmResponsePayload::SignTransaction(response) = payload else {
let result = response return Err(Error::other(
.result "unexpected evm response payload for sign transaction request",
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("missing evm sign transaction result"))?; ));
};
match result {
EvmSignTransactionResult::Signature(signature) => { let result = response
Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) .result
.map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid signature returned by server")) .ok_or_else(|| Error::other("missing evm sign transaction result"))?;
}
EvmSignTransactionResult::EvalError(eval_error) => Err(Error::other( match result {
ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError::PolicyEval(eval_error), EvmSignTransactionResult::Signature(signature) => {
)), Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice())
EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(code) => Err(Error::other(format!( .map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid signature returned by server"))
"server failed to sign transaction with error code {code}" }
))), EvmSignTransactionResult::EvalError(eval_error) => Err(Error::other(
} ArbiterEvmSignTransactionError::PolicyEval(eval_error),
} )),
} EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(code) => Err(Error::other(format!(
"server failed to sign transaction with error code {code}"
))),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
#[cfg(feature = "evm")] #[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub mod evm; pub mod evm;

View File

@@ -1 +1 @@
/target /target

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,25 @@
[package] [package]
name = "arbiter-crypto" name = "arbiter-crypto"
version = "0.1.0" version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024" edition = "2024"
[dependencies] [dependencies]
ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true } ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true }
rand = {workspace = true, optional = true} rand = {workspace = true, optional = true}
base64 = {workspace = true, optional = true } memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true}
memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true} hmac.workspace = true
hmac.workspace = true alloy.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true x-wing = { version = "0.1.0-rc.0", features = ["zeroize"] }
chrono.workspace = true chrono.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true [lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = ["authn", "safecell"] [features]
authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand", "dep:base64"] default = ["authn", "safecell"]
safecell = ["dep:memsafe"] authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand"]
safecell = ["dep:memsafe"]
[lib]
doctest = false

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
pub mod v1; pub mod v1;
pub use v1::*; pub use v1::*;

View File

@@ -1,193 +1,252 @@
use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD}; use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use hmac::digest::Digest; use hmac::digest::Digest;
use ml_dsa::{ use ml_dsa::{
EncodedVerifyingKey, Error, KeyGen, MlDsa87, Seed, Signature as MlDsaSignature, EncodedVerifyingKey, Error, KeyGen, MlDsa87, Seed, Signature as MlDsaSignature,
SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _, SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _,
}; };
use rand::RngExt;
pub static CLIENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_client";
pub static USERAGENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_user_agent"; pub static CLIENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_client";
pub static OPERATOR_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_operator";
pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey)); const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 32;
concat_form.into_bytes()
} #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("invalid length: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
pub type KeyParams = MlDsa87; pub struct InvalidLength {
pub expected: usize,
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] pub actual: usize,
pub struct PublicKey(Box<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>>); }
impl crate::hashing::Hashable for PublicKey { #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { pub struct AuthChallenge {
hasher.update(self.to_bytes()); pub nonce: [u8; NONCE_SIZE],
} pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
} }
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] impl AuthChallenge {
pub struct Signature(Box<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>>); pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::CryptoRng) -> Self {
let timestamp = Utc::now();
#[derive(Debug)] let nonce = {
pub struct SigningKey(Box<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>>); let mut array = [0; NONCE_SIZE];
rng.fill(&mut array);
impl PublicKey { array
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> { };
self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
} Self { nonce, timestamp }
}
pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
self.0.verify_with_context( pub fn format(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
&format_challenge(nonce, &self.to_bytes()), {
context, let mut buffer = Vec::from(self.nonce);
&signature.0,
) let stamp = self
} .timestamp
} .timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("We would be long dead by the time this triggers :)");
impl Signature { buffer.extend_from_slice(stamp.to_be_bytes().as_slice());
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.encode().0.to_vec() buffer
} }
} }
impl SigningKey { pub fn from_parts(nonce: &[u8], timestamp: i64) -> Result<Self, InvalidLength> {
pub fn generate() -> Self { let random_nonce = nonce.as_array().ok_or(InvalidLength {
Self(Box::new(KeyParams::key_gen(&mut rand::rng()))) expected: NONCE_SIZE,
} actual: nonce.len(),
})?;
pub fn from_seed(seed: [u8; 32]) -> Self { Ok(Self {
Self(Box::new(KeyParams::from_seed(&Seed::from(seed)))) nonce: *random_nonce,
} timestamp: DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(timestamp),
})
pub fn to_seed(&self) -> [u8; 32] { }
self.0.to_seed().into() }
}
pub type KeyParams = MlDsa87;
pub fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
self.0.verifying_key().into() #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
} pub struct PublicKey(Box<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>>);
pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> { impl crate::hashing::Hashable for PublicKey {
self.0 fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
.signing_key() hasher.update(self.to_bytes());
.sign_deterministic(message, context) }
.map(Into::into) }
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub fn sign_challenge(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> { pub struct Signature(Box<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>>);
self.sign_message(
&format_challenge(nonce, &self.public_key().to_bytes()), #[derive(Debug)]
context, pub struct SigningKey(Box<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>>);
)
} impl PublicKey {
} pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
impl From<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>> for PublicKey { }
fn from(value: MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value)) #[must_use]
} pub fn verify(&self, challenge: &AuthChallenge, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
} let challenge = challenge.format();
self.0
impl From<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>> for Signature { .verify_with_context(&challenge, context, &signature.0)
fn from(value: MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>) -> Self { }
Self(Box::new(value)) }
}
} impl Signature {
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
impl From<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>> for SigningKey { self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
fn from(value: MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>) -> Self { }
Self(Box::new(value)) }
}
} impl SigningKey {
pub fn generate() -> Self {
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for PublicKey { Self(Box::new(KeyParams::key_gen(&mut rand::rng())))
type Error = (); }
fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { pub fn from_seed(seed: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self::try_from(value.as_slice()) Self(Box::new(KeyParams::from_seed(&Seed::from(seed))))
} }
}
pub fn to_seed(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for PublicKey { self.0.to_seed().into()
type Error = (); }
fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { pub fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
let encoded = EncodedVerifyingKey::<KeyParams>::try_from(value).map_err(|_| ())?; self.0.verifying_key().into()
Ok(Self(Box::new(MlDsaVerifyingKey::decode(&encoded)))) }
}
} pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
self.0
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for Signature { .signing_key()
type Error = (); .sign_deterministic(message, context)
.map(Into::into)
fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { }
Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
} pub fn sign_challenge(
} &self,
challenge: &AuthChallenge,
impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for Signature { context: &[u8],
type Error = (); ) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
let challenge = challenge.format();
fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
MlDsaSignature::try_from(value) self.sign_message(&challenge, context)
.map(|sig| Self(Box::new(sig))) }
.map_err(|_| ()) }
}
} impl From<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>> for PublicKey {
fn from(value: MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
#[cfg(test)] Self(Box::new(value))
mod tests { }
use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, signature::Keypair as _}; }
use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, USERAGENT_CONTEXT}; impl From<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>> for Signature {
fn from(value: MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>) -> Self {
#[test] Self(Box::new(value))
fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() { }
let key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng()); }
let encoded = PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()).to_bytes();
impl From<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>> for SigningKey {
let decoded = PublicKey::try_from(encoded.as_slice()).expect("public key should decode"); fn from(value: MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value))
assert_eq!(decoded, PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key())); }
} }
#[test] impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for PublicKey {
fn signature_round_trip_decodes() { type Error = ();
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let signature = key fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
.sign_message(b"challenge", CLIENT_CONTEXT) Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
.expect("signature should be created"); }
}
let decoded =
Signature::try_from(signature.to_bytes().as_slice()).expect("signature should decode"); impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for PublicKey {
type Error = ();
assert_eq!(decoded, signature);
} fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let encoded = EncodedVerifyingKey::<KeyParams>::try_from(value).map_err(|_| ())?;
#[test] Ok(Self(Box::new(MlDsaVerifyingKey::decode(&encoded))))
fn challenge_verification_uses_context_and_canonical_key_bytes() { }
let key = SigningKey::generate(); }
let public_key = key.public_key();
let nonce = 17; impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for Signature {
let signature = key type Error = ();
.sign_challenge(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created"); fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
assert!(public_key.verify(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature)); }
assert!(!public_key.verify(nonce, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature)); }
}
impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for Signature {
#[test] type Error = ();
fn signing_key_round_trip_seed_preserves_public_key_and_signing() {
let original = SigningKey::generate(); fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let restored = SigningKey::from_seed(original.to_seed()); MlDsaSignature::try_from(value)
.map(|sig| Self(Box::new(sig)))
assert_eq!(restored.public_key(), original.public_key()); .map_err(|_| ())
}
let signature = restored }
.sign_challenge(9, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created"); #[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
assert!(restored.public_key().verify(9, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature)); use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, signature::Keypair as _};
}
} use crate::authn::AuthChallenge;
use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, OPERATOR_CONTEXT};
#[test]
fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() {
let key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let encoded = PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()).to_bytes();
let decoded = PublicKey::try_from(encoded.as_slice()).expect("public key should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded, PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()));
}
#[test]
fn signature_round_trip_decodes() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let signature = key
.sign_message(b"challenge", CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
let decoded =
Signature::try_from(signature.to_bytes().as_slice()).expect("signature should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded, signature);
}
#[test]
fn challenge_verification_uses_context_and_canonical_key_bytes() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let public_key = key.public_key();
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let signature = key
.sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(public_key.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
assert!(!public_key.verify(&challenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT, &signature));
}
#[test]
fn signing_key_round_trip_seed_preserves_public_key_and_signing() {
let original = SigningKey::generate();
let restored = SigningKey::from_seed(original.to_seed());
assert_eq!(restored.public_key(), original.public_key());
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let signature = restored
.sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(
restored
.public_key()
.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature)
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,111 +1,112 @@
pub use hmac::digest::Digest; use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::collections::HashSet;
pub use hmac::digest::Digest;
/// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
#[diagnostic::on_unimplemented( /// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
note = "for local types consider adding `#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]` to your `{Self}` type", #[diagnostic::on_unimplemented(
note = "for types from other crates check whether the crate offers a `Hashable` implementation" note = "for local types consider adding `#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]` to your `{Self}` type",
)] note = "for types from other crates check whether the crate offers a `Hashable` implementation"
pub trait Hashable { )]
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H); pub trait Hashable {
} fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H);
}
macro_rules! impl_numeric {
($($t:ty),*) => { macro_rules! impl_numeric {
$( ($($t:ty),*) => {
impl Hashable for $t { $(
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl Hashable for $t {
hasher.update(&self.to_be_bytes()); fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
} hasher.update(&self.to_be_bytes());
} }
)* }
}; )*
} };
}
impl_numeric!(u8, u16, u32, u64, i8, i16, i32, i64);
impl_numeric!(u8, u16, u32, u64, i8, i16, i32, i64);
impl Hashable for &[u8] {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl Hashable for &[u8] {
hasher.update(self); fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
} hasher.update(self);
} }
}
impl Hashable for String {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl Hashable for String {
hasher.update(self.as_bytes()); fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
} hasher.update(self.as_bytes());
} }
}
impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for Vec<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for Vec<T> {
let ref_sorted = { fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(); let ref_sorted = {
sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap()); let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
sorted sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
}; sorted
for item in ref_sorted { };
item.hash(hasher); for item in ref_sorted {
} item.hash(hasher);
} }
} }
}
impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for HashSet<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd, S: std::hash::BuildHasher> Hashable for HashSet<T, S> {
let ref_sorted = { fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(); let ref_sorted = {
sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap()); let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
sorted sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
}; sorted
for item in ref_sorted { };
item.hash(hasher); for item in ref_sorted {
} item.hash(hasher);
} }
} }
}
impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Option<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Option<T> {
match self { fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
Some(value) => { match self {
hasher.update([1]); Some(value) => {
value.hash(hasher); hasher.update([1]);
} value.hash(hasher);
None => hasher.update([0]), }
} None => hasher.update([0]),
} }
} }
}
impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Box<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Box<T> {
self.as_ref().hash(hasher); fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
} self.as_ref().hash(hasher);
} }
}
impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for &T {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for &T {
(*self).hash(hasher); fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
} (*self).hash(hasher);
} }
}
impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::Address {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::Address {
hasher.update(self.as_slice()); fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
} hasher.update(self.as_slice());
} }
}
impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::U256 {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::U256 {
hasher.update(self.to_be_bytes::<32>()); fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
} hasher.update(self.to_be_bytes::<32>());
} }
}
impl Hashable for chrono::Duration {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl Hashable for chrono::Duration {
hasher.update(self.num_seconds().to_be_bytes()); fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
} hasher.update(self.num_seconds().to_be_bytes());
} }
}
impl Hashable for chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { impl Hashable for chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
hasher.update(self.timestamp_millis().to_be_bytes()); fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
} hasher.update(self.timestamp_millis().to_be_bytes());
} }
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
#[cfg(feature = "authn")] #[cfg(feature = "authn")]
pub mod authn; pub mod authn;
pub mod hashing; pub mod hashing;
#[cfg(feature = "safecell")] #[cfg(feature = "safecell")]
pub mod safecell; pub mod safecell;
pub use x_wing;

View File

@@ -1,116 +1,118 @@
use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut}; use memsafe::MemSafe;
use std::{any::type_name, fmt}; use std::{
any::type_name,
use memsafe::MemSafe; fmt,
ops::{Deref, DerefMut},
pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> { };
type CellRead<'a>: Deref<Target = T>
where pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
Self: 'a, type CellRead<'a>: Deref<Target = T>
T: 'a; where
type CellWrite<'a>: Deref<Target = T> + DerefMut<Target = T> Self: 'a,
where T: 'a;
Self: 'a, type CellWrite<'a>: Deref<Target = T> + DerefMut<Target = T>
T: 'a; where
Self: 'a,
fn new(value: T) -> Self T: 'a;
where
Self: Sized; fn new(value: T) -> Self
where
fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_>; Self: Sized;
fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_>;
fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_>;
fn new_inline<F>(f: F) -> Self fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_>;
where
Self: Sized, fn new_inline<F>(f: F) -> Self
T: Default, where
F: for<'a> FnOnce(&'a mut T), Self: Sized,
{ T: Default,
let mut cell = Self::new(T::default()); F: for<'a> FnOnce(&'a mut T),
{ {
let mut handle = cell.write(); let mut cell = Self::new(T::default());
f(handle.deref_mut()); {
} let mut handle = cell.write();
cell f(&mut *handle);
} }
cell
#[inline(always)] }
fn read_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
where #[inline(always)]
F: FnOnce(&T) -> R, fn read_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
{ where
f(&*self.read()) F: FnOnce(&T) -> R,
} {
f(&*self.read())
#[inline(always)] }
fn write_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
where #[inline(always)]
F: FnOnce(&mut T) -> R, fn write_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
{ where
f(&mut *self.write()) F: FnOnce(&mut T) -> R,
} {
} f(&mut *self.write())
}
pub struct MemSafeCell<T>(MemSafe<T>); }
impl<T> fmt::Debug for MemSafeCell<T> { pub struct MemSafeCell<T>(MemSafe<T>);
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("MemSafeCell") impl<T> fmt::Debug for MemSafeCell<T> {
.field("inner", &format_args!("<protected {}>", type_name::<T>())) fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
.finish() f.debug_struct("MemSafeCell")
} .field("inner", &format_args!("<protected {}>", type_name::<T>()))
} .finish()
}
impl<T> SafeCellHandle<T> for MemSafeCell<T> { }
type CellRead<'a>
= memsafe::MemSafeRead<'a, T> impl<T> SafeCellHandle<T> for MemSafeCell<T> {
where type CellRead<'a>
Self: 'a, = memsafe::MemSafeRead<'a, T>
T: 'a; where
type CellWrite<'a> Self: 'a,
= memsafe::MemSafeWrite<'a, T> T: 'a;
where type CellWrite<'a>
Self: 'a, = memsafe::MemSafeWrite<'a, T>
T: 'a; where
Self: 'a,
fn new(value: T) -> Self { T: 'a;
match MemSafe::new(value) {
Ok(inner) => Self(inner), fn new(value: T) -> Self {
Err(err) => { match MemSafe::new(value) {
// If protected memory cannot be allocated, process integrity is compromised. Ok(inner) => Self(inner),
abort_memory_breach("safe cell allocation", &err) Err(err) => {
} // If protected memory cannot be allocated, process integrity is compromised.
} abort_memory_breach("safe cell allocation", &err)
} }
}
#[inline(always)] }
fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_> {
match self.0.read() { #[inline(always)]
Ok(inner) => inner, fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_> {
Err(err) => abort_memory_breach("safe cell read", &err), match self.0.read() {
} Ok(inner) => inner,
} Err(err) => abort_memory_breach("safe cell read", &err),
}
#[inline(always)] }
fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_> {
match self.0.write() { #[inline(always)]
Ok(inner) => inner, fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_> {
Err(err) => { match self.0.write() {
// If protected memory becomes unwritable here, treat it as a fatal memory breach. Ok(inner) => inner,
abort_memory_breach("safe cell write", &err) Err(err) => {
} // If protected memory becomes unwritable here, treat it as a fatal memory breach.
} abort_memory_breach("safe cell write", &err)
} }
} }
}
fn abort_memory_breach(action: &str, err: &memsafe::error::MemoryError) -> ! { }
eprintln!("fatal {action}: {err}");
// SAFETY: Intentionally cause a segmentation fault to prevent further execution in a compromised state. fn abort_memory_breach(action: &str, err: &memsafe::error::MemoryError) -> ! {
unsafe { eprintln!("fatal {action}: {err}");
let unsafe_pointer = std::ptr::null_mut::<u8>(); // SAFETY: Intentionally cause a segmentation fault to prevent further execution in a compromised state.
std::ptr::write_volatile(unsafe_pointer, 0); unsafe {
} let unsafe_pointer = std::ptr::null_mut::<u8>();
std::process::abort(); std::ptr::write_volatile(unsafe_pointer, 0);
} }
std::process::abort();
pub type SafeCell<T> = MemSafeCell<T>; }
pub type SafeCell<T> = MemSafeCell<T>;

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
[package] [package]
name = "arbiter-macros" name = "arbiter-macros"
version = "0.1.0" version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024" edition = "2024"
[lib] [lib]
proc-macro = true proc-macro = true
doctest = false
[dependencies]
proc-macro2 = "1.0" [dependencies]
quote = "1.0" proc-macro2 = "1.0"
syn = { version = "2.0", features = ["derive", "fold", "full", "visit-mut"] } quote = "1.0"
syn = { version = "2.0", features = ["derive", "fold", "full", "visit-mut"] }
[dev-dependencies]
arbiter-crypto = { path = "../arbiter-crypto" } [dev-dependencies]
arbiter-crypto = { path = "../arbiter-crypto" }
[lints]
workspace = true [lints]
workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,133 +1,131 @@
use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream, TokenTree}; use crate::utils::{HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH, HMAC_DIGEST_PATH};
use quote::quote;
use syn::parse_quote; use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream, TokenTree};
use syn::spanned::Spanned; use quote::quote;
use syn::{DataStruct, DeriveInput, Fields, Generics, Index}; use syn::{DataStruct, DeriveInput, Fields, Generics, Index, parse_quote, spanned::Spanned};
use crate::utils::{HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH, HMAC_DIGEST_PATH}; pub(crate) fn derive(input: &DeriveInput) -> TokenStream {
match &input.data {
pub(crate) fn derive(input: &DeriveInput) -> TokenStream { syn::Data::Struct(struct_data) => hashable_struct(input, struct_data),
match &input.data { syn::Data::Enum(_) => {
syn::Data::Struct(struct_data) => hashable_struct(input, struct_data), syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable can currently be derived only for structs")
syn::Data::Enum(_) => { .to_compile_error()
syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable can currently be derived only for structs") }
.to_compile_error() syn::Data::Union(_) => {
} syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable cannot be derived for unions")
syn::Data::Union(_) => { .to_compile_error()
syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable cannot be derived for unions") }
.to_compile_error() }
} }
}
} fn hashable_struct(input: &DeriveInput, struct_data: &DataStruct) -> TokenStream {
let ident = &input.ident;
fn hashable_struct(input: &DeriveInput, struct_data: &syn::DataStruct) -> TokenStream { let hashable_trait = HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH.to_path();
let ident = &input.ident; let hmac_digest = HMAC_DIGEST_PATH.to_path();
let hashable_trait = HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH.to_path(); let generics = add_hashable_bounds(input.generics.clone(), &hashable_trait);
let hmac_digest = HMAC_DIGEST_PATH.to_path(); let field_accesses = collect_field_accesses(struct_data);
let generics = add_hashable_bounds(input.generics.clone(), &hashable_trait); let hash_calls = build_hash_calls(&field_accesses, &hashable_trait);
let field_accesses = collect_field_accesses(struct_data);
let hash_calls = build_hash_calls(&field_accesses, &hashable_trait); let (impl_generics, ty_generics, where_clause) = generics.split_for_impl();
let (impl_generics, ty_generics, where_clause) = generics.split_for_impl(); quote! {
#[automatically_derived]
quote! { impl #impl_generics #hashable_trait for #ident #ty_generics #where_clause {
#[automatically_derived] fn hash<H: #hmac_digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
impl #impl_generics #hashable_trait for #ident #ty_generics #where_clause { #(#hash_calls)*
fn hash<H: #hmac_digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) { }
#(#hash_calls)* }
} }
} }
}
} fn add_hashable_bounds(mut generics: Generics, hashable_trait: &syn::Path) -> Generics {
for type_param in generics.type_params_mut() {
fn add_hashable_bounds(mut generics: Generics, hashable_trait: &syn::Path) -> Generics { type_param.bounds.push(parse_quote!(#hashable_trait));
for type_param in generics.type_params_mut() { }
type_param.bounds.push(parse_quote!(#hashable_trait));
} generics
}
generics
} struct FieldAccess {
access: TokenStream,
struct FieldAccess { span: Span,
access: TokenStream, }
span: Span,
} fn collect_field_accesses(struct_data: &DataStruct) -> Vec<FieldAccess> {
match &struct_data.fields {
fn collect_field_accesses(struct_data: &DataStruct) -> Vec<FieldAccess> { Fields::Named(fields) => {
match &struct_data.fields { // Keep deterministic alphabetical order for named fields.
Fields::Named(fields) => { // Do not remove this sort, because it keeps hash output stable regardless of source order.
// Keep deterministic alphabetical order for named fields. let mut named_fields = fields
// Do not remove this sort, because it keeps hash output stable regardless of source order. .named
let mut named_fields = fields .iter()
.named .map(|field| {
.iter() let name = field
.map(|field| { .ident
let name = field .as_ref()
.ident .expect("Fields::Named(fields) must have names")
.as_ref() .clone();
.expect("Fields::Named(fields) must have names") (name.to_string(), name)
.clone(); })
(name.to_string(), name) .collect::<Vec<_>>();
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>(); named_fields.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0));
named_fields.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0)); named_fields
.into_iter()
named_fields .map(|(_, name)| FieldAccess {
.into_iter() access: quote! { #name },
.map(|(_, name)| FieldAccess { span: name.span(),
access: quote! { #name }, })
span: name.span(), .collect()
}) }
.collect() Fields::Unnamed(fields) => fields
} .unnamed
Fields::Unnamed(fields) => fields .iter()
.unnamed .enumerate()
.iter() .map(|(i, field)| FieldAccess {
.enumerate() access: {
.map(|(i, field)| FieldAccess { let index = Index::from(i);
access: { quote! { #index }
let index = Index::from(i); },
quote! { #index } span: field.ty.span(),
}, })
span: field.ty.span(), .collect(),
}) Fields::Unit => Vec::new(),
.collect(), }
Fields::Unit => Vec::new(), }
}
} fn build_hash_calls(
field_accesses: &[FieldAccess],
fn build_hash_calls( hashable_trait: &syn::Path,
field_accesses: &[FieldAccess], ) -> Vec<TokenStream> {
hashable_trait: &syn::Path, field_accesses
) -> Vec<TokenStream> { .iter()
field_accesses .map(|field| {
.iter() let access = &field.access;
.map(|field| { let call = quote! {
let access = &field.access; #hashable_trait::hash(&self.#access, hasher);
let call = quote! { };
#hashable_trait::hash(&self.#access, hasher);
}; respan(call, field.span)
})
respan(call, field.span) .collect()
}) }
.collect()
} /// Recursively set span on all tokens, including interpolated ones.
fn respan(tokens: TokenStream, span: Span) -> TokenStream {
/// Recursively set span on all tokens, including interpolated ones. tokens
fn respan(tokens: TokenStream, span: Span) -> TokenStream { .into_iter()
tokens .map(|tt| match tt {
.into_iter() TokenTree::Group(g) => {
.map(|tt| match tt { let mut new = proc_macro2::Group::new(g.delimiter(), respan(g.stream(), span));
TokenTree::Group(g) => { new.set_span(span);
let mut new = proc_macro2::Group::new(g.delimiter(), respan(g.stream(), span)); TokenTree::Group(new)
new.set_span(span); }
TokenTree::Group(new) mut other => {
} other.set_span(span);
mut other => { other
other.set_span(span); }
other })
} .collect()
}) }
.collect()
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
use syn::{DeriveInput, parse_macro_input}; use syn::{DeriveInput, parse_macro_input};
mod hashable; mod hashable;
mod utils; mod utils;
#[proc_macro_derive(Hashable)] #[proc_macro_derive(Hashable)]
pub fn derive_hashable(input: proc_macro::TokenStream) -> proc_macro::TokenStream { pub fn derive_hashable(input: proc_macro::TokenStream) -> proc_macro::TokenStream {
let input = parse_macro_input!(input as DeriveInput); let input = parse_macro_input!(input as DeriveInput);
hashable::derive(&input).into() hashable::derive(&input).into()
} }

View File

@@ -1,19 +1,24 @@
pub struct ToPath(pub &'static str); pub(crate) struct ToPath(pub &'static str);
impl ToPath { impl ToPath {
pub fn to_path(&self) -> syn::Path { pub(crate) fn to_path(&self) -> syn::Path {
syn::parse_str(self.0).expect("Invalid path") syn::parse_str(self.0).expect("Invalid path")
} }
} }
macro_rules! ensure_path { macro_rules! ensure_path {
($path:path) => {{ ($path:path as $name:ident) => {
#[cfg(test)] const _: () = {
#[expect(unused_imports)] #[cfg(test)]
use $path as _; #[expect(
ToPath(stringify!($path)) unused_imports,
}}; reason = "Ensures the path is valid and will cause a compile error if not"
} )]
use $path as _;
pub const HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH: ToPath = ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable); };
pub const HMAC_DIGEST_PATH: ToPath = ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Digest); pub(crate) const $name: ToPath = ToPath(stringify!($path));
};
}
ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable as HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH);
ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Digest as HMAC_DIGEST_PATH);

View File

@@ -1,36 +1,35 @@
[package] [package]
name = "arbiter-proto" name = "arbiter-proto"
version = "0.1.0" version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024" edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter" repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
license = "Apache-2.0" license = "Apache-2.0"
[dependencies] [dependencies]
tonic.workspace = true tonic.workspace = true
tokio.workspace = true tokio.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true futures.workspace = true
hex = "0.4.3" tonic-prost = "0.14.5"
tonic-prost = "0.14.5" prost.workspace = true
prost.workspace = true kameo.workspace = true
kameo.workspace = true url = "2.5.8"
url = "2.5.8" miette.workspace = true
miette.workspace = true thiserror.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
rustls-pki-types.workspace = true base64.workspace = true
base64.workspace = true prost-types.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true async-trait.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true tokio-stream.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true [build-dependencies]
tonic-prost-build = "0.14.5"
[build-dependencies]
tonic-prost-build = "0.14.5" [dev-dependencies]
protoc-bin-vendored = "3" rstest.workspace = true
rcgen.workspace = true
[dev-dependencies]
rstest.workspace = true [lib]
rand.workspace = true doctest = false
rcgen.workspace = true
[package.metadata.cargo-shear]
[package.metadata.cargo-shear] ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost"]
ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost", "kameo"]

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,21 @@
use tonic_prost_build::configure; use tonic_prost_build::configure;
static PROTOBUF_DIR: &str = "../../../protobufs"; static PROTOBUF_DIR: &str = "../../../protobufs";
fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> { fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={PROTOBUF_DIR}"); println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={PROTOBUF_DIR}");
configure() configure()
.message_attribute(".", "#[derive(::kameo::Reply)]") .message_attribute(".", "#[derive(::kameo::Reply)]")
.compile_protos( .compile_protos(
&[ &[
format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR), format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/user_agent.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR), format!("{}/operator.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/client.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR), format!("{}/client.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/evm.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR), format!("{}/evm.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
], ],
&[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()], &[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()],
) )
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }

View File

@@ -1,84 +1,84 @@
pub mod transport; pub mod transport;
pub mod url; pub mod url;
pub mod proto { pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");
pub mod shared { pub mod shared {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.shared"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.shared");
pub mod evm { pub mod evm {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.shared.evm"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.shared.evm");
} }
} }
pub mod user_agent { pub mod operator {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator");
pub mod auth { pub mod auth {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.auth"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.auth");
} }
pub mod evm { pub mod evm {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.evm"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.evm");
} }
pub mod sdk_client { pub mod sdk_client {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.sdk_client"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.sdk_client");
} }
pub mod vault { pub mod vault {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault");
pub mod bootstrap { pub mod bootstrap {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault.bootstrap"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap");
} }
pub mod unseal { pub mod unseal {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault.unseal"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.unseal");
} }
} }
} }
pub mod client { pub mod client {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client");
pub mod auth { pub mod auth {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.auth"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.auth");
} }
pub mod evm { pub mod evm {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.evm"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.evm");
} }
pub mod vault { pub mod vault {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.vault"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client.vault");
} }
} }
pub mod evm { pub mod evm {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.evm"); tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.evm");
} }
} }
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ClientMetadata { pub struct ClientMetadata {
pub name: String, pub name: String,
pub description: Option<String>, pub description: Option<String>,
pub version: Option<String>, pub version: Option<String>,
} }
pub static BOOTSTRAP_PATH: &str = "bootstrap_token"; pub static BOOTSTRAP_PATH: &str = "bootstrap_token";
pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> { pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
static ARBITER_HOME: &str = ".arbiter"; static ARBITER_HOME: &str = ".arbiter";
let home_dir = std::env::home_dir().ok_or(std::io::Error::new( let home_dir = std::env::home_dir().ok_or(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied, std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
"can not get home directory", "can not get home directory",
))?; ))?;
let arbiter_home = home_dir.join(ARBITER_HOME); let arbiter_home = home_dir.join(ARBITER_HOME);
std::fs::create_dir_all(&arbiter_home)?; std::fs::create_dir_all(&arbiter_home)?;
Ok(arbiter_home) Ok(arbiter_home)
} }

View File

@@ -1,163 +1,218 @@
//! Transport-facing abstractions shared by protocol/session code. //! Transport-facing abstractions shared by protocol/session code.
//! //!
//! This module defines a small set of transport traits that actors and other //! This module defines a small set of transport traits that actors and other
//! protocol code can depend on without knowing anything about the concrete //! protocol code can depend on without knowing anything about the concrete
//! transport underneath. //! transport underneath.
//! //!
//! The abstraction is split into: //! The abstraction is split into:
//! - [`Sender`] for outbound delivery //! - [`Sender`] for outbound delivery
//! - [`Receiver`] for inbound delivery //! - [`Receiver`] for inbound delivery
//! - [`Bi`] as the combined duplex form (`Sender + Receiver`) //! - [`Bi`] as the combined duplex form (`Sender + Receiver`)
//! //!
//! This split lets code depend only on the half it actually needs. For //! This split lets code depend only on the half it actually needs. For
//! example, some actor/session code only sends out-of-band messages, while //! example, some actor/session code only sends out-of-band messages, while
//! auth/state-machine code may need full duplex access. //! auth/state-machine code may need full duplex access.
//! //!
//! [`Bi`] remains intentionally minimal and transport-agnostic: //! [`Bi`] remains intentionally minimal and transport-agnostic:
//! - [`Receiver::recv`] yields inbound messages //! - [`Receiver::recv`] yields inbound messages
//! - [`Sender::send`] accepts outbound messages //! - [`Sender::send`] accepts outbound messages
//! //!
//! Transport-specific adapters, including protobuf or gRPC bridges, live in the //! Transport-specific adapters, including protobuf or gRPC bridges, live in the
//! crates that own those boundaries rather than in `arbiter-proto`. //! crates that own those boundaries rather than in `arbiter-proto`.
//! //!
//! [`Bi`] deliberately does not model request/response correlation. Some //! [`Bi`] deliberately does not model request/response correlation. Some
//! transports may carry multiplexed request/response traffic, some may emit //! transports may carry multiplexed request/response traffic, some may emit
//! out-of-band messages, and some may be one-message-at-a-time state machines. //! out-of-band messages, and some may be one-message-at-a-time state machines.
//! Correlation concerns such as request IDs, pending response maps, and //! Correlation concerns such as request IDs, pending response maps, and
//! out-of-band routing belong in the adapter or connection layer built on top //! out-of-band routing belong in the adapter or connection layer built on top
//! of [`Bi`], not in this abstraction itself. //! of [`Bi`], not in this abstraction itself.
//! //!
//! # Generic Ordering Rule //! # Generic Ordering Rule
//! //!
//! This module consistently uses `Inbound` first and `Outbound` second in //! This module consistently uses `Inbound` first and `Outbound` second in
//! generic parameter lists. //! generic parameter lists.
//! //!
//! For [`Receiver`], [`Sender`], and [`Bi`], this means: //! For [`Receiver`], [`Sender`], and [`Bi`], this means:
//! - `Receiver<Inbound>` //! - `Receiver<Inbound>`
//! - `Sender<Outbound>` //! - `Sender<Outbound>`
//! - `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>` //! - `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>`
//! //!
//! Concretely, for [`Bi`]: //! Concretely, for [`Bi`]:
//! - `recv() -> Option<Inbound>` //! - `recv() -> Option<Inbound>`
//! - `send(Outbound)` //! - `send(Outbound)`
//! //!
//! [`expect_message`] is a small helper for linear protocol steps: it reads one //! [`expect_message`] is a small helper for linear protocol steps: it reads one
//! inbound message from a transport and extracts a typed value from it, failing //! inbound message from a transport and extracts a typed value from it, failing
//! if the channel closes or the message shape is not what the caller expected. //! if the channel closes or the message shape is not what the caller expected.
//! //!
//! [`DummyTransport`] is a no-op implementation useful for tests and local //! [`DummyTransport`] is a no-op implementation useful for tests and local
//! actor execution where no real stream exists. //! actor execution where no real stream exists.
//! //!
//! # Design Notes //! # Design Notes
//! //!
//! - [`Bi::send`] returns [`Error`] only for transport delivery failures, such //! - [`Bi::send`] returns [`Error`] only for transport delivery failures, such
//! as a closed outbound channel. //! as a closed outbound channel.
//! - [`Bi::recv`] returns `None` when the underlying transport closes. //! - [`Bi::recv`] returns `None` when the underlying transport closes.
//! - Message translation is intentionally out of scope for this module. //! - Message translation is intentionally out of scope for this module.
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::marker::PhantomData; use kameo::{error::Infallible, prelude::*};
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use async_trait::async_trait;
/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`]. #[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)] pub enum Error {
pub enum Error { #[error("Transport channel is closed")]
#[error("Transport channel is closed")] ChannelClosed,
ChannelClosed, #[error("Unexpected message received")]
#[error("Unexpected message received")] UnexpectedMessage,
UnexpectedMessage, }
}
/// Receives one message from `transport` and extracts a value from it using
/// Receives one message from `transport` and extracts a value from it using /// `extractor`. Returns [`Error::ChannelClosed`] if the transport closes and
/// `extractor`. Returns [`Error::ChannelClosed`] if the transport closes and /// [`Error::UnexpectedMessage`] if `extractor` returns `None`.
/// [`Error::UnexpectedMessage`] if `extractor` returns `None`. pub async fn expect_message<T, Inbound, Outbound, Target, F>(
pub async fn expect_message<T, Inbound, Outbound, Target, F>( transport: &mut T,
transport: &mut T, extractor: F,
extractor: F, ) -> Result<Target, Error>
) -> Result<Target, Error> where
where T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized, F: FnOnce(Inbound) -> Option<Target>,
F: FnOnce(Inbound) -> Option<Target>, {
{ let msg = transport.recv().await.ok_or(Error::ChannelClosed)?;
let msg = transport.recv().await.ok_or(Error::ChannelClosed)?; extractor(msg).ok_or(Error::UnexpectedMessage)
extractor(msg).ok_or(Error::UnexpectedMessage) }
}
#[async_trait]
#[async_trait] pub trait Sender<Outbound>: Send + Sync {
pub trait Sender<Outbound>: Send + Sync { async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error>;
async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error>; }
}
#[async_trait]
#[async_trait] pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync {
pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync { async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound>;
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound>; }
}
/// Minimal bidirectional transport abstraction used by protocol code.
/// Minimal bidirectional transport abstraction used by protocol code. ///
/// /// `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>` is the combined duplex form of [`Sender`] and
/// `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>` is the combined duplex form of [`Sender`] and /// [`Receiver`].
/// [`Receiver`]. ///
/// /// It models a channel with:
/// It models a channel with: /// - inbound items of type `Inbound` read via [`Bi::recv`]
/// - inbound items of type `Inbound` read via [`Bi::recv`] /// - outbound items of type `Outbound` written via [`Bi::send`]
/// - outbound items of type `Outbound` written via [`Bi::send`] ///
/// /// It does not imply request/response sequencing, one-at-a-time exchange, or
/// It does not imply request/response sequencing, one-at-a-time exchange, or /// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items.
/// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items. pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
#[async_trait]
pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> { impl<T, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for &mut T
type Sender: Sender<Outbound>; where
type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>; T: Sender<Outbound> + ?Sized,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver); {
fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self; async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
} (**self).send(item).await
}
/// No-op [`Bi`] transport for tests and manual actor usage. }
///
/// `send` drops all items and succeeds. [`Bi::recv`] never resolves and therefore #[async_trait]
/// does not busy-wait or spuriously close the stream. impl<T, Inbound> Receiver<Inbound> for &mut T
pub struct DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> { where
_marker: PhantomData<(Inbound, Outbound)>, T: Receiver<Inbound> + ?Sized,
} Inbound: Send + 'static,
{
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Default for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> { async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
fn default() -> Self { (**self).recv().await
Self { }
_marker: PhantomData, }
}
} impl<T, Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for &mut T
} where
T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
#[async_trait] Inbound: Send + 'static,
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> Outbound: Send + 'static,
where {
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static, }
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{ pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> {
async fn send(&mut self, _item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> { type Sender: Sender<Outbound>;
Ok(()) type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>;
}
} fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver);
fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self;
#[async_trait] }
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Inbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
where /// No-op [`Bi`] transport for tests and manual actor usage.
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static, ///
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static, /// `send` drops all items and succeeds. [`Bi::recv`] never resolves and therefore
{ /// does not busy-wait or spuriously close the stream.
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> { pub struct DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
std::future::pending::<()>().await; _marker: PhantomData<(Inbound, Outbound)>,
None }
}
} impl<Inbound, Outbound> Default for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
fn default() -> Self {
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> Self {
where _marker: PhantomData,
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static, }
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static, }
{ }
}
#[async_trait]
pub mod grpc; impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, _item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
Ok(())
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Inbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
None
}
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
}
pub mod grpc;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
pub enum ForwardError<I> {
#[error("Transport error: {0}")]
Transport(#[from] Error),
#[error("Actor delivery error: {0}")]
Actor(SendError<I>),
}
pub async fn forward_to_actor<Transport, Inbound, Outbound, Handler>(
transport: &mut Transport,
actor: &ActorRef<Handler>,
) -> Result<(), ForwardError<Inbound>>
where
Transport: Bi<Inbound, <Outbound as Reply>::Ok>,
Handler: Actor + Message<Inbound, Reply = Outbound>,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static + Reply<Error = Infallible>, // `Infallible` to enforce contract that `Outbound` carries handler-level error
{
while let Some(request) = transport.recv().await {
let resp = actor.ask(request).await.map_err(ForwardError::Actor)?;
transport.send(resp).await?
}
Err(Error::ChannelClosed.into())
}

View File

@@ -1,106 +1,106 @@
use async_trait::async_trait; use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
use futures::StreamExt;
use tokio::sync::mpsc; use async_trait::async_trait;
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream; use futures::StreamExt;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender}; use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
pub struct GrpcSender<Outbound> { pub struct GrpcSender<Outbound> {
tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>, tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
} }
#[async_trait] #[async_trait]
impl<Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcSender<Outbound> impl<Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcSender<Outbound>
where where
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{ {
async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> { async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> {
self.tx self.tx
.send(item) .send(item)
.await .await
.map_err(|_| super::Error::ChannelClosed) .map_err(|_| super::Error::ChannelClosed)
} }
} }
pub struct GrpcReceiver<Inbound> { pub struct GrpcReceiver<Inbound> {
rx: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>, rx: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
} }
#[async_trait] #[async_trait]
impl<Inbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcReceiver<Inbound> impl<Inbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcReceiver<Inbound>
where where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{ {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> { async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> {
self.rx.next().await self.rx.next().await
} }
} }
pub struct GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> { pub struct GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> {
sender: GrpcSender<Outbound>, sender: GrpcSender<Outbound>,
receiver: GrpcReceiver<Inbound>, receiver: GrpcReceiver<Inbound>,
} }
impl<Inbound, Outbound> GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> impl<Inbound, Outbound> GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{ {
pub fn from_bi_stream( pub fn from_bi_stream(
receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>, receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
) -> (Self, ReceiverStream<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>) { ) -> (Self, ReceiverStream<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>) {
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(10); let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(10);
let sender = GrpcSender { tx }; let sender = GrpcSender { tx };
let receiver = GrpcReceiver { rx: receiver }; let receiver = GrpcReceiver { rx: receiver };
let bi = GrpcBi { sender, receiver }; let bi = GrpcBi { sender, receiver };
(bi, ReceiverStream::new(rx)) (bi, ReceiverStream::new(rx))
} }
} }
#[async_trait] #[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{ {
async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> { async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> {
self.sender.send(item).await self.sender.send(item).await
} }
} }
#[async_trait] #[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{ {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> { async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> {
self.receiver.recv().await self.receiver.recv().await
} }
} }
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>
for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{ {
} }
impl<Inbound, Outbound> impl<Inbound, Outbound>
super::SplittableBi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> super::SplittableBi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>
for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static, Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{ {
type Sender = GrpcSender<Outbound>; type Sender = GrpcSender<Outbound>;
type Receiver = GrpcReceiver<Inbound>; type Receiver = GrpcReceiver<Inbound>;
fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver) { fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver) {
(self.sender, self.receiver) (self.sender, self.receiver)
} }
fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self { fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self {
GrpcBi { sender, receiver } GrpcBi { sender, receiver }
} }
} }

View File

@@ -1,129 +1,128 @@
use std::fmt::Display; use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_URL_SAFE};
use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_URL_SAFE}; use std::fmt::Display;
use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter";
const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter"; const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert";
const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert"; const BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY: &str = "bootstrap_token";
const BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY: &str = "bootstrap_token";
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone)] pub struct ArbiterUrl {
pub struct ArbiterUrl { pub host: String,
pub host: String, pub port: u16,
pub port: u16, pub ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
pub ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>, pub bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
pub bootstrap_token: Option<String>, }
}
impl Display for ArbiterUrl {
impl Display for ArbiterUrl { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { let mut base = format!(
let mut base = format!( "{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://{}:{}?{CERT_QUERY_KEY}={}",
"{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://{}:{}?{CERT_QUERY_KEY}={}", self.host,
self.host, self.port,
self.port, BASE64_URL_SAFE.encode(&self.ca_cert)
BASE64_URL_SAFE.encode(&self.ca_cert) );
); if let Some(token) = &self.bootstrap_token {
if let Some(token) = &self.bootstrap_token { base.push_str(&format!("&{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY}={}", token));
base.push_str(&format!("&{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY}={}", token)); }
} f.write_str(&base)
f.write_str(&base) }
} }
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)] pub enum Error {
pub enum Error { #[error("Invalid URL scheme, expected '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")]
#[error("Invalid URL scheme, expected '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")] #[diagnostic(
#[diagnostic( code(arbiter::url::invalid_scheme),
code(arbiter::url::invalid_scheme), help("The URL must start with '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")
help("The URL must start with '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'") )]
)] InvalidScheme,
InvalidScheme, #[error("Missing host in URL")]
#[error("Missing host in URL")] #[diagnostic(
#[diagnostic( code(arbiter::url::missing_host),
code(arbiter::url::missing_host), help("The URL must include a host, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:<port>'")
help("The URL must include a host, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:<port>'") )]
)] MissingHost,
MissingHost, #[error("Missing port in URL")]
#[error("Missing port in URL")] #[diagnostic(
#[diagnostic( code(arbiter::url::missing_port),
code(arbiter::url::missing_port), help("The URL must include a port, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:1234'")
help("The URL must include a port, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:1234'") )]
)] MissingPort,
MissingPort, #[error("Missing 'cert' query parameter in URL")]
#[error("Missing 'cert' query parameter in URL")] #[diagnostic(
#[diagnostic( code(arbiter::url::missing_cert),
code(arbiter::url::missing_cert), help("The URL must include a 'cert' query parameter")
help("The URL must include a 'cert' query parameter") )]
)] MissingCert,
MissingCert, #[error("Invalid base64 in 'cert' query parameter: {0}")]
#[error("Invalid base64 in 'cert' query parameter: {0}")] #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::url::invalid_cert_base64))]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::url::invalid_cert_base64))] InvalidCertBase64(#[from] base64::DecodeError),
InvalidCertBase64(#[from] base64::DecodeError), }
}
impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a str> for ArbiterUrl {
impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a str> for ArbiterUrl { type Error = Error;
type Error = Error;
fn try_from(value: &'a str) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
fn try_from(value: &'a str) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { let url = url::Url::parse(value).map_err(|_| Error::InvalidScheme)?;
let url = url::Url::parse(value).map_err(|_| Error::InvalidScheme)?;
if url.scheme() != ARBITER_URL_SCHEME {
if url.scheme() != ARBITER_URL_SCHEME { return Err(Error::InvalidScheme);
return Err(Error::InvalidScheme); }
}
let host = url.host_str().ok_or(Error::MissingHost)?.to_string();
let host = url.host_str().ok_or(Error::MissingHost)?.to_string(); let port = url.port().ok_or(Error::MissingPort)?;
let port = url.port().ok_or(Error::MissingPort)?; let cert_str = url
let cert_str = url .query_pairs()
.query_pairs() .find(|(k, _)| k == CERT_QUERY_KEY)
.find(|(k, _)| k == CERT_QUERY_KEY) .ok_or(Error::MissingCert)?
.ok_or(Error::MissingCert)? .1;
.1;
let cert = BASE64_URL_SAFE.decode(cert_str.as_ref())?;
let cert = BASE64_URL_SAFE.decode(cert_str.as_ref())?; let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&cert).into_owned();
let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&cert).into_owned();
let bootstrap_token = url
let bootstrap_token = url .query_pairs()
.query_pairs() .find(|(k, _)| k == BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY)
.find(|(k, _)| k == BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY) .map(|(_, v)| v.to_string());
.map(|(_, v)| v.to_string());
Ok(ArbiterUrl {
Ok(ArbiterUrl { host,
host, port,
port, ca_cert: cert,
ca_cert: cert, bootstrap_token,
bootstrap_token, })
}) }
} }
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[cfg(test)] mod tests {
mod tests { use rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed;
use rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed; use rstest::rstest;
use rstest::rstest;
use super::*;
use super::*;
#[rstest]
#[rstest]
fn parsing_correctness(
fn test_parsing_correctness( #[values("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "192.168.1.1", "some.domain.com")] host: &str,
#[values("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "192.168.1.1", "some.domain.com")] host: &str,
#[values(None, Some("token123".to_string()))] bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
#[values(None, Some("token123".to_string()))] bootstrap_token: Option<String>, ) {
) { let cert = generate_simple_self_signed(&["Arbiter CA".into()]).unwrap();
let cert = generate_simple_self_signed(&["Arbiter CA".into()]).unwrap(); let cert = cert.cert.der();
let cert = cert.cert.der();
let url = ArbiterUrl {
let url = ArbiterUrl { host: host.to_string(),
host: host.to_string(), port: 1234,
port: 1234, ca_cert: cert.clone().into_owned(),
ca_cert: cert.clone().into_owned(), bootstrap_token,
bootstrap_token, };
}; let url_str = url.to_string();
let url_str = url.to_string(); let parsed_url = ArbiterUrl::try_from(url_str.as_str()).unwrap();
let parsed_url = ArbiterUrl::try_from(url_str.as_str()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(url.host, parsed_url.host);
assert_eq!(url.host, parsed_url.host); assert_eq!(url.port, parsed_url.port);
assert_eq!(url.port, parsed_url.port); assert_eq!(url.ca_cert.to_vec(), parsed_url.ca_cert.to_vec());
assert_eq!(url.ca_cert.to_vec(), parsed_url.ca_cert.to_vec()); assert_eq!(url.bootstrap_token, parsed_url.bootstrap_token);
assert_eq!(url.bootstrap_token, parsed_url.bootstrap_token); }
} }
}

View File

@@ -1,67 +1,61 @@
[package] [package]
name = "arbiter-server" name = "arbiter-server"
version = "0.1.0" version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024" edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter" repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
license = "Apache-2.0" license = "Apache-2.0"
[lints] [lints]
workspace = true workspace = true
[dependencies] [dependencies]
diesel = { version = "2.3.7", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] } diesel = { version = "2.3.9", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
diesel-async = { version = "0.8.0", features = [ diesel-async = { version = "0.9.0", features = [
"bb8", "bb8",
"migrations", "migrations",
"sqlite", "sqlite",
"tokio", "tokio",
] } ] }
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto" arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto" arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
arbiter-macros.path = "../arbiter-macros" arbiter-macros.path = "../arbiter-macros"
tracing.workspace = true tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] } tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
tonic.workspace = true tonic.workspace = true
tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"] tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
tokio.workspace = true tokio.workspace = true
rustls.workspace = true rustls.workspace = true
smlang.workspace = true smlang.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true thiserror.workspace = true
fatality = "0.1.1" diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.2", features = ["sqlite"] }
diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.1", features = ["sqlite"] } async-trait.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true tokio-stream.workspace = true
secrecy = "0.10.3" rand.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true rcgen.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true chrono.workspace = true
dashmap = "6.1.0" kameo.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
rcgen.workspace = true argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
chrono.workspace = true restructed = "0.2.2"
zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] } strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
kameo.workspace = true pem = "3.0.6"
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] } sha2.workspace = true
argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] } hmac.workspace = true
restructed = "0.2.2" alloy.workspace = true
strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] } prost-types.workspace = true
pem = "3.0.6" arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
sha2.workspace = true anyhow = "1.0.102"
hmac.workspace = true mutants.workspace = true
spki.workspace = true subtle = "2.6.1"
alloy.workspace = true x25519-dalek.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true k256.workspace = true
prost.workspace = true kameo_actors.workspace = true
arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
anyhow = "1.0.102" [dev-dependencies]
serde_with = "3.18.0" proptest = "1.11.0"
mutants.workspace = true rstest.workspace = true
subtle = "2.6.1" test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }
ml-dsa.workspace = true ml-dsa.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true [lib]
k256.workspace = true doctest = false
[dev-dependencies]
insta = "1.46.3"
proptest = "1.11.0"
rstest.workspace = true
test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
# For documentation on how to configure this file, # For documentation on how to configure this file,
# see https://diesel.rs/guides/configuring-diesel-cli # see https://diesel.rs/guides/configuring-diesel-cli
[print_schema] [print_schema]
file = "src/db/schema.rs" file = "src/db/schema.rs"
custom_type_derives = ["diesel::query_builder::QueryId", "Clone"] custom_type_derives = ["diesel::query_builder::QueryId", "Clone"]
[migrations_directory] [migrations_directory]
dir = "migrations" dir = "migrations"

View File

@@ -1 +1 @@
-- This file should undo anything in `up.sql` -- This file should undo anything in `up.sql`

View File

@@ -1,209 +1,206 @@
create table if not exists root_key_history ( create table if not exists root_key_history (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY, id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
-- root key stored as aead encrypted artifact, with only difference that it's decrypted by unseal key (derived from user password) -- root key stored as aead encrypted artifact, with only difference that it's decrypted by unseal key (derived from user password)
root_key_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented. Used for encrypting root key root_key_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented. Used for encrypting root key
data_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- nonce used for encrypting with key itself data_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- nonce used for encrypting with key itself
ciphertext blob not null, ciphertext blob not null,
tag blob not null, tag blob not null,
schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
salt blob not null -- for key deriviation salt blob not null -- for key deriviation
) STRICT; ) STRICT;
create table if not exists aead_encrypted ( create table if not exists aead_encrypted (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY, id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
current_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented current_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
ciphertext blob not null, ciphertext blob not null,
tag blob not null, tag blob not null,
schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
associated_root_key_id integer not null references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, associated_root_key_id integer not null references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')) created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT; ) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_nonce_per_root_key on aead_encrypted ( create unique index if not exists uniq_nonce_per_root_key on aead_encrypted (
current_nonce, current_nonce,
associated_root_key_id associated_root_key_id
); );
create table if not exists tls_history ( create table if not exists tls_history (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY, id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
cert text not null, cert text not null,
cert_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key cert_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
ca_cert text not null, ca_cert text not null,
ca_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key ca_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')) created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT; ) STRICT;
-- This is a singleton -- This is a singleton
create table if not exists arbiter_settings ( create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1 id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1
root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT
) STRICT; ) STRICT;
insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing; insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
-- ensure singleton row exists -- ensure singleton row exists
create table if not exists useragent_client ( create table if not exists operator_client (
id integer not null primary key, id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge public_key blob not null,
public_key blob not null, created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
key_type integer not null default(1), updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')), ) STRICT;
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')) create unique index if not exists uniq_operator_client_public_key on operator_client (public_key);
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_useragent_client_public_key on useragent_client (public_key, key_type); create table if not exists client_metadata (
id integer not null primary key,
create table if not exists client_metadata ( name text not null, -- human-readable name for the client
id integer not null primary key, description text, -- optional description for the client
name text not null, -- human-readable name for the client version text, -- client version for tracking and debugging
description text, -- optional description for the client created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
version text, -- client version for tracking and debugging ) STRICT;
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT; -- created to track history of changes
create table if not exists client_metadata_history (
-- created to track history of changes id integer not null primary key,
create table if not exists client_metadata_history ( metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
id integer not null primary key, client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade, created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade, ) STRICT;
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT; create unique index if not exists uniq_metadata_binding_client on client_metadata_history (client_id);
create unique index if not exists uniq_metadata_binding_client on client_metadata_history (client_id); create table if not exists program_client (
id integer not null primary key,
create table if not exists program_client ( public_key blob not null,
id integer not null primary key, metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
public_key blob not null, updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade, ) STRICT;
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')) create unique index if not exists program_client_public_key_unique
) STRICT; on program_client (public_key);
create unique index if not exists program_client_public_key_unique create unique index if not exists uniq_program_client_public_key on program_client (public_key);
on program_client (public_key);
create table if not exists evm_wallet (
create unique index if not exists uniq_program_client_public_key on program_client (public_key); id integer not null primary key,
address blob not null, -- 20-byte Ethereum address
create table if not exists evm_wallet ( aead_encrypted_id integer not null references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT,
id integer not null primary key, created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
address blob not null, -- 20-byte Ethereum address ) STRICT;
aead_encrypted_id integer not null references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')) create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_address on evm_wallet (address);
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_aead on evm_wallet (aead_encrypted_id);
create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_address on evm_wallet (address);
create table if not exists evm_wallet_access (
create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_aead on evm_wallet (aead_encrypted_id); id integer not null primary key,
wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet (id) on delete cascade,
create table if not exists evm_wallet_access ( client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
id integer not null primary key, created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet (id) on delete cascade, ) STRICT;
client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')) create unique index if not exists uniq_wallet_access on evm_wallet_access (wallet_id, client_id);
) STRICT;
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_limit (
create unique index if not exists uniq_wallet_access on evm_wallet_access (wallet_id, client_id); id integer not null primary key,
window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_limit ( max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
id integer not null primary key, ) STRICT;
window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256 -- Shared grant properties: client scope, timeframe, fee caps, and rate limit
) STRICT; create table if not exists evm_basic_grant (
id integer not null primary key,
-- Shared grant properties: client scope, timeframe, fee caps, and rate limit wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
create table if not exists evm_basic_grant ( chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
id integer not null primary key, valid_from integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no lower bound
wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict, valid_until integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no upper bound
chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID max_gas_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
valid_from integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no lower bound max_priority_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
valid_until integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no upper bound rate_limit_count integer, -- max transactions in window, null = unlimited
max_gas_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited rate_limit_window_secs integer, -- window duration in seconds, null = unlimited
max_priority_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited revoked_at integer, -- unix timestamp when revoked, null = still active
rate_limit_count integer, -- max transactions in window, null = unlimited created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
rate_limit_window_secs integer, -- window duration in seconds, null = unlimited ) STRICT;
revoked_at integer, -- unix timestamp when revoked, null = still active
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')) -- Shared transaction log for all EVM grants, used for rate limit tracking and auditing
) STRICT; create table if not exists evm_transaction_log (
id integer not null primary key,
-- Shared transaction log for all EVM grants, used for rate limit tracking and auditing wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
create table if not exists evm_transaction_log ( grant_id integer not null references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete restrict,
id integer not null primary key, chain_id integer not null,
wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict, eth_value blob not null, -- always present on any EVM tx
grant_id integer not null references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete restrict, signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
chain_id integer not null, ) STRICT;
eth_value blob not null, -- always present on any EVM tx
signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')) create index if not exists idx_evm_basic_grant_access_chain on evm_basic_grant (wallet_access_id, chain_id);
) STRICT;
-- ===============================
create index if not exists idx_evm_basic_grant_access_chain on evm_basic_grant (wallet_access_id, chain_id); -- ERC20 token transfer grant
-- ===============================
-- =============================== create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_grant (
-- ERC20 token transfer grant id integer not null primary key,
-- =============================== basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete cascade,
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_grant ( token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
id integer not null primary key, receiver blob -- 20-byte recipient address or null if every recipient allowed
basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete cascade, ) STRICT;
token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
receiver blob -- 20-byte recipient address or null if every recipient allowed -- Per-window volume limits for token transfer grants
) STRICT; create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (
id integer not null primary key,
-- Per-window volume limits for token transfer grants grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant (id) on delete cascade,
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_volume_limit ( window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
id integer not null primary key, max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant (id) on delete cascade, ) STRICT;
window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256 -- Log table for token transfer grant usage
) STRICT; create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_log (
id integer not null primary key,
-- Log table for token transfer grant usage grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant (id) on delete restrict,
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_log ( log_id integer not null references evm_transaction_log (id) on delete restrict,
id integer not null primary key, chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant (id) on delete restrict, token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
log_id integer not null references evm_transaction_log (id) on delete restrict, recipient_address blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID value blob not null, -- big-endian 32-byte U256
token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
recipient_address blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address ) STRICT;
value blob not null, -- big-endian 32-byte U256
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')) create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_grant on evm_token_transfer_log (grant_id);
) STRICT;
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_log_id on evm_token_transfer_log (log_id);
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_grant on evm_token_transfer_log (grant_id);
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_chain on evm_token_transfer_log (chain_id);
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_log_id on evm_token_transfer_log (log_id);
-- ===============================
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_chain on evm_token_transfer_log (chain_id); -- Ether transfer grant (uses base log)
-- ===============================
-- =============================== create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant (
-- Ether transfer grant (uses base log) id integer not null primary key,
-- =============================== basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete cascade,
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant ( limit_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_limit (id) on delete restrict
id integer not null primary key, ) STRICT;
basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant (id) on delete cascade,
limit_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_limit (id) on delete restrict -- Specific recipient addresses for an ether transfer grant
) STRICT; create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (
id integer not null primary key,
-- Specific recipient addresses for an ether transfer grant grant_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_grant (id) on delete cascade,
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant_target ( address blob not null -- 20-byte recipient address
id integer not null primary key, ) STRICT;
grant_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_grant (id) on delete cascade,
address blob not null -- 20-byte recipient address create unique index if not exists uniq_ether_transfer_target on evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (grant_id, address);
) STRICT;
-- ===============================
create unique index if not exists uniq_ether_transfer_target on evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (grant_id, address); -- Integrity Envelopes
-- ===============================
-- =============================== create table if not exists integrity_envelope (
-- Integrity Envelopes id integer not null primary key,
-- =============================== entity_kind text not null,
create table if not exists integrity_envelope ( entity_id blob not null,
id integer not null primary key, payload_version integer not null,
entity_kind text not null, key_version integer not null,
entity_id blob not null, mac blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
payload_version integer not null, signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
key_version integer not null, created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
mac blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address ) STRICT;
signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')) create unique index if not exists uniq_integrity_envelope_entity on integrity_envelope (entity_kind, entity_id);
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_integrity_envelope_entity on integrity_envelope (entity_kind, entity_id);

View File

@@ -1,101 +1,98 @@
use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path}; use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
use diesel::QueryDsl; use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages}; use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng}; use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _; use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use thiserror::Error; use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64; const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> { pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let rng: StdRng = make_rng(); let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
let token: String = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold( let token = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
Default::default(), String::default(),
|mut accum, char| { |mut accum, char| {
accum += char.to_string().as_str(); accum += char.to_string().as_str();
accum accum
}, },
); );
tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?; tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
Ok(token) Ok(token)
} }
#[derive(Error, Debug)] #[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum Error { pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")] #[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] db::PoolError), Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")] #[error("I/O error: {0}")]
Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error), Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
#[error("I/O error: {0}")] #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error), Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
} }
#[derive(Actor)] #[derive(Actor)]
pub struct Bootstrapper { pub struct Bootstrapper {
token: Option<String>, token: Option<String>,
} }
impl Bootstrapper { impl Bootstrapper {
pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> { pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let row_count: i64 = { let row_count: i64 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?; let mut conn = db.get().await?;
schema::useragent_client::table schema::operator_client::table
.count() .count()
.get_result(&mut conn) .get_result(&mut conn)
.await? .await?
}; };
let token = if row_count == 0 { let token = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?; let token = generate_token().await?;
Some(token) Some(token)
} else { } else {
None None
}; };
Ok(Self { token }) Ok(Self { token })
} }
} }
#[messages] #[messages]
impl Bootstrapper { impl Bootstrapper {
#[message] #[message]
pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool { pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
match &self.token { self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| {
Some(expected) => { let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes(); let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes); bool::from(choice)
bool::from(choice) })
} }
None => false,
} #[message]
} pub fn consume_token(&mut self, token: String) -> bool {
if self.is_correct_token(token) {
#[message] self.token = None;
pub fn consume_token(&mut self, token: String) -> bool { true
if self.is_correct_token(token) { } else {
self.token = None; false
true }
} else { }
false }
}
} #[messages]
} impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
#[messages] pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
impl Bootstrapper { self.token.clone()
#[message] }
pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> { }
self.token.clone()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,423 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
dsl::insert_into, update,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::{
client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, ClientProfile},
flow_coordinator::{self, RequestClientApproval},
keyholder::KeyHolder,
},
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
db::{
self,
models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::program_client,
},
};
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database pool unavailable")]
DatabasePoolUnavailable,
#[error("Database operation failed")]
DatabaseOperationFailed,
#[error("Integrity check failed")]
IntegrityCheckFailed,
#[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
InvalidChallengeSolution,
#[error("Client approval request failed")]
ApproveError(#[from] ApproveError),
#[error("Transport error")]
Transport,
}
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
error!(?e, "Database error");
Self::DatabaseOperationFailed
}
}
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ApproveError {
#[error("Internal error")]
Internal,
#[error("Client connection denied by user agents")]
Denied,
#[error("Upstream error: {0}")]
Upstream(flow_coordinator::ApprovalError),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: authn::Signature,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
nonce: i32,
},
AuthSuccess,
}
/// Returns the current nonce and client ID for a registered client.
/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<Option<(i32, i32)>, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn verify_integrity(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?.ok_or_else(|| {
error!("Client not found during integrity verification");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
let attestation = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut db_conn,
keyholder,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
})?;
if attestation != AttestationStatus::Attested {
error!("Integrity attestation unavailable for client {id}");
return Err(Error::IntegrityCheckFailed);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Atomically increments the nonce and re-signs the integrity envelope.
/// Returns the new nonce, which is used as the challenge nonce.
async fn create_nonce(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(program_client::table)
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.set(program_client::nonce.eq(program_client::nonce + 1))
.returning((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&keyholder,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: new_nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity sign failed after nonce update");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
Ok(new_nonce)
})
})
.await
}
async fn approve_new_client(
actors: &crate::actors::GlobalActors,
profile: ClientProfile,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let result = actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RequestClientApproval { client: profile })
.await;
match result {
Ok(true) => Ok(()),
Ok(false) => Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Denied)),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(e)) => {
error!(error = ?e, "Approval upstream error");
Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Upstream(e)))
}
Err(e) => {
error!(error = ?e, "Approval request to flow coordinator failed");
Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Internal))
}
}
}
async fn insert_client(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
let metadata = metadata.clone();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
let client_id = insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
))
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.returning(program_client::id)
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&keyholder,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: NONCE_START,
},
client_id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new client key");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
Ok(client_id)
})
})
.await
}
async fn sync_client_metadata(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
client_id: i32,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history};
let now = SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now());
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let metadata = metadata.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let (current_metadata_id, current): (i32, ProgramClientMetadata) =
program_client::table
.find(client_id)
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
program_client::metadata_id,
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.first(conn)
.await?;
let unchanged = current.name == metadata.name
&& current.description == metadata.description
&& current.version == metadata.version;
if unchanged {
return Ok(());
}
insert_into(client_metadata_history::table)
.values((
client_metadata_history::metadata_id.eq(current_metadata_id),
client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id),
))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(program_client::table.find(client_id))
.set((
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Ok::<(), diesel::result::Error>(())
})
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn challenge_client<T>(
transport: &mut T,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
nonce: i32,
) -> Result<(), Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + ?Sized,
{
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce,
}))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
let signature = expect_message(transport, |req: Inbound| match req {
Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => Some(signature),
_ => None,
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to receive challenge solution");
Error::Transport
})?;
if !pubkey.verify(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature) {
error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn authenticate<T>(props: &mut ClientConnection, transport: &mut T) -> Result<i32, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
let Some(Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { pubkey, metadata }) = transport.recv().await else {
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
let client_id = match get_current_nonce_and_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
Some((id, _)) => {
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
id
}
None => {
approve_new_client(
&props.actors,
ClientProfile {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
metadata: metadata.clone(),
},
)
.await?;
insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
}
};
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, client_id, &metadata).await?;
let challenge_nonce = create_nonce(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge_nonce).await?;
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth success");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(client_id)
}

View File

@@ -1,273 +1,260 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature}; use crate::{
use diesel::{ actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into, crypto::integrity,
}; db::{
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl; DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages}; models::{self},
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng}; schema,
},
use crate::{ evm::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder}, self, ListError, RunKind,
crypto::integrity, policies::{
db::{ CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
DatabaseError, DatabasePool, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
models::{self}, },
schema, },
}, };
evm::{ use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
self, ListError, RunKind,
policies::{ use alloy::{
CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, consensus::TxEip1559, network::TxSignerSync as _, primitives::Address, signers::Signature,
ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer, };
}, use diesel::{
}, ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
}; };
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}; use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer; use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)] pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Wallet not found")] #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
WalletNotFound, pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Wallet not found")]
#[error("Database error: {0}")] WalletNotFound,
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")] Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")] Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
#[error("Signing error: {0}")] VaultSend,
Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
#[error("Signing error: {0}")]
#[error("Policy error: {0}")] Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
} #[error("Policy error: {0}")]
Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)] }
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")] #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error), pub enum Error {
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")] Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
#[error("Database error: {0}")] VaultSend,
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[error("Integrity violation: {0}")] Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
} #[error("Integrity violation: {0}")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
#[derive(Actor)] }
pub struct EvmActor {
pub keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, #[derive(Actor)]
pub db: DatabasePool, pub struct EvmActor {
pub rng: StdRng, pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub engine: evm::Engine, pub db: DatabasePool,
} pub rng: StdRng,
pub engine: evm::Engine,
impl EvmActor { }
pub fn new(keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
// is it safe to seed rng from system once? impl EvmActor {
// todo: audit pub fn new(vault: ActorRef<Vault>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng()); // is it safe to seed rng from system once?
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), keyholder.clone()); // todo: audit
Self { let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
keyholder, let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), vault.clone());
db, Self {
rng, vault,
engine, db,
} rng,
} engine,
} }
}
#[messages] }
impl EvmActor {
#[message] #[messages]
pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> { impl EvmActor {
let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng); #[message]
pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec())); let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);
let aead_id: i32 = self let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
.keyholder
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext }) let aead_id: i32 = self
.await .vault
.map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?; .ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
.await
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?; .map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values(&models::NewEvmWallet { let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(), let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id, .values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
}) address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id) aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
.get_result(&mut conn) })
.await .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?; .get_result(&mut conn)
.await
Ok((wallet_id, address)) .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
}
Ok((wallet_id, address))
#[message] }
pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?; #[message]
let rows: Vec<models::EvmWallet> = schema::evm_wallet::table pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select()) let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
.load(&mut conn) let rows: Vec<models::EvmWallet> = schema::evm_wallet::table
.await .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?; .load(&mut conn)
.await
Ok(rows .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
.into_iter()
.map(|w| (w.id, Address::from_slice(&w.address))) Ok(rows
.collect()) .into_iter()
} .map(|w| (w.id, Address::from_slice(&w.address)))
} .collect())
}
#[messages] }
impl EvmActor {
#[message] #[messages]
pub async fn useragent_create_grant( impl EvmActor {
&mut self, #[message]
basic: SharedGrantSettings, pub async fn operator_create_grant(
grant: SpecificGrant, &mut self,
) -> Result<i32, Error> { basic: SharedGrantSettings,
match grant { grant: SpecificGrant,
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self ) -> Result<i32, Error> {
.engine match grant {
.create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(CombinedSettings { SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self
shared: basic, .engine
specific: settings, .create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
}) shared: basic,
.await specific: settings,
.map_err(Error::from), })
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => self .await
.engine .map_err(Error::from),
.create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(CombinedSettings { SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => self
shared: basic, .engine
specific: settings, .create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
}) shared: basic,
.await specific: settings,
.map_err(Error::from), })
} .await
} .map_err(Error::from),
}
#[message] }
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
// let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?; #[message]
// let keyholder = self.keyholder.clone(); pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(
&mut self,
// diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| { grant_id: i32,
// Box::pin(async move { ) -> Result<(), Error> {
// diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table) self.engine
// .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id)) .revoke_grant(grant_id)
// .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now())) .await
// .execute(conn) .map_err(Error::from)
// .await?; }
// let signed = integrity::evm::load_signed_grant_by_basic_id(conn, grant_id).await?; #[message]
pub async fn operator_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
// diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(()) match self.engine.list_all_grants().await {
// }) Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
// }) Err(ListError::Database(db_err)) => Err(Error::Database(db_err)),
// .await Err(ListError::Integrity(integrity_err)) => Err(Error::Integrity(integrity_err)),
// .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?; }
}
// Ok(())
todo!() #[message]
} pub async fn shared_analyze_transaction(
&mut self,
#[message] client_id: i32,
pub async fn useragent_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> { wallet_address: Address,
match self.engine.list_all_grants().await { transaction: TxEip1559,
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants), ) -> Result<SpecificMeaning, SignTransactionError> {
Err(ListError::Database(db_err)) => Err(Error::Database(db_err)), let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
Err(ListError::Integrity(integrity_err)) => Err(Error::Integrity(integrity_err)), let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
} .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
} .filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
.first(&mut conn)
#[message] .await
pub async fn shared_analyze_transaction( .optional()
&mut self, .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
client_id: i32, .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
wallet_address: Address, let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
transaction: TxEip1559, .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
) -> Result<SpecificMeaning, SignTransactionError> { .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?; .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table .first(&mut conn)
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select()) .await
.filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice())) .optional()
.first(&mut conn) .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.await .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
.optional() drop(conn);
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?; let meaning = self
let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table .engine
.select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select()) .evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id)) .await?;
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
.first(&mut conn) Ok(meaning)
.await }
.optional()
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)? #[message]
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?; pub async fn client_sign_transaction(
drop(conn); &mut self,
client_id: i32,
let meaning = self wallet_address: Address,
.engine mut transaction: TxEip1559,
.evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution) ) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
.await?; let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
Ok(meaning) .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
} .filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
.first(&mut conn)
#[message] .await
pub async fn client_sign_transaction( .optional()
&mut self, .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
client_id: i32, .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
wallet_address: Address, let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
mut transaction: TxEip1559, .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> { .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?; .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table .first(&mut conn)
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select()) .await
.filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice())) .optional()
.first(&mut conn) .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.await .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
.optional() drop(conn);
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?; let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table .vault
.select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select()) .ask(Decrypt {
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id)) aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id)) })
.first(&mut conn) .await
.await .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
.optional()
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)? let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
drop(conn); self.engine
.evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self .await?;
.keyholder
.ask(Decrypt { Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id, }
}) }
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::KeyholderSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
self.engine
.evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.await?;
use alloy::network::TxSignerSync as _;
Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,105 +1,127 @@
use std::ops::ControlFlow; use crate::{
actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
use kameo::{ peers::{
Actor, messages, client::ClientProfile,
prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef}, operator::{OperatorSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
reply::ReplySender, },
}; };
use crate::actors::{ use kameo::{
client::ClientProfile, Actor, messages,
flow_coordinator::ApprovalError, prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval}, reply::ReplySender,
}; };
use std::{ops::ControlFlow, time::Duration};
pub struct Args {
pub client: ClientProfile, const APPROVAL_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
pub user_agents: Vec<ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
pub reply: ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>, pub struct Args {
} pub client: ClientProfile,
pub operators: Vec<ActorRef<OperatorSession>>,
pub struct ClientApprovalController { pub reply: ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>,
/// Number of UAs that have not yet responded (approval or denial) or died. }
pending: usize,
/// Number of approvals received so far. pub struct ClientApprovalController {
approved: usize, /// Number of operators that have not yet responded (approval or denial) or died.
reply: Option<ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>, pending: usize,
} /// Number of approvals received so far.
approved: usize,
impl ClientApprovalController { reply: Option<ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>,
fn send_reply(&mut self, result: Result<bool, ApprovalError>) { }
if let Some(reply) = self.reply.take() {
reply.send(result); impl ClientApprovalController {
} fn send_reply(&mut self, result: Result<bool, ApprovalError>) {
} if let Some(reply) = self.reply.take() {
} reply.send(result);
}
impl Actor for ClientApprovalController { }
type Args = Args; }
type Error = ();
impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
async fn on_start( type Args = Args;
Args { type Error = ();
client,
mut user_agents, async fn on_start(
reply, Args {
}: Self::Args, client,
actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>, operators,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { reply,
let this = Self { }: Self::Args,
pending: user_agents.len(), actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>,
approved: 0, ) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
reply: Some(reply), let this = Self {
}; pending: operators.len(),
approved: 0,
for user_agent in user_agents.drain(..) { reply: Some(reply),
actor_ref.link(&user_agent).await; };
let _ = user_agent
.tell(BeginNewClientApproval { for operator in operators {
client: client.clone(), actor_ref.link(&operator).await;
controller: actor_ref.clone(),
}) let _ = operator
.await; .tell(BeginNewClientApproval {
} client: client.clone(),
controller: actor_ref.clone(),
Ok(this) })
} .await;
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self, let weak = actor_ref.downgrade();
_: WeakActorRef<Self>, tokio::spawn(async move {
_: ActorId, tokio::time::sleep(APPROVAL_TIMEOUT).await;
_: ActorStopReason, if let Some(r) = weak.upgrade() {
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> { let _ = r.tell(OnApprovalTimeout {}).await;
// A linked UA died before responding — counts as a non-approval. }
self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1); });
if self.pending == 0 {
// At least one UA didn't approve: deny. Ok(this)
self.send_reply(Ok(false)); }
return Ok(ControlFlow::Break(ActorStopReason::Normal));
} async fn on_link_died(
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(())) &mut self,
} _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
} _: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
#[messages] ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
impl ClientApprovalController { // A linked operator died before responding — counts as a non-approval.
#[message(ctx)] self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
pub async fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) { if self.pending == 0 {
if !approved { // At least one operator didn't approve: deny.
// Denial wins immediately regardless of other pending responses. self.send_reply(Ok(false));
self.send_reply(Ok(false)); return Ok(ControlFlow::Break(ActorStopReason::Normal));
ctx.stop(); }
return; Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
} }
}
self.approved += 1;
self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1); #[messages]
impl ClientApprovalController {
if self.pending == 0 { #[message(ctx)]
// Every connected UA approved. pub fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
self.send_reply(Ok(true)); if !approved {
ctx.stop(); // Denial wins immediately regardless of other pending responses.
} self.send_reply(Ok(false));
} ctx.stop();
} return;
}
self.approved += 1;
self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
if self.pending == 0 {
// Every connected operator approved.
self.send_reply(Ok(true));
ctx.stop();
}
}
/// Fired after `APPROVAL_TIMEOUT` elapses. Any operator that hasn't responded
/// by then is treated as a denial to prevent zombie sessions from blocking the flow.
#[message(ctx)]
pub fn on_approval_timeout(&mut self, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
if self.pending > 0 {
self.send_reply(Ok(false));
ctx.stop();
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,118 +1,114 @@
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow}; use crate::{
actors::{
use kameo::{ flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
Actor, operator_registry::{GetConnected, OperatorRegistry},
actor::{ActorId, ActorRef, Spawn}, },
messages, peers::client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef}, };
reply::DelegatedReply,
}; use kameo::{
use tracing::info; Actor,
actor::{ActorId, ActorRef, Spawn},
use crate::actors::{ messages,
client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession}, prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController, reply::DelegatedReply,
user_agent::session::UserAgentSession, };
}; use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use tracing::info;
pub mod client_connect_approval;
pub mod client_connect_approval;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct FlowCoordinator { pub struct FlowCoordinator {
pub user_agents: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>, pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>, operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
} }
impl Actor for FlowCoordinator { impl FlowCoordinator {
type Args = Self; pub fn new(operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>) -> Self {
Self {
type Error = (); clients: HashMap::default(),
operator_registry,
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { }
Ok(args) }
} }
async fn on_link_died( impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
&mut self, type Args = Self;
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: ActorId, type Error = ();
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> { async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
if self.user_agents.remove(&id).is_some() { Ok(args)
info!( }
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator", async fn on_link_died(
event = "useragent.disconnected" &mut self,
); _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
} else if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() { id: ActorId,
info!( _: ActorStopReason,
?id, ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
actor = "FlowCoordinator", if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
event = "client.disconnected" info!(
); ?id,
} else { actor = "FlowCoordinator",
info!( event = "client.disconnected"
?id, );
actor = "FlowCoordinator", } else {
event = "unknown.actor.disconnected" info!(
); ?id,
} actor = "FlowCoordinator",
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(())) event = "unknown.actor.disconnected"
} );
} }
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] }
pub enum ApprovalError { }
#[error("No user agents connected")]
NoUserAgentsConnected, #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
} pub enum ApprovalError {
#[error("No operators connected")]
#[messages] NoOperatorsConnected,
impl FlowCoordinator { }
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_user_agent( #[messages]
&mut self, impl FlowCoordinator {
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>, #[message(ctx)]
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>, pub async fn register_client(
) { &mut self,
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "useragent.connected"); actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await; ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
self.user_agents.insert(actor.id(), actor); ) {
} info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
#[message(ctx)] self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor);
pub async fn register_client( }
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>, #[message(ctx)]
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>, pub async fn request_client_approval(
) { &mut self,
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected"); client: ClientProfile,
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await; ctx: &mut Context<Self, DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>,
self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor); ) -> DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>> {
} let (reply, Some(reply_sender)) = ctx.reply_sender() else {
unreachable!("Expected `request_client_approval` to have callback channel");
#[message(ctx)] };
pub async fn request_client_approval(
&mut self, let Ok(refs) = self.operator_registry.ask(GetConnected).await else {
client: ClientProfile, reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoOperatorsConnected));
ctx: &mut Context<Self, DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>, return reply;
) -> DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>> { };
let (reply, Some(reply_sender)) = ctx.reply_sender() else {
unreachable!("Expected `request_client_approval` to have callback channel"); if refs.is_empty() {
}; reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoOperatorsConnected));
return reply;
let refs: Vec<_> = self.user_agents.values().cloned().collect(); }
if refs.is_empty() {
reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected)); ClientApprovalController::spawn(client_connect_approval::Args {
return reply; client,
} operators: refs,
reply: reply_sender,
ClientApprovalController::spawn(client_connect_approval::Args { });
client,
user_agents: refs, reply
reply: reply_sender, }
}); }
reply
}
}

View File

@@ -1,47 +1,59 @@
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn}; use crate::{
use thiserror::Error; actors::{
bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
use crate::{ operator_registry::OperatorRegistry, vault::Vault,
actors::{ },
bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator, db,
keyholder::KeyHolder, };
},
db, use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
}; use kameo_actors::{DeliveryStrategy, message_bus::MessageBus};
use thiserror::Error;
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod client; pub mod bootstrap;
mod evm; pub mod evm;
pub mod flow_coordinator; pub mod flow_coordinator;
pub mod keyholder; pub mod operator_registry;
pub mod user_agent; pub mod vault;
#[derive(Error, Debug)] #[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum SpawnError { pub enum SpawnError {
#[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")] #[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error), Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn KeyHolder actor")] #[error("Failed to spawn Vault actor")]
KeyHolder(#[from] keyholder::Error), Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
} }
/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations /// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
#[derive(Clone)] #[derive(Clone)]
pub struct GlobalActors { pub struct GlobalActors {
pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>, pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>, pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>, pub operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
} pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
pub events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
impl GlobalActors { }
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let key_holder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?); impl GlobalActors {
Ok(Self { pub fn spawn_message_bus() -> ActorRef<MessageBus> {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?), MessageBus::spawn(MessageBus::new(DeliveryStrategy::Guaranteed))
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)), }
key_holder,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::default()), pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
}) let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
} let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
} let operator_registry = OperatorRegistry::spawn(OperatorRegistry::default());
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
vault: key_holder,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::new(
operator_registry.clone(),
)),
operator_registry,
events: message_bus,
})
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
use crate::peers::operator::OperatorSession;
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorId, ActorRef},
error::Infallible,
messages,
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
};
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use tracing::info;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct OperatorRegistry {
connected: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<OperatorSession>>,
}
impl Actor for OperatorRegistry {
type Args = Self;
type Error = Infallible;
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(args)
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.connected.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "OperatorRegistry",
event = "operator.disconnected"
);
}
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
#[messages]
impl OperatorRegistry {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn connect_operator(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "OperatorRegistry", event = "operator.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.connected.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message]
pub fn get_connected(&self) -> Vec<ActorRef<OperatorSession>> {
self.connected.values().cloned().collect()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tracing::error;
use super::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
keyholder::KeyHolder,
user_agent::{UserAgentConnection, UserAgentCredentials, auth::Outbound},
},
crypto::integrity,
db::{DatabasePool, schema::useragent_client},
};
pub struct ChallengeRequest {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub token: String,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge_nonce: i32,
pub key: authn::PublicKey,
}
pub struct ChallengeSolution {
pub solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(authn::PublicKey),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(authn::PublicKey),
}
);
/// Returns the current nonce, ready to use for the challenge nonce.
async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
db: &DatabasePool,
key: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(i32, i32), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
useragent_client::table
.filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(key.to_bytes()))
.select((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
.await
})
})
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?
.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(?key, "Public key not found in database");
Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
})
}
async fn verify_integrity(
db: &DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?;
let _result = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut db_conn,
keyholder,
&UserAgentCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
Error::internal("Integrity verification failed")
})?;
Ok(())
}
async fn create_nonce(
db: &DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let new_nonce = db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(useragent_client::table)
.filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
.set(useragent_client::nonce.eq(useragent_client::nonce + 1))
.returning((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
keyholder,
&UserAgentCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: new_nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity signature update failed");
Error::internal("Database error")
})?;
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(new_nonce)
})
})
.await?;
Ok(new_nonce)
}
async fn register_key(
db: &DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(useragent_client::table)
.values((
useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
useragent_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
))
.returning(useragent_client::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
let entity = UserAgentCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: NONCE_START,
};
integrity::sign_entity(conn, keyholder, &entity, id)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new user-agent key");
Error::internal("Failed to register public key")
})?;
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
pub struct AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
pub(super) transport: T,
}
impl<'a, T> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
type Error = Error;
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
verify_integrity(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
let nonce = create_nonce(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce: nonce,
key: pubkey,
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
) -> Result<authn::PublicKey, Self::Error> {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
match token_ok {
true => {
register_key(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(pubkey)
}
false => {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
}
}
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce,
key,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<authn::PublicKey, Self::Error> {
let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!("Failed to decode signature in challenge solution");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
let valid = key.verify(*challenge_nonce, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature);
match valid {
true => {
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(key.clone())
}
false => {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile},
crypto::integrity::Integrable,
db,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
#[derive(Debug, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct UserAgentCredentials {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub nonce: i32,
}
impl Integrable for UserAgentCredentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "useragent_credentials";
}
// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: authn::PublicKey },
}
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub use auth::authenticate;
pub use session::UserAgentSession;

View File

@@ -1,524 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn,
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use kameo::messages;
use kameo::prelude::Context;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer;
use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
use crate::actors::user_agent::session::Error;
use crate::actors::{
evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentListGrants,
},
keyholder::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
user_agent::session::{
UserAgentSession,
state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
},
};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
};
use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
impl UserAgentSession {
fn take_unseal_secret(&mut self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), Error> {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(Error::internal("Invalid state for unseal encrypted key"));
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Mutex poison is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
match secret {
Some(secret) => secret,
None => {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
return Err(Error::internal("Ephemeral secret already taken"));
}
}
};
Ok((ephemeral_secret, unseal_context.client_public_key))
}
fn decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret: EphemeralSecret,
client_public_key: PublicKey,
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => Ok(key_buffer),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
}
}
}
}
pub struct UnsealStartResponse {
pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum UnsealError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for unsealing")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Internal error during unsealing process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum BootstrapError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for bootstrapping")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Internal error during bootstrapping process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum GrantMutationError {
#[error("Vault is sealed")]
VaultSealed,
#[error("Internal grant mutation error")]
Internal,
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_request(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
) -> Result<UnsealStartResponse, Error> {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
client_public_key: client_pubkey,
}))?;
Ok(UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key,
})
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(_err) => {
return Err(Error::internal("Failed to take unseal secret").into());
}
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(Error::internal("Vault actor error").into())
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(err) => return Err(err.into()),
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to bootstrap vault");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::General(Error::internal(
"Vault actor error",
)))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "keyholder.query.failed");
return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => Ok(address),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
"EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
))),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
&mut self,
basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, GrantMutationError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
.await
{
Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(
&mut self,
grant_id: i32,
) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
// match self
// .props
// .actors
// .evm
// .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
// .await
// {
// Ok(()) => Ok(()),
// Err(err) => {
// error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
// Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
// }
// }
let _ = grant_id;
todo!()
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<i32>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(access_entries)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message(ctx)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
&mut self,
approved: bool,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pending_approval = match self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey.to_bytes()) {
Some(approval) => approval,
None => {
error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
return Err(Error::internal("Unknown client in connection response"));
}
};
pending_approval
.controller
.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to send client approval response to controller"
);
Error::internal("Failed to send client approval response to controller")
})?;
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let clients = program_client::table
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
ProgramClient::as_select(),
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(clients)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,454 +1,462 @@
use chrono::Utc; use crate::{
use diesel::{ crypto::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, KeyCell, derive_key,
dsl::{insert_into, update}, encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
}; integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl}; },
use hmac::Mac as _; db::{
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages}; self,
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant}; models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
use tracing::{error, info}; schema::{self},
},
use crate::crypto::{ };
KeyCell, derive_key, use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
integrity::v1::HmacSha256, use chrono::Utc;
}; use diesel::{
use crate::db::{ ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
self, dsl::{insert_into, update},
models::{self, RootKeyHistory}, };
schema::{self}, use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
}; use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}; use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)] use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(KeyHolderState))] use tracing::{error, info};
enum State {
#[default] pub mod events {
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed { #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
root_key_history_id: i32, pub struct Bootstrapped;
},
Unsealed { #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
root_key_history_id: i32, pub struct Unsealed;
root_key: KeyCell,
}, #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
} pub struct VaultResealed;
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error { #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")] pub enum Error {
AlreadyBootstrapped, #[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
#[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")] AlreadyBootstrapped,
NotBootstrapped, #[error("Vault is not bootstrapped")]
#[error("Invalid key provided")] NotBootstrapped,
InvalidKey, #[error("Vault is sealed")]
Sealed,
#[error("Requested aead entry not found")] #[error("Invalid key provided")]
NotFound, InvalidKey,
#[error("Encryption error: {0}")] #[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error), NotFound,
#[error("Database error: {0}")] #[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError), Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
#[error("Database transaction error: {0}")] #[error("Database error: {0}")]
DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error), DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Broken database")] #[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
BrokenDatabase, DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
#[error("Broken database")]
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed). BrokenDatabase,
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key. }
/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
#[derive(Actor)] struct Unsealed {
pub struct KeyHolder { root_key_history_id: i32,
db: db::DatabasePool, root_key: KeyCell,
state: State, }
}
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[messages] #[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(VaultState))]
impl KeyHolder { enum State {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> { #[default]
let state = { Unbootstrapped,
let mut conn = db.get().await?; Sealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table },
.left_join(schema::root_key_history::table) Unsealed(Unsealed),
.select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),)) }
.get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
.await?; /// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
///
match root_key_history { /// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed { /// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id, #[derive(Actor)]
}, pub struct Vault {
None => State::Unbootstrapped, db: db::DatabasePool,
} state: State,
}; events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
Ok(Self { db, state })
} #[messages]
impl Vault {
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple keyholders write pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
// additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse let state = {
async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> { let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
let nonce = conn .left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| { .select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
Box::pin(async move { .get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table .await?;
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
.select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce) match root_key_history {
.first(conn) Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
.await?; root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id,
},
let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| { None => State::Unbootstrapped,
error!( }
"Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}", };
root_key_id
); Ok(Self { db, state, events })
Error::BrokenDatabase }
})?;
nonce.increment(); // Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write
// additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
update(schema::root_key_history::table) async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id)) let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
.set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
.execute(conn) let nonce = conn
.await?; .exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(nonce) .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
}) .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
}) .first(&mut *conn)
.await?; .await?;
Ok(nonce) let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
} error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
#[message] root_key_id
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> { );
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) { Error::BrokenDatabase
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped); })?;
} nonce.increment();
let salt = v1::generate_salt();
let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt); update(schema::root_key_history::table)
let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random(); .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
.set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
// Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time .execute(&mut *conn)
let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default(); .await?;
let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(nonce)
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| { })
let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice(); .await?;
seal_key
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader) Ok(nonce)
.map_err(|err| { }
error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
Error::Encryption(err) const fn expect_unsealed(state: &mut State) -> Result<&mut Unsealed, Error> {
}) match state {
})?; State::Unsealed(unsealed) => Ok(unsealed),
State::Unbootstrapped => Err(Error::NotBootstrapped),
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?; State::Sealed { .. } => Err(Error::Sealed),
}
let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec(); }
let root_key_history_id = conn
.transaction(|conn| { #[message]
Box::pin(async move { pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table) if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory { return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext, }
tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(), let salt = v1::generate_salt();
root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(), let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes, let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
schema_version: 1,
salt: salt.to_vec(), // Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
}) let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default();
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id) let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
.get_result(conn)
.await?; let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| {
let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice();
update(schema::arbiter_settings::table) seal_key
.set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id)) .encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
.execute(conn) .map_err(|err| {
.await?; error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
Error::Encryption(err)
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id) })
}) })?;
})
.await?; let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
self.state = State::Unsealed { let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
root_key, let root_key_history_id = conn
root_key_history_id, .transaction(async |conn| {
}; let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully"); ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext.clone(),
tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
Ok(()) root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
} data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes.clone(),
schema_version: 1,
#[message] salt: salt.to_vec(),
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> { })
let State::Sealed { .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
root_key_history_id, .get_result(&mut *conn)
} = &self.state .await?;
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped); update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
}; .set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.execute(&mut *conn)
// We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work .await?;
let current_key = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?; Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id)
schema::root_key_history::table })
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id)) .await?;
.select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn) self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
.await? root_key,
}; root_key_history_id,
});
let salt = &current_key.salt;
let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| { info!("Vault bootstrapped successfully");
error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key"); let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await;
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?; Ok(())
let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt); }
let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone()); #[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err( let State::Sealed {
|_| { root_key_history_id,
error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key"); } = &self.state
Error::BrokenDatabase else {
}, return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
)?; };
seal_key // We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key) let current_key = {
.map_err(|err| { let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key"); schema::root_key_history::table
Error::InvalidKey .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
})?; .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
self.state = State::Unsealed { .await?
root_key_history_id: current_key.id, };
root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size"); let salt = &current_key.salt;
Error::BrokenDatabase let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
})?, error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
}; Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully"); let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
Ok(()) let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
}
let nonce =
#[message] Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> { error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else { Error::BrokenDatabase
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped); })?;
};
seal_key
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = { .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?; .map_err(|err| {
schema::aead_encrypted::table error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select()) Error::InvalidKey
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id)) })?;
.first(&mut conn)
.await self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
.optional()? root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
.ok_or(Error::NotFound)? root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
}; error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| { })?,
error!( });
"Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
aead_id info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
); let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Unsealed)).await;
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?; Ok(())
let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext); }
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
Ok(output) #[message]
} pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message] let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> { let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let State::Unsealed { schema::aead_encrypted::table
root_key, .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
root_key_history_id, .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
.. .first(&mut conn)
} = &mut self.state .await
else { .optional()?
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped); .ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
}; };
// Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire let nonce = Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
// Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field error!(
let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?; "Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
aead_id
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write(); );
let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut(); Error::BrokenDatabase
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?; })?;
let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer); root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
Ok(output)
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?; }
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
.values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted { // Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
ciphertext, #[message]
tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(), pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(), let Unsealed {
schema_version: 1, root_key,
associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id, root_key_history_id,
created_at: Utc::now().into(), } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id) // Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
.get_result(&mut conn) // Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
.await?; let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
Ok(aead_id) let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
} let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
#[message]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> KeyHolderState { let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
self.state.discriminant()
} let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
#[message] .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
pub fn sign_integrity(&mut self, mac_input: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(i32, Vec<u8>), Error> { ciphertext,
let State::Unsealed { tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
root_key, current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
root_key_history_id, schema_version: 1,
} = &mut self.state associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
else { created_at: Utc::now().into(),
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped); })
}; .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
let mut hmac = root_key .await?;
.0
.read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) { Ok(aead_id)
Ok(v) => v, }
Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
}); #[message]
hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes()); pub fn get_state(&self) -> VaultState {
hmac.update(&mac_input); self.state.discriminant()
}
let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
Ok((*root_key_history_id, mac)) #[message]
} pub fn sign_integrity(&mut self, mac_input: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(i32, Vec<u8>), Error> {
let Unsealed {
#[message] root_key,
pub fn verify_integrity( root_key_history_id,
&mut self, } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
mac_input: Vec<u8>,
expected_mac: Vec<u8>, let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
key_version: i32, HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
) -> Result<bool, Error> { .unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
let State::Unsealed { });
root_key, hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes());
root_key_history_id, hmac.update(&mac_input);
} = &mut self.state
else { let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped); Ok((*root_key_history_id, mac))
}; }
if *root_key_history_id != key_version { #[message]
return Ok(false); pub fn verify_integrity(
} &mut self,
mac_input: Vec<u8>,
let mut hmac = root_key expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
.0 key_version: i32,
.read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) { ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
Ok(v) => v, let Unsealed {
Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"), root_key,
}); root_key_history_id,
hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes()); } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
hmac.update(&mac_input);
if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok()) return Ok(false);
} }
#[message] let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
pub fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> { HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
let State::Unsealed { .unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
root_key_history_id, });
.. hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes());
} = &self.state hmac.update(&mac_input);
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped); Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
}; }
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id, #[message]
}; pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
Ok(()) let Unsealed {
} root_key_history_id,
} ..
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests { self.state = State::Sealed {
use diesel::SelectableHelper; root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl; let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
Ok(())
use crate::db::{self}; }
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}; }
use super::*; #[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder { use crate::actors::GlobalActors;
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap(); use arbiter_crypto::safecell::SafeCellHandle as _;
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap(); use super::*;
actor
} async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
#[tokio::test] .await
#[test_log::test] .unwrap();
async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() { let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await; actor
let root_key_history_id = match actor.state { }
State::Unsealed {
root_key_history_id, #[tokio::test]
.. #[test_log::test]
} => root_key_history_id, async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
_ => panic!("expected unsealed state"), let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
}; let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let n1 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id) let State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
.await root_key_history_id,
.unwrap(); ..
let n2 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id) }) = actor.state
.await else {
.unwrap(); panic!("expected unsealed state")
assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase"); };
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap(); let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table .await
.select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select()) .unwrap();
.first(&mut conn) let n2 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec()); assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
let id = actor let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec())) let root_row: RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
.await .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.unwrap(); .first(&mut conn)
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table .await
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id)) .unwrap();
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select()) assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
.first(&mut conn)
.await let id = actor
.unwrap(); .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
assert!( .await
row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(), .unwrap();
"next write must advance nonce" let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
); .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id))
} .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
} .first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(),
"next write must advance nonce"
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,58 +1,57 @@
use std::sync::Arc; use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors,
use thiserror::Error; context::tls::TlsManager,
db::{self},
use crate::{ };
actors::GlobalActors,
context::tls::TlsManager, use std::sync::Arc;
db::{self}, use thiserror::Error;
};
pub mod tls;
pub mod tls;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
#[derive(Error, Debug)] pub enum InitError {
pub enum InitError { #[error("Database setup failed: {0}")]
#[error("Database setup failed: {0}")] DatabaseSetup(#[from] db::DatabaseSetupError),
DatabaseSetup(#[from] db::DatabaseSetupError),
#[error("Connection acquire failed: {0}")]
#[error("Connection acquire failed: {0}")] DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
#[error("Database query error: {0}")] DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("TLS initialization failed: {0}")]
#[error("TLS initialization failed: {0}")] Tls(#[from] tls::InitError),
Tls(#[from] tls::InitError),
#[error("Actor spawn failed: {0}")]
#[error("Actor spawn failed: {0}")] ActorSpawn(#[from] crate::actors::SpawnError),
ActorSpawn(#[from] crate::actors::SpawnError),
#[error("I/O Error: {0}")]
#[error("I/O Error: {0}")] Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
Io(#[from] std::io::Error), }
}
pub struct __ServerContextInner {
pub struct _ServerContextInner { pub db: db::DatabasePool,
pub db: db::DatabasePool, pub tls: TlsManager,
pub tls: TlsManager, pub actors: GlobalActors,
pub actors: GlobalActors, }
} #[derive(Clone)]
#[derive(Clone)] pub struct ServerContext(Arc<__ServerContextInner>);
pub struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext { type Target = __ServerContextInner;
type Target = _ServerContextInner;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.0
&self.0 }
} }
}
impl ServerContext {
impl ServerContext { pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> { Ok(Self(Arc::new(__ServerContextInner {
Ok(Self(Arc::new(_ServerContextInner { actors: GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await?,
actors: GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await?, tls: TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?,
tls: TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?, db,
db, })))
}))) }
} }
}

View File

@@ -1,250 +1,257 @@
use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error}; use crate::db::{
self,
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _}; models::{NewTlsHistory, TlsHistory},
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl}; schema::{
arbiter_settings,
use pem::Pem; tls_history::{self},
use rcgen::{ },
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType, };
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
}; use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject; use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use thiserror::Error; use pem::Pem;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer; use rcgen::{
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
use crate::db::{ IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
self, };
models::{NewTlsHistory, TlsHistory}, use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
schema::{ use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
arbiter_settings, use thiserror::Error;
tls_history::{self}, use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
},
}; const ENCODE_CONFIG: pem::EncodeConfig = {
let line_ending = if cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
const ENCODE_CONFIG: pem::EncodeConfig = { pem::LineEnding::CRLF
let line_ending = match cfg!(target_family = "windows") { } else {
true => pem::LineEnding::CRLF, pem::LineEnding::LF
false => pem::LineEnding::LF, };
}; pem::EncodeConfig::new().set_line_ending(line_ending)
pem::EncodeConfig::new().set_line_ending(line_ending) };
};
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
#[derive(Error, Debug)] pub enum InitError {
pub enum InitError { #[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
#[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")] KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
#[error("Key invalid format: {0}")]
#[error("Key invalid format: {0}")] KeyInvalidFormat(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
KeyInvalidFormat(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
#[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")]
#[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")] KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
#[error("Database error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
#[error("Database error during TLS initialization: {0}")] DatabaseError(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
DatabaseError(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Pem deserialization error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
#[error("Pem deserialization error during TLS initialization: {0}")] PemDeserializationError(#[from] rustls::pki_types::pem::Error),
PemDeserializationError(#[from] rustls::pki_types::pem::Error),
#[error("Database pool acquire error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
#[error("Database pool acquire error during TLS initialization: {0}")] DatabasePoolAcquire(#[from] db::PoolError),
DatabasePoolAcquire(#[from] db::PoolError), }
}
pub type PemCert = String;
pub type PemCert = String;
pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer<'_>) -> PemCert {
pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer) -> PemCert { pem::encode_config(&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()), ENCODE_CONFIG)
pem::encode_config(&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()), ENCODE_CONFIG) }
}
#[expect(
#[allow(unused)] unused,
struct SerializedTls { reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
cert_pem: PemCert, )]
cert_key_pem: String, struct SerializedTls {
} cert_pem: PemCert,
cert_key_pem: String,
struct TlsCa { }
issuer: Issuer<'static, KeyPair>,
cert: CertificateDer<'static>, struct TlsCa {
} issuer: Issuer<'static, KeyPair>,
cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
impl TlsCa { }
fn generate() -> Result<Self, InitError> {
let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?; impl TlsCa {
let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance CA".into()])?; fn generate() -> Result<Self, InitError> {
params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained); let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
params.key_usages = vec![ let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance CA".into()])?;
KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign, params.key_usages = vec![
KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature, KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign,
]; KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign,
KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new(); ];
dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance CA");
params.distinguished_name = dn; let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
let certified_issuer = CertifiedIssuer::self_signed(params, keypair)?; dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance CA");
params.distinguished_name = dn;
let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem(); let certified_issuer = CertifiedIssuer::self_signed(params, keypair)?;
#[allow( let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem();
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Broken cert couldn't bootstrap server anyway" #[expect(
)] clippy::unwrap_used,
let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem( reason = "Broken cert couldn't bootstrap server anyway"
&certified_issuer.pem(), )]
KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem.as_ref()).unwrap(), let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(
) &certified_issuer.pem(),
.unwrap(); KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem.as_ref()).unwrap(),
)
Ok(Self { .unwrap();
issuer,
cert: certified_issuer.der().clone(), Ok(Self {
}) issuer,
} cert: certified_issuer.der().clone(),
fn generate_leaf(&self) -> Result<TlsCert, InitError> { })
let cert_key = KeyPair::generate()?; }
let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance Leaf".into()])?; fn generate_leaf(&self) -> Result<TlsCert, InitError> {
params.is_ca = IsCa::NoCa; let cert_key = KeyPair::generate()?;
params.key_usages = vec![ let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance Leaf".into()])?;
KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature, params.is_ca = IsCa::NoCa;
KeyUsagePurpose::KeyEncipherment, params.key_usages = vec![
]; KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
params KeyUsagePurpose::KeyEncipherment,
.subject_alt_names ];
.push(SanType::IpAddress(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST.into())); params
.subject_alt_names
let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new(); .push(SanType::IpAddress(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST.into()));
dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance Leaf");
params.distinguished_name = dn; let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance Leaf");
let new_cert = params.signed_by(&cert_key, &self.issuer)?; params.distinguished_name = dn;
Ok(TlsCert { let new_cert = params.signed_by(&cert_key, &self.issuer)?;
cert: new_cert,
cert_key, Ok(TlsCert {
}) cert: new_cert,
} cert_key,
})
#[allow(unused)] }
fn serialize(&self) -> Result<SerializedTls, InitError> {
let cert_key_pem = self.issuer.key().serialize_pem(); #[expect(
Ok(SerializedTls { unused,
cert_pem: encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert), clippy::unnecessary_wraps,
cert_key_pem, reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
}) )]
} fn serialize(&self) -> Result<SerializedTls, InitError> {
let cert_key_pem = self.issuer.key().serialize_pem();
#[allow(unused)] Ok(SerializedTls {
fn try_deserialize(cert_pem: &str, cert_key_pem: &str) -> Result<Self, InitError> { cert_pem: encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert),
let keypair = cert_key_pem,
KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem).map_err(InitError::KeyDeserializationError)?; })
let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(cert_pem, keypair)?; }
Ok(Self {
issuer, #[expect(
cert: CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(cert_pem.as_bytes())?, unused,
}) reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
} )]
} fn try_deserialize(cert_pem: &str, cert_key_pem: &str) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
let keypair =
struct TlsCert { KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem).map_err(InitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
cert: Certificate, let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(cert_pem, keypair)?;
cert_key: KeyPair, Ok(Self {
} issuer,
cert: CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(cert_pem.as_bytes())?,
// TODO: Implement cert rotation })
pub struct TlsManager { }
cert: CertificateDer<'static>, }
keypair: KeyPair,
ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>, struct TlsCert {
_db: db::DatabasePool, cert: Certificate,
} cert_key: KeyPair,
}
impl TlsManager {
pub async fn generate_new(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> { // TODO: Implement cert rotation
let ca = TlsCa::generate()?; pub struct TlsManager {
let new_cert = ca.generate_leaf()?; cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
keypair: KeyPair,
{ ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
let mut conn = db.get().await?; _db: db::DatabasePool,
conn.transaction(|conn| { }
Box::pin(async {
let new_tls_history = NewTlsHistory { impl TlsManager {
cert: new_cert.cert.pem(), pub async fn generate_new(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
cert_key: new_cert.cert_key.serialize_pem(), let ca = TlsCa::generate()?;
ca_cert: encode_cert_to_pem(&ca.cert), let new_cert = ca.generate_leaf()?;
ca_key: ca.issuer.key().serialize_pem(),
}; {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let inserted_tls_history: i32 = diesel::insert_into(tls_history::table) conn.transaction(async |conn| {
.values(&new_tls_history) let new_tls_history = NewTlsHistory {
.returning(tls_history::id) cert: new_cert.cert.pem(),
.get_result(conn) cert_key: new_cert.cert_key.serialize_pem(),
.await?; ca_cert: encode_cert_to_pem(&ca.cert),
ca_key: ca.issuer.key().serialize_pem(),
diesel::update(arbiter_settings::table) };
.set(arbiter_settings::tls_id.eq(inserted_tls_history))
.execute(conn) let inserted_tls_history: i32 = diesel::insert_into(tls_history::table)
.await?; .values(&new_tls_history)
.returning(tls_history::id)
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(()) .get_result(&mut *conn)
}) .await?;
})
.await?; diesel::update(arbiter_settings::table)
} .set(arbiter_settings::tls_id.eq(inserted_tls_history))
.execute(&mut *conn)
Ok(Self { .await?;
cert: new_cert.cert.der().clone(),
keypair: new_cert.cert_key, Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(())
ca_cert: ca.cert, })
_db: db.clone(), .await?;
}) }
}
Ok(Self {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> { cert: new_cert.cert.der().clone(),
let cert_data: Option<TlsHistory> = { keypair: new_cert.cert_key,
let mut conn = db.get().await?; ca_cert: ca.cert,
arbiter_settings::table _db: db.clone(),
.left_join(tls_history::table) })
.select(Option::<TlsHistory>::as_select()) }
.first(&mut conn)
.await? pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
}; let cert_data: Option<TlsHistory> = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
match cert_data { arbiter_settings::table
Some(data) => { .left_join(tls_history::table)
let try_load = || -> Result<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> { .select(Option::<TlsHistory>::as_select())
let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&data.cert_key)?; .first(&mut conn)
let cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.cert.as_bytes())?; .await?
let ca_cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.ca_cert.as_bytes())?; };
Ok(Self {
cert, match cert_data {
keypair, Some(data) => {
ca_cert, let try_load = || -> Result<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
_db: db.clone(), let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&data.cert_key)?;
}) let cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.cert.as_bytes())?;
}; let ca_cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.ca_cert.as_bytes())?;
match try_load() { Ok(Self {
Ok(manager) => Ok(manager), cert,
Err(e) => { keypair,
eprintln!("Failed to load existing TLS certs: {e}. Generating new ones."); ca_cert,
Self::generate_new(&db).await _db: db.clone(),
} })
} };
} match try_load() {
None => Self::generate_new(&db).await, Ok(manager) => Ok(manager),
} Err(e) => {
} eprintln!("Failed to load existing TLS certs: {e}. Generating new ones.");
Self::generate_new(&db).await
pub fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> { }
&self.cert }
} }
pub fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> { None => Self::generate_new(&db).await,
&self.ca_cert }
} }
pub fn cert_pem(&self) -> PemCert { pub const fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert) &self.cert
} }
pub fn key_pem(&self) -> String { pub const fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
self.keypair.serialize_pem() &self.ca_cert
} }
}
pub fn cert_pem(&self) -> PemCert {
encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert)
}
pub fn key_pem(&self) -> String {
self.keypair.serialize_pem()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
pub mod v1; pub mod v1;
pub use v1::*; pub use v1::*;

View File

@@ -1,107 +1,102 @@
use argon2::password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt; use argon2::password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt;
use rand::{
use rand::{ Rng as _, SeedableRng,
Rng as _, SeedableRng, rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng}, };
};
pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/seal/v1";
pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes(); pub const TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/private-key/v1";
pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
#[derive(Default)]
#[derive(Default)] pub struct Nonce(pub [u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
pub struct Nonce(pub [u8; NONCE_LENGTH]); impl Nonce {
impl Nonce { pub fn increment(&mut self) {
pub fn increment(&mut self) { for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() { if let Some(byte) = self.0.get_mut(i) {
if self.0[i] == 0xFF { if *byte == 0xFF {
self.0[i] = 0; *byte = 0;
} else { } else {
self.0[i] += 1; *byte += 1;
break; break;
} }
} }
} }
}
pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.to_vec() pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
} self.0.to_vec()
} }
impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce { }
type Error = (); impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
if value.len() != NONCE_LENGTH { fn try_from(value: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
return Err(()); if value.len() != NONCE_LENGTH {
} return Err(());
let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]; }
nonce.copy_from_slice(value); let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LENGTH];
Ok(Self(nonce)) nonce.copy_from_slice(value);
} Ok(Self(nonce))
} }
}
pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
let mut salt = Salt::default(); pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
#[allow( let mut salt = Salt::default();
clippy::unwrap_used, let mut rng =
reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic" StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
)] rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap(); salt
rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt); }
salt
} #[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#[cfg(test)] use super::*;
mod tests { use crate::crypto::derive_key;
use std::ops::Deref as _; use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use super::*; #[test]
use crate::crypto::derive_key; fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}; static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
#[test] let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() { let salt = generate_salt();
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()); let mut key1 = derive_key(password, &salt);
let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()); let mut key2 = derive_key(password2, &salt);
let salt = generate_salt();
let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
let mut key1 = derive_key(password, &salt); let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
let mut key2 = derive_key(password2, &salt);
assert_eq!(&*key1_reader, &*key2_reader);
let key1_reader = key1.0.read(); }
let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
#[test]
assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref()); fn successful_derive() {
} static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
#[test] let salt = generate_salt();
pub fn successful_derive() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password"; let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()); let key_reader = key.0.read();
let salt = generate_salt();
assert_ne!(key_reader.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt); }
let key_reader = key.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref(); #[test]
// We should fuzz this
assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]); pub fn nonce_increment() {
} let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
nonce.increment();
#[test]
// We should fuzz this assert_eq!(
pub fn test_nonce_increment() { nonce.0,
let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]); [
nonce.increment(); 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
]
assert_eq!( );
nonce.0, }
[ }
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
]
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
pub mod v1; pub mod v1;
pub use v1::*; pub use v1::*;

View File

@@ -1,321 +1,334 @@
use crate::actors::keyholder; use crate::{
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable; actors::vault::{self, GetState, SignIntegrity, Vault, VerifyIntegrity},
use hmac::Hmac; db::{
use sha2::Sha256; self,
models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite}; schema::integrity_envelope,
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl}; },
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError}; };
use sha2::Digest as _; use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
use crate::{ use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
actors::keyholder::{KeyHolder, SignIntegrity, VerifyIntegrity}, use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
db::{ use hmac::Hmac;
self, use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope}, use sha2::{Digest as _, Sha256};
schema::integrity_envelope,
}, #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
}; pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)] Database(#[from] db::DatabaseError),
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")] #[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] db::DatabaseError), Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
#[error("KeyHolder error: {0}")] #[error("Vault mailbox error")]
Keyholder(#[from] keyholder::Error), VaultSend,
#[error("KeyHolder mailbox error")] #[error("Integrity envelope is missing for entity {entity_kind}")]
KeyholderSend, MissingEnvelope { entity_kind: &'static str },
#[error("Integrity envelope is missing for entity {entity_kind}")] #[error(
MissingEnvelope { entity_kind: &'static str }, "Integrity payload version mismatch for entity {entity_kind}: expected {expected}, found {found}"
)]
#[error( PayloadVersionMismatch {
"Integrity payload version mismatch for entity {entity_kind}: expected {expected}, found {found}" entity_kind: &'static str,
)] expected: i32,
PayloadVersionMismatch { found: i32,
entity_kind: &'static str, },
expected: i32,
found: i32, #[error("Integrity MAC mismatch for entity {entity_kind}")]
}, MacMismatch { entity_kind: &'static str },
}
#[error("Integrity MAC mismatch for entity {entity_kind}")]
MacMismatch { entity_kind: &'static str }, #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
} pub enum AttestationStatus {
Attested,
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] Unavailable,
pub enum AttestationStatus { }
Attested,
Unavailable, pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
} pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1; pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>; const KIND: &'static str;
const VERSION: i32 = 1;
pub trait Integrable: Hashable { }
const KIND: &'static str;
const VERSION: i32 = 1; fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
} let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
payload.hash(&mut hasher);
fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] { hasher.finalize().into()
let mut hasher = Sha256::new(); }
payload.hash(&mut hasher);
hasher.finalize().into() fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
} #[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) { clippy::as_conversions,
out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes()); reason = "fixme! #85"
out.extend_from_slice(bytes); )]
} out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
fn build_mac_input( }
entity_kind: &str,
entity_id: &[u8], fn build_mac_input(
payload_version: i32, entity_kind: &str,
payload_hash: &[u8; 32], entity_id: &[u8],
) -> Vec<u8> { payload_version: i32,
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32); payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes()); ) -> Vec<u8> {
push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id); let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes()); push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash); push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
out out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
} out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
out
pub trait IntoId { }
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8>;
} pub trait IntoId {
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8>;
impl IntoId for i32 { }
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.to_be_bytes().to_vec() impl IntoId for i32 {
} fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
} self.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
}
impl IntoId for &'_ [u8] { }
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.to_vec() impl IntoId for &'_ [u8] {
} fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
} self.to_vec()
}
pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>( }
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>, pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
entity: &E, conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
entity_id: impl IntoId, vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
) -> Result<(), Error> { entity: &E,
let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity); entity_id: impl IntoId,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let entity_id = entity_id.into_id(); let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash); let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
let (key_version, mac) = keyholder let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
.ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
.await let (key_version, mac) =
.map_err(|err| match err { vault
kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Keyholder(inner), .ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
_ => Error::KeyholderSend, .await
})?; .map_err(|err| match err {
SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Vault(inner),
insert_into(integrity_envelope::table) _ => Error::VaultSend,
.values(NewIntegrityEnvelope { })?;
entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
entity_id, insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
payload_version: E::VERSION, .values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
key_version, entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
mac: mac.to_vec(), entity_id,
}) payload_version: E::VERSION,
.on_conflict(( key_version,
integrity_envelope::entity_id, mac: mac.clone(),
integrity_envelope::entity_kind, })
)) .on_conflict((
.do_update() integrity_envelope::entity_id,
.set(( integrity_envelope::entity_kind,
integrity_envelope::payload_version.eq(E::VERSION), ))
integrity_envelope::key_version.eq(key_version), .do_update()
integrity_envelope::mac.eq(mac), .set((
)) integrity_envelope::payload_version.eq(E::VERSION),
.execute(conn) integrity_envelope::key_version.eq(key_version),
.await integrity_envelope::mac.eq(mac),
.map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?; ))
.execute(conn)
Ok(()) .await
} .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>( Ok(())
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>, }
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
entity: &E, pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
entity_id: impl IntoId, conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> { vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
let entity_id = entity_id.into_id(); entity: &E,
let envelope: IntegrityEnvelope = integrity_envelope::table entity_id: impl IntoId,
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND)) ) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&entity_id)) let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
.first(conn) let envelope: IntegrityEnvelope = integrity_envelope::table
.await .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
.map_err(|err| match err { .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&entity_id))
diesel::result::Error::NotFound => Error::MissingEnvelope { .first(conn)
entity_kind: E::KIND, .await
}, .map_err(|err| match err {
other => Error::Database(db::DatabaseError::from(other)), diesel::result::Error::NotFound => Error::MissingEnvelope {
})?; entity_kind: E::KIND,
},
if envelope.payload_version != E::VERSION { other => Error::Database(db::DatabaseError::from(other)),
return Err(Error::PayloadVersionMismatch { })?;
entity_kind: E::KIND,
expected: E::VERSION, if envelope.payload_version != E::VERSION {
found: envelope.payload_version, return Err(Error::PayloadVersionMismatch {
}); entity_kind: E::KIND,
} expected: E::VERSION,
found: envelope.payload_version,
let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity); });
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash); }
let result = keyholder let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
.ask(VerifyIntegrity { let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash);
mac_input,
expected_mac: envelope.mac, let result = vault
key_version: envelope.key_version, .ask(VerifyIntegrity {
}) mac_input,
.await; expected_mac: envelope.mac,
key_version: envelope.key_version,
match result { })
Ok(true) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested), .await;
Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND, match result {
}), Ok(true) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)) => { Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable) entity_kind: E::KIND,
} }),
Err(_) => Err(Error::KeyholderSend), Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
} Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
} }
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests { pub async fn is_signing_available(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl}; let state = vault.ask(GetState).await.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl; Ok(matches!(state, vault::VaultState::Unsealed))
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn}; }
use crate::{ #[cfg(test)]
actors::keyholder::{Bootstrap, KeyHolder}, mod tests {
db::{self, schema}, use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
}; use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}; use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity}; use crate::{
#[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)] actors::{
struct DummyEntity { GlobalActors,
payload_version: i32, vault::{Bootstrap, Vault},
payload: Vec<u8>, },
} db::{self, schema},
impl Integrable for DummyEntity { };
const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity"; use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
}
use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<KeyHolder> { #[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap()); struct DummyEntity {
actor payload_version: i32,
.ask(Bootstrap { payload: Vec<u8>,
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()), }
}) impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
.await const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
.unwrap(); }
actor
} async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
let actor = Vault::spawn(
#[tokio::test] Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() { .await
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; .unwrap(),
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await; );
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap(); actor
.ask(Bootstrap {
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7"; seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
let entity = DummyEntity { .await
payload_version: 1, .unwrap();
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(), actor
}; }
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID) #[tokio::test]
.await async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
.unwrap(); const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity")) let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID)) let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn) let entity = DummyEntity {
.await payload_version: 1,
.unwrap(); payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID) sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await .await
.unwrap(); .unwrap();
}
let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
#[tokio::test] .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() { .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; .count()
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await; .get_result(&mut conn)
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap(); .await
.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
let entity = DummyEntity { verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
payload_version: 1, .await
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(), .unwrap();
}; }
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID) #[tokio::test]
.await async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
.unwrap(); const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table) let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity")) let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID)) let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
.set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
.execute(&mut conn) let entity = DummyEntity {
.await payload_version: 1,
.unwrap(); payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.unwrap_err(); .await
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. })); .unwrap();
}
diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
#[tokio::test] .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() { .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
let db = db::create_test_pool().await; .set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await; .execute(&mut conn)
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap(); .await
.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
let entity = DummyEntity { .await
payload_version: 1, .unwrap_err();
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(), assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}; }
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID) #[tokio::test]
.await async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
.unwrap(); const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
let tampered = DummyEntity { let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(), let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
..entity let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
};
let entity = DummyEntity {
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &tampered, ENTITY_ID) payload_version: 1,
.await payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
.unwrap_err(); };
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
} sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
} .await
.unwrap();
let tampered = DummyEntity {
payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
..entity
};
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
}

View File

@@ -1,169 +1,155 @@
use std::ops::Deref as _; use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
use chacha20poly1305::{ use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, use chacha20poly1305::{
aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload}, AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
}; aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload},
use rand::{ };
Rng as _, SeedableRng as _, use rand::{
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng}, Rng as _, SeedableRng as _,
}; rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
pub mod encryption;
pub mod encryption; pub mod integrity;
pub mod integrity;
pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt}; impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
fn from(value: SafeCell<Key>) -> Self {
pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>); Self(value)
impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell { }
fn from(value: SafeCell<Key>) -> Self { }
Self(value) impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
} type Error = ();
}
impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell { fn try_from(mut value: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
type Error = (); let value = value.read();
if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
fn try_from(mut value: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { return Err(());
let value = value.read(); }
if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() { let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
return Err(()); cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
} });
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| { Ok(Self(cell))
cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value); }
}); }
Ok(Self(cell))
} impl KeyCell {
} pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
impl KeyCell { let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng)
pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self { .expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| { rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
#[allow( });
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic" key.into()
)] }
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer); pub fn encrypt_in_place(
}); &mut self,
nonce: &Nonce,
key.into() associated_data: &[u8],
} mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
pub fn encrypt_in_place( let key_reader = self.0.read();
&mut self, let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
nonce: &Nonce, let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
associated_data: &[u8], let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>, cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
) -> Result<(), Error> { }
let key_reader = self.0.read(); pub fn decrypt_in_place(
let key_ref = key_reader.deref(); &mut self,
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref); nonce: &Nonce,
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref()); associated_data: &[u8],
let buffer = buffer.as_mut(); buffer: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer) ) -> Result<(), Error> {
} let key_reader = self.0.read();
pub fn decrypt_in_place( let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
&mut self, let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
nonce: &Nonce, let mut buffer = buffer.write();
associated_data: &[u8], let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
buffer: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
) -> Result<(), Error> { }
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref(); pub fn encrypt(
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref); &mut self,
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref()); nonce: &Nonce,
let mut buffer = buffer.write(); associated_data: &[u8],
let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut(); plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer) ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
} let key_reader = self.0.read();
let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
pub fn encrypt( let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
&mut self,
nonce: &Nonce, let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
associated_data: &[u8], nonce,
plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>, Payload {
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> { msg: plaintext.as_ref(),
let key_reader = self.0.read(); aad: associated_data,
let key_ref = key_reader.deref(); },
let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref); )?;
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref()); Ok(ciphertext)
}
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt( }
nonce,
Payload { /// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
msg: plaintext.as_ref(), pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
aad: associated_data, let params = {
}, #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
)?; {
Ok(ciphertext) argon2::Params::new(8, 1, 1, None).unwrap()
} }
}
#[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation. {
pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell { argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap()
let params = { }
#[cfg(debug_assertions)] };
{
argon2::Params::new(8, 1, 1, None).unwrap() let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
} let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
password.read_inline(|password_source| {
#[cfg(not(debug_assertions))] let mut key_buffer = key.write();
{ let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap()
} hasher
}; .hash_password_into(password_source, salt, key_buffer)
.expect("Better fail completely than return a weak key");
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)] });
let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default()); key.into()
password.read_inline(|password_source| { }
let mut key_buffer = key.write();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut(); #[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#[allow( use super::{
clippy::unwrap_used, derive_key,
reason = "Better fail completely than return a weak key" encryption::v1::{Nonce, generate_salt},
)] };
hasher use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
.hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
.unwrap(); #[test]
}); fn encrypt_decrypt() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
key.into() let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
} let salt = generate_salt();
#[cfg(test)] let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
mod tests { let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
use super::{ let associated_data = b"associated data";
derive_key, let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();
encryption::v1::{Nonce, generate_salt},
}; key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}; .unwrap();
assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
#[test]
pub fn encrypt_decrypt() { let mut buffer = SafeCell::new(buffer);
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()); key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
let salt = generate_salt(); .unwrap();
let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt); let buffer = buffer.read();
let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305 assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
let associated_data = b"associated data"; }
let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec(); }
key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
.unwrap();
assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
let mut buffer = SafeCell::new(buffer);
key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
.unwrap();
let buffer = buffer.read();
assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
}
}

View File

@@ -1,153 +1,156 @@
use diesel::{Connection as _, SqliteConnection, connection::SimpleConnection as _}; use diesel::{Connection as _, SqliteConnection, connection::SimpleConnection as _};
use diesel_async::{ use diesel_async::{
AsyncConnection, SimpleAsyncConnection, AsyncConnection, SimpleAsyncConnection,
pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig}, pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig},
sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper, sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
}; };
use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations}; use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
use thiserror::Error;
use thiserror::Error; use tracing::info;
use tracing::info;
pub mod models;
pub mod models; pub mod schema;
pub mod schema;
pub type DatabaseConnection = SyncConnectionWrapper<SqliteConnection>;
pub type DatabaseConnection = SyncConnectionWrapper<SqliteConnection>; pub type DatabasePool = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::Pool<DatabaseConnection>;
pub type DatabasePool = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::Pool<DatabaseConnection>; pub type PoolInitError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::PoolError;
pub type PoolInitError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::PoolError; pub type PoolError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::RunError;
pub type PoolError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::RunError;
static DB_FILE: &str = "arbiter.sqlite";
static DB_FILE: &str = "arbiter.sqlite";
const MIGRATIONS: EmbeddedMigrations = embed_migrations!("migrations");
const MIGRATIONS: EmbeddedMigrations = embed_migrations!("migrations");
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
#[derive(Error, Debug)] pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
pub enum DatabaseSetupError { #[error(transparent)]
#[error("Failed to determine home directory")] ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
HomeDir(std::io::Error),
#[error(transparent)]
#[error(transparent)] Connection(diesel::ConnectionError),
Connection(diesel::ConnectionError),
#[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
#[error(transparent)] HomeDir(std::io::Error),
ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
#[error(transparent)]
#[error(transparent)] Migration(Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>),
Migration(Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>),
#[error(transparent)]
#[error(transparent)] Pool(#[from] PoolInitError),
Pool(#[from] PoolInitError), }
}
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
#[derive(Error, Debug)] pub enum DatabaseError {
pub enum DatabaseError { #[error("Database query error")]
#[error("Database connection error")] Connection(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
Pool(#[from] PoolError),
#[error("Database query error")] #[error("Database connection error")]
Connection(#[from] diesel::result::Error), Pool(#[from] PoolError),
} }
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")] #[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
fn database_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, DatabaseSetupError> { fn database_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, DatabaseSetupError> {
let arbiter_home = arbiter_proto::home_path().map_err(DatabaseSetupError::HomeDir)?; let arbiter_home = arbiter_proto::home_path().map_err(DatabaseSetupError::HomeDir)?;
let db_path = arbiter_home.join(DB_FILE); let db_path = arbiter_home.join(DB_FILE);
Ok(db_path) Ok(db_path)
} }
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info", skip(conn))] #[tracing::instrument(level = "info", skip(conn))]
fn db_config(conn: &mut SqliteConnection) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> { fn db_config(conn: &mut SqliteConnection) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
// fsync only in critical moments // fsync only in critical moments
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA synchronous = NORMAL;")?; conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA synchronous = NORMAL;")?;
// write WAL changes back every 1000 pages, for an in average 1MB WAL file. // write WAL changes back every 1000 pages, for an in average 1MB WAL file.
// May affect readers if number is increased // May affect readers if number is increased
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_autocheckpoint = 1000;")?; conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_autocheckpoint = 1000;")?;
// free some space by truncating possibly massive WAL files from the last run // free some space by truncating possibly massive WAL files from the last run
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE);")?; conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE);")?;
// sqlite foreign keys are disabled by default, enable them for safety // sqlite foreign keys are disabled by default, enable them for safety
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;")?; conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;")?;
// better space reclamation // better space reclamation
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA auto_vacuum = FULL;")?; conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA auto_vacuum = FULL;")?;
// secure delete, overwrite deleted content with zeros to prevent recovery // secure delete, overwrite deleted content with zeros to prevent recovery
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA secure_delete = ON;")?; conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA secure_delete = ON;")?;
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info", skip(url))] #[tracing::instrument(level = "info", skip(url))]
fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> { fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
let mut conn = SqliteConnection::establish(url).map_err(DatabaseSetupError::Connection)?; let mut conn = SqliteConnection::establish(url).map_err(DatabaseSetupError::Connection)?;
db_config(&mut conn).map_err(DatabaseSetupError::ConcurrencySetup)?; db_config(&mut conn).map_err(DatabaseSetupError::ConcurrencySetup)?;
conn.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS) conn.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS)
.map_err(DatabaseSetupError::Migration)?; .map_err(DatabaseSetupError::Migration)?;
info!(%url, "Database initialized successfully"); info!(%url, "Database initialized successfully");
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")] #[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> { /// Creates a connection pool for the `SQLite` database.
let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or( ///
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)] /// # Panics
database_path()? /// Panics if the database path is not valid UTF-8.
.to_str() pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
.expect("database path is not valid UTF-8") let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
.to_string(), database_path()?
); .to_str()
.expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
initialize_database(&database_url)?; .to_owned(),
);
let mut config = ManagerConfig::default();
config.custom_setup = Box::new(|url| { initialize_database(&database_url)?;
Box::pin(async move {
let mut conn = DatabaseConnection::establish(url).await?; let mut config = ManagerConfig::default();
config.custom_setup = Box::new(|url| {
// see https://fractaledmind.github.io/2023/09/07/enhancing-rails-sqlite-fine-tuning/ Box::pin(async move {
// sleep if the database is busy, this corresponds to up to 9 seconds sleeping time. let mut conn = DatabaseConnection::establish(url).await?;
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout = 9000;")
.await // see https://fractaledmind.github.io/2023/09/07/enhancing-rails-sqlite-fine-tuning/
.map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?; // sleep if the database is busy, this corresponds to up to 9 seconds sleeping time.
// better write-concurrency conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout = 9000;")
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;") .await
.await .map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?;
.map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?; // better write-concurrency
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;")
Ok(conn) .await
}) .map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?;
});
Ok(conn)
let pool = DatabasePool::builder() })
.build(AsyncDieselConnectionManager::new_with_config( });
database_url,
config, let pool = DatabasePool::builder()
)) .build(AsyncDieselConnectionManager::new_with_config(
.await?; database_url,
config,
Ok(pool) ))
} .await?;
#[mutants::skip] Ok(pool)
pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool { }
use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
#[mutants::skip]
let tempfile_name = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), 16); #[expect(clippy::missing_panics_doc, reason = "Tests oriented function")]
/// Creates a test database pool with a temporary `SQLite` database file.
let file = std::env::temp_dir().join(tempfile_name); pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)] use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
let url = file
.to_str() let tempfile_name = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), 16);
.expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_string(); let file = std::env::temp_dir().join(tempfile_name);
let url = file
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)] .to_str()
create_pool(Some(&url)) .expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
.await .to_owned();
.expect("Failed to create test database pool")
} create_pool(Some(&url))
.await
.expect("Failed to create test database pool")
}

View File

@@ -1,362 +1,406 @@
#![allow(unused)] #![allow(
#![allow(clippy::all)] clippy::duplicated_attributes,
reason = "restructed's #[view] causes false positives"
use crate::db::schema::{ )]
self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant, use crate::db::schema::{
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant, self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_transaction_log, evm_wallet, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
integrity_envelope, root_key_history, tls_history, evm_token_transfer_log, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_transaction_log, evm_wallet,
}; integrity_envelope, root_key_history, tls_history,
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc}; };
use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
use restructed::Models; use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
use restructed::Models;
pub mod types {
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc}; pub mod types {
use diesel::{ use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow}, use diesel::{
expression::AsExpression, deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow},
serialize::{IsNull, ToSql}, expression::AsExpression,
sql_types::Integer, serialize::{IsNull, ToSql},
sqlite::{Sqlite, SqliteType}, sql_types::Integer,
}; sqlite::{Sqlite, SqliteType},
};
#[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)] #[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone)]
#[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away #[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
pub struct SqliteTimestamp(pub DateTime<Utc>); #[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
impl SqliteTimestamp { pub struct SqliteTimestamp(pub DateTime<Utc>);
pub fn now() -> Self { impl SqliteTimestamp {
SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()) pub fn now() -> Self {
} Self(Utc::now())
} }
}
impl From<chrono::DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from(dt: chrono::DateTime<Utc>) -> Self { impl From<DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
SqliteTimestamp(dt) fn from(dt: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
} Self(dt)
} }
impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for chrono::DateTime<Utc> { }
fn from(ts: SqliteTimestamp) -> Self { impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for DateTime<Utc> {
ts.0 fn from(ts: SqliteTimestamp) -> Self {
} ts.0
} }
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn to_sql<'b>( impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
&'b self, fn to_sql<'b>(
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>, &'b self,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result { out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
let unix_timestamp = self.0.timestamp() as i32; ) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
out.set_value(unix_timestamp); #[expect(
Ok(IsNull::No) clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
} clippy::as_conversions,
} reason = "fixme! #84; this will break up in 2038 :3"
)]
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp { let unix_timestamp = self.0.timestamp() as i32;
fn from_sql( out.set_value(unix_timestamp);
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>, Ok(IsNull::No)
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> { }
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else { }
return Err(format!(
"Expected Integer type for SqliteTimestamp, got {:?}", impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
bytes.value_type() fn from_sql(
) mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
.into()); ) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
}; let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err(format!(
let unix_timestamp = bytes.read_long(); "Expected Integer type for SqliteTimestamp, got {:?}",
let datetime = bytes.value_type()
DateTime::from_timestamp(unix_timestamp, 0).ok_or("Timestamp is out of bounds")?; )
.into());
Ok(SqliteTimestamp(datetime)) };
}
} let unix_timestamp = bytes.read_long();
} let datetime =
pub use types::*; DateTime::from_timestamp(unix_timestamp, 0).ok_or("Timestamp is out of bounds")?;
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] Ok(Self(datetime))
#[view( }
NewAeadEncrypted, }
derive(Insertable),
omit(id), #[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone)]
attributes_with = "deriveless" #[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
)] #[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
#[diesel(table_name = aead_encrypted, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] pub struct ChainId(pub i32);
pub struct AeadEncrypted {
pub id: i32, #[expect(
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>, clippy::cast_sign_loss,
pub tag: Vec<u8>, clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>, clippy::as_conversions,
pub schema_version: i32, reason = "safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants"
pub associated_root_key_id: i32, // references root_key_history.id )]
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, const _: () = {
} impl From<ChainId> for alloy::primitives::ChainId {
fn from(chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] chain_id.0 as Self
#[diesel(table_name = root_key_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] }
#[view( }
NewRootKeyHistory, impl From<alloy::primitives::ChainId> for ChainId {
derive(Insertable), fn from(chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId) -> Self {
omit(id), Self(chain_id as _)
attributes_with = "deriveless" }
)] }
pub struct RootKeyHistory { };
pub id: i32,
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>, impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for ChainId {
pub tag: Vec<u8>, fn from_sql(
pub root_key_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>, bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
pub data_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>, ) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
pub schema_version: i32, FromSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::from_sql(bytes).map(Self)
pub salt: Vec<u8>, }
} }
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for ChainId {
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] fn to_sql<'b>(
#[diesel(table_name = tls_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] &'b self,
#[view( out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
NewTlsHistory, ) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
derive(Insertable), ToSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::to_sql(&self.0, out)
omit(id, created_at), }
attributes_with = "deriveless" }
)] }
pub struct TlsHistory { pub use types::*;
pub id: i32,
pub cert: String, #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
pub cert_key: String, // PEM Encoded private key #[view(
pub ca_cert: String, // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing NewAeadEncrypted,
pub ca_key: String, // PEM Encoded public key for cert signing derive(Insertable),
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, omit(id),
} attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] #[diesel(table_name = aead_encrypted, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[diesel(table_name = arbiter_settings, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] pub struct AeadEncrypted {
pub struct ArbiterSettings { pub id: i32,
pub id: i32, pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references root_key_history.id pub tag: Vec<u8>,
pub tls_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_history.id pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>,
} pub schema_version: i32,
pub associated_root_key_id: i32, // references root_key_history.id
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
#[diesel(table_name = evm_wallet, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] }
#[view(
NewEvmWallet, #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
derive(Insertable), #[diesel(table_name = root_key_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
omit(id, created_at), #[view(
attributes_with = "deriveless" NewRootKeyHistory,
)] derive(Insertable),
pub struct EvmWallet { omit(id),
pub id: i32, attributes_with = "deriveless"
pub address: Vec<u8>, )]
pub aead_encrypted_id: i32, pub struct RootKeyHistory {
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, pub id: i32,
} pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
pub tag: Vec<u8>,
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable, Clone)] pub root_key_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
#[diesel(table_name = schema::evm_wallet_access, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] pub data_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
#[view( pub schema_version: i32,
NewEvmWalletAccess, pub salt: Vec<u8>,
derive(Insertable), }
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless" #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
)] #[diesel(table_name = tls_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view( #[view(
CoreEvmWalletAccess, NewTlsHistory,
derive(Insertable), derive(Insertable),
omit(created_at), omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless" attributes_with = "deriveless"
)] )]
pub struct EvmWalletAccess { pub struct TlsHistory {
pub id: i32, pub id: i32,
pub wallet_id: i32, pub cert: String,
pub client_id: i32, pub cert_key: String, // PEM Encoded private key
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, pub ca_cert: String, // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing
} pub ca_key: String, // PEM Encoded public key for cert signing
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] }
#[diesel(table_name = schema::client_metadata, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProgramClientMetadata { #[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
pub id: i32, #[diesel(table_name = arbiter_settings, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub name: String, pub struct ArbiterSettings {
pub description: Option<String>, pub id: i32,
pub version: Option<String>, pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references root_key_history.id
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, pub tls_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_history.id
} }
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::client_metadata_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] #[diesel(table_name = evm_wallet, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProgramClientMetadataHistory { #[view(
pub id: i32, NewEvmWallet,
pub metadata_id: i32, derive(Insertable),
pub client_id: i32, omit(id, created_at),
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, attributes_with = "deriveless"
} )]
pub struct EvmWallet {
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] pub id: i32,
#[diesel(table_name = schema::program_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] pub address: Vec<u8>,
pub struct ProgramClient { pub aead_encrypted_id: i32,
pub id: i32, pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub nonce: i32, }
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub metadata_id: i32, #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable, Clone)]
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, #[diesel(table_name = schema::evm_wallet_access, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp, #[view(
} NewEvmWalletAccess,
derive(Insertable),
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)] omit(id, created_at),
#[diesel(table_name = schema::useragent_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] attributes_with = "deriveless"
pub struct UseragentClient { )]
pub id: i32, #[view(
pub nonce: i32, CoreEvmWalletAccess,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>, derive(Insertable),
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, omit(created_at),
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp, attributes_with = "deriveless"
} )]
pub struct EvmWalletAccess {
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] pub id: i32,
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] pub wallet_id: i32,
#[view( pub client_id: i32,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
derive(Insertable), }
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless" #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
)] #[diesel(table_name = schema::client_metadata, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferLimit { pub struct ProgramClientMetadata {
pub id: i32, pub id: i32,
pub window_secs: i32, pub name: String,
pub max_volume: Vec<u8>, pub description: Option<String>,
} pub version: Option<String>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] }
#[diesel(table_name = evm_basic_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view( #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
NewEvmBasicGrant, #[diesel(table_name = schema::client_metadata_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
derive(Insertable), pub struct ProgramClientMetadataHistory {
omit(id, created_at), pub id: i32,
attributes_with = "deriveless" pub metadata_id: i32,
)] pub client_id: i32,
pub struct EvmBasicGrant { pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub id: i32, }
pub wallet_access_id: i32, // references evm_wallet_access.id
pub chain_id: i32, #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
pub valid_from: Option<SqliteTimestamp>, #[diesel(table_name = schema::program_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub valid_until: Option<SqliteTimestamp>, pub struct ProgramClient {
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>, pub id: i32,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>, pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub rate_limit_count: Option<i32>, pub metadata_id: i32,
pub rate_limit_window_secs: Option<i32>, pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub revoked_at: Option<SqliteTimestamp>, pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, }
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] #[diesel(table_name = schema::operator_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_transaction_log, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] pub struct OperatorClient {
#[view( pub id: i32,
NewEvmTransactionLog, pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
derive(Insertable), pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
omit(id), pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
attributes_with = "deriveless" }
)]
pub struct EvmTransactionLog { #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
pub id: i32, #[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub grant_id: i32, #[view(
pub wallet_access_id: i32, NewEvmEtherTransferLimit,
pub chain_id: i32, derive(Insertable),
pub eth_value: Vec<u8>, omit(id, created_at),
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp, attributes_with = "deriveless"
} )]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferLimit {
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] pub id: i32,
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] pub window_secs: i32,
#[view( pub max_volume: Vec<u8>,
NewEvmEtherTransferGrant, }
derive(Insertable),
omit(id), #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
attributes_with = "deriveless" #[diesel(table_name = evm_basic_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
)] #[view(
pub struct EvmEtherTransferGrant { NewEvmBasicGrant,
pub id: i32, derive(Insertable),
pub basic_grant_id: i32, omit(id, created_at),
pub limit_id: i32, // references evm_ether_transfer_limit.id attributes_with = "deriveless"
} )]
pub struct EvmBasicGrant {
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] pub id: i32,
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] pub wallet_access_id: i32, // references evm_wallet_access.id
#[view( pub chain_id: ChainId,
NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, pub valid_from: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
derive(Insertable), pub valid_until: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
omit(id), pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
attributes_with = "deriveless" pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
)] pub rate_limit_count: Option<i32>,
pub struct EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget { pub rate_limit_window_secs: Option<i32>,
pub id: i32, pub revoked_at: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub grant_id: i32, pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub address: Vec<u8>, }
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] #[diesel(table_name = evm_transaction_log, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] #[view(
#[view( NewEvmTransactionLog,
NewEvmTokenTransferGrant, derive(Insertable),
derive(Insertable), omit(id),
omit(id), attributes_with = "deriveless"
attributes_with = "deriveless" )]
)] pub struct EvmTransactionLog {
pub struct EvmTokenTransferGrant { pub id: i32,
pub id: i32, pub grant_id: i32,
pub basic_grant_id: i32, pub wallet_access_id: i32,
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>, pub chain_id: ChainId,
pub receiver: Option<Vec<u8>>, pub eth_value: Vec<u8>,
} pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[view( #[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, #[view(
derive(Insertable), NewEvmEtherTransferGrant,
omit(id), derive(Insertable),
attributes_with = "deriveless" omit(id),
)] attributes_with = "deriveless"
pub struct EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit { )]
pub id: i32, pub struct EvmEtherTransferGrant {
pub grant_id: i32, pub id: i32,
pub window_secs: i32, pub basic_grant_id: i32,
pub max_volume: Vec<u8>, pub limit_id: i32, // references evm_ether_transfer_limit.id
} }
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_log, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] #[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view( #[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget,
derive(Insertable), derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at), omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless" attributes_with = "deriveless"
)] )]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferLog { pub struct EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget {
pub id: i32, pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32, pub grant_id: i32,
pub log_id: i32, pub address: Vec<u8>,
pub chain_id: i32, }
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
pub recipient_address: Vec<u8>, #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
pub value: Vec<u8>, #[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, #[view(
} NewEvmTokenTransferGrant,
derive(Insertable),
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)] omit(id),
#[diesel(table_name = integrity_envelope, check_for_backend(Sqlite))] attributes_with = "deriveless"
#[view( )]
NewIntegrityEnvelope, pub struct EvmTokenTransferGrant {
derive(Insertable), pub id: i32,
omit(id, signed_at, created_at), pub basic_grant_id: i32,
attributes_with = "deriveless" pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
)] pub receiver: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub struct IntegrityEnvelope { }
pub id: i32,
pub entity_kind: String, #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
pub entity_id: Vec<u8>, #[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub payload_version: i32, #[view(
pub key_version: i32, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
pub mac: Vec<u8>, derive(Insertable),
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp, omit(id),
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp, attributes_with = "deriveless"
} )]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub window_secs: i32,
pub max_volume: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_log, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferLog,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub log_id: i32,
pub chain_id: ChainId,
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
pub recipient_address: Vec<u8>,
pub value: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = integrity_envelope, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewIntegrityEnvelope,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, signed_at, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct IntegrityEnvelope {
pub id: i32,
pub entity_kind: String,
pub entity_id: Vec<u8>,
pub payload_version: i32,
pub key_version: i32,
pub mac: Vec<u8>,
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}

View File

@@ -1,240 +1,237 @@
// @generated automatically by Diesel CLI. // @generated automatically by Diesel CLI.
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
aead_encrypted (id) { aead_encrypted (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
current_nonce -> Binary, current_nonce -> Binary,
ciphertext -> Binary, ciphertext -> Binary,
tag -> Binary, tag -> Binary,
schema_version -> Integer, schema_version -> Integer,
associated_root_key_id -> Integer, associated_root_key_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer, created_at -> Integer,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
arbiter_settings (id) { arbiter_settings (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
root_key_id -> Nullable<Integer>, root_key_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
tls_id -> Nullable<Integer>, tls_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
client_metadata (id) { client_metadata (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
name -> Text, name -> Text,
description -> Nullable<Text>, description -> Nullable<Text>,
version -> Nullable<Text>, version -> Nullable<Text>,
created_at -> Integer, created_at -> Integer,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
client_metadata_history (id) { client_metadata_history (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
metadata_id -> Integer, metadata_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer, client_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer, created_at -> Integer,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
evm_basic_grant (id) { evm_basic_grant (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
wallet_access_id -> Integer, wallet_access_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer, chain_id -> Integer,
valid_from -> Nullable<Integer>, valid_from -> Nullable<Integer>,
valid_until -> Nullable<Integer>, valid_until -> Nullable<Integer>,
max_gas_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>, max_gas_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
max_priority_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>, max_priority_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
rate_limit_count -> Nullable<Integer>, rate_limit_count -> Nullable<Integer>,
rate_limit_window_secs -> Nullable<Integer>, rate_limit_window_secs -> Nullable<Integer>,
revoked_at -> Nullable<Integer>, revoked_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
created_at -> Integer, created_at -> Integer,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_grant (id) { evm_ether_transfer_grant (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
basic_grant_id -> Integer, basic_grant_id -> Integer,
limit_id -> Integer, limit_id -> Integer,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (id) { evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer, grant_id -> Integer,
address -> Binary, address -> Binary,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_limit (id) { evm_ether_transfer_limit (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
window_secs -> Integer, window_secs -> Integer,
max_volume -> Binary, max_volume -> Binary,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_grant (id) { evm_token_transfer_grant (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
basic_grant_id -> Integer, basic_grant_id -> Integer,
token_contract -> Binary, token_contract -> Binary,
receiver -> Nullable<Binary>, receiver -> Nullable<Binary>,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_log (id) { evm_token_transfer_log (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer, grant_id -> Integer,
log_id -> Integer, log_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer, chain_id -> Integer,
token_contract -> Binary, token_contract -> Binary,
recipient_address -> Binary, recipient_address -> Binary,
value -> Binary, value -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer, created_at -> Integer,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (id) { evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer, grant_id -> Integer,
window_secs -> Integer, window_secs -> Integer,
max_volume -> Binary, max_volume -> Binary,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
evm_transaction_log (id) { evm_transaction_log (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
wallet_access_id -> Integer, wallet_access_id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer, grant_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer, chain_id -> Integer,
eth_value -> Binary, eth_value -> Binary,
signed_at -> Integer, signed_at -> Integer,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
evm_wallet (id) { evm_wallet (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
address -> Binary, address -> Binary,
aead_encrypted_id -> Integer, aead_encrypted_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer, created_at -> Integer,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
evm_wallet_access (id) { evm_wallet_access (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
wallet_id -> Integer, wallet_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer, client_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer, created_at -> Integer,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
integrity_envelope (id) { integrity_envelope (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
entity_kind -> Text, entity_kind -> Text,
entity_id -> Binary, entity_id -> Binary,
payload_version -> Integer, payload_version -> Integer,
key_version -> Integer, key_version -> Integer,
mac -> Binary, mac -> Binary,
signed_at -> Integer, signed_at -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer, created_at -> Integer,
} }
} }
diesel::table! { diesel::table! {
program_client (id) { program_client (id) {
id -> Integer, id -> Integer,
nonce -> Integer, public_key -> Binary,
public_key -> Binary, metadata_id -> Integer,
metadata_id -> Integer, created_at -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer, updated_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer, }
} }
}
diesel::table! {
diesel::table! { root_key_history (id) {
root_key_history (id) { id -> Integer,
id -> Integer, root_key_encryption_nonce -> Binary,
root_key_encryption_nonce -> Binary, data_encryption_nonce -> Binary,
data_encryption_nonce -> Binary, ciphertext -> Binary,
ciphertext -> Binary, tag -> Binary,
tag -> Binary, schema_version -> Integer,
schema_version -> Integer, salt -> Binary,
salt -> Binary, }
} }
}
diesel::table! {
diesel::table! { tls_history (id) {
tls_history (id) { id -> Integer,
id -> Integer, cert -> Text,
cert -> Text, cert_key -> Text,
cert_key -> Text, ca_cert -> Text,
ca_cert -> Text, ca_key -> Text,
ca_key -> Text, created_at -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer, }
} }
}
diesel::table! {
diesel::table! { operator_client (id) {
useragent_client (id) { id -> Integer,
id -> Integer, public_key -> Binary,
nonce -> Integer, created_at -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary, updated_at -> Integer,
key_type -> Integer, }
created_at -> Integer, }
updated_at -> Integer,
} diesel::joinable!(aead_encrypted -> root_key_history (associated_root_key_id));
} diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> root_key_history (root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_history (tls_id));
diesel::joinable!(aead_encrypted -> root_key_history (associated_root_key_id)); diesel::joinable!(client_metadata_history -> client_metadata (metadata_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> root_key_history (root_key_id)); diesel::joinable!(client_metadata_history -> program_client (client_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_history (tls_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_basic_grant -> evm_wallet_access (wallet_access_id));
diesel::joinable!(client_metadata_history -> client_metadata (metadata_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant -> evm_basic_grant (basic_grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(client_metadata_history -> program_client (client_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant -> evm_ether_transfer_limit (limit_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_basic_grant -> evm_wallet_access (wallet_access_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target -> evm_ether_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant -> evm_basic_grant (basic_grant_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_grant -> evm_basic_grant (basic_grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant -> evm_ether_transfer_limit (limit_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_log -> evm_token_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target -> evm_ether_transfer_grant (grant_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_log -> evm_transaction_log (log_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_grant -> evm_basic_grant (basic_grant_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit -> evm_token_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_log -> evm_token_transfer_grant (grant_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_transaction_log -> evm_basic_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_log -> evm_transaction_log (log_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_transaction_log -> evm_wallet_access (wallet_access_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit -> evm_token_transfer_grant (grant_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet -> aead_encrypted (aead_encrypted_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_transaction_log -> evm_basic_grant (grant_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> evm_wallet (wallet_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_transaction_log -> evm_wallet_access (wallet_access_id)); diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> program_client (client_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet -> aead_encrypted (aead_encrypted_id)); diesel::joinable!(program_client -> client_metadata (metadata_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> evm_wallet (wallet_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> program_client (client_id)); diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
diesel::joinable!(program_client -> client_metadata (metadata_id)); aead_encrypted,
arbiter_settings,
diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!( client_metadata,
aead_encrypted, client_metadata_history,
arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant,
client_metadata, evm_ether_transfer_grant,
client_metadata_history, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target,
evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit,
evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_transaction_log,
evm_token_transfer_log, evm_wallet,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_wallet_access,
evm_transaction_log, integrity_envelope,
evm_wallet, program_client,
evm_wallet_access, root_key_history,
integrity_envelope, tls_history,
program_client, operator_client,
root_key_history, );
tls_history,
useragent_client,
);

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