47 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Skipper
9ab074170b merge: feat-lints into main
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2026-04-18 15:04:33 +02:00
18b8a3bbf5 Merge pull request 'refactor-integrity-check' (#90) from refactor-integrity-check into main
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Reviewed-on: #90
2026-04-18 11:54:30 +00:00
Skipper
38cf1b98b9 housekeeping(server): clippy warns fix
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2026-04-18 13:53:11 +02:00
Skipper
9cf87b2058 merge: refactor-integrity-check into main
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2026-04-18 13:46:28 +02:00
Skipper
929d50b589 housekeeping(server): clean too-broad visibility markers and organize imports
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2026-04-18 13:30:09 +02:00
Skipper
70acfc99b5 merge: refactor-integrity-check into main 2026-04-18 13:19:13 +02:00
28f84d03ab Merge pull request 'housekeeping(server): dependencies upgrade' (#89) from push-zmvtzuwrnyyv into main
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Reviewed-on: #89
2026-04-17 19:20:50 +00:00
Skipper
4a8e51ef32 docs: updated to new auth challenge format and removed stale TOCTOU race condition note
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2026-04-17 18:25:55 +02:00
Skipper
9ee86afc19 fix(useragent): now using new challenge format 2026-04-17 18:19:51 +02:00
Skipper
790026e93b fix(server::tests): api surface of auth challenge changed 2026-04-17 17:58:22 +02:00
Skipper
0e09afda5d refactor(server::{useragent::auth, client::auth}): use random based + timestamp nonce instead of monotonic counter in database 2026-04-17 17:44:42 +02:00
Skipper
51e6571d80 refactor(server): now keeps track of useragents, instead of 2026-04-17 00:00:43 +02:00
Skipper
3b828d5874 refactor(server::grpc::vault_gate): standard approach using / traits 2026-04-16 22:15:18 +02:00
Skipper
a6f94e3115 fix(server): sending fixed vault state when on stage 2026-04-16 19:36:41 +02:00
hdbg
f49e995c2f WIP: kameo::messages wiring for transport generalization
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2026-04-16 17:18:46 +02:00
Skipper
e88df432fb housekeeping(server): dependencies upgrade
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2026-04-14 19:10:07 +02:00
hdbg
87ee0fe87b feat(user-agent): add VaultGate for sealed vault authentication 2026-04-12 11:53:05 +02:00
CleverWild
41b3fc5d39 fix(lints): remove unstable ones
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2026-04-10 01:00:21 +02:00
CleverWild
f6a0c32b9d feat: rustc and clippy linting
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2026-04-10 00:42:43 +02:00
hdbg
205227a3df fix(server::integrity): vault now differentias between expected/unexpected states for commands more granularly 2026-04-08 18:21:48 +02:00
hdbg
a4070e7df7 fix(useragent): unsafe, but working implementation of ml-dsa 2026-04-08 17:43:51 +02:00
hdbg
6b8da567dd fix(server::user_agent): useragents now self-sign themselves on bootstrap 2026-04-08 17:40:45 +02:00
hdbg
1585f90cae refactor(server): reorganized client/user_agent actors into separate module peers and added event MessageBus 2026-04-08 12:34:16 +02:00
62dff3f810 Merge pull request 'refactor(hashing): introduce Hashable derive macro and migrate server types' (#82) from hashing-proc-macro into main
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Reviewed-on: #82
Reviewed-by: Stas <business@jexter.tech>
2026-04-08 00:18:40 +00:00
CleverWild
6e22f368c9 refactor(hashing): introduce Hashable derive macro and migrate server types
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2026-04-08 01:32:59 +02:00
f3cf6a9438 Merge pull request 'Post-quantum crypto and better useragent security' (#80) from push-xrxykvkuxpsv into main
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Reviewed-on: #80
2026-04-07 19:26:54 +00:00
hdbg
a9f9fc2a9d housekeeping(server): fixed clippy warns
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2026-04-07 16:28:47 +02:00
hdbg
d22ab49e3d refactor(server): moved shared module crypto into arbiter-crypto 2026-04-07 16:24:51 +02:00
hdbg
a845181ef6 docs: ml-dsa scheme everywhere
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2026-04-07 15:02:32 +02:00
hdbg
0d424f3afc refactor(server): migrated auth to ml-dsa 2026-04-07 14:55:31 +02:00
hdbg
1497884ce6 fix(server::bootsrapper): token compare is now constant-time
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2026-04-06 18:33:47 +02:00
hdbg
b3464cf8a6 tests(server::client::auth): integrity envelope insertion for valid paths
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2026-04-06 18:24:13 +02:00
hdbg
46d1318b6f feat(server): add integrity verification for client keys 2026-04-06 18:13:11 +02:00
9c80d51d45 Merge pull request 'fix(server): replaced postcard-based integrity fingerprint with custom trait providing order-independent hashing' (#77) from push-opwuyuwxknyo into main
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Reviewed-on: #77
2026-04-06 15:42:47 +00:00
hdbg
33456a644d tests(server): property-based testing for ordering independency for hash
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2026-04-06 17:40:41 +02:00
hdbg
5bc0c42cc7 fix(server): replaced postcard-based integrity fingerprint with custom trait providing order-independent hashing 2026-04-06 16:25:32 +02:00
hdbg
f6b62ab884 fix(server): added chain_id check and covered check_shared_constraints with unit tests
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2026-04-06 12:57:18 +02:00
hdbg
2dd5a3f32f tests(server): initial cargo-mutants
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2026-04-06 12:03:56 +02:00
hdbg
1aca9d4007 fix(server): simplify hash function for debug profile 2026-04-05 22:50:28 +02:00
5ee1b49c43 Merge pull request 'feat(server): integrity envelope engine for EVM grants with HMAC verification' (#51) from integrity-envelope into main
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Reviewed-on: #51
2026-04-05 16:26:51 +00:00
hdbg
00745bb381 tests(server): fixed for new integrity checks
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2026-04-05 14:49:02 +02:00
hdbg
b122aa464c refactor(server): rework envelopes and integrity check
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2026-04-05 14:17:00 +02:00
hdbg
9fab945a00 fix(server): remove stale mentions of miette
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2026-04-05 10:45:24 +02:00
CleverWild
aeed664e9a chore: inline integrity proto types
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2026-04-05 10:44:21 +02:00
CleverWild
4057c1fc12 feat(server): integrity envelope engine for EVM grants with HMAC verification 2026-04-05 10:44:21 +02:00
hdbg
f5eb51978d docs: add recovery operators and multi-operator details 2026-04-05 08:27:24 +00:00
hdbg
d997e0f843 docs: add multi-operator governance section 2026-04-05 08:27:24 +00:00
220 changed files with 17779 additions and 3873 deletions

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@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ cargo insta review
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
@@ -100,6 +100,27 @@ diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migration
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
### Code Conventions
**`#[must_use]` Attribute:**
Apply the `#[must_use]` attribute to return types of functions where the return value is critical and should not be accidentally ignored. This is commonly used for:
- Methods that return `bool` indicating success/failure or validation state
- Any function where ignoring the return value indicates a logic error
Do not apply `#[must_use]` redundantly to items (types or functions) that are already annotated with `#[must_use]`.
Example:
```rust
#[must_use]
pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
// verification logic
}
```
This forces callers to either use the return value or explicitly ignore it with `let _ = ...;`, preventing silent failures.
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.

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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers:
- **User Agent** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies).
- **SDK Client** — A consumer of signing capabilities, typically an automation tool. In the future, this could include a browser-based wallet.
- **Recovery Operator** — A dormant recovery participant with narrowly scoped authority used only for custody recovery and operator replacement.
---
@@ -42,7 +43,149 @@ There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approve
---
## 3. Server Identity
## 3. Multi-Operator Governance
When more than one User Agent is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision.
### 3.1 Voting Rules
Voting is based on the total number of registered operators:
- **1 operator:** no vote is needed; the single operator decides directly.
- **2 operators:** full consensus is required; both operators must approve.
- **3 or more operators:** quorum is `floor(N / 2) + 1`.
For a decision to count, the operator's approval or rejection must be signed by that operator's associated key. Unsigned votes, or votes that fail signature verification, are ignored.
Examples:
- **3 operators:** 2 approvals required
- **4 operators:** 3 approvals required
### 3.2 Actions Requiring a Vote
In multi-operator mode, a successful vote is required for:
- approving new SDK clients
- granting an SDK client visibility to a wallet
- approving a one-off transaction
- approving creation of a persistent grant
- approving operator replacement
- approving server updates
- updating Shamir secret-sharing parameters
### 3.3 Special Rule for Key Rotation
Key rotation always requires full quorum, regardless of the normal voting threshold.
This is stricter than ordinary governance actions because rotating the root key requires every operator to participate in coordinated share refresh/update steps. The root key itself is not redistributed directly, but each operator's share material must be changed consistently.
### 3.4 Root Key Custody
When the vault has multiple operators, the vault root key is protected using Shamir secret sharing.
The vault root key is encrypted in a way that requires reconstruction from user-held shares rather than from a single shared password.
For ordinary operators, the Shamir threshold matches the ordinary governance quorum. For example:
- **2 operators:** `2-of-2`
- **3 operators:** `2-of-3`
- **4 operators:** `3-of-4`
In practice, the Shamir share set also includes Recovery Operator shares. This means the effective Shamir parameters are computed over the combined share pool while keeping the same threshold. For example:
- **3 ordinary operators + 2 recovery shares:** `2-of-5`
This ensures that the normal custody threshold follows the ordinary operator quorum, while still allowing dormant recovery shares to exist for break-glass recovery flows.
### 3.5 Recovery Operators
Recovery Operators are a separate peer type from ordinary vault operators.
Their role is intentionally narrow. They can only:
- participate in unsealing the vault
- vote for operator replacement
Recovery Operators do not participate in routine governance such as approving SDK clients, granting wallet visibility, approving transactions, creating grants, approving server updates, or changing Shamir parameters.
### 3.6 Sleeping and Waking Recovery Operators
By default, Recovery Operators are **sleeping** and do not participate in any active flow.
Any ordinary operator may request that Recovery Operators **wake up**.
Any ordinary operator may also cancel a pending wake-up request.
This creates a dispute window before recovery powers become active. The default wake-up delay is **14 days**.
Recovery Operators are therefore part of the break-glass recovery path rather than the normal operating quorum.
The high-level recovery flow is:
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Op as Ordinary Operator
participant Server
actor Other as Other Operator
actor Rec as Recovery Operator
Op->>Server: Request recovery wake-up
Server-->>Op: Wake-up pending
Note over Server: Default dispute window: 14 days
alt Wake-up cancelled during dispute window
Other->>Server: Cancel wake-up
Server-->>Op: Recovery cancelled
Server-->>Rec: Stay sleeping
else No cancellation for 14 days
Server-->>Rec: Wake up
Rec->>Server: Join recovery flow
critical Recovery authority
Rec->>Server: Participate in unseal
Rec->>Server: Vote on operator replacement
end
Server-->>Op: Recovery mode active
end
```
### 3.7 Committee Formation
There are two ways to form a multi-operator committee:
- convert an existing single-operator vault by adding new operators
- bootstrap an unbootstrapped vault directly into multi-operator mode
In both cases, committee formation is a coordinated process. Arbiter does not allow multi-operator custody to emerge implicitly from unrelated registrations.
### 3.8 Bootstrapping an Unbootstrapped Vault into Multi-Operator Mode
When an unbootstrapped vault is initialized as a multi-operator vault, the setup proceeds as follows:
1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using a User Agent and the bootstrap token.
2. During bootstrap setup, that operator declares:
- the total number of ordinary operators
- the total number of Recovery Operators
3. The vault enters **multi-bootstrap mode**.
4. While in multi-bootstrap mode:
- every ordinary operator must connect with a User Agent using the bootstrap token
- every Recovery Operator must also connect using the bootstrap token
- each participant is registered individually
- each participant's share is created and protected with that participant's credentials
5. The vault is considered fully bootstrapped only after all declared operator and recovery-share registrations have completed successfully.
This means the operator and recovery set is fixed at bootstrap completion time, based on the counts declared when multi-bootstrap mode was entered.
### 3.9 Special Bootstrap Constraint for Two-Operator Vaults
If a vault is declared with exactly **2 ordinary operators**, Arbiter requires at least **1 Recovery Operator** to be configured during bootstrap.
This prevents the worst-case custody failure in which a `2-of-2` operator set becomes permanently unrecoverable after loss of a single operator.
---
## 4. Server Identity
The server proves its identity using TLS with a self-signed certificate. The TLS private key is generated on first run and is long-term; no rotation mechanism exists yet due to the complexity of multi-peer coordination.
@@ -55,9 +198,9 @@ Peers verify the server by its **public key fingerprint**:
---
## 4. Key Management
## 5. Key Management
### 4.1 Key Hierarchy
### 5.1 Key Hierarchy
There are three layers of keys:
@@ -72,19 +215,19 @@ This layered design enables:
- **Password rotation** without re-encrypting every wallet key (only the root key is re-encrypted).
- **Root key rotation** without requiring the user to change their password.
### 4.2 Encryption at Rest
### 5.2 Encryption at Rest
The database stores everything in encrypted form using symmetric AEAD. The encryption scheme is versioned to support transparent migration — when the vault unseals, Arbiter automatically re-encrypts any entries that are behind the current scheme version. See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the specific scheme and versioning mechanism.
---
## 5. Vault Lifecycle
## 6. Vault Lifecycle
### 5.1 Sealed State
### 6.1 Sealed State
On boot, the root key is encrypted and the server cannot perform any signing operations. This state is called **Sealed**.
### 5.2 Unseal Flow
### 6.2 Unseal Flow
To transition to the **Unsealed** state, a User Agent must provide the password:
@@ -95,7 +238,7 @@ To transition to the **Unsealed** state, a User Agent must provide the password:
- **Success:** The root key is decrypted and placed into a hardened memory cell. The server transitions to `Unsealed`. Any entries pending encryption scheme migration are re-encrypted.
- **Failure:** The server returns an error indicating the password is incorrect.
### 5.3 Memory Protection
### 6.3 Memory Protection
Once unsealed, the root key must be protected in memory against:
@@ -107,9 +250,9 @@ See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the current and planned memory pr
---
## 6. Permission Engine
## 7. Permission Engine
### 6.1 Fundamental Rules
### 7.1 Fundamental Rules
- SDK clients have **no access by default**.
- Access is granted **explicitly** by a User Agent.
@@ -119,11 +262,45 @@ Each blockchain requires its own policy system due to differences in static tran
Arbiter is also responsible for ensuring that **transaction nonces are never reused**.
### 6.2 EVM Policies
### 7.2 EVM Policies
Every EVM grant is scoped to a specific **wallet** and **chain ID**.
#### 6.2.1 Transaction Sub-Grants
#### 7.2.0 Transaction Signing Sequence
The high-level interaction order is:
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor SDK as SDK Client
participant Server
participant UA as User Agent
SDK->>Server: SignTransactionRequest
Server->>Server: Resolve wallet and wallet visibility
alt Visibility approval required
Server->>UA: Ask for wallet visibility approval
UA-->>Server: Vote result
end
Server->>Server: Evaluate transaction
Server->>Server: Load grant and limits context
alt Grant approval required
Server->>UA: Ask for execution / grant approval
UA-->>Server: Vote result
opt Create persistent grant
Server->>Server: Create and store grant
end
Server->>Server: Retry evaluation
end
critical Final authorization path
Server->>Server: Check limits and record execution
Server-->>Server: Signature or evaluation error
end
Server-->>SDK: Signature or error
```
#### 7.2.1 Transaction Sub-Grants
Arbiter maintains an ever-expanding database of known contracts and their ABIs. Based on contract knowledge, transaction requests fall into three categories:
@@ -147,7 +324,7 @@ Available restrictions:
These transactions have no `calldata` and therefore cannot interact with contracts. They can be subject to the same volume and rate restrictions as above.
#### 6.2.2 Global Limits
#### 7.2.2 Global Limits
In addition to sub-grant-specific restrictions, the following limits can be applied across all grant types:

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@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ cargo insta review
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
@@ -100,6 +100,27 @@ diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migration
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
### Code Conventions
**`#[must_use]` Attribute:**
Apply the `#[must_use]` attribute to return types of functions where the return value is critical and should not be accidentally ignored. This is commonly used for:
- Methods that return `bool` indicating success/failure or validation state
- Any function where ignoring the return value indicates a logic error
Do not apply `#[must_use]` redundantly to items (types or functions) that are already annotated with `#[must_use]`.
Example:
```rust
#[must_use]
pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
// verification logic
}
```
This forces callers to either use the return value or explicitly ignore it with `let _ = ...;`, preventing silent failures.
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.

View File

@@ -29,56 +29,37 @@ flowchart TD
A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest]
B --> C{pubkey in DB?}
C -- yes --> D[Read nonce\nIncrement nonce in DB]
D --> G
C -- yes --> G[Generate AuthChallenge]
C -- no --> E[Ask all UserAgents:\nClientConnectionRequest]
E --> F{First response}
F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection])
F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nUserAgent requests]
F2 --> F3[INSERT client\nnonce = 1]
F3 --> G[Send AuthChallenge\nwith nonce]
F2 --> F3[INSERT client]
F3 --> G
G --> H[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
H --> I{Signature valid?}
I -- no --> Z
I -- yes --> J([Session started])
G --> H[Send AuthChallenge\ntimestamp + random bytes]
H --> I[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
I --> K{Signature valid?}
K -- no --> Z
K -- yes --> J([Session started])
```
### Known Issue: Concurrent Registration Race (TOCTOU)
Two connections presenting the same previously-unknown public key can race through the approval flow simultaneously:
1. Both check the DB → neither is registered.
2. Both request approval from user agents → both receive approval.
3. Both `INSERT` the client record → the second insert silently overwrites the first, resetting the nonce.
This means the first connection's nonce is invalidated by the second, causing its challenge verification to fail. A fix requires either serialising new-client registration (e.g. an in-memory lock keyed on pubkey) or replacing the separate check + insert with an `INSERT OR IGNORE` / upsert guarded by a unique constraint on `public_key`.
### Nonce Semantics
The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it is always one ahead of the nonce last issued in a challenge.
- **New client:** inserted with `nonce = 1`; the first challenge is issued with `nonce = 0`.
- **Existing client:** the current DB value is read and used as the challenge nonce, then immediately incremented within the same exclusive transaction, preventing replay.
Auth challenges are generated from fresh random bytes plus a timestamp. They are signed as the canonical challenge payload and are not persisted in `program_client`.
---
## Cryptography
### Authentication
- **Client protocol:** ed25519
- **Client protocol:** ML-DSA
### User-Agent Authentication
User-agent authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
- **Supported schemes:** RSA, Ed25519, ECDSA (secp256k1)
- **Why:** the user agent authenticates with keys backed by platform facilities, and those facilities differ by platform
- **Apple Silicon Secure Enclave / Secure Element:** ECDSA-only in practice
- **Windows Hello / TPM 2.0:** currently RSA-backed in our integration
This is why the user-agent auth protocol carries an explicit `KeyType`, while the SDK client protocol remains fixed to ed25519.
- **Supported schemes:** ML-DSA
- **Why:** Secure Enclave (MacOS) support them natively, on other platforms we could emulate while they roll-out
### Encryption at Rest
- **Scheme:** Symmetric AEAD — currently **XChaCha20-Poly1305**
@@ -128,6 +109,52 @@ The central abstraction is the `Policy` trait. Each implementation handles one s
4. **Evaluate**`Policy::evaluate` checks the decoded meaning against the grant's policy-specific constraints and returns any violations.
5. **Record** — If `RunKind::Execution` and there are no violations, the engine writes to `evm_transaction_log` and calls `Policy::record_transaction` for any policy-specific logging (e.g., token transfer volume).
The detailed branch structure is shown below:
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A[SDK Client sends sign transaction request] --> B[Server resolves wallet]
B --> C{Wallet exists?}
C -- No --> Z1[Return wallet not found error]
C -- Yes --> D[Check SDK client wallet visibility]
D --> E{Wallet visible to SDK client?}
E -- No --> F[Start wallet visibility voting flow]
F --> G{Vote approved?}
G -- No --> Z2[Return wallet access denied error]
G -- Yes --> H[Persist wallet visibility]
E -- Yes --> I[Classify transaction meaning]
H --> I
I --> J{Meaning supported?}
J -- No --> Z3[Return unsupported transaction error]
J -- Yes --> K[Find matching grant]
K --> L{Grant exists?}
L -- Yes --> M[Check grant limits]
L -- No --> N[Start execution or grant voting flow]
N --> O{User-agent decision}
O -- Reject --> Z4[Return no matching grant error]
O -- Allow once --> M
O -- Create grant --> P[Create grant with user-selected limits]
P --> Q[Persist grant]
Q --> M
M --> R{Limits exceeded?}
R -- Yes --> Z5[Return evaluation error]
R -- No --> S[Record transaction in logs]
S --> T[Produce signature]
T --> U[Return signature to SDK client]
note1[Limit checks include volume, count, and gas constraints.]
note2[Grant lookup depends on classified meaning, such as ether transfer or token transfer.]
K -. uses .-> note2
M -. checks .-> note1
```
### Policy Trait
| Method | Purpose |

View File

@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
version = "1.46.3"
backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-mutants"]]
version = "27.0.0"
backend = "cargo:cargo-mutants"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
version = "0.9.126"
backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
@@ -68,6 +72,10 @@ backend = "cargo:diesel_cli"
default-features = "false"
features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled"
[[tools."cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"]]
version = "2.12.0"
backend = "cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"
[[tools.flutter]]
version = "3.38.9-stable"
backend = "asdf:flutter"
@@ -111,30 +119,37 @@ backend = "core:python"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:c43aecde4a663aebff99b9b83da0efec506479f1c3f98331442f33d2c43501f9"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:9ab41dbc2f100a2a45d1833b9c11165f51051c558b5213eda9a9731d5948a0c0"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:bbe19034b35b0267176a7442575ae7dc6343480fd4d35598cb7700173d431e09"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[[tools.rust]]
version = "1.93.0"

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
"cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
flutter = "3.38.9-stable"
protoc = "29.6"
"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy"}
"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy,rust-analyzer"}
"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.11.1"
"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ protoc = "29.6"
python = "3.14.3"
ast-grep = "0.42.0"
"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.9"
"cargo:cargo-mutants" = "27.0.0"
"cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen" = "2.12.0"
[tasks.codegen]
sources = ['protobufs/*.proto', 'protobufs/**/*.proto']

View File

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ message AuthChallengeRequest {
}
message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1;
int32 nonce = 2;
uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
bytes random = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {

View File

@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ message GasLimitExceededViolation {
}
message EvalViolation {
message ChainIdMismatch {
uint64 expected = 1;
uint64 actual = 2;
}
oneof kind {
bytes invalid_target = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
GasLimitExceededViolation gas_limit_exceeded = 2;
@@ -43,6 +47,8 @@ message EvalViolation {
google.protobuf.Empty volumetric_limit_exceeded = 4;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_time = 5;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_transaction_type = 6;
ChainIdMismatch chain_id_mismatch = 7;
}
}

View File

@@ -2,21 +2,14 @@ syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.auth;
enum KeyType {
KEY_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 1;
KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1 = 2;
KEY_TYPE_RSA = 3;
}
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
KeyType key_type = 3;
}
message AuthChallenge {
int32 nonce = 1;
uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
bytes random = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
test_tool = "nextest"

2
server/.gitignore vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
mutants.out/
mutants.out.old/

1174
server/Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -4,42 +4,170 @@ members = [
]
resolver = "3"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
disallowed-methods = "deny"
[workspace.dependencies]
tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [
"deflate",
"gzip",
"tls-connect-info",
"zstd",
] }
tracing = "0.1.44"
tokio = { version = "1.50.0", features = ["full"] }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
rand = "0.10.0"
rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
smlang = "0.8.0"
thiserror = "2.0.18"
alloy = "2.0.0"
async-trait = "0.1.89"
base64 = "0.22.1"
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
futures = "0.3.32"
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
kameo = "0.19.2"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
alloy = "1.7.3"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
"aws_lc_rs",
"pem",
"x509-parser",
"zeroize",
], default-features = false }
k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
sha2 = "0.10"
spki = "0.7"
kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
hmac = "0.13.0"
miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.8", features = ["zeroize"] }
mutants = "0.0.4"
prost = "0.14.3"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
rand = "0.10.1"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs", "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false }
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls = { version = "0.23.38", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
sha2 = "0.11"
smlang = "0.8.0"
spki = "0.8"
thiserror = "2.0.18"
tokio = { version = "1.52.1", features = ["full"] }
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [ "deflate", "gzip", "tls-connect-info", "zstd" ] }
tracing = "0.1.44"
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
[workspace.lints.rust]
missing_unsafe_on_extern = "deny"
unsafe_attr_outside_unsafe = "deny"
unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn = "deny"
unstable_features = "deny"
deprecated_safe_2024 = "warn"
ffi_unwind_calls = "warn"
linker_messages = "warn"
elided_lifetimes_in_paths = "warn"
explicit_outlives_requirements = "warn"
impl-trait-overcaptures = "warn"
impl-trait-redundant-captures = "warn"
redundant_lifetimes = "warn"
single_use_lifetimes = "warn"
unused_lifetimes = "warn"
macro_use_extern_crate = "warn"
redundant_imports = "warn"
unused_import_braces = "warn"
unused_macro_rules = "warn"
unused_qualifications = "warn"
unit_bindings = "warn"
# missing_docs = "warn" # ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
unnameable_types = "warn"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
derive_partial_eq_without_eq = "allow"
future_not_send = "allow"
inconsistent_struct_constructor = "allow"
inline_always = "allow"
missing_errors_doc = "allow"
missing_fields_in_debug = "allow"
missing_panics_doc = "allow"
must_use_candidate = "allow"
needless_pass_by_ref_mut = "allow"
pub_underscore_fields = "allow"
redundant_pub_crate = "allow"
uninhabited_references = "allow" # safe with unsafe_code = "forbid" and standard uninhabited pattern (match *self {})
# restriction lints
alloc_instead_of_core = "warn"
allow_attributes_without_reason = "warn"
as_conversions = "warn"
assertions_on_result_states = "warn"
cfg_not_test = "warn"
clone_on_ref_ptr = "warn"
cognitive_complexity = "warn"
create_dir = "warn"
dbg_macro = "warn"
decimal_literal_representation = "warn"
default_union_representation = "warn"
deref_by_slicing = "warn"
disallowed_script_idents = "warn"
doc_include_without_cfg = "warn"
empty_drop = "warn"
empty_enum_variants_with_brackets = "warn"
empty_structs_with_brackets = "warn"
exit = "warn"
filetype_is_file = "warn"
float_arithmetic = "warn"
float_cmp_const = "warn"
fn_to_numeric_cast_any = "warn"
get_unwrap = "warn"
if_then_some_else_none = "warn"
indexing_slicing = "warn"
infinite_loop = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_att_syntax = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_intel_syntax = "warn"
integer_division = "warn"
large_include_file = "warn"
lossy_float_literal = "warn"
map_with_unused_argument_over_ranges = "warn"
mem_forget = "warn"
missing_assert_message = "warn"
mixed_read_write_in_expression = "warn"
modulo_arithmetic = "warn"
multiple_unsafe_ops_per_block = "warn"
mutex_atomic = "warn"
mutex_integer = "warn"
needless_raw_strings = "warn"
non_ascii_literal = "warn"
non_zero_suggestions = "warn"
pathbuf_init_then_push = "warn"
pointer_format = "warn"
precedence_bits = "warn"
pub_without_shorthand = "warn"
rc_buffer = "warn"
rc_mutex = "warn"
redundant_test_prefix = "warn"
redundant_type_annotations = "warn"
ref_patterns = "warn"
renamed_function_params = "warn"
rest_pat_in_fully_bound_structs = "warn"
return_and_then = "warn"
semicolon_inside_block = "warn"
str_to_string = "warn"
string_add = "warn"
string_lit_chars_any = "warn"
string_slice = "warn"
suspicious_xor_used_as_pow = "warn"
try_err = "warn"
undocumented_unsafe_blocks = "warn"
uninlined_format_args = "warn"
unnecessary_safety_comment = "warn"
unnecessary_safety_doc = "warn"
unnecessary_self_imports = "warn"
unneeded_field_pattern = "warn"
unused_result_ok = "warn"
verbose_file_reads = "warn"
# cargo lints
negative_feature_names = "warn"
redundant_feature_names = "warn"
wildcard_dependencies = "warn"
# ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
# todo = "warn"
# unimplemented = "warn"
# panic = "warn"
# panic_in_result_fn = "warn"
#
# cargo_common_metadata = "warn"
# multiple_crate_versions = "warn" # a controversial option since it's really difficult to maintain
disallowed_methods = "deny"
nursery = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
pedantic = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
type_repetition_in_bounds = "allow" # sometimes, it's better for readability this way

View File

@@ -7,3 +7,22 @@ disallowed-methods = [
{ path = "rsa::traits::Decryptor::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
{ path = "rsa::traits::RandomizedDecryptor::decrypt_with_rng", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt_with_rng() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
]
allow-indexing-slicing-in-tests = true
allow-panic-in-tests = true
check-inconsistent-struct-field-initializers = true
suppress-restriction-lint-in-const = true
allow-renamed-params-for = [
"core::convert::From",
"core::convert::TryFrom",
"core::str::FromStr",
"kameo::actor::Actor",
]
module-items-ordered-within-groupings = ["UPPER_SNAKE_CASE"]
source-item-ordering = ["enum"]
trait-assoc-item-kinds-order = [
"const",
"type",
"fn",
] # community tested standard

View File

@@ -13,14 +13,15 @@ evm = ["dep:alloy"]
[dependencies]
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
tonic.workspace = true
tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
tokio.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
http = "1.4.0"
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.10", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.12", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
async-trait.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
use crate::{
storage::StorageError,
transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
ClientMetadata,
proto::{
client::{
ClientRequest,
@@ -14,29 +19,26 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo,
},
};
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use crate::{
storage::StorageError,
transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
};
use chrono::DateTime;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AuthError {
#[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
MissingAuthChallenge,
#[error("Server sent invalid auth challenge")]
InvalidChallenge,
#[error("Client approval denied by User Agent")]
ApprovalDenied,
#[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
MissingAuthChallenge,
#[error("No User Agents online to approve client")]
NoUserAgentsOnline,
#[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
UnexpectedAuthResponse,
#[error("Signing key storage error")]
Storage(#[from] StorageError),
#[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
UnexpectedAuthResponse,
}
fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
@@ -54,14 +56,14 @@ fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
key: &SigningKey,
) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
request_id: next_request_id(),
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey: key.public_key().to_bytes(),
client_info: Some(ProtoClientInfo {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
@@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
async fn receive_auth_challenge(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
) -> Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
let response = transport
.recv()
.await
@@ -95,11 +97,22 @@ async fn receive_auth_challenge(
async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
key: &SigningKey,
challenge: AuthChallenge,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let signature = key.sign(&challenge_payload).to_bytes().to_vec();
) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos as i64);
let challenge = authn::AuthChallenge {
nonce: *challenge
.random
.as_array()
.ok_or(AuthError::InvalidChallenge)?,
timestamp,
};
let challenge_payload: Vec<u8> = challenge.format();
let signature = key
.sign_message(&challenge_payload, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?
.to_bytes();
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
@@ -114,9 +127,7 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
}
async fn receive_auth_confirmation(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
async fn receive_auth_confirmation(transport: &mut ClientTransport) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
let response = transport
.recv()
.await
@@ -137,11 +148,11 @@ async fn receive_auth_confirmation(
}
}
pub(crate) async fn authenticate(
pub async fn authenticate(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
key: &SigningKey,
) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
send_auth_challenge_request(transport, metadata, key).await?;
let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?;
send_auth_challenge_solution(transport, key, challenge).await?;

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
use std::io::{self, Write};
use arbiter_client::ArbiterClient;
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, url::ArbiterUrl};
use std::io::{self, Write};
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
println!("Testing connection to Arbiter server...");
@@ -29,16 +29,16 @@ async fn main() {
}
};
println!("{:#?}", url);
println!("{url:#?}");
let metadata = ClientMetadata {
name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_string(),
description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_string()),
version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string()),
name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_owned(),
description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_owned()),
version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_owned()),
};
match ArbiterClient::connect(url, metadata).await {
Ok(_) => println!("Connected and authenticated successfully."),
Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {:#?}", err),
Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {err:#?}"),
}
}

View File

@@ -1,49 +1,55 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
use crate::{
StorageError,
auth::{AuthError, authenticate},
storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage},
transport::{BUFFER_LENGTH, ClientTransport},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
};
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("gRPC error")]
Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
pub enum ArbiterClientError {
#[error("Authentication error")]
Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
#[error("Could not establish connection")]
Connection(#[from] tonic::transport::Error),
#[error("Invalid server URI")]
InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
#[error("gRPC error")]
Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
#[error("Invalid CA certificate")]
InvalidCaCert(#[from] webpki::Error),
#[error("Authentication error")]
Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
#[error("Invalid server URI")]
InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
#[error("Storage error")]
Storage(#[from] StorageError),
}
pub struct ArbiterClient {
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[expect(
dead_code,
reason = "transport will be used in future methods for sending requests and receiving responses"
)]
transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
}
impl ArbiterClient {
pub async fn connect(url: ArbiterUrl, metadata: ClientMetadata) -> Result<Self, Error> {
pub async fn connect(
url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::from_default_location()?;
Self::connect_with_storage(url, metadata, &storage).await
}
@@ -52,7 +58,7 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
storage: &S,
) -> Result<Self, Error> {
) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
let key = storage.load_or_create()?;
Self::connect_with_key(url, metadata, key).await
}
@@ -60,8 +66,8 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
pub async fn connect_with_key(
url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> Result<Self, Error> {
key: SigningKey,
) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned();
let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);
@@ -88,7 +94,8 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, Error> {
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "false positive")]
pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, ArbiterClientError> {
todo!("fetch EVM wallet list from server")
}
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ mod transport;
pub mod wallets;
pub use auth::AuthError;
pub use client::{ArbiterClient, Error};
pub use client::{ArbiterClient, ArbiterClientError};
pub use storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,19 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use arbiter_proto::home_path;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum StorageError {
#[error("I/O error")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
#[error("Invalid signing key length in storage: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
InvalidKeyLength { expected: usize, actual: usize },
#[error("I/O error")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
}
pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError>;
fn load_or_create(&self) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError>;
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
@@ -20,17 +22,17 @@ pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage {
}
impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ed25519.key";
pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ml_dsa.key";
pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
Self { path: path.into() }
}
pub fn from_default_location() -> std::result::Result<Self, StorageError> {
pub fn from_default_location() -> Result<Self, StorageError> {
Ok(Self::new(home_path()?.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME)))
}
fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
fn read_key(path: &Path) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
let bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
let raw: [u8; 32] =
bytes
@@ -39,12 +41,12 @@ impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
expected: 32,
actual: v.len(),
})?;
Ok(ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&raw))
Ok(SigningKey::from_seed(raw))
}
}
impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
}
@@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
return Self::read_key(&self.path);
}
let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let raw_key = key.to_bytes();
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let raw_key = key.to_seed();
// Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
@@ -103,7 +105,7 @@ mod tests {
.load_or_create()
.expect("second load_or_create should read same key");
assert_eq!(key_a.to_bytes(), key_b.to_bytes());
assert_eq!(key_a.to_seed(), key_b.to_seed());
assert!(path.exists());
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(expected, 32);
assert_eq!(actual, 31);
}
other => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"),
other @ StorageError::Io(_) => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"),
}
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
pub(crate) const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
pub const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
static NEXT_REQUEST_ID: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(1);
pub(crate) fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
pub fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
NEXT_REQUEST_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub(crate) enum ClientSignError {
pub enum ClientSignError {
#[error("Transport channel closed")]
ChannelClosed,
@@ -18,27 +19,23 @@ pub(crate) enum ClientSignError {
ConnectionClosed,
}
pub(crate) struct ClientTransport {
pub struct ClientTransport {
pub(crate) sender: mpsc::Sender<ClientRequest>,
pub(crate) receiver: tonic::Streaming<ClientResponse>,
}
impl ClientTransport {
pub(crate) async fn send(
&mut self,
request: ClientRequest,
) -> std::result::Result<(), ClientSignError> {
pub(crate) async fn send(&mut self, request: ClientRequest) -> Result<(), ClientSignError> {
self.sender
.send(request)
.await
.map_err(|_| ClientSignError::ChannelClosed)
}
pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> std::result::Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
match self.receiver.message().await {
Ok(Some(resp)) => Ok(resp),
Ok(None) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
Ok(None) | Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,4 @@
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::TxSigner,
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
ClientRequest,
@@ -25,7 +16,15 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
shared::evm::TransactionEvalError,
};
use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::TxSigner,
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
/// A typed error payload returned by [`ArbiterEvmWallet`] transaction signing.
///
@@ -59,7 +58,11 @@ pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet {
}
impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
pub(crate) fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
#[expect(
dead_code,
reason = "new will be used in future methods for creating wallets with different parameters"
)]
pub(crate) const fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
Self {
transport,
address,
@@ -67,11 +70,12 @@ impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
}
}
pub fn address(&self) -> Address {
pub const fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
pub fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
#[must_use]
pub const fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
self.chain_id = Some(chain_id);
self
}
@@ -146,6 +150,7 @@ impl TxSigner<Signature> for ArbiterEvmWallet {
.recv()
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to receive evm sign transaction response"))?;
drop(transport);
if response.request_id != Some(request_id) {
return Err(Error::other(

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
/target

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
[package]
name = "arbiter-crypto"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
[dependencies]
ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true }
rand = {workspace = true, optional = true}
memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true}
hmac.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
x-wing = { version = "0.1.0-rc.0", features = ["zeroize"] }
chrono.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = ["authn", "safecell"]
authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand"]
safecell = ["dep:memsafe"]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
pub mod v1;
pub use v1::*;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use hmac::digest::Digest;
use ml_dsa::{
EncodedVerifyingKey, Error, KeyGen, MlDsa87, Seed, Signature as MlDsaSignature,
SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _,
};
use rand::RngExt;
pub static CLIENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_client";
pub static USERAGENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_user_agent";
const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 32;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("invalid length: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
pub struct InvalidLength {
pub expected: usize,
pub actual: usize,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AuthChallenge {
pub nonce: [u8; NONCE_SIZE],
pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
}
impl AuthChallenge {
pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::CryptoRng) -> Self {
let timestamp = Utc::now();
let nonce = {
let mut array = [0; NONCE_SIZE];
rng.fill(&mut array);
array
};
Self { nonce, timestamp }
}
pub fn format(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
{
let mut buffer = Vec::from(self.nonce);
let stamp = self
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("We would be long dead by the time this triggers :)");
buffer.extend_from_slice(stamp.to_be_bytes().as_slice());
buffer
}
}
pub fn from_parts(nonce: &[u8], timestamp: i64) -> Result<Self, InvalidLength> {
let random_nonce = nonce.as_array().ok_or(InvalidLength {
expected: NONCE_SIZE,
actual: nonce.len(),
})?;
Ok(Self {
nonce: *random_nonce,
timestamp: DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(timestamp),
})
}
}
pub type KeyParams = MlDsa87;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct PublicKey(Box<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>>);
impl crate::hashing::Hashable for PublicKey {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.to_bytes());
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct Signature(Box<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>>);
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct SigningKey(Box<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>>);
impl PublicKey {
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
}
#[must_use]
pub fn verify(&self, challenge: &AuthChallenge, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
let challenge = challenge.format();
self.0
.verify_with_context(&challenge, context, &signature.0)
}
}
impl Signature {
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
}
}
impl SigningKey {
pub fn generate() -> Self {
Self(Box::new(KeyParams::key_gen(&mut rand::rng())))
}
pub fn from_seed(seed: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(KeyParams::from_seed(&Seed::from(seed))))
}
pub fn to_seed(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
self.0.to_seed().into()
}
pub fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
self.0.verifying_key().into()
}
pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
self.0
.signing_key()
.sign_deterministic(message, context)
.map(Into::into)
}
pub fn sign_challenge(
&self,
challenge: &AuthChallenge,
context: &[u8],
) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
let challenge = challenge.format();
self.sign_message(&challenge, context)
}
}
impl From<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>> for PublicKey {
fn from(value: MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value))
}
}
impl From<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>> for Signature {
fn from(value: MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value))
}
}
impl From<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>> for SigningKey {
fn from(value: MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value))
}
}
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for PublicKey {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
}
}
impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for PublicKey {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let encoded = EncodedVerifyingKey::<KeyParams>::try_from(value).map_err(|_| ())?;
Ok(Self(Box::new(MlDsaVerifyingKey::decode(&encoded))))
}
}
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for Signature {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
}
}
impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for Signature {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
MlDsaSignature::try_from(value)
.map(|sig| Self(Box::new(sig)))
.map_err(|_| ())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, signature::Keypair as _};
use crate::authn::AuthChallenge;
use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
#[test]
fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() {
let key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let encoded = PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()).to_bytes();
let decoded = PublicKey::try_from(encoded.as_slice()).expect("public key should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded, PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()));
}
#[test]
fn signature_round_trip_decodes() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let signature = key
.sign_message(b"challenge", CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
let decoded =
Signature::try_from(signature.to_bytes().as_slice()).expect("signature should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded, signature);
}
#[test]
fn challenge_verification_uses_context_and_canonical_key_bytes() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let public_key = key.public_key();
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let signature = key
.sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(public_key.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
assert!(!public_key.verify(&challenge, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
}
#[test]
fn signing_key_round_trip_seed_preserves_public_key_and_signing() {
let original = SigningKey::generate();
let restored = SigningKey::from_seed(original.to_seed());
assert_eq!(restored.public_key(), original.public_key());
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let signature = restored
.sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(
restored
.public_key()
.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature)
);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
use std::collections::HashSet;
pub use hmac::digest::Digest;
/// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
#[diagnostic::on_unimplemented(
note = "for local types consider adding `#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]` to your `{Self}` type",
note = "for types from other crates check whether the crate offers a `Hashable` implementation"
)]
pub trait Hashable {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H);
}
macro_rules! impl_numeric {
($($t:ty),*) => {
$(
impl Hashable for $t {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(&self.to_be_bytes());
}
}
)*
};
}
impl_numeric!(u8, u16, u32, u64, i8, i16, i32, i64);
impl Hashable for &[u8] {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self);
}
}
impl Hashable for String {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.as_bytes());
}
}
impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for Vec<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
let ref_sorted = {
let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
sorted
};
for item in ref_sorted {
item.hash(hasher);
}
}
}
impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd, S: std::hash::BuildHasher> Hashable for HashSet<T, S> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
let ref_sorted = {
let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
sorted
};
for item in ref_sorted {
item.hash(hasher);
}
}
}
impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Option<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
match self {
Some(value) => {
hasher.update([1]);
value.hash(hasher);
}
None => hasher.update([0]),
}
}
}
impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Box<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.as_ref().hash(hasher);
}
}
impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for &T {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
(*self).hash(hasher);
}
}
impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::Address {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.as_slice());
}
}
impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::U256 {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.to_be_bytes::<32>());
}
}
impl Hashable for chrono::Duration {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.num_seconds().to_be_bytes());
}
}
impl Hashable for chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.timestamp_millis().to_be_bytes());
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
#[cfg(feature = "authn")]
pub mod authn;
pub mod hashing;
#[cfg(feature = "safecell")]
pub mod safecell;
pub use x_wing;

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
use std::{any::type_name, fmt};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use std::{
any::type_name,
fmt,
ops::{Deref, DerefMut},
};
pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
type CellRead<'a>: Deref<Target = T>
@@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
let mut cell = Self::new(T::default());
{
let mut handle = cell.write();
f(handle.deref_mut());
f(&mut *handle);
}
cell
}
@@ -105,6 +107,11 @@ impl<T> SafeCellHandle<T> for MemSafeCell<T> {
fn abort_memory_breach(action: &str, err: &memsafe::error::MemoryError) -> ! {
eprintln!("fatal {action}: {err}");
// SAFETY: Intentionally cause a segmentation fault to prevent further execution in a compromised state.
unsafe {
let unsafe_pointer = std::ptr::null_mut::<u8>();
std::ptr::write_volatile(unsafe_pointer, 0);
}
std::process::abort();
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
[package]
name = "arbiter-macros"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
[lib]
proc-macro = true
[dependencies]
proc-macro2 = "1.0"
quote = "1.0"
syn = { version = "2.0", features = ["derive", "fold", "full", "visit-mut"] }
[dev-dependencies]
arbiter-crypto = { path = "../arbiter-crypto" }
[lints]
workspace = true

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
use crate::utils::{HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH, HMAC_DIGEST_PATH};
use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream, TokenTree};
use quote::quote;
use syn::{DataStruct, DeriveInput, Fields, Generics, Index, parse_quote, spanned::Spanned};
pub(crate) fn derive(input: &DeriveInput) -> TokenStream {
match &input.data {
syn::Data::Struct(struct_data) => hashable_struct(input, struct_data),
syn::Data::Enum(_) => {
syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable can currently be derived only for structs")
.to_compile_error()
}
syn::Data::Union(_) => {
syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable cannot be derived for unions")
.to_compile_error()
}
}
}
fn hashable_struct(input: &DeriveInput, struct_data: &DataStruct) -> TokenStream {
let ident = &input.ident;
let hashable_trait = HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH.to_path();
let hmac_digest = HMAC_DIGEST_PATH.to_path();
let generics = add_hashable_bounds(input.generics.clone(), &hashable_trait);
let field_accesses = collect_field_accesses(struct_data);
let hash_calls = build_hash_calls(&field_accesses, &hashable_trait);
let (impl_generics, ty_generics, where_clause) = generics.split_for_impl();
quote! {
#[automatically_derived]
impl #impl_generics #hashable_trait for #ident #ty_generics #where_clause {
fn hash<H: #hmac_digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
#(#hash_calls)*
}
}
}
}
fn add_hashable_bounds(mut generics: Generics, hashable_trait: &syn::Path) -> Generics {
for type_param in generics.type_params_mut() {
type_param.bounds.push(parse_quote!(#hashable_trait));
}
generics
}
struct FieldAccess {
access: TokenStream,
span: Span,
}
fn collect_field_accesses(struct_data: &DataStruct) -> Vec<FieldAccess> {
match &struct_data.fields {
Fields::Named(fields) => {
// Keep deterministic alphabetical order for named fields.
// Do not remove this sort, because it keeps hash output stable regardless of source order.
let mut named_fields = fields
.named
.iter()
.map(|field| {
let name = field
.ident
.as_ref()
.expect("Fields::Named(fields) must have names")
.clone();
(name.to_string(), name)
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
named_fields.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0));
named_fields
.into_iter()
.map(|(_, name)| FieldAccess {
access: quote! { #name },
span: name.span(),
})
.collect()
}
Fields::Unnamed(fields) => fields
.unnamed
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(i, field)| FieldAccess {
access: {
let index = Index::from(i);
quote! { #index }
},
span: field.ty.span(),
})
.collect(),
Fields::Unit => Vec::new(),
}
}
fn build_hash_calls(
field_accesses: &[FieldAccess],
hashable_trait: &syn::Path,
) -> Vec<TokenStream> {
field_accesses
.iter()
.map(|field| {
let access = &field.access;
let call = quote! {
#hashable_trait::hash(&self.#access, hasher);
};
respan(call, field.span)
})
.collect()
}
/// Recursively set span on all tokens, including interpolated ones.
fn respan(tokens: TokenStream, span: Span) -> TokenStream {
tokens
.into_iter()
.map(|tt| match tt {
TokenTree::Group(g) => {
let mut new = proc_macro2::Group::new(g.delimiter(), respan(g.stream(), span));
new.set_span(span);
TokenTree::Group(new)
}
mut other => {
other.set_span(span);
other
}
})
.collect()
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
use syn::{DeriveInput, parse_macro_input};
mod hashable;
mod utils;
#[proc_macro_derive(Hashable)]
pub fn derive_hashable(input: proc_macro::TokenStream) -> proc_macro::TokenStream {
let input = parse_macro_input!(input as DeriveInput);
hashable::derive(&input).into()
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
pub(crate) struct ToPath(pub &'static str);
impl ToPath {
pub(crate) fn to_path(&self) -> syn::Path {
syn::parse_str(self.0).expect("Invalid path")
}
}
macro_rules! ensure_path {
($path:path as $name:ident) => {
const _: () = {
#[cfg(test)]
#[expect(
unused_imports,
reason = "Ensures the path is valid and will cause a compile error if not"
)]
use $path as _;
};
pub(crate) const $name: ToPath = ToPath(stringify!($path));
};
}
ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable as HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH);
ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Digest as HMAC_DIGEST_PATH);

View File

@@ -11,13 +11,13 @@ tokio.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true
hex = "0.4.3"
tonic-prost = "0.14.5"
prost = "0.14.3"
prost.workspace = true
kameo.workspace = true
url = "2.5.8"
miette.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
base64 = "0.22.1"
base64.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
pub mod transport;
pub mod url;
use base64::{Engine, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");
@@ -84,8 +82,3 @@ pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
Ok(arbiter_home)
}
pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes()
}

View File

@@ -54,10 +54,9 @@
//! as a closed outbound channel.
//! - [`Bi::recv`] returns `None` when the underlying transport closes.
//! - Message translation is intentionally out of scope for this module.
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::{error::Infallible, prelude::*};
use std::marker::PhantomData;
/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
@@ -106,6 +105,36 @@ pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync {
/// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items.
pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for &mut T
where
T: Sender<Outbound> + ?Sized,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
(**self).send(item).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Inbound> Receiver<Inbound> for &mut T
where
T: Receiver<Inbound> + ?Sized,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
(**self).recv().await
}
}
impl<T, Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for &mut T
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
{
}
pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> {
type Sender: Sender<Outbound>;
type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>;
@@ -161,3 +190,29 @@ where
}
pub mod grpc;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
pub enum ForwardError<I> {
#[error("Transport error: {0}")]
Transport(#[from] Error),
#[error("Actor delivery error: {0}")]
Actor(SendError<I>),
}
pub async fn forward_to_actor<Transport, Inbound, Outbound, Handler>(
transport: &mut Transport,
actor: &ActorRef<Handler>,
) -> Result<(), ForwardError<Inbound>>
where
Transport: Bi<Inbound, <Outbound as Reply>::Ok>,
Handler: Actor + Message<Inbound, Reply = Outbound>,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static + Reply<Error = Infallible>, // `Infallible` to enforce contract that `Outbound` carries handler-level error
{
while let Some(request) = transport.recv().await {
let resp = actor.ask(request).await.map_err(ForwardError::Actor)?;
transport.send(resp).await?
}
Err(Error::ChannelClosed.into())
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use futures::StreamExt;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
pub struct GrpcSender<Outbound> {
tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
use std::fmt::Display;
use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_URL_SAFE};
use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
use std::fmt::Display;
const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter";
const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert";
@@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ mod tests {
#[rstest]
fn test_parsing_correctness(
fn parsing_correctness(
#[values("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "192.168.1.1", "some.domain.com")] host: &str,
#[values(None, Some("token123".to_string()))] bootstrap_token: Option<String>,

View File

@@ -16,8 +16,9 @@ diesel-async = { version = "0.8.0", features = [
"sqlite",
"tokio",
] }
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
arbiter-macros.path = "../arbiter-macros"
tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
tonic.workspace = true
@@ -36,25 +37,32 @@ dashmap = "6.1.0"
rand.workspace = true
rcgen.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
memsafe = "0.4.0"
zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
kameo.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
restructed = "0.2.2"
strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
pem = "3.0.6"
k256.workspace = true
rsa.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
hmac = "0.12"
hmac.workspace = true
spki.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
prost.workspace = true
arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
anyhow = "1.0.102"
serde_with = "3.18.0"
mutants.workspace = true
subtle = "2.6.1"
ml-dsa.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
k256.workspace = true
kameo_actors.workspace = true
[dev-dependencies]
insta = "1.46.3"
insta = "1.47.2"
proptest = "1.11.0"
rstest.workspace = true
test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }

View File

@@ -45,14 +45,11 @@ insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
create table if not exists useragent_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
pubkey_integrity_tag blob,
key_type integer not null default(1), -- 1=Ed25519, 2=ECDSA(secp256k1)
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_useragent_client_public_key on useragent_client (public_key, key_type);
create unique index if not exists uniq_useragent_client_public_key on useragent_client (public_key);
create table if not exists client_metadata (
id integer not null primary key,
@@ -74,7 +71,6 @@ create unique index if not exists uniq_metadata_binding_client on client_metadat
create table if not exists program_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
@@ -192,3 +188,19 @@ create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_ether_transfer_target on evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (grant_id, address);
-- ===============================
-- Integrity Envelopes
-- ===============================
create table if not exists integrity_envelope (
id integer not null primary key,
entity_kind text not null,
entity_id blob not null,
payload_version integer not null,
key_version integer not null,
mac blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_integrity_envelope_entity on integrity_envelope (entity_kind, entity_id);

View File

@@ -1,19 +1,20 @@
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
let token: String = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
Default::default(),
let token = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
String::default(),
|mut accum, char| {
accum += char.to_string().as_str();
accum
@@ -30,11 +31,11 @@ pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("I/O error: {0}")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
#[derive(Actor)]
@@ -44,14 +45,14 @@ pub struct Bootstrapper {
impl Bootstrapper {
pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let row_count: i64 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let row_count: i64 = schema::useragent_client::table
schema::useragent_client::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
drop(conn);
.await?
};
let token = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?;
@@ -68,10 +69,13 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
match &self.token {
Some(expected) => *expected == token,
None => false,
}
self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| {
let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
bool::from(choice)
})
}
#[message]

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,24 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use crate::{
actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
crypto::integrity,
db::{
DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
models::{self},
schema,
},
evm::{
self, ListError, RunKind,
policies::{
CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559, network::TxSignerSync as _, primitives::Address, signers::Signature,
};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
};
@@ -6,23 +26,6 @@ use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
db::{
DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
models::{self, SqliteTimestamp},
schema,
},
evm::{
self, RunKind,
policies::{
FullGrant, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -33,11 +36,11 @@ pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Signing error: {0}")]
Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
@@ -48,32 +51,35 @@ pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Integrity violation: {0}")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct EvmActor {
pub keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub db: DatabasePool,
pub rng: StdRng,
pub engine: evm::Engine,
}
impl EvmActor {
pub fn new(keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
pub fn new(vault: ActorRef<Vault>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
// is it safe to seed rng from system once?
// todo: audit
let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), vault.clone());
Self {
keyholder,
vault,
db,
rng,
engine,
@@ -90,10 +96,10 @@ impl EvmActor {
let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
let aead_id: i32 = self
.keyholder
.vault
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?;
.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
@@ -132,46 +138,60 @@ impl EvmActor {
&mut self,
basic: SharedGrantSettings,
grant: SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError> {
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match grant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => {
self.engine
.create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(FullGrant {
basic,
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self
.engine
.create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
shared: basic,
specific: settings,
})
.await
}
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => {
self.engine
.create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(FullGrant {
basic,
.map_err(Error::from),
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => self
.engine
.create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
shared: basic,
specific: settings,
})
.await
}
.map_err(Error::from),
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
.set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(())
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "reserved for impl")]
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
// let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// let vault = self.vault.clone();
// diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| {
// Box::pin(async move {
// diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
// .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
// .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
// .execute(conn)
// .await?;
// let signed = integrity::evm::load_signed_grant_by_basic_id(conn, grant_id).await?;
// diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(())
// })
// })
// .await
// .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// Ok(())
todo!()
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
Ok(self
.engine
.list_all_grants()
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?)
match self.engine.list_all_grants().await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(ListError::Database(db_err)) => Err(Error::Database(db_err)),
Err(ListError::Integrity(integrity_err)) => Err(Error::Integrity(integrity_err)),
}
}
#[message]
@@ -237,12 +257,12 @@ impl EvmActor {
drop(conn);
let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
.keyholder
.vault
.ask(Decrypt {
aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::KeyholderSend)?;
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
@@ -250,7 +270,6 @@ impl EvmActor {
.evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.await?;
use alloy::network::TxSignerSync as _;
Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
use std::ops::ControlFlow;
use crate::{
actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
peers::{
client::ClientProfile,
user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
},
};
use kameo::{
Actor, messages,
prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::ReplySender,
};
use crate::actors::{
client::ClientProfile,
flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
};
use std::ops::ControlFlow;
pub struct Args {
pub client: ClientProfile,
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
async fn on_start(
Args {
client,
mut user_agents,
user_agents,
reply,
}: Self::Args,
actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>,
@@ -52,8 +53,9 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
reply: Some(reply),
};
for user_agent in user_agents.drain(..) {
for user_agent in user_agents {
actor_ref.link(&user_agent).await;
let _ = user_agent
.tell(BeginNewClientApproval {
client: client.clone(),
@@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
#[messages]
impl ClientApprovalController {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
pub fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
if !approved {
// Denial wins immediately regardless of other pending responses.
self.send_reply(Ok(false));

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use crate::{
actors::{
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
useragent_registry::{GetConnected, UserAgentRegistry},
},
peers::client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
};
use kameo::{
Actor,
@@ -7,20 +13,23 @@ use kameo::{
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::DelegatedReply,
};
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use tracing::info;
use crate::actors::{
client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
user_agent::session::UserAgentSession,
};
pub mod client_connect_approval;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct FlowCoordinator {
pub user_agents: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
useragent_registry: ActorRef<UserAgentRegistry>,
}
impl FlowCoordinator {
pub fn new(useragent_registry: ActorRef<UserAgentRegistry>) -> Self {
Self {
clients: HashMap::default(),
useragent_registry,
}
}
}
impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
@@ -38,13 +47,7 @@ impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
id: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.user_agents.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
event = "useragent.disconnected"
);
} else if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
@@ -69,17 +72,6 @@ pub enum ApprovalError {
#[messages]
impl FlowCoordinator {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_user_agent(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "useragent.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.user_agents.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_client(
&mut self,
@@ -101,7 +93,11 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
unreachable!("Expected `request_client_approval` to have callback channel");
};
let refs: Vec<_> = self.user_agents.values().cloned().collect();
let Ok(refs) = self.useragent_registry.ask(GetConnected).await else {
reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected));
return reply;
};
if refs.is_empty() {
reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected));
return reply;

View File

@@ -1,47 +1,59 @@
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
keyholder::KeyHolder,
useragent_registry::UserAgentRegistry, vault::Vault,
},
db,
};
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use kameo_actors::{DeliveryStrategy, message_bus::MessageBus};
use thiserror::Error;
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod client;
mod evm;
pub mod evm;
pub mod flow_coordinator;
pub mod keyholder;
pub mod user_agent;
pub mod useragent_registry;
pub mod vault;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum SpawnError {
#[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn KeyHolder actor")]
KeyHolder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn Vault actor")]
Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
}
/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct GlobalActors {
pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
pub useragent_registry: ActorRef<UserAgentRegistry>,
pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
pub events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
impl GlobalActors {
pub fn spawn_message_bus() -> ActorRef<MessageBus> {
MessageBus::spawn(MessageBus::new(DeliveryStrategy::Guaranteed))
}
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let key_holder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?);
let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
let useragent_registry = UserAgentRegistry::spawn(UserAgentRegistry::default());
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
key_holder,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::default()),
vault: key_holder,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::new(
useragent_registry.clone(),
)),
useragent_registry,
events: message_bus,
})
}
}

View File

@@ -1,356 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::error::SendError;
use tracing::error;
use super::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
keyholder::{self, SignIntegrityTag},
user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth::Outbound},
},
crypto::integrity::v1::USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
db::schema,
};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum AttestationStatus {
Attested,
NotAttested,
Unavailable,
}
pub struct ChallengeRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
pub token: String,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge_nonce: i32,
pub key: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct ChallengeSolution {
pub solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
}
);
async fn create_nonce(
db: &crate::db::DatabasePool,
pubkey_bytes: &[u8],
key_type: crate::db::models::KeyType,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.to_vec()))
.filter(schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type))
.select(schema::useragent_client::nonce)
.first::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::useragent_client::table)
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.to_vec()))
.filter(schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type))
.set(schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(current_nonce)
})
})
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?
.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(?pubkey_bytes, "Public key not found in database");
Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
})
}
async fn register_key(
db: &crate::db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
integrity_tag: Option<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let key_type = pubkey.key_type();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(1),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type),
schema::useragent_client::pubkey_integrity_tag.eq(integrity_tag),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
Ok(())
}
pub struct AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
pub(super) transport: T,
}
impl<'a, T> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
type Error = Error;
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
match self.verify_pubkey_attestation_status(&pubkey).await? {
AttestationStatus::Attested | AttestationStatus::Unavailable => {}
AttestationStatus::NotAttested => {
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
}
let stored_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let nonce = create_nonce(&self.conn.db, &stored_bytes, pubkey.key_type()).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce: nonce,
key: pubkey,
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
let integrity_tag = self
.try_sign_pubkey_integrity_tag(&pubkey)
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to sign user-agent pubkey integrity tag");
Error::internal("Failed to sign user-agent pubkey integrity tag")
})?;
register_key(&self.conn.db, &pubkey, integrity_tag).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(pubkey)
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce,
key,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
let formatted = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(*challenge_nonce, &key.to_stored_bytes());
let valid = match key {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(vk) => {
let sig = solution.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid Ed25519 signature length");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify_strict(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(vk) => {
use k256::ecdsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let sig = k256::ecdsa::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid ECDSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(pk) => {
use rsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let verifying_key = rsa::pss::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha256>::new(pk.clone());
let sig = rsa::pss::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid RSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
verifying_key.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
};
match valid {
true => {
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(key.clone())
}
false => {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
}
}
}
}
impl<T> AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
async fn try_sign_pubkey_integrity_tag(
&self,
pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let signed = self
.conn
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(SignIntegrityTag {
purpose_tag: USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG.to_vec(),
data_parts: vec![
(pubkey.key_type() as i32).to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey.to_stored_bytes(),
],
})
.await;
match signed {
Ok(tag) => Ok(Some(tag)),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)) => Ok(None),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(
?err,
"Keyholder failed to sign user-agent pubkey integrity tag"
);
Err(Error::internal(
"Keyholder failed to sign user-agent pubkey integrity tag",
))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to contact keyholder for user-agent pubkey integrity tag"
);
Err(Error::internal(
"Failed to contact keyholder for user-agent pubkey integrity tag",
))
}
}
}
async fn verify_pubkey_attestation_status(
&self,
pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
let stored_tag: Option<Option<Vec<u8>>> = {
let mut conn = self.conn.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
schema::useragent_client::table
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_stored_bytes()))
.filter(schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(pubkey.key_type()))
.select(schema::useragent_client::pubkey_integrity_tag)
.first::<Option<Vec<u8>>>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?
};
let Some(stored_tag) = stored_tag else {
return Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey);
};
let Some(expected_tag) = self.try_sign_pubkey_integrity_tag(pubkey).await? else {
return Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable);
};
match stored_tag {
Some(stored_tag) if stored_tag == expected_tag => Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested),
Some(_) => {
error!("User-agent pubkey integrity tag mismatch");
Ok(AttestationStatus::NotAttested)
}
None => {
error!("Missing pubkey integrity tag for registered key while vault is unsealed");
Ok(AttestationStatus::NotAttested)
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile},
db::{self, models::KeyType},
};
/// Abstraction over Ed25519 / ECDSA-secp256k1 / RSA public keys used during the auth handshake.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub enum AuthPublicKey {
Ed25519(ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey),
/// Compressed SEC1 public key; signature bytes are raw 64-byte (r||s).
EcdsaSecp256k1(k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey),
/// RSA-2048+ public key (Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager); signature bytes are PSS+SHA-256.
Rsa(rsa::RsaPublicKey),
}
impl AuthPublicKey {
/// Canonical bytes stored in DB and echoed back in the challenge.
/// Ed25519: raw 32 bytes. ECDSA: SEC1 compressed 33 bytes. RSA: DER-encoded SPKI.
pub fn to_stored_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(k) => k.to_bytes().to_vec(),
// SEC1 compressed (33 bytes) is the natural compact format for secp256k1
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(k) => k.to_encoded_point(true).as_bytes().to_vec(),
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(k) => {
use rsa::pkcs8::EncodePublicKey as _;
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
k.to_public_key_der()
.expect("rsa SPKI encoding is infallible")
.to_vec()
}
}
}
pub fn key_type(&self) -> KeyType {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(_) => KeyType::Ed25519,
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(_) => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(_) => KeyType::Rsa,
}
}
}
impl TryFrom<(KeyType, Vec<u8>)> for AuthPublicKey {
type Error = &'static str;
fn try_from(value: (KeyType, Vec<u8>)) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let (key_type, bytes) = value;
match key_type {
KeyType::Ed25519 => {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| "invalid Ed25519 key length")?;
let key = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&bytes)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid Ed25519 key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(key))
}
KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => {
let point =
k256::EncodedPoint::from_bytes(&bytes).map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
let key = k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_encoded_point(&point)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(key))
}
KeyType::Rsa => {
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
let key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&bytes)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid RSA key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Rsa(key))
}
}
}
}
// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey },
}
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub use auth::authenticate;
pub use session::UserAgentSession;

View File

@@ -1,510 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use kameo::messages;
use kameo::prelude::Context;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer;
use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
use crate::actors::user_agent::session::Error;
use crate::db::models::{
EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
};
use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
use crate::{
actors::{
evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentDeleteGrant, UseragentListGrants,
},
keyholder::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
user_agent::session::{
UserAgentSession,
state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
},
},
safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
};
impl UserAgentSession {
fn take_unseal_secret(&mut self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), Error> {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(Error::internal("Invalid state for unseal encrypted key"));
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Mutex poison is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
match secret {
Some(secret) => secret,
None => {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
return Err(Error::internal("Ephemeral secret already taken"));
}
}
};
Ok((ephemeral_secret, unseal_context.client_public_key))
}
fn decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret: EphemeralSecret,
client_public_key: PublicKey,
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => Ok(key_buffer),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
}
}
}
}
pub struct UnsealStartResponse {
pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum UnsealError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for unsealing")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Internal error during unsealing process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum BootstrapError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for bootstrapping")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Internal error during bootstrapping process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_request(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
) -> Result<UnsealStartResponse, Error> {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
client_public_key: client_pubkey,
}))?;
Ok(UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key,
})
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(_err) => {
return Err(Error::internal("Failed to take unseal secret").into());
}
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(Error::internal("Vault actor error").into())
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(err) => return Err(err.into()),
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to bootstrap vault");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::General(Error::internal(
"Vault actor error",
)))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "keyholder.query.failed");
return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => Ok(address),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
"EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
))),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
&mut self,
basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
.await
{
Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to create EVM grant"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to delete EVM grant"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<i32>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(access_entries)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message(ctx)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
&mut self,
approved: bool,
pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pending_approval = match self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey) {
Some(approval) => approval,
None => {
error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
return Err(Error::internal("Unknown client in connection response"));
}
};
pending_approval
.controller
.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to send client approval response to controller"
);
Error::internal("Failed to send client approval response to controller")
})?;
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let clients = program_client::table
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
ProgramClient::as_select(),
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(clients)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
use crate::peers::user_agent::UserAgentSession;
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorId, ActorRef},
error::Infallible,
messages,
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
};
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use tracing::info;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct UserAgentRegistry {
connected: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
}
impl Actor for UserAgentRegistry {
type Args = Self;
type Error = Infallible;
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(args)
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.connected.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "UserAgentRegistry",
event = "useragent.disconnected"
);
}
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentRegistry {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn connect_useragent(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "UserAgentRegistry", event = "useragent.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.connected.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message]
pub fn get_connected(&self) -> Vec<ActorRef<UserAgentSession>> {
self.connected.values().cloned().collect()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,50 +1,49 @@
use crate::{
crypto::{
KeyCell, derive_key,
encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
},
db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
dsl::{insert_into, update},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
crypto::{
KeyCell, derive_key,
encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
integrity::v1::compute_integrity_tag,
},
safe_cell::SafeCell,
};
use crate::{
db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
},
safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
};
pub mod events {
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(KeyHolderState))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
},
Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
root_key: KeyCell,
},
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Bootstrapped;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Unsealed;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct VaultResealed;
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")]
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")]
#[error("Vault is not bootstrapped")]
NotBootstrapped,
#[error("Vault is sealed")]
Sealed,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
@@ -64,18 +63,36 @@ pub enum Error {
BrokenDatabase,
}
struct Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
root_key: KeyCell,
}
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(VaultState))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
},
Unsealed(Unsealed),
}
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
///
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct KeyHolder {
pub struct Vault {
db: db::DatabasePool,
state: State,
events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
#[messages]
impl KeyHolder {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
impl Vault {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let state = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
@@ -93,10 +110,10 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
};
Ok(Self { db, state })
Ok(Self { db, state, events })
}
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple keyholders write
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write
// additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
@@ -110,7 +127,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
.first(conn)
.await?;
let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
root_key_id
@@ -133,6 +150,14 @@ impl KeyHolder {
Ok(nonce)
}
const fn expect_unsealed(state: &mut State) -> Result<&mut Unsealed, Error> {
match state {
State::Unsealed(unsealed) => Ok(unsealed),
State::Unbootstrapped => Err(Error::NotBootstrapped),
State::Sealed { .. } => Err(Error::Sealed),
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
@@ -185,12 +210,13 @@ impl KeyHolder {
})
.await?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
};
});
info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully");
info!("Vault bootstrapped successfully");
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await;
Ok(())
}
@@ -223,12 +249,11 @@ impl KeyHolder {
let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(
|_| {
let nonce =
Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
Error::BrokenDatabase
},
)?;
})?;
seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
@@ -237,40 +262,23 @@ impl KeyHolder {
Error::InvalidKey
})?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?,
};
});
info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully");
info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Unsealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
// Signs a generic integrity payload using the vault-derived integrity key
#[message]
pub fn sign_integrity_tag(
&mut self,
purpose_tag: Vec<u8>,
data_parts: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let tag =
compute_integrity_tag(root_key, &purpose_tag, data_parts.iter().map(Vec::as_slice));
Ok(tag.to_vec())
}
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
@@ -283,7 +291,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
.ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
};
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
aead_id
@@ -298,14 +306,10 @@ impl KeyHolder {
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
..
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
// Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
// Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
@@ -335,41 +339,84 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
#[message]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> KeyHolderState {
pub fn get_state(&self) -> VaultState {
self.state.discriminant()
}
#[message]
pub fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
pub fn sign_integrity(&mut self, mac_input: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(i32, Vec<u8>), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let mut hmac = root_key
.0
.read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
});
hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input);
let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
Ok((*root_key_history_id, mac))
}
#[message]
pub fn verify_integrity(
&mut self,
mac_input: Vec<u8>,
expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
key_version: i32,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
return Ok(false);
}
let mut hmac = root_key
.0
.read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
});
hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input);
Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
}
#[message]
pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = &self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
};
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use diesel::SelectableHelper;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::{
db::{self},
safe_cell::SafeCell,
};
use crate::actors::GlobalActors;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::SafeCellHandle as _;
use super::*;
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
actor
@@ -381,17 +428,17 @@ mod tests {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let root_key_history_id = match actor.state {
State::Unsealed {
State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} => root_key_history_id,
}) => root_key_history_id,
_ => panic!("expected unsealed state"),
};
let n1 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
let n2 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
let n2 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors,
context::tls::TlsManager,
db::{self},
};
use std::sync::Arc;
use thiserror::Error;
pub mod tls;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
@@ -31,16 +30,16 @@ pub enum InitError {
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
}
pub struct _ServerContextInner {
pub struct __ServerContextInner {
pub db: db::DatabasePool,
pub tls: TlsManager,
pub actors: GlobalActors,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
pub struct ServerContext(Arc<__ServerContextInner>);
impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
type Target = _ServerContextInner;
type Target = __ServerContextInner;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.0
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
impl ServerContext {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
Ok(Self(Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
Ok(Self(Arc::new(__ServerContextInner {
actors: GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await?,
tls: TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?,
db,

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,3 @@
use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use pem::Pem;
use rcgen::{
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
};
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
use thiserror::Error;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
use crate::db::{
self,
models::{NewTlsHistory, TlsHistory},
@@ -21,10 +7,23 @@ use crate::db::{
},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use pem::Pem;
use rcgen::{
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
};
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
use thiserror::Error;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
const ENCODE_CONFIG: pem::EncodeConfig = {
let line_ending = match cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
true => pem::LineEnding::CRLF,
false => pem::LineEnding::LF,
let line_ending = if cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
pem::LineEnding::CRLF
} else {
pem::LineEnding::LF
};
pem::EncodeConfig::new().set_line_ending(line_ending)
};
@@ -52,11 +51,14 @@ pub enum InitError {
pub type PemCert = String;
pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer) -> PemCert {
pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer<'_>) -> PemCert {
pem::encode_config(&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()), ENCODE_CONFIG)
}
#[allow(unused)]
#[expect(
unused,
reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
)]
struct SerializedTls {
cert_pem: PemCert,
cert_key_pem: String,
@@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ impl TlsCa {
let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem();
#[allow(
#[expect(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Broken cert couldn't bootstrap server anyway"
)]
@@ -124,7 +126,11 @@ impl TlsCa {
})
}
#[allow(unused)]
#[expect(
unused,
clippy::unnecessary_wraps,
reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
)]
fn serialize(&self) -> Result<SerializedTls, InitError> {
let cert_key_pem = self.issuer.key().serialize_pem();
Ok(SerializedTls {
@@ -133,7 +139,10 @@ impl TlsCa {
})
}
#[allow(unused)]
#[expect(
unused,
reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
)]
fn try_deserialize(cert_pem: &str, cert_key_pem: &str) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
let keypair =
KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem).map_err(InitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
@@ -234,10 +243,10 @@ impl TlsManager {
}
}
pub fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
pub const fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
&self.cert
}
pub fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
pub const fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
&self.ca_cert
}

View File

@@ -1 +1,3 @@
pub mod v1;
pub use v1::*;

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
use argon2::password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt;
use rand::{
Rng as _, SeedableRng,
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/seal/v1";
pub const TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/private-key/v1";
pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
@@ -15,14 +14,16 @@ pub struct Nonce(pub [u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
impl Nonce {
pub fn increment(&mut self) {
for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
if self.0[i] == 0xFF {
self.0[i] = 0;
if let Some(byte) = self.0.get_mut(i) {
if *byte == 0xFF {
*byte = 0;
} else {
self.0[i] += 1;
*byte += 1;
break;
}
}
}
}
pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.to_vec()
@@ -45,27 +46,20 @@ pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
let mut salt = Salt::default();
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
let mut rng =
StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
salt
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::ops::Deref as _;
use super::*;
use crate::{
crypto::derive_key,
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use crate::crypto::derive_key;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[test]
pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
@@ -77,25 +71,24 @@ mod tests {
let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
assert_eq!(&*key1_reader, &*key2_reader);
}
#[test]
pub fn successful_derive() {
fn successful_derive() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
let key_reader = key.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
assert_ne!(key_reader.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
}
#[test]
// We should fuzz this
pub fn test_nonce_increment() {
pub fn nonce_increment() {
let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
nonce.increment();

View File

@@ -1 +1,3 @@
pub mod v1;
pub use v1::*;

View File

@@ -1,78 +1,334 @@
use crate::{crypto::KeyCell, safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _};
use chacha20poly1305::Key;
use hmac::Mac as _;
use crate::{
actors::vault::{self, GetState, SignIntegrity, Vault, VerifyIntegrity},
db::{
self,
models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
schema::integrity_envelope,
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
pub const USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_DERIVE_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/useragent/integrity-key/v1".as_bytes();
pub const USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/useragent/pubkey-entry/v1".as_bytes();
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use hmac::Hmac;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use sha2::{Digest as _, Sha256};
/// Computes an integrity tag for a specific domain and payload shape.
pub fn compute_integrity_tag<'a, I>(
integrity_key: &mut KeyCell,
purpose_tag: &[u8],
data_parts: I,
) -> [u8; 32]
where
I: IntoIterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
{
type HmacSha256 = hmac::Hmac<sha2::Sha256>;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] db::DatabaseError),
let mut output_tag = [0u8; 32];
integrity_key.0.read_inline(|integrity_key_bytes: &Key| {
let mut mac = <HmacSha256 as hmac::Mac>::new_from_slice(integrity_key_bytes.as_ref())
.expect("HMAC key initialization must not fail for 32-byte key");
mac.update(purpose_tag);
for data_part in data_parts {
mac.update(data_part);
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Integrity envelope is missing for entity {entity_kind}")]
MissingEnvelope { entity_kind: &'static str },
#[error(
"Integrity payload version mismatch for entity {entity_kind}: expected {expected}, found {found}"
)]
PayloadVersionMismatch {
entity_kind: &'static str,
expected: i32,
found: i32,
},
#[error("Integrity MAC mismatch for entity {entity_kind}")]
MacMismatch { entity_kind: &'static str },
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum AttestationStatus {
Attested,
Unavailable,
}
pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
const KIND: &'static str;
const VERSION: i32 = 1;
}
fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
payload.hash(&mut hasher);
hasher.finalize().into()
}
fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #85"
)]
out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
}
fn build_mac_input(
entity_kind: &str,
entity_id: &[u8],
payload_version: i32,
payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
out
}
pub trait IntoId {
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8>;
}
impl IntoId for i32 {
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
}
output_tag.copy_from_slice(&mac.finalize().into_bytes());
});
}
output_tag
impl IntoId for &'_ [u8] {
fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.to_vec()
}
}
pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity: &E,
entity_id: impl IntoId,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
let (key_version, mac) =
vault
.ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Vault(inner),
_ => Error::VaultSend,
})?;
insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
.values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
entity_id,
payload_version: E::VERSION,
key_version,
mac: mac.clone(),
})
.on_conflict((
integrity_envelope::entity_id,
integrity_envelope::entity_kind,
))
.do_update()
.set((
integrity_envelope::payload_version.eq(E::VERSION),
integrity_envelope::key_version.eq(key_version),
integrity_envelope::mac.eq(mac),
))
.execute(conn)
.await
.map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(())
}
pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity: &E,
entity_id: impl IntoId,
) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
let envelope: IntegrityEnvelope = integrity_envelope::table
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&entity_id))
.first(conn)
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
diesel::result::Error::NotFound => Error::MissingEnvelope {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
},
other => Error::Database(db::DatabaseError::from(other)),
})?;
if envelope.payload_version != E::VERSION {
return Err(Error::PayloadVersionMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
expected: E::VERSION,
found: envelope.payload_version,
});
}
let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash);
let result = vault
.ask(VerifyIntegrity {
mac_input,
expected_mac: envelope.mac,
key_version: envelope.key_version,
})
.await;
match result {
Ok(true) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested),
Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
}),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
}
}
pub async fn is_signing_available(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let state = vault.ask(GetState).await.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
Ok(matches!(state, vault::VaultState::Unsealed))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
use crate::{
crypto::{derive_key, encryption::v1::generate_salt},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{Bootstrap, Vault},
},
db::{self, schema},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
#[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
struct DummyEntity {
payload_version: i32,
payload: Vec<u8>,
}
impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
}
async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
let actor = Vault::spawn(
Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap(),
);
actor
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actor
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
use super::{USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG, compute_integrity_tag};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
#[test]
pub fn integrity_tag_deterministic() {
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut integrity_key = derive_key(SafeCell::new(b"password".to_vec()), &salt);
let key_type = 1i32.to_be_bytes();
let t1 = compute_integrity_tag(
&mut integrity_key,
USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
[key_type.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
);
let t2 = compute_integrity_tag(
&mut integrity_key,
USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
[key_type.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
);
assert_eq!(t1, t2);
let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
}
#[test]
pub fn integrity_tag_changes_with_payload() {
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut integrity_key = derive_key(SafeCell::new(b"password".to_vec()), &salt);
let key_type_1 = 1i32.to_be_bytes();
let key_type_2 = 2i32.to_be_bytes();
let t1 = compute_integrity_tag(
&mut integrity_key,
USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
[key_type_1.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
);
let t2 = compute_integrity_tag(
&mut integrity_key,
USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
[key_type_2.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
);
assert_ne!(t1, t2);
#[tokio::test]
async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
let tampered = DummyEntity {
payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
..entity
};
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
use std::ops::Deref as _;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
use chacha20poly1305::{
@@ -10,13 +11,9 @@ use rand::{
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
pub mod encryption;
pub mod integrity;
use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
fn from(value: SafeCell<Key>) -> Self {
@@ -41,11 +38,8 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
impl KeyCell {
pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng)
.expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
});
@@ -59,8 +53,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
@@ -72,8 +65,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
buffer: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let mut buffer = buffer.write();
let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
@@ -87,8 +79,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
@@ -102,24 +93,29 @@ impl KeyCell {
}
}
/// User password might be of different length, have not enough entropy, etc...
/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
let params = argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap();
let params = {
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
argon2::Params::new(8, 1, 1, None).unwrap()
}
#[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
{
argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap()
}
};
let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
password.read_inline(|password_source| {
let mut key_buffer = key.write();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Better fail completely than return a weak key"
)]
hasher
.hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
.unwrap();
.hash_password_into(password_source, salt, key_buffer)
.expect("Better fail completely than return a weak key");
});
key.into()
@@ -131,10 +127,10 @@ mod tests {
derive_key,
encryption::v1::{Nonce, generate_salt},
};
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[test]
pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
fn encrypt_decrypt() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ use diesel_async::{
sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
};
use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::info;
@@ -23,14 +22,14 @@ const MIGRATIONS: EmbeddedMigrations = embed_migrations!("migrations");
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
#[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
HomeDir(std::io::Error),
#[error(transparent)]
ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
#[error(transparent)]
Connection(diesel::ConnectionError),
#[error(transparent)]
ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
HomeDir(std::io::Error),
#[error(transparent)]
Migration(Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>),
@@ -41,10 +40,11 @@ pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum DatabaseError {
#[error("Database connection error")]
Pool(#[from] PoolError),
#[error("Database query error")]
Connection(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Database connection error")]
Pool(#[from] PoolError),
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
@@ -93,13 +93,16 @@ fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
/// Creates a connection pool for the `SQLite` database.
///
/// # Panics
/// Panics if the database path is not valid UTF-8.
pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
database_path()?
.to_str()
.expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_string(),
.to_owned(),
);
initialize_database(&database_url)?;
@@ -133,19 +136,20 @@ pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetu
Ok(pool)
}
#[mutants::skip]
#[expect(clippy::missing_panics_doc, reason = "Tests oriented function")]
/// Creates a test database pool with a temporary `SQLite` database file.
pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
let tempfile_name = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), 16);
let file = std::env::temp_dir().join(tempfile_name);
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
let url = file
.to_str()
.expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_string();
.to_owned();
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
create_pool(Some(&url))
.await
.expect("Failed to create test database pool")

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
#![allow(unused)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
#![allow(
clippy::duplicated_attributes,
reason = "restructed's #[view] causes false positives"
)]
use crate::db::schema::{
self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_transaction_log, evm_wallet,
root_key_history, tls_history,
integrity_envelope, root_key_history, tls_history,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
use restructed::Models;
@@ -27,16 +28,16 @@ pub mod types {
pub struct SqliteTimestamp(pub DateTime<Utc>);
impl SqliteTimestamp {
pub fn now() -> Self {
SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())
Self(Utc::now())
}
}
impl From<chrono::DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from(dt: chrono::DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
SqliteTimestamp(dt)
impl From<DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from(dt: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
Self(dt)
}
}
impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for chrono::DateTime<Utc> {
impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for DateTime<Utc> {
fn from(ts: SqliteTimestamp) -> Self {
ts.0
}
@@ -47,6 +48,11 @@ pub mod types {
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #84; this will break up in 2038 :3"
)]
let unix_timestamp = self.0.timestamp() as i32;
out.set_value(unix_timestamp);
Ok(IsNull::No)
@@ -69,41 +75,47 @@ pub mod types {
let datetime =
DateTime::from_timestamp(unix_timestamp, 0).ok_or("Timestamp is out of bounds")?;
Ok(SqliteTimestamp(datetime))
Ok(Self(datetime))
}
}
/// Key algorithm stored in the `useragent_client.key_type` column.
/// Values must stay stable — they are persisted in the database.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, strum::FromRepr)]
#[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum KeyType {
Ed25519 = 1,
EcdsaSecp256k1 = 2,
Rsa = 3,
}
#[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
pub struct ChainId(pub i32);
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_sign_loss,
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants"
)]
const _: () = {
impl From<ChainId> for alloy::primitives::ChainId {
fn from(chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
chain_id.0 as Self
}
}
impl From<alloy::primitives::ChainId> for ChainId {
fn from(chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId) -> Self {
Self(chain_id as _)
}
}
};
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for ChainId {
fn from_sql(
bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
FromSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::from_sql(bytes).map(Self)
}
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for ChainId {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
out.set_value(*self as i32);
Ok(IsNull::No)
}
}
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err("Expected Integer for KeyType".into());
};
let discriminant = bytes.read_long();
KeyType::from_repr(discriminant as i32)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("Unknown KeyType discriminant: {discriminant}").into())
ToSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::to_sql(&self.0, out)
}
}
}
@@ -229,7 +241,6 @@ pub struct ProgramClientMetadataHistory {
#[diesel(table_name = schema::program_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProgramClient {
pub id: i32,
pub nonce: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub metadata_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
@@ -240,12 +251,9 @@ pub struct ProgramClient {
#[diesel(table_name = schema::useragent_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct UseragentClient {
pub id: i32,
pub nonce: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub pubkey_integrity_tag: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub key_type: KeyType,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
@@ -273,7 +281,7 @@ pub struct EvmEtherTransferLimit {
pub struct EvmBasicGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub wallet_access_id: i32, // references evm_wallet_access.id
pub chain_id: i32,
pub chain_id: ChainId,
pub valid_from: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub valid_until: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
@@ -296,7 +304,7 @@ pub struct EvmTransactionLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub wallet_access_id: i32,
pub chain_id: i32,
pub chain_id: ChainId,
pub eth_value: Vec<u8>,
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
@@ -371,9 +379,28 @@ pub struct EvmTokenTransferLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub log_id: i32,
pub chain_id: i32,
pub chain_id: ChainId,
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
pub recipient_address: Vec<u8>,
pub value: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = integrity_envelope, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewIntegrityEnvelope,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, signed_at, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct IntegrityEnvelope {
pub id: i32,
pub entity_kind: String,
pub entity_id: Vec<u8>,
pub payload_version: i32,
pub key_version: i32,
pub mac: Vec<u8>,
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}

View File

@@ -139,10 +139,22 @@ diesel::table! {
}
}
diesel::table! {
integrity_envelope (id) {
id -> Integer,
entity_kind -> Text,
entity_id -> Binary,
payload_version -> Integer,
key_version -> Integer,
mac -> Binary,
signed_at -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
program_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
nonce -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
metadata_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
@@ -176,10 +188,7 @@ diesel::table! {
diesel::table! {
useragent_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
nonce -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
pubkey_integrity_tag -> Nullable<Binary>,
key_type -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
@@ -220,6 +229,7 @@ diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
evm_transaction_log,
evm_wallet,
evm_wallet_access,
integrity_envelope,
program_client,
root_key_history,
tls_history,

View File

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ sol! {
sol! {
/// Permit2 — Uniswap's canonical token approval manager.
/// Replaces per-contract ERC-20 approve() with a single approval hub.
/// Replaces per-contract ERC-20 `approve()` with a single approval hub.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IPermit2 {
struct TokenPermissions {

View File

@@ -1,15 +1,6 @@
pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer;
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{TxKind, U256},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::{
actors::vault::Vault,
crypto::integrity,
db::{
self, DatabaseError,
models::{
@@ -18,12 +9,24 @@ use crate::{
schema::{self, evm_transaction_log},
},
evm::policies::{
DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, FullGrant, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
CombinedSettings, DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy,
SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
};
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{TxKind, U256},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer;
pub mod policies;
mod utils;
@@ -31,11 +34,14 @@ mod utils;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum PolicyError {
#[error("Database error")]
Database(#[from] crate::db::DatabaseError),
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Transaction violates policy: {0:?}")]
Violations(Vec<EvalViolation>),
#[error("No matching grant found")]
NoMatchingGrant,
#[error("Integrity error: {0}")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -57,6 +63,15 @@ pub enum AnalyzeError {
UnsupportedTransactionType,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ListError {
#[error("Database error")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Integrity verification failed for grant")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
/// Controls whether a transaction should be executed or only validated
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RunKind {
@@ -75,6 +90,14 @@ async fn check_shared_constraints(
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let now = Utc::now();
if shared.chain != context.chain {
violations.push(EvalViolation::MismatchingChainId {
expected: shared.chain,
actual: context.chain,
});
return Ok(violations);
}
// Validity window
if shared.valid_from.is_some_and(|t| now < t) || shared.valid_until.is_some_and(|t| now > t) {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTime);
@@ -104,7 +127,7 @@ async fn check_shared_constraints(
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
if count >= rate_limit.count as i64 {
if count >= rate_limit.count.into() {
violations.push(EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded);
}
}
@@ -115,6 +138,7 @@ async fn check_shared_constraints(
// Supporting only EIP-1559 transactions for now, but we can easily extend this to support legacy transactions if needed
pub struct Engine {
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
}
impl Engine {
@@ -123,7 +147,10 @@ impl Engine {
context: EvalContext,
meaning: &P::Meaning,
run_kind: RunKind,
) -> Result<(), PolicyError> {
) -> Result<(), PolicyError>
where
P::Settings: Clone,
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
@@ -131,8 +158,14 @@ impl Engine {
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant)?;
let mut violations =
check_shared_constraints(&context, &grant.shared, grant.shared_grant_id, &mut conn)
integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &self.vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
let mut violations = check_shared_constraints(
&context,
&grant.settings.shared,
grant.common_settings_id,
&mut conn,
)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
violations.extend(
@@ -143,14 +176,16 @@ impl Engine {
if !violations.is_empty() {
return Err(PolicyError::Violations(violations));
} else if run_kind == RunKind::Execution {
}
if run_kind == RunKind::Execution {
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let log_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(&NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: grant.shared_grant_id,
grant_id: grant.common_settings_id,
wallet_access_id: context.target.id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
chain_id: context.chain.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(context.value).to_vec(),
signed_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
@@ -172,42 +207,52 @@ impl Engine {
}
impl Engine {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Self {
Self { db }
pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, vault: ActorRef<Vault>) -> Self {
Self { db, vault }
}
pub async fn create_grant<P: Policy>(
&self,
full_grant: FullGrant<P::Settings>,
) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError> {
full_grant: CombinedSettings<P::Settings>,
) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError>
where
P::Settings: Clone,
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let vault = self.vault.clone();
let id = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use schema::evm_basic_grant;
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #86"
)]
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmBasicGrant {
chain_id: full_grant.basic.chain as i32,
wallet_access_id: full_grant.basic.wallet_access_id,
valid_from: full_grant.basic.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: full_grant.basic.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
chain_id: full_grant.shared.chain.into(),
wallet_access_id: full_grant.shared.wallet_access_id,
valid_from: full_grant.shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: full_grant.shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.basic
.shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.basic
.shared
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
rate_limit_count: full_grant
.basic
.shared
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.count as i32),
rate_limit_window_secs: full_grant
.basic
.shared
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.window.num_seconds() as i32),
@@ -217,7 +262,13 @@ impl Engine {
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await
P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await?;
integrity::sign_entity(conn, &vault, &full_grant, basic_grant.id)
.await
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
QueryResult::Ok(basic_grant.id)
})
})
.await?;
@@ -225,33 +276,36 @@ impl Engine {
Ok(id)
}
pub async fn list_all_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, DatabaseError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
async fn list_one_kind<Kind: Policy, Y>(
&self,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> Result<impl Iterator<Item = Grant<Y>>, ListError>
where
Y: From<Kind::Settings>,
{
let all_grants = Kind::find_all_grants(conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// Verify integrity of all grants before returning any results
for grant in &all_grants {
integrity::verify_entity(conn, &self.vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
}
Ok(all_grants.into_iter().map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
common_settings_id: g.common_settings_id,
settings: g.settings.generalize(),
}))
}
pub async fn list_all_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, ListError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let mut grants: Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>> = Vec::new();
grants.extend(
EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut conn)
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
shared_grant_id: g.shared_grant_id,
shared: g.shared,
settings: SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(g.settings),
}),
);
grants.extend(
TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut conn)
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
shared_grant_id: g.shared_grant_id,
shared: g.shared,
settings: SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(g.settings),
}),
);
grants.extend(self.list_one_kind::<EtherTransfer, _>(&mut conn).await?);
grants.extend(self.list_one_kind::<TokenTransfer, _>(&mut conn).await?);
Ok(grants)
}
@@ -265,7 +319,7 @@ impl Engine {
let TxKind::Call(to) = transaction.to else {
return Err(VetError::ContractCreationNotSupported);
};
let context = policies::EvalContext {
let context = EvalContext {
target,
chain: transaction.chain_id,
to,
@@ -297,3 +351,261 @@ impl Engine {
Err(VetError::UnsupportedTransactionType)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use rstest::rstest;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::policies::{
EvalContext, EvalViolation, SharedGrantSettings, TransactionRateLimit,
};
use super::check_shared_constraints;
const WALLET_ACCESS_ID: i32 = 1;
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const RECIPIENT: Address = address!("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111");
fn context() -> EvalContext {
EvalContext {
target: EvmWalletAccess {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: 10,
client_id: 20,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
},
chain: CHAIN_ID,
to: RECIPIENT,
value: U256::ZERO,
calldata: Bytes::new(),
max_fee_per_gas: 100,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 10,
}
}
fn shared_settings() -> SharedGrantSettings {
SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
}
}
async fn insert_basic_grant(
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
shared: &SharedGrantSettings,
) -> EvmBasicGrant {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #86"
)]
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: shared.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: shared.chain.into(),
valid_from: shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| super::utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: shared
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| super::utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
rate_limit_count: shared.rate_limit.as_ref().map(|limit| limit.count as i32),
rate_limit_window_secs: shared
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|limit| limit.window.num_seconds() as i32),
revoked_at: None,
})
.returning(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
#[rstest]
#[case::matching_chain(CHAIN_ID, false)]
#[case::mismatching_chain(CHAIN_ID + 1, true)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_chain_id(
#[case] context_chain: u64,
#[case] expect_mismatch: bool,
) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let context = EvalContext {
chain: context_chain,
..context()
};
let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context, &shared_settings(), 999, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
violations
.iter()
.any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::MismatchingChainId { .. })),
expect_mismatch
);
if expect_mismatch {
assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
} else {
assert!(violations.is_empty());
}
}
#[rstest]
#[case::valid_from_in_bounds(Some(Utc::now() - Duration::hours(1)), None, false)]
#[case::valid_from_out_of_bounds(Some(Utc::now() + Duration::hours(1)), None, true)]
#[case::valid_until_in_bounds(None, Some(Utc::now() + Duration::hours(1)), false)]
#[case::valid_until_out_of_bounds(None, Some(Utc::now() - Duration::hours(1)), true)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_validity_window(
#[case] valid_from: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
#[case] valid_until: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
#[case] expect_invalid_time: bool,
) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let shared = SharedGrantSettings {
valid_from,
valid_until,
..shared_settings()
};
let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context(), &shared, 999, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
violations
.iter()
.any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::InvalidTime)),
expect_invalid_time
);
if expect_invalid_time {
assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
} else {
assert!(violations.is_empty());
}
}
#[rstest]
#[case::max_fee_within_limit(Some(U256::from(100u64)), None, 100, 10, false)]
#[case::max_fee_exceeded(Some(U256::from(99u64)), None, 100, 10, true)]
#[case::priority_fee_within_limit(None, Some(U256::from(10u64)), 100, 10, false)]
#[case::priority_fee_exceeded(None, Some(U256::from(9u64)), 100, 10, true)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_gas_fee_caps(
#[case] max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
#[case] max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
#[case] actual_max_fee_per_gas: u128,
#[case] actual_max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128,
#[case] expect_gas_limit_violation: bool,
) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let context = EvalContext {
max_fee_per_gas: actual_max_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: actual_max_priority_fee_per_gas,
..context()
};
let shared = SharedGrantSettings {
max_gas_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas,
..shared_settings()
};
let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context, &shared, 999, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
violations
.iter()
.any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::GasLimitExceeded { .. })),
expect_gas_limit_violation
);
if expect_gas_limit_violation {
assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
} else {
assert!(violations.is_empty());
}
}
#[rstest]
#[case::under_rate_limit(2, false)]
#[case::at_rate_limit(1, true)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_rate_limit(
#[case] rate_limit_count: u32,
#[case] expect_rate_limit_violation: bool,
) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let shared = SharedGrantSettings {
rate_limit: Some(TransactionRateLimit {
count: rate_limit_count,
window: Duration::hours(1),
}),
..shared_settings()
};
let basic_grant = insert_basic_grant(&mut conn, &shared).await;
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: basic_grant.id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: super::utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::ZERO).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context(), &shared, basic_grant.id, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
violations
.iter()
.any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded)),
expect_rate_limit_violation
);
if expect_rate_limit_violation {
assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
} else {
assert!(violations.is_empty());
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
use std::fmt::Display;
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
db::models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess},
evm::utils,
};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, ChainId, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
@@ -6,14 +10,9 @@ use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, result::QueryResult, sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use std::fmt::Display;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
db::models::{self, EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess},
evm::utils,
};
pub mod ether_transfer;
pub mod token_transfers;
@@ -55,6 +54,9 @@ pub enum EvalViolation {
#[error("Transaction type is not allowed by this grant")]
InvalidTransactionType,
#[error("Mismatching chain ID")]
MismatchingChainId { expected: ChainId, actual: ChainId },
}
pub type DatabaseID = i32;
@@ -62,13 +64,12 @@ pub type DatabaseID = i32;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Grant<PolicySettings> {
pub id: DatabaseID,
pub shared_grant_id: DatabaseID, // ID of the basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
pub shared: SharedGrantSettings,
pub settings: PolicySettings,
pub common_settings_id: DatabaseID, // ID of the basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
pub settings: CombinedSettings<PolicySettings>,
}
pub trait Policy: Sized {
type Settings: Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificGrant>;
type Settings: Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificGrant> + Integrable;
type Meaning: Display + std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificMeaning>;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning>;
@@ -84,10 +85,10 @@ pub trait Policy: Sized {
// Create a new grant in the database based on the provided grant details, and return its ID
fn create_grant(
basic: &models::EvmBasicGrant,
basic: &EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = QueryResult<DatabaseID>> + Send;
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<DatabaseID>> + Send;
// Try to find an existing grant that matches the transaction context, and return its details if found
// Additionally, return ID of basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
@@ -124,19 +125,19 @@ pub enum SpecificMeaning {
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Meaning),
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct TransactionRateLimit {
pub count: u32,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct VolumeRateLimit {
pub max_volume: U256,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
pub wallet_access_id: i32,
pub chain: ChainId,
@@ -151,10 +152,10 @@ pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
}
impl SharedGrantSettings {
fn try_from_model(model: EvmBasicGrant) -> QueryResult<Self> {
pub(crate) fn try_from_model(model: EvmBasicGrant) -> QueryResult<Self> {
Ok(Self {
wallet_access_id: model.wallet_access_id,
chain: model.chain_id as u64, // safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants
chain: model.chain_id.into(),
valid_from: model.valid_from.map(Into::into),
valid_until: model.valid_until.map(Into::into),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: model
@@ -165,10 +166,11 @@ impl SharedGrantSettings {
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))
.transpose()?,
#[expect(clippy::cast_sign_loss, clippy::as_conversions, reason = "fixme! #86")]
rate_limit: match (model.rate_limit_count, model.rate_limit_window_secs) {
(Some(count), Some(window_secs)) => Some(TransactionRateLimit {
count: count as u32,
window: Duration::seconds(window_secs as i64),
window: Duration::seconds(window_secs.into()),
}),
_ => None,
},
@@ -178,7 +180,7 @@ impl SharedGrantSettings {
pub async fn query_by_id(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
id: i32,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<Self> {
) -> QueryResult<Self> {
use crate::db::schema::evm_basic_grant;
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = evm_basic_grant::table
@@ -197,7 +199,22 @@ pub enum SpecificGrant {
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings),
}
pub struct FullGrant<PolicyGrant> {
pub basic: SharedGrantSettings,
#[derive(Debug, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct CombinedSettings<PolicyGrant> {
pub shared: SharedGrantSettings,
pub specific: PolicyGrant,
}
impl<P> CombinedSettings<P> {
pub fn generalize<Y: From<P>>(self) -> CombinedSettings<Y> {
CombinedSettings {
shared: self.shared,
specific: self.specific.into(),
}
}
}
impl<P: Integrable> Integrable for CombinedSettings<P> {
const KIND: &'static str = P::KIND;
const VERSION: i32 = P::VERSION;
}

View File

@@ -1,29 +1,32 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fmt::Display;
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, JoinOnDsl, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::db::models::{
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, EvmEtherTransferLimit,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_transaction_log};
use crate::evm::policies::{
Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
};
use crate::{
},
db::schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_transaction_log},
db::{
models::{self, NewEvmEtherTransferGrant, NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget},
models::{NewEvmEtherTransferGrant, NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget},
schema::{evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target},
},
evm::policies::{
CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
evm::{policies::Policy, utils},
};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{
dsl::{auto_type, insert_into},
prelude::*,
sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use std::{collections::HashMap, fmt::Display};
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
evm_ether_transfer_grant::table.inner_join(
@@ -31,8 +34,6 @@ fn grant_join() -> _ {
)
}
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
// Plain ether transfer
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {
@@ -45,21 +46,24 @@ impl Display for Meaning {
}
}
impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
fn from(val: Meaning) -> SpecificMeaning {
SpecificMeaning::EtherTransfer(val)
fn from(val: Meaning) -> Self {
Self::EtherTransfer(val)
}
}
// A grant for ether transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct Settings {
pub target: Vec<Address>,
pub limit: VolumeRateLimit,
}
impl Integrable for Settings {
const KIND: &'static str = "EtherTransfer";
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(val)
fn from(val: Settings) -> Self {
Self::EtherTransfer(val)
}
}
@@ -70,9 +74,7 @@ async fn query_relevant_past_transaction(
) -> QueryResult<Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)>> {
let past_transactions: Vec<(Vec<u8>, SqliteTimestamp)> = evm_transaction_log::table
.filter(evm_transaction_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id))
.filter(
evm_transaction_log::signed_at.ge(SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() - longest_window)),
)
.filter(evm_transaction_log::signed_at.ge(SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now() - longest_window)))
.select((
evm_transaction_log::eth_value,
evm_transaction_log::signed_at,
@@ -95,17 +97,17 @@ async fn check_rate_limits(
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let window = grant.settings.limit.window;
let window = grant.settings.specific.limit.window;
let past_transaction = query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.id, window, db).await?;
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - grant.settings.limit.window;
let window_start = Utc::now() - grant.settings.specific.limit.window;
let prospective_cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transaction
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
.fold(current_transfer_value, |acc, (value, _)| acc + *value);
if prospective_cumulative_volume > grant.settings.limit.max_volume {
if prospective_cumulative_volume > grant.settings.specific.limit.max_volume {
violations.push(EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded);
}
@@ -138,7 +140,7 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
// Check if the target address is within the grant's allowed targets
if !grant.settings.target.contains(&meaning.to) {
if !grant.settings.specific.target.contains(&meaning.to) {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target: meaning.to });
}
@@ -149,10 +151,15 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
}
async fn create_grant(
basic: &models::EvmBasicGrant,
basic: &EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<DatabaseID> {
) -> QueryResult<DatabaseID> {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #86"
)]
let limit_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_limit::table)
.values(NewEvmEtherTransferLimit {
window_secs: grant.limit.window.num_seconds() as i32,
@@ -187,7 +194,7 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
async fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
) -> QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let target_bytes = context.to.to_vec();
// Find a grant where:
@@ -241,15 +248,17 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume)
.map_err(|err| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err)))?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs.into()),
},
};
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: grant.id,
shared_grant_id: grant.basic_grant_id,
common_settings_id: grant.basic_grant_id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
settings,
specific: settings,
},
}))
}
@@ -259,7 +268,7 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
_log_id: i32,
_grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
_conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<()> {
) -> QueryResult<()> {
// Basic log is sufficient
Ok(())
@@ -312,7 +321,7 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
.map(|(basic, specific)| {
let targets: Vec<Address> = targets_by_grant
.get(&specific.id)
.map(|v| v.as_slice())
.map(Vec::as_slice)
.unwrap_or_default()
.iter()
.filter_map(|t| {
@@ -327,15 +336,17 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
Ok(Grant {
id: specific.id,
shared_grant_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
common_settings_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic)?,
settings: Settings {
specific: Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(
|e| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(e)),
)?,
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs.into()),
},
},
},
})

View File

@@ -1,24 +1,28 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
use crate::{
db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::{
policies::{EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, VolumeRateLimit},
},
evm::{
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
},
};
use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
const WALLET_ACCESS_ID: i32 = 1;
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const CHAIN_ID: alloy::primitives::ChainId = 1;
const ALLOWED: Address = address!("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111");
const OTHER: Address = address!("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222");
@@ -44,7 +48,7 @@ async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicG
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
@@ -81,8 +85,6 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
}
}
// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn analyze_matches_empty_calldata() {
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1_000u64))).unwrap();
@@ -99,8 +101,6 @@ fn analyze_rejects_nonempty_calldata() {
assert!(EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).is_none());
}
// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_for_allowed_target() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
@@ -108,9 +108,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_for_allowed_target() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
specific: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
},
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
@@ -127,9 +129,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_disallowed_target() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
specific: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
},
};
let context = ctx(OTHER, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
@@ -157,7 +161,7 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_when_volume_within_limit() {
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(500u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
@@ -167,9 +171,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_when_volume_within_limit() {
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
common_settings_id: basic.id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings,
specific: settings,
},
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
@@ -197,7 +203,7 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_000u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
@@ -207,9 +213,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
common_settings_id: basic.id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings,
specific: settings,
},
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
@@ -238,7 +246,7 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(900u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
@@ -248,9 +256,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
common_settings_id: basic.id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings,
specific: settings,
},
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
@@ -263,8 +273,6 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
);
}
// ── try_find_grant ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
@@ -282,8 +290,11 @@ async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
assert!(found.is_some());
let g = found.unwrap();
assert_eq!(g.settings.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
assert_eq!(g.settings.limit.max_volume, U256::from(1_000_000u64));
assert_eq!(g.settings.specific.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
assert_eq!(
g.settings.specific.limit.max_volume,
U256::from(1_000_000u64)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -320,7 +331,36 @@ async fn try_find_grant_wrong_target_returns_none() {
assert!(found.is_none());
}
// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
proptest::proptest! {
#[test]
fn target_order_does_not_affect_hash(
raw_addrs in proptest::collection::vec(proptest::prelude::any::<[u8; 20]>(), 0..8),
seed in proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(),
max_volume in proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(),
window_secs in 1i64..=86400,
) {
use rand::{SeedableRng, seq::SliceRandom};
use sha2::Digest;
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
let addrs: Vec<Address> = raw_addrs.iter().map(|b| Address::from(*b)).collect();
let mut shuffled = addrs.clone();
shuffled.shuffle(&mut rand::rngs::StdRng::seed_from_u64(seed));
let limit = VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(max_volume),
window: Duration::seconds(window_secs),
};
let mut h1 = sha2::Sha256::new();
Settings { target: addrs, limit: limit.clone() }.hash(&mut h1);
let mut h2 = sha2::Sha256::new();
Settings { target: shuffled, limit }.hash(&mut h2);
proptest::prop_assert_eq!(h1.finalize(), h2.finalize());
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {
@@ -347,7 +387,7 @@ async fn find_all_grants_excludes_revoked() {
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.specific.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -363,8 +403,11 @@ async fn find_all_grants_multiple_targets() {
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.target.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.limit.max_volume, U256::from(1_000_000u64));
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.specific.target.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(
all[0].settings.specific.limit.max_volume,
U256::from(1_000_000u64)
);
}
#[tokio::test]

View File

@@ -1,33 +1,38 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, U256},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, NewEvmTokenTransferGrant,
NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::Integrable,
db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
NewEvmTokenTransferGrant, NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
SqliteTimestamp,
},
db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
};
use crate::evm::{
},
evm::policies::CombinedSettings,
evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
},
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, U256},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{
dsl::{auto_type, insert_into},
prelude::*,
sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use std::collections::HashMap;
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
@@ -38,9 +43,9 @@ fn grant_join() -> _ {
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {
pub(crate) token: &'static TokenInfo,
pub(crate) to: Address,
pub(crate) value: U256,
pub token: &'static TokenInfo,
pub to: Address,
pub value: U256,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for Meaning {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
@@ -52,21 +57,25 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for Meaning {
}
}
impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
fn from(val: Meaning) -> SpecificMeaning {
SpecificMeaning::TokenTransfer(val)
fn from(val: Meaning) -> Self {
Self::TokenTransfer(val)
}
}
// A grant for token transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct Settings {
pub token_contract: Address,
pub target: Option<Address>,
pub volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit>,
}
impl Integrable for Settings {
const KIND: &'static str = "TokenTransfer";
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(val)
fn from(val: Settings) -> Self {
Self::TokenTransfer(val)
}
}
@@ -77,10 +86,7 @@ async fn query_relevant_past_transfers(
) -> QueryResult<Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)>> {
let past_logs: Vec<(Vec<u8>, SqliteTimestamp)> = evm_token_transfer_log::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id))
.filter(
evm_token_transfer_log::created_at
.ge(SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() - longest_window)),
)
.filter(evm_token_transfer_log::created_at.ge(SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now() - longest_window)))
.select((
evm_token_transfer_log::value,
evm_token_transfer_log::created_at,
@@ -106,14 +112,21 @@ async fn check_volume_rate_limits(
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let Some(longest_window) = grant.settings.volume_limits.iter().map(|l| l.window).max() else {
let Some(longest_window) = grant
.settings
.specific
.volume_limits
.iter()
.map(|l| l.window)
.max()
else {
return Ok(violations);
};
let past_transfers = query_relevant_past_transfers(grant.id, longest_window, db).await?;
for limit in &grant.settings.volume_limits {
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - limit.window;
for limit in &grant.settings.specific.volume_limits {
let window_start = Utc::now() - limit.window;
let prospective_cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transfers
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
@@ -158,7 +171,7 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
return Ok(violations);
}
if let Some(allowed) = grant.settings.target
if let Some(allowed) = grant.settings.specific.target
&& allowed != meaning.to
{
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target: meaning.to });
@@ -189,6 +202,11 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
.await?;
for limit in &grant.volume_limits {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #86"
)]
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
grant_id,
@@ -238,7 +256,7 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(|err| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
})?,
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs.into()),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
@@ -269,9 +287,11 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: token_grant.id,
shared_grant_id: token_grant.basic_grant_id,
common_settings_id: token_grant.basic_grant_id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
settings,
specific: settings,
},
}))
}
@@ -286,7 +306,7 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id: grant.id,
log_id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
chain_id: context.chain.into(),
token_contract: context.to.to_vec(),
recipient_address: meaning.to.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(meaning.value).to_vec(),
@@ -335,7 +355,7 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
.map(|(basic, specific)| {
let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = limits_by_grant
.get(&specific.id)
.map(|v| v.as_slice())
.map(Vec::as_slice)
.unwrap_or_default()
.iter()
.map(|row| {
@@ -343,7 +363,7 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(|e| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(e))
})?,
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs.into()),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
@@ -369,13 +389,15 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
Ok(Grant {
id: specific.id,
shared_grant_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
common_settings_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic)?,
settings: Settings {
specific: Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
},
},
})
})
.collect()

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,27 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use alloy::sol_types::SolCall;
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
use crate::{
db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::evm_basic_grant,
};
use crate::evm::{
},
evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, VolumeRateLimit},
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
},
};
use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
// DAI on Ethereum mainnet — present in the static token registry
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
@@ -56,7 +62,7 @@ async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicG
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
@@ -98,8 +104,6 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
}
}
// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn analyze_known_token_valid_calldata() {
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
@@ -125,8 +129,6 @@ fn analyze_empty_calldata_returns_none() {
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, Bytes::new())).is_none());
}
// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_nonzero_eth_value() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
@@ -134,9 +136,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_nonzero_eth_value() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None),
specific: make_settings(None, None),
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let mut context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -163,9 +167,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_any_recipient_when_no_restriction() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None),
specific: make_settings(None, None),
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -183,9 +189,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_matching_restricted_recipient() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
specific: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -203,9 +211,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_wrong_restricted_recipient() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
specific: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(OTHER, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -231,12 +241,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_volume_at_exact_limit() {
.unwrap();
// Record a past transfer of 900, with current transfer 100 => exactly 1000 limit
use crate::db::{models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog, schema::evm_token_transfer_log};
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
insert_into(db::schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(db::models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(900u64)).to_vec(),
@@ -247,9 +256,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_volume_at_exact_limit() {
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
common_settings_id: basic.id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings,
specific: settings,
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -274,12 +285,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
.await
.unwrap();
use crate::db::{models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog, schema::evm_token_transfer_log};
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
insert_into(db::schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(db::models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_000u64)).to_vec(),
@@ -290,9 +300,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
common_settings_id: basic.id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings,
specific: settings,
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(1u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -313,9 +325,11 @@ async fn evaluate_no_volume_limits_always_passes() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None), // no volume limits
specific: make_settings(None, None), // no volume limits
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(u64::MAX));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -349,10 +363,13 @@ async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
assert!(found.is_some());
let g = found.unwrap();
assert_eq!(g.settings.token_contract, DAI);
assert_eq!(g.settings.target, Some(RECIPIENT));
assert_eq!(g.settings.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(g.settings.volume_limits[0].max_volume, U256::from(5_000u64));
assert_eq!(g.settings.specific.token_contract, DAI);
assert_eq!(g.settings.specific.target, Some(RECIPIENT));
assert_eq!(g.settings.specific.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
g.settings.specific.volume_limits[0].max_volume,
U256::from(5_000u64)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -392,7 +409,39 @@ async fn try_find_grant_unknown_token_returns_none() {
assert!(found.is_none());
}
// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
proptest::proptest! {
#[test]
fn volume_limits_order_does_not_affect_hash(
raw_limits in proptest::collection::vec(
(proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(), 1i64..=86400),
0..8,
),
seed in proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(),
) {
use rand::{SeedableRng, seq::SliceRandom};
use sha2::Digest;
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
let limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = raw_limits
.iter()
.map(|(max_vol, window_secs)| VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(*max_vol),
window: Duration::seconds(*window_secs),
})
.collect();
let mut shuffled = limits.clone();
shuffled.shuffle(&mut rand::rngs::StdRng::seed_from_u64(seed));
let mut h1 = sha2::Sha256::new();
Settings { token_contract: DAI, target: None, volume_limits: limits }.hash(&mut h1);
let mut h2 = sha2::Sha256::new();
Settings { token_contract: DAI, target: None, volume_limits: shuffled }.hash(&mut h2);
proptest::prop_assert_eq!(h1.finalize(), h2.finalize());
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {
@@ -434,9 +483,9 @@ async fn find_all_grants_loads_volume_limits() {
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.specific.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
all[0].settings.volume_limits[0].max_volume,
all[0].settings.specific.volume_limits[0].max_volume,
U256::from(9_999u64)
);
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::{TxSigner, TxSignerSync},
@@ -9,6 +8,7 @@ use alloy::{
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use k256::ecdsa::{self, RecoveryId, SigningKey, signature::hazmat::PrehashSigner};
use std::sync::Mutex;
/// An Ethereum signer that stores its secp256k1 secret key inside a
/// hardware-protected [`MemSafe`] cell.
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ impl SafeSigner {
})
}
#[expect(clippy::significant_drop_tightening, reason = "false positive")]
fn sign_hash_inner(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
let mut cell = self.key.lock().expect("SafeSigner mutex poisoned");
let reader = cell.read();
let sig: (ecdsa::Signature, RecoveryId) = reader.sign_prehash(hash.as_ref())?;
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ impl SafeSigner {
{
return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
signer: chain_id,
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
tx: tx.chain_id().expect("Chain ID is guaranteed to be set"),
});
}

View File

@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@ use alloy::primitives::U256;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
#[error("Expected {expected} bytes but got {actual} bytes")]
pub struct LengthError {
pub expected: usize,
pub actual: usize,
pub(super) struct LengthError {
pub(super) expected: usize,
pub(super) actual: usize,
}
pub fn u256_to_bytes(value: U256) -> [u8; 32] {
pub const fn u256_to_bytes(value: U256) -> [u8; 32] {
value.to_le_bytes()
}
pub fn bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<U256> {
pub(super) fn bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().ok()?;
Some(U256::from_le_bytes(bytes))
}
pub fn try_bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<U256> {
pub(super) fn try_bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(LengthError {
expected: 32,

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
use crate::{
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::client::{ClientConnection, session::ClientSession},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::client::{
ClientRequest, ClientResponse, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
@@ -5,15 +9,11 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
transport::{Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::client::{ClientConnection, session::ClientSession},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
mod auth;
mod evm;
mod inbound;
@@ -98,8 +98,7 @@ pub async fn start(mut conn: ClientConnection, mut bi: GrpcBi<ClientRequest, Cli
Err(err) => {
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::unauthenticated(format!(
"Authentication failed: {}",
err
"Authentication failed: {err}",
))))
.await;
warn!(error = ?err, "Client authentication failed");

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{Convert, request_tracker::RequestTracker},
peers::client::{ClientConnection, auth},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
proto::{
@@ -16,22 +21,18 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::client::{self, ClientConnection, auth},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub(super) struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub fn new(
pub(super) const fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
) -> Self {
@@ -41,39 +42,6 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
}
}
fn response_to_proto(response: auth::Outbound) -> AuthResponsePayload {
match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
nonce,
})
}
auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess => {
AuthResponsePayload::Result(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into())
}
}
}
fn error_to_proto(error: auth::Error) -> AuthResponsePayload {
AuthResponsePayload::Result(
match error {
auth::Error::InvalidChallengeSolution => ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature,
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Denied) => {
ProtoAuthResult::ApprovalDenied
}
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Upstream(
crate::actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected,
)) => ProtoAuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline,
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Internal)
| auth::Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
| auth::Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
| auth::Error::Transport => ProtoAuthResult::Internal,
}
.into(),
)
}
async fn send_client_response(
&mut self,
payload: AuthResponsePayload,
@@ -101,8 +69,8 @@ impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
item: Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let payload = match item {
Ok(message) => AuthTransportAdapter::response_to_proto(message),
Err(err) => AuthTransportAdapter::error_to_proto(err),
Ok(message) => message.convert(),
Err(err) => err.convert(),
};
self.send_client_response(payload).await
@@ -159,21 +127,17 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
.await;
return None;
};
let Ok(pubkey) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(pubkey) else {
let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
return None;
};
let Ok(pubkey) = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey) else {
let Ok(pubkey) = authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey.as_slice()) else {
let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
return None;
};
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
metadata: client_metadata_from_proto(client_info),
metadata: client_info.convert(),
})
}
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => {
let Ok(signature) = ed25519_dalek::Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) else {
let Ok(signature) = authn::Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) else {
let _ = self
.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature)
.await;
@@ -187,19 +151,69 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
fn client_metadata_from_proto(metadata: ProtoClientInfo) -> ClientMetadata {
impl Convert for ProtoClientInfo {
type Output = ClientMetadata;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
ClientMetadata {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
version: metadata.version,
name: self.name,
description: self.description,
version: self.version,
}
}
}
pub async fn start(
impl Convert for auth::Error {
type Output = AuthResponsePayload;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
use auth::Error::{
ApproveError, DatabaseOperationFailed, DatabasePoolUnavailable, IntegrityCheckFailed,
InvalidChallengeSolution, Transport,
};
AuthResponsePayload::Result(
match self {
InvalidChallengeSolution => ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature,
ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Denied) => ProtoAuthResult::ApprovalDenied,
ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Upstream(
crate::actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected,
)) => ProtoAuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline,
ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Internal)
| DatabasePoolUnavailable
| DatabaseOperationFailed
| IntegrityCheckFailed
| Transport => ProtoAuthResult::Internal,
}
.into(),
)
}
}
impl Convert for auth::Outbound {
type Output = AuthResponsePayload;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
match self {
Self::AuthChallenge { challenge } => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
timestamp_nanos: challenge
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("timestamp within range")
as u64,
random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
})
}
Self::AuthSuccess => AuthResponsePayload::Result(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into()),
}
}
}
pub(super) async fn start(
conn: &mut ClientConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
) -> Result<i32, auth::Error> {
let mut transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
client::auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await
auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
peers::client::session::{ClientSession, HandleSignTransaction, SignTransactionRpcError},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
@@ -11,19 +18,12 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult,
},
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::client::session::{ClientSession, HandleSignTransaction, SignTransactionRpcError},
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
};
fn wrap_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> ClientResponsePayload {
const fn wrap_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> ClientResponsePayload {
ClientResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
peers::client::session::{ClientSession, Error, HandleQueryVaultState},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
@@ -8,15 +12,11 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
},
shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
};
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::actors::{
client::session::{ClientSession, Error, HandleQueryVaultState},
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
};
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
actor: &ActorRef<ClientSession>,
req: proto_vault::Request,
@@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
};
match payload {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(_) => {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(()) => {
let state = match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(VaultState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(Error::Internal)) => ProtoVaultState::Error,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
pub mod inbound;
pub mod outbound;
pub(super) mod inbound;
pub(super) mod outbound;

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, rlp::Decodable as _};
use crate::grpc::TryConvert;
pub struct RawEvmAddress(pub Vec<u8>);
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, rlp::Decodable as _};
pub(in crate::grpc) struct RawEvmAddress(pub(in crate::grpc) Vec<u8>);
impl TryConvert for RawEvmAddress {
type Output = Address;
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ impl TryConvert for RawEvmAddress {
}
}
pub struct RawEvmTransaction(pub Vec<u8>);
pub(in crate::grpc) struct RawEvmTransaction(pub(in crate::grpc) Vec<u8>);
impl TryConvert for RawEvmTransaction {
type Output = TxEip1559;

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
use alloy::primitives::U256;
use crate::{
evm::{
PolicyError, VetError,
policies::{EvalViolation, SpecificMeaning},
},
grpc::Convert,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm::{
EvmError as ProtoEvmError,
@@ -8,19 +14,13 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
EvalViolation as ProtoEvalViolation, GasLimitExceededViolation, NoMatchingGrantError,
PolicyViolationsError, SpecificMeaning as ProtoSpecificMeaning,
TokenInfo as ProtoTokenInfo, TransactionEvalError as ProtoTransactionEvalError,
eval_violation::Kind as ProtoEvalViolationKind,
eval_violation as proto_eval_violation, eval_violation::Kind as ProtoEvalViolationKind,
specific_meaning::Meaning as ProtoSpecificMeaningKind,
transaction_eval_error::Kind as ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind,
},
};
use crate::{
evm::{
PolicyError, VetError,
policies::{EvalViolation, SpecificMeaning},
},
grpc::Convert,
};
use alloy::primitives::U256;
fn u256_to_proto_bytes(value: U256) -> Vec<u8> {
value.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec()
@@ -31,16 +31,16 @@ impl Convert for SpecificMeaning {
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
let kind = match self {
SpecificMeaning::EtherTransfer(meaning) => ProtoSpecificMeaningKind::EtherTransfer(
Self::EtherTransfer(meaning) => ProtoSpecificMeaningKind::EtherTransfer(
arbiter_proto::proto::shared::evm::EtherTransferMeaning {
to: meaning.to.to_vec(),
value: u256_to_proto_bytes(meaning.value),
},
),
SpecificMeaning::TokenTransfer(meaning) => ProtoSpecificMeaningKind::TokenTransfer(
Self::TokenTransfer(meaning) => ProtoSpecificMeaningKind::TokenTransfer(
arbiter_proto::proto::shared::evm::TokenTransferMeaning {
token: Some(ProtoTokenInfo {
symbol: meaning.token.symbol.to_string(),
symbol: meaning.token.symbol.to_owned(),
address: meaning.token.contract.to_vec(),
chain_id: meaning.token.chain,
}),
@@ -61,23 +61,25 @@ impl Convert for EvalViolation {
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
let kind = match self {
EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target } => {
Self::InvalidTarget { target } => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTarget(target.to_vec())
}
EvalViolation::GasLimitExceeded {
Self::GasLimitExceeded {
max_gas_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas,
} => ProtoEvalViolationKind::GasLimitExceeded(GasLimitExceededViolation {
max_gas_fee_per_gas: max_gas_fee_per_gas.map(u256_to_proto_bytes),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: max_priority_fee_per_gas.map(u256_to_proto_bytes),
}),
EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded => ProtoEvalViolationKind::RateLimitExceeded(()),
EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::VolumetricLimitExceeded(())
}
EvalViolation::InvalidTime => ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTime(()),
EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTransactionType(())
Self::RateLimitExceeded => ProtoEvalViolationKind::RateLimitExceeded(()),
Self::VolumetricLimitExceeded => ProtoEvalViolationKind::VolumetricLimitExceeded(()),
Self::InvalidTime => ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTime(()),
Self::InvalidTransactionType => ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTransactionType(()),
Self::MismatchingChainId { expected, actual } => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::ChainIdMismatch(proto_eval_violation::ChainIdMismatch {
expected,
actual,
})
}
};
@@ -90,13 +92,13 @@ impl Convert for VetError {
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
let kind = match self {
VetError::ContractCreationNotSupported => {
Self::ContractCreationNotSupported => {
ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind::ContractCreationNotSupported(())
}
VetError::UnsupportedTransactionType => {
Self::UnsupportedTransactionType => {
ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind::UnsupportedTransactionType(())
}
VetError::Evaluated(meaning, policy_error) => match policy_error {
Self::Evaluated(meaning, policy_error) => match policy_error {
PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant => {
ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind::NoMatchingGrant(NoMatchingGrantError {
meaning: Some(meaning.convert()),
@@ -108,12 +110,12 @@ impl Convert for VetError {
violations: violations.into_iter().map(Convert::convert).collect(),
})
}
PolicyError::Database(_) => {
PolicyError::Database(_) | PolicyError::Integrity(_) => {
return EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into());
}
},
};
EvmSignTransactionResult::EvalError(ProtoTransactionEvalError { kind: Some(kind) }.into())
EvmSignTransactionResult::EvalError(ProtoTransactionEvalError { kind: Some(kind) })
}
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
use crate::peers::{client::ClientConnection, user_agent::UserAgentConnection};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{
client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse},
@@ -5,15 +6,11 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
transport::grpc::GrpcBi,
};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::{Request, Response, Status, async_trait};
use tracing::info;
use crate::{
actors::{client::ClientConnection, user_agent::UserAgentConnection},
grpc::user_agent::start,
};
mod request_tracker;
pub mod client;
@@ -63,7 +60,7 @@ impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for super::Ser
let (bi, rx) = GrpcBi::from_bi_stream(req_stream);
tokio::spawn(start(
tokio::spawn(user_agent::start(
UserAgentConnection {
db: self.context.db.clone(),
actors: self.context.actors.clone(),

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
use tonic::Status;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct RequestTracker {
pub(super) struct RequestTracker {
next_request_id: i32,
}
impl RequestTracker {
pub fn request(&mut self, id: i32) -> Result<i32, Status> {
pub(super) fn request(&mut self, id: i32) -> Result<i32, Status> {
if id < self.next_request_id {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Duplicate request id"));
}
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ impl RequestTracker {
// This is used to set the response id for auth responses, which need to match the request id of the auth challenge request.
// -1 offset is needed because request() increments the next_request_id after returning the current request id.
pub fn current_request_id(&self) -> i32 {
pub(super) const fn current_request_id(&self) -> i32 {
self.next_request_id - 1
}
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use crate::{
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentSession},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
@@ -8,22 +10,20 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
transport::{Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentSession},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
mod auth;
mod evm;
mod inbound;
mod outbound;
mod sdk_client;
mod vault;
mod vault_gate;
pub struct OutOfBandAdapter(mpsc::Sender<OutOfBand>);
@@ -124,21 +124,22 @@ pub async fn start(
) {
let mut request_tracker = RequestTracker::default();
let pubkey = match auth::start(&mut conn, &mut bi, &mut request_tracker).await {
Ok(pubkey) => pubkey,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "Authentication failed");
return;
}
};
let (oob_sender, oob_receiver) = mpsc::channel(16);
let oob_adapter = OutOfBandAdapter(oob_sender);
let actor = UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new(conn, Box::new(oob_adapter)));
let actor_for_cleanup = actor.clone();
let actor = {
let transport = auth::AuthTransportAdapter::new(&mut bi, &mut request_tracker);
match crate::peers::user_agent::start(&mut conn, transport, Box::new(oob_adapter)).await {
Ok(actor) => actor,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "User agent connection failed");
return;
}
}
};
info!(?pubkey, "User authenticated successfully");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor, oob_receiver, request_tracker).await;
actor_for_cleanup.kill();
info!("User agent session established");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor.clone(), oob_receiver, request_tracker).await;
actor.kill();
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
use crate::{grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker, peers::user_agent::auth};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
@@ -5,31 +7,25 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
self as proto_auth, AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge,
AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
AuthChallengeSolution as ProtoAuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult,
KeyType as ProtoKeyType, request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload,
response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload, response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
},
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth},
db::models::KeyType,
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
pub(super) struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub(super) bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
pub(super) request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub fn new(
pub(super) const fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
) -> Self {
@@ -39,16 +35,32 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
}
}
async fn send_user_agent_response(
pub(super) const fn bi_mut(&mut self) -> &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse> {
self.bi
}
pub(super) const fn tracker_mut(&mut self) -> &mut RequestTracker {
self.request_tracker
}
pub(super) async fn send_response_payload(
&mut self,
payload: AuthResponsePayload,
payload: UserAgentResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.bi
.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
id: Some(self.request_tracker.current_request_id()),
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::Auth(proto_auth::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})),
}))
.await
}
async fn send_user_agent_response(
&mut self,
payload: AuthResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.send_response_payload(UserAgentResponsePayload::Auth(proto_auth::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
}
@@ -62,8 +74,15 @@ impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
use auth::{Error, Outbound};
let payload = match item {
Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }) => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge { nonce })
Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
timestamp_nanos: challenge
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("timestamp within range")
as u64,
random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
})
}
Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {
AuthResponsePayload::Result(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into())
@@ -141,28 +160,8 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(ProtoAuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
key_type,
}) => {
let Ok(key_type) = ProtoKeyType::try_from(key_type) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid key type",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
let key_type = match key_type {
ProtoKeyType::Ed25519 => KeyType::Ed25519,
ProtoKeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
ProtoKeyType::Rsa => KeyType::Rsa,
ProtoKeyType::Unspecified => {
warn!(
event = "received request with unspecified key type",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
}
};
let Ok(pubkey) = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, pubkey)) else {
let Ok(pubkey) = authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey.as_slice()) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid public key",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
@@ -183,12 +182,3 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
}
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
pub async fn start(
conn: &mut UserAgentConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, auth::Error> {
let transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
auth::authenticate(conn, transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
peers::user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::handlers::{
GrantMutationError, HandleEvmWalletCreate, HandleEvmWalletList, HandleGrantCreate,
HandleGrantDelete, HandleGrantList, HandleSignTransaction,
SignTransactionError as SessionSignTransactionError,
},
},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm::{
EvmError as ProtoEvmError, EvmGrantCreateRequest, EvmGrantCreateResponse,
@@ -18,26 +32,12 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
HandleEvmWalletCreate, HandleEvmWalletList, HandleGrantCreate, HandleGrantDelete,
HandleGrantList, HandleSignTransaction,
SignTransactionError as SessionSignTransactionError,
},
},
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
};
fn wrap_evm_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
const fn wrap_evm_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
};
match payload {
EvmRequestPayload::WalletCreate(_) => handle_wallet_create(actor).await,
EvmRequestPayload::WalletList(_) => handle_wallet_list(actor).await,
EvmRequestPayload::WalletCreate(()) => handle_wallet_create(actor).await,
EvmRequestPayload::WalletList(()) => handle_wallet_list(actor).await,
EvmRequestPayload::GrantCreate(req) => handle_grant_create(actor, req).await,
EvmRequestPayload::GrantDelete(req) => handle_grant_delete(actor, req).await,
EvmRequestPayload::GrantList(_) => handle_grant_list(actor).await,
@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ async fn handle_grant_list(
grants: grants
.into_iter()
.map(|grant| GrantEntry {
id: grant.id,
wallet_access_id: grant.shared.wallet_access_id,
shared: Some(grant.shared.convert()),
specific: Some(grant.settings.convert()),
id: grant.common_settings_id,
wallet_access_id: grant.settings.shared.wallet_access_id,
shared: Some(grant.settings.shared.convert()),
specific: Some(grant.settings.specific.convert()),
})
.collect(),
}),
@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ async fn handle_grant_create(
let result = match actor.ask(HandleGrantCreate { basic, grant }).await {
Ok(grant_id) => EvmGrantCreateResult::GrantId(grant_id),
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed)) => {
EvmGrantCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::VaultSealed.into())
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to create EVM grant");
EvmGrantCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
@@ -171,6 +174,9 @@ async fn handle_grant_delete(
.await
{
Ok(()) => EvmGrantDeleteResult::Ok(()),
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed)) => {
EvmGrantDeleteResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::VaultSealed.into())
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to delete EVM grant");
EvmGrantDeleteResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())

View File

@@ -1,32 +1,32 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use arbiter_proto::proto::evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
SpecificGrant as ProtoSpecificGrant, TokenTransferSettings as ProtoTokenTransferSettings,
TransactionRateLimit as ProtoTransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit as ProtoVolumeRateLimit,
specific_grant::Grant as ProtoSpecificGrantType,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::sdk_client::{
WalletAccess, WalletAccessEntry as SdkClientWalletAccess,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, TimeZone, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use tonic::Status;
use crate::db::models::{CoreEvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess};
use crate::grpc::Convert;
use crate::{
db::models::{CoreEvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess},
evm::policies::{
SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit, ether_transfer,
token_transfers,
},
grpc::Convert,
grpc::TryConvert,
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
SpecificGrant as ProtoSpecificGrant, TokenTransferSettings as ProtoTokenTransferSettings,
TransactionRateLimit as ProtoTransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit as ProtoVolumeRateLimit,
specific_grant::Grant as ProtoSpecificGrantType,
},
proto::user_agent::sdk_client::{WalletAccess, WalletAccessEntry as SdkClientWalletAccess},
};
fn address_from_bytes(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Address, Status> {
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, TimeZone, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use tonic::Status;
fn address_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Address, Status> {
if bytes.len() != 20 {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid EVM address"));
}
Ok(Address::from_slice(&bytes))
Ok(Address::from_slice(bytes))
}
fn u256_from_proto_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<U256, Status> {
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ impl TryConvert for ProtoTimestamp {
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<DateTime<Utc>, Status> {
Utc.timestamp_opt(self.seconds, self.nanos as u32)
Utc.timestamp_opt(self.seconds, self.nanos.try_into().unwrap_or_default())
.single()
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid timestamp"))
}
@@ -116,7 +116,8 @@ impl TryConvert for ProtoSpecificGrant {
limit,
})) => Ok(SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Settings {
target: targets
.into_iter()
.iter()
.map(Vec::as_slice)
.map(address_from_bytes)
.collect::<Result<_, _>>()?,
limit: limit
@@ -130,8 +131,10 @@ impl TryConvert for ProtoSpecificGrant {
target,
volume_limits,
})) => Ok(SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings {
token_contract: address_from_bytes(token_contract)?,
target: target.map(address_from_bytes).transpose()?,
token_contract: address_from_bytes(&token_contract)?,
target: target
.map(|target| address_from_bytes(&target))
.transpose()?,
volume_limits: volume_limits
.into_iter()
.map(ProtoVolumeRateLimit::try_convert)

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
use crate::{
db::models::EvmWalletAccess,
evm::policies::{SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit},
grpc::Convert,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
@@ -7,22 +12,17 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
},
user_agent::sdk_client::{WalletAccess, WalletAccessEntry as ProtoSdkClientWalletAccess},
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use crate::{
db::models::EvmWalletAccess,
evm::policies::{SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit},
grpc::Convert,
};
impl Convert for DateTime<Utc> {
type Output = ProtoTimestamp;
fn convert(self) -> ProtoTimestamp {
ProtoTimestamp {
seconds: self.timestamp(),
nanos: self.timestamp_subsec_nanos() as i32,
nanos: self.timestamp_subsec_nanos().try_into().unwrap_or(i32::MAX),
}
}
}
@@ -74,13 +74,13 @@ impl Convert for SpecificGrant {
fn convert(self) -> ProtoSpecificGrant {
let grant = match self {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(s) => {
Self::EtherTransfer(s) => {
ProtoSpecificGrantType::EtherTransfer(ProtoEtherTransferSettings {
targets: s.target.into_iter().map(|a| a.to_vec()).collect(),
limit: Some(s.limit.convert()),
})
}
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(s) => {
Self::TokenTransfer(s) => {
ProtoSpecificGrantType::TokenTransfer(ProtoTokenTransferSettings {
token_contract: s.token_contract.to_vec(),
target: s.target.map(|a| a.to_vec()),

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
use crate::{
db::models::NewEvmWalletAccess,
grpc::Convert,
peers::user_agent::{
OutOfBand, UserAgentSession,
session::handlers::{
HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess, HandleListWalletAccess, HandleNewClientApprove,
HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess, HandleSdkClientList,
},
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientMetadata,
user_agent::{
@@ -15,23 +27,12 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{
OutOfBand, UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess, HandleListWalletAccess, HandleNewClientApprove,
HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess, HandleSdkClientList,
},
},
db::models::NewEvmWalletAccess,
grpc::Convert,
};
fn wrap_sdk_client_response(payload: SdkClientResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
const fn wrap_sdk_client_response(payload: SdkClientResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClient(proto_sdk_client::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
match oob {
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionRequest { profile } => wrap_sdk_client_response(
SdkClientResponsePayload::ConnectionRequest(ProtoSdkClientConnectionRequest {
pubkey: profile.pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey: profile.pubkey.to_bytes(),
info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
name: profile.metadata.name,
description: profile.metadata.description,
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
),
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey } => wrap_sdk_client_response(
SdkClientResponsePayload::ConnectionCancel(ProtoSdkClientConnectionCancel {
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes(),
}),
),
}
@@ -74,14 +75,14 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
SdkClientRequestPayload::Revoke(_) => Err(Status::unimplemented(
"SdkClientRevoke is not yet implemented",
)),
SdkClientRequestPayload::List(_) => handle_list(actor).await,
SdkClientRequestPayload::List(()) => handle_list(actor).await,
SdkClientRequestPayload::GrantWalletAccess(req) => {
handle_grant_wallet_access(actor, req).await
}
SdkClientRequestPayload::RevokeWalletAccess(req) => {
handle_revoke_wallet_access(actor, req).await
}
SdkClientRequestPayload::ListWalletAccess(_) => handle_list_wallet_access(actor).await,
SdkClientRequestPayload::ListWalletAccess(()) => handle_list_wallet_access(actor).await,
}
}
@@ -89,10 +90,8 @@ async fn handle_connection_response(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
resp: ProtoSdkClientConnectionResponse,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let pubkey_bytes = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(resp.pubkey)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid Ed25519 public key length"))?;
let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey_bytes)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid Ed25519 public key"))?;
let pubkey = authn::PublicKey::try_from(resp.pubkey.as_slice())
.map_err(|()| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid ML-DSA public key"))?;
actor
.ask(HandleNewClientApprove {
@@ -117,12 +116,17 @@ async fn handle_list(
.into_iter()
.map(|(client, metadata)| ProtoSdkClientEntry {
id: client.id,
pubkey: client.public_key,
pubkey: client.public_key.clone(),
info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
version: metadata.version,
}),
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #84"
)]
created_at: client.created_at.0.timestamp() as i32,
})
.collect(),
@@ -143,7 +147,7 @@ async fn handle_grant_wallet_access(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: ProtoSdkClientGrantWalletAccess,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess> = req.accesses.into_iter().map(|a| a.convert()).collect();
let entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess> = req.accesses.into_iter().map(Convert::convert).collect();
match actor.ask(HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess { entries }).await {
Ok(()) => {
info!("Successfully granted wallet access");
@@ -183,7 +187,7 @@ async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
match actor.ask(HandleListWalletAccess {}).await {
Ok(accesses) => Ok(Some(wrap_sdk_client_response(
SdkClientResponsePayload::ListWalletAccess(ListWalletAccessResponse {
accesses: accesses.into_iter().map(|a| a.convert()).collect(),
accesses: accesses.into_iter().map(Convert::convert).collect(),
}),
))),
Err(err) => {

View File

@@ -1,54 +1,28 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState;
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
peers::user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::handlers::HandleQueryVaultState},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
proto::user_agent::{
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault,
bootstrap::{
self as proto_bootstrap, BootstrapEncryptedKey as ProtoBootstrapEncryptedKey,
BootstrapResult as ProtoBootstrapResult,
},
request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
self as proto_vault, request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload,
unseal::{
self as proto_unseal, UnsealEncryptedKey as ProtoUnsealEncryptedKey,
UnsealResult as ProtoUnsealResult, UnsealStart,
request::Payload as UnsealRequestPayload, response::Payload as UnsealResponsePayload,
},
},
};
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::actors::{
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
BootstrapError, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleQueryVaultState,
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest, UnsealError,
},
},
};
fn wrap_vault_response(payload: VaultResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
const fn wrap_vault_response(payload: VaultResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::Vault(proto_vault::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
}
fn wrap_unseal_response(payload: UnsealResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Unseal(proto_unseal::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
}))
}
fn wrap_bootstrap_response(result: ProtoBootstrapResult) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Bootstrap(proto_bootstrap::Response {
result: result.into(),
}))
}
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: proto_vault::Request,
@@ -58,117 +32,22 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
};
match payload {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(_) => handle_query_vault_state(actor).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(req) => dispatch_unseal_request(actor, req).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(req) => handle_bootstrap_request(actor, req).await,
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(()) => handle_query_vault_state(actor).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(_) | VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(_) => {
Err(Status::permission_denied(
"Vault is already unsealed; unseal/bootstrap not permitted in session",
))
}
}
async fn dispatch_unseal_request(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: proto_unseal::Request,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let Some(payload) = req.payload else {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing unseal request payload"));
};
match payload {
UnsealRequestPayload::Start(req) => handle_unseal_start(actor, req).await,
UnsealRequestPayload::EncryptedKey(req) => handle_unseal_encrypted_key(actor, req).await,
}
}
async fn handle_unseal_start(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: UnsealStart,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let client_pubkey = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(req.client_pubkey)
.map(x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid X25519 public key"))?;
let response = actor
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest { client_pubkey })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle unseal start request");
Status::internal("Failed to start unseal flow")
})?;
Ok(Some(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Start(
proto_unseal::UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: response.server_pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
))))
}
async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: ProtoUnsealEncryptedKey,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: req.nonce,
ciphertext: req.ciphertext,
associated_data: req.associated_data,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(UnsealError::InvalidKey)) => ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle unseal request");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault"));
}
};
Ok(Some(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Result(
result.into(),
))))
}
async fn handle_bootstrap_request(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: proto_bootstrap::Request,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let encrypted_key = req
.encrypted_key
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing bootstrap encrypted key"))?;
handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(actor, encrypted_key).await
}
async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: ProtoBootstrapEncryptedKey,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor
.ask(HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce: req.nonce,
ciphertext: req.ciphertext,
associated_data: req.associated_data,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::InvalidKey
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle bootstrap request");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to bootstrap vault"));
}
};
Ok(Some(wrap_bootstrap_response(result)))
}
async fn handle_query_vault_state(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let state = match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(VaultState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");
ProtoVaultState::Error

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
use super::auth::AuthTransportAdapter;
use crate::{
grpc::TryConvert,
peers::user_agent::vault_gate::{self as vault_gate},
};
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
mod inbound;
mod outbound;
#[async_trait]
impl Receiver<vault_gate::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<vault_gate::Inbound> {
let request = match self.bi_mut().recv().await? {
Ok(request) => request,
Err(error) => {
warn!(
?error,
"Failed to receive user agent request during vault gate"
);
return None;
}
};
if let Err(err) = self.tracker_mut().request(request.id) {
let _ = self.bi_mut().send(Err(err)).await;
return None;
}
let Some(payload) = request.payload else {
let _ = self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing request payload")))
.await;
return None;
};
match payload.try_convert() {
Ok(inbound) => Some(inbound),
Err(status) => {
let _ = self.bi_mut().send(Err(status)).await;
None
}
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let outbound = match item {
Ok(outbound) => outbound,
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "vault gate produced transport-level error");
return self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::internal(err.to_string())))
.await;
}
};
match outbound.try_convert() {
Ok(payload) => self.send_response_payload(payload).await,
Err(status) => self.bi_mut().send(Err(status)).await,
}
}
}
impl Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>>
for AuthTransportAdapter<'_>
{
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{Convert, TryConvert},
peers::user_agent::vault_gate::{
self as vault_gate, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleHandshake, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey,
},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault,
bootstrap::{self as proto_bootstrap},
request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
unseal::{self as proto_unseal, request::Payload as UnsealRequestPayload},
},
};
use tonic::Status;
impl TryConvert for UserAgentRequestPayload {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
match self {
Self::Vault(req) => req.try_convert(),
_ => Err(Status::permission_denied(
"Only vault operations are permitted before unsealing",
)),
}
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_vault::Request {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
self.payload
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing vault request payload"))?
.try_convert()
}
}
impl TryConvert for VaultRequestPayload {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
match self {
Self::QueryState(()) => Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleVaultState),
Self::Unseal(req) => req.try_convert(),
Self::Bootstrap(req) => req.try_convert(),
}
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_unseal::Request {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
self.payload
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing unseal request payload"))?
.try_convert()
}
}
impl TryConvert for UnsealRequestPayload {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
match self {
Self::Start(start) => start.try_convert(),
Self::EncryptedKey(key) => Ok(key.convert()),
}
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_unseal::UnsealStart {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
let bytes = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(self.client_pubkey)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid X25519 public key"))?;
Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleHandshake(HandleHandshake {
client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from(bytes),
}))
}
}
impl Convert for proto_unseal::UnsealEncryptedKey {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
fn convert(self) -> vault_gate::Inbound {
vault_gate::Inbound::HandleUnsealEncryptedKey(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: self.nonce,
ciphertext: self.ciphertext,
associated_data: self.associated_data,
})
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_bootstrap::Request {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
self.encrypted_key
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing bootstrap encrypted key"))?
.try_convert()
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_bootstrap::BootstrapEncryptedKey {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey(
HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce: self.nonce,
ciphertext: self.ciphertext,
associated_data: self.associated_data,
},
))
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
grpc::{Convert, TryConvert},
peers::user_agent::vault_gate::{self as vault_gate},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
user_agent::{
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault,
bootstrap::{self as proto_bootstrap, BootstrapResult as ProtoBootstrapResult},
response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload,
unseal::{
self as proto_unseal, UnsealResult as ProtoUnsealResult,
response::Payload as UnsealResponsePayload,
},
},
},
};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
const fn wrap_vault_response(payload: VaultResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::Vault(proto_vault::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
}
const fn wrap_unseal_response(payload: UnsealResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Unseal(proto_unseal::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
}))
}
fn wrap_bootstrap_response(result: ProtoBootstrapResult) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Bootstrap(proto_bootstrap::Response {
result: result.into(),
}))
}
impl Convert for VaultState {
type Output = UserAgentResponsePayload;
fn convert(self) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
let proto_state = match self {
Self::Unbootstrapped => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Self::Sealed => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Self::Unsealed => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
};
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::State(proto_state.into()))
}
}
impl Convert for vault_gate::HandshakeResponse {
type Output = UserAgentResponsePayload;
fn convert(self) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Start(
proto_unseal::UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: self.server_pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
))
}
}
impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
type Output = UserAgentResponsePayload;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<UserAgentResponsePayload, Status> {
match self {
Self::HandleVaultState(result) => result
.map_err(|err| {
warn!(?err, "vault state query failed");
Status::internal("Failed to query vault state")
})
.map(VaultState::convert),
Self::HandleHandshake(result) => result
.map_err(|err| {
warn!(?err, "handshake failed");
Status::internal("Failed to start unseal flow")
})
.map(vault_gate::HandshakeResponse::convert),
Self::HandleUnsealEncryptedKey(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Err(vault_gate::Error::InvalidKey) => ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey,
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "unseal failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault"));
}
};
Ok(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Result(
proto_result.into(),
)))
}
Self::HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Err(vault_gate::Error::InvalidKey) => ProtoBootstrapResult::InvalidKey,
Err(vault_gate::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "bootstrap failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to bootstrap vault"));
}
};
Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
use crate::context::ServerContext;
pub mod actors;
@@ -7,7 +6,7 @@ pub mod crypto;
pub mod db;
pub mod evm;
pub mod grpc;
pub mod safe_cell;
pub mod peers;
pub mod utils;
pub struct Server {
@@ -15,7 +14,7 @@ pub struct Server {
}
impl Server {
pub fn new(context: ServerContext) -> Self {
pub const fn new(context: ServerContext) -> Self {
Self { context }
}
}

View File

@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use anyhow::anyhow;
use arbiter_proto::{proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterServiceServer, url::ArbiterUrl};
use arbiter_server::{Server, actors::bootstrap::GetToken, context::ServerContext, db};
use anyhow::anyhow;
use rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use tonic::transport::{Identity, ServerTlsConfig};
use tracing::info;
const PORT: u16 = 50051;
#[tokio::main]
#[mutants::skip]
async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
aws_lc_rs::default_provider().install_default().unwrap();

View File

@@ -1,28 +1,31 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
dsl::insert_into, update,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use tracing::error;
use super::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, ClientProfile};
use crate::{
actors::{
client::{ClientConnection, ClientProfile},
GlobalActors,
flow_coordinator::{self, RequestClientApproval},
vault::Vault,
},
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
db::{
self,
models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::program_client,
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
dsl::insert_into, update,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tracing::error;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Error {
@@ -30,6 +33,8 @@ pub enum Error {
DatabasePoolUnavailable,
#[error("Database operation failed")]
DatabaseOperationFailed,
#[error("Integrity check failed")]
IntegrityCheckFailed,
#[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
InvalidChallengeSolution,
#[error("Client approval request failed")]
@@ -38,6 +43,13 @@ pub enum Error {
Transport,
}
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
error!(?e, "Database error");
Self::DatabaseOperationFailed
}
}
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ApproveError {
#[error("Internal error")]
@@ -51,73 +63,79 @@ pub enum ApproveError {
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: Signature,
signature: authn::Signature,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge { pubkey: VerifyingKey, nonce: i32 },
AuthChallenge { challenge: AuthChallenge },
AuthSuccess,
}
pub struct ClientInfo {
pub id: i32,
pub current_nonce: i32,
}
/// Atomically reads and increments the nonce for a known client.
/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
async fn get_client_and_nonce(
async fn get_client_id(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
) -> Result<Option<ClientInfo>, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<Option<i32>, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let Some((client_id, current_nonce)) = program_client::table
program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
.await
.optional()?
else {
return Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(None);
};
update(program_client::table)
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.set(program_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Ok(Some(ClientInfo {
id: client_id,
current_nonce,
}))
})
})
.select(program_client::id)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn approve_new_client(
actors: &crate::actors::GlobalActors,
profile: ClientProfile,
async fn verify_integrity(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
let id = get_client_id(db, pubkey).await?.ok_or_else(|| {
error!("Client not found during integrity verification");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
let attestation = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut db_conn,
vault,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
})?;
if attestation != AttestationStatus::Attested {
error!("Integrity attestation unavailable for client {id}");
return Err(Error::IntegrityCheckFailed);
}
Ok(())
}
async fn approve_new_client(actors: &GlobalActors, profile: ClientProfile) -> Result<(), Error> {
let result = actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RequestClientApproval { client: profile })
@@ -139,15 +157,24 @@ async fn approve_new_client(
async fn insert_client(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
use crate::db::schema::client_metadata;
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
let metadata = metadata.clone();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let vault = vault.clone();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
@@ -155,29 +182,37 @@ async fn insert_client(
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to insert client metadata");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
let client_id = insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::nonce.eq(1), // pre-incremented; challenge uses 0
))
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.returning(program_client::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut conn)
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&vault,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
},
client_id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to insert client metadata");
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new client key");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
Ok(client_id)
})
})
.await
}
async fn sync_client_metadata(
@@ -253,14 +288,16 @@ async fn sync_client_metadata(
async fn challenge_client<T>(
transport: &mut T,
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
nonce: i32,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
challenge: AuthChallenge,
) -> Result<(), Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + ?Sized,
{
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce }))
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge {
challenge: challenge.clone(),
}))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
@@ -277,12 +314,10 @@ where
Error::Transport
})?;
let formatted = format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes());
pubkey.verify_strict(&formatted, &signature).map_err(|_| {
if !pubkey.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature) {
error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -295,27 +330,25 @@ where
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
let info = match get_client_and_nonce(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
Some(nonce) => nonce,
None => {
let client_id = if let Some(id) = get_client_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey).await?;
id
} else {
approve_new_client(
&props.actors,
ClientProfile {
pubkey,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
metadata: metadata.clone(),
},
)
.await?;
let client_id = insert_client(&props.db, &pubkey, &metadata).await?;
ClientInfo {
id: client_id,
current_nonce: 0,
}
}
insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
};
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, info.id, &metadata).await?;
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, info.current_nonce).await?;
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, client_id, &metadata).await?;
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge).await?;
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
@@ -325,5 +358,5 @@ where
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(info.id)
Ok(client_id)
}

View File

@@ -1,25 +1,35 @@
use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors, crypto::integrity::Integrable, db, peers::client::session::ClientSession,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_macros::Hashable;
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, transport::Bi};
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::session::ClientSession},
db,
};
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ClientProfile {
pub pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub metadata: ClientMetadata,
}
#[derive(Hashable)]
pub struct ClientCredentials {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
impl Integrable for ClientCredentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "client_credentials";
}
pub struct ClientConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl ClientConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
@@ -31,7 +41,9 @@ pub async fn connect_client<T>(mut props: ClientConnection, transport: &mut T)
where
T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
match auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport).await {
let fut = auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport);
println!("authenticate future size: {}", size_of_val(&fut));
match fut.await {
Ok(client_id) => {
ClientSession::spawn(ClientSession::new(props, client_id));
info!("Client authenticated, session started");

View File

@@ -1,27 +1,26 @@
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use tracing::error;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use super::ClientConnection;
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
client::ClientConnection,
evm::{ClientSignTransaction, SignTransactionError},
flow_coordinator::RegisterClient,
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
vault::VaultState,
},
db,
evm::VetError,
};
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use tracing::error;
pub struct ClientSession {
props: ClientConnection,
client_id: i32,
}
impl ClientSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: i32) -> Self {
pub(crate) const fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: i32) -> Self {
Self { props, client_id }
}
}
@@ -29,13 +28,13 @@ impl ClientSession {
#[messages]
impl ClientSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<VaultState, Error> {
use crate::actors::vault::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "client", "keyholder.query.failed");
error!(?err, actor = "client", "vault.query.failed");
return Err(Error::Internal);
}
};
@@ -92,7 +91,7 @@ impl Actor for ClientSession {
}
impl ClientSession {
pub fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
pub const fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
let props = ClientConnection::new(db, actors);
Self {
props,

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
pub mod client;
pub mod user_agent;

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
use super::{Credentials, UserAgentConnection};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use state::{
AuthContext, AuthError, AuthEvents, AuthStateMachine, AuthStates, ChallengeRequest,
ChallengeSolution,
};
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::user_agent::{
AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection,
auth::state::{AuthContext, AuthStateMachine},
};
mod state;
use state::*;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
@@ -37,9 +38,16 @@ impl Error {
}
}
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
error!(?e, "Database error");
Self::internal("Database error")
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge { nonce: i32 },
AuthChallenge { challenge: AuthChallenge },
AuthSuccess,
}
@@ -47,12 +55,11 @@ fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
match payload {
Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: None,
} => AuthEvents::AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest { pubkey }),
Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
bootstrap_token,
} => AuthEvents::AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
} => AuthEvents::BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }),
bootstrap_token,
}),
Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => {
AuthEvents::ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution {
solution: signature,
@@ -63,21 +70,20 @@ fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut UserAgentConnection,
transport: T,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Error>
transport: &mut T,
) -> Result<Credentials, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send,
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
let mut state = AuthStateMachine::new(AuthContext::new(props, transport));
loop {
// `state` holds a mutable reference to `props` so we can't access it directly here
let Some(payload) = state.context_mut().transport.recv().await else {
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
match state.process_event(parse_auth_event(payload)).await {
Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(key)) => return Ok(key.clone()),
Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(result)) => return Ok(result.clone()),
Err(AuthError::ActionFailed(err)) => {
error!(?err, "State machine action failed");
return Err(err);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
use super::{
super::{Credentials, UserAgentConnection},
Error,
};
use crate::{
actors::bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
db::{DatabasePool, schema::useragent_client},
peers::user_agent::auth::Outbound,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use tracing::error;
pub(super) struct ChallengeRequest {
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
pub(super) struct ChallengeContext {
pub(super) challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
pub(super) struct ChallengeSolution {
pub(super) solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(Credentials),
}
);
async fn get_client_id(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<Option<i32>, Error> {
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
useragent_client::table
.filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
.select(useragent_client::id)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})
}
async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(useragent_client::table)
.values((useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),))
.returning(useragent_client::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
Ok(id)
}
pub(super) struct AuthContext<'a, T: ?Sized> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
pub(super) transport: &'a mut T,
}
impl<'a, T: ?Sized> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) const fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: &'a mut T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
type Error = Error;
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
}: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
// Verify pubkey is registered (unless bootstrapping)
if bootstrap_token.is_none() {
let id = get_client_id(&self.conn.db, &pubkey).await?;
if id.is_none() {
return Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey);
}
}
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge {
challenge: challenge.clone(),
}))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge,
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
challenge,
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<Credentials, Self::Error> {
let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!("Failed to decode signature in challenge solution");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
let valid = pubkey.verify(challenge, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature);
if !valid {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
// Resolve client id: bootstrap (consume token + register) or lookup
let id = match bootstrap_token {
Some(token) => {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
register_key(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await?
}
None => get_client_id(&self.conn.db, pubkey)
.await?
.ok_or(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey)?,
};
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(Credentials {
id,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
})
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{GetState, Vault},
},
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus, Integrable},
db::{DatabaseError, DatabasePool},
peers::client::ClientProfile,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_macros::Hashable;
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Sender};
use vault_gate::VaultGate;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tracing::{error, warn};
pub use auth::authenticate;
pub use session::UserAgentSession;
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub mod vault_gate;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hashable)]
pub struct Credentials {
pub id: i32,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
impl Integrable for Credentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "useragent_credentials";
}
// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: authn::PublicKey },
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
pub(crate) db: DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub const fn new(db: DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("authentication failed: {0:?}")]
Auth(auth::Error),
#[error("vault gate failed: {0}")]
VaultGate(#[from] vault_gate::Error),
#[error("transport closed unexpectedly")]
Transport,
#[error("database error: {0}")]
Database(DatabaseError),
#[error("internal: {0}")]
Internal(String),
}
impl From<auth::Error> for Error {
fn from(err: auth::Error) -> Self {
Self::Auth(err)
}
}
async fn verify_integrity(
db: &DatabasePool,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
credentials: &Credentials,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = db
.get()
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Internal("DB unavailable".into()))?;
match integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, vault, credentials, credentials.id).await {
Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested) => Ok(()),
Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable) => {
Err(Error::Internal("Vault sealed during promotion".into()))
}
Err(e) => {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed during unseal promotion");
Err(Error::Internal("Integrity check failed".into()))
}
}
}
async fn should_run_gate(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let vault_state = vault
.ask(GetState {})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Internal("Failed to contact the vault".into()))?;
Ok(!matches!(
vault_state,
crate::actors::vault::VaultState::Unsealed
))
}
async fn run_vault_gate<T>(
props: &UserAgentConnection,
transport: &mut T,
auth_creds: Credentials,
) -> Result<(), Error>
where
T: Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
let (promotion_tx, mut promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
let gate = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(
auth_creds,
props.actors.clone(),
props.db.clone(),
promotion_tx,
));
let result = loop {
tokio::select! {
promotion = &mut promotion_rx => {
break match promotion {
Ok(Ok(creds)) => Ok(creds),
Ok(Err(err)) => Err(Error::VaultGate(err)),
Err(_) => Err(Error::Internal(
"vault gate promotion channel closed".into(),
)),
};
}
inbound = transport.recv() => {
let Some(inbound) = inbound else {
break Err(Error::Transport);
};
match gate.ask(inbound).await {
Ok(outbound) => {
if transport.send(Ok(outbound)).await.is_err() {
break Err(Error::Transport);
}
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "VaultGate failed to handle message");
break Err(Error::Internal(format!(
"vault gate ask failed: {err:?}"
)));
}
}
}
}
};
gate.kill();
result
}
pub async fn start<T>(
props: &mut UserAgentConnection,
mut transport: T,
oob_sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
) -> Result<ActorRef<UserAgentSession>, Error>
where
T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send,
T: Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> + Send,
{
let creds = authenticate(props, &mut transport).await?;
// should run vault gate only if sealed / unbootstrapped
if should_run_gate(&props.actors.vault).await? {
run_vault_gate(props, &mut transport, creds.clone()).await?;
}
// checking the integrity
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &creds).await?;
Ok(UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new(
props.clone(),
oob_sender,
)))
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
use super::{Error, UserAgentSession};
use crate::{
actors::evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentListGrants,
},
actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
actors::vault::VaultState,
db::models::{EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata},
evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{error::SendError, messages, prelude::Context};
use tracing::error;
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum GrantMutationError {
#[error("Vault is sealed")]
VaultSealed,
#[error("Internal grant mutation error")]
Internal,
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<VaultState, Error> {
use crate::actors::vault::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "vault.query.failed");
return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => Ok(address),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
"EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
))),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
&mut self,
basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
grant: SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, GrantMutationError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
.await
{
Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) fn handle_grant_delete(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
// match self
// .props
// .actors
// .evm
// .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
// .await
// {
// Ok(()) => Ok(()),
// Err(err) => {
// error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
// Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
// }
// }
let _ = grant_id;
todo!()
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<i32>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(access_entries)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message(ctx)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
&mut self,
approved: bool,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Some(pending_approval) = self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey.to_bytes())
else {
error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
return Err(Error::internal("Unknown client in connection response"));
};
pending_approval
.controller
.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to send client approval response to controller"
);
Error::internal("Failed to send client approval response to controller")
})?;
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let clients = program_client::table
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
ProgramClient::as_select(),
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(clients)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,19 @@
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};
use super::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection};
use crate::{
actors::{
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
useragent_registry::ConnectUseragent,
},
peers::client::ClientProfile,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::{
client::ClientProfile,
flow_coordinator::{RegisterUserAgent, client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController},
user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection},
};
mod state;
use state::{DummyContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine};
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("State transition failed")]
@@ -47,52 +45,27 @@ impl Error {
}
pub struct PendingClientApproval {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
controller: ActorRef<ClientApprovalController>,
}
pub struct UserAgentSession {
props: UserAgentConnection,
state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<VerifyingKey, PendingClientApproval>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>,
}
pub mod connection;
pub mod handlers;
impl UserAgentSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: UserAgentConnection, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
Self {
props,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
sender,
pending_client_approvals: Default::default(),
}
}
pub fn new_test(db: crate::db::DatabasePool, actors: crate::actors::GlobalActors) -> Self {
struct DummySender;
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<OutOfBand> for DummySender {
async fn send(
&mut self,
_item: OutOfBand,
) -> Result<(), arbiter_proto::transport::Error> {
Ok(())
}
}
Self::new(UserAgentConnection::new(db, actors), Box::new(DummySender))
}
fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "State transition failed");
Error::State
})?;
Ok(())
}
}
#[messages]
@@ -118,8 +91,13 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
return;
}
self.pending_client_approvals
.insert(client.pubkey, PendingClientApproval { controller });
self.pending_client_approvals.insert(
client.pubkey.to_bytes(),
PendingClientApproval {
pubkey: client.pubkey,
controller,
},
);
}
}
@@ -128,23 +106,20 @@ impl Actor for UserAgentSession {
type Error = Error;
async fn on_start(
args: Self::Args,
this: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props
.actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RegisterUserAgent {
.useragent_registry
.ask(ConnectUseragent {
actor: this.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to register user agent connection with flow coordinator"
"Failed to register user agent connection with user agent registry"
);
Error::internal("Failed to register user agent connection with flow coordinator")
Error::internal("Failed to register user agent connection with user agent registry")
})?;
Ok(args)
}
@@ -158,14 +133,18 @@ impl Actor for UserAgentSession {
let cancelled_pubkey = self
.pending_client_approvals
.iter()
.find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(*k));
.find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(k.clone()));
if let Some(pubkey) = cancelled_pubkey {
self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey);
if let Some(pubkey_bytes) = cancelled_pubkey {
let Some(approval) = self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey_bytes) else {
return Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()));
};
if let Err(e) = self
.sender
.send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey })
.send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel {
pubkey: approval.pubkey,
})
.await
{
error!(

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