114 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
CleverWild
efb11d2271 refactor(arbiter-client): rewrite errors to terrros 2026-03-24 17:25:45 +01:00
2148faa376 Merge pull request 'SDK-client-UA-registration' (#34) from SDK-client-UA-registration into main
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Reviewed-on: #34
2026-03-22 11:11:11 +00:00
hdbg
eb37ee0a0c refactor(client): redesign of wallet handle
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2026-03-22 12:05:48 +01:00
hdbg
1f07fd6a98 refactor(client): split into more modules 2026-03-22 11:57:55 +01:00
hdbg
e135519c06 chore(deps): update Rust dependencies and add cargo-edit
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2026-03-22 00:10:18 +01:00
CleverWild
f015d345f4 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into SDK-client-UA-registration
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2026-03-21 21:14:41 +01:00
CleverWild
784261f4d8 perf(user-agent): use sqlite INSERT ... RETURNING for sdk client approve
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2026-03-19 19:07:28 +01:00
CleverWild
971db0e919 refactor(client-auth): introduce ClientId newtype to avoid client_id/nonce confusion
refactor(user-agent): replace manual terminality helper with fatality::Fatality
2026-03-19 19:07:19 +01:00
CleverWild
e1a8553142 feat(client-auth): emit and require AuthOk for SDK client challenge flow 2026-03-19 19:06:27 +01:00
CleverWild
ec70561c93 refactor(arbiter-client): split auth handshake into check/do steps and simplify TxSigner signing flow 2026-03-19 19:05:56 +01:00
CleverWild
3993d3a8cc refactor(client): decouple grpc connect from wallet address and add explicit wallet configuration 2026-03-19 18:21:09 +01:00
CleverWild
c87456ae2f feat(client): add file-backed signing key storage with transparent first-run key creation 2026-03-19 18:10:43 +01:00
CleverWild
e89983de3a refactor(proto): align remaining ClientConnection protobuf pairs with SdkClient* naming 2026-03-19 18:00:10 +01:00
CleverWild
f56668d9f6 chore: make const for buffer size 2026-03-19 17:54:31 +01:00
CleverWild
434738bae5 fix: return very important comment 2026-03-19 17:52:11 +01:00
hdbg
915540de32 housekeeping(server): fixed clippy warns
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2026-03-19 07:53:55 +00:00
hdbg
5a5008080a docs: document explicit AuthResult enums and request multiplexing 2026-03-19 07:53:55 +00:00
hdbg
3bc423f9b2 feat(useragent): showing auth error when something went wrong 2026-03-19 07:53:55 +00:00
hdbg
f2c33a5bf4 refactor(useragent): using request/response for correct multiplexing behaviour 2026-03-19 07:53:55 +00:00
hdbg
3e8b26418a feat(proto): request / response pair tracking by assigning id 2026-03-19 07:53:55 +00:00
hdbg
60ce1cc110 test(user-agent): add test helpers and update actor integration tests 2026-03-19 07:53:55 +00:00
hdbg
2ff4d0961c refactor(server::client): migrated to new connection design 2026-03-19 07:53:55 +00:00
hdbg
d61dab3285 refactor(server::useragent): migrated to new connection design 2026-03-19 07:53:55 +00:00
hdbg
c439c9645d ci(useragent): added analyze step
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2026-03-19 00:38:59 +01:00
hdbg
c2883704e6 housekeeping: removed ide config from repo 2026-03-19 00:34:43 +01:00
47caec38a6 Merge pull request 'Grant management and vault UI' (#35) from push-zpvzkqpmzrur into main
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Had to merge this because in process of refactoring and would pollute this PR.

Reviewed-on: #35
2026-03-18 21:23:22 +00:00
CleverWild
77c3babec7 feat: compat migrations
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2026-03-17 19:44:58 +01:00
CleverWild
6f03ce4d1d chore: remove invalidly committed PoC crate
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2026-03-17 19:42:35 +01:00
hdbg
712f114763 style(encryption): suppress clippy unwrap lints with justifications
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2026-03-17 11:39:52 +01:00
hdbg
c56184d30b refactor(server): rewrote cell access using new helpers and added ast-grep rules for it
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2026-03-16 20:50:19 +01:00
hdbg
9017ea4017 refactor(server): added SafeCell abstraction for easier protected memory swap 2026-03-16 19:41:12 +01:00
hdbg
088fa6fe72 feat(evm): add grant management for EVM wallets
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2026-03-16 18:53:10 +01:00
CleverWild
c90af9c196 fix(server): restore online client approval UX with sdk management
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2026-03-16 18:46:50 +01:00
CleverWild
a5a9bc73b0 feat(poc): enhance SDK client error handling in user agent module
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2026-03-16 18:19:50 +01:00
hdbg
6ed8150e48 feat(useragent::evm): basic list & creation 2026-03-16 04:19:43 +01:00
hdbg
fac312d860 refactor(server): move connection-related handlers into separate module 2026-03-16 03:41:06 +01:00
hdbg
549a0f5f52 refactor(server): removed grpc adapter and replaced with concrete implementations 2026-03-16 03:12:29 +01:00
hdbg
4db102b3d1 feat(useragent): bootstrap / unseal flow implementattion 2026-03-15 23:08:10 +01:00
hdbg
c61a9e30ac feat(useragent): initial connection impl 2026-03-15 22:10:24 +01:00
hdbg
27836beb75 fix(server::user_agent::auth): not sending AuthOk on succesful auth 2026-03-15 22:09:59 +01:00
CleverWild
099f76166e feat(PoC): terrors crate usage
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2026-03-15 21:11:23 +01:00
CleverWild
66026e903a feat(poc): complete terrors PoC with main scenarios 2026-03-15 19:24:49 +01:00
CleverWild
3360d3c8c7 feat(poc): add db and auth modules with terrors error chains 2026-03-15 19:24:21 +01:00
CleverWild
02980468db feat(poc): add terrors PoC crate scaffold and error types
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-15 19:21:55 +01:00
hdbg
ec0e8a980c feat(useragent): added connection info setup screen 2026-03-15 16:48:03 +01:00
hdbg
16d5b9a233 feat(useragent): settled on routing architecture 2026-03-15 16:46:58 +01:00
hdbg
62c4bc5ade feat(useragent): initial impl 2026-03-15 16:46:58 +01:00
hdbg
ccd657c9ec fix(server): enabled crypto provider for rustls
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2026-03-15 16:46:39 +01:00
hdbg
013af7e65f fix(server): remove useless vendored protoc 2026-03-15 16:43:30 +01:00
84978afd58 fix(clippy): forbidden methods
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2026-03-14 17:08:59 +00:00
CleverWild
4cb5b303dc security: audit some crates
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2026-03-14 17:58:36 +01:00
8fde3cec41 Merge pull request 'feat(user-agent-auth): add RSA and ECDSA auth key types' (#29) from feat-min-RSA-&-ECDSA-auth-pipeline into main
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Reviewed-on: #29
Reviewed-by: Stas <business@jexter.tech>
2026-03-14 14:41:46 +00:00
17ac195c5d clippy: fix
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2026-03-14 14:30:46 +01:00
c1c5d14133 fix(rustc): config toolchaing mismatch
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2026-03-14 14:13:15 +01:00
47144bdf81 feat(auth): limited RSA support for signing
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see server/clippy.toml
2026-03-14 13:57:13 +01:00
42760bbd79 revert(auth): remove RSA support from authentication and related components
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2026-03-14 13:23:06 +01:00
d29bca853b chore: squash migrations 2026-03-14 13:22:47 +01:00
f8d27a1454 refactor(config): specify target for Windows in profile.dev settings
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2026-03-14 12:40:37 +01:00
6030f30901 feat(user-agent-auth): add RSA and ECDSA auth key types
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Extend user-agent authentication to support Ed25519, ECDSA (secp256k1), and RSA (PSS+SHA-256) with minimal protocol and storage changes. Add key_type to auth requests and useragent_client, update key parsing/signature verification paths, and keep backward compatibility by treating UNSPECIFIED as Ed25519.
2026-03-14 12:14:30 +01:00
a3c401194f fix: my having come back 2026-03-13 16:59:37 +01:00
hdbg
6386510f52 merge: evm into main
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2026-03-12 16:29:00 +01:00
ec36e5c2ea Merge pull request 'refactor(server::client::auth): Approval flow for first-time connections and simplified to keep state on stack' (#26) from push-xxmwpvvwnllx into main
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Reviewed-on: #26
2026-03-12 15:22:09 +00:00
hdbg
ba86d18250 refactor(server::client::auth): removed state machine and added approval flow coordination
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2026-03-12 16:12:19 +01:00
hdbg
606a1f3774 feat(server::{router, useragent}): inter-actor approval coordination 2026-03-11 20:07:06 +01:00
hdbg
b3a67ffc00 feat(server::client): proper connect error 2026-03-11 17:58:44 +01:00
hdbg
168290040c feat(server::client): approval flow through user-agent on first-time client connects 2026-03-11 16:31:58 +01:00
hdbg
2b27da224e housekeeping: linter
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2026-03-11 14:51:54 +01:00
hdbg
9e92b168ba tests(evm::engine): basic policies tests 2026-03-11 14:50:32 +01:00
hdbg
bd159c35e8 docs: add EVM Policy Engine section
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2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
b3e378b5fc fix(evm::engine): added shared settings check in vet_transaction 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
b7c4f2e735 feat(evm): add find_all_grants to Policy trait with shared auto_type queries 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
4a5dd3eea7 feat(protobuf): EVM grants and signing definitions 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
5af6d8dd9c housekeeping: linter 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
5dfe390ac3 feat(evm): add grant management and transaction signing 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
43c7b211c3 feat(server::evm::engine): return meaning on error path 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
c5f9cfcaa0 feat(server::evm::engine): initial wiring of all components -- we now can evaluate transactions 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
67fce6f06a feat(server::evm): more criterion types 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
191b126462 feat(server): initial EVM functionality impl 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
cb05407bb6 feat(server): broker agent for inter-actor coordination
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2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
4beb34764d Merge pull request 'refactor(server::{user_agent, client}): move auth part to separate function to not to pollute actor session with one-time concerns' (#24) from push-upvpzwvlwyvs into main
Reviewed-on: #24
2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
hdbg
4b4a8f4489 refactor: consolidate auth messages into client and user_agent packages 2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
hdbg
54d0fe0505 refactor(server::{user_agent, client}): move auth part to separate function to not to pollute actor session with one-time concerns 2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
hdbg
06f4d628db chore(server): update Cargo.lock dependencies 2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
hdbg
657f47e32f refactor(transport): convert Bi trait to use async_trait 2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
hdbg
86f8feb291 tests(user-agent): basic auth tests similar to server 2026-03-11 14:07:46 +01:00
hdbg
6deec731e2 feat(useragent): initial connection impl 2026-03-11 14:07:46 +01:00
hdbg
f5a5c62181 refactor(transport): simplify converters 2026-03-11 14:07:46 +01:00
hdbg
b8afd94b21 refactor(transport): implemented Bi stream based abstraction for actor communication with next loop override 2026-03-11 14:07:46 +01:00
hdbg
7b57965952 housekeeping(useragent): rename 2026-03-11 14:07:06 +01:00
hdbg
9dca7aff27 feat(proto): add URL parsing and TLS certificate management 2026-03-11 14:07:06 +01:00
hdbg
4d1f047baf misc: create license and readme 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
925c7a211f refactor(server): reogranized actors, context, and db modules into <dir>/mod.rs structure 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
d81120f59c refactor(server::tests): moved integration-like tests into tests/ 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
e118eceb85 refactor(server): separated global actors into their own handle 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
4a84fe9339 refactor(server): actors reorganization & linter fixes 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
c6e13dc476 feat(keyholder): add seal method and unseal integration tests 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
8f5d4cc385 feat(server::user-agent): Unseal implemented 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
2ffd60973d test(keyholder): remove unused imports from test modules 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
08af101b2e fix(ci): add protoc installation for lints 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
bb58868333 fix(ci): add clippy installation in mise.toml 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
b05cdeec66 refactor(actors): rename BootstrapActor to Bootstrapper 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
9ec465706a chore(supply-chain): update cargo-vet audits and trusted publishers 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
46a3c1768c feat(server::key_holder): unique index on (root_key_id, nonce) to avoid nonce reuse 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
6c8a67c520 feat(server::key_holder): ability to remotely get current state 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
bbaed3fb97 refactor(keyholder): rename KeyHolderActor to KeyHolder and optimize db connection lifetime 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
4700bc407e security(server::key_holder): replaced nonce-caching with exclusive transaction fetching nonce from the database 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
281fbcb31d feat(server): UserAgent seal/unseal 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
a55221573b feat(unseal): add unseal protocol support for user agents 2026-03-11 14:03:46 +01:00
hdbg
45acb45a05 feat(server): boot mechanism 2026-03-11 14:03:46 +01:00
hdbg
11f1caa6da ci: add server linting pipeline for Rust code quality checks 2026-03-11 14:03:46 +01:00
hdbg
f769c9119b test(user-agent): add challenge-response auth flow test 2026-03-11 14:03:45 +01:00
hdbg
1145642255 tests(server): UserAgent invalid bootstrap token 2026-03-11 14:03:45 +01:00
hdbg
9f33277a4f security(server): cargo-vet proper init 2026-03-11 14:03:45 +01:00
hdbg
0a8e1dce3f housekeeping(server): trimmed-down dependencies 2026-03-11 14:03:45 +01:00
201 changed files with 41299 additions and 2319 deletions

6
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -1 +1,5 @@
target/
target/
scripts/__pycache__/
.DS_Store
.cargo/config.toml
.vscode/

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
{
"git.enabled": false
}

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@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ steps:
- apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
- mise install rust
- mise install protoc
- mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings
- mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all -- -D warnings

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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
when:
- event: pull_request
path:
include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**']
- event: push
branch: main
path:
include: ['.woodpecker/useragent-*.yaml', 'useragent/**']
steps:
- name: analyze
image: jdxcode/mise:latest
commands:
- mise install flutter
- mise install protoc
# Reruns codegen to catch protocol drift
- mise codegen
- cd useragent/ && flutter analyze

128
AGENTS.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
# AGENTS.md
This file provides guidance to Codex (Codex.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Project Overview
Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
## Toolchain Setup
Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
```sh
mise install
```
Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
### Crates
| Crate | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
### Common Commands
```sh
cd server
# Build
cargo build
# Run the server daemon
cargo run -p arbiter-server
# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
cargo nextest run
# Run a single test
cargo nextest run <test_name>
# Lint
cargo clippy
# Security audit
cargo audit
# Check unused dependencies
cargo shear
# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
cargo insta review
```
### Architecture
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`MessageRouter`** — Coordinates streaming messages between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
**Cryptography:**
- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
- Password KDF: Argon2
- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
### Proto Regeneration
When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
```sh
cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
```
### Database Migrations
```sh
# Create a new migration
diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
```sh
cd useragent && rinf gen
```
### Common Commands
```sh
cd useragent
# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
flutter run
# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
rinf gen
# Analyze Dart code
flutter analyze
```
The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

128
CLAUDE.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
# CLAUDE.md
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Project Overview
Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
## Toolchain Setup
Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
```sh
mise install
```
Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
### Crates
| Crate | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
### Common Commands
```sh
cd server
# Build
cargo build
# Run the server daemon
cargo run -p arbiter-server
# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
cargo nextest run
# Run a single test
cargo nextest run <test_name>
# Lint
cargo clippy
# Security audit
cargo audit
# Check unused dependencies
cargo shear
# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
cargo insta review
```
### Architecture
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`MessageRouter`** — Coordinates streaming messages between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
**Cryptography:**
- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
- Password KDF: Argon2
- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
### Proto Regeneration
When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
```sh
cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
```
### Database Migrations
```sh
# Create a new migration
diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
```sh
cd useragent && rinf gen
```
### Common Commands
```sh
cd useragent
# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
flutter run
# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
rinf gen
# Analyze Dart code
flutter analyze
```
The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,66 @@ This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the archi
---
## Client Connection Flow
### Authentication Result Semantics
Authentication no longer uses an implicit success-only response shape. Both `client` and `user-agent` return explicit auth status enums over the wire.
- **Client:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `APPROVAL_DENIED`, `NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE`, or `INTERNAL`
- **User-agent:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED`, `TOKEN_INVALID`, or `INTERNAL`
This makes transport-level failures and actor/domain-level auth failures distinct:
- **Transport/protocol failures** are surfaced as stream/status errors
- **Authentication failures** are surfaced as successful protocol responses carrying an explicit auth status
Clients are expected to handle these status codes directly and present the concrete failure reason to the user.
### New Client Approval
When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected user agents are asked to approve the connection. The first agent to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest]
B --> C{pubkey in DB?}
C -- yes --> D[Read nonce\nIncrement nonce in DB]
D --> G
C -- no --> E[Ask all UserAgents:\nClientConnectionRequest]
E --> F{First response}
F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection])
F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nUserAgent requests]
F2 --> F3[INSERT client\nnonce = 1]
F3 --> G[Send AuthChallenge\nwith nonce]
G --> H[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
H --> I{Signature valid?}
I -- no --> Z
I -- yes --> J([Session started])
```
### Known Issue: Concurrent Registration Race (TOCTOU)
Two connections presenting the same previously-unknown public key can race through the approval flow simultaneously:
1. Both check the DB → neither is registered.
2. Both request approval from user agents → both receive approval.
3. Both `INSERT` the client record → the second insert silently overwrites the first, resetting the nonce.
This means the first connection's nonce is invalidated by the second, causing its challenge verification to fail. A fix requires either serialising new-client registration (e.g. an in-memory lock keyed on pubkey) or replacing the separate check + insert with an `INSERT OR IGNORE` / upsert guarded by a unique constraint on `public_key`.
### Nonce Semantics
The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it is always one ahead of the nonce last issued in a challenge.
- **New client:** inserted with `nonce = 1`; the first challenge is issued with `nonce = 0`.
- **Existing client:** the current DB value is read and used as the challenge nonce, then immediately incremented within the same exclusive transaction, preventing replay.
---
## Cryptography
### Authentication
@@ -22,9 +82,97 @@ This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the archi
## Communication
- **Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers
- **Request/response matching:** multiplexed over a single bidirectional stream using per-connection request IDs
- **Server identity distribution:** `ServerInfo` protobuf struct containing the TLS public key fingerprint
- **Future consideration:** grpc-web lacks bidirectional stream support, so a browser-based wallet may require protojson over WebSocket
### Request Multiplexing
Both `client` and `user-agent` connections support multiple in-flight requests over one gRPC bidi stream.
- Every request carries a monotonically increasing request ID
- Every normal response echoes the request ID it corresponds to
- Out-of-band server messages omit the response ID entirely
- The server rejects already-seen request IDs at the transport adapter boundary before business logic sees the message
This keeps request correlation entirely in transport/client connection code while leaving actor and domain handlers unaware of request IDs.
---
## EVM Policy Engine
### Overview
The EVM engine classifies incoming transactions, enforces grant constraints, and records executions. It is the sole path through which a wallet key is used for signing.
The central abstraction is the `Policy` trait. Each implementation handles one semantic transaction category and owns its own database tables for grant storage and transaction logging.
### Transaction Evaluation Flow
`Engine::evaluate_transaction` runs the following steps in order:
1. **Classify** — Each registered policy's `analyze(context)` inspects the transaction fields (`chain`, `to`, `value`, `calldata`). The first one returning `Some(meaning)` wins. If none match, the transaction is rejected as `UnsupportedTransactionType`.
2. **Find grant**`Policy::try_find_grant` queries for a non-revoked grant covering this wallet, client, chain, and target address.
3. **Check shared constraints**`check_shared_constraints` runs in the engine before any policy-specific logic. It enforces the validity window, gas fee caps, and transaction count rate limit (see below).
4. **Evaluate**`Policy::evaluate` checks the decoded meaning against the grant's policy-specific constraints and returns any violations.
5. **Record** — If `RunKind::Execution` and there are no violations, the engine writes to `evm_transaction_log` and calls `Policy::record_transaction` for any policy-specific logging (e.g., token transfer volume).
### Policy Trait
| Method | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `analyze` | Pure — classifies a transaction into a typed `Meaning`, or `None` if this policy doesn't apply |
| `evaluate` | Checks the `Meaning` against a `Grant`; returns a list of `EvalViolation`s |
| `create_grant` | Inserts policy-specific rows; returns the specific grant ID |
| `try_find_grant` | Finds a matching non-revoked grant for the given `EvalContext` |
| `find_all_grants` | Returns all non-revoked grants (used for listing) |
| `record_transaction` | Persists policy-specific data after execution |
`analyze` and `evaluate` are intentionally separate: classification is pure and cheap, while evaluation may involve DB queries (e.g., fetching past transfer volume).
### Registered Policies
**EtherTransfer** — plain ETH transfers (empty calldata)
- Grant requires: allowlist of recipient addresses + one volumetric rate limit (max ETH over a time window)
- Violations: recipient not in allowlist, cumulative ETH volume exceeded
**TokenTransfer** — ERC-20 `transfer(address,uint256)` calls
- Recognised by ABI-decoding the `transfer(address,uint256)` selector against a static registry of known token contracts (`arbiter_tokens_registry`)
- Grant requires: token contract address, optional recipient restriction, zero or more volumetric rate limits
- Violations: recipient mismatch, any volumetric limit exceeded
### Grant Model
Every grant has two layers:
- **Shared (`evm_basic_grant`)** — wallet, chain, validity period, gas fee caps, transaction count rate limit. One row per grant regardless of type.
- **Specific** — policy-owned tables (`evm_ether_transfer_grant`, `evm_token_transfer_grant`, etc.) holding type-specific configuration.
`find_all_grants` uses a `#[diesel::auto_type]` base join between the specific and shared tables, then batch-loads related rows (targets, volume limits) in two additional queries to avoid N+1.
The engine exposes `list_all_grants` which collects across all policy types into `Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>` via a blanket `From<Grant<S>> for Grant<SpecificGrant>` conversion.
### Shared Constraints (enforced by the engine)
These are checked centrally in `check_shared_constraints` before policy evaluation:
| Constraint | Fields | Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| Validity window | `valid_from`, `valid_until` | Emits `InvalidTime` if current time is outside the range |
| Gas fee cap | `max_gas_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas` | Emits `GasLimitExceeded` if either cap is breached |
| Tx count rate limit | `rate_limit` (`count` + `window`) | Counts rows in `evm_transaction_log` within the window; emits `RateLimitExceeded` if at or above the limit |
---
### Known Limitations
- **Only EIP-1559 transactions are supported.** Legacy and EIP-2930 types are rejected outright.
- **No opaque-calldata (unknown contract) grant type.** The architecture describes a category for unrecognised contracts, but no policy implements it yet. Any transaction that is not a plain ETH transfer or a known ERC-20 transfer is unconditionally rejected.
- **Token registry is static.** Tokens are recognised only if they appear in the hard-coded `arbiter_tokens_registry` crate. There is no mechanism to register additional contracts at runtime.
- **Nonce management is not implemented.** The architecture lists nonce deduplication as a core responsibility, but no nonce tracking or enforcement exists yet.
---
## Memory Protection

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
Extension Discovery Cache
=========================
This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
packages that contains extensions for other packages.
DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
----------------------
* Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
* Do write to this folder.
If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
Use package `extension_discovery`
---------------------------------
If you want to access information from this folder.
Feel free to delete this folder
-------------------------------
Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
need to do please file a bug.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{"version":2,"entries":[{"package":"app","rootUri":"../","packageUri":"lib/"}]}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,37 @@
# @generated - this file is auto-generated by `mise lock` https://mise.jdx.dev/dev-tools/mise-lock.html
[[tools.ast-grep]]
version = "0.42.0"
backend = "aqua:ast-grep/ast-grep"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:5c830eae8456569e2f7212434ed9c238f58dca412d76045418ed6d394a755836"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:e825a05603f0bcc4cd9076c4cc8c9abd6d008b7cd07d9aa3cc323ba4b8606651"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:fc300d5293b1c770a5aece03a8a193b92e71e87cec726c28096990691a582620"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-aarch64-apple-darwin.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:979ffe611327056f4730a1ae71b0209b3b830f58b22c6ed194cda34f55400db2"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-apple-darwin.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:55836fa1b2c65dc7d61615a4d9368622a0d2371a76d28b9a165e5a3ab6ae32a4"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-audit"]]
version = "0.22.1"
backend = "cargo:cargo-audit"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-edit"]]
version = "0.13.9"
backend = "cargo:cargo-edit"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-features"]]
version = "1.0.0"
backend = "cargo:cargo-features"
@@ -42,6 +72,10 @@ backend = "cargo:diesel_cli"
default-features = "false"
features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled"
[[tools."cargo:rinf_cli"]]
version = "8.9.1"
backend = "cargo:rinf_cli"
[[tools.flutter]]
version = "3.38.9-stable"
backend = "asdf:flutter"
@@ -49,11 +83,50 @@ backend = "asdf:flutter"
[[tools.protoc]]
version = "29.6"
backend = "aqua:protocolbuffers/protobuf/protoc"
"platforms.linux-arm64" = { checksum = "sha256:2594ff4fcae8cb57310d394d0961b236190ad9c5efbfdf1f597ea471d424fe79", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-aarch_64.zip"}
"platforms.linux-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:48785a926e73ffa3f68e2f22b14e7b849620c7a1d36809ac9249a5495e280323", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-x86_64.zip"}
"platforms.macos-arm64" = { checksum = "sha256:b9576b5fa1a1ef3fe13a8c91d9d8204b46545759bea5ae155cd6ba2ea4cdaeed", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-aarch_64.zip"}
"platforms.macos-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:312f04713946921cc0187ef34df80241ddca1bab6f564c636885fd2cc90d3f88", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-x86_64.zip"}
"platforms.windows-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f6f7", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"}
[tools.protoc."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:2594ff4fcae8cb57310d394d0961b236190ad9c5efbfdf1f597ea471d424fe79"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-aarch_64.zip"
[tools.protoc."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:48785a926e73ffa3f68e2f22b14e7b849620c7a1d36809ac9249a5495e280323"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-x86_64.zip"
[tools.protoc."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:b9576b5fa1a1ef3fe13a8c91d9d8204b46545759bea5ae155cd6ba2ea4cdaeed"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-aarch_64.zip"
[tools.protoc."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:312f04713946921cc0187ef34df80241ddca1bab6f564c636885fd2cc90d3f88"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-x86_64.zip"
[tools.protoc."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f6f7"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"
[[tools.python]]
version = "3.14.3"
backend = "core:python"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:be0f4dc2932f762292b27d46ea7d3e8e66ddf3969a5eb0254a229015ed402625"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260303/cpython-3.14.3+20260303-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:0a73413f89efd417871876c9accaab28a9d1e3cd6358fbfff171a38ec99302f0"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260303/cpython-3.14.3+20260303-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:4703cdf18b26798fde7b49b6b66149674c25f97127be6a10dbcf29309bdcdcdb"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260303/cpython-3.14.3+20260303-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:76f1cc26e3d262eae8ca546a93e8bded10cf0323613f7e246fea2e10a8115eb7"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260303/cpython-3.14.3+20260303-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[tools.python."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:950c5f21a015c1bdd1337f233456df2470fab71e4d794407d27a84cb8b9909a0"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260303/cpython-3.14.3+20260303-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
[[tools.rust]]
version = "1.93.0"

View File

@@ -9,3 +9,14 @@ protoc = "29.6"
"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.46.3"
python = "3.14.3"
ast-grep = "0.42.0"
"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.9"
[tasks.codegen]
sources = ['protobufs/*.proto']
outputs = ['useragent/lib/proto/*']
run = '''
dart pub global activate protoc_plugin && \
protoc --dart_out=grpc:useragent/lib/proto --proto_path=protobufs/ protobufs/*.proto
'''

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter;
import "auth.proto";
import "client.proto";
import "user_agent.proto";
@@ -12,6 +11,6 @@ message ServerInfo {
}
service ArbiterService {
rpc Client(stream ClientRequest) returns (stream ClientResponse);
rpc UserAgent(stream UserAgentRequest) returns (stream UserAgentResponse);
rpc Client(stream arbiter.client.ClientRequest) returns (stream arbiter.client.ClientResponse);
rpc UserAgent(stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentRequest) returns (stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentResponse);
}

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.auth;
import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
}
message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1;
int32 nonce = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {
bytes signature = 1;
}
message AuthOk {}
message ClientMessage {
oneof payload {
AuthChallengeRequest auth_challenge_request = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution auth_challenge_solution = 2;
}
}
message ServerMessage {
oneof payload {
AuthChallenge auth_challenge = 1;
AuthOk auth_ok = 2;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,57 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter;
package arbiter.client;
import "auth.proto";
import "evm.proto";
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
}
message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1;
int32 nonce = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {
bytes signature = 1;
}
enum AuthResult {
AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
AUTH_RESULT_APPROVAL_DENIED = 4;
AUTH_RESULT_NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE = 5;
AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
}
enum VaultState {
VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
}
message ClientRequest {
int32 request_id = 4;
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
AuthChallengeRequest auth_challenge_request = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution auth_challenge_solution = 2;
google.protobuf.Empty query_vault_state = 3;
}
}
message ClientResponse {
optional int32 request_id = 7;
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
AuthChallenge auth_challenge = 1;
AuthResult auth_result = 2;
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse evm_sign_transaction = 3;
arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse evm_analyze_transaction = 4;
VaultState vault_state = 6;
}
}

216
protobufs/evm.proto Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.evm;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
enum EvmError {
EVM_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
EVM_ERROR_VAULT_SEALED = 1;
EVM_ERROR_INTERNAL = 2;
}
message WalletEntry {
bytes address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
}
message WalletList {
repeated WalletEntry wallets = 1;
}
message WalletCreateResponse {
oneof result {
WalletEntry wallet = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
message WalletListResponse {
oneof result {
WalletList wallets = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
// --- Grant types ---
message TransactionRateLimit {
uint32 count = 1;
int64 window_secs = 2;
}
message VolumeRateLimit {
bytes max_volume = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
int64 window_secs = 2;
}
message SharedSettings {
int32 wallet_id = 1;
uint64 chain_id = 2;
optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_from = 3;
optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_until = 4;
optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 5; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional TransactionRateLimit rate_limit = 7;
}
message EtherTransferSettings {
repeated bytes targets = 1; // list of 20-byte Ethereum addresses
VolumeRateLimit limit = 2;
}
message TokenTransferSettings {
bytes token_contract = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
optional bytes target = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address; absent means any recipient allowed
repeated VolumeRateLimit volume_limits = 3;
}
message SpecificGrant {
oneof grant {
EtherTransferSettings ether_transfer = 1;
TokenTransferSettings token_transfer = 2;
}
}
message EtherTransferMeaning {
bytes to = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes value = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
}
message TokenInfo {
string symbol = 1;
bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
uint64 chain_id = 3;
}
// Mirror of token_transfers::Meaning
message TokenTransferMeaning {
TokenInfo token = 1;
bytes to = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes value = 3; // U256 as big-endian bytes
}
// Mirror of policies::SpecificMeaning
message SpecificMeaning {
oneof meaning {
EtherTransferMeaning ether_transfer = 1;
TokenTransferMeaning token_transfer = 2;
}
}
// --- Eval error types ---
message GasLimitExceededViolation {
optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
}
message EvalViolation {
oneof kind {
bytes invalid_target = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
GasLimitExceededViolation gas_limit_exceeded = 2;
google.protobuf.Empty rate_limit_exceeded = 3;
google.protobuf.Empty volumetric_limit_exceeded = 4;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_time = 5;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_transaction_type = 6;
}
}
// Transaction was classified but no grant covers it
message NoMatchingGrantError {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
}
// Transaction was classified and a grant was found, but constraints were violated
message PolicyViolationsError {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
repeated EvalViolation violations = 2;
}
// top-level error returned when transaction evaluation fails
message TransactionEvalError {
oneof kind {
google.protobuf.Empty contract_creation_not_supported = 1;
google.protobuf.Empty unsupported_transaction_type = 2;
NoMatchingGrantError no_matching_grant = 3;
PolicyViolationsError policy_violations = 4;
}
}
// --- UserAgent grant management ---
message EvmGrantCreateRequest {
int32 client_id = 1;
SharedSettings shared = 2;
SpecificGrant specific = 3;
}
message EvmGrantCreateResponse {
oneof result {
int32 grant_id = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
message EvmGrantDeleteRequest {
int32 grant_id = 1;
}
message EvmGrantDeleteResponse {
oneof result {
google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
// Basic grant info returned in grant listings
message GrantEntry {
int32 id = 1;
int32 client_id = 2;
SharedSettings shared = 3;
SpecificGrant specific = 4;
}
message EvmGrantListRequest {
optional int32 wallet_id = 1;
}
message EvmGrantListResponse {
oneof result {
EvmGrantList grants = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
message EvmGrantList {
repeated GrantEntry grants = 1;
}
// --- Client transaction operations ---
message EvmSignTransactionRequest {
bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction (unsigned)
}
// oneof because signing and evaluation happen atomically — a signing failure
// is always either an eval error or an internal error, never a partial success
message EvmSignTransactionResponse {
oneof result {
bytes signature = 1; // 65-byte signature: r[32] || s[32] || v[1]
TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
EvmError error = 3;
}
}
message EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest {
bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction
}
message EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse {
oneof result {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
EvmError error = 3;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,91 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter;
package arbiter.user_agent;
import "auth.proto";
import "evm.proto";
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
enum KeyType {
KEY_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 1;
KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1 = 2;
KEY_TYPE_RSA = 3;
}
// --- SDK client management ---
enum SdkClientError {
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS = 1;
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_NOT_FOUND = 2;
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_HAS_RELATED_DATA = 3; // hard-delete blocked by FK (client has grants or transaction logs)
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_INTERNAL = 4;
}
message SdkClientApproveRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1; // 32-byte ed25519 public key
}
message SdkClientRevokeRequest {
int32 client_id = 1;
}
message SdkClientEntry {
int32 id = 1;
bytes pubkey = 2;
int32 created_at = 3;
}
message SdkClientList {
repeated SdkClientEntry clients = 1;
}
message SdkClientApproveResponse {
oneof result {
SdkClientEntry client = 1;
SdkClientError error = 2;
}
}
message SdkClientRevokeResponse {
oneof result {
google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
SdkClientError error = 2;
}
}
message SdkClientListResponse {
oneof result {
SdkClientList clients = 1;
SdkClientError error = 2;
}
}
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
KeyType key_type = 3;
}
message AuthChallenge {
int32 nonce = 2;
reserved 1;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {
bytes signature = 1;
}
enum AuthResult {
AUTH_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
AUTH_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
AUTH_RESULT_BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED = 4;
AUTH_RESULT_TOKEN_INVALID = 5;
AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
}
message UnsealStart {
bytes client_pubkey = 1;
}
@@ -18,6 +99,12 @@ message UnsealEncryptedKey {
bytes associated_data = 3;
}
message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
bytes nonce = 1;
bytes ciphertext = 2;
bytes associated_data = 3;
}
enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
@@ -25,6 +112,13 @@ enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
}
enum BootstrapResult {
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3;
}
enum VaultState {
VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
@@ -33,19 +127,53 @@ enum VaultState {
VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
}
message SdkClientConnectionRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
}
message SdkClientConnectionResponse {
bool approved = 1;
}
message SdkClientConnectionCancel {}
message UserAgentRequest {
int32 id = 16;
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
UnsealStart unseal_start = 2;
UnsealEncryptedKey unseal_encrypted_key = 3;
google.protobuf.Empty query_vault_state = 4;
AuthChallengeRequest auth_challenge_request = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution auth_challenge_solution = 2;
UnsealStart unseal_start = 3;
UnsealEncryptedKey unseal_encrypted_key = 4;
google.protobuf.Empty query_vault_state = 5;
google.protobuf.Empty evm_wallet_create = 6;
google.protobuf.Empty evm_wallet_list = 7;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateRequest evm_grant_create = 8;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteRequest evm_grant_delete = 9;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListRequest evm_grant_list = 10;
SdkClientConnectionResponse sdk_client_connection_response = 11;
SdkClientApproveRequest sdk_client_approve = 12;
SdkClientRevokeRequest sdk_client_revoke = 13;
google.protobuf.Empty sdk_client_list = 14;
BootstrapEncryptedKey bootstrap_encrypted_key = 15;
}
}
message UserAgentResponse {
optional int32 id = 16;
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
UnsealStartResponse unseal_start_response = 2;
UnsealResult unseal_result = 3;
VaultState vault_state = 4;
AuthChallenge auth_challenge = 1;
AuthResult auth_result = 2;
UnsealStartResponse unseal_start_response = 3;
UnsealResult unseal_result = 4;
VaultState vault_state = 5;
arbiter.evm.WalletCreateResponse evm_wallet_create = 6;
arbiter.evm.WalletListResponse evm_wallet_list = 7;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateResponse evm_grant_create = 8;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteResponse evm_grant_delete = 9;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListResponse evm_grant_list = 10;
SdkClientConnectionResponse sdk_client_connection_response = 11;
SdkClientApproveResponse sdk_client_approve_response = 12;
SdkClientRevokeResponse sdk_client_revoke_response = 13;
SdkClientListResponse sdk_client_list_response = 14;
BootstrapResult bootstrap_result = 15;
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Fetch the Uniswap default token list and emit Rust `TokenInfo` statics.
Usage:
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py # fetch from IPFS
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json # local file
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json out.rs # custom output file
"""
import json
import re
import sys
import unicodedata
import urllib.request
UNISWAP_URL = "https://ipfs.io/ipns/tokens.uniswap.org"
SOLANA_CHAIN_ID = 501000101
IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+")
def load_tokens(source=None):
if source:
with open(source) as f:
return json.load(f)
req = urllib.request.Request(
UNISWAP_URL,
headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "gen_tokens/1.0"},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp:
return json.loads(resp.read())
def escape(s: str) -> str:
return s.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
def to_screaming_case(name: str) -> str:
normalized = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", name or "")
ascii_name = normalized.encode("ascii", "ignore").decode("ascii")
snake = IDENTIFIER_RE.sub("_", ascii_name).strip("_").upper()
if not snake:
snake = "TOKEN"
if snake[0].isdigit():
snake = f"TOKEN_{snake}"
return snake
def static_name_for_token(token: dict, used_names: set[str]) -> str:
base = to_screaming_case(token.get("name", ""))
if base not in used_names:
used_names.add(base)
return base
address = token["address"]
suffix = f"{token['chainId']}_{address[2:].upper()[-8:]}"
candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}"
i = 2
while candidate in used_names:
candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}_{i}"
i += 1
used_names.add(candidate)
return candidate
def main():
source = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
output = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "generated_tokens.rs"
data = load_tokens(source)
tokens = data["tokens"]
# Deduplicate by (chainId, address)
seen = set()
unique = []
for t in tokens:
key = (t["chainId"], t["address"].lower())
if key not in seen:
seen.add(key)
unique.append(t)
unique.sort(key=lambda t: (t["chainId"], t.get("symbol", "").upper()))
evm_tokens = [t for t in unique if t["chainId"] != SOLANA_CHAIN_ID]
ver = data["version"]
lines = []
w = lines.append
w(
f"// Auto-generated from Uniswap token list v{ver['major']}.{ver['minor']}.{ver['patch']}"
)
w(f"// {len(evm_tokens)} tokens")
w("// DO NOT EDIT - regenerate with gen_erc20_registry.py")
w("")
used_static_names = set()
token_statics = []
for t in evm_tokens:
static_name = static_name_for_token(t, used_static_names)
token_statics.append((static_name, t))
for static_name, t in token_statics:
addr = t["address"]
name = escape(t.get("name", ""))
symbol = escape(t.get("symbol", ""))
decimals = t.get("decimals", 18)
logo = t.get("logoURI")
chain = t["chainId"]
logo_val = f'Some("{escape(logo)}")' if logo else "None"
w(f"pub static {static_name}: TokenInfo = TokenInfo {{")
w(f' name: "{name}",')
w(f' symbol: "{symbol}",')
w(f" decimals: {decimals},")
w(f' contract: address!("{addr}"),')
w(f" chain: {chain},")
w(f" logo_uri: {logo_val},")
w("};")
w("")
w("pub static TOKENS: &[&TokenInfo] = &[")
for static_name, _ in token_statics:
w(f" &{static_name},")
w("];")
w("")
w("pub fn get_token(")
w(" chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId,")
w(" address: alloy::primitives::Address,")
w(") -> Option<&'static TokenInfo> {")
w(" match (chain_id, address) {")
for static_name, t in token_statics:
w(
f' ({t["chainId"]}, addr) if addr == address!("{t["address"]}") => Some(&{static_name}),'
)
w(" _ => None,")
w(" }")
w("}")
w("")
with open(output, "w") as f:
f.write("\n".join(lines))
print(f"Wrote {len(token_statics)} tokens to {output}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

13
server/.cargo/audit.toml Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
[advisories]
# RUSTSEC-2023-0071: Marvin Attack timing side-channel in rsa crate.
# No fixed version is available upstream.
# RSA support is required for Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager
# (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.security.credentials.keycredentialmanager.requestcreateasync),
# which only issues RSA-2048 keys.
# Mitigations in place:
# - Signing uses BlindedSigningKey (PSS+SHA-256), which applies blinding to
# protect the private key from timing recovery during signing.
# - RSA decryption is never performed; we only verify public-key signatures.
# - The attack requires local, high-resolution timing access against the
# signing process, which is not exposed in our threat model.
ignore = ["RUSTSEC-2023-0071"]

3001
server/Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,34 +1,44 @@
[workspace]
members = [
"crates/arbiter-client",
"crates/arbiter-proto",
"crates/arbiter-server",
"crates/arbiter-useragent",
]
members = ["crates/*"]
resolver = "3"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
disallowed-methods = "deny"
[workspace.dependencies]
tonic = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["deflate", "gzip", "tls-connect-info", "zstd"] }
tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [
"deflate",
"gzip",
"tls-connect-info",
"zstd",
] }
tracing = "0.1.44"
tokio = { version = "1.49.0", features = ["full"] }
tokio = { version = "1.50.0", features = ["full"] }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
chrono = { version = "0.4.43", features = ["serde"] }
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
rand = "0.10.0"
rustls = "0.23.36"
rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
smlang = "0.8.0"
miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
thiserror = "2.0.18"
async-trait = "0.1.89"
futures = "0.3.31"
futures = "0.3.32"
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
kameo = "0.19.2"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
alloy = "1.7.3"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
"aws_lc_rs",
"pem",
"x509-parser",
"zeroize",
], default-features = false }
k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
sha2 = "0.10"
spki = "0.7"
terrors = { version = "0.5", git = "https://github.com/CleverWild/terrors" }

9
server/clippy.toml Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
disallowed-methods = [
# RSA decryption is forbidden: the rsa crate has RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack).
# We only use RSA for Windows Hello (KeyCredentialManager) public-key verification — decryption
# is never required and must not be introduced.
{ path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
{ path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt_blinded", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
{ path = "rsa::traits::Decryptor::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
{ path = "rsa::traits::RandomizedDecryptor::decrypt_with_rng", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt_with_rng() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
]

View File

@@ -5,4 +5,23 @@ edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
license = "Apache-2.0"
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
evm = ["dep:alloy"]
[dependencies]
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
tonic.workspace = true
tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
tokio.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
http = "1.4.0"
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.10", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
async-trait.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
terrors.workspace = true

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
format_challenge,
proto::client::{
AuthChallengeRequest, AuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult, ClientRequest,
client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
};
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use terrors::OneOf;
use crate::{
errors::{
ConnectError, MissingAuthChallengeError, UnexpectedAuthResponseError, map_auth_code_error,
},
transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
};
async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), ConnectError> {
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
request_id: next_request_id(),
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
},
)),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| OneOf::new(UnexpectedAuthResponseError))
}
async fn receive_auth_challenge(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<arbiter_proto::proto::client::AuthChallenge, ConnectError> {
let response = transport
.recv()
.await
.map_err(|_| OneOf::new(MissingAuthChallengeError))?;
let payload = response
.payload
.ok_or_else(|| OneOf::new(MissingAuthChallengeError))?;
match payload {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(challenge) => Ok(challenge),
ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(result) => Err(map_auth_code_error(result)),
_ => Err(OneOf::new(UnexpectedAuthResponseError)),
}
}
async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
challenge: arbiter_proto::proto::client::AuthChallenge,
) -> std::result::Result<(), ConnectError> {
let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let signature = key.sign(&challenge_payload).to_bytes().to_vec();
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
request_id: next_request_id(),
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(
AuthChallengeSolution { signature },
)),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| OneOf::new(UnexpectedAuthResponseError))
}
async fn receive_auth_confirmation(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
) -> std::result::Result<(), ConnectError> {
let response = transport
.recv()
.await
.map_err(|_| OneOf::new(UnexpectedAuthResponseError))?;
let payload = response
.payload
.ok_or_else(|| OneOf::new(UnexpectedAuthResponseError))?;
match payload {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(result)
if AuthResult::try_from(result).ok() == Some(AuthResult::Success) =>
{
Ok(())
}
ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(result) => Err(map_auth_code_error(result)),
_ => Err(OneOf::new(UnexpectedAuthResponseError)),
}
}
pub(crate) async fn authenticate(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), ConnectError> {
send_auth_challenge_request(transport, key).await?;
let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?;
send_auth_challenge_solution(transport, key, challenge).await?;
receive_auth_confirmation(transport).await
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
use arbiter_proto::{proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl};
use std::sync::Arc;
use terrors::{Broaden as _, OneOf};
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
use crate::{
auth::authenticate,
errors::ConnectError,
storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage},
transport::{BUFFER_LENGTH, ClientTransport},
};
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use crate::errors::{ClientConnectionClosedError, ClientError};
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
pub struct ArbiterClient {
#[allow(dead_code)]
transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
}
impl ArbiterClient {
pub async fn connect(url: ArbiterUrl) -> Result<Self, ConnectError> {
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::from_default_location().broaden()?;
Self::connect_with_storage(url, &storage).await
}
pub async fn connect_with_storage<S: SigningKeyStorage>(
url: ArbiterUrl,
storage: &S,
) -> Result<Self, ConnectError> {
let key = storage.load_or_create().broaden()?;
Self::connect_with_key(url, key).await
}
pub async fn connect_with_key(
url: ArbiterUrl,
key: ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> Result<Self, ConnectError> {
let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)
.map_err(OneOf::new)?
.to_owned();
let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);
let channel = tonic::transport::Channel::from_shared(format!("{}:{}", url.host, url.port))
.map_err(OneOf::new)?
.tls_config(tls)
.map_err(OneOf::new)?
.connect()
.await
.map_err(OneOf::new)?;
let mut client = ArbiterServiceClient::new(channel);
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(BUFFER_LENGTH);
let response_stream = client
.client(ReceiverStream::new(rx))
.await
.map_err(OneOf::new)?
.into_inner();
let mut transport = ClientTransport {
sender: tx,
receiver: response_stream,
};
authenticate(&mut transport, &key).await?;
Ok(Self {
transport: Arc::new(Mutex::new(transport)),
})
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, ClientError> {
let _ = &self.transport;
Err(OneOf::new(ClientConnectionClosedError))
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
use terrors::OneOf;
use thiserror::Error;
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use alloy::{primitives::ChainId, signers::Error as AlloySignerError};
pub type StorageError = OneOf<(std::io::Error, InvalidKeyLengthError)>;
pub type ConnectError = OneOf<(
tonic::transport::Error,
http::uri::InvalidUri,
webpki::Error,
tonic::Status,
MissingAuthChallengeError,
ApprovalDeniedError,
NoUserAgentsOnlineError,
UnexpectedAuthResponseError,
std::io::Error,
InvalidKeyLengthError,
)>;
pub type ClientError = OneOf<(tonic::Status, ClientConnectionClosedError)>;
pub(crate) type ClientTransportError =
OneOf<(TransportChannelClosedError, TransportConnectionClosedError)>;
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub(crate) type EvmWalletError = OneOf<(
EvmChainIdMismatchError,
EvmHashSigningUnsupportedError,
EvmTransactionSigningUnsupportedError,
)>;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("Invalid signing key length in storage: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
pub struct InvalidKeyLengthError {
pub expected: usize,
pub actual: usize,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
pub struct MissingAuthChallengeError;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("Client approval denied by User Agent")]
pub struct ApprovalDeniedError;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("No User Agents online to approve client")]
pub struct NoUserAgentsOnlineError;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
pub struct UnexpectedAuthResponseError;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("Connection closed by server")]
pub struct ClientConnectionClosedError;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("Transport channel closed")]
pub struct TransportChannelClosedError;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("Connection closed by server")]
pub struct TransportConnectionClosedError;
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("Transaction chain id mismatch: signer {signer}, tx {tx}")]
pub struct EvmChainIdMismatchError {
pub signer: ChainId,
pub tx: ChainId,
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("hash-only signing is not supported for ArbiterEvmWallet; use transaction signing")]
pub struct EvmHashSigningUnsupportedError;
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Error)]
#[error("transaction signing is not supported by current arbiter.client protocol")]
pub struct EvmTransactionSigningUnsupportedError;
pub(crate) fn map_auth_code_error(code: i32) -> ConnectError {
use arbiter_proto::proto::client::AuthResult;
match AuthResult::try_from(code).unwrap_or(AuthResult::Unspecified) {
AuthResult::ApprovalDenied => OneOf::new(ApprovalDeniedError),
AuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline => OneOf::new(NoUserAgentsOnlineError),
AuthResult::Unspecified
| AuthResult::Success
| AuthResult::InvalidKey
| AuthResult::InvalidSignature
| AuthResult::Internal => OneOf::new(UnexpectedAuthResponseError),
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
impl From<EvmChainIdMismatchError> for AlloySignerError {
fn from(value: EvmChainIdMismatchError) -> Self {
AlloySignerError::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
signer: value.signer,
tx: value.tx,
}
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
impl From<EvmHashSigningUnsupportedError> for AlloySignerError {
fn from(_value: EvmHashSigningUnsupportedError) -> Self {
AlloySignerError::other(
"hash-only signing is not supported for ArbiterEvmWallet; use transaction signing",
)
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
impl From<EvmTransactionSigningUnsupportedError> for AlloySignerError {
fn from(_value: EvmTransactionSigningUnsupportedError) -> Self {
AlloySignerError::other(
"transaction signing is not supported by current arbiter.client protocol",
)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
pub fn add(left: u64, right: u64) -> u64 {
left + right
}
mod auth;
mod client;
mod errors;
mod storage;
mod transport;
pub mod wallets;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
pub use client::ArbiterClient;
pub use errors::{ClientError, ConnectError, StorageError};
pub use storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage};
#[test]
fn it_works() {
let result = add(2, 2);
assert_eq!(result, 4);
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub use wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
use arbiter_proto::home_path;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use terrors::OneOf;
use crate::errors::{InvalidKeyLengthError, StorageError};
pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError>;
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage {
path: PathBuf,
}
impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ed25519.key";
pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
Self { path: path.into() }
}
pub fn from_default_location() -> std::result::Result<Self, StorageError> {
Ok(Self::new(
home_path()
.map_err(OneOf::new)?
.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME),
))
}
fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
let bytes = std::fs::read(path).map_err(OneOf::new)?;
let raw: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|v: Vec<u8>| {
OneOf::new(InvalidKeyLengthError {
expected: 32,
actual: v.len(),
})
})?;
Ok(ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&raw))
}
}
impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).map_err(OneOf::new)?;
}
if self.path.exists() {
return Self::read_key(&self.path);
}
let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let raw_key = key.to_bytes();
// Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.create_new(true)
.write(true)
.open(&self.path)
{
Ok(mut file) => {
use std::io::Write as _;
file.write_all(&raw_key).map_err(OneOf::new)?;
Ok(key)
}
Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => {
Self::read_key(&self.path)
}
Err(err) => Err(OneOf::new(err)),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage};
use crate::errors::InvalidKeyLengthError;
fn unique_temp_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
let nanos = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("clock should be after unix epoch")
.as_nanos();
std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"arbiter-client-key-{}-{}.bin",
std::process::id(),
nanos
))
}
#[test]
fn file_storage_creates_and_reuses_key() {
let path = unique_temp_key_path();
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone());
let key_a = storage
.load_or_create()
.expect("first load_or_create should create key");
let key_b = storage
.load_or_create()
.expect("second load_or_create should read same key");
assert_eq!(key_a.to_bytes(), key_b.to_bytes());
assert!(path.exists());
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
}
#[test]
fn file_storage_rejects_invalid_key_length() {
let path = unique_temp_key_path();
std::fs::write(&path, [42u8; 31]).expect("should write invalid key file");
let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::new(path.clone());
let err = storage
.load_or_create()
.expect_err("storage should reject non-32-byte key file");
match err.narrow::<InvalidKeyLengthError, _>() {
Ok(invalid_len) => {
assert_eq!(invalid_len.expected, 32);
assert_eq!(invalid_len.actual, 31);
}
Err(other) => panic!("unexpected io error: {other:?}"),
}
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering};
use terrors::OneOf;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use crate::errors::{
ClientTransportError, TransportChannelClosedError, TransportConnectionClosedError,
};
pub(crate) const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
static NEXT_REQUEST_ID: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(1);
pub(crate) fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
NEXT_REQUEST_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
}
pub(crate) struct ClientTransport {
pub(crate) sender: mpsc::Sender<ClientRequest>,
pub(crate) receiver: tonic::Streaming<ClientResponse>,
}
impl ClientTransport {
pub(crate) async fn send(
&mut self,
request: ClientRequest,
) -> std::result::Result<(), ClientTransportError> {
self.sender
.send(request)
.await
.map_err(|_| OneOf::new(TransportChannelClosedError))
}
pub(crate) async fn recv(
&mut self,
) -> std::result::Result<ClientResponse, ClientTransportError> {
match self.receiver.message().await {
Ok(Some(resp)) => Ok(resp),
Ok(None) => Err(OneOf::new(TransportConnectionClosedError)),
Err(_) => Err(OneOf::new(TransportConnectionClosedError)),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::TxSigner,
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Result, Signer},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::sync::Arc;
use terrors::OneOf;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use crate::{
errors::{
EvmChainIdMismatchError, EvmHashSigningUnsupportedError,
EvmTransactionSigningUnsupportedError, EvmWalletError,
},
transport::ClientTransport,
};
pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet {
transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
address: Address,
chain_id: Option<ChainId>,
}
impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(crate) fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
Self {
transport,
address,
chain_id: None,
}
}
pub fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
pub fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
self.chain_id = Some(chain_id);
self
}
fn validate_chain_id(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> std::result::Result<(), EvmWalletError> {
if let Some(chain_id) = self.chain_id
&& !tx.set_chain_id_checked(chain_id)
{
return Err(OneOf::new(EvmChainIdMismatchError {
signer: chain_id,
tx: tx.chain_id().unwrap(),
}));
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Signer for ArbiterEvmWallet {
async fn sign_hash(&self, _hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
Err(EvmWalletError::new(EvmHashSigningUnsupportedError).into())
}
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
fn chain_id(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
self.chain_id
}
fn set_chain_id(&mut self, chain_id: Option<ChainId>) {
self.chain_id = chain_id;
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl TxSigner<Signature> for ArbiterEvmWallet {
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
async fn sign_transaction(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
let _transport = self.transport.lock().await;
self.validate_chain_id(tx)
.map_err(OneOf::into::<alloy::signers::Error>)?;
Err(EvmWalletError::new(EvmTransactionSigningUnsupportedError).into())
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
pub mod evm;

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ license = "Apache-2.0"
tonic.workspace = true
tokio.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true
tonic-prost = "0.14.3"
hex = "0.4.3"
tonic-prost = "0.14.5"
prost = "0.14.3"
kameo.workspace = true
url = "2.5.8"
@@ -17,11 +18,14 @@ miette.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
base64 = "0.22.1"
prost-types.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
[build-dependencies]
tonic-prost-build = "0.14.3"
tonic-prost-build = "0.14.5"
protoc-bin-vendored = "3"
[dev-dependencies]
rstest.workspace = true
@@ -30,5 +34,3 @@ rcgen.workspace = true
[package.metadata.cargo-shear]
ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost", "kameo"]

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,32 @@
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tonic_prost_build::configure;
static PROTOBUF_DIR: &str = "../../../protobufs";
fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let manifest_dir = PathBuf::from(std::env::var("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")?);
let protobuf_dir = manifest_dir.join(PROTOBUF_DIR);
let protoc_include = protoc_bin_vendored::include_path()?;
let protoc_path = protoc_bin_vendored::protoc_bin_path()?;
println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={PROTOBUF_DIR}");
unsafe {
std::env::set_var("PROTOC", &protoc_path);
std::env::set_var("PROTOC_INCLUDE", &protoc_include);
}
println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={}", protobuf_dir.display());
configure()
.message_attribute(".", "#[derive(::kameo::Reply)]")
.compile_well_known_types(true)
.compile_protos(
&[
format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/auth.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
protobuf_dir.join("arbiter.proto"),
protobuf_dir.join("user_agent.proto"),
protobuf_dir.join("client.proto"),
protobuf_dir.join("evm.proto"),
],
&[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()],
)
.unwrap();
&[protobuf_dir],
)?;
Ok(())
}

View File

@@ -3,13 +3,25 @@ pub mod url;
use base64::{Engine, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
use crate::proto::auth::AuthChallenge;
pub mod google {
pub mod protobuf {
tonic::include_proto!("google.protobuf");
}
}
pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");
pub mod auth {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.auth");
pub mod user_agent {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent");
}
pub mod client {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client");
}
pub mod evm {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.evm");
}
}
@@ -28,7 +40,7 @@ pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
Ok(arbiter_home)
}
pub fn format_challenge(challenge: &AuthChallenge) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", challenge.nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(&challenge.pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes().to_vec()
pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes()
}

View File

@@ -1,371 +1,163 @@
//! Transport abstraction layer for bridging gRPC bidirectional streaming with kameo actors.
//! Transport-facing abstractions shared by protocol/session code.
//!
//! This module provides a clean separation between the gRPC transport layer and business logic
//! by modeling the connection as two linked kameo actors:
//! This module defines a small set of transport traits that actors and other
//! protocol code can depend on without knowing anything about the concrete
//! transport underneath.
//!
//! - A **transport actor** ([`GrpcTransportActor`]) that owns the gRPC stream and channel,
//! forwarding inbound messages to the business actor and outbound messages to the client.
//! - A **business logic actor** that receives inbound messages from the transport actor and
//! sends outbound messages back through the transport actor.
//! The abstraction is split into:
//! - [`Sender`] for outbound delivery
//! - [`Receiver`] for inbound delivery
//! - [`Bi`] as the combined duplex form (`Sender + Receiver`)
//!
//! The [`wire()`] function sets up bidirectional linking between the two actors, ensuring
//! that if either actor dies, the other is notified and can shut down gracefully.
//! This split lets code depend only on the half it actually needs. For
//! example, some actor/session code only sends out-of-band messages, while
//! auth/state-machine code may need full duplex access.
//!
//! # Terminology
//! [`Bi`] remains intentionally minimal and transport-agnostic:
//! - [`Receiver::recv`] yields inbound messages
//! - [`Sender::send`] accepts outbound messages
//!
//! - **InboundMessage**: a message received by the transport actor from the channel/socket
//! and forwarded to the business actor.
//! - **OutboundMessage**: a message produced by the business actor and sent to the transport
//! actor to be forwarded to the channel/socket.
//! Transport-specific adapters, including protobuf or gRPC bridges, live in the
//! crates that own those boundaries rather than in `arbiter-proto`.
//!
//! # Architecture
//! [`Bi`] deliberately does not model request/response correlation. Some
//! transports may carry multiplexed request/response traffic, some may emit
//! out-of-band messages, and some may be one-message-at-a-time state machines.
//! Correlation concerns such as request IDs, pending response maps, and
//! out-of-band routing belong in the adapter or connection layer built on top
//! of [`Bi`], not in this abstraction itself.
//!
//! ```text
//! gRPC Stream ──InboundMessage──▶ GrpcTransportActor ──tell(InboundMessage)──▶ BusinessActor
//! ▲ │
//! └─tell(Result<OutboundMessage, _>)────┘
//! │
//! mpsc::Sender ──▶ Client
//! ```
//! # Generic Ordering Rule
//!
//! # Example
//! This module consistently uses `Inbound` first and `Outbound` second in
//! generic parameter lists.
//!
//! ```rust,ignore
//! let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(1000);
//! let context = server_context.clone();
//! For [`Receiver`], [`Sender`], and [`Bi`], this means:
//! - `Receiver<Inbound>`
//! - `Sender<Outbound>`
//! - `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>`
//!
//! wire(
//! |transport_ref| MyBusinessActor::new(context, transport_ref),
//! |business_recipient, business_id| GrpcTransportActor {
//! sender: tx,
//! receiver: grpc_stream,
//! business_logic_actor: business_recipient,
//! business_logic_actor_id: business_id,
//! },
//! ).await;
//! Concretely, for [`Bi`]:
//! - `recv() -> Option<Inbound>`
//! - `send(Outbound)`
//!
//! Ok(Response::new(ReceiverStream::new(rx)))
//! ```
//! [`expect_message`] is a small helper for linear protocol steps: it reads one
//! inbound message from a transport and extracts a typed value from it, failing
//! if the channel closes or the message shape is not what the caller expected.
//!
//! [`DummyTransport`] is a no-op implementation useful for tests and local
//! actor execution where no real stream exists.
//!
//! # Design Notes
//!
//! - [`Bi::send`] returns [`Error`] only for transport delivery failures, such
//! as a closed outbound channel.
//! - [`Bi::recv`] returns `None` when the underlying transport closes.
//! - Message translation is intentionally out of scope for this module.
use futures::{Stream, StreamExt};
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorRef, PreparedActor, Recipient, Spawn, WeakActorRef},
mailbox::Signal,
prelude::Message,
};
use tokio::{
select,
sync::mpsc::{self, error::SendError},
};
use tonic::{Status, Streaming};
use tracing::{debug, error};
use std::marker::PhantomData;
/// A bidirectional stream abstraction for sans-io testing.
///
/// Combines a [`Stream`] of incoming messages with the ability to [`send`](Bi::send)
/// outgoing responses. This trait allows business logic to be tested without a real
/// gRPC connection by swapping in an in-memory implementation.
///
/// # Type Parameters
/// - `T`: `InboundMessage` received from the channel/socket (e.g., `UserAgentRequest`)
/// - `U`: `OutboundMessage` sent to the channel/socket (e.g., `UserAgentResponse`)
pub trait Bi<T, U>: Stream<Item = Result<T, Status>> + Send + Sync + 'static {
type Error;
fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<U, Status>,
) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = Result<(), Self::Error>> + Send;
use async_trait::async_trait;
/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Transport channel is closed")]
ChannelClosed,
#[error("Unexpected message received")]
UnexpectedMessage,
}
/// Concrete [`Bi`] implementation backed by a tonic gRPC [`Streaming`] and an [`mpsc::Sender`].
///
/// This is the production implementation used in gRPC service handlers. The `request_stream`
/// receives messages from the client, and `response_sender` sends responses back.
pub struct BiStream<T, U> {
pub request_stream: Streaming<T>,
pub response_sender: mpsc::Sender<Result<U, Status>>,
}
impl<T, U> Stream for BiStream<T, U>
/// Receives one message from `transport` and extracts a value from it using
/// `extractor`. Returns [`Error::ChannelClosed`] if the transport closes and
/// [`Error::UnexpectedMessage`] if `extractor` returns `None`.
pub async fn expect_message<T, Inbound, Outbound, Target, F>(
transport: &mut T,
extractor: F,
) -> Result<Target, Error>
where
T: Send + 'static,
U: Send + 'static,
T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
F: FnOnce(Inbound) -> Option<Target>,
{
type Item = Result<T, Status>;
fn poll_next(
mut self: std::pin::Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut std::task::Context<'_>,
) -> std::task::Poll<Option<Self::Item>> {
self.request_stream.poll_next_unpin(cx)
}
let msg = transport.recv().await.ok_or(Error::ChannelClosed)?;
extractor(msg).ok_or(Error::UnexpectedMessage)
}
impl<T, U> Bi<T, U> for BiStream<T, U>
where
T: Send + 'static,
U: Send + 'static,
{
type Error = SendError<Result<U, Status>>;
async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<U, Status>) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
self.response_sender.send(item).await
}
#[async_trait]
pub trait Sender<Outbound>: Send + Sync {
async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error>;
}
/// Marker trait for transport actors that can receive outbound messages of type `T`.
///
/// Implement this on your transport actor to indicate it can handle outbound messages
/// produced by the business actor. Requires the actor to implement [`Message<Result<T, E>>`]
/// so business logic can forward responses via [`tell()`](ActorRef::tell).
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```rust,ignore
/// #[derive(Actor)]
/// struct MyTransportActor { /* ... */ }
///
/// impl Message<Result<MyResponse, MyError>> for MyTransportActor {
/// type Reply = ();
/// async fn handle(&mut self, msg: Result<MyResponse, MyError>, _ctx: &mut Context<Self, Self::Reply>) -> Self::Reply {
/// // forward outbound message to channel/socket
/// }
/// }
///
/// impl TransportActor<MyResponse, MyError> for MyTransportActor {}
/// ```
pub trait TransportActor<Outbound: Send + 'static, DomainError: Send + 'static>:
Actor + Send + Message<Result<Outbound, DomainError>>
{
#[async_trait]
pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound>;
}
/// A kameo actor that bridges a gRPC bidirectional stream with a business logic actor.
/// Minimal bidirectional transport abstraction used by protocol code.
///
/// This actor owns the gRPC [`Streaming`] receiver and an [`mpsc::Sender`] for responses.
/// It multiplexes between its own mailbox (for outbound messages from the business actor)
/// and the gRPC stream (for inbound client messages) using [`tokio::select!`].
/// `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>` is the combined duplex form of [`Sender`] and
/// [`Receiver`].
///
/// # Message Flow
/// It models a channel with:
/// - inbound items of type `Inbound` read via [`Bi::recv`]
/// - outbound items of type `Outbound` written via [`Bi::send`]
///
/// - **Inbound**: Messages from the gRPC stream are forwarded to `business_logic_actor`
/// via [`tell()`](Recipient::tell).
/// - **Outbound**: The business actor sends `Result<Outbound, DomainError>` messages to this
/// actor, which forwards them through the `sender` channel to the gRPC response stream.
///
/// # Lifecycle
///
/// - If the business logic actor dies (detected via actor linking), this actor stops,
/// which closes the gRPC stream.
/// - If the gRPC stream closes or errors, this actor stops, which (via linking) notifies
/// the business actor.
/// - Error responses (`Err(DomainError)`) are forwarded to the client and then the actor stops,
/// closing the connection.
///
/// # Type Parameters
/// - `Outbound`: `OutboundMessage` sent to the client (e.g., `UserAgentResponse`)
/// - `Inbound`: `InboundMessage` received from the client (e.g., `UserAgentRequest`)
/// - `E`: The domain error type, must implement `Into<tonic::Status>` for gRPC conversion
pub struct GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, DomainError>
where
Outbound: Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
DomainError: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
{
sender: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
business_logic_actor: Recipient<Inbound>,
_error: std::marker::PhantomData<DomainError>,
/// It does not imply request/response sequencing, one-at-a-time exchange, or
/// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items.
pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> {
type Sender: Sender<Outbound>;
type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>;
fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver);
fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self;
}
impl<Outbound, Inbound, DomainError> GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, DomainError>
where
Outbound: Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
DomainError: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
{
pub fn new(
sender: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
business_logic_actor: Recipient<Inbound>,
) -> Self {
/// No-op [`Bi`] transport for tests and manual actor usage.
///
/// `send` drops all items and succeeds. [`Bi::recv`] never resolves and therefore
/// does not busy-wait or spuriously close the stream.
pub struct DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
_marker: PhantomData<(Inbound, Outbound)>,
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Default for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
sender,
receiver,
business_logic_actor,
_error: std::marker::PhantomData,
_marker: PhantomData,
}
}
}
impl<Outbound, Inbound, E> Actor for GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, E>
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Outbound: Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
E: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
type Args = Self;
type Error = ();
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(args)
}
fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: kameo::prelude::ActorId,
_: kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason,
) -> impl Future<
Output = Result<std::ops::ControlFlow<kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason>, Self::Error>,
> + Send {
async move {
if id == self.business_logic_actor.id() {
error!("Business logic actor died, stopping GrpcTransportActor");
Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Break(
kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason::Normal,
))
} else {
debug!(
"Linked actor {} died, but it's not the business logic actor, ignoring",
id
);
Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
}
async fn next(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
mailbox_rx: &mut kameo::prelude::MailboxReceiver<Self>,
) -> Option<kameo::mailbox::Signal<Self>> {
select! {
msg = mailbox_rx.recv() => {
msg
}
recv_msg = self.receiver.next() => {
match recv_msg {
Some(Ok(msg)) => {
match self.business_logic_actor.tell(msg).await {
Ok(_) => None,
Err(e) => {
// TODO: this would probably require better error handling - or resending if backpressure is the issue
error!("Failed to send message to business logic actor: {}", e);
Some(Signal::Stop)
}
}
}
Some(Err(e)) => {
error!("Received error from stream: {}, stopping GrpcTransportActor", e);
Some(Signal::Stop)
}
None => {
error!("Receiver channel closed, stopping GrpcTransportActor");
Some(Signal::Stop)
}
}
}
}
async fn send(&mut self, _item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
Ok(())
}
}
impl<Outbound, Inbound, E> Message<Result<Outbound, E>> for GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, E>
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Inbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Outbound: Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
E: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
msg: Result<Outbound, E>,
ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let is_err = msg.is_err();
let grpc_msg = msg.map_err(Into::into);
match self.sender.send(grpc_msg).await {
Ok(_) => {
if is_err {
ctx.stop();
}
}
Err(e) => {
error!("Failed to send message: {}", e);
ctx.stop();
}
}
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
None
}
}
impl<Outbound, Inbound, E> TransportActor<Outbound, E> for GrpcTransportActor<Outbound, Inbound, E>
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Outbound: Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
E: Into<tonic::Status> + Send + 'static,
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
}
/// Wires together a transport actor and a business logic actor with bidirectional linking.
///
/// This function handles the chicken-and-egg problem of two actors that need references
/// to each other at construction time. It uses kameo's [`PreparedActor`] to obtain
/// [`ActorRef`]s before spawning, then links both actors so that if either dies,
/// the other is notified via [`on_link_died`](Actor::on_link_died).
///
/// The business actor receives a type-erased [`Recipient<Result<Outbound, DomainError>>`] instead of an
/// `ActorRef<Transport>`, keeping it decoupled from the concrete transport implementation.
///
/// # Type Parameters
/// - `Transport`: The transport actor type (e.g., [`GrpcTransportActor`])
/// - `Inbound`: `InboundMessage` received by the business actor from the transport
/// - `Outbound`: `OutboundMessage` sent by the business actor back to the transport
/// - `Business`: The business logic actor
/// - `BusinessCtor`: Closure that receives a prepared business actor and transport recipient,
/// spawns the business actor, and returns its [`ActorRef`]
/// - `TransportCtor`: Closure that receives a prepared transport actor, a recipient for
/// inbound messages, and the business actor id, then spawns the transport actor
///
/// # Returns
/// A tuple of `(transport_ref, business_ref)` — actor references for both spawned actors.
pub async fn wire<
Transport,
Inbound,
Outbound,
DomainError,
Business,
BusinessCtor,
TransportCtor,
>(
business_ctor: BusinessCtor,
transport_ctor: TransportCtor,
) -> (ActorRef<Transport>, ActorRef<Business>)
where
Transport: TransportActor<Outbound, DomainError>,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
DomainError: Send + 'static,
Business: Actor + Message<Inbound> + Send + 'static,
BusinessCtor: FnOnce(PreparedActor<Business>, Recipient<Result<Outbound, DomainError>>),
TransportCtor:
FnOnce(PreparedActor<Transport>, Recipient<Inbound>),
{
let prepared_business: PreparedActor<Business> = Spawn::prepare();
let prepared_transport: PreparedActor<Transport> = Spawn::prepare();
let business_ref = prepared_business.actor_ref().clone();
let transport_ref = prepared_transport.actor_ref().clone();
transport_ref.link(&business_ref).await;
business_ref.link(&transport_ref).await;
let recipient = transport_ref.clone().recipient();
business_ctor(prepared_business, recipient);
let business_recipient = business_ref.clone().recipient();
transport_ctor(prepared_transport, business_recipient);
(transport_ref, business_ref)
}
pub mod grpc;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
use async_trait::async_trait;
use futures::StreamExt;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
pub struct GrpcSender<Outbound> {
tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcSender<Outbound>
where
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> {
self.tx
.send(item)
.await
.map_err(|_| super::Error::ChannelClosed)
}
}
pub struct GrpcReceiver<Inbound> {
rx: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcReceiver<Inbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> {
self.rx.next().await
}
}
pub struct GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound> {
sender: GrpcSender<Outbound>,
receiver: GrpcReceiver<Inbound>,
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound> GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
pub fn from_bi_stream(
receiver: tonic::Streaming<Inbound>,
) -> (Self, ReceiverStream<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>) {
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(10);
let sender = GrpcSender { tx };
let receiver = GrpcReceiver { rx: receiver };
let bi = GrpcBi { sender, receiver };
(bi, ReceiverStream::new(rx))
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>) -> Result<(), super::Error> {
self.sender.send(item).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Receiver<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>> {
self.receiver.recv().await
}
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>
for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound>
super::SplittableBi<Result<Inbound, tonic::Status>, Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>
for GrpcBi<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
type Sender = GrpcSender<Outbound>;
type Receiver = GrpcReceiver<Inbound>;
fn split(self) -> (Self::Sender, Self::Receiver) {
(self.sender, self.receiver)
}
fn from_parts(sender: Self::Sender, receiver: Self::Receiver) -> Self {
GrpcBi { sender, receiver }
}
}

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ impl Display for ArbiterUrl {
"{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://{}:{}?{CERT_QUERY_KEY}={}",
self.host,
self.port,
BASE64_URL_SAFE.encode(self.ca_cert.to_vec())
BASE64_URL_SAFE.encode(&self.ca_cert)
);
if let Some(token) = &self.bootstrap_token {
base.push_str(&format!("&{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY}={}", token));

View File

@@ -5,9 +5,12 @@ edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
license = "Apache-2.0"
[lints]
workspace = true
[dependencies]
diesel = { version = "2.3.6", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
diesel-async = { version = "0.7.4", features = [
diesel = { version = "2.3.7", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
diesel-async = { version = "0.8.0", features = [
"bb8",
"migrations",
"sqlite",
@@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ rustls.workspace = true
smlang.workspace = true
miette.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
fatality = "0.1.1"
diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.1", features = ["sqlite"] }
async-trait.workspace = true
secrecy = "0.10.3"
@@ -40,8 +44,15 @@ x25519-dalek.workspace = true
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
restructed = "0.2.2"
strum = { version = "0.27.2", features = ["derive"] }
strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
pem = "3.0.6"
k256.workspace = true
rsa.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
spki.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
[dev-dependencies]
insta = "1.46.3"

View File

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ create table if not exists useragent_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
key_type integer not null default(1), -- 1=Ed25519, 2=ECDSA(secp256k1)
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
@@ -56,4 +57,105 @@ create table if not exists program_client (
public_key blob not null,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
) STRICT;
create table if not exists evm_wallet (
id integer not null primary key,
address blob not null, -- 20-byte Ethereum address
aead_encrypted_id integer not null references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_address on evm_wallet (address);
create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_aead on evm_wallet (aead_encrypted_id);
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_limit (
id integer not null primary key,
window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
) STRICT;
-- Shared grant properties: client scope, timeframe, fee caps, and rate limit
create table if not exists evm_basic_grant (
id integer not null primary key,
wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet(id) on delete restrict,
client_id integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict,
chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
valid_from integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no lower bound
valid_until integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no upper bound
max_gas_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
max_priority_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
rate_limit_count integer, -- max transactions in window, null = unlimited
rate_limit_window_secs integer, -- window duration in seconds, null = unlimited
revoked_at integer, -- unix timestamp when revoked, null = still active
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
-- Shared transaction log for all EVM grants, used for rate limit tracking and auditing
create table if not exists evm_transaction_log (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_basic_grant(id) on delete restrict,
client_id integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict,
wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet(id) on delete restrict,
chain_id integer not null,
eth_value blob not null, -- always present on any EVM tx
signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
create index if not exists idx_evm_basic_grant_wallet_chain on evm_basic_grant(client_id, wallet_id, chain_id);
-- ===============================
-- ERC20 token transfer grant
-- ===============================
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_grant (
id integer not null primary key,
basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant(id) on delete cascade,
token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
receiver blob -- 20-byte recipient address or null if every recipient allowed
) STRICT;
-- Per-window volume limits for token transfer grants
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant(id) on delete cascade,
window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
) STRICT;
-- Log table for token transfer grant usage
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_log (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant(id) on delete restrict,
log_id integer not null references evm_transaction_log(id) on delete restrict,
chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
recipient_address blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
value blob not null, -- big-endian 32-byte U256
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_grant on evm_token_transfer_log(grant_id);
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_log_id on evm_token_transfer_log(log_id);
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_chain on evm_token_transfer_log(chain_id);
-- ===============================
-- Ether transfer grant (uses base log)
-- ===============================
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant (
id integer not null primary key,
basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant(id) on delete cascade,
limit_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_limit(id) on delete restrict
) STRICT;
-- Specific recipient addresses for an ether transfer grant
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_grant(id) on delete cascade,
address blob not null -- 20-byte recipient address
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_ether_transfer_target on evm_ether_transfer_grant_target(grant_id, address);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX program_client_public_key_unique
ON program_client (public_key);

Binary file not shown.

View File

@@ -3,12 +3,7 @@ use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use miette::Diagnostic;
use rand::{
RngExt,
distr::{Alphanumeric},
make_rng,
rngs::StdRng,
};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
@@ -61,7 +56,6 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
drop(conn);
let token = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?;
Some(token)

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse},
transport::Bi,
};
use crate::ServerContext;
pub(crate) async fn handle_client(
_context: ServerContext,
_bistream: impl Bi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
) {
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
format_challenge,
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, dsl::insert_into, update,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::{
client::ClientConnection,
router::{self, RequestClientApproval},
},
db::{self, schema::program_client},
};
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database pool unavailable")]
DatabasePoolUnavailable,
#[error("Database operation failed")]
DatabaseOperationFailed,
#[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
InvalidChallengeSolution,
#[error("Client approval request failed")]
ApproveError(#[from] ApproveError),
#[error("Transport error")]
Transport,
}
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ApproveError {
#[error("Internal error")]
Internal,
#[error("Client connection denied by user agents")]
Denied,
#[error("Upstream error: {0}")]
Upstream(router::ApprovalError),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest { pubkey: VerifyingKey },
AuthChallengeSolution { signature: Signature },
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge { pubkey: VerifyingKey, nonce: i32 },
AuthSuccess,
}
/// Atomically reads and increments the nonce for a known client.
/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
async fn get_nonce(db: &db::DatabasePool, pubkey: &VerifyingKey) -> Result<Option<i32>, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey_bytes.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let Some((client_id, current_nonce)) = program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
.await
.optional()?
else {
return Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(None);
};
update(program_client::table)
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.set(program_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
let _ = client_id;
Ok(Some(current_nonce))
})
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn approve_new_client(
actors: &crate::actors::GlobalActors,
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let result = actors
.router
.ask(RequestClientApproval {
client_pubkey: pubkey,
})
.await;
match result {
Ok(true) => Ok(()),
Ok(false) => Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Denied)),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(e)) => {
error!(error = ?e, "Approval upstream error");
Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Upstream(e)))
}
Err(e) => {
error!(error = ?e, "Approval request to router failed");
Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Internal))
}
}
}
enum InsertClientResult {
Inserted,
AlreadyExists,
}
async fn insert_client(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
) -> Result<InsertClientResult, Error> {
let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap_or_default()
.as_secs() as i32;
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
match insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::nonce.eq(1), // pre-incremented; challenge uses 0
program_client::created_at.eq(now),
program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
{
Ok(_) => {}
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(
diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::UniqueViolation,
_,
)) => return Ok(InsertClientResult::AlreadyExists),
Err(e) => {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to insert new client");
return Err(Error::DatabaseOperationFailed);
}
}
let client_id = program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()))
.order(program_client::id.desc())
.select(program_client::id)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to load inserted client id");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
let _ = client_id;
Ok(InsertClientResult::Inserted)
}
async fn challenge_client<T>(
transport: &mut T,
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
nonce: i32,
) -> Result<(), Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + ?Sized,
{
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce }))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
let signature = expect_message(transport, |req: Inbound| match req {
Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => Some(signature),
_ => None,
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to receive challenge solution");
Error::Transport
})?;
let formatted = format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes());
pubkey.verify_strict(&formatted, &signature).map_err(|_| {
error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
Ok(())
}
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut ClientConnection,
transport: &mut T,
) -> Result<VerifyingKey, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
let Some(Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { pubkey }) = transport.recv().await
else {
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
let nonce = match get_nonce(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
Some(nonce) => nonce,
None => {
approve_new_client(&props.actors, pubkey).await?;
match insert_client(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
InsertClientResult::Inserted => 0,
InsertClientResult::AlreadyExists => match get_nonce(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
Some(nonce) => nonce,
None => return Err(Error::DatabaseOperationFailed),
},
}
}
};
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, nonce).await?;
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth success");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(pubkey)
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::session::ClientSession},
db,
};
pub struct ClientConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl ClientConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub async fn connect_client<T>(mut props: ClientConnection, transport: &mut T)
where
T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
match auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport).await {
Ok(_pubkey) => {
ClientSession::spawn(ClientSession::new(props));
info!("Client authenticated, session started");
}
Err(err) => {
let _ = transport.send(Err(err.clone())).await;
error!(?err, "Authentication failed, closing connection");
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors, client::ClientConnection, keyholder::KeyHolderState, router::RegisterClient,
},
db,
};
pub struct ClientSession {
props: ClientConnection,
}
impl ClientSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection) -> Self {
Self { props }
}
}
#[messages]
impl ClientSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "client", "keyholder.query.failed");
return Err(Error::Internal);
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
impl Actor for ClientSession {
type Args = Self;
type Error = Error;
async fn on_start(
args: Self::Args,
this: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props
.actors
.router
.ask(RegisterClient { actor: this })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::ConnectionRegistrationFailed)?;
Ok(args)
}
}
impl ClientSession {
pub fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
let props = ClientConnection::new(db, actors);
Self { props }
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Connection registration failed")]
ConnectionRegistrationFailed,
#[error("Internal error")]
Internal,
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
db::{
self, DatabasePool,
models::{self, SqliteTimestamp},
schema,
},
evm::{
self, ListGrantsError, RunKind,
policies::{
FullGrant, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Wallet not found")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::wallet_not_found))]
WalletNotFound,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::database))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Database pool error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::pool))]
Pool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::keyholder))]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::keyholder_send))]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Signing error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::signing))]
Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
#[error("Policy error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::vet))]
Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::keyholder))]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::keyholder_send))]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::database))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Database pool error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::database_pool))]
DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Grant creation error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::creation))]
Creation(#[from] evm::CreationError),
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct EvmActor {
pub keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub db: DatabasePool,
pub rng: StdRng,
pub engine: evm::Engine,
}
impl EvmActor {
pub fn new(keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
// is it safe to seed rng from system once?
// todo: audit
let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone());
Self {
keyholder,
db,
rng,
engine,
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl EvmActor {
#[message]
pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<Address, Error> {
let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);
let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
let aead_id: i32 = self
.keyholder
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
})
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(address)
}
#[message]
pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<Address>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let rows: Vec<models::EvmWallet> = schema::evm_wallet::table
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
.load(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(rows
.into_iter()
.map(|w| Address::from_slice(&w.address))
.collect())
}
}
#[messages]
impl EvmActor {
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_create_grant(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
basic: SharedGrantSettings,
grant: SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, evm::CreationError> {
match grant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => {
self.engine
.create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(
client_id,
FullGrant {
basic,
specific: settings,
},
)
.await
}
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => {
self.engine
.create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(
client_id,
FullGrant {
basic,
specific: settings,
},
)
.await
}
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
.set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
match self.engine.list_all_grants().await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(ListGrantsError::Database(db)) => Err(Error::Database(db)),
Err(ListGrantsError::Pool(pool)) => Err(Error::DatabasePool(pool)),
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn shared_analyze_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<SpecificMeaning, SignTransactionError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
drop(conn);
let meaning = self
.engine
.evaluate_transaction(
wallet.id,
client_id,
transaction.clone(),
RunKind::Execution,
)
.await?;
Ok(meaning)
}
#[message]
pub async fn client_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
mut transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
drop(conn);
let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
.keyholder
.ask(Decrypt {
aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::KeyholderSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
self.engine
.evaluate_transaction(
wallet.id,
client_id,
transaction.clone(),
RunKind::Execution,
)
.await?;
use alloy::network::TxSignerSync as _;
Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
}
}

View File

@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ use chacha20poly1305::{
AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload},
};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use rand::{
Rng as _, SeedableRng,
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
@@ -47,40 +48,37 @@ impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce {
}
}
pub struct KeyCell(pub MemSafe<Key>);
impl From<MemSafe<Key>> for KeyCell {
fn from(value: MemSafe<Key>) -> Self {
pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
fn from(value: SafeCell<Key>) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
impl TryFrom<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(mut value: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let value = value.read().unwrap();
fn try_from(mut value: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let value = value.read();
if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
return Err(());
}
let mut cell = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let mut cell_write = cell.write().unwrap();
let cell_slice: &mut [u8] = cell_write.as_mut();
cell_slice.copy_from_slice(&value);
}
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
});
Ok(Self(cell))
}
}
impl KeyCell {
pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
}
});
key.into()
}
@@ -91,7 +89,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
associated_data: &[u8],
mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
@@ -102,13 +100,13 @@ impl KeyCell {
&mut self,
nonce: &Nonce,
associated_data: &[u8],
buffer: &mut MemSafe<Vec<u8>>,
buffer: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let mut buffer = buffer.write().unwrap();
let mut buffer = buffer.write();
let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
}
@@ -119,7 +117,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
associated_data: &[u8],
plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_reader = self.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
@@ -139,6 +137,10 @@ pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
let mut salt = Salt::default();
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
salt
@@ -146,19 +148,23 @@ pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
/// User password might be of different length, have not enough entropy, etc...
/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
pub fn derive_seal_key(mut password: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
pub fn derive_seal_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
let params = argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap();
let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let password_source = password.read().unwrap();
let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
password.read_inline(|password_source| {
let mut key_buffer = key.write();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Better fail completely than return a weak key"
)]
hasher
.hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
.unwrap();
}
});
key.into()
}
@@ -166,20 +172,20 @@ pub fn derive_seal_key(mut password: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
#[test]
pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let password2 = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key1 = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
let mut key2 = derive_seal_key(password2, &salt);
let key1_reader = key1.0.read().unwrap();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read().unwrap();
let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
}
@@ -187,11 +193,11 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
pub fn successful_derive() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
let key_reader = key.0.read().unwrap();
let key_reader = key.0.read();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
@@ -200,7 +206,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
@@ -212,12 +218,12 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap();
assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
let mut buffer = MemSafe::new(buffer).unwrap();
let mut buffer = SafeCell::new(buffer);
key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
.unwrap();
let buffer = buffer.read().unwrap();
let buffer = buffer.read();
assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
}

View File

@@ -1,24 +1,28 @@
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
dsl::{insert_into, update},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
use crate::{
db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
},
safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
};
use encryption::v1::{self, KeyCell, Nonce};
pub mod encryption;
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub))]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(KeyHolderState))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
@@ -135,7 +139,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
}
@@ -147,16 +151,15 @@ impl KeyHolder {
let root_key_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
let data_encryption_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = {
let root_key_reader = root_key.0.read().unwrap();
let root_key_reader = root_key_reader.as_slice();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| {
let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice();
seal_key
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
Error::Encryption(err)
})?
};
})
})?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
@@ -198,7 +201,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
#[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id,
} = &self.state
@@ -224,7 +227,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
})?;
let mut seal_key = v1::derive_seal_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
let mut root_key = MemSafe::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(
|_| {
@@ -255,7 +258,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
// Decrypts the `aead_encrypted` entry with the given ID and returns the plaintext
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
@@ -278,14 +281,14 @@ impl KeyHolder {
);
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut output = MemSafe::new(row.ciphertext).unwrap();
let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
Ok(output)
}
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
@@ -298,7 +301,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
// Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write().unwrap();
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
@@ -312,7 +315,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
schema_version: 1,
associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() as i32,
created_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
@@ -322,7 +325,7 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
#[message]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> StateDiscriminants {
pub fn get_state(&self) -> KeyHolderState {
self.state.discriminant()
}
@@ -345,17 +348,19 @@ impl KeyHolder {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use diesel::SelectableHelper;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::db::{self};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::{
db::{self},
safe_cell::SafeCell,
};
use super::*;
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
actor
}
@@ -390,7 +395,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
let id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table

View File

@@ -3,13 +3,15 @@ use miette::Diagnostic;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{bootstrap::Bootstrapper, keyholder::KeyHolder},
actors::{bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, keyholder::KeyHolder, router::MessageRouter},
db,
};
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod client;
mod evm;
pub mod keyholder;
pub mod router;
pub mod user_agent;
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
@@ -28,13 +30,18 @@ pub enum SpawnError {
pub struct GlobalActors {
pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
pub router: ActorRef<MessageRouter>,
pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
}
impl GlobalActors {
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let key_holder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?);
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
key_holder: KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?),
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
key_holder,
router: MessageRouter::spawn(MessageRouter::default()),
})
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorId, ActorRef},
messages,
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::DelegatedReply,
};
use tokio::{sync::watch, task::JoinSet};
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::actors::{
client::session::ClientSession,
user_agent::session::{RequestNewClientApproval, UserAgentSession},
};
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct MessageRouter {
pub user_agents: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
}
impl Actor for MessageRouter {
type Args = Self;
type Error = ();
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(args)
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.user_agents.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "MessageRouter",
event = "useragent.disconnected"
);
} else if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(?id, actor = "MessageRouter", event = "client.disconnected");
} else {
info!(
?id,
actor = "MessageRouter",
event = "unknown.actor.disconnected"
);
}
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum ApprovalError {
#[error("No user agents connected")]
NoUserAgentsConnected,
}
async fn request_client_approval(
user_agents: &[WeakActorRef<UserAgentSession>],
client_pubkey: VerifyingKey,
) -> Result<bool, ApprovalError> {
if user_agents.is_empty() {
return Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected);
}
let mut pool = JoinSet::new();
let (cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = watch::channel(());
for weak_ref in user_agents {
match weak_ref.upgrade() {
Some(agent) => {
let cancel_rx = cancel_rx.clone();
pool.spawn(async move {
agent
.ask(RequestNewClientApproval {
client_pubkey,
cancel_flag: cancel_rx.clone(),
})
.await
});
}
None => {
warn!(
id = weak_ref.id().to_string(),
actor = "MessageRouter",
event = "useragent.disconnected_before_approval"
);
}
}
}
while let Some(result) = pool.join_next().await {
match result {
Ok(Ok(approved)) => {
// cancel other pending requests
let _ = cancel_tx.send(());
return Ok(approved);
}
Ok(Err(err)) => {
warn!(
?err,
actor = "MessageRouter",
event = "useragent.approval_error"
);
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(
?err,
actor = "MessageRouter",
event = "useragent.approval_task_failed"
);
}
}
}
Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected)
}
#[messages]
impl MessageRouter {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_user_agent(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "MessageRouter", event = "useragent.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.user_agents.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_client(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "MessageRouter", event = "client.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn request_client_approval(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: VerifyingKey,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>,
) -> DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>> {
let (reply, Some(reply_sender)) = ctx.reply_sender() else {
unreachable!("Expected `request_client_approval` to have callback channel");
};
let weak_refs = self
.user_agents
.values()
.map(|agent| agent.downgrade())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
tokio::task::spawn(async move {
let result = request_client_approval(&weak_refs, client_pubkey).await;
reply_sender.send(result);
});
reply
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::user_agent::{
AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection,
auth::state::{AuthContext, AuthStateMachine},
};
mod state;
use state::*;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: Vec<u8>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum Error {
UnregisteredPublicKey,
InvalidChallengeSolution,
InvalidBootstrapToken,
Internal { details: String },
Transport,
}
impl Error {
fn internal(details: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self::Internal {
details: details.into(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge { nonce: i32 },
AuthSuccess,
}
fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
match payload {
Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: None,
} => AuthEvents::AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest { pubkey }),
Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
} => AuthEvents::BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }),
Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => {
AuthEvents::ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution {
solution: signature,
})
}
}
}
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut UserAgentConnection,
transport: T,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
let mut state = AuthStateMachine::new(AuthContext::new(props, transport));
loop {
// `state` holds a mutable reference to `props` so we can't access it directly here
let Some(payload) = state.context_mut().transport.recv().await else {
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
match state.process_event(parse_auth_event(payload)).await {
Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(key)) => return Ok(key.clone()),
Err(AuthError::ActionFailed(err)) => {
error!(?err, "State machine action failed");
return Err(err);
}
Err(AuthError::GuardFailed(err)) => {
error!(?err, "State machine guard failed");
return Err(err);
}
Err(AuthError::InvalidEvent) => {
error!("Invalid event for current state");
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
Err(AuthError::TransitionsFailed) => {
error!("Invalid state transition");
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
_ => (),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use tracing::error;
use super::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth::Outbound},
},
db::schema,
};
pub struct ChallengeRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
pub token: String,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge_nonce: i32,
pub key: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct ChallengeSolution {
pub solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
}
);
async fn create_nonce(db: &crate::db::DatabasePool, pubkey_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.to_vec()))
.select(schema::useragent_client::nonce)
.first::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::useragent_client::table)
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.to_vec()))
.set(schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(current_nonce)
})
})
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?
.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(?pubkey_bytes, "Public key not found in database");
Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
})
}
async fn register_key(db: &crate::db::DatabasePool, pubkey: &AuthPublicKey) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let key_type = pubkey.key_type();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(1),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
Ok(())
}
pub struct AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
pub(super) transport: T,
}
impl<'a, T> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
type Error = Error;
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
let stored_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let nonce = create_nonce(&self.conn.db, &stored_bytes).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce: nonce,
key: pubkey,
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
register_key(&self.conn.db, &pubkey).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(pubkey)
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce,
key,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
let formatted = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(*challenge_nonce, &key.to_stored_bytes());
let valid = match key {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(vk) => {
let sig = solution.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid Ed25519 signature length");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify_strict(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(vk) => {
use k256::ecdsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let sig = k256::ecdsa::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid ECDSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(pk) => {
use rsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let verifying_key = rsa::pss::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha256>::new(pk.clone());
let sig = rsa::pss::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid RSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
verifying_key.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
};
if valid {
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
}
Ok(key.clone())
}
}

View File

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
use tonic::Status;
use crate::db;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum UserAgentError {
#[error("Missing payload in request")]
MissingPayload,
#[error("Invalid bootstrap token")]
InvalidBootstrapToken,
#[error("Public key not registered")]
PubkeyNotRegistered,
#[error("Invalid public key format")]
InvalidPubkey,
#[error("Invalid signature length")]
InvalidSignatureLength,
#[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
InvalidChallengeSolution,
#[error("Invalid state for operation")]
InvalidState,
#[error("Actor unavailable")]
ActorUnavailable,
#[error("Database error")]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Database pool error")]
DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
}
impl From<UserAgentError> for Status {
fn from(err: UserAgentError) -> Self {
match err {
UserAgentError::MissingPayload
| UserAgentError::InvalidBootstrapToken
| UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey
| UserAgentError::InvalidSignatureLength => Status::invalid_argument(err.to_string()),
UserAgentError::PubkeyNotRegistered | UserAgentError::InvalidChallengeSolution => {
Status::unauthenticated(err.to_string())
}
UserAgentError::InvalidState => Status::failed_precondition(err.to_string()),
UserAgentError::ActorUnavailable
| UserAgentError::Database(_)
| UserAgentError::DatabasePool(_) => Status::internal(err.to_string()),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,401 +1,94 @@
use std::{ops::DerefMut, sync::Mutex};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult, UnsealStart, UnsealStartResponse, UserAgentRequest,
UserAgentResponse,
auth::{
self, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk, ClientMessage as ClientAuthMessage,
ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage,
client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
},
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::Recipient, error::SendError, messages, prelude::Message};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::{
ServerContext,
actors::{
GlobalActors,
bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
keyholder::{self, TryUnseal},
user_agent::state::{
ChallengeContext, DummyContext, UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine,
UserAgentStates,
},
},
db::{self, schema},
actors::GlobalActors,
db::{self, models::KeyType},
};
mod error;
mod state;
pub use error::UserAgentError;
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct UserAgentActor {
db: db::DatabasePool,
actors: GlobalActors,
state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
transport: Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>>,
/// Abstraction over Ed25519 / ECDSA-secp256k1 / RSA public keys used during the auth handshake.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub enum AuthPublicKey {
Ed25519(ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey),
/// Compressed SEC1 public key; signature bytes are raw 64-byte (r||s).
EcdsaSecp256k1(k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey),
/// RSA-2048+ public key (Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager); signature bytes are PSS+SHA-256.
Rsa(rsa::RsaPublicKey),
}
impl UserAgentActor {
pub(crate) fn new(
context: ServerContext,
transport: Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
db: context.db.clone(),
actors: context.actors.clone(),
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
transport,
}
}
pub fn new_manual(
db: db::DatabasePool,
actors: GlobalActors,
transport: Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
db,
actors,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
transport,
}
}
async fn process_request(&mut self, req: UserAgentRequest) -> Output {
let msg = req.payload.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(actor = "useragent", "Received message with no payload");
UserAgentError::MissingPayload
})?;
match msg {
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientAuthMessage {
payload: Some(ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(req)),
}) => self.handle_auth_challenge_request(req).await,
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientAuthMessage {
payload: Some(ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(solution)),
}) => self.handle_auth_challenge_solution(solution).await,
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealStart(unseal_start) => {
self.handle_unseal_request(unseal_start).await
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealEncryptedKey(unseal_encrypted_key) => {
self.handle_unseal_encrypted_key(unseal_encrypted_key).await
}
_ => Err(UserAgentError::MissingPayload),
}
}
fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), UserAgentError> {
self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "State transition failed");
UserAgentError::InvalidState
})?;
Ok(())
}
async fn auth_with_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
token: String,
) -> Output {
let token_ok: bool = self
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken { token })
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?pubkey, "Failed to consume bootstrap token: {e}");
UserAgentError::ActorUnavailable
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!(?pubkey, "Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(UserAgentError::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(1),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBootstrapToken)?;
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
}
async fn auth_with_challenge(&mut self, pubkey: VerifyingKey, pubkey_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Output {
let nonce: Option<i32> = {
let mut db_conn = self.db.get().await?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
.filter(
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
)
.select(schema::useragent_client::nonce)
.first::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::useragent_client::table)
.filter(
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
)
.set(schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(current_nonce)
})
})
.await
.optional()?
};
let Some(nonce) = nonce else {
error!(?pubkey, "Public key not found in database");
return Err(UserAgentError::PubkeyNotRegistered);
};
let challenge = auth::AuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
nonce,
};
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::SentChallenge(ChallengeContext {
challenge: challenge.clone(),
key: pubkey,
}))?;
info!(
?pubkey,
?challenge,
"Sent authentication challenge to client"
);
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthChallenge(challenge)))
}
fn verify_challenge_solution(
&self,
solution: &auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<(bool, &ChallengeContext), UserAgentError> {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForChallengeSolution(challenge_context) = self.state.state()
else {
error!("Received challenge solution in invalid state");
return Err(UserAgentError::InvalidState);
};
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(&challenge_context.challenge);
let signature = solution.signature.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid signature length");
UserAgentError::InvalidSignatureLength
})?;
let valid = challenge_context
.key
.verify_strict(&formatted_challenge, &signature)
.is_ok();
Ok((valid, challenge_context))
}
}
type Output = Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>;
fn auth_response(payload: ServerAuthPayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(AuthServerMessage {
payload: Some(payload),
})),
}
}
fn unseal_response(payload: UserAgentResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(payload),
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentActor {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_request(&mut self, req: UnsealStart) -> Output {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
let client_pubkey_bytes: [u8; 32] = req
.client_pubkey
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey)?;
let client_public_key = PublicKey::from(client_pubkey_bytes);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
client_public_key,
}))?;
Ok(unseal_response(
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
}),
))
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(&mut self, req: UnsealEncryptedKey) -> Output {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received unseal encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(UserAgentError::InvalidState);
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
match secret {
Some(secret) => secret,
None => {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)));
}
}
};
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(&req.nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&unseal_context.client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut seal_key_buffer = MemSafe::new(req.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
let decryption_result = {
let mut write_handle = seal_key_buffer.write().unwrap();
let write_handle = write_handle.deref_mut();
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, &req.associated_data, write_handle)
};
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => {
match self
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::Success.into(),
)))
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)))
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UserAgentError::ActorUnavailable)
}
}
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)))
impl AuthPublicKey {
/// Canonical bytes stored in DB and echoed back in the challenge.
/// Ed25519: raw 32 bytes. ECDSA: SEC1 compressed 33 bytes. RSA: DER-encoded SPKI.
pub fn to_stored_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(k) => k.to_bytes().to_vec(),
// SEC1 compressed (33 bytes) is the natural compact format for secp256k1
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(k) => k.to_encoded_point(true).as_bytes().to_vec(),
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(k) => {
use rsa::pkcs8::EncodePublicKey as _;
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
k.to_public_key_der()
.expect("rsa SPKI encoding is infallible")
.to_vec()
}
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_request(&mut self, req: AuthChallengeRequest) -> Output {
let pubkey = req
.pubkey
.as_array()
.ok_or(UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey)?;
let pubkey = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey).map_err(|_err| {
error!(?pubkey, "Failed to convert to VerifyingKey");
UserAgentError::InvalidPubkey
})?;
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::AuthRequest)?;
match req.bootstrap_token {
Some(token) => self.auth_with_bootstrap_token(pubkey, token).await,
None => self.auth_with_challenge(pubkey, req.pubkey).await,
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_solution(
&mut self,
solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
) -> Output {
let (valid, challenge_context) = self.verify_challenge_solution(&solution)?;
if valid {
info!(
?challenge_context,
"Client provided valid solution to authentication challenge"
);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedGoodSolution)?;
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
} else {
error!("Client provided invalid solution to authentication challenge");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBadSolution)?;
Err(UserAgentError::InvalidChallengeSolution)
pub fn key_type(&self) -> KeyType {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(_) => KeyType::Ed25519,
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(_) => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(_) => KeyType::Rsa,
}
}
}
impl Message<UserAgentRequest> for UserAgentActor {
type Reply = ();
impl TryFrom<(KeyType, Vec<u8>)> for AuthPublicKey {
type Error = &'static str;
async fn handle(
&mut self,
msg: UserAgentRequest,
_ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let result = self.process_request(msg).await;
if let Err(e) = self.transport.tell(result).await {
error!(actor = "useragent", "Failed to send response to transport: {}", e);
fn try_from(value: (KeyType, Vec<u8>)) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let (key_type, bytes) = value;
match key_type {
KeyType::Ed25519 => {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| "invalid Ed25519 key length")?;
let key = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&bytes)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid Ed25519 key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(key))
}
KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => {
let point =
k256::EncodedPoint::from_bytes(&bytes).map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
let key = k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_encoded_point(&point)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(key))
}
KeyType::Rsa => {
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
let key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&bytes)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid RSA key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Rsa(key))
}
}
}
}
// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
ClientConnectionRequest { pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey },
ClientConnectionCancel,
}
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub use auth::authenticate;
pub use session::UserAgentSession;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
use std::borrow::Cow;
use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use thiserror::Error;
use tokio::sync::watch;
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::{
router::RegisterUserAgent,
user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection},
};
mod state;
use state::{DummyContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine};
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("State transition failed")]
State,
#[error("Internal error: {message}")]
Internal { message: Cow<'static, str> },
}
impl Error {
pub fn internal(message: impl Into<Cow<'static, str>>) -> Self {
Self::Internal {
message: message.into(),
}
}
}
pub struct UserAgentSession {
props: UserAgentConnection,
state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
#[allow(dead_code, reason = "The session keeps ownership of the outbound transport even before the state-machine flow starts using it directly")]
sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
}
mod connection;
pub(crate) use connection::{
BootstrapError, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleEvmWalletCreate, HandleEvmWalletList,
HandleGrantCreate, HandleGrantDelete, HandleGrantList, HandleQueryVaultState,
};
pub use connection::{HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest, UnsealError};
impl UserAgentSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: UserAgentConnection, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
Self {
props,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
sender,
}
}
pub fn new_test(db: crate::db::DatabasePool, actors: crate::actors::GlobalActors) -> Self {
struct DummySender;
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<OutOfBand> for DummySender {
async fn send(
&mut self,
_item: OutOfBand,
) -> Result<(), arbiter_proto::transport::Error> {
Ok(())
}
}
Self::new(UserAgentConnection::new(db, actors), Box::new(DummySender))
}
fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "State transition failed");
Error::State
})?;
Ok(())
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub async fn request_new_client_approval(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: VerifyingKey,
mut cancel_flag: watch::Receiver<()>,
) -> Result<bool, ()> {
if self
.sender
.send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionRequest {
pubkey: client_pubkey,
})
.await
.is_err()
{
return Err(());
}
let _ = cancel_flag.changed().await;
let _ = self.sender.send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel).await;
Ok(false)
}
}
impl Actor for UserAgentSession {
type Args = Self;
type Error = Error;
async fn on_start(
args: Self::Args,
this: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props
.actors
.router
.ask(RegisterUserAgent {
actor: this.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to register user agent connection with router");
Error::internal("Failed to register user agent connection with router")
})?;
Ok(args)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use alloy::primitives::Address;
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use kameo::messages;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
use crate::actors::user_agent::session::Error;
use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
use crate::{
actors::{
evm::{
Generate, ListWallets, UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentDeleteGrant, UseragentListGrants,
},
keyholder::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
user_agent::session::{
UserAgentSession,
state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
},
},
safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
};
impl UserAgentSession {
fn take_unseal_secret(&mut self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), Error> {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(Error::internal("Invalid state for unseal encrypted key"));
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Mutex poison is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
match secret {
Some(secret) => secret,
None => {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
return Err(Error::internal("Ephemeral secret already taken"));
}
}
};
Ok((ephemeral_secret, unseal_context.client_public_key))
}
fn decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret: EphemeralSecret,
client_public_key: PublicKey,
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => Ok(key_buffer),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
}
}
}
}
pub struct UnsealStartResponse {
pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum UnsealError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for unsealing")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Internal error during unsealing process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum BootstrapError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for bootstrapping")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Internal error during bootstrapping process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_request(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
) -> Result<UnsealStartResponse, Error> {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
client_public_key: client_pubkey,
}))?;
Ok(UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key,
})
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(_err) => {
return Err(Error::internal("Failed to take unseal secret").into());
}
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(Error::internal("Vault actor error").into())
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(err) => return Err(err.into()),
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to bootstrap vault");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::General(Error::internal(
"Vault actor error",
)))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "keyholder.query.failed");
return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Result<Address, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => Ok(address),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
"EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
))),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Address>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentCreateGrant {
client_id,
basic,
grant,
})
.await
{
Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to create EVM grant"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to delete EVM grant"))
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use arbiter_proto::proto::auth::AuthChallenge;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
/// Context for state machine with validated key and sent challenge
/// Challenge is then transformed to bytes using shared function and verified
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub key: VerifyingKey,
}
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest = ReceivedAuthRequest,
ReceivedAuthRequest + ReceivedBootstrapToken = Idle,
ReceivedAuthRequest + SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) / move_challenge = WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext),
WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedGoodSolution = Idle,
WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedBadSolution = AuthError, // block further transitions, but connection should close anyway
Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn move_challenge(&mut self, event_data: ChallengeContext) -> Result<ChallengeContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use rcgen::{
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose,
};
use rustls::pki_types::{pem::PemObject};
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
use thiserror::Error;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
@@ -59,10 +59,7 @@ pub enum InitError {
pub type PemCert = String;
pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer) -> PemCert {
pem::encode_config(
&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()),
ENCODE_CONFIG,
)
pem::encode_config(&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()), ENCODE_CONFIG)
}
#[allow(unused)]
@@ -94,6 +91,10 @@ impl TlsCa {
let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem();
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Broken cert couldn't bootstrap server anyway"
)]
let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(
&certified_issuer.pem(),
KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem.as_ref()).unwrap(),

View File

@@ -44,6 +44,14 @@ pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
Pool(#[from] PoolInitError),
}
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum DatabaseError {
#[error("Database connection error")]
Pool(#[from] PoolError),
#[error("Database query error")]
Connection(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
fn database_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, DatabaseSetupError> {
let arbiter_home = arbiter_proto::home_path().map_err(DatabaseSetupError::HomeDir)?;
@@ -92,6 +100,7 @@ fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
database_path()?
.to_str()
.expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
@@ -135,11 +144,13 @@ pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
let tempfile_name = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), 16);
let file = std::env::temp_dir().join(tempfile_name);
let url = format!(
"{}?mode=rwc",
file.to_str().expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
);
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
let url = file
.to_str()
.expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_string();
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
create_pool(Some(&url))
.await
.expect("Failed to create test database pool")

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,113 @@
#![allow(unused)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
use crate::db::schema::{self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, root_key_history, tls_history};
use crate::db::schema::{
self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_transaction_log, evm_wallet,
root_key_history, tls_history,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
use restructed::Models;
pub mod types {
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
pub struct SqliteTimestamp(DateTime<Utc>);
use diesel::{
deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow},
expression::AsExpression,
serialize::{IsNull, ToSql},
sql_types::Integer,
sqlite::{Sqlite, SqliteType},
};
#[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
pub struct SqliteTimestamp(pub DateTime<Utc>);
impl SqliteTimestamp {
pub fn now() -> Self {
SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())
}
}
impl From<chrono::DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from(dt: chrono::DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
SqliteTimestamp(dt)
}
}
impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for chrono::DateTime<Utc> {
fn from(ts: SqliteTimestamp) -> Self {
ts.0
}
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
let unix_timestamp = self.0.timestamp() as i32;
out.set_value(unix_timestamp);
Ok(IsNull::No)
}
}
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err(format!(
"Expected Integer type for SqliteTimestamp, got {:?}",
bytes.value_type()
)
.into());
};
let unix_timestamp = bytes.read_long();
let datetime =
DateTime::from_timestamp(unix_timestamp, 0).ok_or("Timestamp is out of bounds")?;
Ok(SqliteTimestamp(datetime))
}
}
/// Key algorithm stored in the `useragent_client.key_type` column.
/// Values must stay stable — they are persisted in the database.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, strum::FromRepr)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum KeyType {
Ed25519 = 1,
EcdsaSecp256k1 = 2,
Rsa = 3,
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
out.set_value(*self as i32);
Ok(IsNull::No)
}
}
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err("Expected Integer for KeyType".into());
};
let discriminant = bytes.read_long();
KeyType::from_repr(discriminant as i32)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("Unknown KeyType discriminant: {discriminant}").into())
}
}
}
pub use types::*;
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[view(
@@ -25,7 +124,7 @@ pub struct AeadEncrypted {
pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub schema_version: i32,
pub associated_root_key_id: i32, // references root_key_history.id
pub created_at: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
@@ -58,9 +157,9 @@ pub struct TlsHistory {
pub id: i32,
pub cert: String,
pub cert_key: String, // PEM Encoded private key
pub ca_cert: String, // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing
pub ca_key: String, // PEM Encoded public key for cert signing
pub created_at: i32,
pub ca_cert: String, // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing
pub ca_key: String, // PEM Encoded public key for cert signing
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
@@ -68,25 +167,173 @@ pub struct TlsHistory {
pub struct ArbiterSettings {
pub id: i32,
pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references root_key_history.id
pub tls_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_history.id
pub tls_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_history.id
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_wallet, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmWallet,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmWallet {
pub id: i32,
pub address: Vec<u8>,
pub aead_encrypted_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::program_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProgramClient {
pub id: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub nonce: i32,
pub created_at: i32,
pub updated_at: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::useragent_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct UseragentClient {
pub id: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub nonce: i32,
pub created_at: i32,
pub updated_at: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub key_type: KeyType,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferLimit {
pub id: i32,
pub window_secs: i32,
pub max_volume: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_basic_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmBasicGrant,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmBasicGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub wallet_id: i32, // references evm_wallet.id
pub client_id: i32, // references program_client.id
pub chain_id: i32,
pub valid_from: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub valid_until: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub rate_limit_count: Option<i32>,
pub rate_limit_window_secs: Option<i32>,
pub revoked_at: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_transaction_log, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTransactionLog,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTransactionLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub client_id: i32,
pub wallet_id: i32,
pub chain_id: i32,
pub eth_value: Vec<u8>,
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmEtherTransferGrant,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub basic_grant_id: i32,
pub limit_id: i32, // references evm_ether_transfer_limit.id
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub address: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferGrant,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub basic_grant_id: i32,
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
pub receiver: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub window_secs: i32,
pub max_volume: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_log, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferLog,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub log_id: i32,
pub chain_id: i32,
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
pub recipient_address: Vec<u8>,
pub value: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,99 @@ diesel::table! {
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_basic_grant (id) {
id -> Integer,
wallet_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer,
valid_from -> Nullable<Integer>,
valid_until -> Nullable<Integer>,
max_gas_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
max_priority_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
rate_limit_count -> Nullable<Integer>,
rate_limit_window_secs -> Nullable<Integer>,
revoked_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_grant (id) {
id -> Integer,
basic_grant_id -> Integer,
limit_id -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
address -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_limit (id) {
id -> Integer,
window_secs -> Integer,
max_volume -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_grant (id) {
id -> Integer,
basic_grant_id -> Integer,
token_contract -> Binary,
receiver -> Nullable<Binary>,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_log (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
log_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer,
token_contract -> Binary,
recipient_address -> Binary,
value -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
window_secs -> Integer,
max_volume -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_transaction_log (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer,
wallet_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer,
eth_value -> Binary,
signed_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_wallet (id) {
id -> Integer,
address -> Binary,
aead_encrypted_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
program_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
@@ -60,16 +153,36 @@ diesel::table! {
public_key -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
key_type -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::joinable!(aead_encrypted -> root_key_history (associated_root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> root_key_history (root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_history (tls_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_basic_grant -> evm_wallet (wallet_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_basic_grant -> program_client (client_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant -> evm_basic_grant (basic_grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant -> evm_ether_transfer_limit (limit_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target -> evm_ether_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_grant -> evm_basic_grant (basic_grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_log -> evm_token_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_log -> evm_transaction_log (log_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit -> evm_token_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet -> aead_encrypted (aead_encrypted_id));
diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
aead_encrypted,
arbiter_settings,
evm_basic_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target,
evm_ether_transfer_limit,
evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
evm_transaction_log,
evm_wallet,
program_client,
root_key_history,
tls_history,

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
use alloy::sol;
sol! {
interface IERC20 {
event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);
event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 value);
function totalSupply() external view returns (uint256);
function balanceOf(address account) external view returns (uint256);
function transfer(address to, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256);
function approve(address spender, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
}
}
sol! {
/// ERC-721: Non-Fungible Token Standard.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IERC721 {
event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 indexed tokenId);
event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed approved, uint256 indexed tokenId);
event ApprovalForAll(address indexed owner, address indexed operator, bool approved);
function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256 balance);
function ownerOf(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (address owner);
function safeTransferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function safeTransferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId, bytes calldata data) external;
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function approve(address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function setApprovalForAll(address operator, bool approved) external;
function getApproved(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (address operator);
function isApprovedForAll(address owner, address operator) external view returns (bool);
}
}
sol! {
/// Wrapped Ether — the only functions beyond ERC-20 that matter.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IWETH {
function deposit() external payable;
function withdraw(uint256 wad) external;
}
}
sol! {
/// Permit2 — Uniswap's canonical token approval manager.
/// Replaces per-contract ERC-20 approve() with a single approval hub.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IPermit2 {
struct TokenPermissions {
address token;
uint256 amount;
}
struct PermitSingle {
TokenPermissions details;
address spender;
uint256 sigDeadline;
}
struct PermitBatch {
TokenPermissions[] details;
address spender;
uint256 sigDeadline;
}
struct AllowanceTransferDetails {
address from;
address to;
uint160 amount;
address token;
}
function approve(address token, address spender, uint160 amount, uint48 expiration) external;
function permit(address owner, PermitSingle calldata permitSingle, bytes calldata signature) external;
function permit(address owner, PermitBatch calldata permitBatch, bytes calldata signature) external;
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint160 amount, address token) external;
function transferFrom(AllowanceTransferDetails[] calldata transferDetails) external;
function allowance(address user, address token, address spender)
external view returns (uint160 amount, uint48 expiration, uint48 nonce);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer;
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{TxKind, U256},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::{
db::{
self,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::{self, evm_transaction_log},
},
evm::policies::{
DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, FullGrant, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
};
pub mod policies;
mod utils;
/// Errors that can only occur once the transaction meaning is known (during policy evaluation)
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum PolicyError {
#[error("Database connection pool error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::policy_error::pool))]
Pool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database returned error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::policy_error::database))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Transaction violates policy: {0:?}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::policy_error::violation))]
Violations(Vec<EvalViolation>),
#[error("No matching grant found")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::policy_error::no_matching_grant))]
NoMatchingGrant,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum VetError {
#[error("Contract creation transactions are not supported")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::vet_error::contract_creation_unsupported))]
ContractCreationNotSupported,
#[error("Engine can't classify this transaction")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::vet_error::unsupported))]
UnsupportedTransactionType,
#[error("Policy evaluation failed: {1}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::vet_error::evaluated))]
Evaluated(SpecificMeaning, #[source] PolicyError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum SignError {
#[error("Database connection pool error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::database_error))]
Pool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database returned error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::database_error))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum AnalyzeError {
#[error("Engine doesn't support granting permissions for contract creation")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::analyze_error::contract_creation_not_supported))]
ContractCreationNotSupported,
#[error("Unsupported transaction type")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::analyze_error::unsupported_transaction_type))]
UnsupportedTransactionType,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum CreationError {
#[error("Database connection pool error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::creation_error::database_error))]
Pool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database returned error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::creation_error::database_error))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum ListGrantsError {
#[error("Database connection pool error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::list_grants_error::pool))]
Pool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database returned error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::list_grants_error::database))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
/// Controls whether a transaction should be executed or only validated
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RunKind {
/// Validate and record the transaction
Execution,
/// Validate only, do not record
CheckOnly,
}
async fn check_shared_constraints(
context: &EvalContext,
shared: &SharedGrantSettings,
shared_grant_id: DatabaseID,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let now = Utc::now();
// Validity window
if shared.valid_from.is_some_and(|t| now < t) || shared.valid_until.is_some_and(|t| now > t) {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTime);
}
// Gas fee caps
let fee_exceeded = shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.is_some_and(|cap| U256::from(context.max_fee_per_gas) > cap);
let priority_exceeded = shared
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.is_some_and(|cap| U256::from(context.max_priority_fee_per_gas) > cap);
if fee_exceeded || priority_exceeded {
violations.push(EvalViolation::GasLimitExceeded {
max_gas_fee_per_gas: shared.max_gas_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: shared.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
});
}
// Transaction count rate limit
if let Some(rate_limit) = &shared.rate_limit {
let window_start = SqliteTimestamp(now - rate_limit.window);
let count: i64 = evm_transaction_log::table
.filter(evm_transaction_log::grant_id.eq(shared_grant_id))
.filter(evm_transaction_log::signed_at.ge(window_start))
.count()
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
if count >= rate_limit.count as i64 {
violations.push(EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded);
}
}
Ok(violations)
}
// Supporting only EIP-1559 transactions for now, but we can easily extend this to support legacy transactions if needed
pub struct Engine {
db: db::DatabasePool,
}
impl Engine {
async fn vet_transaction<P: Policy>(
&self,
context: EvalContext,
meaning: &P::Meaning,
run_kind: RunKind,
) -> Result<(), PolicyError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
.await?
.ok_or(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant)?;
let mut violations =
check_shared_constraints(&context, &grant.shared, grant.shared_grant_id, &mut conn)
.await?;
violations.extend(P::evaluate(&context, meaning, &grant, &mut conn).await?);
if !violations.is_empty() {
return Err(PolicyError::Violations(violations));
} else if run_kind == RunKind::Execution {
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let log_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(&NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: grant.shared_grant_id,
client_id: context.client_id,
wallet_id: context.wallet_id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(context.value).to_vec(),
signed_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(evm_transaction_log::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
P::record_transaction(&context, meaning, log_id, &grant, conn).await?;
QueryResult::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl Engine {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Self {
Self { db }
}
pub async fn create_grant<P: Policy>(
&self,
client_id: i32,
full_grant: FullGrant<P::Settings>,
) -> Result<i32, CreationError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let id = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use schema::evm_basic_grant;
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_id: full_grant.basic.wallet_id,
chain_id: full_grant.basic.chain as i32,
client_id,
valid_from: full_grant.basic.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: full_grant.basic.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.basic
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.basic
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
rate_limit_count: full_grant
.basic
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.count as i32),
rate_limit_window_secs: full_grant
.basic
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.window.num_seconds() as i32),
revoked_at: None,
})
.returning(evm_basic_grant::all_columns)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await
})
})
.await?;
Ok(id)
}
pub async fn list_all_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, ListGrantsError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let mut grants: Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>> = Vec::new();
grants.extend(
EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut conn)
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
shared_grant_id: g.shared_grant_id,
shared: g.shared,
settings: SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(g.settings),
}),
);
grants.extend(
TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut conn)
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
shared_grant_id: g.shared_grant_id,
shared: g.shared,
settings: SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(g.settings),
}),
);
Ok(grants)
}
pub async fn evaluate_transaction(
&self,
wallet_id: i32,
client_id: i32,
transaction: TxEip1559,
run_kind: RunKind,
) -> Result<SpecificMeaning, VetError> {
let TxKind::Call(to) = transaction.to else {
return Err(VetError::ContractCreationNotSupported);
};
let context = policies::EvalContext {
wallet_id,
client_id,
chain: transaction.chain_id,
to,
value: transaction.value,
calldata: transaction.input.clone(),
max_fee_per_gas: transaction.max_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: transaction.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
};
if let Some(meaning) = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context) {
return match self
.vet_transaction::<EtherTransfer>(context, &meaning, run_kind)
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(meaning.into()),
Err(e) => Err(VetError::Evaluated(meaning.into(), e)),
};
}
if let Some(meaning) = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context) {
return match self
.vet_transaction::<TokenTransfer>(context, &meaning, run_kind)
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(meaning.into()),
Err(e) => Err(VetError::Evaluated(meaning.into(), e)),
};
}
Err(VetError::UnsupportedTransactionType)
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
use std::fmt::Display;
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, ChainId, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, result::QueryResult, sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use miette::Diagnostic;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
db::models::{self, EvmBasicGrant},
evm::utils,
};
pub mod ether_transfer;
pub mod token_transfers;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct EvalContext {
// Which wallet is this transaction for
pub client_id: i32,
pub wallet_id: i32,
// The transaction data
pub chain: ChainId,
pub to: Address,
pub value: U256,
pub calldata: Bytes,
// Gas pricing (EIP-1559)
pub max_fee_per_gas: u128,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error, Diagnostic)]
pub enum EvalViolation {
#[error("This grant doesn't allow transactions to the target address {target}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::invalid_target))]
InvalidTarget { target: Address },
#[error("Gas limit exceeded for this grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::gas_limit_exceeded))]
GasLimitExceeded {
max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
},
#[error("Rate limit exceeded for this grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::rate_limit_exceeded))]
RateLimitExceeded,
#[error("Transaction exceeds volumetric limits of the grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::volumetric_limit_exceeded))]
VolumetricLimitExceeded,
#[error("Transaction is outside of the grant's validity period")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::invalid_time))]
InvalidTime,
#[error("Transaction type is not allowed by this grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::invalid_transaction_type))]
InvalidTransactionType,
}
pub type DatabaseID = i32;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Grant<PolicySettings> {
pub id: DatabaseID,
pub shared_grant_id: DatabaseID, // ID of the basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
pub shared: SharedGrantSettings,
pub settings: PolicySettings,
}
pub trait Policy: Sized {
type Settings: Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificGrant>;
type Meaning: Display + std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificMeaning>;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning>;
// Evaluate whether a transaction with the given meaning complies with the provided grant, and return any violations if not
// Empty vector means transaction is compliant with the grant
fn evaluate(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>>> + Send;
// Create a new grant in the database based on the provided grant details, and return its ID
fn create_grant(
basic: &models::EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = QueryResult<DatabaseID>> + Send;
// Try to find an existing grant that matches the transaction context, and return its details if found
// Additionally, return ID of basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>>> + Send;
// Return all non-revoked grants, eagerly loading policy-specific settings
fn find_all_grants(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Vec<Grant<Self::Settings>>>> + Send;
// Records, updates or deletes rate limits
// In other words, records grant-specific things after transaction is executed
fn record_transaction(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
log_id: i32,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<()>> + Send;
}
pub enum ReceiverTarget {
Specific(Vec<Address>), // only allow transfers to these addresses
Any, // allow transfers to any address
}
// Classification of what transaction does
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum SpecificMeaning {
EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Meaning),
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Meaning),
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct TransactionRateLimit {
pub count: u32,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct VolumeRateLimit {
pub max_volume: U256,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
pub wallet_id: i32,
pub client_id: i32,
pub chain: ChainId,
pub valid_from: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub valid_until: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
pub rate_limit: Option<TransactionRateLimit>,
}
impl SharedGrantSettings {
fn try_from_model(model: EvmBasicGrant) -> QueryResult<Self> {
Ok(Self {
wallet_id: model.wallet_id,
client_id: model.client_id,
chain: model.chain_id as u64, // safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants
valid_from: model.valid_from.map(Into::into),
valid_until: model.valid_until.map(Into::into),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: model
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))
.transpose()?,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: model
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))
.transpose()?,
rate_limit: match (model.rate_limit_count, model.rate_limit_window_secs) {
(Some(count), Some(window_secs)) => Some(TransactionRateLimit {
count: count as u32,
window: Duration::seconds(window_secs as i64),
}),
_ => None,
},
})
}
pub async fn query_by_id(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
id: i32,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<Self> {
use crate::db::schema::evm_basic_grant;
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = evm_basic_grant::table
.select(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(id))
.first::<EvmBasicGrant>(conn)
.await?;
Self::try_from_model(basic_grant)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum SpecificGrant {
EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Settings),
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings),
}
pub struct FullGrant<PolicyGrant> {
pub basic: SharedGrantSettings,
pub specific: PolicyGrant,
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fmt::Display;
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, JoinOnDsl, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, EvmEtherTransferLimit,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_transaction_log};
use crate::evm::policies::{
Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
};
use crate::{
db::{
models::{self, NewEvmEtherTransferGrant, NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget},
schema::{evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target},
},
evm::{policies::Policy, utils},
};
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
evm_ether_transfer_grant::table.inner_join(
evm_basic_grant::table.on(evm_ether_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(evm_basic_grant::id)),
)
}
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
// Plain ether transfer
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {
to: Address,
value: U256,
}
impl Display for Meaning {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "Ether transfer of {} to {}", self.value, self.to)
}
}
impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
fn from(val: Meaning) -> SpecificMeaning {
SpecificMeaning::EtherTransfer(val)
}
}
// A grant for ether transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Settings {
pub target: Vec<Address>,
pub limit: VolumeRateLimit,
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(val)
}
}
async fn query_relevant_past_transaction(
grant_id: i32,
longest_window: Duration,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)>> {
let past_transactions: Vec<(Vec<u8>, SqliteTimestamp)> = evm_transaction_log::table
.filter(evm_transaction_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id))
.filter(
evm_transaction_log::signed_at.ge(SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() - longest_window)),
)
.select((
evm_transaction_log::eth_value,
evm_transaction_log::signed_at,
))
.load(db)
.await?;
let past_transaction: Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)> = past_transactions
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(value_bytes, timestamp)| {
let value = utils::bytes_to_u256(&value_bytes)?;
Some((value, timestamp.0))
})
.collect();
Ok(past_transaction)
}
async fn check_rate_limits(
grant: &Grant<Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let window = grant.settings.limit.window;
let past_transaction = query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.id, window, db).await?;
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - grant.settings.limit.window;
let cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transaction
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
.fold(U256::default(), |acc, (value, _)| acc + *value);
if cumulative_volume > grant.settings.limit.max_volume {
violations.push(EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded);
}
Ok(violations)
}
pub struct EtherTransfer;
impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
type Settings = Settings;
type Meaning = Meaning;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning> {
if !context.calldata.is_empty() {
return None;
}
Some(Meaning {
to: context.to,
value: context.value,
})
}
async fn evaluate(
_: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
// Check if the target address is within the grant's allowed targets
if !grant.settings.target.contains(&meaning.to) {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target: meaning.to });
}
let rate_violations = check_rate_limits(grant, db).await?;
violations.extend(rate_violations);
Ok(violations)
}
async fn create_grant(
basic: &models::EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<DatabaseID> {
let limit_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_limit::table)
.values(NewEvmEtherTransferLimit {
window_secs: grant.limit.window.num_seconds() as i32,
max_volume: utils::u256_to_bytes(grant.limit.max_volume).to_vec(),
})
.returning(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmEtherTransferGrant {
basic_grant_id: basic.id,
limit_id,
})
.returning(evm_ether_transfer_grant::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
for target in &grant.target {
insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table)
.values(NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget {
grant_id,
address: target.to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Ok(grant_id)
}
async fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let target_bytes = context.to.to_vec();
// Find a grant where:
// 1. The basic grant's wallet_id and client_id match the context
// 2. Any of the grant's targets match the context's `to` address
let grant: Option<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant)> = evm_ether_transfer_grant::table
.inner_join(evm_basic_grant::table)
.inner_join(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table)
.filter(
evm_basic_grant::wallet_id
.eq(context.wallet_id)
.and(evm_basic_grant::client_id.eq(context.client_id))
.and(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.and(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::address.eq(&target_bytes)),
)
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmEtherTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.first(conn)
.await
.optional()?;
let Some((basic_grant, grant)) = grant else {
return Ok(None);
};
let target_bytes: Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget> = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
.select(EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget::as_select())
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq(grant.id))
.load(conn)
.await?;
let limit: EvmEtherTransferLimit = evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq(grant.limit_id))
.select(EvmEtherTransferLimit::as_select())
.first::<EvmEtherTransferLimit>(conn)
.await?;
// Convert bytes back to Address
let targets: Vec<Address> = target_bytes
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|target| {
// TODO: Handle invalid addresses more gracefully
let arr: [u8; 20] = target.address.try_into().ok()?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
})
.collect();
let settings = Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume)
.map_err(|err| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err)))?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
},
};
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: grant.id,
shared_grant_id: grant.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
settings,
}))
}
async fn record_transaction(
_context: &EvalContext,
_: &Self::Meaning,
_log_id: i32,
_grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
_conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<()> {
// Basic log is sufficient
Ok(())
}
async fn find_all_grants(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let grants: Vec<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant)> = grant_join()
.filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmEtherTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.load(conn)
.await?;
if grants.is_empty() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
let grant_ids: Vec<i32> = grants.iter().map(|(_, g)| g.id).collect();
let limit_ids: Vec<i32> = grants.iter().map(|(_, g)| g.limit_id).collect();
let all_targets: Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget> = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq_any(&grant_ids))
.select(EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let all_limits: Vec<EvmEtherTransferLimit> = evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq_any(&limit_ids))
.select(EvmEtherTransferLimit::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let mut targets_by_grant: HashMap<i32, Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget>> = HashMap::new();
for target in all_targets {
targets_by_grant
.entry(target.grant_id)
.or_default()
.push(target);
}
let limits_by_id: HashMap<i32, EvmEtherTransferLimit> =
all_limits.into_iter().map(|l| (l.id, l)).collect();
grants
.into_iter()
.map(|(basic, specific)| {
let targets: Vec<Address> = targets_by_grant
.get(&specific.id)
.map(|v| v.as_slice())
.unwrap_or_default()
.iter()
.filter_map(|t| {
let arr: [u8; 20] = t.address.clone().try_into().ok()?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
})
.collect();
let limit = limits_by_id
.get(&specific.limit_id)
.ok_or(diesel::result::Error::NotFound)?;
Ok(Grant {
id: specific.id,
shared_grant_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic)?,
settings: Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(
|e| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(e)),
)?,
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
},
},
})
})
.collect()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;

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@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::{
policies::{EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, VolumeRateLimit},
utils,
};
use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
const WALLET_ID: i32 = 1;
const CLIENT_ID: i32 = 2;
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const ALLOWED: Address = address!("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111");
const OTHER: Address = address!("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222");
fn ctx(to: Address, value: U256) -> EvalContext {
EvalContext {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
to,
value,
calldata: Bytes::new(),
max_fee_per_gas: 0,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 0,
}
}
async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicGrant {
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit_count: None,
rate_limit_window_secs: None,
revoked_at: revoked.then(|| SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())),
})
.returning(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
fn make_settings(targets: Vec<Address>, max_volume: u64) -> Settings {
Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(max_volume),
window: Duration::hours(1),
},
}
}
fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
}
}
// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn analyze_matches_empty_calldata() {
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1_000u64))).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m.to, ALLOWED);
assert_eq!(m.value, U256::from(1_000u64));
}
#[test]
fn analyze_rejects_nonempty_calldata() {
let context = EvalContext {
calldata: Bytes::from(vec![0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]),
..ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64))
};
assert!(EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).is_none());
}
// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_for_allowed_target() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(v.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_disallowed_target() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
};
let context = ctx(OTHER, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { .. }))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_when_volume_within_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000);
let grant_id = EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(500u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000);
let grant_id = EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_001u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000);
let grant_id = EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// Exactly at the limit — the check is `>`, so this should not violate
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_000u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
// ── try_find_grant ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let found = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_some());
let g = found.unwrap();
assert_eq!(g.settings.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
assert_eq!(g.settings.limit.max_volume, U256::from(1_000_000u64));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_revoked_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let found = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_wrong_target_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let found = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(OTHER, U256::from(1u64)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(all.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_excludes_revoked() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
let active = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&active, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let revoked = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&revoked, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_multiple_targets() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED, OTHER], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.target.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.limit.max_volume, U256::from(1_000_000u64));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_multiple_grants() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic1 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic1, &make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 500), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let basic2 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic2, &make_settings(vec![OTHER], 1_000), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 2);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, U256},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, NewEvmTokenTransferGrant,
NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
evm_token_transfer_grant::table.inner_join(
evm_basic_grant::table.on(evm_token_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(evm_basic_grant::id)),
)
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {
token: &'static TokenInfo,
to: Address,
value: U256,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for Meaning {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(
f,
"Transfer of {} {} to {}",
self.value, self.token.symbol, self.to
)
}
}
impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
fn from(val: Meaning) -> SpecificMeaning {
SpecificMeaning::TokenTransfer(val)
}
}
// A grant for token transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Settings {
pub token_contract: Address,
pub target: Option<Address>,
pub volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit>,
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(val)
}
}
async fn query_relevant_past_transfers(
grant_id: i32,
longest_window: Duration,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)>> {
let past_logs: Vec<(Vec<u8>, SqliteTimestamp)> = evm_token_transfer_log::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id))
.filter(
evm_token_transfer_log::created_at
.ge(SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() - longest_window)),
)
.select((
evm_token_transfer_log::value,
evm_token_transfer_log::created_at,
))
.load(db)
.await?;
let past_transfers: Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)> = past_logs
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(value_bytes, timestamp)| {
let value = utils::bytes_to_u256(&value_bytes)?;
Some((value, timestamp.0))
})
.collect();
Ok(past_transfers)
}
async fn check_volume_rate_limits(
grant: &Grant<Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let Some(longest_window) = grant.settings.volume_limits.iter().map(|l| l.window).max() else {
return Ok(violations);
};
let past_transfers = query_relevant_past_transfers(grant.id, longest_window, db).await?;
for limit in &grant.settings.volume_limits {
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - limit.window;
let cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transfers
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
.fold(U256::default(), |acc, (value, _)| acc + *value);
if cumulative_volume > limit.max_volume {
violations.push(EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded);
break;
}
}
Ok(violations)
}
pub struct TokenTransfer;
impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
type Settings = Settings;
type Meaning = Meaning;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning> {
let token = nonfungible::get_token(context.chain, context.to)?;
let decoded = transferCall::abi_decode_raw_validate(&context.calldata).ok()?;
Some(Meaning {
token,
to: decoded.to,
value: decoded.value,
})
}
async fn evaluate(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
// erc20 transfer shouldn't carry eth value
if !context.value.is_zero() {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType);
return Ok(violations);
}
if let Some(allowed) = grant.settings.target
&& allowed != meaning.to
{
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target: meaning.to });
}
let rate_violations = check_volume_rate_limits(grant, db).await?;
violations.extend(rate_violations);
Ok(violations)
}
async fn create_grant(
basic: &EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<DatabaseID> {
// Store the specific receiver as bytes (None means any receiver is allowed)
let receiver: Option<Vec<u8>> = grant.target.map(|addr| addr.to_vec());
let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_token_transfer_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferGrant {
basic_grant_id: basic.id,
token_contract: grant.token_contract.to_vec(),
receiver,
})
.returning(evm_token_transfer_grant::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
for limit in &grant.volume_limits {
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
grant_id,
window_secs: limit.window.num_seconds() as i32,
max_volume: utils::u256_to_bytes(limit.max_volume).to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Ok(grant_id)
}
async fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let token_contract_bytes = context.to.to_vec();
let grant: Option<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant)> = grant_join()
.filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.filter(evm_basic_grant::wallet_id.eq(context.wallet_id))
.filter(evm_basic_grant::client_id.eq(context.client_id))
.filter(evm_token_transfer_grant::token_contract.eq(&token_contract_bytes))
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmTokenTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.first(conn)
.await
.optional()?;
let Some((basic_grant, token_grant)) = grant else {
return Ok(None);
};
let volume_limits_db: Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit> =
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq(token_grant.id))
.select(EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = volume_limits_db
.into_iter()
.map(|row| {
Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(|err| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
})?,
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
let token_contract: [u8; 20] = token_grant.token_contract.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid token contract address length".into(),
)
})?;
let target: Option<Address> = match token_grant.receiver {
None => None,
Some(bytes) => {
let arr: [u8; 20] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid receiver address length".into(),
)
})?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
}
};
let settings = Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
};
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: token_grant.id,
shared_grant_id: token_grant.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
settings,
}))
}
async fn record_transaction(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
log_id: i32,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id: grant.id,
log_id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
token_contract: context.to.to_vec(),
recipient_address: meaning.to.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(meaning.value).to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn find_all_grants(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let grants: Vec<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant)> = grant_join()
.filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmTokenTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.load(conn)
.await?;
if grants.is_empty() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
let grant_ids: Vec<i32> = grants.iter().map(|(_, g)| g.id).collect();
let all_volume_limits: Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit> =
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq_any(&grant_ids))
.select(EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let mut limits_by_grant: HashMap<i32, Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit>> = HashMap::new();
for limit in all_volume_limits {
limits_by_grant
.entry(limit.grant_id)
.or_default()
.push(limit);
}
grants
.into_iter()
.map(|(basic, specific)| {
let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = limits_by_grant
.get(&specific.id)
.map(|v| v.as_slice())
.unwrap_or_default()
.iter()
.map(|row| {
Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(|e| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(e))
})?,
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
let token_contract: [u8; 20] =
specific.token_contract.clone().try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid token contract address length".into(),
)
})?;
let target: Option<Address> = match &specific.receiver {
None => None,
Some(bytes) => {
let arr: [u8; 20] = bytes.clone().try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid receiver address length".into(),
)
})?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
}
};
Ok(Grant {
id: specific.id,
shared_grant_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic)?,
settings: Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
},
})
})
.collect()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use alloy::sol_types::SolCall;
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::evm_basic_grant,
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, VolumeRateLimit},
utils,
};
use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
// DAI on Ethereum mainnet — present in the static token registry
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const DAI: Address = address!("6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F");
const WALLET_ID: i32 = 1;
const CLIENT_ID: i32 = 2;
const RECIPIENT: Address = address!("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa");
const OTHER: Address = address!("bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb");
const UNKNOWN_TOKEN: Address = address!("cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc");
/// Encode `transfer(to, value)` raw params (no 4-byte selector).
/// `abi_decode_raw_validate` expects exactly this format.
fn transfer_calldata(to: Address, value: U256) -> Bytes {
let mut raw = Vec::new();
transferCall { to, value }.abi_encode_raw(&mut raw);
Bytes::from(raw)
}
fn ctx(to: Address, calldata: Bytes) -> EvalContext {
EvalContext {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
to,
value: U256::ZERO,
calldata,
max_fee_per_gas: 0,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 0,
}
}
async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicGrant {
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit_count: None,
rate_limit_window_secs: None,
revoked_at: revoked.then(|| SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())),
})
.returning(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
fn make_settings(target: Option<Address>, max_volume: Option<u64>) -> Settings {
Settings {
token_contract: DAI,
target,
volume_limits: max_volume
.map(|v| {
vec![VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(v),
window: Duration::hours(1),
}]
})
.unwrap_or_default(),
}
}
fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
}
}
// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn analyze_known_token_valid_calldata() {
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, calldata)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m.to, RECIPIENT);
assert_eq!(m.value, U256::from(100u64));
}
#[test]
fn analyze_unknown_token_returns_none() {
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(UNKNOWN_TOKEN, calldata)).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn analyze_invalid_calldata_returns_none() {
let calldata = Bytes::from(vec![0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]);
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, calldata)).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn analyze_empty_calldata_returns_none() {
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, Bytes::new())).is_none());
}
// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_nonzero_eth_value() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let mut context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
context.value = U256::from(1u64); // ETH attached to an ERC-20 call
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&EvalContext {
value: U256::ZERO,
..context.clone()
})
.unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_any_recipient_when_no_restriction() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(v.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_matching_restricted_recipient() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(v.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_wrong_restricted_recipient() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(OTHER, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { .. }))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_volume_within_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(1_000));
let grant_id = TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// Record a past transfer of 500 (within 1000 limit)
use crate::db::{models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog, schema::evm_token_transfer_log};
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(500u64)).to_vec(),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(1_000));
let grant_id = TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
use crate::db::{models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog, schema::evm_token_transfer_log};
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_001u64)).to_vec(),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_no_volume_limits_always_passes() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None), // no volume limits
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(u64::MAX));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
// ── try_find_grant ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), Some(5_000));
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let found = TokenTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(DAI, calldata), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_some());
let g = found.unwrap();
assert_eq!(g.settings.token_contract, DAI);
assert_eq!(g.settings.target, Some(RECIPIENT));
assert_eq!(g.settings.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(g.settings.volume_limits[0].max_volume, U256::from(5_000u64));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_revoked_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, None);
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(1u64));
let found = TokenTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(DAI, calldata), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_unknown_token_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, None);
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// Query with a different token contract
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(1u64));
let found = TokenTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(UNKNOWN_TOKEN, calldata), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(all.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_excludes_revoked() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(1_000));
let active = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&active, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let revoked = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&revoked, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_loads_volume_limits() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(9_999));
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
all[0].settings.volume_limits[0].max_volume,
U256::from(9_999u64)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_multiple_grants_batch_loaded() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let b1 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&b1, &make_settings(None, Some(1_000)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let b2 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(
&b2,
&make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), Some(2_000)),
&mut *conn,
)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 2);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::{TxSigner, TxSignerSync},
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer, SignerSync, utils::secret_key_to_address},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use k256::ecdsa::{self, RecoveryId, SigningKey, signature::hazmat::PrehashSigner};
/// An Ethereum signer that stores its secp256k1 secret key inside a
/// hardware-protected [`MemSafe`] cell.
///
/// The underlying memory page is kept non-readable/non-writable at rest.
/// Access is temporarily elevated only for the duration of each signing
/// operation, then immediately revoked.
///
/// Because [`MemSafe::read`] requires `&mut self` while the [`Signer`] trait
/// requires `&self`, the cell is wrapped in a [`Mutex`].
pub struct SafeSigner {
key: Mutex<SafeCell<SigningKey>>,
address: Address,
chain_id: Option<ChainId>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for SafeSigner {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("SafeSigner")
.field("address", &self.address)
.field("chain_id", &self.chain_id)
.finish()
}
}
/// Generates a secp256k1 secret key directly inside a [`MemSafe`] cell.
///
/// Random bytes are written in-place into protected memory, then validated
/// as a legal scalar on the secp256k1 curve (the scalar must be in
/// `[1, n)` where `n` is the curve order — roughly 1-in-2^128 chance of
/// rejection, but we retry to be correct).
///
/// Returns the protected key bytes and the derived Ethereum address.
pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::Rng) -> (SafeCell<[u8; 32]>, Address) {
loop {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|w: &mut [u8; 32]| {
rng.fill_bytes(w);
});
let reader = cell.read();
if let Ok(sk) = SigningKey::from_slice(reader.as_ref()) {
let address = secret_key_to_address(&sk);
drop(reader);
return (cell, address);
}
}
}
impl SafeSigner {
/// Reconstructs a `SafeSigner` from key material held in a [`MemSafe`] buffer.
///
/// The key bytes are read from protected memory, parsed as a secp256k1
/// scalar, and immediately moved into a new [`MemSafe`] cell. The raw
/// bytes are never exposed outside this function.
pub fn from_cell(mut cell: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self> {
let reader = cell.read();
let sk = SigningKey::from_slice(reader.as_slice()).map_err(Error::other)?;
drop(reader);
Self::new(sk)
}
/// Creates a new `SafeSigner` by moving the signing key into a protected
/// memory region.
pub fn new(key: SigningKey) -> Result<Self> {
let address = secret_key_to_address(&key);
let cell = SafeCell::new(key);
Ok(Self {
key: Mutex::new(cell),
address,
chain_id: None,
})
}
fn sign_hash_inner(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
let mut cell = self.key.lock().expect("SafeSigner mutex poisoned");
let reader = cell.read();
let sig: (ecdsa::Signature, RecoveryId) = reader.sign_prehash(hash.as_ref())?;
Ok(sig.into())
}
fn sign_tx_inner(&self, tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>) -> Result<Signature> {
if let Some(chain_id) = self.chain_id
&& !tx.set_chain_id_checked(chain_id)
{
return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
signer: chain_id,
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
tx: tx.chain_id().expect("Chain ID is guaranteed to be set"),
});
}
self.sign_hash_inner(&tx.signature_hash())
.map_err(Error::other)
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Signer for SafeSigner {
#[inline]
async fn sign_hash(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_hash_inner(hash)
}
#[inline]
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
#[inline]
fn chain_id(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
self.chain_id
}
#[inline]
fn set_chain_id(&mut self, chain_id: Option<ChainId>) {
self.chain_id = chain_id;
}
}
impl SignerSync for SafeSigner {
#[inline]
fn sign_hash_sync(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_hash_inner(hash)
}
#[inline]
fn chain_id_sync(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
self.chain_id
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl TxSigner<Signature> for SafeSigner {
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
async fn sign_transaction(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_tx_inner(tx)
}
}
impl TxSignerSync<Signature> for SafeSigner {
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
fn sign_transaction_sync(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_tx_inner(tx)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use alloy::signers::local::PrivateKeySigner;
#[test]
fn sign_and_recover() {
let pk = PrivateKeySigner::random();
let key = pk.into_credential();
let signer = SafeSigner::new(key).unwrap();
let message = b"hello arbiter";
let sig = signer.sign_message_sync(message).unwrap();
let recovered = sig.recover_address_from_msg(message).unwrap();
assert_eq!(recovered, Signer::address(&signer));
}
#[test]
fn chain_id_roundtrip() {
let pk = PrivateKeySigner::random();
let key = pk.into_credential();
let mut signer = SafeSigner::new(key).unwrap();
assert_eq!(Signer::chain_id(&signer), None);
signer.set_chain_id(Some(1337));
assert_eq!(Signer::chain_id(&signer), Some(1337));
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
use alloy::primitives::U256;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
#[error("Expected {expected} bytes but got {actual} bytes")]
pub struct LengthError {
pub expected: usize,
pub actual: usize,
}
pub fn u256_to_bytes(value: U256) -> [u8; 32] {
value.to_le_bytes()
}
pub fn bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().ok()?;
Some(U256::from_le_bytes(bytes))
}
pub fn try_bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(LengthError {
expected: 32,
actual: bytes.len(),
}))
})?;
Ok(U256::from_le_bytes(bytes))
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::client::{
ClientRequest, ClientResponse, VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
transport::{Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use kameo::{
actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _},
error::SendError,
};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::{
client::{
self, ClientConnection,
session::{ClientSession, Error, HandleQueryVaultState},
},
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
utils::defer,
};
mod auth;
async fn dispatch_loop(
mut bi: GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
mut request_tracker: RequestTracker,
) {
loop {
let Some(conn) = bi.recv().await else {
return;
};
if dispatch_conn_message(&mut bi, &actor, &mut request_tracker, conn)
.await
.is_err()
{
return;
}
}
}
async fn dispatch_conn_message(
bi: &mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
actor: &ActorRef<ClientSession>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
conn: Result<ClientRequest, Status>,
) -> Result<(), ()> {
let conn = match conn {
Ok(conn) => conn,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to receive client request");
return Err(());
}
};
let request_id = match request_tracker.request(conn.request_id) {
Ok(request_id) => request_id,
Err(err) => {
let _ = bi.send(Err(err)).await;
return Err(());
}
};
let Some(payload) = conn.payload else {
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Missing client request payload",
)))
.await;
return Err(());
};
let payload = match payload {
ClientRequestPayload::QueryVaultState(_) => ClientResponsePayload::VaultState(
match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(Error::Internal)) => ProtoVaultState::Error,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");
ProtoVaultState::Error
}
}
.into(),
),
payload => {
warn!(?payload, "Unsupported post-auth client request");
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Unsupported client request")))
.await;
return Err(());
}
};
bi.send(Ok(ClientResponse {
request_id: Some(request_id),
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
.map_err(|_| ())
}
pub async fn start(conn: ClientConnection, mut bi: GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>) {
let mut conn = conn;
let mut request_tracker = RequestTracker::default();
let mut response_id = None;
match auth::start(&mut conn, &mut bi, &mut request_tracker, &mut response_id).await {
Ok(_) => {
let actor =
client::session::ClientSession::spawn(client::session::ClientSession::new(conn));
let actor_for_cleanup = actor.clone();
let _ = defer(move || {
actor_for_cleanup.kill();
});
info!("Client authenticated successfully");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor, request_tracker).await;
}
Err(e) => {
let mut transport = auth::AuthTransportAdapter::new(
&mut bi,
&mut request_tracker,
&mut response_id,
);
let _ = transport.send(Err(e.clone())).await;
warn!(error = ?e, "Authentication failed");
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::client::{
AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
AuthChallengeSolution as ProtoAuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult,
ClientRequest, ClientResponse, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::client::{self, ClientConnection, auth},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
response_id: &'a mut Option<i32>,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
response_id: &'a mut Option<i32>,
) -> Self {
Self {
bi,
request_tracker,
response_id,
}
}
fn response_to_proto(response: auth::Outbound) -> ClientResponsePayload {
match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
nonce,
})
}
auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess => {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into())
}
}
}
fn error_to_proto(error: auth::Error) -> ClientResponsePayload {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(
match error {
auth::Error::InvalidChallengeSolution => ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature,
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Denied) => {
ProtoAuthResult::ApprovalDenied
}
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Upstream(
crate::actors::router::ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected,
)) => ProtoAuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline,
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Internal)
| auth::Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
| auth::Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
| auth::Error::Transport => ProtoAuthResult::Internal,
}
.into(),
)
}
async fn send_client_response(
&mut self,
payload: ClientResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let request_id = self.response_id.take();
self.bi
.send(Ok(ClientResponse {
request_id,
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
}
async fn send_auth_result(&mut self, result: ProtoAuthResult) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.send_client_response(ClientResponsePayload::AuthResult(result.into()))
.await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let payload = match item {
Ok(message) => AuthTransportAdapter::response_to_proto(message),
Err(err) => AuthTransportAdapter::error_to_proto(err),
};
self.send_client_response(payload).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<auth::Inbound> {
let request = match self.bi.recv().await? {
Ok(request) => request,
Err(error) => {
warn!(error = ?error, "grpc client recv failed; closing stream");
return None;
}
};
let request_id = match self.request_tracker.request(request.request_id) {
Ok(request_id) => request_id,
Err(error) => {
let _ = self.bi.send(Err(error)).await;
return None;
}
};
*self.response_id = Some(request_id);
let payload = request.payload?;
match payload {
ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(ProtoAuthChallengeRequest { pubkey }) => {
let Ok(pubkey) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(pubkey) else {
let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
return None;
};
let Ok(pubkey) = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey) else {
let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
return None;
};
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { pubkey })
}
ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution {
signature,
}) => {
let Ok(signature) = ed25519_dalek::Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) else {
let _ = self
.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature)
.await;
return None;
};
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
}
_ => {
let _ = self
.bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Unsupported client auth request")))
.await;
None
}
}
}
}
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
pub async fn start(
conn: &mut ClientConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
response_id: &mut Option<i32>,
) -> Result<(), auth::Error> {
let mut transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker, response_id);
client::auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await?;
Ok(())
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{
client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse},
user_agent::{UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
},
transport::grpc::GrpcBi,
};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::{Request, Response, Status, async_trait};
use tracing::info;
use crate::{
actors::{client::ClientConnection, user_agent::UserAgentConnection},
grpc::user_agent::start,
};
pub mod client;
mod request_tracker;
pub mod user_agent;
#[async_trait]
impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for super::Server {
type UserAgentStream = ReceiverStream<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>;
type ClientStream = ReceiverStream<Result<ClientResponse, Status>>;
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
async fn client(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<ClientRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::ClientStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (bi, rx) = GrpcBi::from_bi_stream(req_stream);
let props = ClientConnection::new(self.context.db.clone(), self.context.actors.clone());
tokio::spawn(client::start(props, bi));
info!(event = "connection established", "grpc.client");
Ok(Response::new(rx))
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
async fn user_agent(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<UserAgentRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::UserAgentStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (bi, rx) = GrpcBi::from_bi_stream(req_stream);
tokio::spawn(start(
UserAgentConnection {
db: self.context.db.clone(),
actors: self.context.actors.clone(),
},
bi,
));
info!(event = "connection established", "grpc.user_agent");
Ok(Response::new(rx))
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
use tonic::Status;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct RequestTracker {
next_request_id: i32,
}
impl RequestTracker {
pub fn request(&mut self, id: i32) -> Result<i32, Status> {
if id < self.next_request_id {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Duplicate request id"));
}
self.next_request_id = id
.checked_add(1)
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid request id"))?;
Ok(id)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,604 @@
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use arbiter_proto::{
google::protobuf::{Empty as ProtoEmpty, Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp},
proto::{
evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, EvmError as ProtoEvmError,
EvmGrantCreateRequest, EvmGrantCreateResponse, EvmGrantDeleteRequest,
EvmGrantDeleteResponse, EvmGrantList, EvmGrantListResponse, GrantEntry,
SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings, SpecificGrant as ProtoSpecificGrant,
TokenTransferSettings as ProtoTokenTransferSettings,
TransactionRateLimit as ProtoTransactionRateLimit,
VolumeRateLimit as ProtoVolumeRateLimit, WalletCreateResponse, WalletEntry, WalletList,
WalletListResponse, evm_grant_create_response::Result as EvmGrantCreateResult,
evm_grant_delete_response::Result as EvmGrantDeleteResult,
evm_grant_list_response::Result as EvmGrantListResult,
specific_grant::Grant as ProtoSpecificGrantType,
wallet_create_response::Result as WalletCreateResult,
wallet_list_response::Result as WalletListResult,
},
user_agent::{
BootstrapEncryptedKey as ProtoBootstrapEncryptedKey,
BootstrapResult as ProtoBootstrapResult,
SdkClientConnectionResponse as ProtoSdkClientConnectionResponse,
UnsealEncryptedKey as ProtoUnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult as ProtoUnsealResult,
UnsealStart, UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse, VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
},
transport::{Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use chrono::{TimeZone, Utc};
use kameo::{
actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _},
error::SendError,
};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::{
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
user_agent::{
OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentSession,
session::{
BootstrapError, Error, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleEvmWalletCreate,
HandleEvmWalletList, HandleGrantCreate, HandleGrantDelete, HandleGrantList,
HandleQueryVaultState, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest, UnsealError,
},
},
},
evm::policies::{
Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit,
ether_transfer, token_transfers,
},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
utils::defer,
};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
mod auth;
pub struct OutOfBandAdapter(mpsc::Sender<OutOfBand>);
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<OutOfBand> for OutOfBandAdapter {
async fn send(&mut self, item: OutOfBand) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.0.send(item).await.map_err(|e| {
warn!(error = ?e, "Failed to send out-of-band message");
TransportError::ChannelClosed
})
}
}
async fn dispatch_loop(
mut bi: GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
mut receiver: mpsc::Receiver<OutOfBand>,
mut request_tracker: RequestTracker,
) {
loop {
tokio::select! {
oob = receiver.recv() => {
let Some(oob) = oob else {
return;
};
if send_out_of_band(&mut bi, oob).await.is_err() {
return;
}
}
conn = bi.recv() => {
let Some(conn) = conn else {
return;
};
if dispatch_conn_message(&mut bi, &actor, &mut request_tracker, conn)
.await
.is_err()
{
return;
}
}
}
}
}
async fn dispatch_conn_message(
bi: &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
conn: Result<UserAgentRequest, Status>,
) -> Result<(), ()> {
let conn = match conn {
Ok(conn) => conn,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to receive user agent request");
return Err(());
}
};
let request_id = match request_tracker.request(conn.id) {
Ok(request_id) => request_id,
Err(err) => {
let _ = bi.send(Err(err)).await;
return Err(());
}
};
let Some(payload) = conn.payload else {
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Missing user-agent request payload",
)))
.await;
return Err(());
};
let payload = match payload {
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealStart(UnsealStart { client_pubkey }) => {
let client_pubkey = match <[u8; 32]>::try_from(client_pubkey) {
Ok(bytes) => x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from(bytes),
Err(_) => {
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid X25519 public key")))
.await;
return Err(());
}
};
match actor.ask(HandleUnsealRequest { client_pubkey }).await {
Ok(response) => UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(
arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: response.server_pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle unseal start request");
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::internal("Failed to start unseal flow")))
.await;
return Err(());
}
}
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealEncryptedKey(ProtoUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce,
ciphertext,
associated_data,
}) => UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
match actor
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce,
ciphertext,
associated_data,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(UnsealError::InvalidKey)) => {
ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle unseal request");
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault")))
.await;
return Err(());
}
}
.into(),
),
UserAgentRequestPayload::BootstrapEncryptedKey(ProtoBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce,
ciphertext,
associated_data,
}) => UserAgentResponsePayload::BootstrapResult(
match actor
.ask(HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce,
ciphertext,
associated_data,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::InvalidKey
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle bootstrap request");
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::internal("Failed to bootstrap vault")))
.await;
return Err(());
}
}
.into(),
),
UserAgentRequestPayload::QueryVaultState(_) => UserAgentResponsePayload::VaultState(
match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");
ProtoVaultState::Error
}
}
.into(),
),
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmWalletCreate(_) => UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmWalletCreate(
EvmGrantOrWallet::wallet_create_response(actor.ask(HandleEvmWalletCreate {}).await),
),
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmWalletList(_) => UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmWalletList(
EvmGrantOrWallet::wallet_list_response(actor.ask(HandleEvmWalletList {}).await),
),
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmGrantList(_) => UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmGrantList(
EvmGrantOrWallet::grant_list_response(actor.ask(HandleGrantList {}).await),
),
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmGrantCreate(EvmGrantCreateRequest {
client_id,
shared,
specific,
}) => {
let (basic, grant) = match parse_grant_request(shared, specific) {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(status) => {
let _ = bi.send(Err(status)).await;
return Err(());
}
};
UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmGrantCreate(EvmGrantOrWallet::grant_create_response(
actor
.ask(HandleGrantCreate {
client_id,
basic,
grant,
})
.await,
))
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmGrantDelete(EvmGrantDeleteRequest { grant_id }) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmGrantDelete(EvmGrantOrWallet::grant_delete_response(
actor.ask(HandleGrantDelete { grant_id }).await,
))
}
payload => {
warn!(?payload, "Unsupported post-auth user agent request");
let _ = bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Unsupported user-agent request",
)))
.await;
return Err(());
}
};
bi.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
id: Some(request_id),
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
.map_err(|_| ())
}
async fn send_out_of_band(
bi: &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
oob: OutOfBand,
) -> Result<(), ()> {
let payload = match oob {
// The current protobuf response payload carries only an approval boolean.
// Keep emitting this shape until a dedicated out-of-band request/cancel payload
// is reintroduced in the protocol definition.
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionRequest { pubkey: _ } => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientConnectionResponse(
ProtoSdkClientConnectionResponse { approved: false },
)
}
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel => UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientConnectionResponse(
ProtoSdkClientConnectionResponse { approved: false },
),
};
bi.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
id: None,
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
.map_err(|_| ())
}
fn parse_grant_request(
shared: Option<ProtoSharedSettings>,
specific: Option<ProtoSpecificGrant>,
) -> Result<(SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant), Status> {
let shared = shared.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing shared grant settings"))?;
let specific =
specific.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing specific grant settings"))?;
Ok((
shared_settings_from_proto(shared)?,
specific_grant_from_proto(specific)?,
))
}
fn shared_settings_from_proto(shared: ProtoSharedSettings) -> Result<SharedGrantSettings, Status> {
Ok(SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_id: shared.wallet_id,
client_id: 0,
chain: shared.chain_id,
valid_from: shared.valid_from.map(proto_timestamp_to_utc).transpose()?,
valid_until: shared.valid_until.map(proto_timestamp_to_utc).transpose()?,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.as_deref()
.map(u256_from_proto_bytes)
.transpose()?,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: shared
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.as_deref()
.map(u256_from_proto_bytes)
.transpose()?,
rate_limit: shared.rate_limit.map(|limit| TransactionRateLimit {
count: limit.count,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs),
}),
})
}
fn specific_grant_from_proto(specific: ProtoSpecificGrant) -> Result<SpecificGrant, Status> {
match specific.grant {
Some(ProtoSpecificGrantType::EtherTransfer(ProtoEtherTransferSettings {
targets,
limit,
})) => Ok(SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Settings {
target: targets
.into_iter()
.map(address_from_bytes)
.collect::<Result<_, _>>()?,
limit: volume_rate_limit_from_proto(limit.ok_or_else(|| {
Status::invalid_argument("Missing ether transfer volume rate limit")
})?)?,
})),
Some(ProtoSpecificGrantType::TokenTransfer(ProtoTokenTransferSettings {
token_contract,
target,
volume_limits,
})) => Ok(SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings {
token_contract: address_from_bytes(token_contract)?,
target: target.map(address_from_bytes).transpose()?,
volume_limits: volume_limits
.into_iter()
.map(volume_rate_limit_from_proto)
.collect::<Result<_, _>>()?,
})),
None => Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing specific grant kind")),
}
}
fn volume_rate_limit_from_proto(limit: ProtoVolumeRateLimit) -> Result<VolumeRateLimit, Status> {
Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: u256_from_proto_bytes(&limit.max_volume)?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs),
})
}
fn address_from_bytes(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Address, Status> {
if bytes.len() != 20 {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid EVM address"));
}
Ok(Address::from_slice(&bytes))
}
fn u256_from_proto_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<U256, Status> {
if bytes.len() > 32 {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid U256 byte length"));
}
Ok(U256::from_be_slice(bytes))
}
fn proto_timestamp_to_utc(timestamp: ProtoTimestamp) -> Result<chrono::DateTime<Utc>, Status> {
Utc.timestamp_opt(timestamp.seconds, timestamp.nanos as u32)
.single()
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid timestamp"))
}
fn shared_settings_to_proto(shared: SharedGrantSettings) -> ProtoSharedSettings {
ProtoSharedSettings {
wallet_id: shared.wallet_id,
chain_id: shared.chain,
valid_from: shared.valid_from.map(|time| ProtoTimestamp {
seconds: time.timestamp(),
nanos: time.timestamp_subsec_nanos() as i32,
}),
valid_until: shared.valid_until.map(|time| ProtoTimestamp {
seconds: time.timestamp(),
nanos: time.timestamp_subsec_nanos() as i32,
}),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|value| value.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: shared
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|value| value.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec()),
rate_limit: shared.rate_limit.map(|limit| ProtoTransactionRateLimit {
count: limit.count,
window_secs: limit.window.num_seconds(),
}),
}
}
fn specific_grant_to_proto(grant: SpecificGrant) -> ProtoSpecificGrant {
let grant = match grant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => {
ProtoSpecificGrantType::EtherTransfer(ProtoEtherTransferSettings {
targets: settings
.target
.into_iter()
.map(|address| address.to_vec())
.collect(),
limit: Some(ProtoVolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: settings.limit.max_volume.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec(),
window_secs: settings.limit.window.num_seconds(),
}),
})
}
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => {
ProtoSpecificGrantType::TokenTransfer(ProtoTokenTransferSettings {
token_contract: settings.token_contract.to_vec(),
target: settings.target.map(|address| address.to_vec()),
volume_limits: settings
.volume_limits
.into_iter()
.map(|limit| ProtoVolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: limit.max_volume.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec(),
window_secs: limit.window.num_seconds(),
})
.collect(),
})
}
};
ProtoSpecificGrant { grant: Some(grant) }
}
struct EvmGrantOrWallet;
impl EvmGrantOrWallet {
fn wallet_create_response<M>(
result: Result<Address, SendError<M, Error>>,
) -> WalletCreateResponse {
let result = match result {
Ok(wallet) => WalletCreateResult::Wallet(WalletEntry {
address: wallet.to_vec(),
}),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to create EVM wallet");
WalletCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
WalletCreateResponse {
result: Some(result),
}
}
fn wallet_list_response<M>(
result: Result<Vec<Address>, SendError<M, Error>>,
) -> WalletListResponse {
let result = match result {
Ok(wallets) => WalletListResult::Wallets(WalletList {
wallets: wallets
.into_iter()
.map(|wallet| WalletEntry {
address: wallet.to_vec(),
})
.collect(),
}),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to list EVM wallets");
WalletListResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
WalletListResponse {
result: Some(result),
}
}
fn grant_create_response<M>(
result: Result<i32, SendError<M, Error>>,
) -> EvmGrantCreateResponse {
let result = match result {
Ok(grant_id) => EvmGrantCreateResult::GrantId(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to create EVM grant");
EvmGrantCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
EvmGrantCreateResponse {
result: Some(result),
}
}
fn grant_delete_response<M>(result: Result<(), SendError<M, Error>>) -> EvmGrantDeleteResponse {
let result = match result {
Ok(()) => EvmGrantDeleteResult::Ok(ProtoEmpty {}),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to delete EVM grant");
EvmGrantDeleteResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
EvmGrantDeleteResponse {
result: Some(result),
}
}
fn grant_list_response<M>(
result: Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, SendError<M, Error>>,
) -> EvmGrantListResponse {
let result = match result {
Ok(grants) => EvmGrantListResult::Grants(EvmGrantList {
grants: grants
.into_iter()
.map(|grant| GrantEntry {
id: grant.id,
client_id: grant.shared.client_id,
shared: Some(shared_settings_to_proto(grant.shared)),
specific: Some(specific_grant_to_proto(grant.settings)),
})
.collect(),
}),
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to list EVM grants");
EvmGrantListResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
EvmGrantListResponse {
result: Some(result),
}
}
}
pub async fn start(
mut conn: UserAgentConnection,
mut bi: GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
) {
let mut request_tracker = RequestTracker::default();
let mut response_id = None;
let pubkey = match auth::start(&mut conn, &mut bi, &mut request_tracker, &mut response_id).await
{
Ok(pubkey) => pubkey,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "Authentication failed");
return;
}
};
let (oob_sender, oob_receiver) = mpsc::channel(16);
let oob_adapter = OutOfBandAdapter(oob_sender);
let actor = UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new(conn, Box::new(oob_adapter)));
let actor_for_cleanup = actor.clone();
let _ = defer(move || {
actor_for_cleanup.kill();
});
info!(?pubkey, "User authenticated successfully");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor, oob_receiver, request_tracker).await;
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{
AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
AuthChallengeSolution as ProtoAuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult,
KeyType as ProtoKeyType, UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth},
db::models::KeyType,
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
response_id: &'a mut Option<i32>,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
response_id: &'a mut Option<i32>,
) -> Self {
Self {
bi,
request_tracker,
response_id,
}
}
async fn send_user_agent_response(
&mut self,
payload: UserAgentResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let id = self.response_id.take();
self.bi
.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
id,
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
use auth::{Error, Outbound};
let payload = match item {
Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(ProtoAuthChallenge { nonce })
}
Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthResult(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into())
}
Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthResult(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey.into())
}
Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthResult(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature.into())
}
Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken) => {
UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthResult(ProtoAuthResult::TokenInvalid.into())
}
Err(Error::Internal { details }) => return self.bi.send(Err(Status::internal(details))).await,
Err(Error::Transport) => {
return self.bi.send(Err(Status::unavailable("transport error"))).await;
}
};
self.send_user_agent_response(payload).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<auth::Inbound> {
let request = match self.bi.recv().await? {
Ok(request) => request,
Err(error) => {
warn!(error = ?error, "Failed to receive user agent auth request");
return None;
}
};
let request_id = match self.request_tracker.request(request.id) {
Ok(request_id) => request_id,
Err(error) => {
let _ = self.bi.send(Err(error)).await;
return None;
}
};
*self.response_id = Some(request_id);
let Some(payload) = request.payload else {
warn!(
event = "received request with empty payload",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
match payload {
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(ProtoAuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
key_type,
}) => {
let Ok(key_type) = ProtoKeyType::try_from(key_type) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid key type",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
let key_type = match key_type {
ProtoKeyType::Ed25519 => KeyType::Ed25519,
ProtoKeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
ProtoKeyType::Rsa => KeyType::Rsa,
ProtoKeyType::Unspecified => {
warn!(
event = "received request with unspecified key type",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
}
};
let Ok(pubkey) = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, pubkey)) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid public key",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
})
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution {
signature,
}) => Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature }),
_ => {
let _ = self
.bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Unsupported user-agent auth request",
)))
.await;
None
}
}
}
}
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
pub async fn start(
conn: &mut UserAgentConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
response_id: &mut Option<i32>,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, auth::Error> {
let transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker, response_id);
auth::authenticate(conn, transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,28 +1,13 @@
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse, UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
transport::{BiStream, GrpcTransportActor, wire},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::actor::PreparedActor;
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tonic::{Request, Response, Status};
use crate::{
actors::{
client::handle_client,
user_agent::UserAgentActor,
},
context::ServerContext,
};
use crate::context::ServerContext;
pub mod actors;
pub mod context;
pub mod db;
const DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE: usize = 1000;
pub mod evm;
pub mod grpc;
pub mod safe_cell;
pub mod utils;
pub struct Server {
context: ServerContext,
@@ -33,51 +18,3 @@ impl Server {
Self { context }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for Server {
type UserAgentStream = ReceiverStream<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>;
type ClientStream = ReceiverStream<Result<ClientResponse, Status>>;
async fn client(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<ClientRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::ClientStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE);
tokio::spawn(handle_client(
self.context.clone(),
BiStream {
request_stream: req_stream,
response_sender: tx,
},
));
Ok(Response::new(ReceiverStream::new(rx)))
}
async fn user_agent(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<UserAgentRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::UserAgentStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE);
let context = self.context.clone();
wire(
|prepared: PreparedActor<UserAgentActor>, recipient| {
prepared.spawn(UserAgentActor::new(context, recipient));
},
|prepared: PreparedActor<GrpcTransportActor<_, _, _>>, business_recipient| {
prepared.spawn(GrpcTransportActor::new(
tx,
req_stream,
business_recipient,
));
},
)
.await;
Ok(Response::new(ReceiverStream::new(rx)))
}
}

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ use std::net::SocketAddr;
use arbiter_proto::{proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterServiceServer, url::ArbiterUrl};
use arbiter_server::{Server, actors::bootstrap::GetToken, context::ServerContext, db};
use miette::miette;
use rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs;
use tonic::transport::{Identity, ServerTlsConfig};
use tracing::info;
@@ -10,6 +11,8 @@ const PORT: u16 = 50051;
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> miette::Result<()> {
aws_lc_rs::default_provider().install_default().unwrap();
tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(
tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
use std::{any::type_name, fmt};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
type CellRead<'a>: Deref<Target = T>
where
Self: 'a,
T: 'a;
type CellWrite<'a>: Deref<Target = T> + DerefMut<Target = T>
where
Self: 'a,
T: 'a;
fn new(value: T) -> Self
where
Self: Sized;
fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_>;
fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_>;
fn new_inline<F>(f: F) -> Self
where
Self: Sized,
T: Default,
F: for<'a> FnOnce(&'a mut T),
{
let mut cell = Self::new(T::default());
{
let mut handle = cell.write();
f(handle.deref_mut());
}
cell
}
#[inline(always)]
fn read_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
where
F: FnOnce(&T) -> R,
{
f(&*self.read())
}
#[inline(always)]
fn write_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
where
F: FnOnce(&mut T) -> R,
{
f(&mut *self.write())
}
}
pub struct MemSafeCell<T>(MemSafe<T>);
impl<T> fmt::Debug for MemSafeCell<T> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("MemSafeCell")
.field("inner", &format_args!("<protected {}>", type_name::<T>()))
.finish()
}
}
impl<T> SafeCellHandle<T> for MemSafeCell<T> {
type CellRead<'a>
= memsafe::MemSafeRead<'a, T>
where
Self: 'a,
T: 'a;
type CellWrite<'a>
= memsafe::MemSafeWrite<'a, T>
where
Self: 'a,
T: 'a;
fn new(value: T) -> Self {
match MemSafe::new(value) {
Ok(inner) => Self(inner),
Err(err) => {
// If protected memory cannot be allocated, process integrity is compromised.
abort_memory_breach("safe cell allocation", &err)
}
}
}
#[inline(always)]
fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_> {
match self.0.read() {
Ok(inner) => inner,
Err(err) => abort_memory_breach("safe cell read", &err),
}
}
#[inline(always)]
fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_> {
match self.0.write() {
Ok(inner) => inner,
Err(err) => {
// If protected memory becomes unwritable here, treat it as a fatal memory breach.
abort_memory_breach("safe cell write", &err)
}
}
}
}
fn abort_memory_breach(action: &str, err: &memsafe::error::MemoryError) -> ! {
eprintln!("fatal {action}: {err}");
std::process::abort();
}
pub type SafeCell<T> = MemSafeCell<T>;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
struct DeferClosure<F: FnOnce()> {
f: Option<F>,
}
impl<F: FnOnce()> Drop for DeferClosure<F> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if let Some(f) = self.f.take() {
f();
}
}
}
// Run some code when a scope is exited, similar to Go's defer statement
pub fn defer<F: FnOnce()>(f: F) -> impl Drop + Sized {
DeferClosure { f: Some(f) }
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
mod common;
#[path = "client/auth.rs"]
mod auth;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::actors::GlobalActors;
use arbiter_server::{
actors::client::{ClientConnection, auth, connect_client},
db::{self, schema},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut server_transport = server_transport;
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Auth fails, connect_client returns, transport drops
task.await.unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
.values(schema::program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut server_transport = server_transport;
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
// Send challenge request
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Read the challenge response
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
// Sign the challenge and send solution
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge.1, challenge.0.as_bytes());
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive auth success");
match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {}
Ok(other) => panic!("Expected AuthSuccess, got {other:?}"),
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
}
// Auth completes, session spawned
task.await.unwrap();
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Error, Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
db::{self, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actor
.bootstrap(MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap())
.bootstrap(SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
actor
@@ -26,3 +29,59 @@ pub async fn root_key_history_id(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> i32 {
.unwrap();
id.expect("root_key_id should be set after bootstrap")
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub struct ChannelTransport<T, Y> {
receiver: mpsc::Receiver<T>,
sender: mpsc::Sender<Y>,
}
impl<T, Y> ChannelTransport<T, Y> {
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn new() -> (Self, ChannelTransport<Y, T>) {
let (tx1, rx1) = mpsc::channel(10);
let (tx2, rx2) = mpsc::channel(10);
(
Self {
receiver: rx1,
sender: tx2,
},
ChannelTransport {
receiver: rx2,
sender: tx1,
},
)
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Y> Sender<Y> for ChannelTransport<T, Y>
where
T: Send + Sync + 'static,
Y: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Y) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.sender
.send(item)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::ChannelClosed)
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Y> Receiver<T> for ChannelTransport<T, Y>
where
T: Send + Sync + 'static,
Y: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<T> {
self.receiver.recv().await
}
}
impl<T, Y> Bi<T, Y> for ChannelTransport<T, Y>
where
T: Send + Sync + 'static,
Y: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
}

View File

@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Error, KeyHolder},
db::{self, models, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::sql_query};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use tokio::task::JoinSet;
use crate::common;
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ async fn write_concurrently(
let plaintext = format!("{prefix}-{i}").into_bytes();
let id = actor
.ask(CreateNew {
plaintext: MemSafe::new(plaintext.clone()).unwrap(),
plaintext: SafeCell::new(plaintext.clone()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
drop(conn);
let err = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"should fail".to_vec()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"should fail".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::DatabaseTransaction(_)));
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
let mut decryptor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
decryptor
.try_unseal(MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap())
.try_unseal(SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
for (id, plaintext) in expected {
let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{Error, KeyHolder},
db::{self, models, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::common;
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ async fn test_bootstrap() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let seal_key2 = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
let seal_key2 = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::AlreadyBootstrapped));
}
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
let err = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"data".to_vec()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
@@ -91,17 +91,17 @@ async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -112,20 +112,20 @@ async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let plaintext = b"important data";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let bad_key = MemSafe::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec()).unwrap();
let bad_key = SafeCell::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec());
let err = actor.try_unseal(bad_key).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidKey));
let good_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
let good_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}

View File

@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ use std::collections::HashSet;
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{Error, encryption::v1},
db::{self, models, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::common;
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
let plaintext = b"same content";
let id1 = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let id2 = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1).await.unwrap();
let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*d1.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d2.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d1.read(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d2.read(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ async fn test_nonce_never_reused() {
let n = 5;
for i in 0..n {
actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()))
.await
.unwrap();
}
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
drop(conn);
let err = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"must fail".to_vec()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"must fail".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()).unwrap())
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();

View File

@@ -1,30 +1,5 @@
mod common;
use arbiter_proto::proto::UserAgentResponse;
use arbiter_server::actors::user_agent::UserAgentError;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::Recipient, actor::Spawn, prelude::Message};
/// A no-op actor that discards any messages it receives.
#[derive(Actor)]
struct NullSink;
impl Message<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>> for NullSink {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_msg: Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>,
_ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
}
}
/// Creates a `Recipient` that silently discards all messages.
fn null_recipient() -> Recipient<Result<UserAgentResponse, UserAgentError>> {
let actor_ref = NullSink::spawn(NullSink);
actor_ref.recipient()
}
#[path = "user_agent/auth.rs"]
mod auth;
#[path = "user_agent/unseal.rs"]

View File

@@ -1,57 +1,51 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UserAgentResponse,
auth::{self, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk},
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
bootstrap::GetToken,
user_agent::{HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution, UserAgentActor},
user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth},
},
db::{self, schema},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
let db =db::create_test_pool().await;
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
let user_agent =
UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
});
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
},
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
})
.await
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
result,
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
AuthOk {},
)),
},
)),
}
);
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive auth result");
match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {}
other => panic!("Expected AuthSuccess, got {other:?}"),
}
task.await.unwrap().unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let stored_pubkey: Vec<u8> = schema::useragent_client::table
@@ -66,106 +60,108 @@ pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let user_agent =
UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
});
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_string()),
},
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_string()),
})
.await;
.await
.unwrap();
match result {
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
assert!(
matches!(err, arbiter_server::actors::user_agent::UserAgentError::InvalidBootstrapToken),
"Expected InvalidBootstrapToken, got {err:?}"
);
}
Err(other) => {
panic!("Expected SendError::HandlerError, got {other:?}");
}
Ok(_) => {
panic!("Expected error due to invalid bootstrap token, but got success");
}
}
assert!(matches!(
task.await.unwrap(),
Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
));
// Verify no key was registered
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let count: i64 = schema::useragent_client::table
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let user_agent =
UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
// Pre-register key with key_type
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()))
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: None,
},
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
});
// Send challenge request
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
bootstrap_token: None,
})
.await
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
.unwrap();
let UserAgentResponse {
payload:
Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload:
Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthChallenge(challenge)),
})),
} = result
else {
panic!("Expected auth challenge response, got {result:?}");
// Read the challenge response
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce } => nonce,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(&challenge);
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge, &pubkey_bytes);
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
let serialized_signature = signature.to_bytes().to_vec();
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeSolution {
solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: serialized_signature,
},
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
})
.await
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
result,
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
AuthOk {},
)),
},
)),
}
);
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive auth result");
match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {}
other => panic!("Expected AuthSuccess, got {other:?}"),
}
task.await.unwrap().unwrap();
}

View File

@@ -1,81 +1,55 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult, UnsealStart, auth::AuthChallengeRequest,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
bootstrap::GetToken,
keyholder::{Bootstrap, Seal},
user_agent::{
HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest,
UserAgentActor,
user_agent::session::{
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest, UnsealError, UserAgentSession,
},
},
db,
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
async fn setup_authenticated_user_agent(
async fn setup_sealed_user_agent(
seal_key: &[u8],
) -> (arbiter_server::db::DatabasePool, ActorRef<UserAgentActor>) {
) -> (db::DatabasePool, kameo::actor::ActorRef<UserAgentSession>) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.key_holder
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: MemSafe::new(seal_key.to_vec()).unwrap(),
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(seal_key.to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actors.key_holder.ask(Seal).await.unwrap();
let user_agent =
UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors.clone(), super::null_recipient());
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
let session = UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new_test(db.clone(), actors));
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
let auth_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: auth_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
},
})
.await
.unwrap();
(db, user_agent_ref)
(db, session)
}
async fn client_dh_encrypt(
user_agent_ref: &ActorRef<UserAgentActor>,
user_agent: &kameo::actor::ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
key_to_send: &[u8],
) -> UnsealEncryptedKey {
) -> HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
let response = user_agent_ref
let response = user_agent
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
req: UnsealStart {
client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
client_pubkey: client_public,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let server_pubkey = match response.payload.unwrap() {
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(resp) => resp.server_pubkey,
other => panic!("Expected UnsealStartResponse, got {other:?}"),
};
let server_public = PublicKey::from(<[u8; 32]>::try_from(server_pubkey.as_slice()).unwrap());
let server_pubkey = response.server_pubkey;
let shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&server_public);
let shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&server_pubkey);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let nonce = XNonce::from([0u8; 24]);
let associated_data = b"unseal";
@@ -84,7 +58,7 @@ async fn client_dh_encrypt(
.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut ciphertext)
.unwrap();
UnsealEncryptedKey {
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
ciphertext,
associated_data: associated_data.to_vec(),
@@ -95,136 +69,83 @@ async fn client_dh_encrypt(
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_success() {
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(seal_key).await;
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, seal_key).await;
let response = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::Success.into()),
);
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(())));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(b"correct-key").await;
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(b"correct-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, b"wrong-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, b"wrong-key").await;
let response = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
);
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(
response,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
UnsealError::InvalidKey
))
));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(b"test-key").await;
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(b"test-key").await;
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
user_agent_ref
user_agent
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
req: UnsealStart {
client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
client_pubkey: client_public,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = user_agent_ref
let response = user_agent
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
req: UnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
associated_data: vec![],
},
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_start_without_auth_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let user_agent =
UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, super::null_recipient());
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
req: UnsealStart {
client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
associated_data: vec![],
})
.await;
match result {
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
assert!(
matches!(err, arbiter_server::actors::user_agent::UserAgentError::InvalidState),
"Expected InvalidState, got {err:?}"
);
}
other => panic!("Expected state machine error, got {other:?}"),
}
assert!(matches!(
response,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
UnsealError::InvalidKey
))
));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {
let seal_key = b"real-seal-key";
let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(seal_key).await;
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(seal_key).await;
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, b"wrong-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, b"wrong-key").await;
let response = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
);
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(
response,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
UnsealError::InvalidKey
))
));
}
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, seal_key).await;
let response = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::Success.into()),
);
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(())));
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
[package]
name = "arbiter-tokens-registry"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
[dependencies]
alloy.workspace = true

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
pub mod nonfungible;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, ChainId, address};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct TokenInfo {
pub name: &'static str,
pub symbol: &'static str,
pub decimals: u32,
pub contract: Address,
pub chain: ChainId,
pub logo_uri: Option<&'static str>,
}
include!("tokens.rs");

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
pub mod evm;

View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
[package]
name = "arbiter-useragent"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
license = "Apache-2.0"
[dependencies]
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
kameo.workspace = true
tokio = {workspace = true, features = ["net"]}
tonic.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
smlang.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::{proto::UserAgentRequest, transport::TransportActor};
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
use kameo::{
Actor, Reply,
actor::{ActorRef, WeakActorRef},
prelude::Message,
};
use smlang::statemachine;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
use tracing::{debug, error};
struct Storage {
pub identity: SigningKey,
pub server_ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum InitError {
StorageError,
Other(String),
}
statemachine! {
name: UserAgentStateMachine,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Init + SendAuthChallenge = WaitingForAuthSolution
}
}
pub struct UserAgentActor<A: TransportActor<UserAgentRequest>> {
key: SigningKey,
server_ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
sender: ActorRef<A>,
}
impl<A: TransportActor<UserAgentRequest>> Actor for UserAgentActor<A> {
type Args = Self;
type Error = InitError;
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
todo!()
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: kameo::prelude::ActorId,
_: kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<std::ops::ControlFlow<kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if id == self.sender.id() {
error!("Transport actor died, stopping UserAgentActor");
Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Break(
kameo::prelude::ActorStopReason::Normal,
))
} else {
debug!(
"Linked actor {} died, but it's not the transport actor, ignoring",
id
);
Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
}

0
server/rules/.gitkeep Normal file
View File

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
id: safecell-new-inline
language: Rust
rule:
pattern: $CELL.write_inline(|$W| $BODY);
follows:
pattern: let mut $CELL = SafeCell::new($INIT);
fix:
template: let mut $CELL = SafeCell::new_inline(|$W| $BODY);
expandStart:
pattern: let mut $CELL = SafeCell::new($INIT)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
id: safecell-read-inline
language: Rust
rule:
pattern:
context: |
{
let $READ = $CELL.read();
$$$BODY
}
selector: block
inside:
kind: block
fix:
template: |
$CELL.read_inline(|$READ| {
$$$BODY
});

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