8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
hdbg
c5b51f4b70 feat(server): UserAgent seal/unseal
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2026-02-16 14:00:23 +01:00
hdbg
6b8f8c9ff7 feat(unseal): add unseal protocol support for user agents 2026-02-15 13:04:55 +01:00
hdbg
8263bc6b6f feat(server): boot mechanism 2026-02-15 01:44:12 +01:00
hdbg
a6c849f268 ci: add server linting pipeline for Rust code quality checks 2026-02-14 23:44:16 +01:00
hdbg
d8d65da0b4 test(user-agent): add challenge-response auth flow test 2026-02-14 23:43:36 +01:00
hdbg
abdf4e3893 tests(server): UserAgent invalid bootstrap token 2026-02-14 19:48:37 +01:00
hdbg
4bac70a6e9 security(server): cargo-vet proper init
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ci/woodpecker/push/server-vet Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/server-test Pipeline was successful
2026-02-14 19:16:09 +01:00
hdbg
54a41743be housekeeping(server): trimmed-down dependencies 2026-02-14 19:04:50 +01:00
53 changed files with 1908 additions and 2928 deletions

3
.vscode/settings.json vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
{
"git.enabled": false
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
when:
- event: pull_request
path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
- event: push
branch: main
path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
steps:
- name: test
image: jdxcode/mise:latest
directory: server
environment:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
volumes:
- cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
- cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
commands:
- apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
- mise install rust
- mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings

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@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ backend = "cargo:cargo-features"
version = "0.11.1"
backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-insta"]]
version = "1.46.3"
backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
version = "0.9.126"
backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"

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@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@
flutter = "3.38.9-stable"
protoc = "29.6"
rust = "1.93.1"
rust = "1.93.0"
"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.11.1"
"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.46.3"

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@@ -3,111 +3,14 @@ syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter;
import "auth.proto";
message ClientRequest {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
CertRotationAck cert_rotation_ack = 2;
}
}
message ClientResponse {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
CertRotationNotification cert_rotation_notification = 2;
}
}
message UserAgentRequest {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
CertRotationAck cert_rotation_ack = 2;
UnsealRequest unseal_request = 3;
}
}
message UserAgentResponse {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
CertRotationNotification cert_rotation_notification = 2;
UnsealResponse unseal_response = 3;
}
}
import "client.proto";
import "user_agent.proto";
message ServerInfo {
string version = 1;
bytes cert_public_key = 2;
}
// TLS Certificate Rotation Protocol
message CertRotationNotification {
// New public certificate (DER-encoded)
bytes new_cert = 1;
// Unix timestamp when rotation will be executed (if all ACKs received)
int64 rotation_scheduled_at = 2;
// Unix timestamp deadline for ACK (7 days from now)
int64 ack_deadline = 3;
// Rotation ID for tracking
int32 rotation_id = 4;
}
message CertRotationAck {
// Rotation ID (from CertRotationNotification)
int32 rotation_id = 1;
// Client public key for identification
bytes client_public_key = 2;
// Confirmation that client saved the new certificate
bool cert_saved = 3;
}
// Vault Unseal Protocol (X25519 ECDH + ChaCha20Poly1305)
message UnsealRequest {
oneof payload {
EphemeralKeyRequest ephemeral_key_request = 1;
SealedPassword sealed_password = 2;
}
}
message UnsealResponse {
oneof payload {
EphemeralKeyResponse ephemeral_key_response = 1;
UnsealResult unseal_result = 2;
}
}
message EphemeralKeyRequest {}
message EphemeralKeyResponse {
// Server's X25519 ephemeral public key (32 bytes)
bytes server_pubkey = 1;
// Unix timestamp when this key expires (60 seconds from generation)
int64 expires_at = 2;
}
message SealedPassword {
// Client's X25519 ephemeral public key (32 bytes)
bytes client_pubkey = 1;
// ChaCha20Poly1305 encrypted password (ciphertext + tag)
bytes encrypted_password = 2;
// 12-byte nonce for ChaCha20Poly1305
bytes nonce = 3;
}
message UnsealResult {
// Whether unseal was successful
bool success = 1;
// Error message if unseal failed
optional string error_message = 2;
}
service ArbiterService {
rpc Client(stream ClientRequest) returns (stream ClientResponse);
rpc UserAgent(stream UserAgentRequest) returns (stream UserAgentResponse);

17
protobufs/client.proto Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter;
import "auth.proto";
message ClientRequest {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
}
}
message ClientResponse {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
}
}

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@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
// Protocol Buffers - Google's data interchange format
// Copyright 2008 Google Inc. All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
// met:
//
// * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
// * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
// copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
// in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
// distribution.
// * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
// contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
// this software without specific prior written permission.
syntax = "proto3";
package google.protobuf;
option csharp_namespace = "Google.Protobuf.WellKnownTypes";
option cc_enable_arenas = true;
option go_package = "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb";
option java_package = "com.google.protobuf";
option java_outer_classname = "TimestampProto";
option java_multiple_files = true;
option objc_class_prefix = "GPB";
// A Timestamp represents a point in time independent of any time zone or local
// calendar, encoded as a count of seconds and fractions of seconds at
// nanosecond resolution. The count is relative to an epoch at UTC midnight on
// January 1, 1970, in the proleptic Gregorian calendar which extends the
// Gregorian calendar backwards to year one.
message Timestamp {
// Represents seconds of UTC time since Unix epoch
// 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z. Must be from 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z to
// 9999-12-31T23:59:59Z inclusive.
int64 seconds = 1;
// Non-negative fractions of a second at nanosecond resolution. Negative
// second values with fractions must still have non-negative nanos values
// that count forward in time. Must be from 0 to 999,999,999
// inclusive.
int32 nanos = 2;
}

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@@ -2,13 +2,24 @@ syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.unseal;
message UserAgentKeyRequest {}
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
message ServerKeyResponse {
bytes pubkey = 1;
message UnsealStart {
bytes client_pubkey = 1;
}
message UserAgentSealedKey {
bytes sealed_key = 1;
bytes pubkey = 2;
bytes nonce = 3;
message UnsealStartResponse {
bytes server_pubkey = 1;
}
message UnsealEncryptedKey {
bytes nonce = 1;
bytes ciphertext = 2;
bytes associated_data = 3;
}
enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter;
import "auth.proto";
import "unseal.proto";
message UserAgentRequest {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
arbiter.unseal.UnsealStart unseal_start = 2;
arbiter.unseal.UnsealEncryptedKey unseal_encrypted_key = 3;
}
}
message UserAgentResponse {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
arbiter.unseal.UnsealStartResponse unseal_start_response = 2;
arbiter.unseal.UnsealResult unseal_result = 3;
}
}

432
server/Cargo.lock generated

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@@ -23,4 +23,3 @@ async-trait = "0.1.89"
futures = "0.3.31"
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
kameo = "0.19.2"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }

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server/crates/.DS_Store vendored Normal file

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@@ -12,11 +12,8 @@ hex = "0.4.3"
tonic-prost = "0.14.3"
prost = "0.14.3"
kameo.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
[build-dependencies]
prost-build = "0.14.3"
serde_json = "1"
tonic-prost-build = "0.14.3"

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@@ -1,15 +1,21 @@
use tonic_prost_build::configure;
static PROTOBUF_DIR: &str = "../../../protobufs";
fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let proto_files = vec![
println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={PROTOBUF_DIR}");
configure()
.message_attribute(".", "#[derive(::kameo::Reply)]")
.compile_protos(
&[
format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/auth.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
];
// Компилируем protobuf (tonic-prost-build автоматически использует prost_types для google.protobuf)
tonic_prost_build::configure()
.message_attribute(".", "#[derive(::kameo::Reply)]")
.compile_protos(&proto_files, &[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()])?;
],
&[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()],
)
.unwrap();
Ok(())
}

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@@ -6,14 +6,17 @@ pub mod proto {
pub mod auth {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.auth");
}
pub mod unseal {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.unseal");
}
}
pub mod transport;
pub static BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH: &str = "bootstrap_token";
pub static BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH: &'static str = "bootstrap_token";
pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
static ARBITER_HOME: &str = ".arbiter";
static ARBITER_HOME: &'static str = ".arbiter";
let home_dir = std::env::home_dir().ok_or(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
"can not get home directory",

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server/crates/arbiter-server/.DS_Store vendored Normal file

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@@ -5,13 +5,7 @@ edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
[dependencies]
diesel = { version = "2.3.6", features = [
"sqlite",
"uuid",
"time",
"chrono",
"serde_json",
] }
diesel = { version = "2.3.6", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
diesel-async = { version = "0.7.4", features = [
"bb8",
"migrations",
@@ -21,6 +15,7 @@ diesel-async = { version = "0.7.4", features = [
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
tonic.workspace = true
tokio.workspace = true
rustls.workspace = true
@@ -43,11 +38,14 @@ rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
chrono.workspace = true
memsafe = "0.4.0"
zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
argon2 = { version = "0.5", features = ["std"] }
kameo.workspace = true
hex = "0.4.3"
chacha20poly1305 = "0.10.1"
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0", features = ["static_secrets"] }
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
statig = { version = "0.4.1", features = ["async"] }
argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
restructed = "0.2.2"
strum = { version = "0.27.2", features = ["derive"] }
[dev-dependencies]
insta = "1.46.3"
test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }

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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-- Rollback TLS rotation tables
-- Удалить добавленную колонку из arbiter_settings
ALTER TABLE arbiter_settings DROP COLUMN current_cert_id;
-- Удалить таблицы в обратном порядке
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tls_rotation_history;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rotation_client_acks;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tls_rotation_state;
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_tls_certificates_active;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tls_certificates;

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@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-- История всех сертификатов
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_certificates (
id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
cert BLOB NOT NULL, -- DER-encoded
cert_key BLOB NOT NULL, -- PEM-encoded
not_before INTEGER NOT NULL, -- Unix timestamp
not_after INTEGER NOT NULL, -- Unix timestamp
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT(unixepoch('now')),
is_active BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 -- Только один active=1
) STRICT;
CREATE INDEX idx_tls_certificates_active ON tls_certificates(is_active, not_after);
-- Tracking процесса ротации
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_rotation_state (
id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY CHECK(id = 1), -- Singleton
state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT('normal') CHECK(state IN ('normal', 'initiated', 'waiting_acks', 'ready')),
new_cert_id INTEGER REFERENCES tls_certificates(id),
initiated_at INTEGER,
timeout_at INTEGER -- Таймаут для ожидания ACKs (initiated_at + 7 дней)
) STRICT;
-- Tracking ACKs от клиентов
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rotation_client_acks (
rotation_id INTEGER NOT NULL, -- Ссылка на new_cert_id
client_key TEXT NOT NULL, -- Публичный ключ клиента (hex)
ack_received_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT(unixepoch('now')),
PRIMARY KEY (rotation_id, client_key)
) STRICT;
-- Audit trail событий ротации
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_rotation_history (
id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
cert_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES tls_certificates(id),
event_type TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(event_type IN ('created', 'rotation_initiated', 'acks_complete', 'activated', 'timeout')),
timestamp INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT(unixepoch('now')),
details TEXT -- JSON с доп. информацией
) STRICT;
-- Миграция существующего сертификата
INSERT INTO tls_certificates (id, cert, cert_key, not_before, not_after, is_active, created_at)
SELECT
1,
cert,
cert_key,
unixepoch('now') as not_before,
unixepoch('now') + (90 * 24 * 60 * 60) as not_after, -- 90 дней
1 as is_active,
unixepoch('now')
FROM arbiter_settings WHERE id = 1;
-- Инициализация rotation_state
INSERT INTO tls_rotation_state (id, state) VALUES (1, 'normal');
-- Добавить ссылку на текущий сертификат
ALTER TABLE arbiter_settings ADD COLUMN current_cert_id INTEGER REFERENCES tls_certificates(id);
UPDATE arbiter_settings SET current_cert_id = 1 WHERE id = 1;

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@@ -1,22 +1,34 @@
create table if not exists aead_encrypted (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
current_nonce integer not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
current_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
ciphertext blob not null,
tag blob not null,
schema_version integer not null default(1) -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create table if not exists root_key_history (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
-- root key stored as aead encrypted artifact, with only difference that it's decrypted by unseal key (derived from user password)
root_key_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented. Used for encrypting root key
data_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- nonce used for encrypting with key itself
ciphertext blob not null,
tag blob not null,
schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
salt blob not null -- for key deriviation
) STRICT;
-- This is a singleton
create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1
root_key_id integer references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
cert_key blob not null,
cert blob not null
) STRICT;
create table if not exists useragent_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default (1), -- used for auth challenge
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
@@ -24,7 +36,7 @@ create table if not exists useragent_client (
create table if not exists program_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default (1), -- used for auth challenge
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-- Remove argon2_salt column
ALTER TABLE aead_encrypted DROP COLUMN argon2_salt;

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-- Add argon2_salt column to store password derivation salt
ALTER TABLE aead_encrypted ADD COLUMN argon2_salt TEXT;

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@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
pub mod user_agent;
pub mod client;
pub(crate) mod bootstrap;
pub(crate) mod keyholder;

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@@ -1,19 +1,13 @@
use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, QueryDsl};
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use miette::Diagnostic;
use rand::{RngExt, distr::StandardUniform, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use secrecy::SecretString;
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::info;
use zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};
use crate::{
context::{self, ServerContext},
db::{self, DatabasePool, schema},
};
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;

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@@ -0,0 +1,583 @@
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
dsl::{insert_into, update},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::v1::{KeyCell, Nonce},
db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
},
};
pub mod v1;
#[derive(Default)]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed {
encrypted_root_key: RootKeyHistory,
data_encryption_nonce: v1::Nonce,
root_key_encryption_nonce: v1::Nonce,
},
Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
root_key: KeyCell,
nonce: v1::Nonce,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::already_bootstrapped))]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::not_bootstrapped))]
NotBootstrapped,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::invalid_key))]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::aead_not_found))]
NotFound,
#[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::encryption_error))]
Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::database_error))]
DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::database_transaction_error))]
DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Broken database")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::broken_database))]
BrokenDatabase,
}
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct KeyHolderActor {
db: db::DatabasePool,
state: State,
}
#[messages]
impl KeyHolderActor {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let state = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
.select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
.get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
match root_key_history {
Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
data_encryption_nonce: Nonce::try_from(
root_key_history.data_encryption_nonce.as_slice(),
)
.map_err(|_| {
error!("Broken database: invalid data encryption nonce");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?,
root_key_encryption_nonce: Nonce::try_from(
root_key_history.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice(),
)
.map_err(|_| {
error!("Broken database: invalid root key encryption nonce");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?,
encrypted_root_key: root_key_history,
},
None => State::Unbootstrapped,
}
};
Ok(Self { db, state })
}
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
}
let salt = v1::generate_salt();
let mut seal_key = v1::derive_seal_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
let root_key_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
let data_encryption_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = {
let root_key_reader = root_key.0.read().unwrap();
let root_key_reader = root_key_reader.as_slice();
seal_key
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
Error::Encryption(err)
})?
};
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
let root_key_history_id = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext,
tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes,
schema_version: 1,
salt: salt.to_vec(),
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
.set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id)
})
})
.await?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
nonce: data_encryption_nonce,
};
info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully");
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::Sealed {
encrypted_root_key,
data_encryption_nonce,
root_key_encryption_nonce,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let salt = &encrypted_root_key.salt;
let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut seal_key = v1::derive_seal_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
let mut root_key = MemSafe::new(encrypted_root_key.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(root_key_encryption_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
Error::InvalidKey
})?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: encrypted_root_key.id,
root_key: v1::KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?,
nonce: std::mem::take(data_encryption_nonce), // we are replacing state, so it's safe to take the nonce out of it
};
info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully");
Ok(())
}
// Decrypts the `aead_encrypted` entry with the given ID and returns the plaintext
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()?
.ok_or(Error::NotFound)?;
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
aead_id
);
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut output = MemSafe::new(row.ciphertext).unwrap();
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
Ok(output)
}
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
nonce,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
nonce.increment();
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write().unwrap();
let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
let aead_id: i32 = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
.values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
ciphertext,
tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
schema_version: 1,
created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() as i32,
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::root_key_history::table)
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
.set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(aead_id)
})
})
.await?;
Ok(aead_id)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::collections::HashSet;
use diesel::dsl::insert_into;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::db::{self, models::ArbiterSetting};
use super::*;
async fn seed_settings(pool: &db::DatabasePool) {
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
.values(&ArbiterSetting {
id: 1,
root_key_id: None,
cert_key: vec![],
cert: vec![],
})
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolderActor {
seed_settings(db).await;
let mut actor = KeyHolderActor::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
actor
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_bootstrap() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
seed_settings(&db).await;
let mut actor = KeyHolderActor::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(actor.state, State::Unbootstrapped));
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(actor.state, State::Unsealed { .. }));
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
.select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(row.schema_version, 1);
assert_eq!(row.tag, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG);
assert!(!row.ciphertext.is_empty());
assert!(!row.salt.is_empty());
assert_eq!(row.data_encryption_nonce, v1::Nonce::default().to_vec());
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let seal_key2 = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::AlreadyBootstrapped));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
let decrypted = decrypted.read().unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted, plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
seed_settings(&db).await;
let mut actor = KeyHolderActor::new(db).await.unwrap();
let err = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"data".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
seed_settings(&db).await;
let mut actor = KeyHolderActor::new(db).await.unwrap();
let err = actor.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let err = actor.decrypt(9999).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotFound));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
drop(actor);
let actor2 = KeyHolderActor::new(db).await.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(actor2.state, State::Sealed { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_nonce_never_reused() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let n = 5;
let mut ids = Vec::with_capacity(n);
for i in 0..n {
let id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
ids.push(id);
}
// read all stored nonces from DB
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let rows: Vec<models::AeadEncrypted> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.load(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(rows.len(), n);
let nonces: Vec<&Vec<u8>> = rows.iter().map(|r| &r.current_nonce).collect();
let unique: HashSet<&Vec<u8>> = nonces.iter().copied().collect();
assert_eq!(nonces.len(), unique.len(), "all nonces must be unique");
// verify nonces are sequential increments from 1
for (i, row) in rows.iter().enumerate() {
let mut expected = v1::Nonce::default();
for _ in 0..=i {
expected.increment();
}
assert_eq!(row.current_nonce, expected.to_vec(), "nonce {i} mismatch");
}
// verify data_encryption_nonce on root_key_history tracks the latest nonce
let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
.select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let last_nonce = &rows.last().unwrap().current_nonce;
assert_eq!(
&root_row.data_encryption_nonce, last_nonce,
"root_key_history must track the latest nonce"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
let mut actor = KeyHolderActor::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(actor.state, State::Sealed { .. }));
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(actor.state, State::Unsealed { .. }));
// previously encrypted data is still decryptable
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"important data";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
let mut actor = KeyHolderActor::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(actor.state, State::Sealed { .. }));
// wrong password
let bad_key = MemSafe::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec()).unwrap();
let err = actor.try_unseal(bad_key).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidKey));
assert!(
matches!(actor.state, State::Sealed { .. }),
"state must remain Sealed after failed attempt"
);
// correct password
let good_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(actor.state, State::Unsealed { .. }));
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"same content";
let id1 = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let id2 = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
// different nonces => different ciphertext, even for identical plaintext
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let row1: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id1))
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let row2: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id2))
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_ne!(row1.ciphertext, row2.ciphertext);
// but both decrypt to the same plaintext
let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1).await.unwrap();
let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*d1.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d2.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
use std::ops::Deref as _;
use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2, password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt};
use chacha20poly1305::{
AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload},
};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use rand::{
Rng as _, SeedableRng,
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct Nonce([u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
impl Nonce {
pub fn increment(&mut self) {
for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
if self.0[i] == 0xFF {
self.0[i] = 0;
} else {
self.0[i] += 1;
break;
}
}
}
pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.to_vec()
}
}
impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
if value.len() != NONCE_LENGTH {
return Err(());
}
let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LENGTH];
nonce.copy_from_slice(&value);
Ok(Self(nonce))
}
}
pub struct KeyCell(pub(super) MemSafe<Key>);
impl From<MemSafe<Key>> for KeyCell {
fn from(value: MemSafe<Key>) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
impl TryFrom<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(mut value: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let value = value.read().unwrap();
if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
return Err(());
}
let mut cell = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let mut cell_write = cell.write().unwrap();
let cell_slice: &mut [u8] = cell_write.as_mut();
cell_slice.copy_from_slice(&value);
}
Ok(Self(cell))
}
}
impl KeyCell {
pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
}
key.into()
}
pub fn into_inner(self) -> MemSafe<Key> {
self.0
}
pub fn encrypt_in_place(
&mut self,
nonce: &Nonce,
associated_data: &[u8],
mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
}
pub fn decrypt_in_place(
&mut self,
nonce: &Nonce,
associated_data: &[u8],
buffer: &mut MemSafe<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let mut buffer = buffer.write().unwrap();
let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
}
pub fn encrypt(
&mut self,
nonce: &Nonce,
associated_data: &[u8],
plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
&nonce,
Payload {
msg: plaintext.as_ref(),
aad: associated_data,
},
)?;
Ok(ciphertext)
}
}
pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
pub(super) fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
let mut salt = Salt::default();
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
salt
}
/// User password might be of different length, have not enough entropy, etc...
/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
pub(super) fn derive_seal_key(mut password: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
let params = argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap();
let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let password_source = password.read().unwrap();
let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
hasher
.hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
.unwrap();
}
key.into()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
#[test]
pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let password2 = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key1 = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
let mut key2 = derive_seal_key(password2, &salt);
let key1_reader = key1.0.read().unwrap();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read().unwrap();
assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
}
#[test]
pub fn successful_derive() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
let key_reader = key.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
}
#[test]
pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
let associated_data = b"associated data";
let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();
key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
.unwrap();
assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
let mut buffer = MemSafe::new(buffer).unwrap();
key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
.unwrap();
let buffer = buffer.read().unwrap();
assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
}
#[test]
// We should fuzz this
pub fn test_nonce_increment() {
let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
nonce.increment();
assert_eq!(
nonce.0,
[
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
]
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,102 +1,58 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::{
ops::DerefMut,
sync::Mutex,
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UserAgentResponse,
auth::{
self, AuthChallengeRequest, ClientMessage, ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage,
client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
self, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk, ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage,
server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
},
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
unseal::{UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult, UnsealStart, UnsealStartResponse},
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
transport::Bi,
};
use chacha20poly1305::{
AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
aead::KeyInit,
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use futures::StreamExt;
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorRef, Spawn},
error::SendError,
messages,
prelude::Context,
};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use tokio::sync::mpsc::Sender;
use tonic::{Status, transport::Server};
use tracing::{debug, error, info};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::{
ServerContext,
actors::user_agent::auth::AuthChallenge,
context::bootstrap::{BootstrapActor, ConsumeToken},
actors::{
bootstrap::{BootstrapActor, ConsumeToken},
user_agent::state::{
AuthRequestContext, ChallengeContext, DummyContext, UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents,
UserAgentStateMachine, UserAgentStates,
},
},
db::{self, schema},
errors::GrpcStatusExt,
};
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ChallengeContext {
challenge: AuthChallenge,
key: VerifyingKey,
}
mod state;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
// Request context with deserialized public key for state machine.
// This intermediate struct is needed because the state machine branches depending on presence of bootstrap token,
// but we want to have the deserialized key in both branches.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct AuthRequestContext {
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
derive_states: [Debug],
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) / auth_request_context = ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext),
ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) + ReceivedBootstrapToken = Authenticated,
ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) + SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) / move_challenge = WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext),
WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedGoodSolution = Authenticated,
WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedBadSolution = AuthError, // block further transitions, but connection should close anyway
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn move_challenge(
&mut self,
state_data: &AuthRequestContext,
event_data: ChallengeContext,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn auth_request_context(
&mut self,
event_data: AuthRequestContext,
) -> Result<AuthRequestContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}
mod transport;
pub(crate) use transport::handle_user_agent;
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct UserAgentActor {
db: db::DatabasePool,
bootstapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
context: ServerContext,
ephemeral_key: Option<crate::context::unseal::EphemeralKeyPair>,
// will be used in future
_tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
}
impl UserAgentActor {
@@ -108,25 +64,21 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
db: context.db.clone(),
bootstapper: context.bootstrapper.clone(),
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
tx,
context,
ephemeral_key: None,
_tx: tx,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn new_manual(
db: db::DatabasePool,
bootstapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
context: ServerContext,
tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
db,
bootstapper,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
tx,
context,
ephemeral_key: None,
_tx: tx,
}
}
@@ -172,7 +124,7 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBootstrapToken)?;
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(auth::AuthOk {})))
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
}
async fn auth_with_challenge(&mut self, pubkey: VerifyingKey, pubkey_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Output {
@@ -212,7 +164,7 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
let challenge = auth::AuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
nonce,
nonce: nonce,
};
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::SentChallenge(ChallengeContext {
@@ -266,18 +218,93 @@ fn auth_response(payload: ServerAuthPayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
}
}
fn unseal_response(payload: UserAgentResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(payload),
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentActor {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_request(
&mut self,
req: AuthChallengeRequest,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Output>,
) -> Output {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_request(&mut self, req: UnsealStart) -> Output {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
let client_pubkey_bytes: [u8; 32] = req
.client_pubkey
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("client_pubkey must be 32 bytes"))?;
let client_public_key = PublicKey::from(client_pubkey_bytes);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
server_public_key: public_key,
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
client_public_key,
}))?;
Ok(unseal_response(
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
}),
))
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(&mut self, req: UnsealEncryptedKey) -> Output {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received unseal encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(Status::failed_precondition(
"Invalid state for unseal encrypted key",
));
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
match secret {
Some(secret) => secret,
None => {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)));
}
}
};
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(&req.nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&unseal_context.client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut root_key_buffer = MemSafe::new(req.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
let mut write_handle = root_key_buffer.write().unwrap();
let write_handle = write_handle.deref_mut();
let decryption_result = cipher
.decrypt_in_place(nonce, &req.associated_data, write_handle);
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => todo!("Send key to the keyguarding"),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)));
},
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_request(&mut self, req: AuthChallengeRequest) -> Output {
let pubkey = req.pubkey.as_array().ok_or(Status::invalid_argument(
"Expected pubkey to have specific length",
))?;
let pubkey = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey).map_err(|err| {
let pubkey = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey).map_err(|_err| {
error!(?pubkey, "Failed to convert to VerifyingKey");
Status::invalid_argument("Failed to convert pubkey to VerifyingKey")
})?;
@@ -293,11 +320,10 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
}
}
#[message(ctx)]
#[message]
pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_solution(
&mut self,
solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Output>,
) -> Output {
let (valid, challenge_context) = self.verify_challenge_solution(&solution)?;
@@ -307,192 +333,11 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
"Client provided valid solution to authentication challenge"
);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedGoodSolution)?;
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(auth::AuthOk {})))
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
} else {
error!("Client provided invalid solution to authentication challenge");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBadSolution)?;
Err(Status::unauthenticated("Invalid challenge solution"))
}
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn handle_unseal_request(
&mut self,
request: arbiter_proto::proto::UnsealRequest,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Output>,
) -> Output {
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
EphemeralKeyResponse, SealedPassword, UnsealResponse, UnsealResult,
unseal_request::Payload as ReqPayload,
unseal_response::Payload as RespPayload,
};
match request.payload {
Some(ReqPayload::EphemeralKeyRequest(_)) => {
// Generate new ephemeral keypair
let keypair = crate::context::unseal::EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
let expires_at = keypair.expires_at() as i64;
let public_bytes = keypair.public_bytes();
// Store for later use
self.ephemeral_key = Some(keypair);
info!("Generated ephemeral X25519 keypair for unseal, expires at {}", expires_at);
Ok(UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResponse(UnsealResponse {
payload: Some(RespPayload::EphemeralKeyResponse(EphemeralKeyResponse {
server_pubkey: public_bytes,
expires_at,
})),
})),
})
}
Some(ReqPayload::SealedPassword(sealed)) => {
// Get and consume ephemeral key
let keypair = self
.ephemeral_key
.take()
.ok_or_else(|| Status::failed_precondition("No ephemeral key generated"))?;
// Check expiration
if keypair.is_expired() {
error!("Ephemeral key expired before sealed password was received");
return Err(Status::deadline_exceeded("Ephemeral key expired"));
}
// Perform ECDH
let shared_secret = keypair
.perform_dh(&sealed.client_pubkey)
.map_err(|e| Status::invalid_argument(format!("Invalid client pubkey: {}", e)))?;
// Decrypt password
let nonce: [u8; 12] = sealed
.nonce
.as_slice()
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Nonce must be 12 bytes"))?;
let password_bytes = crate::crypto::aead::decrypt(
&sealed.encrypted_password,
&shared_secret,
&nonce,
)
.map_err(|e| {
error!("Failed to decrypt password: {}", e);
Status::internal(format!("Decryption failed: {}", e))
})?;
let password = String::from_utf8(password_bytes).map_err(|_| {
error!("Password is not valid UTF-8");
Status::invalid_argument("Password must be UTF-8")
})?;
// Call unseal on context
info!("Attempting to unseal vault with decrypted password");
let result = self.context.unseal(&password).await;
match result {
Ok(()) => {
info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
Ok(UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResponse(
UnsealResponse {
payload: Some(RespPayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult {
success: true,
error_message: None,
})),
},
)),
})
}
Err(e) => {
error!("Unseal failed: {}", e);
Ok(UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResponse(
UnsealResponse {
payload: Some(RespPayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult {
success: false,
error_message: Some(e.to_string()),
})),
},
)),
})
}
}
}
None => {
error!("Received empty unseal request");
Err(Status::invalid_argument("Empty unseal request"))
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UserAgentResponse,
auth::{AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk},
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::HandleAuthChallengeRequest, context::bootstrap::BootstrapActor, db,
};
use super::UserAgentActor;
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
// explicitly not installing any user_agent pubkeys
let bootstrapper = BootstrapActor::new(&db).await.unwrap(); // this will create bootstrap token
let token = bootstrapper.get_token().unwrap();
let bootstrapper_ref = BootstrapActor::spawn(bootstrapper);
let context = crate::ServerContext::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let user_agent = UserAgentActor::new_manual(
db.clone(),
bootstrapper_ref,
context,
tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0, // dummy channel, we won't actually send responses in this test
);
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
// simulate client sending auth request with bootstrap token
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
},
})
.await
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
// auth succeeded
assert_eq!(
result,
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
AuthOk {},
)),
},
)),
}
);
}
}
mod transport;
pub(crate) use transport::handle_user_agent;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use arbiter_proto::proto::auth::AuthChallenge;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
/// Context for state machine with validated key and sent challenge
/// Challenge is then transformed to bytes using shared function and verified
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub key: VerifyingKey,
}
// Request context with deserialized public key for state machine.
// This intermediate struct is needed because the state machine branches depending on presence of bootstrap token,
// but we want to have the deserialized key in both branches.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct AuthRequestContext {
pub pubkey: VerifyingKey,
pub bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub server_public_key: PublicKey,
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) / auth_request_context = ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext),
ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) + ReceivedBootstrapToken = Idle,
ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) + SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) / move_challenge = WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext),
WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedGoodSolution = Idle,
WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedBadSolution = AuthError, // block further transitions, but connection should close anyway
Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn move_challenge(
&mut self,
_state_data: &AuthRequestContext,
event_data: ChallengeContext,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn auth_request_context(
&mut self,
event_data: AuthRequestContext,
) -> Result<AuthRequestContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UserAgentResponse,
auth::{self, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk},
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use chrono::format;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::BootstrapActor,
user_agent::{HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution},
},
db::{self, schema},
};
use super::UserAgentActor;
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
// explicitly not installing any user_agent pubkeys
let bootstrapper = BootstrapActor::new(&db).await.unwrap(); // this will create bootstrap token
let token = bootstrapper.get_token().unwrap();
let bootstrapper_ref = BootstrapActor::spawn(bootstrapper);
let user_agent = UserAgentActor::new_manual(
db.clone(),
bootstrapper_ref,
tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0, // dummy channel, we won't actually send responses in this test
);
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
// simulate client sending auth request with bootstrap token
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
},
})
.await
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
// auth succeeded
assert_eq!(
result,
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
AuthOk {},
)),
},
)),
}
);
// key is succesfully recorded in database
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let stored_pubkey: Vec<u8> = schema::useragent_client::table
.select(schema::useragent_client::public_key)
.first::<Vec<u8>>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(stored_pubkey, new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec());
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
// explicitly not installing any user_agent pubkeys
let bootstrapper = BootstrapActor::new(&db).await.unwrap(); // this will create bootstrap token
let bootstrapper_ref = BootstrapActor::spawn(bootstrapper);
let user_agent = UserAgentActor::new_manual(
db.clone(),
bootstrapper_ref,
tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0, // dummy channel, we won't actually send responses in this test
);
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
// simulate client sending auth request with bootstrap token
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_string()),
},
})
.await;
match result {
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(status)) => {
assert_eq!(status.code(), tonic::Code::InvalidArgument);
insta::assert_debug_snapshot!(status, @r#"
Status {
code: InvalidArgument,
message: "Invalid bootstrap token",
source: None,
}
"#);
}
Err(other) => {
panic!("Expected SendError::HandlerError, got {other:?}");
}
Ok(_) => {
panic!("Expected error due to invalid bootstrap token, but got success");
}
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let bootstrapper_ref = BootstrapActor::spawn(BootstrapActor::new(&db).await.unwrap());
let user_agent = UserAgentActor::new_manual(
db.clone(),
bootstrapper_ref,
tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0, // dummy channel, we won't actually send responses in this test
);
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
// simulate client sending auth request with bootstrap token
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
// insert pubkey into database to trigger challenge-response auth flow
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: None,
},
})
.await
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
// auth challenge succeeded
let UserAgentResponse {
payload:
Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload:
Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthChallenge(challenge)),
})),
} = result
else {
panic!("Expected auth challenge response, got {result:?}");
};
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(&challenge);
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
let serialized_signature = signature.to_bytes().to_vec();
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeSolution {
solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: serialized_signature,
},
})
.await
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
// auth succeeded
assert_eq!(
result,
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
AuthOk {},
)),
},
)),
}
);
}

View File

@@ -2,12 +2,9 @@ use super::UserAgentActor;
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
auth::{
self, AuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk, ClientMessage,
ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage, client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
ClientMessage as ClientAuthMessage, client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
},
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use futures::StreamExt;
use kameo::{
@@ -19,7 +16,10 @@ use tonic::Status;
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution},
actors::user_agent::{
HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey,
HandleUnsealRequest,
},
context::ServerContext,
};
@@ -59,28 +59,30 @@ async fn process_message(
Status::invalid_argument("Expected message with payload")
})?;
let UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientMessage {
payload: Some(client_message),
}) = msg
else {
error!(
actor = "useragent",
"Received unexpected message type during authentication"
);
return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Expected AuthMessage with ClientMessage payload",
));
};
match client_message {
ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(req) => actor
match msg {
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientAuthMessage {
payload: Some(ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(req)),
}) => actor
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest { req })
.await
.map_err(into_status),
ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(solution) => actor
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientAuthMessage {
payload: Some(ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(solution)),
}) => actor
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeSolution { solution })
.await
.map_err(into_status),
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealStart(unseal_start) => actor
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest { req: unseal_start })
.await
.map_err(into_status),
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealEncryptedKey(unseal_encrypted_key) => actor
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
req: unseal_encrypted_key,
})
.await
.map_err(into_status),
_ => Err(Status::invalid_argument("Expected message with payload")),
}
}

View File

@@ -1,36 +1,24 @@
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use diesel::OptionalExtension as _;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use miette::Diagnostic;
use rand::rngs::StdRng;
use secrecy::{ExposeSecret, SecretBox};
use smlang::statemachine;
use thiserror::Error;
use tokio::sync::{watch, RwLock};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use crate::{
context::{
bootstrap::{BootstrapActor, generate_token},
lease::LeaseHandler,
tls::{RotationState, RotationTask, TlsDataRaw, TlsManager},
},
db::{
actors::bootstrap::{self, BootstrapActor}, context::tls::{TlsDataRaw, TlsManager}, db::{
self,
models::ArbiterSetting,
schema::{self, arbiter_settings},
},
schema::arbiter_settings,
}
};
pub(crate) mod bootstrap;
pub(crate) mod lease;
pub(crate) mod tls;
pub(crate) mod unseal;
pub mod tls;
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum InitError {
@@ -59,66 +47,8 @@ pub enum InitError {
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
}
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum UnsealError {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::database_pool))]
Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Query error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::database_query))]
Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Decryption failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::decryption))]
DecryptionFailed(#[from] crate::crypto::CryptoError),
#[error("Invalid state for unseal")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::invalid_state))]
InvalidState,
#[error("Missing salt in database")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::missing_salt))]
MissingSalt,
#[error("No root key configured in database")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::no_root_key))]
NoRootKey,
}
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum SealError {
#[error("Invalid state for seal")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::seal::invalid_state))]
InvalidState,
}
/// Secure in-memory storage for root encryption key
///
/// Uses `secrecy` crate for automatic zeroization on drop to prevent key material
/// from remaining in memory after use. SecretBox provides heap-allocated secret
/// storage that implements Send + Sync for safe use in async contexts.
pub struct KeyStorage {
/// 32-byte root key protected by SecretBox
key: SecretBox<[u8; 32]>,
}
impl KeyStorage {
/// Create new KeyStorage from a 32-byte root key
pub fn new(key: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self {
key: SecretBox::new(Box::new(key)),
}
}
/// Access the key for cryptographic operations
pub fn key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
self.key.expose_secret()
}
}
// Drop автоматически реализован через secrecy::Zeroize
// который зануляет память при освобождении
// TODO: Placeholder for secure root key cell implementation
pub struct KeyStorage;
statemachine! {
name: Server,
@@ -130,36 +60,26 @@ statemachine! {
}
pub struct _Context;
impl ServerStateMachineContext for _Context {
/// Move key from unseal event into Ready state
fn move_key(&mut self, event_data: KeyStorage) -> Result<KeyStorage, ()> {
// Просто перемещаем KeyStorage из event в state
// Без клонирования - event data consumed
Ok(event_data)
fn move_key(&mut self, _event_data: KeyStorage) -> Result<KeyStorage, ()> {
todo!()
}
/// Securely dispose of key when sealing
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn dispose_key(&mut self, _state_data: &KeyStorage) -> Result<(), ()> {
// KeyStorage будет dropped после state transition
// secrecy::Zeroize зануляет память автоматически
Ok(())
todo!()
}
}
pub(crate) struct _ServerContextInner {
pub struct _ServerContextInner {
pub db: db::DatabasePool,
pub state: RwLock<ServerStateMachine<_Context>>,
pub rng: StdRng,
pub tls: Arc<TlsManager>,
pub tls: TlsManager,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
pub rotation_state: RwLock<RotationState>,
pub rotation_acks: Arc<RwLock<HashSet<VerifyingKey>>>,
pub user_agent_leases: LeaseHandler<VerifyingKey>,
pub client_leases: LeaseHandler<VerifyingKey>,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub(crate) struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
pub struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
type Target = _ServerContextInner;
@@ -170,49 +90,34 @@ impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
}
impl ServerContext {
/// Check if all active clients have acknowledged the rotation
pub async fn check_rotation_ready(&self) -> bool {
// TODO: Implement proper rotation readiness check
// For now, return false as placeholder
false
}
async fn load_tls(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
db: &mut db::DatabaseConnection,
settings: Option<&ArbiterSetting>,
) -> Result<TlsManager, InitError> {
match settings {
Some(s) if s.current_cert_id.is_some() => {
// Load active certificate from tls_certificates table
Ok(TlsManager::load_from_db(
db.clone(),
s.current_cert_id.unwrap(),
)
.await?)
}
Some(s) => {
// Legacy migration: extract validity and save to new table
match &settings {
Some(settings) => {
let tls_data_raw = TlsDataRaw {
cert: s.cert.clone(),
key: s.cert_key.clone(),
cert: settings.cert.clone(),
key: settings.cert_key.clone(),
};
// For legacy certificates, use current time as not_before
// and current time + 90 days as not_after
let not_before = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
let not_after = not_before + (90 * 24 * 60 * 60); // 90 days
Ok(TlsManager::new_from_legacy(
db.clone(),
tls_data_raw,
not_before,
not_after,
)
.await?)
Ok(TlsManager::new(Some(tls_data_raw)).await?)
}
None => {
// First startup - generate new certificate
Ok(TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?)
let tls = TlsManager::new(None).await?;
let tls_data_raw = tls.bytes();
diesel::insert_into(arbiter_settings::table)
.values(&ArbiterSetting {
id: 1,
root_key_id: None,
cert_key: tls_data_raw.key,
cert: tls_data_raw.cert,
})
.execute(db)
.await?;
Ok(tls)
}
}
}
@@ -226,18 +131,10 @@ impl ServerContext {
.await
.optional()?;
let tls = Self::load_tls(&mut conn, settings.as_ref()).await?;
drop(conn);
// Load TLS manager
let tls = Self::load_tls(&db, settings.as_ref()).await?;
// Load rotation state from database
let rotation_state = RotationState::load_from_db(&db)
.await
.unwrap_or(RotationState::Normal);
let bootstrap_token = generate_token().await?;
let mut state = ServerStateMachine::new(_Context);
if let Some(settings) = &settings
@@ -247,157 +144,12 @@ impl ServerContext {
let _ = state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped);
}
// Create shutdown channel for rotation task
let (rotation_shutdown_tx, rotation_shutdown_rx) = watch::channel(false);
// Initialize bootstrap actor
let bootstrapper = BootstrapActor::spawn(BootstrapActor::new(&db).await?);
let context = Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
db: db.clone(),
Ok(Self(Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
bootstrapper: BootstrapActor::spawn(BootstrapActor::new(&db).await?),
db,
rng,
tls: Arc::new(tls),
tls,
state: RwLock::new(state),
bootstrapper,
rotation_state: RwLock::new(rotation_state),
rotation_acks: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashSet::new())),
user_agent_leases: Default::default(),
client_leases: Default::default(),
});
Ok(Self(context))
}
/// Unseal vault with password
pub async fn unseal(&self, password: &str) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
use crate::crypto::root_key;
use diesel::QueryDsl as _;
// 1. Get root_key_id from settings
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let settings: db::models::ArbiterSetting = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.first(&mut conn)
.await?;
let root_key_id = settings.root_key_id.ok_or(UnsealError::NoRootKey)?;
// 2. Load encrypted root key
let encrypted: db::models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.find(root_key_id)
.first(&mut conn)
.await?;
let salt = encrypted
.argon2_salt
.as_ref()
.ok_or(UnsealError::MissingSalt)?;
drop(conn);
// 3. Decrypt root key using password
let root_key = root_key::decrypt_root_key(&encrypted, password, salt)
.map_err(UnsealError::DecryptionFailed)?;
// 4. Create secure storage
let key_storage = KeyStorage::new(root_key);
// 5. Transition state machine
let mut state = self.state.write().await;
state
.process_event(ServerEvents::Unsealed(key_storage))
.map_err(|_| UnsealError::InvalidState)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Seal the server (lock the key)
pub async fn seal(&self) -> Result<(), SealError> {
let mut state = self.state.write().await;
state
.process_event(ServerEvents::Sealed)
.map_err(|_| SealError::InvalidState)?;
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_keystorage_creation() {
let key = [42u8; 32];
let storage = KeyStorage::new(key);
assert_eq!(storage.key()[0], 42);
assert_eq!(storage.key().len(), 32);
}
#[test]
fn test_keystorage_zeroization() {
let key = [99u8; 32];
{
let _storage = KeyStorage::new(key);
// storage будет dropped здесь
}
// После drop SecretBox должен зануляеть память
// Это проверяется автоматически через secrecy::Zeroize
}
#[test]
fn test_state_machine_transitions() {
let mut state = ServerStateMachine::new(_Context);
// Начальное состояние
assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::NotBootstrapped));
// Bootstrapped transition
state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped).unwrap();
assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::Sealed));
// Unsealed transition
let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([1u8; 32]);
state
.process_event(ServerEvents::Unsealed(key_storage))
.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::Ready(_)));
// Sealed transition
state.process_event(ServerEvents::Sealed).unwrap();
assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::Sealed));
}
#[test]
fn test_move_key_callback() {
let mut ctx = _Context;
let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([7u8; 32]);
let result = ctx.move_key(key_storage);
assert!(result.is_ok());
assert_eq!(result.unwrap().key()[0], 7);
}
#[test]
fn test_dispose_key_callback() {
let mut ctx = _Context;
let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([13u8; 32]);
let result = ctx.dispose_key(&key_storage);
assert!(result.is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_invalid_state_transitions() {
let mut state = ServerStateMachine::new(_Context);
// Попытка unseal без bootstrap
let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([1u8; 32]);
let result = state.process_event(ServerEvents::Unsealed(key_storage));
assert!(result.is_err());
// Правильный путь
state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped).unwrap();
// Попытка повторного bootstrap
let result = state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped);
assert!(result.is_err());
})))
}
}

View File

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use dashmap::DashSet;
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
struct LeaseStorage<T: Eq + std::hash::Hash>(Arc<DashSet<T>>);
// A lease that automatically releases the item when dropped
pub struct Lease<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> {
item: T,
storage: LeaseStorage<T>,
}
impl<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> Drop for Lease<T> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.storage.0.remove(&self.item);
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
pub struct LeaseHandler<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> {
storage: LeaseStorage<T>,
}
impl<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> LeaseHandler<T> {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
storage: LeaseStorage(Arc::new(DashSet::new())),
}
}
pub fn acquire(&self, item: T) -> Result<Lease<T>, ()> {
if self.storage.0.insert(item.clone()) {
Ok(Lease {
item,
storage: self.storage.clone(),
})
} else {
Err(())
}
}
/// Get all currently leased items
pub fn get_all(&self) -> Vec<T> {
self.storage.0.iter().map(|entry| entry.clone()).collect()
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
use std::string::FromUtf8Error;
use miette::Diagnostic;
use rcgen::{Certificate, KeyPair};
use rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer;
use thiserror::Error;
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum TlsInitError {
#[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_generation))]
KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
#[error("Key invalid format: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_invalid_format))]
KeyInvalidFormat(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
#[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_deserialization))]
KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
}
pub struct TlsData {
pub cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
pub keypair: KeyPair,
}
pub struct TlsDataRaw {
pub cert: Vec<u8>,
pub key: Vec<u8>,
}
impl TlsDataRaw {
pub fn serialize(cert: &TlsData) -> Self {
Self {
cert: cert.cert.as_ref().to_vec(),
key: cert.keypair.serialize_pem().as_bytes().to_vec(),
}
}
pub fn deserialize(&self) -> Result<TlsData, TlsInitError> {
let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&self.cert).into_owned();
let key =
String::from_utf8(self.key.clone()).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyInvalidFormat)?;
let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&key).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
Ok(TlsData { cert, keypair })
}
}
fn generate_cert(key: &KeyPair) -> Result<Certificate, rcgen::Error> {
let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(vec![
"arbiter.local".to_string(),
"localhost".to_string(),
])?;
params.self_signed(key)
}
// TODO: Implement cert rotation
pub struct TlsManager {
data: TlsData,
}
impl TlsManager {
pub async fn new(data: Option<TlsDataRaw>) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
match data {
Some(raw) => {
let tls_data = raw.deserialize()?;
Ok(Self { data: tls_data })
}
None => {
let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
let cert = generate_cert(&keypair)?;
let tls_data = TlsData {
cert: cert.der().clone(),
keypair,
};
Ok(Self { data: tls_data })
}
}
}
pub fn bytes(&self) -> TlsDataRaw {
TlsDataRaw::serialize(&self.data)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::string::FromUtf8Error;
use miette::Diagnostic;
use rcgen::{Certificate, KeyPair};
use rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer;
use thiserror::Error;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use crate::db;
pub mod rotation;
pub use rotation::{RotationError, RotationState, RotationTask};
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
#[expect(clippy::enum_variant_names)]
pub enum TlsInitError {
#[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_generation))]
KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
#[error("Key invalid format: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_invalid_format))]
KeyInvalidFormat(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
#[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_deserialization))]
KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
}
pub struct TlsData {
pub cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
pub keypair: KeyPair,
}
pub struct TlsDataRaw {
pub cert: Vec<u8>,
pub key: Vec<u8>,
}
impl TlsDataRaw {
pub fn serialize(cert: &TlsData) -> Self {
Self {
cert: cert.cert.as_ref().to_vec(),
key: cert.keypair.serialize_pem().as_bytes().to_vec(),
}
}
pub fn deserialize(&self) -> Result<TlsData, TlsInitError> {
let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&self.cert).into_owned();
let key =
String::from_utf8(self.key.clone()).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyInvalidFormat)?;
let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&key).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
Ok(TlsData { cert, keypair })
}
}
/// Metadata about a certificate including validity period
pub struct CertificateMetadata {
pub cert_id: i32,
pub cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
pub keypair: Arc<KeyPair>,
pub not_before: i64,
pub not_after: i64,
pub created_at: i64,
}
pub(crate) fn generate_cert(key: &KeyPair) -> Result<(Certificate, i64, i64), rcgen::Error> {
let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(vec![
"arbiter.local".to_string(),
"localhost".to_string(),
])?;
// Set validity period: 90 days from now
let not_before = chrono::Utc::now();
let not_after = not_before + chrono::Duration::days(90);
// Note: rcgen doesn't directly expose not_before/not_after setting in all versions
// For now, we'll generate the cert and track validity separately
let cert = params.self_signed(key)?;
Ok((cert, not_before.timestamp(), not_after.timestamp()))
}
// Certificate rotation enabled
pub(crate) struct TlsManager {
// Current active certificate (atomic replacement via RwLock)
current_cert: Arc<RwLock<CertificateMetadata>>,
// Database pool for persistence
db: db::DatabasePool,
}
impl TlsManager {
/// Create new TlsManager with a generated certificate
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
let (cert, not_before, not_after) = generate_cert(&keypair)?;
let cert_der = cert.der().clone();
// For initial creation, cert_id will be set after DB insert
let metadata = CertificateMetadata {
cert_id: 0, // Temporary, will be updated after DB insert
cert: cert_der,
keypair: Arc::new(keypair),
not_before,
not_after,
created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
};
Ok(Self {
current_cert: Arc::new(RwLock::new(metadata)),
db,
})
}
/// Load TlsManager from database with specific certificate ID
pub async fn load_from_db(db: db::DatabasePool, cert_id: i32) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
// TODO: Load certificate from database
// For now, return error - will be implemented when database access is ready
Err(TlsInitError::KeyGeneration(rcgen::Error::CouldNotParseCertificate))
}
/// Create from legacy TlsDataRaw format
pub async fn new_from_legacy(
db: db::DatabasePool,
data: TlsDataRaw,
not_before: i64,
not_after: i64,
) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
let tls_data = data.deserialize()?;
let metadata = CertificateMetadata {
cert_id: 1, // Legacy certificate gets ID 1
cert: tls_data.cert,
keypair: Arc::new(tls_data.keypair),
not_before,
not_after,
created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
};
Ok(Self {
current_cert: Arc::new(RwLock::new(metadata)),
db,
})
}
/// Get current certificate data
pub async fn get_certificate(&self) -> (CertificateDer<'static>, Arc<KeyPair>) {
let cert = self.current_cert.read().await;
(cert.cert.clone(), cert.keypair.clone())
}
/// Replace certificate atomically
pub async fn replace_certificate(&self, new_cert: CertificateMetadata) -> Result<(), TlsInitError> {
let mut cert = self.current_cert.write().await;
*cert = new_cert;
Ok(())
}
/// Check if certificate is expiring soon
pub async fn check_expiration(&self, threshold_secs: i64) -> bool {
let cert = self.current_cert.read().await;
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
cert.not_after - now < threshold_secs
}
/// Get certificate metadata for rotation logic
pub async fn get_certificate_metadata(&self) -> CertificateMetadata {
let cert = self.current_cert.read().await;
CertificateMetadata {
cert_id: cert.cert_id,
cert: cert.cert.clone(),
keypair: cert.keypair.clone(),
not_before: cert.not_before,
not_after: cert.not_after,
created_at: cert.created_at,
}
}
pub fn bytes(&self) -> TlsDataRaw {
// This method is now async-compatible but we keep sync interface
// TODO: Make this async or remove if not needed
TlsDataRaw {
cert: vec![],
key: vec![],
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,552 +0,0 @@
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use diesel::prelude::*;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use miette::Diagnostic;
use rcgen::KeyPair;
use thiserror::Error;
use tokio::sync::watch;
use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
use crate::context::ServerContext;
use crate::db::models::{NewRotationClientAck, NewTlsCertificate, NewTlsRotationHistory};
use crate::db::schema::{rotation_client_acks, tls_certificates, tls_rotation_history, tls_rotation_state};
use crate::db::DatabasePool;
use super::{generate_cert, CertificateMetadata, TlsInitError};
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum RotationError {
#[error("Certificate generation failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::cert_generation))]
CertGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::database))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("TLS initialization error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::tls_init))]
TlsInit(#[from] TlsInitError),
#[error("Invalid rotation state: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::invalid_state))]
InvalidState(String),
#[error("No active certificate found")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::no_active_cert))]
NoActiveCertificate,
}
/// Состояние процесса ротации сертификата
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum RotationState {
/// Обычная работа, ротация не требуется
Normal,
/// Ротация инициирована, новый сертификат сгенерирован
RotationInitiated {
initiated_at: i64,
new_cert_id: i32,
},
/// Ожидание подтверждений (ACKs) от клиентов
WaitingForAcks {
new_cert_id: i32,
initiated_at: i64,
timeout_at: i64,
},
/// Все ACK получены или таймаут истёк, готов к ротации
ReadyToRotate {
new_cert_id: i32,
},
}
impl RotationState {
/// Загрузить состояние из базы данных
pub async fn load_from_db(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, RotationError> {
use crate::db::schema::tls_rotation_state::dsl::*;
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
})?;
let state_record: (i32, String, Option<i32>, Option<i32>, Option<i32>) =
tls_rotation_state
.select((id, state, new_cert_id, initiated_at, timeout_at))
.filter(id.eq(1))
.first(&mut conn)
.await?;
let rotation_state = match state_record.1.as_str() {
"normal" => RotationState::Normal,
"initiated" => {
let cert_id = state_record.2.ok_or_else(|| {
RotationError::InvalidState("Initiated state missing new_cert_id".into())
})?;
let init_at = state_record.3.ok_or_else(|| {
RotationError::InvalidState("Initiated state missing initiated_at".into())
})?;
RotationState::RotationInitiated {
initiated_at: init_at as i64,
new_cert_id: cert_id,
}
}
"waiting_acks" => {
let cert_id = state_record.2.ok_or_else(|| {
RotationError::InvalidState("WaitingForAcks state missing new_cert_id".into())
})?;
let init_at = state_record.3.ok_or_else(|| {
RotationError::InvalidState("WaitingForAcks state missing initiated_at".into())
})?;
let timeout = state_record.4.ok_or_else(|| {
RotationError::InvalidState("WaitingForAcks state missing timeout_at".into())
})?;
RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
new_cert_id: cert_id,
initiated_at: init_at as i64,
timeout_at: timeout as i64,
}
}
"ready" => {
let cert_id = state_record.2.ok_or_else(|| {
RotationError::InvalidState("Ready state missing new_cert_id".into())
})?;
RotationState::ReadyToRotate {
new_cert_id: cert_id,
}
}
other => {
return Err(RotationError::InvalidState(format!(
"Unknown state: {}",
other
)))
}
};
Ok(rotation_state)
}
/// Сохранить состояние в базу данных
pub async fn save_to_db(&self, db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
use crate::db::schema::tls_rotation_state::dsl::*;
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
})?;
let (state_str, cert_id, init_at, timeout) = match self {
RotationState::Normal => ("normal", None, None, None),
RotationState::RotationInitiated {
initiated_at: init,
new_cert_id: cert,
} => ("initiated", Some(*cert), Some(*init as i32), None),
RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
new_cert_id: cert,
initiated_at: init,
timeout_at: timeout_val,
} => (
"waiting_acks",
Some(*cert),
Some(*init as i32),
Some(*timeout_val as i32),
),
RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id: cert } => ("ready", Some(*cert), None, None),
};
diesel::update(tls_rotation_state.filter(id.eq(1)))
.set((
state.eq(state_str),
new_cert_id.eq(cert_id),
initiated_at.eq(init_at),
timeout_at.eq(timeout),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
}
/// Фоновый таск для автоматической ротации сертификатов
pub struct RotationTask {
context: Arc<crate::context::_ServerContextInner>,
check_interval: Duration,
rotation_threshold: Duration,
ack_timeout: Duration,
shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
}
impl RotationTask {
/// Создать новый rotation task
pub fn new(
context: Arc<crate::context::_ServerContextInner>,
check_interval: Duration,
rotation_threshold: Duration,
ack_timeout: Duration,
shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
) -> Self {
Self {
context,
check_interval,
rotation_threshold,
ack_timeout,
shutdown_rx,
}
}
/// Запустить фоновый таск мониторинга и ротации
pub async fn run(mut self) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
info!("Starting TLS certificate rotation task");
loop {
tokio::select! {
_ = tokio::time::sleep(self.check_interval) => {
if let Err(e) = self.check_and_process().await {
error!("Rotation task error: {}", e);
}
}
_ = self.shutdown_rx.changed() => {
info!("Rotation task shutting down");
break;
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Проверить текущее состояние и выполнить необходимые действия
async fn check_and_process(&self) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
let state = self.context.rotation_state.read().await.clone();
match state {
RotationState::Normal => {
// Проверить, нужна ли ротация
self.check_expiration_and_initiate().await?;
}
RotationState::RotationInitiated { new_cert_id, .. } => {
// Автоматически перейти в WaitingForAcks
self.transition_to_waiting_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
}
RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
new_cert_id,
timeout_at,
..
} => {
self.handle_waiting_for_acks(new_cert_id, timeout_at).await?;
}
RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id } => {
self.execute_rotation(new_cert_id).await?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Проверить срок действия сертификата и инициировать ротацию если нужно
async fn check_expiration_and_initiate(&self) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
let threshold_secs = self.rotation_threshold.as_secs() as i64;
if self.context.tls.check_expiration(threshold_secs).await {
info!("Certificate expiring soon, initiating rotation");
self.initiate_rotation().await?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Инициировать ротацию: сгенерировать новый сертификат и сохранить в БД
pub async fn initiate_rotation(&self) -> Result<i32, RotationError> {
info!("Initiating certificate rotation");
// 1. Генерация нового сертификата
let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
let (cert, not_before, not_after) = generate_cert(&keypair)?;
let cert_der = cert.der().clone();
// 2. Сохранение в БД (is_active = false, пока не активирован)
let new_cert_id = self
.save_new_certificate(&cert_der, &keypair, not_before, not_after)
.await?;
info!(new_cert_id, "New certificate generated and saved");
// 3. Обновление rotation_state
let new_state = RotationState::RotationInitiated {
initiated_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
new_cert_id,
};
*self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
// 4. Логирование в audit trail
self.log_rotation_event(new_cert_id, "rotation_initiated", None)
.await?;
Ok(new_cert_id)
}
/// Перейти в состояние WaitingForAcks и разослать уведомления
async fn transition_to_waiting_acks(&self, new_cert_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
info!(new_cert_id, "Transitioning to WaitingForAcks state");
let initiated_at = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
let timeout_at = initiated_at + self.ack_timeout.as_secs() as i64;
// Обновить состояние
let new_state = RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
new_cert_id,
initiated_at,
timeout_at,
};
*self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
// TODO: Broadcast уведомлений клиентам
// self.broadcast_rotation_notification(new_cert_id, timeout_at).await?;
info!(timeout_at, "Rotation notifications sent, waiting for ACKs");
Ok(())
}
/// Обработка состояния WaitingForAcks: проверка ACKs и таймаута
async fn handle_waiting_for_acks(
&self,
new_cert_id: i32,
timeout_at: i64,
) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
// Проверить таймаут
if now > timeout_at {
let missing = self.get_missing_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
warn!(
missing_count = missing.len(),
"Rotation ACK timeout reached, proceeding with rotation"
);
// Переход в ReadyToRotate
let new_state = RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id };
*self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
self.log_rotation_event(
new_cert_id,
"timeout",
Some(format!("Missing ACKs from {} clients", missing.len())),
)
.await?;
return Ok(());
}
// Проверить, все ли ACK получены
let missing = self.get_missing_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
if missing.is_empty() {
info!("All clients acknowledged, ready to rotate");
let new_state = RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id };
*self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
self.log_rotation_event(new_cert_id, "acks_complete", None)
.await?;
} else {
let time_remaining = timeout_at - now;
debug!(
missing_count = missing.len(),
time_remaining,
"Waiting for rotation ACKs"
);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Выполнить атомарную ротацию сертификата
async fn execute_rotation(&self, new_cert_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
info!(new_cert_id, "Executing certificate rotation");
// 1. Загрузить новый сертификат из БД
let new_cert = self.load_certificate(new_cert_id).await?;
// 2. Атомарная замена в TlsManager
self.context
.tls
.replace_certificate(new_cert)
.await
.map_err(RotationError::TlsInit)?;
// 3. Обновить БД: старый is_active=false, новый is_active=true
self.activate_certificate(new_cert_id).await?;
// 4. TODO: Отключить всех клиентов
// self.disconnect_all_clients().await?;
// 5. Очистить rotation_state
let new_state = RotationState::Normal;
*self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
// 6. Очистить ACKs
self.context.rotation_acks.write().await.clear();
self.clear_rotation_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
// 7. Логирование
self.log_rotation_event(new_cert_id, "activated", None)
.await?;
info!(new_cert_id, "Certificate rotation completed successfully");
Ok(())
}
/// Сохранить новый сертификат в БД
async fn save_new_certificate(
&self,
cert_der: &[u8],
keypair: &KeyPair,
cert_not_before: i64,
cert_not_after: i64,
) -> Result<i32, RotationError> {
use crate::db::schema::tls_certificates::dsl::*;
let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
})?;
let new_cert = NewTlsCertificate {
cert: cert_der.to_vec(),
cert_key: keypair.serialize_pem().as_bytes().to_vec(),
not_before: cert_not_before as i32,
not_after: cert_not_after as i32,
is_active: false,
};
diesel::insert_into(tls_certificates)
.values(&new_cert)
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
// Получить ID последней вставленной записи
let cert_id: i32 = diesel::select(diesel::dsl::sql::<diesel::sql_types::Integer>(
"last_insert_rowid()",
))
.first(&mut conn)
.await?;
self.log_rotation_event(cert_id, "created", None).await?;
Ok(cert_id)
}
/// Загрузить сертификат из БД
async fn load_certificate(&self, cert_id: i32) -> Result<CertificateMetadata, RotationError> {
use crate::db::schema::tls_certificates::dsl::*;
let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
})?;
let cert_record: (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, i32, i32, i32) = tls_certificates
.select((cert, cert_key, not_before, not_after, created_at))
.filter(id.eq(cert_id))
.first(&mut conn)
.await?;
let cert_der = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(cert_record.0);
let key_pem = String::from_utf8(cert_record.1)
.map_err(|e| RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Invalid key encoding: {}", e)))?;
let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&key_pem)?;
Ok(CertificateMetadata {
cert_id,
cert: cert_der,
keypair: Arc::new(keypair),
not_before: cert_record.2 as i64,
not_after: cert_record.3 as i64,
created_at: cert_record.4 as i64,
})
}
/// Активировать сертификат (установить is_active=true)
async fn activate_certificate(&self, cert_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
use crate::db::schema::tls_certificates::dsl::*;
let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
})?;
// Деактивировать все сертификаты
diesel::update(tls_certificates)
.set(is_active.eq(false))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
// Активировать новый
diesel::update(tls_certificates.filter(id.eq(cert_id)))
.set(is_active.eq(true))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Получить список клиентов, которые ещё не отправили ACK
async fn get_missing_acks(&self, rotation_id: i32) -> Result<Vec<VerifyingKey>, RotationError> {
// TODO: Реализовать получение списка всех активных клиентов
// и вычитание тех, кто уже отправил ACK
// Пока возвращаем пустой список
Ok(Vec::new())
}
/// Очистить ACKs для данной ротации из БД
async fn clear_rotation_acks(&self, rotation_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
use crate::db::schema::rotation_client_acks::dsl::*;
let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
})?;
diesel::delete(rotation_client_acks.filter(rotation_id.eq(rotation_id)))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Записать событие в audit trail
async fn log_rotation_event(
&self,
history_cert_id: i32,
history_event_type: &str,
history_details: Option<String>,
) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
use crate::db::schema::tls_rotation_history::dsl::*;
let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
})?;
let new_history = NewTlsRotationHistory {
cert_id: history_cert_id,
event_type: history_event_type.to_string(),
details: history_details,
};
diesel::insert_into(tls_rotation_history)
.values(&new_history)
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
}

View File

@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use miette::Diagnostic;
use secrecy::{ExposeSecret, SecretBox};
use thiserror::Error;
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
const EPHEMERAL_KEY_LIFETIME_SECS: u64 = 60;
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum UnsealError {
#[error("Invalid public key")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::invalid_pubkey))]
InvalidPublicKey,
}
/// Ephemeral X25519 keypair for secure password transmission
///
/// Generated on-demand when client requests unseal. Expires after 60 seconds.
/// Uses StaticSecret stored in SecretBox for automatic zeroization on drop.
pub struct EphemeralKeyPair {
/// Secret key stored securely
secret: SecretBox<StaticSecret>,
public: PublicKey,
expires_at: u64,
}
impl EphemeralKeyPair {
/// Generate new ephemeral X25519 keypair
pub fn generate() -> Self {
// Generate random 32 bytes
let secret_bytes = rand::random::<[u8; 32]>();
let secret = StaticSecret::from(secret_bytes);
let public = PublicKey::from(&secret);
let now = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("System time before UNIX epoch")
.as_secs();
Self {
secret: SecretBox::new(Box::new(secret)),
public,
expires_at: now + EPHEMERAL_KEY_LIFETIME_SECS,
}
}
/// Check if this ephemeral key has expired
pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
let now = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("System time before UNIX epoch")
.as_secs();
now > self.expires_at
}
/// Get expiration timestamp (Unix epoch seconds)
pub fn expires_at(&self) -> u64 {
self.expires_at
}
/// Get public key as bytes for transmission to client
pub fn public_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.public.as_bytes().to_vec()
}
/// Perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange with client's public key
///
/// Returns 32-byte shared secret for ChaCha20Poly1305 encryption
pub fn perform_dh(&self, client_pubkey: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 32], UnsealError> {
// Parse client public key
let client_public = PublicKey::from(
<[u8; 32]>::try_from(client_pubkey).map_err(|_| UnsealError::InvalidPublicKey)?,
);
// Perform ECDH
let shared_secret = self.secret.expose_secret().diffie_hellman(&client_public);
Ok(shared_secret.to_bytes())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_ephemeral_keypair_generation() {
let keypair = EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
// Public key should be 32 bytes
assert_eq!(keypair.public_bytes().len(), 32);
// Should not be expired immediately
assert!(!keypair.is_expired());
// Expiration should be ~60 seconds in future
let now = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap()
.as_secs();
let time_until_expiry = keypair.expires_at() - now;
assert!((59..=61).contains(&time_until_expiry));
}
#[test]
fn test_perform_dh_with_valid_key() {
let server_keypair = EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
let client_secret_bytes = rand::random::<[u8; 32]>();
let client_secret = StaticSecret::from(client_secret_bytes);
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
// Server performs DH
let server_shared_secret = server_keypair
.perform_dh(client_public.as_bytes())
.expect("DH should succeed");
// Client performs DH
let client_shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&server_keypair.public);
// Shared secrets should match
assert_eq!(server_shared_secret, client_shared_secret.to_bytes());
assert_eq!(server_shared_secret.len(), 32);
}
#[test]
fn test_perform_dh_with_invalid_key() {
let keypair = EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
// Try with invalid length
let invalid_key = vec![1, 2, 3];
let result = keypair.perform_dh(&invalid_key);
assert!(result.is_err());
// Try with wrong length (not 32 bytes)
let invalid_key = vec![0u8; 16];
let result = keypair.perform_dh(&invalid_key);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_different_keypairs_produce_different_shared_secrets() {
let server_keypair1 = EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
let server_keypair2 = EphemeralKeyPair::generate();
let client_secret_bytes = rand::random::<[u8; 32]>();
let client_secret = StaticSecret::from(client_secret_bytes);
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
let shared1 = server_keypair1
.perform_dh(client_public.as_bytes())
.unwrap();
let shared2 = server_keypair2
.perform_dh(client_public.as_bytes())
.unwrap();
// Different server keys should produce different shared secrets
assert_ne!(shared1, shared2);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
use chacha20poly1305::{
aead::{Aead, KeyInit},
ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce,
};
use super::CryptoError;
/// Encrypt plaintext with AEAD (ChaCha20Poly1305)
///
/// Returns (ciphertext, tag) on success
pub fn encrypt(
plaintext: &[u8],
key: &[u8; 32],
nonce: &[u8; 12],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
let cipher_key = Key::from_slice(key);
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(cipher_key);
let nonce_array = Nonce::from_slice(nonce);
cipher
.encrypt(nonce_array, plaintext)
.map_err(|e| CryptoError::AeadEncryption(e.to_string()))
}
/// Decrypt ciphertext with AEAD (ChaCha20Poly1305)
///
/// The ciphertext должен содержать tag (последние 16 bytes)
pub fn decrypt(
ciphertext_with_tag: &[u8],
key: &[u8; 32],
nonce: &[u8; 12],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
let cipher_key = Key::from_slice(key);
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(cipher_key);
let nonce_array = Nonce::from_slice(nonce);
cipher
.decrypt(nonce_array, ciphertext_with_tag)
.map_err(|e| CryptoError::AeadDecryption(e.to_string()))
}
/// Generate nonce from counter
///
/// Converts i32 counter to 12-byte nonce (big-endian encoding)
pub fn nonce_from_counter(counter: i32) -> [u8; 12] {
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
nonce[8..12].copy_from_slice(&counter.to_be_bytes());
nonce
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_aead_encrypt_decrypt_round_trip() {
let plaintext = b"Hello, World! This is a secret message.";
let key = [42u8; 32];
let nonce = nonce_from_counter(1);
// Encrypt
let ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
// Verify ciphertext is different from plaintext
assert_ne!(ciphertext.as_slice(), plaintext);
// Decrypt
let decrypted = decrypt(&ciphertext, &key, &nonce).expect("Decryption failed");
// Verify round-trip
assert_eq!(decrypted.as_slice(), plaintext);
}
#[test]
fn test_aead_decrypt_with_wrong_key() {
let plaintext = b"Secret data";
let key = [1u8; 32];
let wrong_key = [2u8; 32];
let nonce = nonce_from_counter(1);
let ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
// Attempt decrypt with wrong key
let result = decrypt(&ciphertext, &wrong_key, &nonce);
// Should fail
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_aead_decrypt_with_wrong_nonce() {
let plaintext = b"Secret data";
let key = [1u8; 32];
let nonce = nonce_from_counter(1);
let wrong_nonce = nonce_from_counter(2);
let ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
// Attempt decrypt with wrong nonce
let result = decrypt(&ciphertext, &key, &wrong_nonce);
// Should fail
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_nonce_generation_from_counter() {
let nonce1 = nonce_from_counter(1);
let nonce2 = nonce_from_counter(2);
let nonce_max = nonce_from_counter(i32::MAX);
// Verify nonces are different
assert_ne!(nonce1, nonce2);
// Verify nonce format (first 8 bytes should be zero, last 4 contain counter)
assert_eq!(&nonce1[0..8], &[0u8; 8]);
assert_eq!(&nonce1[8..12], &1i32.to_be_bytes());
assert_eq!(&nonce_max[8..12], &i32::MAX.to_be_bytes());
}
#[test]
fn test_aead_tampered_ciphertext() {
let plaintext = b"Important message";
let key = [7u8; 32];
let nonce = nonce_from_counter(5);
let mut ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
// Tamper with ciphertext (flip a bit)
if let Some(byte) = ciphertext.get_mut(5) {
*byte ^= 0x01;
}
// Attempt decrypt - should fail due to authentication tag mismatch
let result = decrypt(&ciphertext, &key, &nonce);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
}

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
pub mod aead;
pub mod root_key;
use miette::Diagnostic;
use thiserror::Error;
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum CryptoError {
#[error("AEAD encryption failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::aead_encryption))]
AeadEncryption(String),
#[error("AEAD decryption failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::aead_decryption))]
AeadDecryption(String),
#[error("Key derivation failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::key_derivation))]
KeyDerivation(String),
#[error("Invalid nonce: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::invalid_nonce))]
InvalidNonce(String),
#[error("Invalid key format: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::invalid_key))]
InvalidKey(String),
}

View File

@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
use argon2::{
password_hash::{rand_core::OsRng, PasswordHasher, SaltString},
Argon2, PasswordHash, PasswordVerifier,
};
use crate::db::models::AeadEncrypted;
use super::{aead, CryptoError};
/// Encrypt root key with user password
///
/// Uses Argon2id for password derivation and ChaCha20Poly1305 for encryption
pub fn encrypt_root_key(
root_key: &[u8; 32],
password: &str,
nonce_counter: i32,
) -> Result<(AeadEncrypted, String), CryptoError> {
// Derive key from password using Argon2
let (derived_key, salt) = derive_key_from_password(password)?;
// Generate nonce from counter
let nonce = aead::nonce_from_counter(nonce_counter);
// Encrypt root key
let ciphertext_with_tag = aead::encrypt(root_key, &derived_key, &nonce)?;
// Extract tag (last 16 bytes)
let tag_start = ciphertext_with_tag
.len()
.checked_sub(16)
.ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::AeadEncryption("Ciphertext too short".into()))?;
let ciphertext = ciphertext_with_tag[..tag_start].to_vec();
let tag = ciphertext_with_tag[tag_start..].to_vec();
let aead_encrypted = AeadEncrypted {
id: 1, // Will be set by database
current_nonce: nonce_counter,
ciphertext,
tag,
schema_version: 1, // Current version
argon2_salt: Some(salt.clone()),
};
Ok((aead_encrypted, salt))
}
/// Decrypt root key with user password
///
/// Verifies password hash and decrypts using ChaCha20Poly1305
pub fn decrypt_root_key(
encrypted: &AeadEncrypted,
password: &str,
salt: &str,
) -> Result<[u8; 32], CryptoError> {
// Derive key from password using stored salt
let derived_key = derive_key_with_salt(password, salt)?;
// Generate nonce from counter
let nonce = aead::nonce_from_counter(encrypted.current_nonce);
// Reconstruct ciphertext with tag
let mut ciphertext_with_tag = encrypted.ciphertext.clone();
ciphertext_with_tag.extend_from_slice(&encrypted.tag);
// Decrypt
let plaintext = aead::decrypt(&ciphertext_with_tag, &derived_key, &nonce)?;
// Verify length
if plaintext.len() != 32 {
return Err(CryptoError::InvalidKey(format!(
"Expected 32 bytes, got {}",
plaintext.len()
)));
}
// Convert to fixed-size array
let mut root_key = [0u8; 32];
root_key.copy_from_slice(&plaintext);
Ok(root_key)
}
/// Derive 32-byte key from password using Argon2id
///
/// Generates new random salt and returns (derived_key, salt_string)
fn derive_key_from_password(password: &str) -> Result<([u8; 32], String), CryptoError> {
let salt = SaltString::generate(&mut OsRng);
let argon2 = Argon2::default();
let password_hash = argon2
.hash_password(password.as_bytes(), &salt)
.map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyDerivation(e.to_string()))?;
// Extract hash output (32 bytes)
let hash_output = password_hash
.hash
.ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::KeyDerivation("No hash output".into()))?;
let hash_bytes = hash_output.as_bytes();
if hash_bytes.len() != 32 {
return Err(CryptoError::KeyDerivation(format!(
"Expected 32 bytes, got {}",
hash_bytes.len()
)));
}
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
key.copy_from_slice(hash_bytes);
Ok((key, salt.to_string()))
}
/// Derive 32-byte key from password using existing salt
fn derive_key_with_salt(password: &str, salt_str: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], CryptoError> {
let argon2 = Argon2::default();
// Parse salt
let salt =
SaltString::from_b64(salt_str).map_err(|e| CryptoError::InvalidKey(e.to_string()))?;
let password_hash = argon2
.hash_password(password.as_bytes(), &salt)
.map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyDerivation(e.to_string()))?;
// Extract hash output
let hash_output = password_hash
.hash
.ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::KeyDerivation("No hash output".into()))?;
let hash_bytes = hash_output.as_bytes();
if hash_bytes.len() != 32 {
return Err(CryptoError::KeyDerivation(format!(
"Expected 32 bytes, got {}",
hash_bytes.len()
)));
}
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
key.copy_from_slice(hash_bytes);
Ok(key)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_root_key_encrypt_decrypt_round_trip() {
let root_key = [42u8; 32];
let password = "super_secret_password_123";
let nonce_counter = 1;
// Encrypt
let (encrypted, salt) =
encrypt_root_key(&root_key, password, nonce_counter).expect("Encryption failed");
// Verify structure
assert_eq!(encrypted.current_nonce, nonce_counter);
assert_eq!(encrypted.schema_version, 1);
assert_eq!(encrypted.tag.len(), 16); // AEAD tag size
// Decrypt
let decrypted =
decrypt_root_key(&encrypted, password, &salt).expect("Decryption failed");
// Verify round-trip
assert_eq!(decrypted, root_key);
}
#[test]
fn test_decrypt_with_wrong_password() {
let root_key = [99u8; 32];
let correct_password = "correct_password";
let wrong_password = "wrong_password";
let nonce_counter = 1;
// Encrypt with correct password
let (encrypted, salt) =
encrypt_root_key(&root_key, correct_password, nonce_counter).expect("Encryption failed");
// Attempt decrypt with wrong password
let result = decrypt_root_key(&encrypted, wrong_password, &salt);
// Should fail due to authentication tag mismatch
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_password_derivation_different_salts() {
let password = "same_password";
// Derive key twice - should produce different salts
let (key1, salt1) = derive_key_from_password(password).expect("Derivation 1 failed");
let (key2, salt2) = derive_key_from_password(password).expect("Derivation 2 failed");
// Salts should be different (randomly generated)
assert_ne!(salt1, salt2);
// Keys should be different (due to different salts)
assert_ne!(key1, key2);
}
#[test]
fn test_password_derivation_with_same_salt() {
let password = "test_password";
// Generate key and salt
let (key1, salt) = derive_key_from_password(password).expect("Derivation failed");
// Derive key again with same salt
let key2 = derive_key_with_salt(password, &salt).expect("Re-derivation failed");
// Keys should be identical
assert_eq!(key1, key2);
}
#[test]
fn test_different_nonce_produces_different_ciphertext() {
let root_key = [77u8; 32];
let password = "password123";
let (encrypted1, salt1) = encrypt_root_key(&root_key, password, 1).expect("Encryption 1 failed");
let (encrypted2, salt2) = encrypt_root_key(&root_key, password, 2).expect("Encryption 2 failed");
// Different nonces should produce different ciphertexts
assert_ne!(encrypted1.ciphertext, encrypted2.ciphertext);
// But both should decrypt correctly
let decrypted1 = decrypt_root_key(&encrypted1, password, &salt1).expect("Decryption 1 failed");
let decrypted2 = decrypt_root_key(&encrypted2, password, &salt2).expect("Decryption 2 failed");
assert_eq!(decrypted1, root_key);
assert_eq!(decrypted2, root_key);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use diesel::{
Connection as _, SqliteConnection,
connection::{SimpleConnection as _, TransactionManager},
connection::SimpleConnection as _,
};
use diesel_async::{
AsyncConnection, SimpleAsyncConnection,
pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig, RecyclingMethod},
pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig},
sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
};
use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
@@ -22,7 +21,7 @@ pub type DatabasePool = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::Pool<DatabaseConne
pub type PoolInitError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::PoolError;
pub type PoolError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::RunError;
static DB_FILE: &str = "arbiter.sqlite";
static DB_FILE: &'static str = "arbiter.sqlite";
const MIGRATIONS: EmbeddedMigrations = embed_migrations!("migrations");

View File

@@ -1,33 +1,57 @@
#![allow(unused)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
use crate::db::schema::{self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings};
use crate::db::schema::{self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, root_key_history};
use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
use restructed::Models;
pub mod types {
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
pub struct SqliteTimestamp(DateTime<Utc>);
}
#[derive(Queryable, Selectable, Debug, Insertable)]
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[view(
NewAeadEncrypted,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
#[diesel(table_name = aead_encrypted, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct AeadEncrypted {
pub id: i32,
pub current_nonce: i32,
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
pub tag: Vec<u8>,
pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub schema_version: i32,
pub argon2_salt: Option<String>,
pub created_at: i32,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = root_key_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewRootKeyHistory,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct RootKeyHistory {
pub id: i32,
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
pub tag: Vec<u8>,
pub root_key_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub data_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub schema_version: i32,
pub salt: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = arbiter_settings, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ArbiterSetting {
pub id: i32,
pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references aead_encrypted.id
pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references root_key_history.id
pub cert_key: Vec<u8>,
pub cert: Vec<u8>,
pub current_cert_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_certificates.id
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
@@ -49,70 +73,3 @@ pub struct UseragentClient {
pub created_at: i32,
pub updated_at: i32,
}
// TLS Certificate Rotation Models
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_certificates, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct TlsCertificate {
pub id: i32,
pub cert: Vec<u8>,
pub cert_key: Vec<u8>,
pub not_before: i32,
pub not_after: i32,
pub created_at: i32,
pub is_active: bool,
}
#[derive(Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_certificates)]
pub struct NewTlsCertificate {
pub cert: Vec<u8>,
pub cert_key: Vec<u8>,
pub not_before: i32,
pub not_after: i32,
pub is_active: bool,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_rotation_state, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct TlsRotationState {
pub id: i32,
pub state: String,
pub new_cert_id: Option<i32>,
pub initiated_at: Option<i32>,
pub timeout_at: Option<i32>,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::rotation_client_acks, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct RotationClientAck {
pub rotation_id: i32,
pub client_key: String,
pub ack_received_at: i32,
}
#[derive(Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::rotation_client_acks)]
pub struct NewRotationClientAck {
pub rotation_id: i32,
pub client_key: String,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_rotation_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct TlsRotationHistory {
pub id: i32,
pub cert_id: i32,
pub event_type: String,
pub timestamp: i32,
pub details: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_rotation_history)]
pub struct NewTlsRotationHistory {
pub cert_id: i32,
pub event_type: String,
pub details: Option<String>,
}

View File

@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@
diesel::table! {
aead_encrypted (id) {
id -> Integer,
current_nonce -> Integer,
current_nonce -> Binary,
ciphertext -> Binary,
tag -> Binary,
schema_version -> Integer,
argon2_salt -> Nullable<Text>,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ diesel::table! {
root_key_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
cert_key -> Binary,
cert -> Binary,
current_cert_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
}
}
@@ -31,6 +30,18 @@ diesel::table! {
}
}
diesel::table! {
root_key_history (id) {
id -> Integer,
root_key_encryption_nonce -> Binary,
data_encryption_nonce -> Binary,
ciphertext -> Binary,
tag -> Binary,
schema_version -> Integer,
salt -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
useragent_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
@@ -41,59 +52,12 @@ diesel::table! {
}
}
diesel::table! {
tls_certificates (id) {
id -> Integer,
cert -> Binary,
cert_key -> Binary,
not_before -> Integer,
not_after -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
is_active -> Bool,
}
}
diesel::table! {
tls_rotation_state (id) {
id -> Integer,
state -> Text,
new_cert_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
initiated_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
timeout_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
}
}
diesel::table! {
rotation_client_acks (rotation_id, client_key) {
rotation_id -> Integer,
client_key -> Text,
ack_received_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
tls_rotation_history (id) {
id -> Integer,
cert_id -> Integer,
event_type -> Text,
timestamp -> Integer,
details -> Nullable<Text>,
}
}
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> aead_encrypted (root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_certificates (current_cert_id));
diesel::joinable!(tls_rotation_state -> tls_certificates (new_cert_id));
diesel::joinable!(rotation_client_acks -> tls_certificates (rotation_id));
diesel::joinable!(tls_rotation_history -> tls_certificates (cert_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> root_key_history (root_key_id));
diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
aead_encrypted,
arbiter_settings,
program_client,
root_key_history,
useragent_client,
tls_certificates,
tls_rotation_state,
rotation_client_acks,
tls_rotation_history,
);

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
#![allow(unused)]
use std::sync::Arc;
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse, UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
transport::BiStream,
@@ -18,9 +15,8 @@ use crate::{
};
pub mod actors;
mod context;
mod crypto;
mod db;
pub mod context;
pub mod db;
mod errors;
const DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE: usize = 1000;
@@ -29,6 +25,12 @@ pub struct Server {
context: ServerContext,
}
impl Server {
pub fn new(context: ServerContext) -> Self {
Self { context }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for Server {
type UserAgentStream = ReceiverStream<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterServiceServer;
use arbiter_server::{Server, context::ServerContext, db};
use tracing::info;
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> miette::Result<()> {
tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(
tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
.unwrap_or_else(|_| tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("info")),
)
.init();
info!("Starting arbiter server");
info!("Initializing database");
let db = db::create_pool(None).await?;
info!("Database ready");
info!("Initializing server context");
let context = ServerContext::new(db).await?;
info!("Server context ready");
let addr = "[::1]:50051".parse().expect("valid address");
info!(%addr, "Starting gRPC server");
tonic::transport::Server::builder()
.add_service(ArbiterServiceServer::new(Server::new(context)))
.serve(addr)
.await
.map_err(|e| miette::miette!("gRPC server error: {e}"))?;
unreachable!("gRPC server should run indefinitely");
}

View File

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
Extension Discovery Cache
=========================
This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
packages that contains extensions for other packages.
DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
----------------------
* Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
* Do write to this folder.
If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
Use package `extension_discovery`
---------------------------------
If you want to access information from this folder.
Feel free to delete this folder
-------------------------------
Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
need to do please file a bug.

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{"version":2,"entries":[{"package":"arbiter","rootUri":"../","packageUri":"lib/"}]}

View File

@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
{
"configVersion": 2,
"packages": [
{
"name": "async",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/async-2.13.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "boolean_selector",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/boolean_selector-2.1.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "characters",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/characters-1.4.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "clock",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/clock-1.1.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "collection",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/collection-1.19.1",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "fake_async",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/fake_async-1.3.3",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.3"
},
{
"name": "flutter",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8"
},
{
"name": "flutter_lints",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/flutter_lints-6.0.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8"
},
{
"name": "flutter_test",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter_test",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8"
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker-11.0.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.2"
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker_flutter_testing-3.0.10",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.2"
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker_testing",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker_testing-3.0.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.2"
},
{
"name": "lints",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/lints-6.1.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8"
},
{
"name": "matcher",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/matcher-0.12.17",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "material_color_utilities",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/material_color_utilities-0.11.1",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "2.17"
},
{
"name": "meta",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/meta-1.17.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.5"
},
{
"name": "path",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/path-1.9.1",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "sky_engine",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/bin/cache/pkg/sky_engine",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8"
},
{
"name": "source_span",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/source_span-1.10.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "stack_trace",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stack_trace-1.12.1",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "stream_channel",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stream_channel-2.1.4",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.3"
},
{
"name": "string_scanner",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/string_scanner-1.4.1",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "term_glyph",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/term_glyph-1.2.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "test_api",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/test_api-0.7.7",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.5"
},
{
"name": "vector_math",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vector_math-2.2.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "vm_service",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vm_service-15.0.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.5"
},
{
"name": "arbiter",
"rootUri": "../",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.10"
}
],
"generator": "pub",
"generatorVersion": "3.10.8",
"flutterRoot": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable",
"flutterVersion": "3.38.9",
"pubCache": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache"
}

View File

@@ -1,224 +0,0 @@
{
"roots": [
"arbiter"
],
"packages": [
{
"name": "arbiter",
"version": "0.1.0",
"dependencies": [
"flutter"
],
"devDependencies": [
"flutter_lints",
"flutter_test"
]
},
{
"name": "flutter_lints",
"version": "6.0.0",
"dependencies": [
"lints"
]
},
{
"name": "flutter_test",
"version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": [
"clock",
"collection",
"fake_async",
"flutter",
"leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
"matcher",
"meta",
"path",
"stack_trace",
"stream_channel",
"test_api",
"vector_math"
]
},
{
"name": "flutter",
"version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": [
"characters",
"collection",
"material_color_utilities",
"meta",
"sky_engine",
"vector_math"
]
},
{
"name": "lints",
"version": "6.1.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "stream_channel",
"version": "2.1.4",
"dependencies": [
"async"
]
},
{
"name": "meta",
"version": "1.17.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "collection",
"version": "1.19.1",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
"version": "3.0.10",
"dependencies": [
"flutter",
"leak_tracker",
"leak_tracker_testing",
"matcher",
"meta"
]
},
{
"name": "vector_math",
"version": "2.2.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "stack_trace",
"version": "1.12.1",
"dependencies": [
"path"
]
},
{
"name": "clock",
"version": "1.1.2",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "fake_async",
"version": "1.3.3",
"dependencies": [
"clock",
"collection"
]
},
{
"name": "path",
"version": "1.9.1",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "matcher",
"version": "0.12.17",
"dependencies": [
"async",
"meta",
"stack_trace",
"term_glyph",
"test_api"
]
},
{
"name": "test_api",
"version": "0.7.7",
"dependencies": [
"async",
"boolean_selector",
"collection",
"meta",
"source_span",
"stack_trace",
"stream_channel",
"string_scanner",
"term_glyph"
]
},
{
"name": "sky_engine",
"version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "material_color_utilities",
"version": "0.11.1",
"dependencies": [
"collection"
]
},
{
"name": "characters",
"version": "1.4.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "async",
"version": "2.13.0",
"dependencies": [
"collection",
"meta"
]
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker_testing",
"version": "3.0.2",
"dependencies": [
"leak_tracker",
"matcher",
"meta"
]
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker",
"version": "11.0.2",
"dependencies": [
"clock",
"collection",
"meta",
"path",
"vm_service"
]
},
{
"name": "term_glyph",
"version": "1.2.2",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "string_scanner",
"version": "1.4.1",
"dependencies": [
"source_span"
]
},
{
"name": "source_span",
"version": "1.10.2",
"dependencies": [
"collection",
"path",
"term_glyph"
]
},
{
"name": "boolean_selector",
"version": "2.1.2",
"dependencies": [
"source_span",
"string_scanner"
]
},
{
"name": "vm_service",
"version": "15.0.2",
"dependencies": []
}
],
"configVersion": 1
}

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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
3.38.9

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
// This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable
FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/useragent
COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true
FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build
FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=0.1.0
FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=0.1.0
DART_OBFUSCATION=false
TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true
TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false
PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
export "FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable"
export "FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/useragent"
export "COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true"
export "FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build"
export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=0.1.0"
export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=0.1.0"
export "DART_OBFUSCATION=false"
export "TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true"
export "TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false"
export "PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json"