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Author SHA1 Message Date
CleverWild
a30bef11da fix: terminate VaultGate connection after vault lockout
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2026-06-30 20:07:01 +02:00
357726bc5d Merge pull request 'security: batch of fixes' (#95) from zeroized-bootstrap-token into main
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Reviewed-on: #95
2026-06-29 18:00:14 +00:00
Clippy Bot
23827c613e test(client-auth): update metadata test to reflect frozen-metadata behavior
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2026-06-28 12:06:06 +02:00
Clippy Bot
8381b68a52 Merge branch 'main' into zeroized-bootstrap-token
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2026-06-27 13:25:27 +02:00
Clippy Bot
022003ac5e fix: lints
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2026-06-25 20:09:18 +02:00
CleverWild
00ddf99d77 fix!: protect evm_wallet integrity and bind key ciphertext to wallet address
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Three independent failures allowed an offline attacker with DB write access
to sign transactions using a different wallet's private key:
1. evm_wallet had no HMAC envelope — aead_encrypted_id could be swapped silently.
2. AEAD used a static tag as AAD — any valid ciphertext decrypted as any wallet key.
3. No post-decryption check that the derived address matched the requested wallet.

Fix: sign_entity covers (address, aead_encrypted_id) in a single transaction;
CreateNew/Decrypt take caller-provided AAD (wallet address bytes); after decryption
signer.address() is verified against the requested wallet address.
2026-06-22 17:53:34 +02:00
CleverWild
b7ab5c79b7 fix(client-auth): freeze client metadata after initial operator approval
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2026-06-22 16:07:58 +02:00
CleverWild
b8e092b9d7 fix(operator): bind sign-transaction to operator-approved client set
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2026-06-22 15:58:40 +02:00
CleverWild
9c9dc1fbb5 fix(integrity): return AttestationStatus::Unavailable for key version mismatch
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2026-06-22 15:50:43 +02:00
CleverWild
77bf19f99e fix(wallet): delete access entries by entry ID instead of wallet ID
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2026-06-22 14:55:32 +02:00
CleverWild
f0456157d5 security(bootstrap): use SafeCell for token storage instead of zeroize
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2026-06-19 22:53:28 +02:00
CleverWild
c12c12d73e fix(UA): signing endpoint accepts arbitrary client_id
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2026-06-19 22:21:48 +02:00
CleverWild
670448292a security: feat unseal and bootstrap handshake brute-force protection
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2026-06-18 21:16:38 +02:00
CleverWild
85f27d8f09 fix(bootstrap): token persists on disk with weak file permissions #59
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2026-06-18 20:59:24 +02:00
CleverWild
32ceb27d77 security(server): use SysRng directly for bootstrap token generation
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Replace make_rng()/StdRng with UnwrapErr(SysRng) to eliminate the PRNG
intermediate layer and make OS entropy derivation explicit and unambiguous.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 19:30:31 +02:00
CleverWild
dc03923c24 security(memory): zeroization of bootstrap token
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2026-06-18 17:16:06 +02:00
48 changed files with 688 additions and 587 deletions

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
UNSEAL_RESULT_LOCKED_OUT = 4;
}
message Request {

70
server/Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -719,7 +719,6 @@ dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.117",
"trybuild",
]
[[package]]
@@ -772,6 +771,7 @@ dependencies = [
"proptest",
"prost-types",
"rand 0.10.1",
"rand_core 0.10.1",
"rcgen",
"restructed",
"rstest",
@@ -1966,12 +1966,6 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "dissimilar"
version = "1.0.11"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "aeda16ab4059c5fd2a83f2b9c9e9c981327b18aa8e3b313f7e6563799d4f093e"
[[package]]
name = "downcast-rs"
version = "2.0.2"
@@ -3207,7 +3201,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "36c791ecdf977c99f45f23280405d7723727470f6689a5e6dbf513ac547ae10d"
dependencies = [
"serde",
"toml 0.9.12+spec-1.1.0",
"toml",
]
[[package]]
@@ -4979,12 +4973,6 @@ version = "1.0.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "55937e1799185b12863d447f42597ed69d9928686b8d88a1df17376a097d8369"
[[package]]
name = "target-triple"
version = "1.0.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "591ef38edfb78ca4771ee32cf494cb8771944bee237a9b91fc9c1424ac4b777b"
[[package]]
name = "tempfile"
version = "3.27.0"
@@ -4998,15 +4986,6 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "termcolor"
version = "1.4.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "06794f8f6c5c898b3275aebefa6b8a1cb24cd2c6c79397ab15774837a0bc5755"
dependencies = [
"winapi-util",
]
[[package]]
name = "terminal_size"
version = "0.4.4"
@@ -5229,21 +5208,6 @@ dependencies = [
"winnow 0.7.15",
]
[[package]]
name = "toml"
version = "1.1.2+spec-1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "81f3d15e84cbcd896376e6730314d59fb5a87f31e4b038454184435cd57defee"
dependencies = [
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"serde_core",
"serde_spanned",
"toml_datetime 1.1.1+spec-1.1.0",
"toml_parser",
"toml_writer",
"winnow 1.0.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "toml_datetime"
version = "0.7.5+spec-1.1.0"
@@ -5283,12 +5247,6 @@ dependencies = [
"winnow 1.0.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "toml_writer"
version = "1.1.1+spec-1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "756daf9b1013ebe47a8776667b466417e2d4c5679d441c26230efd9ef78692db"
[[package]]
name = "tonic"
version = "0.14.5"
@@ -5476,22 +5434,6 @@ version = "0.2.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e421abadd41a4225275504ea4d6566923418b7f05506fbc9c0fe86ba7396114b"
[[package]]
name = "trybuild"
version = "1.0.117"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0710d4dfbeae4f9c390baa784c49858a7468fa433f3fe5d0ec5ebef651cf59f9"
dependencies = [
"dissimilar",
"glob",
"serde",
"serde_derive",
"serde_json",
"target-triple",
"termcolor",
"toml 1.1.2+spec-1.1.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "typenum"
version = "1.20.0"
@@ -6320,18 +6262,18 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "zeroize"
version = "1.8.2"
version = "1.9.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b97154e67e32c85465826e8bcc1c59429aaaf107c1e4a9e53c8d8ccd5eff88d0"
checksum = "e13c156562582aa81c60cb29407084cdb54c4164760106ab78e6c5b0858cf64e"
dependencies = [
"zeroize_derive",
]
[[package]]
name = "zeroize_derive"
version = "1.4.3"
version = "1.5.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "85a5b4158499876c763cb03bc4e49185d3cccbabb15b33c627f7884f43db852e"
checksum = "3c50655cbb0fe3fc43170059e702f1ce5e19b84cec58dc87b037a09935c2f328"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ mutants = "0.0.4"
prost = "0.14.3"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
rand = "0.10.1"
rand_core = "0.10.1"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs", "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false }
rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls = { version = "0.23.40", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
@@ -129,6 +130,7 @@ rc_buffer = "warn"
rc_mutex = "warn"
redundant_test_prefix = "warn"
redundant_type_annotations = "warn"
ref_patterns = "warn"
renamed_function_params = "warn"
rest_pat_in_fully_bound_structs = "warn"
return_and_then = "warn"

View File

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
use crate::hashing::Hashable;
/// Marks a struct as a participant in the database integrity system.
///
/// Implementors are protected by an HMAC-SHA256 MAC stored in the
/// `integrity_envelope` table. The MAC is computed over:
///
/// ```text
/// HMAC-SHA256(key, len(KIND) || KIND || len(entity_id) || entity_id || VERSION || SHA256(Hashable))
/// ```
///
/// Both `KIND` and `VERSION` act as domain separators — they prevent a valid
/// MAC for one entity type or schema version from being accepted for another.
///
/// # Deriving
///
/// Use `#[derive(Integrable)]` with the `#[integrable(kind = "...")]` attribute.
/// `VERSION` is computed automatically as an FNV-1a hash of the struct's field
/// names and types, so it changes whenever the schema changes without any manual
/// bookkeeping.
///
/// ```rust,ignore
/// #[derive(Hashable, Integrable)]
/// #[integrable(kind = "operator_credentials")]
/// pub struct OperatorCredentials {
/// pub pubkey: PublicKey,
/// }
/// ```
///
/// # Upgrading schema
///
/// When fields are added, removed, or reordered, `VERSION` changes automatically.
/// Existing MAC records in the database will return [`PayloadVersionMismatch`] on
/// verification — this is the signal to re-sign all rows for this `KIND` as part
/// of a migration.
///
/// [`PayloadVersionMismatch`]: crate::integrity::Integrable
pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
/// Stable name of this entity type as stored in `integrity_envelope.entity_kind`.
///
/// Must be a valid schema name: starts with a letter, contains only `[a-zA-Z0-9_]`,
/// and must be globally unique across all `Integrable` types in the system.
const KIND: &'static str;
/// FNV-1a hash of the struct's field names and types at the time the derive
/// macro ran. Changes automatically when the schema changes, invalidating
/// existing MACs and signalling that a migration is required.
const VERSION: i32;
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
#[cfg(feature = "authn")]
pub mod authn;
pub mod hashing;
pub mod integrity;
#[cfg(feature = "safecell")]
pub mod safecell;

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ syn = { version = "2.0", features = ["derive", "fold", "full", "visit-mut"] }
[dev-dependencies]
arbiter-crypto = { path = "../arbiter-crypto" }
trybuild = { version = "1.0", features = ["diff"] }
[lints]
workspace = true

View File

@@ -53,16 +53,32 @@ struct FieldAccess {
fn collect_field_accesses(struct_data: &DataStruct) -> Vec<FieldAccess> {
match &struct_data.fields {
Fields::Named(fields) => crate::utils::sorted_named_fields(fields)
.into_iter()
Fields::Named(fields) => {
// Keep deterministic alphabetical order for named fields.
// Do not remove this sort, because it keeps hash output stable regardless of source order.
let mut named_fields = fields
.named
.iter()
.map(|field| {
let name = field.ident.as_ref().unwrap();
FieldAccess {
let name = field
.ident
.as_ref()
.expect("Fields::Named(fields) must have names")
.clone();
(name.to_string(), name)
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
named_fields.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0));
named_fields
.into_iter()
.map(|(_, name)| FieldAccess {
access: quote! { #name },
span: name.span(),
}
})
.collect(),
.collect()
}
Fields::Unnamed(fields) => fields
.unnamed
.iter()

View File

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
use crate::utils::INTEGRABLE_TRAIT_PATH;
use proc_macro2::TokenStream;
use quote::quote;
use syn::{DeriveInput, LitStr, spanned::Spanned as _};
struct IntegrableAttr {
kind: String,
}
impl IntegrableAttr {
fn from_attrs(
attrs: &[syn::Attribute],
ident_span: proc_macro2::Span,
) -> Result<Self, syn::Error> {
let mut kind: Option<String> = None;
let mut found = false;
for attr in attrs {
if !attr.path().is_ident("integrable") {
continue;
}
if found {
return Err(syn::Error::new(attr.span(), "duplicate #[integrable] attribute"));
}
found = true;
attr.parse_nested_meta(|meta| {
if meta.path.is_ident("kind") {
let lit: LitStr = meta.value()?.parse()?;
let v = lit.value();
if v.is_empty() {
return Err(syn::Error::new(lit.span(), "kind must not be empty"));
}
if !is_valid_kind(&v) {
return Err(syn::Error::new(
lit.span(),
"kind must be a valid schema name: start with a letter, contain only [a-zA-Z0-9_]",
));
}
kind = Some(v);
} else {
return Err(meta.error("unknown key; expected `kind`"));
}
Ok(())
})?;
}
let kind = kind.ok_or_else(|| {
syn::Error::new(ident_span, "#[integrable(kind = \"...\")] is required")
})?;
Ok(Self { kind })
}
}
fn is_valid_kind(s: &str) -> bool {
let mut chars = s.chars();
matches!(chars.next(), Some(c) if c.is_ascii_alphabetic())
&& chars.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_')
}
fn fnv1a(data: &[u8], mut hash: u32) -> u32 {
const FNV_PRIME: u32 = 16_777_619;
for &b in data {
hash ^= u32::from(b);
hash = hash.wrapping_mul(FNV_PRIME);
}
hash
}
// Hashes field names and types using the same alphabetical sort order as Hashable,
// so that source-level field reordering never changes VERSION.
fn compute_version(fields: &syn::Fields) -> i32 {
const FNV_OFFSET: u32 = 2_166_136_261;
let mut hash = FNV_OFFSET;
match fields {
syn::Fields::Named(named) => {
for field in crate::utils::sorted_named_fields(named) {
let name = field.ident.as_ref().unwrap().to_string();
let ty = &field.ty;
hash = fnv1a(name.as_bytes(), hash);
hash = fnv1a(quote!(#ty).to_string().as_bytes(), hash);
}
}
syn::Fields::Unnamed(unnamed) => {
for (i, field) in unnamed.unnamed.iter().enumerate() {
let ty = &field.ty;
hash = fnv1a(i.to_string().as_bytes(), hash);
hash = fnv1a(quote!(#ty).to_string().as_bytes(), hash);
}
}
syn::Fields::Unit => {}
}
// Clear sign bit to guarantee a positive i32; substitute 0 → 1.
let v = (hash >> 1).cast_signed();
if v == 0 { 1 } else { v }
}
pub(crate) fn derive(input: &DeriveInput) -> TokenStream {
let syn::Data::Struct(ref data) = input.data else {
return syn::Error::new(
input.ident.span(),
"#[derive(Integrable)] is only supported on structs",
)
.to_compile_error();
};
let integrable_trait = INTEGRABLE_TRAIT_PATH.to_path();
let hashable_trait = crate::utils::HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH.to_path();
let ident = &input.ident;
let mut generics = input.generics.clone();
for type_param in generics.type_params_mut() {
type_param.bounds.push(syn::parse_quote!(#hashable_trait));
}
let (impl_generics, ty_generics, where_clause) = generics.split_for_impl();
let attr = match IntegrableAttr::from_attrs(&input.attrs, input.ident.span()) {
Ok(a) => a,
Err(e) => return e.to_compile_error(),
};
let kind = attr.kind;
let version = compute_version(&data.fields);
quote! {
#[automatically_derived]
impl #impl_generics #integrable_trait for #ident #ty_generics #where_clause {
const KIND: &'static str = #kind;
const VERSION: i32 = #version;
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
use syn::{DeriveInput, parse_macro_input};
mod hashable;
mod integrable;
mod utils;
#[proc_macro_derive(Hashable)]
@@ -9,9 +8,3 @@ pub fn derive_hashable(input: proc_macro::TokenStream) -> proc_macro::TokenStrea
let input = parse_macro_input!(input as DeriveInput);
hashable::derive(&input).into()
}
#[proc_macro_derive(Integrable, attributes(integrable))]
pub fn derive_integrable(input: proc_macro::TokenStream) -> proc_macro::TokenStream {
let input = parse_macro_input!(input as DeriveInput);
integrable::derive(&input).into()
}

View File

@@ -22,14 +22,3 @@ macro_rules! ensure_path {
ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable as HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH);
ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Digest as HMAC_DIGEST_PATH);
ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::integrity::Integrable as INTEGRABLE_TRAIT_PATH);
/// Returns named struct fields sorted alphabetically by name.
/// Both `Hashable` and `Integrable` derive macros must iterate fields in the
/// same deterministic order so that source-level reordering never changes
/// either the runtime hash or the compile-time VERSION.
pub(crate) fn sorted_named_fields(fields: &syn::FieldsNamed) -> Vec<&syn::Field> {
let mut v: Vec<&syn::Field> = fields.named.iter().collect();
v.sort_by_key(|f| f.ident.as_ref().unwrap().to_string());
v
}

View File

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_crypto::integrity::Integrable;
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "test_entity")]
struct TestEntity {
value: i32,
}
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "other_entity")]
struct OtherEntity {
label: String,
count: u64,
}
#[test]
fn kind_is_set_correctly() {
assert_eq!(<TestEntity as Integrable>::KIND, "test_entity");
assert_eq!(<OtherEntity as Integrable>::KIND, "other_entity");
}
#[test]
fn version_is_positive() {
const {
assert!(<TestEntity as Integrable>::VERSION > 0);
assert!(<OtherEntity as Integrable>::VERSION > 0);
}
}
#[test]
fn different_field_layouts_produce_different_versions() {
assert_ne!(
<TestEntity as Integrable>::VERSION,
<OtherEntity as Integrable>::VERSION,
);
}
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "generic_entity")]
struct GenericEntity<T> {
inner: T,
}
#[test]
fn generic_struct_derives_integrable() {
assert_eq!(
<GenericEntity<TestEntity> as Integrable>::KIND,
"generic_entity"
);
const {
assert!(<GenericEntity<TestEntity> as Integrable>::VERSION > 0);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
#[test]
fn integrable_compile_fail() {
let t = trybuild::TestCases::new();
t.compile_fail("tests/ui/integrable/*.rs");
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "entity_a")]
#[integrable(kind = "entity_b")]
struct DuplicateAttr {
value: i32,
}
fn main() {}

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
error: duplicate #[integrable] attribute
--> tests/ui/integrable/duplicate_attr.rs:3:1
|
3 | #[integrable(kind = "entity_b")]
| ^

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "")]
struct EmptyKind {
value: i32,
}
fn main() {}

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
error: kind must not be empty
--> tests/ui/integrable/empty_kind.rs:2:21
|
2 | #[integrable(kind = "")]
| ^^

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "my_enum")]
enum MyEnum {
A,
B,
}
fn main() {}

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
error: #[derive(Integrable)] is only supported on structs
--> tests/ui/integrable/enum_not_supported.rs:3:6
|
3 | enum MyEnum {
| ^^^^^^

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "bad kind!")]
struct InvalidKind {
value: i32,
}
fn main() {}

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
error: kind must be a valid schema name: start with a letter, contain only [a-zA-Z0-9_]
--> tests/ui/integrable/invalid_kind.rs:2:21
|
2 | #[integrable(kind = "bad kind!")]
| ^^^^^^^^^^^

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
struct MissingAttr {
value: i32,
}
fn main() {}

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
error: #[integrable(kind = "...")] is required
--> tests/ui/integrable/missing_attr.rs:2:8
|
2 | struct MissingAttr {
| ^^^^^^^^^^^

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.2", features = ["sqlite"] }
async-trait.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
rand_core.workspace = true
rcgen.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
kameo.workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,29 +1,48 @@
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, rngs::SysRng};
use rand_core::UnwrapErr;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::warn;
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
async fn write_token_file(path: &Path, content: &str) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
tokio::fs::write(path, content.as_bytes()).await?;
let token = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
String::default(),
|mut accum, char| {
accum += char.to_string().as_str();
accum
},
);
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
tokio::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).await?;
}
tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
Ok(())
}
Ok(token)
async fn generate_token(path: &Path) -> Result<SafeCell<[u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]>, std::io::Error> {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new([0u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]);
{
let mut buf = cell.write();
for (slot, b) in buf
.iter_mut()
.zip(UnwrapErr(SysRng).sample_iter(Alphanumeric))
{
*slot = b;
}
}
let token_str = cell.read_inline(|buf| String::from_utf8_lossy(buf.as_ref()).into_owned());
write_token_file(path, &token_str).await?;
Ok(cell)
}
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
@@ -40,7 +59,8 @@ pub enum Error {
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct Bootstrapper {
token: Option<String>,
token: Option<SafeCell<[u8; TOKEN_LENGTH]>>,
token_path: Option<PathBuf>,
}
impl Bootstrapper {
@@ -54,34 +74,37 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
.await?
};
let token = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?;
Some(token)
let (token, token_path) = if row_count == 0 {
let path = home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH);
let token = generate_token(&path).await?;
(Some(token), Some(path))
} else {
None
(None, None)
};
Ok(Self { token })
Ok(Self { token, token_path })
}
}
impl Bootstrapper {
fn is_correct_token(&mut self, token: &[u8]) -> bool {
self.token.as_mut().is_some_and(|expected| {
expected.read_inline(|exp| bool::from(exp.as_ref().ct_eq(token)))
})
}
}
#[messages]
impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| {
let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
bool::from(choice)
})
}
#[message]
pub fn consume_token(&mut self, token: String) -> bool {
if self.is_correct_token(token) {
pub async fn consume_token(&mut self, token: Vec<u8>) -> bool {
if self.is_correct_token(&token) {
self.token = None;
if let Some(path) = self.token_path.take()
&& let Err(e) = tokio::fs::remove_file(&path).await
{
warn!(error = ?e, path = ?path, "Failed to delete bootstrap token file after consumption");
}
true
} else {
false
@@ -92,7 +115,9 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
#[messages]
impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
self.token.clone()
pub fn get_token(&mut self) -> Option<String> {
self.token
.as_mut()
.map(|cell| cell.read_inline(|buf| String::from_utf8_lossy(buf.as_ref()).into_owned()))
}
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
use crate::{
actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
crypto::integrity,
crypto::integrity::{self, Integrable},
db::{
DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
models::{self},
@@ -25,14 +25,35 @@ use diesel::{
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use tracing::error;
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
/// Integrity guard that binds a wallet's encrypted key ID to its Ethereum address.
/// Both fields are included in the HMAC — swapping `aead_encrypted_id` in the DB
/// invalidates the envelope MAC, and the AEAD ciphertext is also bound to `address`
/// as AAD, so decryption fails too.
#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
struct EvmWalletIntegrity {
aead_encrypted_id: i32,
address: Address,
}
impl Integrable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
const KIND: &'static str = "evm_wallet";
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Wallet not found")]
WalletNotFound,
#[error("Decrypted key does not match requested wallet address")]
KeyAddressMismatch,
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
@@ -64,6 +85,12 @@ pub enum Error {
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
Self::Database(DatabaseError::from(e))
}
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct EvmActor {
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
@@ -97,20 +124,39 @@ impl EvmActor {
let aead_id: i32 = self
.vault
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
.ask(CreateNew {
plaintext,
aad: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
let wallet_id = conn
.exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
let wallet_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
})
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)
.map_err(Error::Database)?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&self.vault,
&EvmWalletIntegrity { address, aead_encrypted_id: aead_id },
wallet_id,
)
.await
.map_err(Error::Integrity)?;
Ok::<i32, Error>(wallet_id)
})
.await?;
Ok((wallet_id, address))
}
@@ -241,16 +287,51 @@ impl EvmActor {
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
drop(conn);
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let attestation = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut conn,
&self.vault,
&EvmWalletIntegrity {
address: wallet_address,
aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
},
wallet.id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, wallet_id = wallet.id, "EVM wallet integrity check failed");
SignTransactionError::Internal
})?;
drop(conn);
if attestation != integrity::AttestationStatus::Attested {
error!(
wallet_id = wallet.id,
"EVM wallet integrity unavailable; refusing to sign"
);
return Err(SignTransactionError::Internal);
}
let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
.vault
.ask(Decrypt {
aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
aad: wallet.address.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
if signer.address() != wallet_address {
error!(
expected = %wallet_address,
actual = %signer.address(),
"Decrypted private key address does not match requested wallet"
);
return Err(SignTransactionError::KeyAddressMismatch);
}
self.engine
.evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.await?;

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ pub mod client_connect_approval;
pub struct FlowCoordinator {
pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
/// Maps DB `client_id` → `ActorId` for fast connected-client lookup.
client_ids: HashMap<i32, ActorId>,
operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
}
@@ -27,6 +29,7 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
pub fn new(operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>) -> Self {
Self {
clients: HashMap::default(),
client_ids: HashMap::default(),
operator_registry,
}
}
@@ -48,6 +51,7 @@ impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
self.client_ids.retain(|_, actor_id| *actor_id != id);
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
@@ -75,14 +79,28 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_client(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
info!(id = %actor.id(), client_id, actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "client.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.client_ids.insert(client_id, actor.id());
self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message]
pub fn is_client_connected(&self, client_id: i32) -> bool {
self.client_ids.contains_key(&client_id)
}
/// Returns the DB `client_ids` of all currently connected SDK clients.
/// Used by operator sessions on startup to seed their approved-client set.
#[message]
pub fn get_connected_client_ids(&self) -> Vec<i32> {
self.client_ids.keys().copied().collect()
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn request_client_approval(
&mut self,

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
pub mod events {
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ pub enum Error {
Sealed,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault locked: too many failed unseal attempts")]
LockedOut,
#[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
NotFound,
@@ -61,6 +63,9 @@ pub enum Error {
#[error("Broken database")]
BrokenDatabase,
#[error("Integrity key version mismatch: envelope uses key {envelope}, current key is {current}")]
KeyVersionMismatch { envelope: i32, current: i32 },
}
struct Unsealed {
@@ -79,6 +84,8 @@ enum State {
Unsealed(Unsealed),
}
const MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 5;
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
///
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
@@ -88,6 +95,7 @@ pub struct Vault {
db: db::DatabasePool,
state: State,
events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
unseal_failures: u32,
}
#[messages]
@@ -110,7 +118,7 @@ impl Vault {
}
};
Ok(Self { db, state, events })
Ok(Self { db, state, events, unseal_failures: 0 })
}
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write
@@ -219,6 +227,10 @@ impl Vault {
#[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
if self.unseal_failures >= MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS {
return Err(Error::LockedOut);
}
let State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id,
} = &self.state
@@ -251,13 +263,27 @@ impl Vault {
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
seal_key
if seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
Error::InvalidKey
})?;
.is_err()
{
self.unseal_failures += 1;
if self.unseal_failures >= MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS {
error!(
attempts = self.unseal_failures,
"Vault locked: maximum failed unseal attempts reached"
);
} else {
warn!(
attempts = self.unseal_failures,
remaining = MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS - self.unseal_failures,
"Failed unseal attempt"
);
}
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
}
self.unseal_failures = 0;
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
@@ -272,8 +298,10 @@ impl Vault {
Ok(())
}
/// Decrypts an AEAD entry. The `aad` must match the value used at encryption time;
/// a mismatch causes authentication failure, preventing cross-wallet key swaps.
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32, aad: Vec<u8>) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
@@ -295,13 +323,15 @@ impl Vault {
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut output)?;
Ok(output)
}
/// Creates a new `aead_encrypted` entry and returns its ID.
/// The `aad` is bound into the ciphertext and must be reproduced exactly at decryption time.
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, aad: Vec<u8>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
@@ -313,7 +343,7 @@ impl Vault {
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
@@ -370,7 +400,10 @@ impl Vault {
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
return Ok(false);
return Err(Error::KeyVersionMismatch {
envelope: key_version,
current: *root_key_history_id,
});
}
let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
@@ -445,7 +478,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()), b"test-aad".to_vec())
.await
.unwrap();
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table

View File

@@ -52,7 +52,10 @@ pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
pub use arbiter_crypto::integrity::Integrable;
pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
const KIND: &'static str;
const VERSION: i32 = 1;
}
fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
@@ -189,7 +192,9 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
}),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(
vault::Error::Sealed | vault::Error::KeyVersionMismatch { .. },
)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
}
}
@@ -214,13 +219,15 @@ mod tests {
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use super::{Error, sign_entity, verify_entity};
#[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "dummy_entity")]
use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
#[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
struct DummyEntity {
payload_version: i32,
payload: Vec<u8>,
}
impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
}
async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
let actor = Vault::spawn(
@@ -326,4 +333,47 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn key_version_mismatch_returns_unavailable_not_mac_mismatch() {
use crate::db::schema::integrity_envelope;
use super::AttestationStatus;
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-rotation-test";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
// Simulate key rotation: update the stored key_version to a stale value.
// After real rotation the vault's root_key_history_id would advance, but
// here we achieve the same mismatch by back-dating the envelope's key_version.
diesel::update(integrity_envelope::table)
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.set(integrity_envelope::key_version.eq(0))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// Must NOT error — version mismatch is Unavailable, not tampered.
let status = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.expect("key version mismatch must not be treated as an error");
assert_eq!(
status,
AttestationStatus::Unavailable,
"stale key_version must yield Unavailable, not MacMismatch"
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, EvmEtherTransferLimit,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
@@ -51,12 +52,14 @@ impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
}
// A grant for ether transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
#[derive(Debug, Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "EtherTransfer")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct Settings {
pub target: Vec<Address>,
pub limit: VolumeRateLimit,
}
impl Integrable for Settings {
const KIND: &'static str = "EtherTransfer";
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> Self {

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::Integrable,
db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
NewEvmTokenTransferGrant, NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
@@ -62,13 +63,15 @@ impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
}
// A grant for token transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
#[derive(Debug, Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "TokenTransfer")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct Settings {
pub token_contract: Address,
pub target: Option<Address>,
pub volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit>,
}
impl Integrable for Settings {
const KIND: &'static str = "TokenTransfer";
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> Self {

View File

@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
bootstrap_token: bootstrap_token.map(String::into_bytes),
})
}
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => {

View File

@@ -217,6 +217,11 @@ async fn handle_sign_transaction(
result: Some(vet_error.convert()),
}
}
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
SessionSignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected,
)) => {
return Err(Status::permission_denied("client not connected"));
}
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(SessionSignTransactionError::Internal)) => {
EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(

View File

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Err(vault_gate::Error::InvalidKey) => ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey,
Err(vault_gate::Error::LockedOut) => ProtoUnsealResult::LockedOut,
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "unseal failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault"));

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use crate::{
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
db::{
self,
models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
models::ProgramClientMetadata,
schema::program_client,
},
};
@@ -18,14 +18,13 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
dsl::insert_into, update,
dsl::insert_into,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tracing::error;
use tracing::{error, warn};
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Error {
@@ -211,71 +210,47 @@ async fn insert_client(
.await
}
async fn sync_client_metadata(
/// Compares stored metadata against what a reconnecting client presents.
/// Metadata is frozen after initial operator approval and must not be silently
/// overwritten. Doing so would let an approved client forge its displayed
/// identity in later approval prompts. Drift is logged and ignored.
async fn check_metadata_drift(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
client_id: i32,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
presented: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history};
let now = SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now());
use crate::db::schema::client_metadata;
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
let (current_metadata_id, current): (i32, ProgramClientMetadata) = program_client::table
let current: ProgramClientMetadata = program_client::table
.find(client_id)
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
program_client::metadata_id,
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.first(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let unchanged = current.name == metadata.name
&& current.description == metadata.description
&& current.version == metadata.version;
if unchanged {
return Ok(());
}
insert_into(client_metadata_history::table)
.values((
client_metadata_history::metadata_id.eq(current_metadata_id),
client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id),
))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut *conn)
.await?;
update(program_client::table.find(client_id))
.set((
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Ok::<(), diesel::result::Error>(())
})
.select(ProgramClientMetadata::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
})?;
let changed = current.name != presented.name
|| current.description != presented.description
|| current.version != presented.version;
if changed {
warn!(
client_id,
stored_name = %current.name,
presented_name = %presented.name,
"reconnecting client presented different metadata; ignoring - metadata is frozen after operator approval"
);
}
Ok(())
}
async fn challenge_client<T>(
@@ -324,6 +299,7 @@ where
let client_id = if let Some(id) = get_client_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey).await?;
check_metadata_drift(&props.db, id, &metadata).await?;
id
} else {
approve_new_client(
@@ -337,8 +313,6 @@ where
insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
};
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, client_id, &metadata).await?;
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge).await?;

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors, db, peers::client::session::ClientSession,
actors::GlobalActors, crypto::integrity::Integrable, db, peers::client::session::ClientSession,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_macros::Hashable;
@@ -14,12 +14,15 @@ pub struct ClientProfile {
pub metadata: ClientMetadata,
}
#[derive(Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "client_credentials")]
#[derive(Hashable)]
pub struct ClientCredentials {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
impl Integrable for ClientCredentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "client_credentials";
}
pub struct ClientConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,

View File

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ impl Actor for ClientSession {
args.props
.actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RegisterClient { actor: this })
.ask(RegisterClient { client_id: args.client_id, actor: this })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::ConnectionRegistrationFailed)?;
Ok(args)

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ mod state;
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: Vec<u8>,

View File

@@ -16,13 +16,12 @@ use tracing::error;
pub(super) struct ChallengeRequest {
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub(super) challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
pub(super) struct ChallengeSolution {
@@ -79,11 +78,16 @@ async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<i3
pub(super) struct AuthContext<'a, T: ?Sized> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut OperatorConnection,
pub(super) transport: &'a mut T,
bootstrap_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
impl<'a, T: ?Sized> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) const fn new(conn: &'a mut OperatorConnection, transport: &'a mut T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
Self {
conn,
transport,
bootstrap_token: None,
}
}
}
@@ -108,6 +112,8 @@ where
}
}
self.bootstrap_token = bootstrap_token;
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
self.transport
@@ -120,20 +126,12 @@ where
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge,
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
})
Ok(ChallengeContext { challenge, pubkey })
}
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
challenge,
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeContext { challenge, pubkey }: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<Credentials, Self::Error> {
let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
@@ -152,15 +150,13 @@ where
}
// Resolve client id: bootstrap (consume token + register) or lookup
let id = match bootstrap_token {
let id = match self.bootstrap_token.take() {
Some(token) => {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.ask(ConsumeToken { token })
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ use crate::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{GetState, Vault},
},
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus, Integrable},
db::{DatabaseError, DatabasePool},
peers::client::ClientProfile,
};
@@ -23,13 +23,16 @@ pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub mod vault_gate;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hashable, arbiter_macros::Integrable)]
#[integrable(kind = "operator_credentials")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hashable)]
pub struct Credentials {
pub id: i32,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
impl Integrable for Credentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "operator_credentials";
}
// Messages, sent by operator to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {

View File

@@ -4,9 +4,12 @@ use crate::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, OperatorCreateGrant, OperatorListGrants,
SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
},
actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
actors::flow_coordinator::{IsClientConnected, client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer},
actors::vault::VaultState,
db::models::{EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata},
db::{
models::{EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata},
schema::program_client,
},
evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
@@ -15,13 +18,16 @@ use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{error::SendError, messages, prelude::Context};
use tracing::error;
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Client not connected")]
ClientNotConnected,
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
@@ -141,6 +147,30 @@ impl OperatorSession {
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
if !self.approved_client_ids.contains(&client_id) {
warn!(
client_id,
"operator attempted to sign for client not in its approved set"
);
return Err(SignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected);
}
let connected = self
.props
.actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(IsClientConnected { client_id })
.await
.unwrap_or(false);
if !connected {
self.approved_client_ids.remove(&client_id);
warn!(client_id, "operator attempted to sign for disconnected client");
return Err(SignTransactionError::ClientNotConnected);
}
info!(client_id, event = "sign_transaction", "operator.sign_transaction");
match self
.props
.actors
@@ -196,7 +226,7 @@ impl OperatorSession {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
}
@@ -249,6 +279,30 @@ impl OperatorSession {
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
if approved {
let pubkey_bytes = pending_approval.pubkey.to_bytes();
match self.props.db.get().await {
Ok(mut conn) => {
match program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.as_slice()))
.select(program_client::id)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
{
Ok(client_id) => {
self.approved_client_ids.insert(client_id);
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to look up client_id for approved pubkey");
}
}
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "DB pool error after client approval");
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -271,3 +325,142 @@ impl OperatorSession {
Ok(clients)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::db::{self, models::NewEvmWalletAccess, schema::evm_wallet_access};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
/// Regression test: revocation must delete by access-entry `id`, not by `wallet_id`.
///
/// Before the fix, revoking `entry_id=1` would delete all rows where `wallet_id=1`,
/// wiping out every client's access to wallet #1.
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoke_deletes_by_entry_id_not_wallet_id() {
use crate::db::models::EvmWalletAccess;
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.expect("pool connection");
// Insert two access entries for the same wallet but different clients.
// entry A: id will be 1, wallet_id=1, client_id=10
// entry B: id will be 2, wallet_id=1, client_id=20
let entry_a = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: 1,
client_id: 10,
})
.returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert entry A");
let entry_b = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: 1,
client_id: 20,
})
.returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert entry B");
// Revoke only entry A by its primary key id.
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_a.id))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
})
.await
.expect("revoke entry A");
// Entry A must be gone.
let gone = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_a.id))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count entry A");
assert_eq!(gone, 0, "revoked entry must be deleted");
// Entry B (same wallet, different client) must still exist.
let still_there = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(entry_b.id))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count entry B");
assert_eq!(still_there, 1, "unrelated entry must not be deleted");
}
/// Regression test: when `entry_id` and `wallet_id` differ, only the correct row is removed.
///
/// This specifically catches the case where `entry.id=5` and `wallet_id=1` are different values;
/// the old bug would delete by `wallet_id`, potentially matching a completely different entry.
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoke_with_mismatched_wallet_and_entry_ids() {
use crate::db::models::EvmWalletAccess;
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.expect("pool connection");
// Insert entries to force auto-increment IDs to diverge from wallet_ids.
// We'll insert 5 placeholder entries first so that the real entry gets id=6.
for i in 1_i32..=5 {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: 99,
client_id: i,
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert placeholder");
}
// Real target: wallet_id=1, will get id=6.
let target = diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: 1,
client_id: 1,
})
.returning(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("insert target");
// Sanity: target.id != target.wallet_id
assert_ne!(
target.id, target.wallet_id,
"test prerequisite: id and wallet_id must differ"
);
// Revoke by entry id.
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(target.id))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
})
.await
.expect("revoke target");
let remaining = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq(target.id))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count target");
assert_eq!(remaining, 0, "target must be deleted by its entry id");
// Placeholders for wallet_id=99 must be untouched.
let placeholders = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(99))
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut *conn)
.await
.expect("count placeholders");
assert_eq!(placeholders, 5, "unrelated entries must survive");
}
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
use super::{OutOfBand, OperatorConnection};
use crate::{
actors::{
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::{ClientApprovalAnswer, ClientApprovalController},
operator_registry::ConnectOperator,
},
peers::client::ClientProfile,
flow_coordinator::{GetConnectedClientIds, client_connect_approval::{ClientApprovalAnswer, ClientApprovalController}}, operator_registry::ConnectOperator,
}, peers::client::ClientProfile,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::{HashMap, HashSet}};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::error;
@@ -54,6 +52,10 @@ pub struct OperatorSession {
sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>,
/// DB `client_ids` this operator session is allowed to sign for.
/// Seeded from currently-connected clients on start, then updated as
/// approvals are granted or denied during the session lifetime.
approved_client_ids: HashSet<i32>,
}
pub mod handlers;
@@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ impl OperatorSession {
props,
sender,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap::default(),
approved_client_ids: HashSet::default(),
}
}
}
@@ -107,7 +110,7 @@ impl Actor for OperatorSession {
type Error = Error;
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
async fn on_start(mut args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props
.actors
.operator_registry
@@ -122,6 +125,16 @@ impl Actor for OperatorSession {
);
Error::internal("Failed to register operator connection with operator registry")
})?;
// Seed approved set with clients already connected when this session starts.
// New clients will be added via handle_new_client_approve as they are approved.
match args.props.actors.flow_coordinator.ask(GetConnectedClientIds {}).await {
Ok(ids) => args.approved_client_ids.extend(ids),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to fetch connected client IDs on operator session start");
}
}
Ok(args)
}

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use state::State;
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce};
use kameo::{Actor, error::SendError, messages, prelude::Message};
use kameo::{Actor, error::SendError, messages, prelude::{Context, Message}};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::Register;
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tracing::{error, info};
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ pub enum Error {
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault locked: too many failed unseal attempts")]
LockedOut,
#[error("State transition failed")]
State,
@@ -141,12 +143,13 @@ impl VaultGate {
})
}
#[message]
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else {
return Err(Error::State);
@@ -170,6 +173,12 @@ impl VaultGate {
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::InvalidKey)) => Err(Error::InvalidKey),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::LockedOut)) => {
// Vault is permanently locked — terminate this gate so the
// run_vault_gate loop breaks and the connection is closed.
ctx.stop();
Err(Error::LockedOut)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Vault failed to unseal key");
Err(Error::InvalidKey)
@@ -242,7 +251,7 @@ impl Message<events::Bootstrapped> for VaultGate {
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_: events::Bootstrapped,
ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let result = async {
let mut conn = self
@@ -278,7 +287,7 @@ impl Message<events::Unsealed> for VaultGate {
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_: events::Unsealed,
ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
if let Some(tx) = self.promotion_tx.take() {
let _ = tx.send(Ok(()));

View File

@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ pub async fn metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
pub async fn metadata_frozen_after_approval_ignores_reconnect_changes() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
// Reconnect presenting different metadata — must be silently ignored.
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
@@ -313,6 +314,7 @@ pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
client_metadata, client_metadata_history, program_client,
};
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
// Metadata is frozen: no new row, no history entry.
let metadata_count: i64 = client_metadata::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
@@ -338,15 +340,16 @@ pub async fn metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
.first::<(String, Option<String>, Option<String>)>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(metadata_count, 2);
assert_eq!(history_count, 1);
assert_eq!(metadata_count, 1, "frozen: no new metadata row on reconnect");
assert_eq!(history_count, 0, "frozen: no history entry on reconnect");
assert_eq!(
current,
(
"client".to_owned(),
Some("new".to_owned()),
Some("2.0.0".to_owned())
)
Some("old".to_owned()),
Some("1.0.0".to_owned())
),
"frozen: original metadata must be preserved"
);
}
}

View File

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_token_auth() {
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
bootstrap_token: Some(token.into_bytes()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_owned()),
bootstrap_token: Some(b"invalid_token".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();

View File

@@ -140,6 +140,47 @@ pub async fn unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
));
}
/// After MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS wrong keys, the vault locks and the VaultGate
/// must stop itself so the connection is dropped.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn lockout_stops_vault_gate() {
use kameo::error::SendError;
let seal_key = b"real-seal-key";
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
// Exhaust all MAX_UNSEAL_ATTEMPTS (5) with wrong keys; each returns InvalidKey.
for _ in 0..5 {
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key").await;
assert!(matches!(
gate.ask(encrypted_key).await,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(VaultGateError::InvalidKey))
));
}
// Sixth attempt: vault is now locked, returns LockedOut, and the gate stops itself.
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key").await;
assert!(matches!(
gate.ask(encrypted_key).await,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(VaultGateError::LockedOut))
));
// Give the actor scheduler time to process the stop signal.
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
// Any subsequent message must be rejected because the gate is stopped.
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
assert!(
matches!(
gate.ask(HandleHandshake { client_pubkey: client_public }).await,
Err(SendError::ActorNotRunning(_))
),
"VaultGate must be stopped after LockedOut"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use tokio::task::JoinSet;
const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
async fn write_concurrently(
actor: ActorRef<Vault>,
prefix: &'static str,
@@ -27,6 +29,7 @@ async fn write_concurrently(
let id = actor
.ask(CreateNew {
plaintext: SafeCell::new(plaintext.clone()),
aad: TEST_AAD.to_vec(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -120,7 +123,7 @@ async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
drop(conn);
let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"should fail".to_vec()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"should fail".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::DatabaseTransaction(_)));
@@ -171,7 +174,7 @@ async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
.unwrap();
for (id, plaintext) in expected {
let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}
}

View File

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ use arbiter_server::{
use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn bootstrap() {
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ async fn create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
.unwrap();
let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
@@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ async fn decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
.await
.unwrap();
let err = actor.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
let err = actor.decrypt(1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
}
@@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ async fn new_restores_sealed_state() {
let mut actor2 = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let err = actor2.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
let err = actor2.decrypt(1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::Sealed));
}
@@ -97,7 +99,7 @@ async fn unseal_correct_password() {
let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ async fn unseal_correct_password() {
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}
@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ async fn unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let plaintext = b"important data";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
@@ -136,6 +138,6 @@ async fn unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let good_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use std::collections::HashSet;
const TEST_AAD: &[u8] = b"test-aad";
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
@@ -18,11 +20,11 @@ async fn create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await
.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}
@@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ async fn decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let err = actor.decrypt(9999).await.unwrap_err();
let err = actor.decrypt(9999, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotFound));
}
@@ -44,11 +46,11 @@ async fn ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
let plaintext = b"same content";
let id1 = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await
.unwrap();
let id2 = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(plaintext.to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -68,8 +70,8 @@ async fn ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
assert_ne!(row1.ciphertext, row2.ciphertext);
let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1).await.unwrap();
let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2).await.unwrap();
let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*d1.read(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d2.read(), plaintext);
}
@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ async fn nonce_never_reused() {
let n = 5;
for i in 0..n {
actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await
.unwrap();
}
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
drop(conn);
let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"must fail".to_vec()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"must fail".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()))
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()), TEST_AAD.to_vec())
.await
.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -156,6 +158,6 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let err = actor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap_err();
let err = actor.decrypt(id, TEST_AAD.to_vec()).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
}