29 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
CleverWild
d1f97617c6 feat(integrtity): introduce zero cost wrapper Verified
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2026-04-16 20:28:38 +02:00
hdbg
f49e995c2f WIP: kameo::messages wiring for transport generalization
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2026-04-16 17:18:46 +02:00
hdbg
87ee0fe87b feat(user-agent): add VaultGate for sealed vault authentication 2026-04-12 11:53:05 +02:00
hdbg
205227a3df fix(server::integrity): vault now differentias between expected/unexpected states for commands more granularly 2026-04-08 18:21:48 +02:00
hdbg
a4070e7df7 fix(useragent): unsafe, but working implementation of ml-dsa 2026-04-08 17:43:51 +02:00
hdbg
6b8da567dd fix(server::user_agent): useragents now self-sign themselves on bootstrap 2026-04-08 17:40:45 +02:00
hdbg
1585f90cae refactor(server): reorganized client/user_agent actors into separate module peers and added event MessageBus 2026-04-08 12:34:16 +02:00
f3cf6a9438 Merge pull request 'Post-quantum crypto and better useragent security' (#80) from push-xrxykvkuxpsv into main
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Reviewed-on: #80
2026-04-07 19:26:54 +00:00
hdbg
a9f9fc2a9d housekeeping(server): fixed clippy warns
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2026-04-07 16:28:47 +02:00
hdbg
d22ab49e3d refactor(server): moved shared module crypto into arbiter-crypto 2026-04-07 16:24:51 +02:00
hdbg
a845181ef6 docs: ml-dsa scheme everywhere
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2026-04-07 15:02:32 +02:00
hdbg
0d424f3afc refactor(server): migrated auth to ml-dsa 2026-04-07 14:55:31 +02:00
hdbg
1497884ce6 fix(server::bootsrapper): token compare is now constant-time
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2026-04-06 18:33:47 +02:00
hdbg
b3464cf8a6 tests(server::client::auth): integrity envelope insertion for valid paths
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2026-04-06 18:24:13 +02:00
hdbg
46d1318b6f feat(server): add integrity verification for client keys 2026-04-06 18:13:11 +02:00
9c80d51d45 Merge pull request 'fix(server): replaced postcard-based integrity fingerprint with custom trait providing order-independent hashing' (#77) from push-opwuyuwxknyo into main
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Reviewed-on: #77
2026-04-06 15:42:47 +00:00
hdbg
33456a644d tests(server): property-based testing for ordering independency for hash
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2026-04-06 17:40:41 +02:00
hdbg
5bc0c42cc7 fix(server): replaced postcard-based integrity fingerprint with custom trait providing order-independent hashing 2026-04-06 16:25:32 +02:00
hdbg
f6b62ab884 fix(server): added chain_id check and covered check_shared_constraints with unit tests
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2026-04-06 12:57:18 +02:00
hdbg
2dd5a3f32f tests(server): initial cargo-mutants
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2026-04-06 12:03:56 +02:00
hdbg
1aca9d4007 fix(server): simplify hash function for debug profile 2026-04-05 22:50:28 +02:00
5ee1b49c43 Merge pull request 'feat(server): integrity envelope engine for EVM grants with HMAC verification' (#51) from integrity-envelope into main
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Reviewed-on: #51
2026-04-05 16:26:51 +00:00
hdbg
00745bb381 tests(server): fixed for new integrity checks
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2026-04-05 14:49:02 +02:00
hdbg
b122aa464c refactor(server): rework envelopes and integrity check
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2026-04-05 14:17:00 +02:00
hdbg
9fab945a00 fix(server): remove stale mentions of miette
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2026-04-05 10:45:24 +02:00
CleverWild
aeed664e9a chore: inline integrity proto types
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2026-04-05 10:44:21 +02:00
CleverWild
4057c1fc12 feat(server): integrity envelope engine for EVM grants with HMAC verification 2026-04-05 10:44:21 +02:00
hdbg
f5eb51978d docs: add recovery operators and multi-operator details 2026-04-05 08:27:24 +00:00
hdbg
d997e0f843 docs: add multi-operator governance section 2026-04-05 08:27:24 +00:00
195 changed files with 16363 additions and 3016 deletions

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@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ cargo insta review
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.

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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers:
- **User Agent** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies).
- **SDK Client** — A consumer of signing capabilities, typically an automation tool. In the future, this could include a browser-based wallet.
- **Recovery Operator** — A dormant recovery participant with narrowly scoped authority used only for custody recovery and operator replacement.
---
@@ -42,7 +43,149 @@ There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approve
---
## 3. Server Identity
## 3. Multi-Operator Governance
When more than one User Agent is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision.
### 3.1 Voting Rules
Voting is based on the total number of registered operators:
- **1 operator:** no vote is needed; the single operator decides directly.
- **2 operators:** full consensus is required; both operators must approve.
- **3 or more operators:** quorum is `floor(N / 2) + 1`.
For a decision to count, the operator's approval or rejection must be signed by that operator's associated key. Unsigned votes, or votes that fail signature verification, are ignored.
Examples:
- **3 operators:** 2 approvals required
- **4 operators:** 3 approvals required
### 3.2 Actions Requiring a Vote
In multi-operator mode, a successful vote is required for:
- approving new SDK clients
- granting an SDK client visibility to a wallet
- approving a one-off transaction
- approving creation of a persistent grant
- approving operator replacement
- approving server updates
- updating Shamir secret-sharing parameters
### 3.3 Special Rule for Key Rotation
Key rotation always requires full quorum, regardless of the normal voting threshold.
This is stricter than ordinary governance actions because rotating the root key requires every operator to participate in coordinated share refresh/update steps. The root key itself is not redistributed directly, but each operator's share material must be changed consistently.
### 3.4 Root Key Custody
When the vault has multiple operators, the vault root key is protected using Shamir secret sharing.
The vault root key is encrypted in a way that requires reconstruction from user-held shares rather than from a single shared password.
For ordinary operators, the Shamir threshold matches the ordinary governance quorum. For example:
- **2 operators:** `2-of-2`
- **3 operators:** `2-of-3`
- **4 operators:** `3-of-4`
In practice, the Shamir share set also includes Recovery Operator shares. This means the effective Shamir parameters are computed over the combined share pool while keeping the same threshold. For example:
- **3 ordinary operators + 2 recovery shares:** `2-of-5`
This ensures that the normal custody threshold follows the ordinary operator quorum, while still allowing dormant recovery shares to exist for break-glass recovery flows.
### 3.5 Recovery Operators
Recovery Operators are a separate peer type from ordinary vault operators.
Their role is intentionally narrow. They can only:
- participate in unsealing the vault
- vote for operator replacement
Recovery Operators do not participate in routine governance such as approving SDK clients, granting wallet visibility, approving transactions, creating grants, approving server updates, or changing Shamir parameters.
### 3.6 Sleeping and Waking Recovery Operators
By default, Recovery Operators are **sleeping** and do not participate in any active flow.
Any ordinary operator may request that Recovery Operators **wake up**.
Any ordinary operator may also cancel a pending wake-up request.
This creates a dispute window before recovery powers become active. The default wake-up delay is **14 days**.
Recovery Operators are therefore part of the break-glass recovery path rather than the normal operating quorum.
The high-level recovery flow is:
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Op as Ordinary Operator
participant Server
actor Other as Other Operator
actor Rec as Recovery Operator
Op->>Server: Request recovery wake-up
Server-->>Op: Wake-up pending
Note over Server: Default dispute window: 14 days
alt Wake-up cancelled during dispute window
Other->>Server: Cancel wake-up
Server-->>Op: Recovery cancelled
Server-->>Rec: Stay sleeping
else No cancellation for 14 days
Server-->>Rec: Wake up
Rec->>Server: Join recovery flow
critical Recovery authority
Rec->>Server: Participate in unseal
Rec->>Server: Vote on operator replacement
end
Server-->>Op: Recovery mode active
end
```
### 3.7 Committee Formation
There are two ways to form a multi-operator committee:
- convert an existing single-operator vault by adding new operators
- bootstrap an unbootstrapped vault directly into multi-operator mode
In both cases, committee formation is a coordinated process. Arbiter does not allow multi-operator custody to emerge implicitly from unrelated registrations.
### 3.8 Bootstrapping an Unbootstrapped Vault into Multi-Operator Mode
When an unbootstrapped vault is initialized as a multi-operator vault, the setup proceeds as follows:
1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using a User Agent and the bootstrap token.
2. During bootstrap setup, that operator declares:
- the total number of ordinary operators
- the total number of Recovery Operators
3. The vault enters **multi-bootstrap mode**.
4. While in multi-bootstrap mode:
- every ordinary operator must connect with a User Agent using the bootstrap token
- every Recovery Operator must also connect using the bootstrap token
- each participant is registered individually
- each participant's share is created and protected with that participant's credentials
5. The vault is considered fully bootstrapped only after all declared operator and recovery-share registrations have completed successfully.
This means the operator and recovery set is fixed at bootstrap completion time, based on the counts declared when multi-bootstrap mode was entered.
### 3.9 Special Bootstrap Constraint for Two-Operator Vaults
If a vault is declared with exactly **2 ordinary operators**, Arbiter requires at least **1 Recovery Operator** to be configured during bootstrap.
This prevents the worst-case custody failure in which a `2-of-2` operator set becomes permanently unrecoverable after loss of a single operator.
---
## 4. Server Identity
The server proves its identity using TLS with a self-signed certificate. The TLS private key is generated on first run and is long-term; no rotation mechanism exists yet due to the complexity of multi-peer coordination.
@@ -55,9 +198,9 @@ Peers verify the server by its **public key fingerprint**:
---
## 4. Key Management
## 5. Key Management
### 4.1 Key Hierarchy
### 5.1 Key Hierarchy
There are three layers of keys:
@@ -72,19 +215,19 @@ This layered design enables:
- **Password rotation** without re-encrypting every wallet key (only the root key is re-encrypted).
- **Root key rotation** without requiring the user to change their password.
### 4.2 Encryption at Rest
### 5.2 Encryption at Rest
The database stores everything in encrypted form using symmetric AEAD. The encryption scheme is versioned to support transparent migration — when the vault unseals, Arbiter automatically re-encrypts any entries that are behind the current scheme version. See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the specific scheme and versioning mechanism.
---
## 5. Vault Lifecycle
## 6. Vault Lifecycle
### 5.1 Sealed State
### 6.1 Sealed State
On boot, the root key is encrypted and the server cannot perform any signing operations. This state is called **Sealed**.
### 5.2 Unseal Flow
### 6.2 Unseal Flow
To transition to the **Unsealed** state, a User Agent must provide the password:
@@ -95,7 +238,7 @@ To transition to the **Unsealed** state, a User Agent must provide the password:
- **Success:** The root key is decrypted and placed into a hardened memory cell. The server transitions to `Unsealed`. Any entries pending encryption scheme migration are re-encrypted.
- **Failure:** The server returns an error indicating the password is incorrect.
### 5.3 Memory Protection
### 6.3 Memory Protection
Once unsealed, the root key must be protected in memory against:
@@ -107,9 +250,9 @@ See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the current and planned memory pr
---
## 6. Permission Engine
## 7. Permission Engine
### 6.1 Fundamental Rules
### 7.1 Fundamental Rules
- SDK clients have **no access by default**.
- Access is granted **explicitly** by a User Agent.
@@ -119,11 +262,45 @@ Each blockchain requires its own policy system due to differences in static tran
Arbiter is also responsible for ensuring that **transaction nonces are never reused**.
### 6.2 EVM Policies
### 7.2 EVM Policies
Every EVM grant is scoped to a specific **wallet** and **chain ID**.
#### 6.2.1 Transaction Sub-Grants
#### 7.2.0 Transaction Signing Sequence
The high-level interaction order is:
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor SDK as SDK Client
participant Server
participant UA as User Agent
SDK->>Server: SignTransactionRequest
Server->>Server: Resolve wallet and wallet visibility
alt Visibility approval required
Server->>UA: Ask for wallet visibility approval
UA-->>Server: Vote result
end
Server->>Server: Evaluate transaction
Server->>Server: Load grant and limits context
alt Grant approval required
Server->>UA: Ask for execution / grant approval
UA-->>Server: Vote result
opt Create persistent grant
Server->>Server: Create and store grant
end
Server->>Server: Retry evaluation
end
critical Final authorization path
Server->>Server: Check limits and record execution
Server-->>Server: Signature or evaluation error
end
Server-->>SDK: Signature or error
```
#### 7.2.1 Transaction Sub-Grants
Arbiter maintains an ever-expanding database of known contracts and their ABIs. Based on contract knowledge, transaction requests fall into three categories:
@@ -147,7 +324,7 @@ Available restrictions:
These transactions have no `calldata` and therefore cannot interact with contracts. They can be subject to the same volume and rate restrictions as above.
#### 6.2.2 Global Limits
#### 7.2.2 Global Limits
In addition to sub-grant-specific restrictions, the following limits can be applied across all grant types:

View File

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ cargo insta review
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.

View File

@@ -67,18 +67,14 @@ The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it i
## Cryptography
### Authentication
- **Client protocol:** ed25519
- **Client protocol:** ML-DSA
### User-Agent Authentication
User-agent authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
- **Supported schemes:** RSA, Ed25519, ECDSA (secp256k1)
- **Why:** the user agent authenticates with keys backed by platform facilities, and those facilities differ by platform
- **Apple Silicon Secure Enclave / Secure Element:** ECDSA-only in practice
- **Windows Hello / TPM 2.0:** currently RSA-backed in our integration
This is why the user-agent auth protocol carries an explicit `KeyType`, while the SDK client protocol remains fixed to ed25519.
- **Supported schemes:** ML-DSA
- **Why:** Secure Enclave (MacOS) support them natively, on other platforms we could emulate while they roll-out
### Encryption at Rest
- **Scheme:** Symmetric AEAD — currently **XChaCha20-Poly1305**
@@ -128,6 +124,52 @@ The central abstraction is the `Policy` trait. Each implementation handles one s
4. **Evaluate**`Policy::evaluate` checks the decoded meaning against the grant's policy-specific constraints and returns any violations.
5. **Record** — If `RunKind::Execution` and there are no violations, the engine writes to `evm_transaction_log` and calls `Policy::record_transaction` for any policy-specific logging (e.g., token transfer volume).
The detailed branch structure is shown below:
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A[SDK Client sends sign transaction request] --> B[Server resolves wallet]
B --> C{Wallet exists?}
C -- No --> Z1[Return wallet not found error]
C -- Yes --> D[Check SDK client wallet visibility]
D --> E{Wallet visible to SDK client?}
E -- No --> F[Start wallet visibility voting flow]
F --> G{Vote approved?}
G -- No --> Z2[Return wallet access denied error]
G -- Yes --> H[Persist wallet visibility]
E -- Yes --> I[Classify transaction meaning]
H --> I
I --> J{Meaning supported?}
J -- No --> Z3[Return unsupported transaction error]
J -- Yes --> K[Find matching grant]
K --> L{Grant exists?}
L -- Yes --> M[Check grant limits]
L -- No --> N[Start execution or grant voting flow]
N --> O{User-agent decision}
O -- Reject --> Z4[Return no matching grant error]
O -- Allow once --> M
O -- Create grant --> P[Create grant with user-selected limits]
P --> Q[Persist grant]
Q --> M
M --> R{Limits exceeded?}
R -- Yes --> Z5[Return evaluation error]
R -- No --> S[Record transaction in logs]
S --> T[Produce signature]
T --> U[Return signature to SDK client]
note1[Limit checks include volume, count, and gas constraints.]
note2[Grant lookup depends on classified meaning, such as ether transfer or token transfer.]
K -. uses .-> note2
M -. checks .-> note1
```
### Policy Trait
| Method | Purpose |

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@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
version = "1.46.3"
backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-mutants"]]
version = "27.0.0"
backend = "cargo:cargo-mutants"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
version = "0.9.126"
backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
@@ -68,6 +72,10 @@ backend = "cargo:diesel_cli"
default-features = "false"
features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled"
[[tools."cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"]]
version = "2.12.0"
backend = "cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"
[[tools.flutter]]
version = "3.38.9-stable"
backend = "asdf:flutter"
@@ -111,30 +119,37 @@ backend = "core:python"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:c43aecde4a663aebff99b9b83da0efec506479f1c3f98331442f33d2c43501f9"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:9ab41dbc2f100a2a45d1833b9c11165f51051c558b5213eda9a9731d5948a0c0"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:bbe19034b35b0267176a7442575ae7dc6343480fd4d35598cb7700173d431e09"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[[tools.rust]]
version = "1.93.0"

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@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ protoc = "29.6"
python = "3.14.3"
ast-grep = "0.42.0"
"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.9"
"cargo:cargo-mutants" = "27.0.0"
"cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen" = "2.12.0"
[tasks.codegen]
sources = ['protobufs/*.proto', 'protobufs/**/*.proto']

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@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ message GasLimitExceededViolation {
}
message EvalViolation {
message ChainIdMismatch {
uint64 expected = 1;
uint64 actual = 2;
}
oneof kind {
bytes invalid_target = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
GasLimitExceededViolation gas_limit_exceeded = 2;
@@ -43,6 +47,8 @@ message EvalViolation {
google.protobuf.Empty volumetric_limit_exceeded = 4;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_time = 5;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_transaction_type = 6;
ChainIdMismatch chain_id_mismatch = 7;
}
}

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@@ -2,17 +2,9 @@ syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.auth;
enum KeyType {
KEY_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 1;
KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1 = 2;
KEY_TYPE_RSA = 3;
}
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
KeyType key_type = 3;
}
message AuthChallenge {

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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
test_tool = "nextest"

2
server/.gitignore vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
mutants.out/
mutants.out.old/

1072
server/Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

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@@ -20,13 +20,12 @@ tokio = { version = "1.50.0", features = ["full"] }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
rand = "0.10.0"
rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
smlang = "0.8.0"
thiserror = "2.0.18"
async-trait = "0.1.89"
futures = "0.3.32"
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
kameo = "0.19.2"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
rstest = "0.26.1"
@@ -42,4 +41,11 @@ k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
sha2 = "0.10"
spki = "0.7"
prost = "0.14.3"
miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
mutants = "0.0.4"
ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.8", features = ["zeroize"] }
base64 = "0.22.1"
kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}

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@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ evm = ["dep:alloy"]
[dependencies]
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
tonic.workspace = true
tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
tokio.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
http = "1.4.0"
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.10", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }

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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey, format_challenge};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
ClientMetadata,
proto::{
client::{
ClientRequest,
@@ -14,7 +15,6 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo,
},
};
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use crate::{
storage::StorageError,
@@ -54,14 +54,14 @@ fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
key: &SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
request_id: next_request_id(),
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey: key.public_key().to_bytes(),
client_info: Some(ProtoClientInfo {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
@@ -95,11 +95,14 @@ async fn receive_auth_challenge(
async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
key: &SigningKey,
challenge: AuthChallenge,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let signature = key.sign(&challenge_payload).to_bytes().to_vec();
let signature = key
.sign_message(&challenge_payload, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?
.to_bytes();
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
@@ -140,7 +143,7 @@ async fn receive_auth_confirmation(
pub(crate) async fn authenticate(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
key: &SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
send_auth_challenge_request(transport, metadata, key).await?;
let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?;

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@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
};
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
pub async fn connect_with_key(
url: ArbiterUrl,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
key: ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
key: SigningKey,
) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned();
let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use arbiter_proto::home_path;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
@@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ pub enum StorageError {
}
pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError>;
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<SigningKey, StorageError>;
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage {
}
impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ed25519.key";
pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ml_dsa.key";
pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
Self { path: path.into() }
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
Ok(Self::new(home_path()?.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME)))
}
fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
let bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
let raw: [u8; 32] =
bytes
@@ -39,12 +40,12 @@ impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
expected: 32,
actual: v.len(),
})?;
Ok(ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&raw))
Ok(SigningKey::from_seed(raw))
}
}
impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
}
@@ -53,8 +54,8 @@ impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
return Self::read_key(&self.path);
}
let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let raw_key = key.to_bytes();
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let raw_key = key.to_seed();
// Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ mod tests {
.load_or_create()
.expect("second load_or_create should read same key");
assert_eq!(key_a.to_bytes(), key_b.to_bytes());
assert_eq!(key_a.to_seed(), key_b.to_seed());
assert!(path.exists());
std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");

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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
/target

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
[package]
name = "arbiter-crypto"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
[dependencies]
ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true }
rand = {workspace = true, optional = true}
base64 = {workspace = true, optional = true }
memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true}
x-wing = { version = "0.1.0-rc.0", features = ["zeroize"] }
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = ["authn", "safecell"]
authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand", "dep:base64"]
safecell = ["dep:memsafe"]

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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
pub mod v1;
pub use v1::*;

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@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
use std::hash::Hash;
use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
use ml_dsa::{
EncodedVerifyingKey, Error, KeyGen, MlDsa87, Seed, Signature as MlDsaSignature,
SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _,
};
pub static CLIENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_client";
pub static USERAGENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_user_agent";
pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes()
}
pub type KeyParams = MlDsa87;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct PublicKey(Box<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>>);
impl Hash for PublicKey {
fn hash<H: std::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
self.to_bytes().hash(state);
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct Signature(Box<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>>);
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct SigningKey(Box<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>>);
impl PublicKey {
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.encode().to_vec()
}
pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
self.0.verify_with_context(
&format_challenge(nonce, &self.to_bytes()),
context,
&signature.0,
)
}
}
impl Signature {
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.encode().to_vec()
}
}
impl SigningKey {
pub fn generate() -> Self {
Self(Box::new(KeyParams::key_gen(&mut rand::rng())))
}
pub fn from_seed(seed: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(KeyParams::from_seed(&Seed::from(seed))))
}
pub fn to_seed(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
self.0.to_seed().into()
}
pub fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
self.0.verifying_key().into()
}
pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
self.0
.signing_key()
.sign_deterministic(message, context)
.map(Into::into)
}
pub fn sign_challenge(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
self.sign_message(
&format_challenge(nonce, &self.public_key().to_bytes()),
context,
)
}
}
impl From<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>> for PublicKey {
fn from(value: MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value))
}
}
impl From<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>> for Signature {
fn from(value: MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value))
}
}
impl From<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>> for SigningKey {
fn from(value: MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
Self(Box::new(value))
}
}
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for PublicKey {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
}
}
impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for PublicKey {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let encoded = EncodedVerifyingKey::<KeyParams>::try_from(value).map_err(|_| ())?;
Ok(Self(Box::new(MlDsaVerifyingKey::decode(&encoded))))
}
}
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for Signature {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
}
}
impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for Signature {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
MlDsaSignature::try_from(value)
.map(|sig| Self(Box::new(sig)))
.map_err(|_| ())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, signature::Keypair as _};
use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
#[test]
fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() {
let key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let encoded = PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()).to_bytes();
let decoded = PublicKey::try_from(encoded.as_slice()).expect("public key should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded, PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()));
}
#[test]
fn signature_round_trip_decodes() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let signature = key
.sign_message(b"challenge", CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
let decoded =
Signature::try_from(signature.to_bytes().as_slice()).expect("signature should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded, signature);
}
#[test]
fn challenge_verification_uses_context_and_canonical_key_bytes() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let public_key = key.public_key();
let nonce = 17;
let signature = key
.sign_challenge(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(public_key.verify(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
assert!(!public_key.verify(nonce, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
}
#[test]
fn signing_key_round_trip_seed_preserves_public_key_and_signing() {
let original = SigningKey::generate();
let restored = SigningKey::from_seed(original.to_seed());
assert_eq!(restored.public_key(), original.public_key());
let signature = restored
.sign_challenge(9, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(restored.public_key().verify(9, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
#[cfg(feature = "authn")]
pub mod authn;
#[cfg(feature = "safecell")]
pub mod safecell;
pub use x_wing;

View File

@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ impl<T> SafeCellHandle<T> for MemSafeCell<T> {
fn abort_memory_breach(action: &str, err: &memsafe::error::MemoryError) -> ! {
eprintln!("fatal {action}: {err}");
// SAFETY: Intentionally cause a segmentation fault to prevent further execution in a compromised state.
unsafe {
let unsafe_pointer = std::ptr::null_mut::<u8>();
std::ptr::write_volatile(unsafe_pointer, 0);
}
std::process::abort();
}

View File

@@ -11,13 +11,13 @@ tokio.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true
hex = "0.4.3"
tonic-prost = "0.14.5"
prost = "0.14.3"
prost.workspace = true
kameo.workspace = true
url = "2.5.8"
miette.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
base64 = "0.22.1"
base64.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
pub mod transport;
pub mod url;
use base64::{Engine, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");
@@ -84,8 +82,3 @@ pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
Ok(arbiter_home)
}
pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes()
}

View File

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::{error::Infallible, prelude::*};
/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
@@ -106,6 +107,36 @@ pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync {
/// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items.
pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for &mut T
where
T: Sender<Outbound> + ?Sized,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
(**self).send(item).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Inbound> Receiver<Inbound> for &mut T
where
T: Receiver<Inbound> + ?Sized,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
(**self).recv().await
}
}
impl<T, Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for &mut T
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
{
}
pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> {
type Sender: Sender<Outbound>;
type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>;
@@ -161,3 +192,29 @@ where
}
pub mod grpc;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
pub enum ForwardError<I> {
#[error("Transport error: {0}")]
Transport(#[from] Error),
#[error("Actor delivery error: {0}")]
Actor(SendError<I>),
}
pub async fn forward_to_actor<Transport, Inbound, Outbound, Handler>(
transport: &mut Transport,
actor: &ActorRef<Handler>,
) -> Result<(), ForwardError<Inbound>>
where
Transport: Bi<Inbound, <Outbound as Reply>::Ok>,
Handler: Actor + Message<Inbound, Reply = Outbound>,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static + Reply<Error = Infallible>, // `Infallible` to enforce contract that `Outbound` carries handler-level error
{
while let Some(request) = transport.recv().await {
let resp = actor.ask(request).await.map_err(ForwardError::Actor)?;
transport.send(resp).await?
}
Err(Error::ChannelClosed.into())
}

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@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ diesel-async = { version = "0.8.0", features = [
"sqlite",
"tokio",
] }
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
tonic.workspace = true
@@ -36,25 +36,32 @@ dashmap = "6.1.0"
rand.workspace = true
rcgen.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
memsafe = "0.4.0"
zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
kameo.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
restructed = "0.2.2"
strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
pem = "3.0.6"
k256.workspace = true
rsa.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
hmac = "0.12"
spki.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
prost.workspace = true
arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
anyhow = "1.0.102"
serde_with = "3.18.0"
mutants.workspace = true
subtle = "2.6.1"
ml-dsa.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
k256.workspace = true
kameo_actors.workspace = true
[dev-dependencies]
insta = "1.46.3"
proptest = "1.11.0"
rstest.workspace = true
test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }

View File

@@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ create table if not exists useragent_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
pubkey_integrity_tag blob,
key_type integer not null default(1), -- 1=Ed25519, 2=ECDSA(secp256k1)
key_type integer not null default(1),
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
@@ -192,3 +191,19 @@ create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_ether_transfer_target on evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (grant_id, address);
-- ===============================
-- Integrity Envelopes
-- ===============================
create table if not exists integrity_envelope (
id integer not null primary key,
entity_kind text not null,
entity_id blob not null,
payload_version integer not null,
key_version integer not null,
mac blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_integrity_envelope_entity on integrity_envelope (entity_kind, entity_id);

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
@@ -44,14 +45,14 @@ pub struct Bootstrapper {
impl Bootstrapper {
pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let row_count: i64 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let row_count: i64 = schema::useragent_client::table
schema::useragent_client::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
drop(conn);
.await?
};
let token = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?;
@@ -69,7 +70,13 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
match &self.token {
Some(expected) => *expected == token,
Some(expected) => {
let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
bool::from(choice)
}
None => false,
}
}

View File

@@ -7,21 +7,22 @@ use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
crypto::integrity,
db::{
DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
models::{self, SqliteTimestamp},
models::{self},
schema,
},
evm::{
self, RunKind,
self, ListError, RunKind,
policies::{
FullGrant, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
@@ -33,11 +34,11 @@ pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Signing error: {0}")]
Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
@@ -48,32 +49,35 @@ pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Integrity violation: {0}")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct EvmActor {
pub keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub db: DatabasePool,
pub rng: StdRng,
pub engine: evm::Engine,
}
impl EvmActor {
pub fn new(keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
pub fn new(vault: ActorRef<Vault>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
// is it safe to seed rng from system once?
// todo: audit
let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), vault.clone());
Self {
keyholder,
vault,
db,
rng,
engine,
@@ -90,10 +94,10 @@ impl EvmActor {
let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
let aead_id: i32 = self
.keyholder
.vault
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?;
.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
@@ -132,46 +136,59 @@ impl EvmActor {
&mut self,
basic: SharedGrantSettings,
grant: SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError> {
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match grant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => {
self.engine
.create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(FullGrant {
basic,
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self
.engine
.create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
shared: basic,
specific: settings,
})
.await
}
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => {
self.engine
.create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(FullGrant {
basic,
.map_err(Error::from),
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => self
.engine
.create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
shared: basic,
specific: settings,
})
.await
}
.map_err(Error::from),
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
.set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(())
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
// let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// let vault = self.vault.clone();
// diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| {
// Box::pin(async move {
// diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
// .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
// .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
// .execute(conn)
// .await?;
// let signed = integrity::evm::load_signed_grant_by_basic_id(conn, grant_id).await?;
// diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(())
// })
// })
// .await
// .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// Ok(())
todo!()
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
Ok(self
.engine
.list_all_grants()
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?)
match self.engine.list_all_grants().await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(ListError::Database(db_err)) => Err(Error::Database(db_err)),
Err(ListError::Integrity(integrity_err)) => Err(Error::Integrity(integrity_err)),
}
}
#[message]
@@ -237,12 +254,12 @@ impl EvmActor {
drop(conn);
let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
.keyholder
.vault
.ask(Decrypt {
aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::KeyholderSend)?;
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;

View File

@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ use kameo::{
reply::ReplySender,
};
use crate::actors::{
use crate::{
actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
peers::{
client::ClientProfile,
flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
},
};
pub struct Args {

View File

@@ -9,10 +9,12 @@ use kameo::{
};
use tracing::info;
use crate::actors::{
use crate::{
actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
peers::{
client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
user_agent::session::UserAgentSession,
user_agent::UserAgentSession,
},
};
pub mod client_connect_approval;

View File

@@ -1,47 +1,53 @@
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use kameo_actors::{DeliveryStrategy, message_bus::MessageBus};
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
keyholder::KeyHolder,
bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator, vault::Vault,
},
db,
};
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod client;
mod evm;
pub mod evm;
pub mod flow_coordinator;
pub mod keyholder;
pub mod user_agent;
pub mod vault;
pub mod useragent_registry;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum SpawnError {
#[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn KeyHolder actor")]
KeyHolder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn Vault actor")]
Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
}
/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct GlobalActors {
pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
pub events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
impl GlobalActors {
pub fn spawn_message_bus() -> ActorRef<MessageBus> {
MessageBus::spawn(MessageBus::new(DeliveryStrategy::Guaranteed))
}
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let key_holder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?);
let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
key_holder,
vault: key_holder,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::default()),
events: message_bus,
})
}
}

View File

@@ -1,356 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::error::SendError;
use tracing::error;
use super::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
keyholder::{self, SignIntegrityTag},
user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth::Outbound},
},
crypto::integrity::v1::USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
db::schema,
};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum AttestationStatus {
Attested,
NotAttested,
Unavailable,
}
pub struct ChallengeRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
pub token: String,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge_nonce: i32,
pub key: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct ChallengeSolution {
pub solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
}
);
async fn create_nonce(
db: &crate::db::DatabasePool,
pubkey_bytes: &[u8],
key_type: crate::db::models::KeyType,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.to_vec()))
.filter(schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type))
.select(schema::useragent_client::nonce)
.first::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::useragent_client::table)
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.to_vec()))
.filter(schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type))
.set(schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(current_nonce)
})
})
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?
.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(?pubkey_bytes, "Public key not found in database");
Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
})
}
async fn register_key(
db: &crate::db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
integrity_tag: Option<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let key_type = pubkey.key_type();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(1),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type),
schema::useragent_client::pubkey_integrity_tag.eq(integrity_tag),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
Ok(())
}
pub struct AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
pub(super) transport: T,
}
impl<'a, T> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
type Error = Error;
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
match self.verify_pubkey_attestation_status(&pubkey).await? {
AttestationStatus::Attested | AttestationStatus::Unavailable => {}
AttestationStatus::NotAttested => {
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
}
let stored_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let nonce = create_nonce(&self.conn.db, &stored_bytes, pubkey.key_type()).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce: nonce,
key: pubkey,
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
let integrity_tag = self
.try_sign_pubkey_integrity_tag(&pubkey)
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to sign user-agent pubkey integrity tag");
Error::internal("Failed to sign user-agent pubkey integrity tag")
})?;
register_key(&self.conn.db, &pubkey, integrity_tag).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(pubkey)
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce,
key,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
let formatted = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(*challenge_nonce, &key.to_stored_bytes());
let valid = match key {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(vk) => {
let sig = solution.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid Ed25519 signature length");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify_strict(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(vk) => {
use k256::ecdsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let sig = k256::ecdsa::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid ECDSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(pk) => {
use rsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let verifying_key = rsa::pss::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha256>::new(pk.clone());
let sig = rsa::pss::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid RSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
verifying_key.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
};
match valid {
true => {
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(key.clone())
}
false => {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
}
}
}
}
impl<T> AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
async fn try_sign_pubkey_integrity_tag(
&self,
pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let signed = self
.conn
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(SignIntegrityTag {
purpose_tag: USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG.to_vec(),
data_parts: vec![
(pubkey.key_type() as i32).to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey.to_stored_bytes(),
],
})
.await;
match signed {
Ok(tag) => Ok(Some(tag)),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)) => Ok(None),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(
?err,
"Keyholder failed to sign user-agent pubkey integrity tag"
);
Err(Error::internal(
"Keyholder failed to sign user-agent pubkey integrity tag",
))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to contact keyholder for user-agent pubkey integrity tag"
);
Err(Error::internal(
"Failed to contact keyholder for user-agent pubkey integrity tag",
))
}
}
}
async fn verify_pubkey_attestation_status(
&self,
pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
let stored_tag: Option<Option<Vec<u8>>> = {
let mut conn = self.conn.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
schema::useragent_client::table
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_stored_bytes()))
.filter(schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(pubkey.key_type()))
.select(schema::useragent_client::pubkey_integrity_tag)
.first::<Option<Vec<u8>>>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?
};
let Some(stored_tag) = stored_tag else {
return Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey);
};
let Some(expected_tag) = self.try_sign_pubkey_integrity_tag(pubkey).await? else {
return Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable);
};
match stored_tag {
Some(stored_tag) if stored_tag == expected_tag => Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested),
Some(_) => {
error!("User-agent pubkey integrity tag mismatch");
Ok(AttestationStatus::NotAttested)
}
None => {
error!("Missing pubkey integrity tag for registered key while vault is unsealed");
Ok(AttestationStatus::NotAttested)
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile},
db::{self, models::KeyType},
};
/// Abstraction over Ed25519 / ECDSA-secp256k1 / RSA public keys used during the auth handshake.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub enum AuthPublicKey {
Ed25519(ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey),
/// Compressed SEC1 public key; signature bytes are raw 64-byte (r||s).
EcdsaSecp256k1(k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey),
/// RSA-2048+ public key (Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager); signature bytes are PSS+SHA-256.
Rsa(rsa::RsaPublicKey),
}
impl AuthPublicKey {
/// Canonical bytes stored in DB and echoed back in the challenge.
/// Ed25519: raw 32 bytes. ECDSA: SEC1 compressed 33 bytes. RSA: DER-encoded SPKI.
pub fn to_stored_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(k) => k.to_bytes().to_vec(),
// SEC1 compressed (33 bytes) is the natural compact format for secp256k1
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(k) => k.to_encoded_point(true).as_bytes().to_vec(),
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(k) => {
use rsa::pkcs8::EncodePublicKey as _;
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
k.to_public_key_der()
.expect("rsa SPKI encoding is infallible")
.to_vec()
}
}
}
pub fn key_type(&self) -> KeyType {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(_) => KeyType::Ed25519,
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(_) => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(_) => KeyType::Rsa,
}
}
}
impl TryFrom<(KeyType, Vec<u8>)> for AuthPublicKey {
type Error = &'static str;
fn try_from(value: (KeyType, Vec<u8>)) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let (key_type, bytes) = value;
match key_type {
KeyType::Ed25519 => {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| "invalid Ed25519 key length")?;
let key = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&bytes)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid Ed25519 key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(key))
}
KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => {
let point =
k256::EncodedPoint::from_bytes(&bytes).map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
let key = k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_encoded_point(&point)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(key))
}
KeyType::Rsa => {
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
let key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&bytes)
.map_err(|_e| "invalid RSA key")?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Rsa(key))
}
}
}
}
// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey },
}
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub use auth::authenticate;
pub use session::UserAgentSession;

View File

@@ -1,510 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use kameo::messages;
use kameo::prelude::Context;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer;
use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
use crate::actors::user_agent::session::Error;
use crate::db::models::{
EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
};
use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
use crate::{
actors::{
evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentDeleteGrant, UseragentListGrants,
},
keyholder::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
user_agent::session::{
UserAgentSession,
state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
},
},
safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
};
impl UserAgentSession {
fn take_unseal_secret(&mut self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), Error> {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(Error::internal("Invalid state for unseal encrypted key"));
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Mutex poison is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
match secret {
Some(secret) => secret,
None => {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
return Err(Error::internal("Ephemeral secret already taken"));
}
}
};
Ok((ephemeral_secret, unseal_context.client_public_key))
}
fn decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret: EphemeralSecret,
client_public_key: PublicKey,
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => Ok(key_buffer),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
}
}
}
}
pub struct UnsealStartResponse {
pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum UnsealError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for unsealing")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Internal error during unsealing process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum BootstrapError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for bootstrapping")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Internal error during bootstrapping process")]
General(#[from] super::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_request(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
) -> Result<UnsealStartResponse, Error> {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
client_public_key: client_pubkey,
}))?;
Ok(UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key,
})
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(_err) => {
return Err(Error::internal("Failed to take unseal secret").into());
}
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(Error::internal("Vault actor error").into())
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(Error::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(err) => return Err(err.into()),
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) {
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to bootstrap vault");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::General(Error::internal(
"Vault actor error",
)))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "keyholder.query.failed");
return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => Ok(address),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
"EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
))),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
&mut self,
basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
.await
{
Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to create EVM grant"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to delete EVM grant"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<i32>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(access_entries)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message(ctx)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
&mut self,
approved: bool,
pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pending_approval = match self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey) {
Some(approval) => approval,
None => {
error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
return Err(Error::internal("Unknown client in connection response"));
}
};
pending_approval
.controller
.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to send client approval response to controller"
);
Error::internal("Failed to send client approval response to controller")
})?;
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let clients = program_client::table
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
ProgramClient::as_select(),
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(clients)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
use alloy::primitives::map::HashMap;
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use kameo::{error::Infallible, prelude::*};
use crate::{db::DatabasePool, peers::user_agent::{Credentials, UserAgentSession}};
use super::vault::{Vault, events as vault_events};
pub struct Args {
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub pool: DatabasePool,
}
pub struct UserAgentRegistry {
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pool: DatabasePool,
connected: HashMap<Credentials, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
}
impl Message<vault_events::Bootstrapped> for UserAgentRegistry {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
msg: vault_events::Bootstrapped,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
todo!()
}
}
impl Message<vault_events::Unsealed> for UserAgentRegistry {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
msg: vault_events::Unsealed,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
todo!()
}
}
impl Actor for UserAgentRegistry {
type Args = Args;
type Error = Infallible;
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(Self {
vault: args.vault,
pool: args.pool,
connected: HashMap::default(),
})
}
}

View File

@@ -4,47 +4,44 @@ use diesel::{
dsl::{insert_into, update},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
use hmac::Mac as _;
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
crypto::{
use crate::crypto::{
KeyCell, derive_key,
encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
integrity::v1::compute_integrity_tag,
},
safe_cell::SafeCell,
integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
};
use crate::{
db::{
use crate::db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
},
safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(KeyHolderState))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
},
Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
root_key: KeyCell,
},
pub mod events {
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Bootstrapped;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Unsealed;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct VaultResealed;
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")]
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")]
#[error("Vault is not bootstrapped")]
NotBootstrapped,
#[error("Vault is sealed")]
Sealed,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
@@ -64,18 +61,35 @@ pub enum Error {
BrokenDatabase,
}
struct Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
root_key: KeyCell,
}
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(VaultState))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
},
Unsealed(Unsealed),
}
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct KeyHolder {
pub struct Vault {
db: db::DatabasePool,
state: State,
events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
#[messages]
impl KeyHolder {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
impl Vault {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let state = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
@@ -93,10 +107,10 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
};
Ok(Self { db, state })
Ok(Self { db, state, events })
}
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple keyholders write
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write
// additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
@@ -133,6 +147,14 @@ impl KeyHolder {
Ok(nonce)
}
fn expect_unsealed(state: &mut State) -> Result<&mut Unsealed, Error> {
match state {
State::Unsealed(unsealed) => Ok(unsealed),
State::Unbootstrapped => Err(Error::NotBootstrapped),
State::Sealed { .. } => Err(Error::Sealed),
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
@@ -185,12 +207,13 @@ impl KeyHolder {
})
.await?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
};
});
info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully");
info!("Vault bootstrapped successfully");
self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await;
Ok(())
}
@@ -237,40 +260,23 @@ impl KeyHolder {
Error::InvalidKey
})?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?,
};
});
info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully");
info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
self.events.tell(Publish(events::Unsealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
// Signs a generic integrity payload using the vault-derived integrity key
#[message]
pub fn sign_integrity_tag(
&mut self,
purpose_tag: Vec<u8>,
data_parts: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let tag =
compute_integrity_tag(root_key, &purpose_tag, data_parts.iter().map(Vec::as_slice));
Ok(tag.to_vec())
}
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
@@ -298,14 +304,10 @@ impl KeyHolder {
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
..
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
// Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
// Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
@@ -335,22 +337,69 @@ impl KeyHolder {
}
#[message]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> KeyHolderState {
pub fn get_state(&self) -> VaultState {
self.state.discriminant()
}
#[message]
pub fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
pub fn sign_integrity(&mut self, mac_input: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(i32, Vec<u8>), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let mut hmac = root_key
.0
.read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
});
hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input);
let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
Ok((*root_key_history_id, mac))
}
#[message]
pub fn verify_integrity(
&mut self,
mac_input: Vec<u8>,
expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
key_version: i32,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
return Ok(false);
}
let mut hmac = root_key
.0
.read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
});
hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input);
Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
}
#[message]
pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = &self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
};
self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -362,14 +411,17 @@ mod tests {
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors,
db::{self},
safe_cell::SafeCell,
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use super::*;
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
actor
@@ -381,17 +433,17 @@ mod tests {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let root_key_history_id = match actor.state {
State::Unsealed {
State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} => root_key_history_id,
}) => root_key_history_id,
_ => panic!("expected unsealed state"),
};
let n1 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
let n2 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
let n2 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");

View File

@@ -1 +1,3 @@
pub mod v1;
pub use v1::*;

View File

@@ -59,10 +59,8 @@ mod tests {
use std::ops::Deref as _;
use super::*;
use crate::{
crypto::derive_key,
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use crate::crypto::derive_key;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[test]
pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {

View File

@@ -1 +1,3 @@
pub mod v1;
pub use v1::*;

View File

@@ -1,78 +1,438 @@
use crate::{crypto::KeyCell, safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _};
use chacha20poly1305::Key;
use hmac::Mac as _;
use crate::{actors::vault::{self, GetState}, crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable};
use hmac::Hmac;
use sha2::Sha256;
use std::future::Future;
use std::ops::Deref;
use std::pin::Pin;
pub const USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_DERIVE_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/useragent/integrity-key/v1".as_bytes();
pub const USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/useragent/pubkey-entry/v1".as_bytes();
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use sha2::Digest as _;
/// Computes an integrity tag for a specific domain and payload shape.
pub fn compute_integrity_tag<'a, I>(
integrity_key: &mut KeyCell,
purpose_tag: &[u8],
data_parts: I,
) -> [u8; 32]
where
I: IntoIterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
{
type HmacSha256 = hmac::Hmac<sha2::Sha256>;
pub mod hashing;
pub mod verified;
let mut output_tag = [0u8; 32];
integrity_key.0.read_inline(|integrity_key_bytes: &Key| {
let mut mac = <HmacSha256 as hmac::Mac>::new_from_slice(integrity_key_bytes.as_ref())
.expect("HMAC key initialization must not fail for 32-byte key");
mac.update(purpose_tag);
for data_part in data_parts {
mac.update(data_part);
use crate::{
actors::vault::{SignIntegrity, Vault, VerifyIntegrity},
db::{
self,
models::{IntegrityEnvelope as IntegrityEnvelopeRow, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
schema::integrity_envelope,
},
};
pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
pub use self::verified::{Nested, VerificationOrigin, Verified};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] db::DatabaseError),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Integrity envelope is missing for entity {entity_kind}")]
MissingEnvelope { entity_kind: &'static str },
#[error(
"Integrity payload version mismatch for entity {entity_kind}: expected {expected}, found {found}"
)]
PayloadVersionMismatch {
entity_kind: &'static str,
expected: i32,
found: i32,
},
#[error("Integrity MAC mismatch for entity {entity_kind}")]
MacMismatch { entity_kind: &'static str },
}
output_tag.copy_from_slice(&mac.finalize().into_bytes());
});
output_tag
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[must_use]
pub enum AttestationStatus {
Attested,
Unavailable,
}
pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
const KIND: &'static str;
const VERSION: i32 = 1;
}
impl<T: Integrable> Integrable for &T {
const KIND: &'static str = T::KIND;
const VERSION: i32 = T::VERSION;
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct EntityId(Vec<u8>);
impl Deref for EntityId {
type Target = [u8];
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.0
}
}
impl From<i32> for EntityId {
fn from(value: i32) -> Self {
Self(value.to_be_bytes().to_vec())
}
}
impl From<&'_ [u8]> for EntityId {
fn from(bytes: &'_ [u8]) -> Self {
Self(bytes.to_vec())
}
}
pub async fn lookup_verified<E, Id, C, F, Fut>(
conn: &mut C,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity_id: Id,
load: F,
) -> Result<VerifiedEntity<E, Id>, Error>
where
C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
E: Integrable,
Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
F: FnOnce(&mut C) -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = Result<E, db::DatabaseError>>,
{
let entity = load(conn).await?;
verify_entity(conn, vault, entity, entity_id).await
}
pub async fn lookup_verified_from_query<E, Id, C, F>(
conn: &mut C,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
load: F,
) -> Result<VerifiedEntity<E, Id>, Error>
where
C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite> + Send,
E: Integrable,
Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
F: for<'a> FnOnce(
&'a mut C,
) -> Pin<
Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<(Id, E), db::DatabaseError>> + Send + 'a>,
>,
{
let (entity_id, entity) = load(conn).await?;
verify_entity(conn, vault, entity, entity_id).await
}
pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity: &E,
as_entity_id: Id,
) -> Result<Verified<Id, Nested<E>>, Error> {
let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
let entity_id = as_entity_id.clone().into();
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
let (key_version, mac) =
vault
.ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Vault(inner),
_ => Error::VaultSend,
})?;
insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
.values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
entity_id: entity_id.to_vec(),
payload_version: E::VERSION,
key_version,
mac: mac.to_vec(),
})
.on_conflict((
integrity_envelope::entity_id,
integrity_envelope::entity_kind,
))
.do_update()
.set((
integrity_envelope::payload_version.eq(E::VERSION),
integrity_envelope::key_version.eq(key_version),
integrity_envelope::mac.eq(mac),
))
.execute(conn)
.await
.map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(Verified::<Id, Nested<E>>::new(as_entity_id))
}
pub async fn check_entity_attestation<E: Integrable>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity: &E,
entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
let entity_id = entity_id.into();
let envelope: IntegrityEnvelopeRow = integrity_envelope::table
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id))
.first(conn)
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
diesel::result::Error::NotFound => Error::MissingEnvelope {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
},
other => Error::Database(db::DatabaseError::from(other)),
})?;
if envelope.payload_version != E::VERSION {
return Err(Error::PayloadVersionMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
expected: E::VERSION,
found: envelope.payload_version,
});
}
let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash);
let result = vault
.ask(VerifyIntegrity {
mac_input,
expected_mac: envelope.mac,
key_version: envelope.key_version,
})
.await;
match result {
Ok(true) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested),
Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
}),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[repr(C)]
pub struct VerifiedEntity<E, Id> {
pub entity: Verified<E>,
pub entity_id: Verified<Id, Nested<E>>,
}
impl<E, Id> Deref for VerifiedEntity<E, Id> {
type Target = Verified<E>;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.entity
}
}
pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity: E,
entity_id: Id,
) -> Result<VerifiedEntity<E, Id>, Error> {
match check_entity_attestation(conn, vault, &entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(VerifiedEntity {
entity: Verified::new(entity),
entity_id: Verified::new(entity_id),
}),
AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Vault(vault::Error::Sealed)),
}
}
pub async fn verify_entity_ref<'e, E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity: &'e E,
entity_id: Id,
) -> Result<Verified<VerifiedEntity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
match check_entity_attestation(conn, vault, entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<VerifiedEntity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(
VerifiedEntity {
entity: Verified::new(entity),
entity_id: Verified::new(entity_id),
},
)),
AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Vault(vault::Error::Sealed)),
}
}
pub async fn delete_envelope<E: Integrable>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
) -> Result<usize, Error> {
let entity_id = entity_id.into();
let affected = diesel::delete(
integrity_envelope::table
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id)),
)
.execute(conn)
.await
.map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(affected)
}
pub async fn is_signing_available(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let state = vault.ask(GetState).await.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
Ok(matches!(state, vault::VaultState::Unsealed))
}
fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
payload.hash(&mut hasher);
hasher.finalize().into()
}
fn build_mac_input(
entity_kind: &str,
entity_id: &[u8],
payload_version: i32,
payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
out
}
fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
use sha2::Digest;
use crate::{
crypto::{derive_key, encryption::v1::generate_salt},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{Bootstrap, Vault},
},
db::{self, schema},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use super::hashing::Hashable;
use super::{Error, Integrable, check_entity_attestation, sign_entity};
#[derive(Clone)]
struct DummyEntity {
payload_version: i32,
payload: Vec<u8>,
}
impl Hashable for DummyEntity {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.payload_version.hash(hasher);
self.payload.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
}
async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
let actor = Vault::spawn(
Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap(),
);
actor
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actor
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
use super::{USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG, compute_integrity_tag};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap()
.drop_verification_provenance();
#[test]
pub fn integrity_tag_deterministic() {
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut integrity_key = derive_key(SafeCell::new(b"password".to_vec()), &salt);
let key_type = 1i32.to_be_bytes();
let t1 = compute_integrity_tag(
&mut integrity_key,
USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
[key_type.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
);
let t2 = compute_integrity_tag(
&mut integrity_key,
USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
[key_type.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
);
assert_eq!(t1, t2);
let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
let status = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(status, super::AttestationStatus::Attested));
}
#[test]
pub fn integrity_tag_changes_with_payload() {
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut integrity_key = derive_key(SafeCell::new(b"password".to_vec()), &salt);
let key_type_1 = 1i32.to_be_bytes();
let key_type_2 = 2i32.to_be_bytes();
let t1 = compute_integrity_tag(
&mut integrity_key,
USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
[key_type_1.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
);
let t2 = compute_integrity_tag(
&mut integrity_key,
USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
[key_type_2.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
);
assert_ne!(t1, t2);
#[tokio::test]
async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
let entity = DummyEntity {
payload_version: 1,
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap()
.drop_verification_provenance();
diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
.filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
.set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
use hmac::digest::Digest;
use std::collections::HashSet;
/// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
pub trait Hashable {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H);
}
macro_rules! impl_numeric {
($($t:ty),*) => {
$(
impl Hashable for $t {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(&self.to_be_bytes());
}
}
)*
};
}
impl_numeric!(u8, u16, u32, u64, i8, i16, i32, i64);
impl Hashable for &[u8] {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self);
}
}
impl Hashable for String {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.as_bytes());
}
}
impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for Vec<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
let ref_sorted = {
let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
sorted
};
for item in ref_sorted {
item.hash(hasher);
}
}
}
impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for HashSet<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
let ref_sorted = {
let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
sorted
};
for item in ref_sorted {
item.hash(hasher);
}
}
}
impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Option<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
match self {
Some(value) => {
hasher.update([1]);
value.hash(hasher);
}
None => hasher.update([0]),
}
}
}
impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Box<T> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.as_ref().hash(hasher);
}
}
impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for &T {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
(*self).hash(hasher);
}
}
impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::Address {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.as_slice());
}
}
impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::U256 {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.to_be_bytes::<32>());
}
}
impl Hashable for chrono::Duration {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.num_seconds().to_be_bytes());
}
}
impl Hashable for chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.timestamp_millis().to_be_bytes());
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
use std::ops::Deref;
use super::Integrable;
mod private {
pub trait Sealed {}
}
/// Marker trait for type-level verification provenance.
///
/// This trait is intentionally sealed so external code cannot invent arbitrary
/// provenance tags and bypass the intended type-level guarantees.
pub trait VerificationOrigin: private::Sealed {
type Origin: VerificationOrigin;
}
/// Root provenance marker for values directly produced by integrity APIs.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Default)]
pub struct Root;
impl private::Sealed for Root {}
impl VerificationOrigin for Root {
type Origin = Self;
}
/// Nested provenance marker carrying the source integrable type and previous
/// provenance marker in the chain.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Nested<From, P: VerificationOrigin = Root>(core::marker::PhantomData<(From, P)>);
impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> private::Sealed for Nested<T, P> {}
impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> VerificationOrigin for Nested<T, P> {
type Origin = P::Origin;
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
// #[derive(Copy)] // fixme!: soundness: Unimplemented Copy helps to avoid accidentally origin-unqualifying due to Deref impl.
#[repr(transparent)]
#[must_use = "Verified<T> is a proof-bearing wrapper; use self.drop_verification_provenance() to explicitly discard integrity provenance when needed"]
pub struct Verified<T, O: VerificationOrigin = Root> {
inner: T,
origin: core::marker::PhantomData<O>,
}
impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> AsRef<T> for Verified<T, O> {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &T {
&self.inner
}
}
impl<T, N: Integrable, O: VerificationOrigin> Deref for Verified<T, Nested<N, O>> {
type Target = Verified<T, O::Origin>;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
// SAFETY: `Verified<T, _>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so
// `&Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>` and `&Verified<T, O::Origin>` have identical layout.
unsafe { &*(self as *const Self as *const Verified<T, O::Origin>) }
}
}
impl<T> Deref for Verified<T, Root> {
type Target = T;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
AsRef::as_ref(self)
}
}
impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> Verified<T, O> {
/// Unwraps the verified value, discarding the integrity provenance.
pub fn drop_verification_provenance(self) -> T {
self.inner
}
/// Downgrades the origin provenance by recursively resolving the terminal
/// origin of the verification chain.
pub fn unqualify_origin(self) -> Verified<T, O::Origin> {
Verified {
inner: self.inner,
origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
/// Constructs a `Verified<T>` by wrapping a `T`.
#[cfg(not(test))]
pub(super) const fn new(value: T) -> Self {
Self {
inner: value,
origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) const fn new(value: T) -> Self {
Self {
inner: value,
origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::crypto::integrity::v1::hashing::Hashable;
use hmac::digest::Digest;
use std::mem::{align_of, size_of};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct Marker;
impl Hashable for Marker {
fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(b"marker");
}
}
impl Integrable for Marker {
const KIND: &'static str = "marker";
}
#[test]
fn verified_root_exposes_inner_value() {
let verified = Verified::<_, Root>::new("root-value");
assert_eq!(verified.as_ref(), &"root-value");
assert_eq!(*verified, "root-value");
assert_eq!(verified.drop_verification_provenance(), "root-value");
assert_eq!(size_of::<Verified<&str>>(), size_of::<&str>());
assert_eq!(align_of::<Verified<&str>>(), align_of::<&str>());
}
#[test]
fn nested_verified_derefs_back_to_root() {
let verified: Verified<_, Nested<Marker, Nested<Marker>>> = Verified::new("nested-value");
let _: &Verified<&str, Root> = &verified;
let root_view: Verified<&str, Root> = verified.unqualify_origin();
assert_eq!(root_view.as_ref(), &"nested-value");
}
#[test]
fn nested_verified_can_be_unqualified_to_root() {
let verified: Verified<_, Nested<Marker>> = Verified::new("nested-value");
let downgraded = verified.unqualify_origin();
assert_eq!(downgraded.as_ref(), &"nested-value");
assert_eq!(downgraded.drop_verification_provenance(), "nested-value");
}
}

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use rand::{
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
pub mod encryption;
pub mod integrity;
@@ -102,11 +102,21 @@ impl KeyCell {
}
}
/// User password might be of different length, have not enough entropy, etc...
/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
let params = {
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
argon2::Params::new(8, 1, 1, None).unwrap()
}
#[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
{
argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap()
}
};
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
let params = argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap();
let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
password.read_inline(|password_source| {
@@ -131,7 +141,7 @@ mod tests {
derive_key,
encryption::v1::{Nonce, generate_salt},
};
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[test]
pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {

View File

@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetu
Ok(pool)
}
#[mutants::skip]
pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use crate::db::schema::{
self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_transaction_log, evm_wallet,
root_key_history, tls_history,
integrity_envelope, root_key_history, tls_history,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
@@ -72,40 +72,6 @@ pub mod types {
Ok(SqliteTimestamp(datetime))
}
}
/// Key algorithm stored in the `useragent_client.key_type` column.
/// Values must stay stable — they are persisted in the database.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, strum::FromRepr)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum KeyType {
Ed25519 = 1,
EcdsaSecp256k1 = 2,
Rsa = 3,
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
out.set_value(*self as i32);
Ok(IsNull::No)
}
}
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err("Expected Integer for KeyType".into());
};
let discriminant = bytes.read_long();
KeyType::from_repr(discriminant as i32)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("Unknown KeyType discriminant: {discriminant}").into())
}
}
}
pub use types::*;
@@ -242,10 +208,8 @@ pub struct UseragentClient {
pub id: i32,
pub nonce: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub pubkey_integrity_tag: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub key_type: KeyType,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
@@ -377,3 +341,22 @@ pub struct EvmTokenTransferLog {
pub value: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = integrity_envelope, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewIntegrityEnvelope,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, signed_at, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct IntegrityEnvelope {
pub id: i32,
pub entity_kind: String,
pub entity_id: Vec<u8>,
pub payload_version: i32,
pub key_version: i32,
pub mac: Vec<u8>,
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}

View File

@@ -139,6 +139,19 @@ diesel::table! {
}
}
diesel::table! {
integrity_envelope (id) {
id -> Integer,
entity_kind -> Text,
entity_id -> Binary,
payload_version -> Integer,
key_version -> Integer,
mac -> Binary,
signed_at -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
program_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
@@ -178,7 +191,6 @@ diesel::table! {
id -> Integer,
nonce -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
pubkey_integrity_tag -> Nullable<Binary>,
key_type -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
@@ -220,6 +232,7 @@ diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
evm_transaction_log,
evm_wallet,
evm_wallet_access,
integrity_envelope,
program_client,
root_key_history,
tls_history,

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,11 @@ use alloy::{
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use crate::{
actors::vault::Vault,
crypto::integrity,
db::{
self, DatabaseError,
models::{
@@ -18,8 +21,8 @@ use crate::{
schema::{self, evm_transaction_log},
},
evm::policies::{
DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, FullGrant, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
CombinedSettings, DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy,
SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
};
@@ -36,6 +39,9 @@ pub enum PolicyError {
Violations(Vec<EvalViolation>),
#[error("No matching grant found")]
NoMatchingGrant,
#[error("Integrity error: {0}")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -57,6 +63,15 @@ pub enum AnalyzeError {
UnsupportedTransactionType,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ListError {
#[error("Database error")]
Database(#[from] crate::db::DatabaseError),
#[error("Integrity verification failed for grant")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
/// Controls whether a transaction should be executed or only validated
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RunKind {
@@ -75,6 +90,14 @@ async fn check_shared_constraints(
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let now = Utc::now();
if shared.chain != context.chain {
violations.push(EvalViolation::MismatchingChainId {
expected: shared.chain,
actual: context.chain,
});
return Ok(violations);
}
// Validity window
if shared.valid_from.is_some_and(|t| now < t) || shared.valid_until.is_some_and(|t| now > t) {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTime);
@@ -115,6 +138,7 @@ async fn check_shared_constraints(
// Supporting only EIP-1559 transactions for now, but we can easily extend this to support legacy transactions if needed
pub struct Engine {
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
}
impl Engine {
@@ -123,7 +147,10 @@ impl Engine {
context: EvalContext,
meaning: &P::Meaning,
run_kind: RunKind,
) -> Result<(), PolicyError> {
) -> Result<(), PolicyError>
where
P::Settings: Clone,
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
@@ -131,8 +158,14 @@ impl Engine {
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant)?;
let mut violations =
check_shared_constraints(&context, &grant.shared, grant.shared_grant_id, &mut conn)
integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &self.vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
let mut violations = check_shared_constraints(
&context,
&grant.settings.shared,
grant.common_settings_id,
&mut conn,
)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
violations.extend(
@@ -143,12 +176,14 @@ impl Engine {
if !violations.is_empty() {
return Err(PolicyError::Violations(violations));
} else if run_kind == RunKind::Execution {
}
if run_kind == RunKind::Execution {
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let log_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(&NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: grant.shared_grant_id,
grant_id: grant.common_settings_id,
wallet_access_id: context.target.id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(context.value).to_vec(),
@@ -172,15 +207,19 @@ impl Engine {
}
impl Engine {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Self {
Self { db }
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, vault: ActorRef<Vault>) -> Self {
Self { db, vault }
}
pub async fn create_grant<P: Policy>(
&self,
full_grant: FullGrant<P::Settings>,
) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError> {
full_grant: CombinedSettings<P::Settings>,
) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError>
where
P::Settings: Clone,
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let vault = self.vault.clone();
let id = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
@@ -189,25 +228,25 @@ impl Engine {
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmBasicGrant {
chain_id: full_grant.basic.chain as i32,
wallet_access_id: full_grant.basic.wallet_access_id,
valid_from: full_grant.basic.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: full_grant.basic.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
chain_id: full_grant.shared.chain as i32,
wallet_access_id: full_grant.shared.wallet_access_id,
valid_from: full_grant.shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: full_grant.shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.basic
.shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.basic
.shared
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
rate_limit_count: full_grant
.basic
.shared
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.count as i32),
rate_limit_window_secs: full_grant
.basic
.shared
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.window.num_seconds() as i32),
@@ -217,7 +256,13 @@ impl Engine {
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await
P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await?;
integrity::sign_entity(conn, &vault, &full_grant, basic_grant.id)
.await
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
QueryResult::Ok(basic_grant.id)
})
})
.await?;
@@ -225,33 +270,36 @@ impl Engine {
Ok(id)
}
pub async fn list_all_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, DatabaseError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
async fn list_one_kind<Kind: Policy, Y>(
&self,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> Result<impl Iterator<Item = Grant<Y>>, ListError>
where
Y: From<Kind::Settings>,
{
let all_grants = Kind::find_all_grants(conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// Verify integrity of all grants before returning any results
for grant in &all_grants {
integrity::verify_entity(conn, &self.vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
}
Ok(all_grants.into_iter().map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
common_settings_id: g.common_settings_id,
settings: g.settings.generalize(),
}))
}
pub async fn list_all_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, ListError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let mut grants: Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>> = Vec::new();
grants.extend(
EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut conn)
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
shared_grant_id: g.shared_grant_id,
shared: g.shared,
settings: SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(g.settings),
}),
);
grants.extend(
TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut conn)
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
shared_grant_id: g.shared_grant_id,
shared: g.shared,
settings: SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(g.settings),
}),
);
grants.extend(self.list_one_kind::<EtherTransfer, _>(&mut conn).await?);
grants.extend(self.list_one_kind::<TokenTransfer, _>(&mut conn).await?);
Ok(grants)
}
@@ -297,3 +345,255 @@ impl Engine {
Err(VetError::UnsupportedTransactionType)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use rstest::rstest;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::policies::{
EvalContext, EvalViolation, SharedGrantSettings, TransactionRateLimit,
};
use super::check_shared_constraints;
const WALLET_ACCESS_ID: i32 = 1;
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const RECIPIENT: Address = address!("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111");
fn context() -> EvalContext {
EvalContext {
target: EvmWalletAccess {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: 10,
client_id: 20,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
},
chain: CHAIN_ID,
to: RECIPIENT,
value: U256::ZERO,
calldata: Bytes::new(),
max_fee_per_gas: 100,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 10,
}
}
fn shared_settings() -> SharedGrantSettings {
SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
}
}
async fn insert_basic_grant(
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
shared: &SharedGrantSettings,
) -> EvmBasicGrant {
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: shared.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: shared.chain as i32,
valid_from: shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| super::utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: shared
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| super::utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
rate_limit_count: shared.rate_limit.as_ref().map(|limit| limit.count as i32),
rate_limit_window_secs: shared
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|limit| limit.window.num_seconds() as i32),
revoked_at: None,
})
.returning(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
#[rstest]
#[case::matching_chain(CHAIN_ID, false)]
#[case::mismatching_chain(CHAIN_ID + 1, true)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_chain_id(
#[case] context_chain: u64,
#[case] expect_mismatch: bool,
) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let context = EvalContext {
chain: context_chain,
..context()
};
let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context, &shared_settings(), 999, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
violations
.iter()
.any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::MismatchingChainId { .. })),
expect_mismatch
);
if expect_mismatch {
assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
} else {
assert!(violations.is_empty());
}
}
#[rstest]
#[case::valid_from_in_bounds(Some(Utc::now() - Duration::hours(1)), None, false)]
#[case::valid_from_out_of_bounds(Some(Utc::now() + Duration::hours(1)), None, true)]
#[case::valid_until_in_bounds(None, Some(Utc::now() + Duration::hours(1)), false)]
#[case::valid_until_out_of_bounds(None, Some(Utc::now() - Duration::hours(1)), true)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_validity_window(
#[case] valid_from: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
#[case] valid_until: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
#[case] expect_invalid_time: bool,
) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let shared = SharedGrantSettings {
valid_from,
valid_until,
..shared_settings()
};
let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context(), &shared, 999, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
violations
.iter()
.any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::InvalidTime)),
expect_invalid_time
);
if expect_invalid_time {
assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
} else {
assert!(violations.is_empty());
}
}
#[rstest]
#[case::max_fee_within_limit(Some(U256::from(100u64)), None, 100, 10, false)]
#[case::max_fee_exceeded(Some(U256::from(99u64)), None, 100, 10, true)]
#[case::priority_fee_within_limit(None, Some(U256::from(10u64)), 100, 10, false)]
#[case::priority_fee_exceeded(None, Some(U256::from(9u64)), 100, 10, true)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_gas_fee_caps(
#[case] max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
#[case] max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
#[case] actual_max_fee_per_gas: u128,
#[case] actual_max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128,
#[case] expect_gas_limit_violation: bool,
) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let context = EvalContext {
max_fee_per_gas: actual_max_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: actual_max_priority_fee_per_gas,
..context()
};
let shared = SharedGrantSettings {
max_gas_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas,
..shared_settings()
};
let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context, &shared, 999, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
violations
.iter()
.any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::GasLimitExceeded { .. })),
expect_gas_limit_violation
);
if expect_gas_limit_violation {
assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
} else {
assert!(violations.is_empty());
}
}
#[rstest]
#[case::under_rate_limit(2, false)]
#[case::at_rate_limit(1, true)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_rate_limit(
#[case] rate_limit_count: u32,
#[case] expect_rate_limit_violation: bool,
) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let shared = SharedGrantSettings {
rate_limit: Some(TransactionRateLimit {
count: rate_limit_count,
window: Duration::hours(1),
}),
..shared_settings()
};
let basic_grant = insert_basic_grant(&mut conn, &shared).await;
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: basic_grant.id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
eth_value: super::utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::ZERO).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context(), &shared, basic_grant.id, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
violations
.iter()
.any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded)),
expect_rate_limit_violation
);
if expect_rate_limit_violation {
assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
} else {
assert!(violations.is_empty());
}
}
}

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
db::models::{self, EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess},
evm::utils,
};
@@ -55,6 +56,9 @@ pub enum EvalViolation {
#[error("Transaction type is not allowed by this grant")]
InvalidTransactionType,
#[error("Mismatching chain ID")]
MismatchingChainId { expected: ChainId, actual: ChainId },
}
pub type DatabaseID = i32;
@@ -62,13 +66,12 @@ pub type DatabaseID = i32;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Grant<PolicySettings> {
pub id: DatabaseID,
pub shared_grant_id: DatabaseID, // ID of the basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
pub shared: SharedGrantSettings,
pub settings: PolicySettings,
pub common_settings_id: DatabaseID, // ID of the basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
pub settings: CombinedSettings<PolicySettings>,
}
pub trait Policy: Sized {
type Settings: Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificGrant>;
type Settings: Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificGrant> + Integrable;
type Meaning: Display + std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificMeaning>;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning>;
@@ -124,13 +127,13 @@ pub enum SpecificMeaning {
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Meaning),
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub struct TransactionRateLimit {
pub count: u32,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub struct VolumeRateLimit {
pub max_volume: U256,
pub window: Duration,
@@ -151,7 +154,7 @@ pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
}
impl SharedGrantSettings {
fn try_from_model(model: EvmBasicGrant) -> QueryResult<Self> {
pub(crate) fn try_from_model(model: EvmBasicGrant) -> QueryResult<Self> {
Ok(Self {
wallet_access_id: model.wallet_access_id,
chain: model.chain_id as u64, // safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants
@@ -197,7 +200,57 @@ pub enum SpecificGrant {
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings),
}
pub struct FullGrant<PolicyGrant> {
pub basic: SharedGrantSettings,
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct CombinedSettings<PolicyGrant> {
pub shared: SharedGrantSettings,
pub specific: PolicyGrant,
}
impl<P> CombinedSettings<P> {
pub fn generalize<Y: From<P>>(self) -> CombinedSettings<Y> {
CombinedSettings {
shared: self.shared,
specific: self.specific.into(),
}
}
}
impl<P: Integrable> Integrable for CombinedSettings<P> {
const KIND: &'static str = P::KIND;
const VERSION: i32 = P::VERSION;
}
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
impl Hashable for TransactionRateLimit {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.count.hash(hasher);
self.window.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl Hashable for VolumeRateLimit {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.max_volume.hash(hasher);
self.window.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl Hashable for SharedGrantSettings {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.wallet_access_id.hash(hasher);
self.chain.hash(hasher);
self.valid_from.hash(hasher);
self.valid_until.hash(hasher);
self.max_gas_fee_per_gas.hash(hasher);
self.max_priority_fee_per_gas.hash(hasher);
self.rate_limit.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl<P: Hashable> Hashable for CombinedSettings<P> {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.shared.hash(hasher);
self.specific.hash(hasher);
}
}

View File

@@ -8,13 +8,14 @@ use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, JoinOnDsl, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable;
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, EvmEtherTransferLimit,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_transaction_log};
use crate::evm::policies::{
Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
};
use crate::{
db::{
@@ -56,6 +57,18 @@ pub struct Settings {
pub target: Vec<Address>,
pub limit: VolumeRateLimit,
}
impl Integrable for Settings {
const KIND: &'static str = "EtherTransfer";
}
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
impl Hashable for Settings {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.target.hash(hasher);
self.limit.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
@@ -95,17 +108,17 @@ async fn check_rate_limits(
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let window = grant.settings.limit.window;
let window = grant.settings.specific.limit.window;
let past_transaction = query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.id, window, db).await?;
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - grant.settings.limit.window;
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - grant.settings.specific.limit.window;
let prospective_cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transaction
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
.fold(current_transfer_value, |acc, (value, _)| acc + *value);
if prospective_cumulative_volume > grant.settings.limit.max_volume {
if prospective_cumulative_volume > grant.settings.specific.limit.max_volume {
violations.push(EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded);
}
@@ -138,7 +151,7 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
// Check if the target address is within the grant's allowed targets
if !grant.settings.target.contains(&meaning.to) {
if !grant.settings.specific.target.contains(&meaning.to) {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target: meaning.to });
}
@@ -247,9 +260,11 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: grant.id,
shared_grant_id: grant.basic_grant_id,
common_settings_id: grant.basic_grant_id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
settings,
specific: settings,
},
}))
}
@@ -327,9 +342,10 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
Ok(Grant {
id: specific.id,
shared_grant_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
common_settings_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic)?,
settings: Settings {
specific: Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(
@@ -338,6 +354,7 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
},
},
},
})
})
.collect()

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,10 @@ use crate::db::{
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::{
policies::{EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, VolumeRateLimit},
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
@@ -81,8 +84,6 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
}
}
// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn analyze_matches_empty_calldata() {
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1_000u64))).unwrap();
@@ -99,8 +100,6 @@ fn analyze_rejects_nonempty_calldata() {
assert!(EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).is_none());
}
// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_for_allowed_target() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
@@ -108,9 +107,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_for_allowed_target() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
specific: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
},
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
@@ -127,9 +128,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_disallowed_target() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
specific: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
},
};
let context = ctx(OTHER, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
@@ -167,9 +170,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_when_volume_within_limit() {
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
common_settings_id: basic.id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings,
specific: settings,
},
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
@@ -207,9 +212,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
common_settings_id: basic.id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings,
specific: settings,
},
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
@@ -248,9 +255,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
common_settings_id: basic.id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings,
specific: settings,
},
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
@@ -263,8 +272,6 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
);
}
// ── try_find_grant ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
@@ -282,8 +289,11 @@ async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
assert!(found.is_some());
let g = found.unwrap();
assert_eq!(g.settings.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
assert_eq!(g.settings.limit.max_volume, U256::from(1_000_000u64));
assert_eq!(g.settings.specific.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
assert_eq!(
g.settings.specific.limit.max_volume,
U256::from(1_000_000u64)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -320,7 +330,36 @@ async fn try_find_grant_wrong_target_returns_none() {
assert!(found.is_none());
}
// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
proptest::proptest! {
#[test]
fn target_order_does_not_affect_hash(
raw_addrs in proptest::collection::vec(proptest::prelude::any::<[u8; 20]>(), 0..8),
seed in proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(),
max_volume in proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(),
window_secs in 1i64..=86400,
) {
use rand::{SeedableRng, seq::SliceRandom};
use sha2::Digest;
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
let addrs: Vec<Address> = raw_addrs.iter().map(|b| Address::from(*b)).collect();
let mut shuffled = addrs.clone();
shuffled.shuffle(&mut rand::rngs::StdRng::seed_from_u64(seed));
let limit = VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(max_volume),
window: Duration::seconds(window_secs),
};
let mut h1 = sha2::Sha256::new();
Settings { target: addrs, limit: limit.clone() }.hash(&mut h1);
let mut h2 = sha2::Sha256::new();
Settings { target: shuffled, limit }.hash(&mut h2);
proptest::prop_assert_eq!(h1.finalize(), h2.finalize());
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {
@@ -347,7 +386,7 @@ async fn find_all_grants_excludes_revoked() {
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.specific.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -363,8 +402,11 @@ async fn find_all_grants_multiple_targets() {
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.target.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.limit.max_volume, U256::from(1_000_000u64));
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.specific.target.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(
all[0].settings.specific.limit.max_volume,
U256::from(1_000_000u64)
);
}
#[tokio::test]

View File

@@ -1,20 +1,5 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, U256},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, NewEvmTokenTransferGrant,
NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
@@ -26,6 +11,25 @@ use crate::evm::{
},
utils,
};
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::Integrable,
db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
NewEvmTokenTransferGrant, NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
SqliteTimestamp,
},
evm::policies::CombinedSettings,
};
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, U256},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
@@ -38,9 +42,9 @@ fn grant_join() -> _ {
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {
pub(crate) token: &'static TokenInfo,
pub(crate) to: Address,
pub(crate) value: U256,
pub token: &'static TokenInfo,
pub to: Address,
pub value: U256,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for Meaning {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
@@ -64,6 +68,20 @@ pub struct Settings {
pub target: Option<Address>,
pub volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit>,
}
impl Integrable for Settings {
const KIND: &'static str = "TokenTransfer";
}
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
impl Hashable for Settings {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.token_contract.hash(hasher);
self.target.hash(hasher);
self.volume_limits.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(val)
@@ -106,13 +124,20 @@ async fn check_volume_rate_limits(
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let Some(longest_window) = grant.settings.volume_limits.iter().map(|l| l.window).max() else {
let Some(longest_window) = grant
.settings
.specific
.volume_limits
.iter()
.map(|l| l.window)
.max()
else {
return Ok(violations);
};
let past_transfers = query_relevant_past_transfers(grant.id, longest_window, db).await?;
for limit in &grant.settings.volume_limits {
for limit in &grant.settings.specific.volume_limits {
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - limit.window;
let prospective_cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transfers
.iter()
@@ -158,7 +183,7 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
return Ok(violations);
}
if let Some(allowed) = grant.settings.target
if let Some(allowed) = grant.settings.specific.target
&& allowed != meaning.to
{
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target: meaning.to });
@@ -269,9 +294,11 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: token_grant.id,
shared_grant_id: token_grant.basic_grant_id,
common_settings_id: token_grant.basic_grant_id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
settings,
specific: settings,
},
}))
}
@@ -369,13 +396,15 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
Ok(Grant {
id: specific.id,
shared_grant_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
common_settings_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic)?,
settings: Settings {
specific: Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
},
},
})
})
.collect()

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,10 @@ use crate::db::{
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, VolumeRateLimit},
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
@@ -98,8 +101,6 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
}
}
// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn analyze_known_token_valid_calldata() {
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
@@ -125,8 +126,6 @@ fn analyze_empty_calldata_returns_none() {
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, Bytes::new())).is_none());
}
// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_nonzero_eth_value() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
@@ -134,9 +133,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_nonzero_eth_value() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None),
specific: make_settings(None, None),
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let mut context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -163,9 +164,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_any_recipient_when_no_restriction() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None),
specific: make_settings(None, None),
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -183,9 +186,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_matching_restricted_recipient() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
specific: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -203,9 +208,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_wrong_restricted_recipient() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
specific: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(OTHER, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -247,9 +254,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_volume_at_exact_limit() {
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
common_settings_id: basic.id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings,
specific: settings,
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -290,9 +299,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
common_settings_id: basic.id,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings,
specific: settings,
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(1u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -313,9 +324,11 @@ async fn evaluate_no_volume_limits_always_passes() {
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
common_settings_id: 999,
settings: CombinedSettings {
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None), // no volume limits
specific: make_settings(None, None), // no volume limits
},
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(u64::MAX));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
@@ -349,10 +362,13 @@ async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
assert!(found.is_some());
let g = found.unwrap();
assert_eq!(g.settings.token_contract, DAI);
assert_eq!(g.settings.target, Some(RECIPIENT));
assert_eq!(g.settings.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(g.settings.volume_limits[0].max_volume, U256::from(5_000u64));
assert_eq!(g.settings.specific.token_contract, DAI);
assert_eq!(g.settings.specific.target, Some(RECIPIENT));
assert_eq!(g.settings.specific.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
g.settings.specific.volume_limits[0].max_volume,
U256::from(5_000u64)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -392,7 +408,39 @@ async fn try_find_grant_unknown_token_returns_none() {
assert!(found.is_none());
}
// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
proptest::proptest! {
#[test]
fn volume_limits_order_does_not_affect_hash(
raw_limits in proptest::collection::vec(
(proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(), 1i64..=86400),
0..8,
),
seed in proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(),
) {
use rand::{SeedableRng, seq::SliceRandom};
use sha2::Digest;
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
let limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = raw_limits
.iter()
.map(|(max_vol, window_secs)| VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(*max_vol),
window: Duration::seconds(*window_secs),
})
.collect();
let mut shuffled = limits.clone();
shuffled.shuffle(&mut rand::rngs::StdRng::seed_from_u64(seed));
let mut h1 = sha2::Sha256::new();
Settings { token_contract: DAI, target: None, volume_limits: limits }.hash(&mut h1);
let mut h2 = sha2::Sha256::new();
Settings { token_contract: DAI, target: None, volume_limits: shuffled }.hash(&mut h2);
proptest::prop_assert_eq!(h1.finalize(), h2.finalize());
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {
@@ -434,9 +482,9 @@ async fn find_all_grants_loads_volume_limits() {
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.specific.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
all[0].settings.volume_limits[0].max_volume,
all[0].settings.specific.volume_limits[0].max_volume,
U256::from(9_999u64)
);
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::{TxSigner, TxSignerSync},
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer, SignerSync, utils::secret_key_to_address},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use k256::ecdsa::{self, RecoveryId, SigningKey, signature::hazmat::PrehashSigner};

View File

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::client::{ClientConnection, session::ClientSession},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::client::{ClientConnection, session::ClientSession},
};
mod auth;

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
proto::{
@@ -21,8 +22,9 @@ use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::client::{self, ClientConnection, auth},
crypto::integrity::{Nested, Verified},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::client::{self, ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, auth},
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
@@ -45,7 +47,7 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
match response {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes(),
nonce,
})
}
@@ -68,6 +70,7 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Internal)
| auth::Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
| auth::Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
| auth::Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
| auth::Error::Transport => ProtoAuthResult::Internal,
}
.into(),
@@ -159,11 +162,7 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
.await;
return None;
};
let Ok(pubkey) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(pubkey) else {
let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
return None;
};
let Ok(pubkey) = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey) else {
let Ok(pubkey) = authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey.as_slice()) else {
let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
return None;
};
@@ -173,7 +172,7 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
})
}
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => {
let Ok(signature) = ed25519_dalek::Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) else {
let Ok(signature) = authn::Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) else {
let _ = self
.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature)
.await;
@@ -199,7 +198,7 @@ pub async fn start(
conn: &mut ClientConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
) -> Result<i32, auth::Error> {
) -> Result<Verified<i32, Nested<ClientCredentials>>, auth::Error> {
let mut transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
client::auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await
}

View File

@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::client::session::{ClientSession, HandleSignTransaction, SignTransactionRpcError},
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
peers::client::session::{ClientSession, HandleSignTransaction, SignTransactionRpcError},
};
fn wrap_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> ClientResponsePayload {

View File

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::actors::{
client::session::{ClientSession, Error, HandleQueryVaultState},
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
peers::client::session::{ClientSession, Error, HandleQueryVaultState},
};
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
match payload {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(_) => {
let state = match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(VaultState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(Error::Internal)) => ProtoVaultState::Error,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
EvalViolation as ProtoEvalViolation, GasLimitExceededViolation, NoMatchingGrantError,
PolicyViolationsError, SpecificMeaning as ProtoSpecificMeaning,
TokenInfo as ProtoTokenInfo, TransactionEvalError as ProtoTransactionEvalError,
eval_violation::Kind as ProtoEvalViolationKind,
eval_violation as proto_eval_violation, eval_violation::Kind as ProtoEvalViolationKind,
specific_meaning::Meaning as ProtoSpecificMeaningKind,
transaction_eval_error::Kind as ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind,
},
@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ impl Convert for EvalViolation {
EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTransactionType(())
}
EvalViolation::MismatchingChainId { expected, actual } => {
ProtoEvalViolationKind::ChainIdMismatch(proto_eval_violation::ChainIdMismatch {
expected,
actual,
})
}
};
ProtoEvalViolation { kind: Some(kind) }
@@ -108,12 +114,12 @@ impl Convert for VetError {
violations: violations.into_iter().map(Convert::convert).collect(),
})
}
PolicyError::Database(_) => {
PolicyError::Database(_) | PolicyError::Integrity(_) => {
return EvmSignTransactionResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into());
}
},
};
EvmSignTransactionResult::EvalError(ProtoTransactionEvalError { kind: Some(kind) }.into())
EvmSignTransactionResult::EvalError(ProtoTransactionEvalError { kind: Some(kind) })
}
}

View File

@@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ use tonic::{Request, Response, Status, async_trait};
use tracing::info;
use crate::{
actors::{client::ClientConnection, user_agent::UserAgentConnection},
grpc::user_agent::start,
peers::{client::ClientConnection, user_agent::UserAgentConnection},
};
mod request_tracker;
@@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for super::Ser
let (bi, rx) = GrpcBi::from_bi_stream(req_stream);
tokio::spawn(start(
tokio::spawn(user_agent::start(
UserAgentConnection {
db: self.context.db.clone(),
actors: self.context.actors.clone(),

View File

@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
transport::{Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentSession},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentSession},
};
mod auth;
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ mod inbound;
mod outbound;
mod sdk_client;
mod vault;
mod vault_gate;
pub struct OutOfBandAdapter(mpsc::Sender<OutOfBand>);
@@ -124,21 +125,23 @@ pub async fn start(
) {
let mut request_tracker = RequestTracker::default();
let pubkey = match auth::start(&mut conn, &mut bi, &mut request_tracker).await {
Ok(pubkey) => pubkey,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "Authentication failed");
return;
}
};
let (oob_sender, oob_receiver) = mpsc::channel(16);
let oob_adapter = OutOfBandAdapter(oob_sender);
let actor = UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new(conn, Box::new(oob_adapter)));
let actor_for_cleanup = actor.clone();
info!(?pubkey, "User authenticated successfully");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor, oob_receiver, request_tracker).await;
actor_for_cleanup.kill();
let actor = {
let transport = auth::AuthTransportAdapter::new(&mut bi, &mut request_tracker);
match crate::peers::user_agent::start(&mut conn, transport, Box::new(oob_adapter)).await {
Ok(actor) => actor,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "User agent connection failed");
return;
}
}
};
info!("User agent session established");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor.clone(), oob_receiver, request_tracker).await;
actor.kill();
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
@@ -5,8 +6,7 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
self as proto_auth, AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge,
AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
AuthChallengeSolution as ProtoAuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult,
KeyType as ProtoKeyType, request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload,
response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload, response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
},
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
@@ -18,14 +18,13 @@ use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth},
db::models::KeyType,
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::user_agent::{AuthCredentials, UserAgentConnection, auth},
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
pub(super) bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
pub(super) request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
@@ -39,16 +38,32 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
}
}
async fn send_user_agent_response(
pub(super) fn bi_mut(&mut self) -> &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse> {
self.bi
}
pub(super) fn tracker_mut(&mut self) -> &mut RequestTracker {
self.request_tracker
}
pub(super) async fn send_response_payload(
&mut self,
payload: AuthResponsePayload,
payload: UserAgentResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.bi
.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
id: Some(self.request_tracker.current_request_id()),
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::Auth(proto_auth::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})),
}))
.await
}
async fn send_user_agent_response(
&mut self,
payload: AuthResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.send_response_payload(UserAgentResponsePayload::Auth(proto_auth::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
}
@@ -141,28 +156,8 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(ProtoAuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
key_type,
}) => {
let Ok(key_type) = ProtoKeyType::try_from(key_type) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid key type",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
let key_type = match key_type {
ProtoKeyType::Ed25519 => KeyType::Ed25519,
ProtoKeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
ProtoKeyType::Rsa => KeyType::Rsa,
ProtoKeyType::Unspecified => {
warn!(
event = "received request with unspecified key type",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
}
};
let Ok(pubkey) = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, pubkey)) else {
let Ok(pubkey) = authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey.as_slice()) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid public key",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
@@ -188,7 +183,7 @@ pub async fn start(
conn: &mut UserAgentConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, auth::Error> {
let transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
auth::authenticate(conn, transport).await
) -> Result<AuthCredentials, auth::Error> {
let mut transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await
}

View File

@@ -23,18 +23,18 @@ use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
HandleEvmWalletCreate, HandleEvmWalletList, HandleGrantCreate, HandleGrantDelete,
HandleGrantList, HandleSignTransaction,
SignTransactionError as SessionSignTransactionError,
},
},
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
peers::user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::handlers::{
GrantMutationError, HandleEvmWalletCreate, HandleEvmWalletList, HandleGrantCreate,
HandleGrantDelete, HandleGrantList, HandleSignTransaction,
SignTransactionError as SessionSignTransactionError,
},
},
};
fn wrap_evm_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ async fn handle_grant_list(
grants: grants
.into_iter()
.map(|grant| GrantEntry {
id: grant.id,
wallet_access_id: grant.shared.wallet_access_id,
shared: Some(grant.shared.convert()),
specific: Some(grant.settings.convert()),
id: grant.common_settings_id,
wallet_access_id: grant.settings.shared.wallet_access_id,
shared: Some(grant.settings.shared.convert()),
specific: Some(grant.settings.specific.convert()),
})
.collect(),
}),
@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ async fn handle_grant_create(
let result = match actor.ask(HandleGrantCreate { basic, grant }).await {
Ok(grant_id) => EvmGrantCreateResult::GrantId(grant_id),
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed)) => {
EvmGrantCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::VaultSealed.into())
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to create EVM grant");
EvmGrantCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
@@ -171,6 +174,9 @@ async fn handle_grant_delete(
.await
{
Ok(()) => EvmGrantDeleteResult::Ok(()),
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed)) => {
EvmGrantDeleteResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::VaultSealed.into())
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to delete EVM grant");
EvmGrantDeleteResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientMetadata,
user_agent::{
@@ -20,15 +21,15 @@ use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{
db::models::NewEvmWalletAccess,
grpc::Convert,
peers::user_agent::{
OutOfBand, UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
session::handlers::{
HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess, HandleListWalletAccess, HandleNewClientApprove,
HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess, HandleSdkClientList,
},
},
db::models::NewEvmWalletAccess,
grpc::Convert,
};
fn wrap_sdk_client_response(payload: SdkClientResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
match oob {
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionRequest { profile } => wrap_sdk_client_response(
SdkClientResponsePayload::ConnectionRequest(ProtoSdkClientConnectionRequest {
pubkey: profile.pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey: profile.pubkey.to_bytes(),
info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
name: profile.metadata.name,
description: profile.metadata.description,
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
),
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey } => wrap_sdk_client_response(
SdkClientResponsePayload::ConnectionCancel(ProtoSdkClientConnectionCancel {
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes(),
}),
),
}
@@ -89,10 +90,8 @@ async fn handle_connection_response(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
resp: ProtoSdkClientConnectionResponse,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let pubkey_bytes = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(resp.pubkey)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid Ed25519 public key length"))?;
let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey_bytes)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid Ed25519 public key"))?;
let pubkey = authn::PublicKey::try_from(resp.pubkey.as_slice())
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid ML-DSA public key"))?;
actor
.ask(HandleNewClientApprove {
@@ -117,7 +116,7 @@ async fn handle_list(
.into_iter()
.map(|(client, metadata)| ProtoSdkClientEntry {
id: client.id,
pubkey: client.public_key,
pubkey: client.public_key.to_vec(),
info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,

View File

@@ -1,34 +1,15 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState;
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault,
bootstrap::{
self as proto_bootstrap, BootstrapEncryptedKey as ProtoBootstrapEncryptedKey,
BootstrapResult as ProtoBootstrapResult,
},
request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload,
unseal::{
self as proto_unseal, UnsealEncryptedKey as ProtoUnsealEncryptedKey,
UnsealResult as ProtoUnsealResult, UnsealStart,
request::Payload as UnsealRequestPayload, response::Payload as UnsealResponsePayload,
},
},
vault::{self as proto_vault, request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload, response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload},
};
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::actors::{
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
BootstrapError, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleQueryVaultState,
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest, UnsealError,
},
},
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
peers::user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::handlers::HandleQueryVaultState},
};
fn wrap_vault_response(payload: VaultResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
@@ -37,18 +18,6 @@ fn wrap_vault_response(payload: VaultResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayloa
})
}
fn wrap_unseal_response(payload: UnsealResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Unseal(proto_unseal::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
}))
}
fn wrap_bootstrap_response(result: ProtoBootstrapResult) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Bootstrap(proto_bootstrap::Response {
result: result.into(),
}))
}
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: proto_vault::Request,
@@ -59,116 +28,21 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
match payload {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(_) => handle_query_vault_state(actor).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(req) => dispatch_unseal_request(actor, req).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(req) => handle_bootstrap_request(actor, req).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(_) | VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(_) => {
Err(Status::permission_denied(
"Vault is already unsealed; unseal/bootstrap not permitted in session",
))
}
}
async fn dispatch_unseal_request(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: proto_unseal::Request,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let Some(payload) = req.payload else {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing unseal request payload"));
};
match payload {
UnsealRequestPayload::Start(req) => handle_unseal_start(actor, req).await,
UnsealRequestPayload::EncryptedKey(req) => handle_unseal_encrypted_key(actor, req).await,
}
}
async fn handle_unseal_start(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: UnsealStart,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let client_pubkey = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(req.client_pubkey)
.map(x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid X25519 public key"))?;
let response = actor
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest { client_pubkey })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle unseal start request");
Status::internal("Failed to start unseal flow")
})?;
Ok(Some(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Start(
proto_unseal::UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: response.server_pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
))))
}
async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: ProtoUnsealEncryptedKey,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: req.nonce,
ciphertext: req.ciphertext,
associated_data: req.associated_data,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(UnsealError::InvalidKey)) => ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle unseal request");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault"));
}
};
Ok(Some(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Result(
result.into(),
))))
}
async fn handle_bootstrap_request(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: proto_bootstrap::Request,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let encrypted_key = req
.encrypted_key
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing bootstrap encrypted key"))?;
handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(actor, encrypted_key).await
}
async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
req: ProtoBootstrapEncryptedKey,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor
.ask(HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce: req.nonce,
ciphertext: req.ciphertext,
associated_data: req.associated_data,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::InvalidKey
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to handle bootstrap request");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to bootstrap vault"));
}
};
Ok(Some(wrap_bootstrap_response(result)))
}
async fn handle_query_vault_state(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
let state = match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(VaultState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");
ProtoVaultState::Error

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault,
bootstrap::{self as proto_bootstrap, BootstrapResult as ProtoBootstrapResult},
request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload,
unseal::{
self as proto_unseal, UnsealResult as ProtoUnsealResult,
request::Payload as UnsealRequestPayload,
response::Payload as UnsealResponsePayload,
},
},
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use super::auth::AuthTransportAdapter;
use crate::peers::user_agent::vault_gate::{
self as vault_gate, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleHandshake, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey,
};
fn wrap_vault_response(payload: VaultResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::Vault(proto_vault::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
}
fn wrap_unseal_response(payload: UnsealResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Unseal(proto_unseal::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
}))
}
fn wrap_bootstrap_response(result: ProtoBootstrapResult) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Bootstrap(proto_bootstrap::Response {
result: result.into(),
}))
}
impl AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn send_query_state(&mut self) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
use arbiter_proto::proto::shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState;
self.send_response_payload(wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::State(
ProtoVaultState::Sealed.into(),
)))
.await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Receiver<vault_gate::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<vault_gate::Inbound> {
loop {
let request = match self.bi_mut().recv().await? {
Ok(request) => request,
Err(error) => {
warn!(?error, "Failed to receive user agent request during vault gate");
return None;
}
};
if let Err(err) = self.tracker_mut().request(request.id) {
let _ = self.bi_mut().send(Err(err)).await;
return None;
}
let Some(payload) = request.payload else {
let _ = self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing request payload")))
.await;
return None;
};
let vault_req = match payload {
UserAgentRequestPayload::Vault(req) => req,
_ => {
let _ = self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::permission_denied(
"Only vault operations are permitted before unsealing",
)))
.await;
return None;
}
};
let Some(vault_payload) = vault_req.payload else {
let _ = self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing vault request payload")))
.await;
return None;
};
match vault_payload {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(_) => {
if self.send_query_state().await.is_err() {
return None;
}
continue;
}
VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(req) => {
let Some(unseal_payload) = req.payload else {
let _ = self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing unseal request payload")))
.await;
return None;
};
match unseal_payload {
UnsealRequestPayload::Start(start) => {
let Ok(bytes) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(start.client_pubkey) else {
let _ = self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Invalid X25519 public key",
)))
.await;
return None;
};
return Some(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleHandshake(HandleHandshake {
client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from(bytes),
}));
}
UnsealRequestPayload::EncryptedKey(key) => {
return Some(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleUnsealEncryptedKey(
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: key.nonce,
ciphertext: key.ciphertext,
associated_data: key.associated_data,
},
));
}
}
}
VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(req) => {
let Some(encrypted_key) = req.encrypted_key else {
let _ = self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Missing bootstrap encrypted key",
)))
.await;
return None;
};
return Some(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey(
HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce: encrypted_key.nonce,
ciphertext: encrypted_key.ciphertext,
associated_data: encrypted_key.associated_data,
},
));
}
}
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let outbound = match item {
Ok(outbound) => outbound,
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "vault gate produced transport-level error");
return self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::internal(err.to_string())))
.await;
}
};
let payload = match outbound {
vault_gate::Outbound::HandleHandshake(Ok(response)) => {
wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Start(
proto_unseal::UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: response.server_pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
))
}
vault_gate::Outbound::HandleHandshake(Err(err)) => {
warn!(?err, "handshake failed");
return self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::internal("Failed to start unseal flow")))
.await;
}
vault_gate::Outbound::HandleUnsealEncryptedKey(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(()) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Err(vault_gate::Error::InvalidKey) => ProtoUnsealResult::InvalidKey,
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "unseal failed");
return self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::internal("Failed to unseal vault")))
.await;
}
};
wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Result(proto_result.into()))
}
vault_gate::Outbound::HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Err(vault_gate::Error::InvalidKey) => ProtoBootstrapResult::InvalidKey,
Err(vault_gate::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "bootstrap failed");
return self
.bi_mut()
.send(Err(Status::internal("Failed to bootstrap vault")))
.await;
}
};
wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result)
}
};
self.send_response_payload(payload).await
}
}
impl Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>>
for AuthTransportAdapter<'_>
{
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
use crate::context::ServerContext;
pub mod actors;
@@ -7,7 +6,7 @@ pub mod crypto;
pub mod db;
pub mod evm;
pub mod grpc;
pub mod safe_cell;
pub mod peers;
pub mod utils;
pub struct Server {

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use tracing::info;
const PORT: u16 = 50051;
#[tokio::main]
#[mutants::skip]
async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
aws_lc_rs::default_provider().install_default().unwrap();

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
ClientMetadata,
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use chrono::Utc;
@@ -8,15 +9,16 @@ use diesel::{
dsl::insert_into, update,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::{
client::{ClientConnection, ClientProfile},
GlobalActors,
flow_coordinator::{self, RequestClientApproval},
vault::Vault,
},
crypto::integrity::{self, Nested, Verified},
db::{
self,
models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
@@ -24,12 +26,16 @@ use crate::{
},
};
use super::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, ClientProfile};
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database pool unavailable")]
DatabasePoolUnavailable,
#[error("Database operation failed")]
DatabaseOperationFailed,
#[error("Integrity check failed")]
IntegrityCheckFailed,
#[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
InvalidChallengeSolution,
#[error("Client approval request failed")]
@@ -38,6 +44,13 @@ pub enum Error {
Transport,
}
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
error!(?e, "Database error");
Self::DatabaseOperationFailed
}
}
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ApproveError {
#[error("Internal error")]
@@ -51,32 +64,55 @@ pub enum ApproveError {
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: Signature,
signature: authn::Signature,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge { pubkey: VerifyingKey, nonce: i32 },
AuthChallenge {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
nonce: i32,
},
AuthSuccess,
}
pub struct ClientInfo {
pub id: i32,
pub current_nonce: i32,
/// Returns the current nonce and client ID for a registered client.
/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<Option<(i32, i32)>, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
/// Atomically reads and increments the nonce for a known client.
/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
async fn get_client_and_nonce(
/// Atomically increments the nonce and re-signs the integrity envelope.
/// Returns the new nonce, which is used as the challenge nonce.
async fn create_nonce(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
) -> Result<Option<ClientInfo>, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
@@ -84,40 +120,38 @@ async fn get_client_and_nonce(
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let vault = vault.clone();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let Some((client_id, current_nonce)) = program_client::table
let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(program_client::table)
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
.await
.optional()?
else {
return Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(None);
};
update(program_client::table)
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.set(program_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.set(program_client::nonce.eq(program_client::nonce + 1))
.returning((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
Ok(Some(ClientInfo {
id: client_id,
current_nonce,
}))
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&vault,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: new_nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity sign failed after nonce update");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
Ok(new_nonce)
})
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn approve_new_client(
actors: &crate::actors::GlobalActors,
profile: ClientProfile,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
async fn approve_new_client(actors: &GlobalActors, profile: ClientProfile) -> Result<(), Error> {
let result = actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RequestClientApproval { client: profile })
@@ -139,15 +173,25 @@ async fn approve_new_client(
async fn insert_client(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
) -> Result<Verified<i32, Nested<ClientCredentials>>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
let metadata = metadata.clone();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let vault = vault.clone();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
@@ -155,34 +199,44 @@ async fn insert_client(
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to insert client metadata");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
let client_id = insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::nonce.eq(1), // pre-incremented; challenge uses 0
program_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
))
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.returning(program_client::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut conn)
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
let verified_id = integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&vault,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: NONCE_START,
},
client_id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to insert client metadata");
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new client key");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
Ok(client_id)
Ok(verified_id)
})
})
.await
}
async fn sync_client_metadata(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
client_id: i32,
client_id: &Verified<i32, Nested<ClientCredentials>>,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history};
@@ -199,7 +253,7 @@ async fn sync_client_metadata(
Box::pin(async move {
let (current_metadata_id, current): (i32, ProgramClientMetadata) =
program_client::table
.find(client_id)
.find(client_id.as_ref())
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
program_client::metadata_id,
@@ -218,7 +272,7 @@ async fn sync_client_metadata(
insert_into(client_metadata_history::table)
.values((
client_metadata_history::metadata_id.eq(current_metadata_id),
client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id),
client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id.as_ref()),
))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
@@ -233,7 +287,7 @@ async fn sync_client_metadata(
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(program_client::table.find(client_id))
update(program_client::table.find(client_id.as_ref()))
.set((
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
@@ -253,14 +307,17 @@ async fn sync_client_metadata(
async fn challenge_client<T>(
transport: &mut T,
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
nonce: i32,
) -> Result<(), Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + ?Sized,
{
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce }))
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce,
}))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
@@ -277,17 +334,18 @@ where
Error::Transport
})?;
let formatted = format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes());
pubkey.verify_strict(&formatted, &signature).map_err(|_| {
if !pubkey.verify(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature) {
error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn authenticate<T>(props: &mut ClientConnection, transport: &mut T) -> Result<i32, Error>
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut ClientConnection,
transport: &mut T,
) -> Result<Verified<i32, Nested<ClientCredentials>>, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
@@ -295,27 +353,45 @@ where
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
let info = match get_client_and_nonce(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
Some(nonce) => nonce,
let client_id = match get_current_nonce_and_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
Some((id, nonce)) => {
let mut db_conn = props.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
integrity::verify_entity(
&mut db_conn,
&props.actors.vault,
ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
})?
.entity_id
}
None => {
approve_new_client(
&props.actors,
ClientProfile {
pubkey,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
metadata: metadata.clone(),
},
)
.await?;
let client_id = insert_client(&props.db, &pubkey, &metadata).await?;
ClientInfo {
id: client_id,
current_nonce: 0,
}
insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
}
};
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, info.id, &metadata).await?;
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, info.current_nonce).await?;
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, &client_id, &metadata).await?;
let challenge_nonce = create_nonce(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &pubkey).await?;
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge_nonce).await?;
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
@@ -325,5 +401,5 @@ where
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(info.id)
Ok(client_id)
}

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,37 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, transport::Bi};
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::session::ClientSession},
actors::GlobalActors,
crypto::integrity::{Integrable, hashing::Hashable},
db,
peers::client::session::ClientSession,
};
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ClientProfile {
pub pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub metadata: ClientMetadata,
}
pub struct ClientCredentials {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub nonce: i32,
}
impl Integrable for ClientCredentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "client_credentials";
}
impl Hashable for ClientCredentials {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.pubkey.to_bytes());
self.nonce.hash(hasher);
}
}
pub struct ClientConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
@@ -31,7 +50,9 @@ pub async fn connect_client<T>(mut props: ClientConnection, transport: &mut T)
where
T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
match auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport).await {
let fut = auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport);
println!("authenticate future size: {}", std::mem::size_of_val(&fut));
match fut.await {
Ok(client_id) => {
ClientSession::spawn(ClientSession::new(props, client_id));
info!("Client authenticated, session started");

View File

@@ -6,22 +6,28 @@ use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
client::ClientConnection,
evm::{ClientSignTransaction, SignTransactionError},
flow_coordinator::RegisterClient,
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
vault::VaultState,
},
crypto::integrity::{Nested, Verified},
db,
evm::VetError,
};
use super::ClientConnection;
use super::ClientCredentials;
pub struct ClientSession {
props: ClientConnection,
client_id: i32,
client_id: Verified<i32, Nested<ClientCredentials>>,
}
impl ClientSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: i32) -> Self {
pub(crate) fn new(
props: ClientConnection,
client_id: Verified<i32, Nested<ClientCredentials>>,
) -> Self {
Self { props, client_id }
}
}
@@ -29,13 +35,13 @@ impl ClientSession {
#[messages]
impl ClientSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<VaultState, Error> {
use crate::actors::vault::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "client", "keyholder.query.failed");
error!(?err, actor = "client", "vault.query.failed");
return Err(Error::Internal);
}
};
@@ -54,7 +60,7 @@ impl ClientSession {
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id: self.client_id,
client_id: *self.client_id.as_ref(),
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
@@ -92,11 +98,12 @@ impl Actor for ClientSession {
}
impl ClientSession {
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
let props = ClientConnection::new(db, actors);
Self {
props,
client_id: 0,
client_id: Verified::new(0),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
pub mod client;
pub mod user_agent;

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,16 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::user_agent::{
AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection,
auth::state::{AuthContext, AuthStateMachine},
};
mod state;
use state::*;
use super::{AuthCredentials, UserAgentConnection};
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
@@ -37,6 +35,13 @@ impl Error {
}
}
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
error!(?e, "Database error");
Self::internal("Database error")
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge { nonce: i32 },
@@ -63,10 +68,10 @@ fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut UserAgentConnection,
transport: T,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Error>
transport: &mut T,
) -> Result<AuthCredentials, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send,
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
let mut state = AuthStateMachine::new(AuthContext::new(props, transport));
@@ -77,7 +82,7 @@ where
};
match state.process_event(parse_auth_event(payload)).await {
Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(key)) => return Ok(key.clone()),
Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(result)) => return Ok(result.clone()),
Err(AuthError::ActionFailed(err)) => {
error!(?err, "State machine action failed");
return Err(err);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
use super::super::{AuthCredentials, Credentials, UserAgentConnection};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, sqlite::Sqlite, update};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tracing::error;
use super::Error;
use crate::{crypto::integrity::{Nested, Verified}, peers::user_agent::auth::Outbound};
use crate::{
actors::{bootstrap::ConsumeToken, vault::Vault},
crypto::integrity,
db::{DatabasePool, schema::useragent_client},
};
pub struct ChallengeRequest {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub token: String,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub id: i32,
pub challenge_nonce: i32,
pub key: authn::PublicKey,
}
pub struct ChallengeSolution {
pub solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(AuthCredentials),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthCredentials),
}
);
const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
/// Returns the current nonce, ready to use for the challenge nonce.
async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
db: &DatabasePool,
key: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(i32, i32), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
useragent_client::table
.filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(key.to_bytes()))
.select((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
.await
})
})
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?
.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(?key, "Public key not found in database");
Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
})
}
async fn verify_integrity(
db: &DatabasePool,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?;
let _result = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut db_conn,
vault,
&AuthCredentials {
creds: Credentials {
id,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
},
new_nonce: nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
Error::internal("Integrity verification failed")
})?;
Ok(())
}
async fn compute_current_nonce(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(i32, i32), Error> {
update(useragent_client::table)
.filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
.set(useragent_client::nonce.eq(useragent_client::nonce + 1))
.returning((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error incrementing nonce");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})
}
async fn resign_credentials(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
id: i32,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
new_nonce: i32,
) -> Result<Verified<i32, Nested<AuthCredentials>>, Error> {
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
vault,
&AuthCredentials {
creds: Credentials {
id,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
},
new_nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity signature update failed");
Error::internal("Database error")
})
}
async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(useragent_client::table)
.values((
useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
useragent_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
))
.returning(useragent_client::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
Ok(id)
}
pub struct AuthContext<'a, T: ?Sized> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
pub(super) transport: &'a mut T,
}
impl<'a, T: ?Sized> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: &'a mut T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
type Error = Error;
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
let is_signing = integrity::is_signing_available(&self.conn.actors.vault)
.await
.unwrap_or(false);
if is_signing {
verify_integrity(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.vault, &pubkey).await?;
}
let vault = self.conn.actors.vault.clone();
let mut conn = self.conn.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let (id, nonce) = conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
let vault = vault.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let (id, new_nonce) = compute_current_nonce(conn, &pubkey).await?;
if is_signing {
resign_credentials(conn, &vault, id, &pubkey, new_nonce).await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok((id, new_nonce))
})
})
.await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
id,
challenge_nonce: nonce,
key: pubkey,
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
) -> Result<AuthCredentials, Self::Error> {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
match token_ok {
true => {
let id = register_key(&self.conn.db, &pubkey).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(AuthCredentials {
creds: Credentials { id, pubkey },
new_nonce: NONCE_START,
})
}
false => {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
}
}
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
id,
challenge_nonce,
key,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<AuthCredentials, Self::Error> {
let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!("Failed to decode signature in challenge solution");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
let valid = key.verify(*challenge_nonce, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature);
match valid {
true => {
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(AuthCredentials {
creds: Credentials {
id: *id,
pubkey: key.clone(),
},
new_nonce: *challenge_nonce,
})
}
false => {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors,
crypto::integrity::{self, Integrable},
db::{self, DatabaseError},
peers::client::ClientProfile,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Sender};
pub use auth::authenticate;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
pub use session::UserAgentSession;
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tracing::warn;
use vault_gate::VaultGate;
use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub mod vault_gate;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hash)]
pub struct Credentials {
pub id: i32,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
impl Hashable for Credentials {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.id.hash(hasher);
self.pubkey.hash(hasher);
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AuthCredentials {
pub creds: Credentials,
// denotes new nonce, not current
pub new_nonce: i32,
}
impl Hashable for authn::PublicKey {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
hasher.update(self.to_bytes());
}
}
impl Hashable for AuthCredentials {
fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.creds.hash(hasher);
self.new_nonce.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl Integrable for AuthCredentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "useragent_credentials";
}
// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: authn::PublicKey },
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("authentication failed: {0:?}")]
Auth(auth::Error),
#[error("vault gate failed: {0}")]
VaultGate(#[from] vault_gate::Error),
#[error("transport closed unexpectedly")]
Transport,
#[error("database error: {0}")]
Database(DatabaseError),
#[error("internal: {0}")]
Internal(String),
}
impl From<auth::Error> for Error {
fn from(err: auth::Error) -> Self {
Self::Auth(err)
}
}
pub async fn start<T>(
props: &mut UserAgentConnection,
mut transport: T,
oob_sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
) -> Result<ActorRef<UserAgentSession>, Error>
where
T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send,
T: Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> + Send,
{
let auth_creds = authenticate(props, &mut transport).await?;
let creds = match integrity::is_signing_available(&props.actors.vault)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Internal("Integrity verification failed".into()))?
{
// credentials were checked by `auth` stage
true => auth_creds.creds,
false => run_vault_gate(props, &mut transport, auth_creds).await?,
};
Ok(UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new(
props.clone(),
creds,
oob_sender,
)))
}
async fn run_vault_gate<T>(
props: &UserAgentConnection,
transport: &mut T,
auth_creds: AuthCredentials,
) -> Result<Credentials, Error>
where
T: Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
let (promotion_tx, mut promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
let gate = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(
auth_creds,
props.actors.clone(),
props.db.clone(),
promotion_tx,
));
let result = loop {
tokio::select! {
promotion = &mut promotion_rx => {
break match promotion {
Ok(Ok(creds)) => Ok(creds),
Ok(Err(err)) => Err(Error::VaultGate(err)),
Err(_) => Err(Error::Internal(
"vault gate promotion channel closed".into(),
)),
};
}
inbound = transport.recv() => {
let Some(inbound) = inbound else {
break Err(Error::Transport);
};
match gate.ask(inbound).await {
Ok(outbound) => {
if transport.send(Ok(outbound)).await.is_err() {
break Err(Error::Transport);
}
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "VaultGate failed to handle message");
break Err(Error::Internal(format!(
"vault gate ask failed: {err:?}"
)));
}
}
}
}
};
gate.kill();
result
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn,
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use kameo::messages;
use kameo::prelude::Context;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer;
use crate::actors::{
evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentListGrants,
},
vault::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
};
use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
};
use super::{Error, UserAgentSession};
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum GrantMutationError {
#[error("Vault is sealed")]
VaultSealed,
#[error("Internal grant mutation error")]
Internal,
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<VaultState, Error> {
use crate::actors::vault::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "vault.query.failed");
return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => Ok(address),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
"EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
))),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
&mut self,
basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, GrantMutationError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
.await
{
Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(
&mut self,
grant_id: i32,
) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
// match self
// .props
// .actors
// .evm
// .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
// .await
// {
// Ok(()) => Ok(()),
// Err(err) => {
// error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
// Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
// }
// }
let _ = grant_id;
todo!()
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<i32>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(access_entries)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message(ctx)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
&mut self,
approved: bool,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pending_approval = match self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey.to_bytes()) {
Some(approval) => approval,
None => {
error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
return Err(Error::internal("Unknown client in connection response"));
}
};
pending_approval
.controller
.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to send client approval response to controller"
);
Error::internal("Failed to send client approval response to controller")
})?;
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, Error> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let clients = program_client::table
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
ProgramClient::as_select(),
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(clients)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::{RunQueryDsl};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::Register;
use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages, prelude::Message};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::{
client::ClientProfile,
use crate::{
actors::{
flow_coordinator::{RegisterUserAgent, client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController},
user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection},
vault::events,
}, crypto::integrity, db::schema::useragent_client, peers::{client::ClientProfile, user_agent::{AuthCredentials, Credentials}}
};
mod state;
use state::{DummyContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine};
use super::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection};
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
@@ -47,52 +50,33 @@ impl Error {
}
pub struct PendingClientApproval {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
controller: ActorRef<ClientApprovalController>,
}
pub struct UserAgentSession {
creds: Credentials,
props: UserAgentConnection,
state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<VerifyingKey, PendingClientApproval>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>,
}
pub mod connection;
pub mod handlers;
impl UserAgentSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: UserAgentConnection, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
pub(crate) fn new(
props: UserAgentConnection,
creds: Credentials,
sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
creds,
props,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
sender,
pending_client_approvals: Default::default(),
}
}
pub fn new_test(db: crate::db::DatabasePool, actors: crate::actors::GlobalActors) -> Self {
struct DummySender;
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<OutOfBand> for DummySender {
async fn send(
&mut self,
_item: OutOfBand,
) -> Result<(), arbiter_proto::transport::Error> {
Ok(())
}
}
Self::new(UserAgentConnection::new(db, actors), Box::new(DummySender))
}
fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "State transition failed");
Error::State
})?;
Ok(())
}
}
#[messages]
@@ -118,8 +102,13 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
return;
}
self.pending_client_approvals
.insert(client.pubkey, PendingClientApproval { controller });
self.pending_client_approvals.insert(
client.pubkey.to_bytes(),
PendingClientApproval {
pubkey: client.pubkey,
controller,
},
);
}
}
@@ -158,14 +147,18 @@ impl Actor for UserAgentSession {
let cancelled_pubkey = self
.pending_client_approvals
.iter()
.find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(*k));
.find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(k.clone()));
if let Some(pubkey) = cancelled_pubkey {
self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey);
if let Some(pubkey_bytes) = cancelled_pubkey {
let Some(approval) = self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey_bytes) else {
return Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()));
};
if let Err(e) = self
.sender
.send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey })
.send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel {
pubkey: approval.pubkey,
})
.await
{
error!(

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce};
use kameo::{Actor, error::SendError, messages, prelude::Message};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::Register;
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey, SharedSecret};
pub mod state;
use state::*;
use super::{AuthCredentials, Credentials};
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal, events},
},
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
db::DatabasePool,
};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("State transition failed")]
State,
#[error("Internal error: {0}")]
Internal(String),
}
impl Error {
fn internal(message: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self::Internal(message.into())
}
}
pub struct HandshakeResponse {
pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
pub struct VaultGate {
pub auth_creds: AuthCredentials,
pub promotion_tx: Option<oneshot::Sender<Result<Credentials, Error>>>,
pub state: State,
pub actors: GlobalActors,
pub db: DatabasePool,
}
impl VaultGate {
pub fn new(
auth_creds: AuthCredentials,
actors: GlobalActors,
db: DatabasePool,
promotion_tx: oneshot::Sender<Result<Credentials, Error>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
auth_creds,
state: State::default(),
actors,
db,
promotion_tx: Some(promotion_tx),
}
}
}
impl Actor for VaultGate {
type Args = Self;
type Error = ();
async fn on_start(
args: Self::Args,
actor_ref: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let _ = args
.actors
.events
.tell(Register(
actor_ref.clone().recipient::<events::Bootstrapped>(),
))
.await;
let _ = args
.actors
.events
.tell(Register(actor_ref.recipient::<events::Unsealed>()))
.await;
Ok(args)
}
}
impl VaultGate {
fn decrypt_key(
secret: &SharedSecret,
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => Ok(key_buffer),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
}
}
}
}
#[messages(messages = Inbound, replies = Outbound)]
impl VaultGate {
#[message]
pub async fn handle_handshake(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
) -> Result<HandshakeResponse, Error> {
let ephemeral_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&ephemeral_secret);
let secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_pubkey);
self.state = State::ReadyForExchange {
server_key: public_key.clone(),
secret,
};
Ok(HandshakeResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key,
})
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else {
return Err(Error::State);
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data)
{
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.actors
.vault
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::InvalidKey)) => Err(Error::InvalidKey),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Vault failed to unseal key");
Err(Error::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to vault");
Err(Error::internal("Vault actor error").into())
}
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else {
return Err(Error::State);
};
let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data)
{
Ok(buffer) => buffer,
Err(()) => {
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
}
};
match self
.actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Vault failed to bootstrap vault");
Err(Error::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to vault");
Err(Error::internal("Vault error"))
}
}
}
}
impl Message<events::Bootstrapped> for VaultGate {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_: events::Bootstrapped,
ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let result = async {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(|_| Error::internal("DB unavailable"))?;
integrity::sign_entity(&mut conn, &self.actors.vault, &self.auth_creds, self.auth_creds.creds.id)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to sign integrity envelope on bootstrap");
Error::internal("Integrity sign failed")
})?;
Ok(self.auth_creds.creds.clone())
}
.await;
if let Some(tx) = self.promotion_tx.take() {
let _ = tx.send(result);
}
ctx.stop();
}
}
impl Message<events::Unsealed> for VaultGate {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_: events::Unsealed,
ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let result = async {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(|_| Error::internal("DB unavailable"))?;
match integrity::check_entity_attestation(
&mut conn,
&self.actors.vault,
&self.auth_creds,
self.auth_creds.creds.id,
)
.await
{
Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested) => Ok(self.auth_creds.creds.clone()),
Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable) => {
Err(Error::internal("Vault sealed during promotion"))
}
Err(e) => {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed during unseal promotion");
Err(Error::InvalidKey)
}
}
}
.await;
if let Some(tx) = self.promotion_tx.take() {
let _ = tx.send(result);
}
ctx.stop();
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey, SharedSecret};
pub struct Handshake {
client_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
#[derive(Default)]
pub enum State {
#[default]
Idle,
ReadyForExchange {
server_key: PublicKey,
secret: SharedSecret,
},
}

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT, format_challenge},
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use arbiter_proto::ClientMetadata;
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::actors::GlobalActors;
use arbiter_server::{
actors::client::{ClientConnection, auth, connect_client},
db,
actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Bootstrap},
crypto::integrity,
db::{self, schema},
peers::client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, auth, connect_client},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, NullableExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, SigningKey, VerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _};
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
@@ -21,7 +26,8 @@ fn metadata(name: &str, description: Option<&str>, version: Option<&str>) -> Cli
async fn insert_registered_client(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: Vec<u8>,
actors: &GlobalActors,
pubkey: VerifyingKey<MlDsa87>,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) {
use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
@@ -37,34 +43,90 @@ async fn insert_registered_client(
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(program_client::table)
let client_id: i32 = insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey),
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.encode().to_vec()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.returning(program_client::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
integrity::sign_entity(
&mut conn,
&actors.vault,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.into(),
nonce: 1,
},
client_id,
)
.await
.unwrap();
}
fn sign_client_challenge(
key: &SigningKey<MlDsa87>,
nonce: i32,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> authn::Signature {
let challenge = format_challenge(nonce, &pubkey.to_bytes());
key.signing_key()
.sign_deterministic(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.unwrap()
.into()
}
async fn insert_bootstrap_sentinel_useragent(db: &db::DatabasePool) {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let sentinel_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng())
.verifying_key()
.encode()
.to_vec();
insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(sentinel_key),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
async fn spawn_test_actors(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> GlobalActors {
insert_bootstrap_sentinel_useragent(db).await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actors
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut server_transport = server_transport;
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
metadata: metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
})
.await
@@ -78,20 +140,19 @@ pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
insert_registered_client(
&db,
pubkey_bytes.clone(),
&actors,
new_key.verifying_key(),
&metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
)
.await;
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut server_transport = server_transport;
@@ -101,7 +162,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
// Send challenge request
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
metadata: metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
})
.await
@@ -121,8 +182,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
};
// Sign the challenge and send solution
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge.1, challenge.0.as_bytes());
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
let signature = sign_client_challenge(&new_key, challenge.1, &challenge.0);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
@@ -147,34 +207,13 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let requested = metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0"));
{
use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&requested.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&requested.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&requested.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
insert_registered_client(&db, &actors, new_key.verifying_key(), &requested).await;
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -184,7 +223,7 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
metadata: requested,
})
.await
@@ -195,7 +234,7 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
};
let signature = new_key.sign(&arbiter_proto::format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes()));
let signature = sign_client_challenge(&new_key, nonce, &pubkey);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
.await
@@ -225,34 +264,19 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
insert_registered_client(
&db,
&actors,
new_key.verifying_key(),
&metadata("client", Some("old"), Some("1.0.0")),
)
.await;
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
{
use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq("client"),
client_metadata::description.eq(Some("old")),
client_metadata::version.eq(Some("1.0.0")),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut server_transport = server_transport;
@@ -261,7 +285,7 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
metadata: metadata("client", Some("new"), Some("2.0.0")),
})
.await
@@ -272,7 +296,7 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
};
let signature = new_key.sign(&arbiter_proto::format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes()));
let signature = sign_client_challenge(&new_key, nonce, &pubkey);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
.await
@@ -322,3 +346,59 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let requested = metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0"));
{
use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&requested.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&requested.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&requested.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().encode().to_vec()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut server_transport = server_transport;
connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
});
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
metadata: requested,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive auth rejection");
assert!(matches!(response, Err(auth::Error::IntegrityCheckFailed)));
task.await.unwrap();
}

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Error, Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Vault},
db::{self, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
pub async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
actor
.bootstrap(SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()))
.await

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
mod common;
#[path = "keyholder/concurrency.rs"]
mod concurrency;
#[path = "keyholder/lifecycle.rs"]
mod lifecycle;
#[path = "keyholder/storage.rs"]
mod storage;

View File

@@ -1,38 +1,58 @@
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn::{self, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, format_challenge},
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
bootstrap::GetToken,
keyholder::Bootstrap,
user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth},
},
actors::{GlobalActors, bootstrap::GetToken, vault::Bootstrap},
crypto::integrity,
db::{self, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
peers::user_agent::{AuthCredentials, Credentials, UserAgentConnection, auth},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, SigningKey, signature::Keypair as _};
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
fn sign_useragent_challenge(
key: &SigningKey<MlDsa87>,
nonce: i32,
pubkey_bytes: &[u8],
) -> authn::Signature {
let challenge = format_challenge(nonce, pubkey_bytes);
key.signing_key()
.sign_deterministic(&challenge, USERAGENT_CONTEXT)
.unwrap()
.into()
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
})
.await
@@ -55,7 +75,7 @@ pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
.first::<Vec<u8>>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(stored_pubkey, new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec());
assert_eq!(stored_pubkey, new_key.verifying_key().encode().to_vec());
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -64,17 +84,17 @@ pub async fn test_bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_string()),
})
.await
@@ -99,32 +119,54 @@ pub async fn test_bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().encode().to_vec();
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
let id: i32 = insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.returning(schema::useragent_client::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
integrity::sign_entity(
&mut conn,
&actors.vault,
&AuthCredentials {
creds: Credentials {
id,
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
},
new_nonce: 1,
},
id,
)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
bootstrap_token: None,
})
.await
@@ -142,12 +184,11 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge, &pubkey_bytes);
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
let signature = sign_useragent_challenge(&new_key, challenge, &pubkey_bytes);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -171,15 +212,15 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed()
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.key_holder
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().encode().to_vec();
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -187,23 +228,22 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed()
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
schema::useragent_client::pubkey_integrity_tag.eq(Some(vec![0u8; 32])),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
bootstrap_token: None,
})
.await
@@ -211,7 +251,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed()
assert!(matches!(
task.await.unwrap(),
Err(auth::Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
Err(auth::Error::Internal { .. })
));
}
@@ -220,32 +260,54 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed()
pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().encode().to_vec();
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
let id: i32 = insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.returning(schema::useragent_client::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
integrity::sign_entity(
&mut conn,
&actors.vault,
&AuthCredentials {
creds: Credentials {
id,
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
},
new_nonce: 1,
},
id,
)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = UserAgentConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
bootstrap_token: None,
})
.await
@@ -263,12 +325,11 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
let wrong_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge + 1, &pubkey_bytes);
let signature = new_key.sign(&wrong_challenge);
let signature = sign_useragent_challenge(&new_key, challenge + 1, &pubkey_bytes);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
})
.await
.unwrap();

View File

@@ -1,50 +1,59 @@
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn,
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
keyholder::{Bootstrap, Seal},
user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest, UnsealError},
},
vault::{Bootstrap, Seal},
},
db,
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
peers::user_agent::{
AuthCredentials, Credentials,
vault_gate::{Error as VaultGateError, HandleHandshake, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, VaultGate},
},
};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
async fn setup_sealed_user_agent(
async fn setup_sealed_gate(
seal_key: &[u8],
) -> (db::DatabasePool, kameo::actor::ActorRef<UserAgentSession>) {
) -> (db::DatabasePool, kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>, oneshot::Receiver<Result<Credentials, VaultGateError>>) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.key_holder
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(seal_key.to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actors.key_holder.ask(Seal).await.unwrap();
actors.vault.ask(Seal).await.unwrap();
let session = UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new_test(db.clone(), actors));
let (promotion_tx, promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
let pubkey = authn::SigningKey::generate().public_key();
let auth_creds = AuthCredentials {
creds: Credentials { id: 1, pubkey },
new_nonce: 1,
};
let gate = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(auth_creds, actors, db.clone(), promotion_tx));
(db, session)
(db, gate, promotion_rx)
}
async fn client_dh_encrypt(
user_agent: &kameo::actor::ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
gate: &kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
key_to_send: &[u8],
) -> HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
let response = user_agent
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
let response = gate
.ask(HandleHandshake {
client_pubkey: client_public,
})
.await
@@ -72,26 +81,26 @@ async fn client_dh_encrypt(
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_success() {
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(seal_key).await;
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, seal_key).await;
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(())));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(b"correct-key").await;
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(b"correct-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, b"wrong-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key").await;
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(
response,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
UnsealError::InvalidKey
VaultGateError::InvalidKey
))
));
}
@@ -99,19 +108,18 @@ pub async fn test_unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(b"test-key").await;
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(b"test-key").await;
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
user_agent
.ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
gate.ask(HandleHandshake {
client_pubkey: client_public,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = user_agent
let response = gate
.ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
@@ -122,7 +130,7 @@ pub async fn test_unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
assert!(matches!(
response,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
UnsealError::InvalidKey
VaultGateError::InvalidKey
))
));
}
@@ -131,63 +139,24 @@ pub async fn test_unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {
let seal_key = b"real-seal-key";
let (_db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(seal_key).await;
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, b"wrong-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key").await;
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(
response,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(
UnsealError::InvalidKey
VaultGateError::InvalidKey
))
));
}
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, seal_key).await;
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(())));
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_backfills_missing_pubkey_integrity_tags() {
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
let (db, user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(seal_key).await;
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(arbiter_server::db::schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
arbiter_server::db::schema::useragent_client::public_key
.eq(vec![1u8, 2u8, 3u8, 4u8]),
arbiter_server::db::schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
arbiter_server::db::schema::useragent_client::pubkey_integrity_tag
.eq(Option::<Vec<u8>>::None),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent, seal_key).await;
let response = user_agent.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(())));
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let tags: Vec<Option<Vec<u8>>> = arbiter_server::db::schema::useragent_client::table
.select(arbiter_server::db::schema::useragent_client::pubkey_integrity_tag)
.load(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
tags.iter()
.all(|tag| matches!(tag, Some(v) if v.len() == 32))
);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
mod common;
#[path = "vault/concurrency.rs"]
mod concurrency;
#[path = "vault/lifecycle.rs"]
mod lifecycle;
#[path = "vault/storage.rs"]
mod storage;

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Error, KeyHolder},
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{CreateNew, Error, Vault},
},
db::{self, models, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::sql_query};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
@@ -13,7 +17,7 @@ use tokio::task::JoinSet;
use crate::common;
async fn write_concurrently(
actor: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
actor: ActorRef<Vault>,
prefix: &'static str,
count: usize,
) -> Vec<(i32, Vec<u8>)> {
@@ -43,7 +47,7 @@ async fn write_concurrently(
#[test_log::test]
async fn concurrent_create_new_no_duplicate_nonces_() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
let actor = Vault::spawn(common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await);
let writes = write_concurrently(actor, "nonce-unique", 32).await;
assert_eq!(writes.len(), 32);
@@ -65,7 +69,7 @@ async fn concurrent_create_new_no_duplicate_nonces_() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn concurrent_create_new_root_nonce_never_moves_backward() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
let actor = Vault::spawn(common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await);
write_concurrently(actor, "root-max", 24).await;
@@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ async fn concurrent_create_new_root_nonce_never_moves_backward() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let root_key_history_id = common::root_key_history_id(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -155,12 +159,14 @@ async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
let actor = Vault::spawn(common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await);
let writes = write_concurrently(actor, "roundtrip", 40).await;
let expected: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>> = writes.into_iter().collect();
let mut decryptor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let mut decryptor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
decryptor
.try_unseal(SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()))
.await

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{Error, KeyHolder},
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{Error, Vault},
},
crypto::encryption::v1::{Nonce, ROOT_KEY_TAG},
db::{self, models, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
@@ -13,7 +17,9 @@ use crate::common;
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_bootstrap() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
@@ -36,7 +42,7 @@ async fn test_bootstrap() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let seal_key2 = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2).await.unwrap_err();
@@ -47,7 +53,9 @@ async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
let mut actor = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let err = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"data".to_vec()))
@@ -60,7 +68,9 @@ async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
let mut actor = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let err = actor.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
@@ -70,10 +80,12 @@ async fn test_decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
drop(actor);
let mut actor2 = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
let mut actor2 = Vault::new(db, GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let err = actor2.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
}
@@ -82,7 +94,7 @@ async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
let aead_id = actor
@@ -91,7 +103,9 @@ async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
@@ -103,7 +117,7 @@ async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"important data";
let aead_id = actor
@@ -112,7 +126,9 @@ async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let bad_key = SafeCell::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec());
let err = actor.try_unseal(bad_key).await.unwrap_err();

View File

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
use std::collections::HashSet;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::Error,
actors::vault::Error,
crypto::encryption::v1::Nonce,
db::{self, models, schema},
safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@ use crate::common;
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
let aead_id = actor
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let err = actor.decrypt(9999).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotFound));
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ async fn test_decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"same content";
let id1 = actor
@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_nonce_never_reused() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let n = 5;
for i in 0..n {
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ async fn test_nonce_never_reused() {
#[test_log::test]
async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let root_key_history_id = common::root_key_history_id(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@ async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()))
.await

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
rust_input: crate::api
rust_root: rust/
dart_output: lib/src/rust

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ sealed class CalloutEvent with _$CalloutEvent {
required CalloutData data,
}) = CalloutEventAdded;
const factory CalloutEvent.cancelled({
required String id,
}) = CalloutEventCancelled;
const factory CalloutEvent.cancelled({required String id}) =
CalloutEventCancelled;
}

View File

@@ -14,11 +14,8 @@ Future<void> showCallout(BuildContext context, WidgetRef ref, String id) async {
barrierLabel: MaterialLocalizations.of(context).modalBarrierDismissLabel,
barrierColor: Colors.transparent,
transitionDuration: const Duration(milliseconds: 320),
pageBuilder: (_, animation, _) => _CalloutOverlay(
id: id,
data: data,
animation: animation,
),
pageBuilder: (_, animation, _) =>
_CalloutOverlay(id: id, data: data, animation: animation),
);
}
@@ -35,21 +32,24 @@ class _CalloutOverlay extends ConsumerWidget {
@override
Widget build(BuildContext context, WidgetRef ref) {
ref.listen(
calloutManagerProvider.select((map) => map.containsKey(id)),
(wasPresent, isPresent) {
ref.listen(calloutManagerProvider.select((map) => map.containsKey(id)), (
wasPresent,
isPresent,
) {
if (wasPresent == true && !isPresent && context.mounted) {
Navigator.of(context).pop();
}
},
);
});
final content = switch (data) {
ConnectApprovalData(:final pubkey, :final clientInfo) => SdkConnectCallout(
ConnectApprovalData(:final pubkey, :final clientInfo) =>
SdkConnectCallout(
pubkey: pubkey,
clientInfo: clientInfo,
onAccept: () => ref.read(calloutManagerProvider.notifier).sendDecision(id, true),
onDecline: () => ref.read(calloutManagerProvider.notifier).sendDecision(id, false),
onAccept: () =>
ref.read(calloutManagerProvider.notifier).sendDecision(id, true),
onDecline: () =>
ref.read(calloutManagerProvider.notifier).sendDecision(id, false),
),
};

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ Future<void> showCalloutList(BuildContext context, WidgetRef ref) async {
barrierLabel: MaterialLocalizations.of(context).modalBarrierDismissLabel,
barrierColor: Colors.transparent,
transitionDuration: const Duration(milliseconds: 280),
pageBuilder: (_, animation, __) => _CalloutListOverlay(animation: animation),
pageBuilder: (_, animation, __) =>
_CalloutListOverlay(animation: animation),
);
if (selectedId != null && context.mounted) {
@@ -51,7 +52,9 @@ class _CalloutListOverlay extends ConsumerWidget {
child: AnimatedBuilder(
animation: barrierAnim,
builder: (_, __) => ColoredBox(
color: Colors.black.withValues(alpha: 0.35 * barrierAnim.value),
color: Colors.black.withValues(
alpha: 0.35 * barrierAnim.value,
),
),
),
),

View File

@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@ class ArbiterUrl {
try {
return base64Url.decode(base64Url.normalize(cert));
} on FormatException catch (error) {
throw FormatException("Invalid base64 in 'cert' query parameter: ${error.message}");
throw FormatException(
"Invalid base64 in 'cert' query parameter: ${error.message}",
);
}
}
}

View File

@@ -61,11 +61,6 @@ Future<Connection> connectAndAuthorize(
final req = ua_auth.AuthChallengeRequest(
pubkey: pubkey,
bootstrapToken: bootstrapToken,
keyType: switch (key.alg) {
KeyAlgorithm.rsa => ua_auth.KeyType.KEY_TYPE_RSA,
KeyAlgorithm.ecdsa => ua_auth.KeyType.KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1,
KeyAlgorithm.ed25519 => ua_auth.KeyType.KEY_TYPE_ED25519,
},
);
final response = await connection.ask(
UserAgentRequest(auth: ua_auth.Request(challengeRequest: req)),
@@ -106,7 +101,9 @@ Future<Connection> connectAndAuthorize(
final solutionResponse = await connection.ask(
UserAgentRequest(
auth: ua_auth.Request(
challengeSolution: ua_auth.AuthChallengeSolution(signature: signature),
challengeSolution: ua_auth.AuthChallengeSolution(
signature: signature,
),
),
),
);

View File

@@ -85,7 +85,9 @@ class Connection {
if (response.hasId()) {
final completer = _pendingRequests.remove(response.id);
if (completer == null) {
talker.warning('Received response for unknown request id ${response.id}');
talker.warning(
'Received response for unknown request id ${response.id}',
);
return;
}
completer.complete(response);

View File

@@ -9,9 +9,7 @@ Future<List<WalletEntry>> listEvmWallets(Connection connection) async {
UserAgentRequest(evm: ua_evm.Request(walletList: Empty())),
);
if (!response.hasEvm()) {
throw Exception(
'Expected EVM response, got ${response.whichPayload()}',
);
throw Exception('Expected EVM response, got ${response.whichPayload()}');
}
final evmResponse = response.evm;
@@ -37,9 +35,7 @@ Future<void> createEvmWallet(Connection connection) async {
UserAgentRequest(evm: ua_evm.Request(walletCreate: Empty())),
);
if (!response.hasEvm()) {
throw Exception(
'Expected EVM response, got ${response.whichPayload()}',
);
throw Exception('Expected EVM response, got ${response.whichPayload()}');
}
final evmResponse = response.evm;

View File

@@ -10,9 +10,7 @@ Future<List<GrantEntry>> listEvmGrants(Connection connection) async {
UserAgentRequest(evm: ua_evm.Request(grantList: request)),
);
if (!response.hasEvm()) {
throw Exception(
'Expected EVM response, got ${response.whichPayload()}',
);
throw Exception('Expected EVM response, got ${response.whichPayload()}');
}
final evmResponse = response.evm;
@@ -50,9 +48,7 @@ Future<int> createEvmGrant(
final resp = await connection.ask(request);
if (!resp.hasEvm()) {
throw Exception(
'Expected EVM response, got ${resp.whichPayload()}',
);
throw Exception('Expected EVM response, got ${resp.whichPayload()}');
}
final evmResponse = resp.evm;
@@ -70,15 +66,11 @@ Future<int> createEvmGrant(
Future<void> deleteEvmGrant(Connection connection, int grantId) async {
final response = await connection.ask(
UserAgentRequest(
evm: ua_evm.Request(
grantDelete: EvmGrantDeleteRequest(grantId: grantId),
),
evm: ua_evm.Request(grantDelete: EvmGrantDeleteRequest(grantId: grantId)),
),
);
if (!response.hasEvm()) {
throw Exception(
'Expected EVM response, got ${response.whichPayload()}',
);
throw Exception('Expected EVM response, got ${response.whichPayload()}');
}
final evmResponse = response.evm;

View File

@@ -8,9 +8,7 @@ Future<Set<int>> readClientWalletAccess(
required int clientId,
}) async {
final response = await connection.ask(
UserAgentRequest(
sdkClient: ua_sdk.Request(listWalletAccess: Empty()),
),
UserAgentRequest(sdkClient: ua_sdk.Request(listWalletAccess: Empty())),
);
if (!response.hasSdkClient()) {
throw Exception(
@@ -33,9 +31,7 @@ Future<List<ua_sdk.WalletAccessEntry>> listAllWalletAccesses(
Connection connection,
) async {
final response = await connection.ask(
UserAgentRequest(
sdkClient: ua_sdk.Request(listWalletAccess: Empty()),
),
UserAgentRequest(sdkClient: ua_sdk.Request(listWalletAccess: Empty())),
);
if (!response.hasSdkClient()) {
throw Exception(
@@ -81,9 +77,7 @@ Future<void> writeClientWalletAccess(
UserAgentRequest(
sdkClient: ua_sdk.Request(
revokeWalletAccess: ua_sdk.RevokeWalletAccess(
accesses: [
for (final walletId in toRevoke) walletId,
],
accesses: [for (final walletId in toRevoke) walletId],
),
),
),

View File

@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ class StoredServerInfo {
final int port;
final String caCertFingerprint;
factory StoredServerInfo.fromJson(Map<String, dynamic> json) => _$StoredServerInfoFromJson(json);
factory StoredServerInfo.fromJson(Map<String, dynamic> json) =>
_$StoredServerInfoFromJson(json);
Map<String, dynamic> toJson() => _$StoredServerInfoToJson(this);
}
abstract class ServerInfoStorage {

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