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WIP: feat-shamir (old) #103

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CleverWild wants to merge 66 commits from feat-shamir into main
pull from: feat-shamir
merge into: MarketTakers:main
Conversation 2 Commits 66 Files Changed 66 +12863 -583
66 changed files with 12863 additions and 583 deletions
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1
.gitattributes vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
* text=auto eol=lf

49
mise.lock
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ backend = "aqua:ast-grep/ast-grep"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:3ba383839044cf9817929435f5ce0027f91d06931e8efb32d942e58d73d92be5"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/assets/388772218"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:3ba383839044cf9817929435f5ce0027f91d06931e8efb32d942e58d73d92be5"
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:5de8b87cba67fc8dc3e239d54b6484802ad745a7ae3de76be4fe89661dc52657"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/assets/388771275"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:5de8b87cba67fc8dc3e239d54b6484802ad745a7ae3de76be4fe89661dc52657"
@@ -23,14 +25,17 @@ url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:c3961d8e8a4ee0ce2d0d98c7beeb168bb331cdc766b53630118a7b6c4fd39015"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64-apple-darwin.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/assets/388770234"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:a038965bfd7fe44257c771cdf8918dc3467dd8ec0eef673b8b14f639b144cdbd"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-apple-darwin.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/assets/388770498"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:fe34f631bb24c08ad146f92ca2a92971a53d179461b509fd8d32dc863bff9f83"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/assets/388771363"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-audit"]]
version = "0.22.1"
@@ -57,7 +62,7 @@ version = "0.9.133"
backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-shear"]]
version = "1.11.2"
version = "1.13.4"
backend = "cargo:cargo-shear"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-vet"]]
@@ -78,7 +83,27 @@ backend = "cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"
[[tools.flutter]]
version = "3.41.7-stable"
backend = "asdf:flutter"
backend = "http:flutter"
[tools.flutter."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:f344d5057db52abc2a63cd3a7c7370957b7685d1fca5e5fbe2ce4dfe74657a79"
url = "https://storage.googleapis.com/flutter_infra_release/releases/stable/linux/flutter_linux_3.41.7-stable.tar.xz"
[tools.flutter."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:f344d5057db52abc2a63cd3a7c7370957b7685d1fca5e5fbe2ce4dfe74657a79"
url = "https://storage.googleapis.com/flutter_infra_release/releases/stable/linux/flutter_linux_3.41.7-stable.tar.xz"
[tools.flutter."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:2e3e6af44d1adccf695deff52e5e4c8beb10e5625066b27ad082b38b83ef805e"
url = "https://storage.googleapis.com/flutter_infra_release/releases/stable/macos/flutter_macos_arm64_3.41.7-stable.zip"
[tools.flutter."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:a0b9af49e6e1a6800f31a408b98c1d7bd51e98650a8b9ebcd77168b48c916ff0"
url = "https://storage.googleapis.com/flutter_infra_release/releases/stable/macos/flutter_macos_3.41.7-stable.zip"
[tools.flutter."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:de17b513b740a931c5dbc3f96b5a659c1612dfe6b5e1f910c5ad954a8bac17ee"
url = "https://storage.googleapis.com/flutter_infra_release/releases/stable/windows/flutter_windows_3.41.7-stable.zip"
[[tools.protoc]]
version = "29.6"
@@ -87,30 +112,37 @@ backend = "aqua:protocolbuffers/protobuf/protoc"
[tools.protoc."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:2594ff4fcae8cb57310d394d0961b236190ad9c5efbfdf1f597ea471d424fe79"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-aarch_64.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795076"
[tools.protoc."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:2594ff4fcae8cb57310d394d0961b236190ad9c5efbfdf1f597ea471d424fe79"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-aarch_64.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795076"
[tools.protoc."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:48785a926e73ffa3f68e2f22b14e7b849620c7a1d36809ac9249a5495e280323"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-x86_64.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795083"
[tools.protoc."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:48785a926e73ffa3f68e2f22b14e7b849620c7a1d36809ac9249a5495e280323"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-linux-x86_64.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795083"
[tools.protoc."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:b9576b5fa1a1ef3fe13a8c91d9d8204b46545759bea5ae155cd6ba2ea4cdaeed"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-aarch_64.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795082"
[tools.protoc."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:312f04713946921cc0187ef34df80241ddca1bab6f564c636885fd2cc90d3f88"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-x86_64.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795085"
[tools.protoc."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f6f7"
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"
url_api = "https://api.github.com/repos/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/assets/350795088"
[[tools.python]]
version = "3.14.4"
@@ -122,8 +154,8 @@ url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:b8b597fdb2f8dccdc502c11947b60a4b65eb6bce79cfa60c7ccf9b6e8352c60a"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
checksum = "sha256:a10687b226e0941632569836bc1d8fa6353a8e3e8424316467ca9cdf220b983d"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-musl-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
@@ -132,12 +164,12 @@ url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:fe9a9c32d13870af632cbac3dfc7528ae53597e94472aa4c7d6a42e8166136cd"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
checksum = "sha256:d6005226cd24e780630626232c7a63243d4885fdf975dcf930a0758a0759ce14"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "blake3:0314ec66e0f33ec04959583b5900bc8edae371a396aa96b8874e750d1fe936e6"
checksum = "sha256:6f304f4ec30854611f23316578302235fb517cd970519ecdd11a8c4db87fd843"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
@@ -154,3 +186,6 @@ provenance = "github-attestations"
[[tools.rust]]
version = "1.95.0"
backend = "core:rust"
[tools.rust.options]
components = "clippy,rust-analyzer"

21
protobufs/operator/governance.proto
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@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.operator.governance;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
message Request {
oneof payload {
CreateProposalRequest create = 1;
@@ -13,14 +15,13 @@ message Request {
message CreateProposalRequest {
oneof kind {
ApproveSdkClientPayload approve_sdk_client = 1;
GrantWalletAccessPayload grant_wallet_access = 3;
ApproveServerUpdatePayload approve_server_update = 4;
ReplaceOperatorPayload replace_operator = 5;
UpdateShamirParametersPayload update_shamir_parameters = 6;
ApprovePersistentGrantPayload approve_persistent_grant = 7;
ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload approve_one_off_transaction = 8;
GrantWalletAccessPayload grant_wallet_access = 2;
ReplaceOperatorPayload replace_operator = 3;
google.protobuf.Empty trigger_rekey = 4;
ApprovePersistentGrantPayload approve_persistent_grant = 5;
ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload approve_one_off_transaction = 6;
}
optional uint32 ttl_secs = 2;
optional uint32 ttl_secs = 7;
}
message ReplaceOperatorPayload {
@@ -28,12 +29,6 @@ message ReplaceOperatorPayload {
bytes new_pubkey = 2;
}
message UpdateShamirParametersPayload {
uint32 new_n = 1;
}
message ApproveServerUpdatePayload {}
message ApproveSdkClientPayload {
int32 client_id = 1;
}

3
protobufs/operator/vault/bootstrap.proto
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@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ message ContributePassphrase {
}
message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
bytes passphrase = 2;
bytes passphrase = 1;
}
enum BootstrapResult {

3
protobufs/operator/vault/rekey.proto
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@@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ message ContributePassphrase {
}
message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
bytes passphrase = 2;
bytes passphrase = 1;
}
enum RekeyResult {

3
protobufs/operator/vault/unseal.proto
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@@ -20,8 +20,7 @@ message ContributePassphrase {
}
message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
bytes passphrase = 2;
bytes passphrase = 1;
}
enum UnsealResult {

320
server/Cargo.lock generated
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d122413f284cf2d62fb1b7db97e02edb8cda96d769b16e443a4f6195e35662b0"
dependencies = [
"crypto-common 0.1.7",
"generic-array",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
]
[[package]]
@@ -674,6 +674,12 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
]
[[package]]
name = "anstyle"
version = "1.0.14"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "940b3a0ca603d1eade50a4846a2afffd5ef57a9feac2c0e2ec2e14f9ead76000"
[[package]]
name = "anyhow"
version = "1.0.102"
@@ -707,6 +713,7 @@ dependencies = [
"memsafe",
"ml-dsa",
"rand 0.10.1",
"strum 0.28.0",
"thiserror",
"x-wing",
]
@@ -766,11 +773,14 @@ dependencies = [
"kameo",
"kameo_actors",
"ml-dsa",
"mockall",
"mutants",
"pem",
"proptest",
"prost",
"prost-types",
"rand 0.10.1",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"rcgen",
"restructed",
"rstest",
@@ -779,6 +789,7 @@ dependencies = [
"smlang",
"strum 0.28.0",
"subtle",
"tempfile",
"test-log",
"thiserror",
"tokio",
@@ -786,6 +797,7 @@ dependencies = [
"tonic",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"vsss-rs",
"x25519-dalek 2.0.1",
]
@@ -1283,7 +1295,7 @@ version = "0.10.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3078c7629b62d3f0439517fa394996acacc5cbc91c5a20d8c658e77abd503a71"
dependencies = [
"generic-array",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1612,8 +1624,22 @@ version = "0.5.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0dc92fb57ca44df6db8059111ab3af99a63d5d0f8375d9972e319a379c6bab76"
dependencies = [
"generic-array",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"serdect 0.2.0",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "crypto-bigint"
version = "0.6.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "96272c2ff28b807e09250b180ad1fb7889a3258f7455759b5c3c58b719467130"
dependencies = [
"num-traits",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"serdect 0.3.0",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
@@ -1624,7 +1650,7 @@ version = "0.1.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "78c8292055d1c1df0cce5d180393dc8cce0abec0a7102adb6c7b1eef6016d60a"
dependencies = [
"generic-array",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"typenum",
]
@@ -1927,7 +1953,7 @@ version = "0.9.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d3dd60d1080a57a05ab032377049e0591415d2b31afd7028356dbf3cc6dcb066"
dependencies = [
"generic-array",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1965,6 +1991,12 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "downcast"
version = "0.11.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1435fa1053d8b2fbbe9be7e97eca7f33d37b28409959813daefc1446a14247f1"
[[package]]
name = "downcast-rs"
version = "2.0.2"
@@ -2007,7 +2039,7 @@ dependencies = [
"digest 0.10.7",
"elliptic-curve",
"rfc6979",
"serdect",
"serdect 0.2.0",
"signature 2.2.0",
"spki 0.7.3",
]
@@ -2040,16 +2072,32 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b5e6043086bf7973472e0c7dff2142ea0b680d30e18d9cc40f267efbf222bd47"
dependencies = [
"base16ct",
"crypto-bigint",
"crypto-bigint 0.5.5",
"digest 0.10.7",
"ff",
"generic-array",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"group",
"hkdf",
"pkcs8 0.10.2",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"sec1",
"serdect",
"serdect 0.2.0",
"subtle",
"tap",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "elliptic-curve-tools"
version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1de2b6fae800f08032a6ea32995b52925b1d451bff9d445c8ab2932323277faf"
dependencies = [
"elliptic-curve",
"heapless",
"hex",
"multiexp",
"serde",
"zeroize",
]
@@ -2123,6 +2171,7 @@ version = "0.13.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c0b50bfb653653f9ca9095b427bed08ab8d75a137839d9ad64eb11810d5b6393"
dependencies = [
"bitvec",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
]
@@ -2200,6 +2249,15 @@ dependencies = [
"percent-encoding",
]
[[package]]
name = "fragile"
version = "2.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8878864ba14bb86e818a412bfd6f18f9eabd4ec0f008a28e8f7eb61db532fcf9"
dependencies = [
"futures-core",
]
[[package]]
name = "fs_extra"
version = "1.3.0"
@@ -2323,6 +2381,17 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "generic-array"
version = "1.4.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "dab9e9188e97a93276e1fe7b56401b851e2b45a46d045ca658100c1303ada649"
dependencies = [
"rustversion",
"serde_core",
"typenum",
]
[[package]]
name = "getrandom"
version = "0.2.17"
@@ -2406,6 +2475,15 @@ dependencies = [
"tracing",
]
[[package]]
name = "hash32"
version = "0.3.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "47d60b12902ba28e2730cd37e95b8c9223af2808df9e902d4df49588d1470606"
dependencies = [
"byteorder",
]
[[package]]
name = "hashbrown"
version = "0.12.3"
@@ -2446,6 +2524,16 @@ version = "0.17.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4f467dd6dccf739c208452f8014c75c18bb8301b050ad1cfb27153803edb0f51"
[[package]]
name = "heapless"
version = "0.8.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0bfb9eb618601c89945a70e254898da93b13be0388091d42117462b265bb3fad"
dependencies = [
"hash32",
"stable_deref_trait",
]
[[package]]
name = "heck"
version = "0.5.0"
@@ -2473,6 +2561,15 @@ dependencies = [
"arrayvec",
]
[[package]]
name = "hkdf"
version = "0.12.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7b5f8eb2ad728638ea2c7d47a21db23b7b58a72ed6a38256b8a1849f15fbbdf7"
dependencies = [
"hmac 0.12.1",
]
[[package]]
name = "hmac"
version = "0.12.1"
@@ -2543,6 +2640,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "08d46837a0ed51fe95bd3b05de33cd64a1ee88fc797477ca48446872504507c5"
dependencies = [
"ctutils",
"serde",
"typenum",
"zeroize",
]
@@ -2808,7 +2906,7 @@ version = "0.1.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "879f10e63c20629ecabbb64a8010319738c66a5cd0c29b02d63d272b03751d01"
dependencies = [
"generic-array",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
]
[[package]]
@@ -2947,15 +3045,15 @@ dependencies = [
"ecdsa",
"elliptic-curve",
"once_cell",
"serdect",
"serdect 0.2.0",
"sha2 0.10.9",
"signature 2.2.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "kameo"
version = "0.20.0"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=805b417#805b41783fe90b54827ecad142b422c7a9b69b9a"
version = "0.22.2"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=17af90e3#17af90e3ae95fc6f89fa31a2f1b9506ac127f0b7"
dependencies = [
"downcast-rs",
"dyn-clone",
@@ -2968,8 +3066,8 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "kameo_actors"
version = "0.5.0"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=805b417#805b41783fe90b54827ecad142b422c7a9b69b9a"
version = "0.8.1"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=17af90e3#17af90e3ae95fc6f89fa31a2f1b9506ac127f0b7"
dependencies = [
"futures",
"glob",
@@ -2980,14 +3078,13 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "kameo_macros"
version = "0.20.0"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=805b417#805b41783fe90b54827ecad142b422c7a9b69b9a"
version = "0.21.1"
source = "git+https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git?rev=17af90e3#17af90e3ae95fc6f89fa31a2f1b9506ac127f0b7"
dependencies = [
"darling 0.23.0",
"heck",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.117",
"syn 3.0.4",
]
[[package]]
@@ -3278,6 +3375,32 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "mockall"
version = "0.15.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1a6ceddfe3ce334925e96bf420fdb2dcee5bed6c632a168ece622676dadeaf8a"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
"downcast",
"fragile",
"mockall_derive",
"predicates",
"predicates-tree",
]
[[package]]
name = "mockall_derive"
version = "0.15.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9cfe16fbe8a314aeec0b861ac24e60b1e123e97634bab045475b9d6a18416fd8"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "module-lattice"
version = "0.2.2"
@@ -3290,6 +3413,20 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "multiexp"
version = "0.4.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7ec2ce93a6f06ac6cae04c1da3f2a6a24fcfc1f0eb0b4e0f3d302f0df45326cb"
dependencies = [
"ff",
"group",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"rustversion",
"std-shims",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "multimap"
version = "0.10.1"
@@ -3321,6 +3458,20 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "num"
version = "0.4.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "35bd024e8b2ff75562e5f34e7f4905839deb4b22955ef5e73d2fea1b9813cb23"
dependencies = [
"num-bigint",
"num-complex",
"num-integer",
"num-iter",
"num-rational",
"num-traits",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-bigint"
version = "0.4.6"
@@ -3329,6 +3480,19 @@ checksum = "a5e44f723f1133c9deac646763579fdb3ac745e418f2a7af9cd0c431da1f20b9"
dependencies = [
"num-integer",
"num-traits",
"rand 0.8.6",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-complex"
version = "0.4.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "73f88a1307638156682bada9d7604135552957b7818057dcef22705b4d509495"
dependencies = [
"num-traits",
"rand 0.8.6",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
@@ -3346,6 +3510,29 @@ dependencies = [
"num-traits",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-iter"
version = "0.1.45"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1429034a0490724d0075ebb2bc9e875d6503c3cf69e235a8941aa757d83ef5bf"
dependencies = [
"autocfg",
"num-integer",
"num-traits",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-rational"
version = "0.4.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f83d14da390562dca69fc84082e73e548e1ad308d24accdedd2720017cb37824"
dependencies = [
"num-bigint",
"num-integer",
"num-traits",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "num-traits"
version = "0.2.19"
@@ -3647,6 +3834,32 @@ dependencies = [
"zerocopy",
]
[[package]]
name = "predicates"
version = "3.1.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ada8f2932f28a27ee7b70dd6c1c39ea0675c55a36879ab92f3a715eaa1e63cfe"
dependencies = [
"anstyle",
"predicates-core",
]
[[package]]
name = "predicates-core"
version = "1.0.10"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "cad38746f3166b4031b1a0d39ad9f954dd291e7854fcc0eed52ee41a0b50d144"
[[package]]
name = "predicates-tree"
version = "1.0.13"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d0de1b847b39c8131db0467e9df1ff60e6d0562ab8e9a16e568ad0fdb372e2f2"
dependencies = [
"predicates-core",
"termtree",
]
[[package]]
name = "prettyplease"
version = "0.2.37"
@@ -4454,9 +4667,9 @@ checksum = "d3e97a565f76233a6003f9f5c54be1d9c5bdfa3eccfb189469f11ec4901c47dc"
dependencies = [
"base16ct",
"der 0.7.10",
"generic-array",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"pkcs8 0.10.2",
"serdect",
"serdect 0.2.0",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
@@ -4622,6 +4835,16 @@ dependencies = [
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "serdect"
version = "0.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f42f67da2385b51a5f9652db9c93d78aeaf7610bf5ec366080b6de810604af53"
dependencies = [
"base16ct",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "sha2"
version = "0.10.9"
@@ -4787,6 +5010,12 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "spin"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d5fe4ccb98d9c292d56fec89a5e07da7fc4cf0dc11e156b41793132775d3e591"
[[package]]
name = "spki"
version = "0.7.3"
@@ -4831,6 +5060,17 @@ version = "1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a2eb9349b6444b326872e140eb1cf5e7c522154d69e7a0ffb0fb81c06b37543f"
[[package]]
name = "std-shims"
version = "0.1.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "227c4f8561598188d0df96dbe749824576174bba278b5b6bb2eacff1066067d0"
dependencies = [
"hashbrown 0.16.1",
"rustversion",
"spin",
]
[[package]]
name = "string_morph"
version = "0.1.0"
@@ -4934,6 +5174,17 @@ dependencies = [
"unicode-ident",
]
[[package]]
name = "syn"
version = "3.0.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e6275cddf4610d1775e6d1fe9469b2e77d0f39fd98fb7450901b821e0c53649f"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"unicode-ident",
]
[[package]]
name = "syn-solidity"
version = "1.5.7"
@@ -4995,6 +5246,12 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "termtree"
version = "0.5.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8f50febec83f5ee1df3015341d8bd429f2d1cc62bcba7ea2076759d315084683"
[[package]]
name = "test-log"
version = "0.2.20"
@@ -5574,6 +5831,27 @@ version = "0.9.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0b928f33d975fc6ad9f86c8f283853ad26bdd5b10b7f1542aa2fa15e2289105a"
[[package]]
name = "vsss-rs"
version = "5.4.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6ec751bdcc8bda099e269b24cc6b4ad14f9ce8b0490c1599174070e792ecd70c"
dependencies = [
"crypto-bigint 0.5.5",
"crypto-bigint 0.6.1",
"elliptic-curve",
"elliptic-curve-tools",
"generic-array 1.4.1",
"hex",
"hybrid-array",
"num",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"serde",
"sha3 0.10.9",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "wait-timeout"
version = "0.2.1"

7
server/Cargo.toml
View File

@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ base64 = "0.22.1"
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
futures = "0.3.32"
k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "805b417"}
kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "17af90e3"}
kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "17af90e3"}
hmac = "0.13.0"
miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.9", features = ["zeroize"] }
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ rustls = { version = "0.23.40", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.1"
sha2 = "0.11"
smlang = "0.8.0"
strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
thiserror = "2.0.18"
tokio = { version = "1.52.1", features = ["full"] }
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
@@ -106,7 +107,6 @@ indexing_slicing = "warn"
infinite_loop = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_att_syntax = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_intel_syntax = "warn"
integer_division = "warn"
large_include_file = "warn"
lossy_float_literal = "warn"
map_with_unused_argument_over_ranges = "warn"
@@ -168,3 +168,4 @@ nursery = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
pedantic = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
type_repetition_in_bounds = "allow" # sometimes, it's better for readability this way
unused_async_trait_impl = "allow"

2
server/clippy.toml
View File

@@ -26,3 +26,5 @@ trait-assoc-item-kinds-order = [
"type",
"fn",
] # community tested standard
too-many-lines-threshold = 150

4
server/crates/arbiter-client/src/auth.rs
View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use crate::{
storage::StorageError,
transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, SigningContext, SigningKey};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
proto::{
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
};
let challenge_payload: Vec<u8> = challenge.format();
let signature = key
.sign_message(&challenge_payload, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.sign_message(&challenge_payload, SigningContext::Client)
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?
.to_bytes();

3
server/crates/arbiter-crypto/Cargo.toml
View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ edition = "2024"
ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true }
rand = {workspace = true, optional = true}
memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true}
strum = { workspace = true, optional = true }
hmac.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
x-wing = { version = "0.1.0-rc.0", features = ["zeroize"] }
@@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ workspace = true
[features]
default = ["authn", "safecell"]
authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand"]
authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand", "dep:strum"]
safecell = ["dep:memsafe"]
[lib]

64
server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/authn/v1.rs
View File

@@ -5,9 +5,25 @@ use ml_dsa::{
SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _,
};
use rand::RngExt;
use strum::IntoStaticStr;
pub static CLIENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_client";
pub static OPERATOR_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_operator";
/// Domain separation tag mixed into every ML-DSA signature.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, IntoStaticStr)]
pub enum SigningContext {
#[strum(serialize = "arbiter_client")]
Client,
#[strum(serialize = "arbiter_operator")]
Operator,
#[strum(serialize = "arbiter_governance_vote")]
GovernanceVote,
}
impl SigningContext {
#[must_use]
pub fn as_bytes(self) -> &'static [u8] {
<&'static str>::from(self).as_bytes()
}
}
const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 32;
@@ -85,10 +101,26 @@ impl PublicKey {
}
#[must_use]
pub fn verify(&self, challenge: &AuthChallenge, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
pub fn verify(
&self,
challenge: &AuthChallenge,
context: SigningContext,
signature: &Signature,
) -> bool {
let challenge = challenge.format();
self.0
.verify_with_context(&challenge, context, &signature.0)
.verify_with_context(&challenge, context.as_bytes(), &signature.0)
}
#[must_use]
pub fn verify_message(
&self,
message: &[u8],
context: SigningContext,
signature: &Signature,
) -> bool {
self.0
.verify_with_context(message, context.as_bytes(), &signature.0)
}
}
@@ -115,17 +147,21 @@ impl SigningKey {
self.0.verifying_key().into()
}
pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
pub fn sign_message(
&self,
message: &[u8],
context: SigningContext,
) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
self.0
.signing_key()
.sign_deterministic(message, context)
.sign_deterministic(message, context.as_bytes())
.map(Into::into)
}
pub fn sign_challenge(
&self,
challenge: &AuthChallenge,
context: &[u8],
context: SigningContext,
) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
let challenge = challenge.format();
@@ -192,7 +228,7 @@ mod tests {
use crate::authn::AuthChallenge;
use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, OPERATOR_CONTEXT};
use super::{PublicKey, Signature, SigningContext, SigningKey};
#[test]
fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() {
@@ -208,7 +244,7 @@ mod tests {
fn signature_round_trip_decodes() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let signature = key
.sign_message(b"challenge", CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.sign_message(b"challenge", SigningContext::Client)
.expect("signature should be created");
let decoded =
@@ -223,11 +259,11 @@ mod tests {
let public_key = key.public_key();
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let signature = key
.sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.sign_challenge(&challenge, SigningContext::Client)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(public_key.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
assert!(!public_key.verify(&challenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT, &signature));
assert!(public_key.verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Client, &signature));
assert!(!public_key.verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Operator, &signature));
}
#[test]
@@ -240,13 +276,13 @@ mod tests {
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let signature = restored
.sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.sign_challenge(&challenge, SigningContext::Client)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(
restored
.public_key()
.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature)
.verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Client, &signature)
);
}
}

10
server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/safecell.rs
View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_>;
fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_>;
fn new_inline<F>(f: F) -> Self
fn new_inline_default<F>(f: F) -> Self
where
Self: Sized,
T: Default,
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
cell
}
fn new_inline<F>(f: Box<F>) -> Self
where
Self: Sized,
F: for<'a> FnOnce() -> T,
{
Self::new(f())
}
#[inline(always)]
fn read_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
where

8
server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/lib.rs
View File

@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.evm");
}
pub mod governance {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.governance");
}
pub mod sdk_client {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.sdk_client");
}
@@ -34,6 +38,10 @@ pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap");
}
pub mod rekey {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.rekey");
}
pub mod unseal {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.unseal");
}

7
server/crates/arbiter-server/Cargo.toml
View File

@@ -37,11 +37,12 @@ kameo.workspace = true
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
restructed = "0.2.2"
strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
strum.workspace = true
pem = "3.0.6"
sha2.workspace = true
hmac.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
prost.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
anyhow = "1.0.102"
@@ -50,12 +51,16 @@ subtle = "2.6.1"
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
k256.workspace = true
kameo_actors.workspace = true
vsss-rs = "5.4.0"
rand_core = "0.6"
[dev-dependencies]
proptest = "1.11.0"
rstest.workspace = true
test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }
ml-dsa.workspace = true
mockall = "0.15.0"
tempfile = "3.27.0"
[lib]
doctest = false

161
server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-14-171124-0000_init/up.sql
View File

@@ -37,7 +37,11 @@ create table if not exists tls_history (
create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1
root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT
tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT,
-- Shamir threshold of the split that produced the stored shares. Null before bootstrap.
-- Recorded rather than recomputed: an aborted operator replacement leaves fewer share
-- rows than the split has shares, and a recomputed threshold would then be wrong.
shamir_threshold integer
) STRICT;
insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
@@ -56,6 +60,7 @@ create table if not exists operator (
share blob not null,
share_nonce blob not null,
share_salt blob not null,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
@@ -108,6 +113,7 @@ create table if not exists evm_wallet_access (
id integer not null primary key,
wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet (id) on delete cascade,
client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
revoked_at integer, -- unix timestamp when revoked, null = still active
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
@@ -215,3 +221,156 @@ create table if not exists integrity_envelope (
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_integrity_envelope_entity on integrity_envelope (entity_kind, entity_id);
create table if not exists proposal (
id integer not null primary key,
kind text not null,
initiator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
expires_at integer not null,
status text not null default 'pending'
check (status in ('pending', 'approved', 'rejected'))
) STRICT;
-- Parameters of an approved-or-pending proposal
create table if not exists proposal_approve_sdk_client (
proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
client_id integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict
) STRICT;
create table if not exists proposal_grant_wallet_access (
proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet(id) on delete restrict,
client_id integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict
) STRICT;
create table if not exists proposal_replace_operator (
proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
old_operator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
new_pubkey blob not null
) STRICT;
-- The transaction an operator votes to sign.
create table if not exists proposal_one_off_transaction (
proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
client_id integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict,
wallet_address blob not null check (length(wallet_address) = 20),
chain_id integer not null,
nonce integer not null,
gas_limit integer not null,
max_fee_per_gas blob not null check (length(max_fee_per_gas) = 16),
max_priority_fee_per_gas blob not null check (length(max_priority_fee_per_gas) = 16),
to_address blob not null check (length(to_address) = 20),
value blob not null check (length(value) = 32),
input blob not null
) STRICT;
-- The grant an operator votes to creat
create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant (
proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal (id) on delete cascade,
wallet_access_id integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
valid_from integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no lower bound
valid_until integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no upper bound
max_gas_fee_per_gas blob check (max_gas_fee_per_gas is null or length(max_gas_fee_per_gas) = 32),
max_priority_fee_per_gas blob check (max_priority_fee_per_gas is null or length(max_priority_fee_per_gas) = 32),
rate_limit_count integer, -- max transactions in window, null = unlimited
rate_limit_window_secs integer, -- window duration in seconds, null = unlimited
check ((rate_limit_count is null) = (rate_limit_window_secs is null))
) STRICT;
-- `specific = ether_transfer`
create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_ether (
proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
window_secs integer not null,
max_volume blob not null check (length(max_volume) = 32)
) STRICT;
create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target (
id integer not null primary key,
proposal_id integer not null references proposal_persistent_grant_ether (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
address blob not null check (length(address) = 20)
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_proposal_ether_target on proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target (proposal_id, address);
-- `specific = token_transfer`
create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_token (
proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
token_contract blob not null check (length(token_contract) = 20),
receiver blob check (receiver is null or length(receiver) = 20)
) STRICT;
create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit (
id integer not null primary key,
proposal_id integer not null references proposal_persistent_grant_token (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
window_secs integer not null,
max_volume blob not null check (length(max_volume) = 32)
) STRICT;
create table if not exists proposal_vote (
id integer not null primary key,
proposal_id integer not null references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
operator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
approve integer not null check (approve in (0, 1)),
signature blob not null,
voted_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
unique (proposal_id, operator_id)
) STRICT;
-- The signature the vault produced for an approved transaction, by component.
--
-- secp256k1 signatures have three common encodings (Electrum v=27/28, raw parity,
-- ERC-2098 compact); a single blob would not say which one it holds. `y_parity` is
-- the raw bit -- add 27 to rebuild the Electrum form `Signature::as_bytes` emits.
create table if not exists proposal_one_off_transaction_result (
proposal_id integer not null primary key
references proposal_one_off_transaction (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
r blob not null check (length(r) = 32),
s blob not null check (length(s) = 32),
y_parity integer not null check (y_parity in (0, 1)),
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
-- ===============================
-- Recovery Operators (§3.4/§3.5/§3.6)
-- ===============================
-- Encrypted Shamir shares for recovery operators (mirrors the `operator` table).
create table if not exists recovery_operator (
id integer not null primary key references recovery_operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
share blob not null,
share_nonce blob not null,
share_salt blob not null,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
create table if not exists recovery_operator_identity (
id integer not null primary key,
public_key blob not null unique,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
-- One active wakeup request at a time. A request is pending when cancelled_at IS NULL
-- and requested_at + 14 days > now. It becomes active (recovery live) after 14 days.
create table if not exists recovery_wakeup_request (
id integer not null primary key,
requested_by integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
requested_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
cancelled_by integer references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
cancelled_at integer
) STRICT;
-- Votes cast by recovery operators; only allowed on replace_operator proposals.
create table if not exists recovery_proposal_vote (
id integer not null primary key,
proposal_id integer not null references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
recovery_operator_id integer not null references recovery_operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
approve integer not null check (approve in (0, 1)),
signature blob not null,
voted_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
unique (proposal_id, recovery_operator_id)
) STRICT;

301
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/bootstrap.rs
View File

@@ -4,28 +4,43 @@ use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use rand::{
distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _},
make_rng,
rngs::StdRng,
};
use std::path::Path;
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
use thiserror::Error;
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
pub async fn generate_token(home: &Path) -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let mut rng: StdRng = make_rng();
let token = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
String::default(),
|mut accum, char| {
accum += char.to_string().as_str();
accum
},
);
// `Alphanumeric` samples raw `u8` ASCII codes, not `char`s -- `SampleString::sample_string`
// is `rand`'s own documented way to turn that into an actual TOKEN_LENGTH-character string
// (see the "Passwords" example on `Alphanumeric`'s docs). A prior version of this function
// called `.to_string()` on the sampled `u8` directly, which stringifies the numeric byte
// value (e.g. `65` instead of `'A'`) rather than the character it represents, silently
// producing a variable-length, all-decimal-digit string instead of a real token.
let token = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rng, TOKEN_LENGTH);
tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
tokio::fs::write(home.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
Ok(token)
}
/// A token file is only trustworthy if it looks like something `generate_token` could have
/// produced. Anything else -- empty (a crash between the file's truncate and write), foreign
/// content, or a trailing newline added by an editor -- must not be adopted as a live
/// credential: an empty file would make every empty-string token verify, and mismatched
/// content would silently lock out every operator holding the real, already-printed token.
#[must_use]
fn is_valid_token(candidate: &str) -> bool {
candidate.len() == TOKEN_LENGTH && candidate.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
}
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
@@ -44,31 +59,77 @@ pub struct Bootstrapper {
}
impl Bootstrapper {
/// Production constructor: resolves the real `~/.arbiter` directory and delegates.
pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let row_count: i64 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
schema::operator::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?
};
let token = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?;
Some(token)
} else {
None
};
Ok(Self { token })
let home = home_path()?;
Self::new_in(db, &home).await
}
}
#[messages]
impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
/// Carries all of `new`'s logic, parameterized on the directory the token file lives in.
/// `new` resolves the real home directory and calls this; tests call it directly with a
/// throwaway temp directory so they never touch the real `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token`.
pub async fn new_in(db: &DatabasePool, home: &Path) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let bootstrapped: bool = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.select(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
.first::<Option<i32>>(&mut conn)
.await?
.is_some();
if bootstrapped {
return Ok(Self { token: None });
}
let any_operator_registered: bool = schema::operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
.await?
> 0;
if !any_operator_registered {
// Nobody has used the current token yet, so there is nothing to preserve across a
// restart: generate a fresh one, exactly as on a first run. Reusing an old file
// here would let a token survive a database reset, silently reviving trust in
// whoever still held it.
return Ok(Self {
token: Some(generate_token(home).await?),
});
}
// At least one operator has already registered with the current token: every other
// declared operator still needs that same token, including across a restart, so an
// existing file is reused rather than replaced -- but only if it still looks like a
// real token. A truncated, foreign, or corrupted file must not become a live
// credential (see `is_valid_token`).
let path = home.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH);
let token = match tokio::fs::read_to_string(&path).await {
Ok(existing) if is_valid_token(&existing) => existing,
Ok(_) => {
// Replacing the file invalidates whatever token the already-registered
// operators were handed, so it must not happen quietly. The content itself is
// a credential and stays out of the log; the path is enough to act on.
tracing::warn!(
?path,
"Bootstrap token file is not a well-formed token; replacing it"
);
generate_token(home).await?
}
Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => generate_token(home).await?,
Err(err) => return Err(Error::Io(err)),
};
Ok(Self { token: Some(token) })
}
/// Drops the token from memory. Called once the vault is bootstrapped: from then on,
/// operators are added through governance rather than through the token.
pub(crate) fn forget_token(&mut self) {
self.token = None;
}
#[must_use]
fn is_correct_token(&self, token: &str) -> bool {
self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| {
let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
@@ -77,15 +138,28 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
bool::from(choice)
})
}
}
#[messages]
impl Bootstrapper {
/// Checks the token without retiring it: every operator in a declared committee
/// authenticates with the same token during bootstrap.
#[message]
pub fn consume_token(&mut self, token: String) -> bool {
if self.is_correct_token(token) {
self.token = None;
true
} else {
false
}
#[must_use]
pub fn verify_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
self.is_correct_token(&token)
}
}
impl kameo::prelude::Message<crate::actors::vault::events::Bootstrapped> for Bootstrapper {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_msg: crate::actors::vault::events::Bootstrapped,
_ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
self.forget_token();
}
}
@@ -96,3 +170,150 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
self.token.clone()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, insert_into, update};
/// A multi-operator committee registers every member with the same token, so verifying it
/// must not consume it. Only a completed bootstrap retires the token.
#[tokio::test]
async fn token_verifies_repeatedly_until_bootstrap_completes() {
let mut bootstrapper = Bootstrapper {
token: Some("test-token".to_owned()),
};
assert!(bootstrapper.verify_token("test-token".to_owned()));
assert!(bootstrapper.verify_token("test-token".to_owned()));
assert!(!bootstrapper.verify_token("wrong-token".to_owned()));
bootstrapper.forget_token();
assert!(!bootstrapper.verify_token("test-token".to_owned()));
assert!(bootstrapper.get_token().is_none());
}
/// Once the vault is bootstrapped, `Bootstrapper::new_in` must return with no token -- and
/// it must do so from `arbiter_settings.root_key_id` alone, taking the early return before
/// `home` is ever consulted. Uses `new_in` with a throwaway temp directory (never the
/// production `new`, which unconditionally resolves the real home directory before this
/// method even runs) so this test cannot touch the real filesystem regardless of outcome.
#[tokio::test]
async fn new_returns_no_token_once_the_vault_is_bootstrapped() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&db::models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
salt: vec![0u8; 16],
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
.set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home.path()).await.unwrap();
assert!(bootstrapper.get_token().is_none());
}
/// The file-reuse path (an operator has already registered, so bootstrap is unfinished)
/// must not adopt a corrupted token file as a live credential: it must reject it and
/// generate a fresh one instead. This is the Critical from the review, now reachable
/// safely because `new_in` takes a throwaway temp directory instead of the real home.
#[tokio::test]
async fn new_in_rejects_and_replaces_a_corrupted_token_file() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
// At least one operator must have registered, or `new_in` would regenerate
// unconditionally regardless of the file (Important 2) and never exercise validation.
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
tokio::fs::write(home.path().join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), "")
.await
.unwrap();
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home.path()).await.unwrap();
let token = bootstrapper
.get_token()
.expect("a fresh token must be generated");
assert!(is_valid_token(&token));
// The replacement must also have landed on disk, not just in memory, so a restart
// reads back the same (now valid) token rather than the corrupted one again.
let on_disk = tokio::fs::read_to_string(home.path().join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(on_disk, token);
}
/// The second defect the task exists to fix: a restart between the first registration and
/// the completed bootstrap must not invalidate the token the other declared operators were
/// already given. With an operator registered and a well-formed file on disk, `new_in` has
/// to hand back exactly what it read instead of generating a replacement.
#[tokio::test]
async fn new_in_reuses_a_valid_token_file_across_a_restart() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
// Without a registered operator, `new_in` regenerates unconditionally (Important 2 of
// the round-2 review) and never reaches the reuse path this test is about.
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
// Stands in for the token a previous run wrote and printed to the console.
let handed_out = "Zq7Z2rXaB90kLmNpQwErTyUiOpAsDfGhJkLzXcVbNmQwErTyUiOpAsDfGhJkLzXc";
assert!(is_valid_token(handed_out));
tokio::fs::write(home.path().join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), handed_out)
.await
.unwrap();
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home.path()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(bootstrapper.get_token().as_deref(), Some(handed_out));
}
/// An empty file must not be adopted as a live credential: `is_correct_token`'s
/// `is_some_and` would enter its closure for `Some(String::new())`, and comparing two empty
/// byte slices is true, so an unauthenticated `Some("")` from the wire would otherwise
/// verify. Also pins the other corrupted-content shapes `is_valid_token` must reject.
#[test]
fn is_valid_token_rejects_anything_that_is_not_a_real_token() {
assert!(!is_valid_token(""));
assert!(!is_valid_token("too-short"));
assert!(!is_valid_token(&"a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH - 1)));
assert!(!is_valid_token(&"a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH + 1)));
// A trailing newline (e.g. from an editor) must not be silently accepted either.
assert!(!is_valid_token(&format!("{}\n", "a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH))));
assert!(!is_valid_token(&"!".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH)));
assert!(is_valid_token(&"a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH)));
}
}

465
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/evm/mod.rs
View File

@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
use crate::{
actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
actors::{
proposal_manager::events::ProposalApproved,
vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
},
crypto::integrity,
db::{
DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
models::{self, EvmWalletId},
models::{self, EvmWalletId, ProposalId},
proposal::{ProposalKind, grant_wallet_access, one_off_transaction, persistent_grant},
schema,
},
evm::{
@@ -23,8 +27,9 @@ use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages, prelude::Message};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use tracing::error;
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
@@ -62,6 +67,55 @@ pub enum Error {
#[error("Integrity violation: {0}")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
#[error("Signing error: {0}")]
Sign(#[from] SignTransactionError),
#[error(
"Grant timestamp {0} is outside the i32 range a grant boundary column can store \
(Unix seconds, so no later than 2038-01-19T03:14:07Z)"
)]
InvalidTimestamp(i64),
#[error("Wallet access {0} is revoked or does not exist")]
AccessNotActive(i32),
}
/// Converts a grant boundary from Unix seconds. `None` in means "unbounded"; a value the
/// boundary column cannot store is an error, never a silently different window.
///
/// The range is `i32`, not `i64`, because that is what actually reaches the database:
/// `SqliteTimestamp::to_sql` narrows to `i32` (`fixme! #84`), so `3_000_000_000` -- a
/// `valid_from` in 2065 -- would wrap to 1902 and open the grant immediately instead of in
/// forty years. Accepting only what round-trips keeps the grant that gets written the grant
/// that was voted on.
fn grant_timestamp(secs: Option<i64>) -> Result<Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>, Error> {
secs.map(|s| {
let storable = i32::try_from(s).map_err(|_| Error::InvalidTimestamp(s))?;
chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(i64::from(storable), 0).ok_or(Error::InvalidTimestamp(s))
})
.transpose()
}
/// Refuses an access id that is revoked or absent, so nothing hangs a grant off it.
async fn ensure_access_active(
conn: &mut crate::db::DatabaseConnection,
access_id: i32,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let active: bool = diesel::select(diesel::dsl::exists(
schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::id.eq(access_id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null()),
))
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
if active {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(Error::AccessNotActive(access_id))
}
}
#[derive(Actor)]
@@ -160,29 +214,23 @@ impl EvmActor {
}
#[message]
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "reserved for impl")]
pub async fn operator_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
// let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// let vault = self.vault.clone();
pub async fn operator_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| {
// Box::pin(async move {
// diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
// .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
// .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
// .execute(conn)
// .await?;
let affected = diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
.set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// let signed = integrity::evm::load_signed_grant_by_basic_id(conn, grant_id).await?;
if affected == 0 {
return Err(Error::Database(DatabaseError::from(
diesel::result::Error::NotFound,
)));
}
// diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(())
// })
// })
// .await
// .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// Ok(())
todo!()
Ok(())
}
#[message]
@@ -214,6 +262,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
.select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
@@ -249,6 +298,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
.select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
@@ -273,3 +323,372 @@ impl EvmActor {
Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
}
}
impl Message<ProposalApproved> for EvmActor {
type Reply = ();
/// Every subscriber sees every approval and acts only on the kinds it owns.
async fn handle(
&mut self,
msg: ProposalApproved,
_ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let result = match msg.kind {
ProposalKind::GrantWalletAccess(settings) => self.grant_wallet_access(&settings).await,
ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(settings) => {
self.create_persistent_grant(*settings).await
}
ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(settings) => {
self.sign_one_off_transaction(msg.id, *settings).await
}
_ => return,
};
if let Err(error) = result {
error!(
?error,
proposal_id = msg.id.to_raw(),
"Failed to execute an approved proposal"
);
}
}
}
impl EvmActor {
async fn grant_wallet_access(
&mut self,
settings: &grant_wallet_access::Settings,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// Revives a previously revoked row instead of conflicting on it forever:
// `uniq_wallet_access` is a unique index on `(wallet_id, client_id)`. Visibility is
// all this restores -- revocation closes the grants that hung off the access, so a
// persistent grant needs its own vote again (§3.2). See
// `peers::operator::session::handlers::revoke_wallet_access`.
insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(EvmWalletId::from_raw(settings.wallet_id)),
schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(settings.client_id),
))
.on_conflict((
schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id,
schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id,
))
.do_update()
.set(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(None::<models::SqliteTimestamp>))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(())
}
async fn create_persistent_grant(
&mut self,
grant: persistent_grant::Settings,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
use crate::evm::policies::{
TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit, ether_transfer, token_transfers,
};
use alloy::primitives::U256;
use chrono::Duration;
// A persistent grant is only as good as the visibility it hangs off (§3.2, two
// separate votes). The proposal names the access id when it is created and can be
// approved much later, so the access may have been revoked in between; a grant
// against a revoked access would sit dormant and go live the moment anyone re-grants.
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
ensure_access_active(&mut conn, grant.wallet_access_id).await?;
drop(conn);
let volume = |limit: persistent_grant::VolumeLimit| VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from_be_bytes(limit.max_volume),
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs),
};
let basic = SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_access_id: grant.wallet_access_id,
chain: grant.chain_id,
valid_from: grant_timestamp(grant.valid_from_secs)?,
valid_until: grant_timestamp(grant.valid_until_secs)?,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: grant.max_gas_fee_per_gas.map(U256::from_be_bytes),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: grant.max_priority_fee_per_gas.map(U256::from_be_bytes),
rate_limit: grant.rate_limit.map(|r| TransactionRateLimit {
count: r.count,
window: Duration::seconds(r.window_secs),
}),
};
let specific = match grant.specific {
persistent_grant::Specific::EtherTransfer { targets, limit } => {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Settings {
target: targets.into_iter().map(Address::from).collect(),
limit: volume(limit),
})
}
persistent_grant::Specific::TokenTransfer {
token_contract,
receiver,
volume_limits,
} => SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target: receiver.map(Address::from),
volume_limits: volume_limits.into_iter().map(volume).collect(),
}),
};
self.operator_create_grant(basic, specific).await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn sign_one_off_transaction(
&mut self,
proposal_id: ProposalId,
tx: one_off_transaction::Settings,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
use alloy::{
eips::eip2930::AccessList,
primitives::{Bytes, TxKind, U256},
};
let transaction = TxEip1559 {
chain_id: tx.chain_id,
nonce: tx.nonce,
gas_limit: tx.gas_limit,
max_fee_per_gas: tx.max_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: tx.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
to: TxKind::Call(Address::from(tx.to)),
value: U256::from_be_bytes(tx.value),
input: Bytes::from(tx.input),
access_list: AccessList::default(),
};
let signature = self
.client_sign_transaction(tx.client_id, Address::from(tx.wallet_address), transaction)
.await?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
one_off_transaction::store_signature(proposal_id, &signature, &mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{Error, EvmActor, ensure_access_active, grant_timestamp};
use crate::db::{self, models, schema};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, dsl::insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
#[test]
fn absent_timestamp_stays_absent() {
assert!(grant_timestamp(None).unwrap().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn in_range_timestamp_is_converted() {
let converted = grant_timestamp(Some(1_800_000_000)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(converted.unwrap().timestamp(), 1_800_000_000);
}
/// An unrepresentable expiry must not silently become "no expiry": that would widen the
/// grant beyond what was voted on.
#[test]
fn out_of_range_timestamp_is_an_error() {
let err = grant_timestamp(Some(i64::MAX)).unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidTimestamp(i64::MAX)));
}
/// A `valid_from` past 2038 is representable as a `DateTime` but not as the `i32` the
/// boundary column stores: `3_000_000_000` (2065) wraps to a negative, which reads back as
/// 1902 and makes the grant active immediately. Refusing it is the only way the grant
/// that lands can match the window that was voted on.
#[test]
fn a_timestamp_past_2038_is_an_error() {
let past_2038 = 3_000_000_000_i64;
assert!(
chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(past_2038, 0).is_some(),
"the fixture must be a date chrono accepts, or it proves nothing about storage"
);
let err = grant_timestamp(Some(past_2038)).unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, Error::InvalidTimestamp(got) if got == past_2038),
"expected an out-of-range error, got {err:?}"
);
}
/// The last second the boundary column can hold must still be accepted: the range check
/// has to stop at what storage can take, not short of it.
#[test]
fn the_last_storable_timestamp_is_accepted() {
let converted = grant_timestamp(Some(i64::from(i32::MAX))).unwrap();
assert_eq!(converted.unwrap().timestamp(), i64::from(i32::MAX));
}
/// Seeds a wallet, a client and one access row between them, and returns the access id.
async fn seed_access(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
salt: vec![0u8; 16],
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
.values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
current_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
associated_root_key_id: root_key_id,
created_at: chrono::Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let wallet_id: models::EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec()),
schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
))
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
.values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
.returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let client_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
.values((
schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.returning(schema::program_client::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
))
.returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
/// Both directions, so a guard that refused everything could not pass: a live access is
/// let through, a revoked one is not.
#[tokio::test]
async fn only_a_live_access_passes_the_grant_guard() {
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
let access_id = seed_access(&mut conn).await;
ensure_access_active(&mut conn, access_id)
.await
.expect("a live access must pass");
diesel::update(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::id.eq(access_id))
.set(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let err = ensure_access_active(&mut conn, access_id)
.await
.expect_err("a revoked access must be refused");
assert!(
matches!(err, Error::AccessNotActive(got) if got == access_id),
"expected AccessNotActive, got {err:?}"
);
}
/// The guard has to be wired into the executor, not just exist: an approved persistent
/// grant whose access was revoked between proposal and approval must not create a grant
/// that would go live again the moment anyone re-grants that access (§3.2).
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_approved_persistent_grant_refuses_a_revoked_access() {
use crate::actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Vault};
use crate::db::proposal::persistent_grant;
use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
let access_id = seed_access(&mut conn).await;
diesel::update(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::id.eq(access_id))
.set(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let vault = Vault::spawn(
Vault::new(pool.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap(),
);
let mut evm_actor = EvmActor::new(vault, pool.clone());
let err = evm_actor
.create_persistent_grant(persistent_grant::Settings {
wallet_access_id: access_id,
chain_id: 1,
valid_from_secs: None,
valid_until_secs: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
specific: persistent_grant::Specific::EtherTransfer {
targets: vec![[0u8; 20]],
limit: persistent_grant::VolumeLimit {
max_volume: [0u8; 32],
window_secs: 3600,
},
},
})
.await
.expect_err("a grant against a revoked access must be refused");
assert!(
matches!(err, Error::AccessNotActive(got) if got == access_id),
"expected AccessNotActive, got {err:?}"
);
let grants: i64 = schema::evm_basic_grant::table
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::wallet_access_id.eq(access_id))
.count()
.get_result(&mut pool.get().await.unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
grants, 0,
"no grant row may be written for a revoked access"
);
}
}

74
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/mod.rs
View File

@@ -1,20 +1,31 @@
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
operator_registry::OperatorRegistry, vault::Vault,
bootstrap::Bootstrapper,
evm::EvmActor,
flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
operator_registry::OperatorRegistry,
proposal_manager::{ProposalManager, events::ProposalApproved},
vault::{Vault, events},
vault_coordinator::VaultCoordinator,
},
db,
};
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use kameo_actors::{DeliveryStrategy, message_bus::MessageBus};
use kameo_actors::{
DeliveryStrategy,
message_bus::{MessageBus, Register},
};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::error;
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod evm;
pub mod flow_coordinator;
pub mod operator_registry;
pub mod proposal_manager;
pub mod vault;
pub mod vault_coordinator;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum SpawnError {
@@ -30,9 +41,11 @@ pub enum SpawnError {
pub struct GlobalActors {
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
pub vault_coordinator: ActorRef<VaultCoordinator>,
pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
pub operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
pub proposal_manager: ActorRef<ProposalManager>,
pub events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
@@ -42,18 +55,69 @@ impl GlobalActors {
}
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?;
Self::spawn_with_bootstrapper(db, bootstrapper).await
}
/// Test-facing: threads an explicit directory through to `Bootstrapper` instead of letting
/// it resolve the real home directory, so a test spawning a full `GlobalActors` can never
/// reach (let alone write to) the real `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token`. Mirrors `spawn`
/// exactly, aside from where the token file lives.
pub async fn spawn_in(
db: db::DatabasePool,
home: &std::path::Path,
) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home).await?;
Self::spawn_with_bootstrapper(db, bootstrapper).await
}
async fn spawn_with_bootstrapper(
db: db::DatabasePool,
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper,
) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
let operator_registry = OperatorRegistry::spawn(OperatorRegistry::default());
let evm = EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db.clone()));
let vault_coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(
db.clone(),
key_holder.clone(),
));
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::spawn(bootstrapper);
// Approved proposals are executed by whoever owns the kind, not by ProposalManager.
for recipient in [
evm.clone().recipient::<ProposalApproved>(),
vault_coordinator.clone().recipient::<ProposalApproved>(),
key_holder.clone().recipient::<ProposalApproved>(),
] {
let _ = message_bus.tell(Register(recipient)).await;
}
// The token guards bootstrap only: once the vault reports success, it must be retired.
// A dropped registration would leave the token valid forever with nothing else to
// notice, so a failure here is logged rather than silently discarded.
if let Err(err) = message_bus
.tell(Register(
bootstrapper.clone().recipient::<events::Bootstrapped>(),
))
.await
{
error!(
?err,
"Failed to register Bootstrapper for the Bootstrapped event"
);
}
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
bootstrapper,
proposal_manager: ProposalManager::spawn(ProposalManager::new(db, message_bus.clone())),
vault: key_holder,
vault_coordinator,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::new(
operator_registry.clone(),
)),
operator_registry,
events: message_bus,
evm,
})
}
}

355
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
use crate::{
actors::proposal_manager::{
events::ProposalApproved,
store::{DieselProposalStore, ProposalStore, Tally},
},
crypto::governance,
db::{
self,
models::{
NewProposalVote, NewRecoveryProposalVote, OperatorIdentityId, Proposal, ProposalId,
ProposalStatus, RecoveryOperatorIdentityId, SqliteTimestamp,
},
proposal::{ProposalKind, ProposalKindTag},
},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tracing::warn;
pub mod events;
pub mod store;
pub const DEFAULT_TTL_SECS: u32 = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 7 days
pub const MAX_TTL_SECS: u32 = DEFAULT_TTL_SECS;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum VoteOutcome {
Pending,
Approved,
Rejected,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Proposal not found")]
ProposalNotFound,
#[error("Proposal is not pending")]
ProposalNotPending,
#[error("Proposal has expired")]
ProposalExpired,
#[error("Requested TTL exceeds the maximum of {} seconds", MAX_TTL_SECS)]
TtlTooLong,
#[error("Operator already voted on this proposal")]
AlreadyVoted,
#[error("Invalid vote signature")]
InvalidSignature,
#[error("Operator not found")]
OperatorNotFound,
#[error("Database connection error: {0}")]
DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Proposal manager is unavailable")]
Unavailable,
#[error("Recovery operators are sleeping")]
RecoveryNotActive,
#[error("Recovery operators may only vote on operator replacement")]
NotAllowedForRecoveryOperator,
#[error("A recovery wake-up is already pending or active")]
WakeupAlreadyPending,
#[error("No active recovery wake-up to cancel")]
NoActiveWakeup,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ProposalSummary {
pub id: ProposalId,
pub kind: ProposalKindTag,
pub initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub approve_count: i64,
pub reject_count: i64,
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct ProposalManager {
pub(crate) store: Arc<dyn ProposalStore>,
pub(crate) events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
impl ProposalManager {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Self {
Self::with_store(Arc::new(DieselProposalStore::new(db)), events)
}
/// Builds the actor over an arbitrary store, so tests can supply a mock.
pub(crate) const fn with_store(
store: Arc<dyn ProposalStore>,
events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
) -> Self {
Self { store, events }
}
}
#[messages]
impl ProposalManager {
#[message]
pub async fn create_proposal(
&mut self,
kind: ProposalKind,
initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
ttl_secs: Option<u32>,
) -> Result<ProposalId, Error> {
let ttl = ttl_secs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_TTL_SECS);
if ttl > MAX_TTL_SECS {
return Err(Error::TtlTooLong);
}
let expires_at =
SqliteTimestamp::from(Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::seconds(i64::from(ttl)));
self.store.create(kind, initiator_id, expires_at).await
}
#[message]
pub async fn query_pending(&mut self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Vec<ProposalSummary> {
self.store
.pending_for(operator_id)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
warn!(?e, "query_pending failed");
vec![]
})
}
#[message]
pub async fn cast_vote(
&mut self,
proposal_id: ProposalId,
operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
approve: bool,
signature: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<VoteOutcome, Error> {
let proposal = self.store.load(proposal_id).await?;
// Checked before the status check so AlreadyVoted takes priority.
if self.store.has_voted(proposal_id, operator_id).await? {
return Err(Error::AlreadyVoted);
}
Self::check_votable(&proposal)?;
let public_key = self.store.operator_public_key(operator_id).await?;
governance::verify_vote(&public_key, proposal_id, approve, &signature)
.map_err(|_| Error::InvalidSignature)?;
self.store
.record_vote(NewProposalVote {
proposal_id,
operator_id,
approve,
signature,
})
.await?;
let mut tally = self.store.tally(proposal_id).await?;
self.narrow_electorate(&proposal, &mut tally).await?;
self.settle(&proposal, &tally).await
}
/// §3.6: Any ordinary operator may request recovery wake-up.
/// Fails if a wake-up is already pending or active.
#[message]
pub async fn request_recovery_wakeup(
&mut self,
operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
if self.store.has_uncancelled_wakeup().await? {
return Err(Error::WakeupAlreadyPending);
}
self.store.request_wakeup(operator_id).await
}
/// §3.6: Any ordinary operator may cancel a pending wake-up request.
/// Fails if there is no uncancelled request.
#[message]
pub async fn cancel_recovery_wakeup(
&mut self,
operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
if self.store.cancel_wakeup(operator_id).await? {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(Error::NoActiveWakeup)
}
}
/// §3.5: Recovery operators may only vote on operator replacement proposals.
/// §3.6: Voting is gated behind recovery being active (14-day window elapsed).
#[message]
pub async fn cast_recovery_vote(
&mut self,
proposal_id: ProposalId,
recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
approve: bool,
signature: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<VoteOutcome, Error> {
let proposal = self.store.load(proposal_id).await?;
if proposal.kind != ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator {
return Err(Error::NotAllowedForRecoveryOperator);
}
if !self.store.is_recovery_active().await? {
return Err(Error::RecoveryNotActive);
}
if self
.store
.has_recovery_voted(proposal_id, recovery_operator_id)
.await?
{
return Err(Error::AlreadyVoted);
}
Self::check_votable(&proposal)?;
let public_key = self
.store
.recovery_operator_public_key(recovery_operator_id)
.await?;
governance::verify_vote(&public_key, proposal_id, approve, &signature)
.map_err(|_| Error::InvalidSignature)?;
self.store
.record_recovery_vote(NewRecoveryProposalVote {
proposal_id,
recovery_operator_id,
approve,
signature,
})
.await?;
let mut tally = self.store.tally(proposal_id).await?;
self.narrow_electorate(&proposal, &mut tally).await?;
self.settle(&proposal, &tally).await
}
}
impl ProposalManager {
/// A vote only counts while the proposal is still open.
fn check_votable(proposal: &Proposal) -> Result<(), Error> {
if proposal.status != ProposalStatus::Pending {
return Err(Error::ProposalNotPending);
}
if proposal.expires_at.0 <= Utc::now() {
return Err(Error::ProposalExpired);
}
Ok(())
}
/// §3.5/§3.6: recovery operators join the electorate only for the kinds they may vote on,
/// and only once the wake-up window has elapsed. Counting them anywhere else makes the
/// rejection threshold unreachable and, for full-quorum kinds, approval unreachable too.
///
/// The votes go out with the voters. A wake-up can be cancelled after recovery operators
/// have already voted (`cancel_wakeup` cancels any uncancelled request, elapsed or not),
/// so a `ReplaceOperator` tally can hold recovery approvals at the moment the committee
/// stops being eligible. Keeping those while zeroing only the electorate size would let
/// them cover ordinary votes that were never cast.
async fn narrow_electorate(&self, proposal: &Proposal, tally: &mut Tally) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !proposal.kind.recovery_may_vote() || !self.store.is_recovery_active().await? {
tally.drop_recovery();
}
Ok(())
}
/// Pure quorum arithmetic — no I/O, so the rules can be tested directly (§3.3).
///
/// A proposal is rejected once approval has become unreachable: even if every voter
/// who has not spoken yet approved, the threshold could not be met.
#[must_use]
pub(crate) const fn evaluate_quorum(tally: &Tally, requires_full_quorum: bool) -> VoteOutcome {
let total_eligible = tally.total_ordinary + tally.total_recovery;
// No electorate, nothing to settle. Guarded before the branch rather than inside it:
// the full-quorum arm would otherwise set `threshold` to 0 and read an empty tally as
// unanimous approval.
if total_eligible <= 0 {
return VoteOutcome::Pending;
}
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::cast_sign_loss,
clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "operator counts are always small positive integers"
)]
// §3.3: key-rotation proposals require every eligible voter to approve.
// §3.5: when recovery is active, recovery operators are eligible too.
let threshold: i64 = if requires_full_quorum {
total_eligible
} else {
match crate::crypto::shamir::shamir_threshold(tally.total_ordinary as usize) {
Some(threshold) => threshold as i64,
// No ordinary operators means no electorate: nothing can settle.
None => return VoteOutcome::Pending,
}
};
if tally.approve() >= threshold {
VoteOutcome::Approved
} else if tally.reject() > total_eligible - threshold {
VoteOutcome::Rejected
} else {
VoteOutcome::Pending
}
}
/// Applies the quorum rules to a fresh tally and records whatever they decide.
async fn settle(&self, proposal: &Proposal, tally: &Tally) -> Result<VoteOutcome, Error> {
let outcome = Self::evaluate_quorum(tally, proposal.kind.requires_full_quorum());
match outcome {
VoteOutcome::Approved => self.announce_approval(proposal).await?,
VoteOutcome::Rejected => {
self.store
.set_status(proposal.id, ProposalStatus::Rejected)
.await?;
}
VoteOutcome::Pending => {}
}
Ok(outcome)
}
/// Marks the proposal approved and hands the outcome to whoever owns that kind.
///
/// The outcome is published, not executed: this actor coordinates voting and nothing
/// else. Executors subscribe on the bus, so a vote is answered once the quorum is
/// recorded rather than once the effect has landed.
async fn announce_approval(&self, proposal: &Proposal) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.store
.set_status(proposal.id, ProposalStatus::Approved)
.await?;
let kind = self.store.load_kind(proposal.id, proposal.kind).await?;
let _ = self
.events
.tell(Publish(ProposalApproved {
id: proposal.id,
kind,
}))
.await;
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;

11
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager/events.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
use crate::db::{models::ProposalId, proposal::ProposalKind};
/// Published once a proposal reaches its approval threshold.
///
/// Executors subscribe on the global `MessageBus` and act on the kinds they own;
/// `ProposalManager` does not know who acts on an outcome, or whether anyone does.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ProposalApproved {
pub id: ProposalId,
pub kind: ProposalKind,
}

431
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager/store.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
//! Database access for [`super::ProposalManager`], behind a trait.
//!
//! The actor holds a `dyn ProposalStore` rather than a connection pool, so the quorum
//! rules can be exercised against a mock instead of a live SQLite file.
use super::{Error, ProposalSummary};
use crate::db::{
self,
models::{
NewProposal, NewProposalVote, NewRecoveryProposalVote, NewRecoveryWakeupRequest,
OperatorIdentityId, Proposal, ProposalId, ProposalStatus, RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
SqliteTimestamp,
},
proposal::{ProposalKind, ProposalKindTag},
schema,
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl,
dsl::{exists, select},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection as _, RunQueryDsl};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use strum::IntoDiscriminant as _;
/// Everything the quorum rules need to know about one proposal's votes.
///
/// Votes are kept per electorate rather than pre-summed: an electorate can stop counting
/// between the vote and the tally (§3.6 -- recovery goes back to sleep the moment a wake-up
/// is cancelled), and the votes it already cast have to leave with it. A single `approve`
/// field would carry them past [`Tally::drop_recovery`] into a threshold computed for the
/// ordinary committee alone.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Tally {
pub ordinary_approve: i64,
pub ordinary_reject: i64,
pub recovery_approve: i64,
pub recovery_reject: i64,
pub total_ordinary: i64,
pub total_recovery: i64,
}
impl Tally {
/// Approvals from every electorate that still counts.
pub const fn approve(&self) -> i64 {
self.ordinary_approve + self.recovery_approve
}
/// Rejections from every electorate that still counts.
pub const fn reject(&self) -> i64 {
self.ordinary_reject + self.recovery_reject
}
/// Takes the recovery committee out of the electorate, votes and all. The three numbers
/// go together: leaving the votes behind counts them against a threshold derived from an
/// electorate they are no longer part of.
pub const fn drop_recovery(&mut self) {
self.recovery_approve = 0;
self.recovery_reject = 0;
self.total_recovery = 0;
}
}
#[cfg_attr(test, mockall::automock)]
#[async_trait]
pub trait ProposalStore: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// Writes the proposal and its kind-specific rows in one transaction.
async fn create(
&self,
kind: ProposalKind,
initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
) -> Result<ProposalId, Error>;
async fn load(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Proposal, Error>;
async fn load_kind(&self, id: ProposalId, tag: ProposalKindTag) -> Result<ProposalKind, Error>;
async fn has_voted(
&self,
id: ProposalId,
operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
) -> Result<bool, Error>;
async fn has_recovery_voted(
&self,
id: ProposalId,
recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
) -> Result<bool, Error>;
async fn operator_public_key(&self, id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error>;
async fn recovery_operator_public_key(
&self,
id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error>;
async fn record_vote(&self, vote: NewProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error>;
async fn record_recovery_vote(&self, vote: NewRecoveryProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error>;
/// Vote counts for one proposal, alongside the size of each electorate.
async fn tally(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Tally, Error>;
async fn set_status(&self, id: ProposalId, status: ProposalStatus) -> Result<(), Error>;
/// Pending, unexpired proposals this operator has not voted on yet.
async fn pending_for(
&self,
operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
) -> Result<Vec<ProposalSummary>, Error>;
/// True once an uncancelled wake-up request has outlived the dispute window.
async fn is_recovery_active(&self) -> Result<bool, Error>;
/// True while any wake-up request stands, whether or not the window has elapsed.
async fn has_uncancelled_wakeup(&self) -> Result<bool, Error>;
async fn request_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<(), Error>;
/// Returns false when there was no uncancelled request to cancel.
async fn cancel_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<bool, Error>;
}
pub struct DieselProposalStore {
db: db::DatabasePool,
}
impl DieselProposalStore {
pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Self {
Self { db }
}
}
/// `NotFound` means the row is absent, which every caller reports as its own error.
fn missing(absent: Error) -> impl FnOnce(diesel::result::Error) -> Error {
move |e| match e {
diesel::result::Error::NotFound => absent,
other => Error::DatabaseQuery(other),
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl ProposalStore for DieselProposalStore {
async fn create(
&self,
kind: ProposalKind,
initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
) -> Result<ProposalId, Error> {
let id = self
.db
.get()
.await?
.transaction(async |conn| {
let id: ProposalId = diesel::insert_into(schema::proposal::table)
.values(&NewProposal {
kind: kind.discriminant(),
initiator_id,
expires_at,
})
.returning(schema::proposal::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
db::proposal::insert_kind(conn, id, &kind).await?;
Ok::<_, diesel::result::Error>(id)
})
.await?;
Ok(id)
}
async fn load(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Proposal, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::proposal::table
.find(id)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(missing(Error::ProposalNotFound))
}
async fn load_kind(&self, id: ProposalId, tag: ProposalKindTag) -> Result<ProposalKind, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
db::proposal::load_kind(&mut conn, id, tag)
.await
.map_err(Error::from)
}
async fn has_voted(
&self,
id: ProposalId,
operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
select(exists(
schema::proposal_vote::table
.filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
.filter(schema::proposal_vote::operator_id.eq(operator_id)),
))
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(Error::from)
}
async fn has_recovery_voted(
&self,
id: ProposalId,
recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
select(exists(
schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table
.filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
.filter(
schema::recovery_proposal_vote::recovery_operator_id.eq(recovery_operator_id),
),
))
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(Error::from)
}
async fn operator_public_key(&self, id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::operator_identity::table
.find(id)
.select(schema::operator_identity::public_key)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(missing(Error::OperatorNotFound))
}
async fn recovery_operator_public_key(
&self,
id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
.find(id)
.select(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(missing(Error::OperatorNotFound))
}
async fn record_vote(&self, vote: NewProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::proposal_vote::table)
.values(&vote)
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn record_recovery_vote(&self, vote: NewRecoveryProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table)
.values(&vote)
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn tally(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Tally, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let ordinary_approve: i64 = schema::proposal_vote::table
.filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
.filter(schema::proposal_vote::approve.eq(true))
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
let recovery_approve: i64 = schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table
.filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
.filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::approve.eq(true))
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
let ordinary_reject: i64 = schema::proposal_vote::table
.filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
.filter(schema::proposal_vote::approve.eq(false))
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
let recovery_reject: i64 = schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table
.filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
.filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::approve.eq(false))
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
let total_ordinary: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
let total_recovery: i64 = schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(Tally {
ordinary_approve,
ordinary_reject,
recovery_approve,
recovery_reject,
total_ordinary,
total_recovery,
})
}
async fn set_status(&self, id: ProposalId, status: ProposalStatus) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
diesel::update(schema::proposal::table.find(id))
.set(schema::proposal::status.eq(status))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn pending_for(
&self,
operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
) -> Result<Vec<ProposalSummary>, Error> {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #84; this will break in 2038"
)]
let now_ts = Utc::now().timestamp() as i32;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let voted_ids: Vec<ProposalId> = schema::proposal_vote::table
.filter(schema::proposal_vote::operator_id.eq(operator_id))
.select(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id)
.load(&mut conn)
.await?;
let proposals: Vec<Proposal> = schema::proposal::table
.filter(schema::proposal::status.eq(ProposalStatus::Pending))
.filter(schema::proposal::expires_at.gt(now_ts))
.filter(diesel::dsl::not(schema::proposal::id.eq_any(&voted_ids)))
.load(&mut conn)
.await?;
let ids: Vec<ProposalId> = proposals.iter().map(|p| p.id).collect();
let tallies: Vec<(ProposalId, bool, i64)> = schema::proposal_vote::table
.filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq_any(&ids))
.group_by((
schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id,
schema::proposal_vote::approve,
))
.select((
schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id,
schema::proposal_vote::approve,
diesel::dsl::count_star(),
))
.load(&mut conn)
.await?;
let mut by_proposal: HashMap<ProposalId, (i64, i64)> = HashMap::new();
for (proposal_id, approve, count) in tallies {
let entry = by_proposal.entry(proposal_id).or_insert((0, 0));
if approve {
entry.0 += count;
} else {
entry.1 += count;
}
}
Ok(proposals
.into_iter()
.map(|p| {
let (approve_count, reject_count) =
by_proposal.get(&p.id).copied().unwrap_or((0, 0));
ProposalSummary {
id: p.id,
kind: p.kind,
initiator_id: p.initiator_id,
expires_at: p.expires_at,
approve_count,
reject_count,
}
})
.collect())
}
async fn is_recovery_active(&self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
db::recovery::is_active(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(Error::from)
}
async fn has_uncancelled_wakeup(&self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
select(exists(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table.filter(
schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.is_null(),
)))
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(Error::from)
}
async fn request_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table)
.values(&NewRecoveryWakeupRequest {
requested_by: operator_id,
})
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn cancel_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let rows = diesel::update(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table)
.filter(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.is_null())
.set((
schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_by.eq(Some(operator_id)),
schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.eq(Some(SqliteTimestamp::now())),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(rows > 0)
}
}

395
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager/tests.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
//! The quorum rules, exercised without a database.
//!
//! These assertions are the point of [`super::store::ProposalStore`]: until the actor took
//! its data through a trait, checking that two of three operators carry an ordinary
//! proposal meant opening SQLite and registering operators first.
use super::{
ProposalManager, VoteOutcome,
store::{MockProposalStore, Tally},
};
use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors,
crypto::governance::vote_message,
db::{
models::{OperatorIdentityId, Proposal, ProposalId, ProposalStatus, SqliteTimestamp},
proposal::ProposalKindTag,
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{SigningContext, SigningKey};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use std::sync::Arc;
/// A tally where every vote came from the ordinary committee.
const fn tally(approve: i64, reject: i64, ordinary: i64, recovery: i64) -> Tally {
Tally {
ordinary_approve: approve,
ordinary_reject: reject,
recovery_approve: 0,
recovery_reject: 0,
total_ordinary: ordinary,
total_recovery: recovery,
}
}
/// A tally with votes from both committees, in the order approve/reject per committee.
const fn mixed_tally(
ordinary_approve: i64,
ordinary_reject: i64,
recovery_approve: i64,
recovery_reject: i64,
total_ordinary: i64,
total_recovery: i64,
) -> Tally {
Tally {
ordinary_approve,
ordinary_reject,
recovery_approve,
recovery_reject,
total_ordinary,
total_recovery,
}
}
#[test]
fn simple_majority_approves_at_two_of_three() {
assert_eq!(
ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(2, 0, 3, 0), false),
VoteOutcome::Approved
);
}
#[test]
fn one_of_three_is_not_yet_a_majority() {
assert_eq!(
ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(1, 0, 3, 0), false),
VoteOutcome::Pending
);
}
#[test]
fn full_quorum_kind_needs_every_voter() {
assert_eq!(
ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(2, 0, 3, 0), true),
VoteOutcome::Pending,
"two of three must not carry a key-rotation proposal"
);
}
#[test]
fn recovery_voters_count_towards_full_quorum() {
assert_eq!(
ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&mixed_tally(2, 0, 1, 0, 2, 1), true),
VoteOutcome::Approved
);
assert_eq!(
ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&mixed_tally(2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1), true),
VoteOutcome::Pending,
"the sleeping recovery operator still owes a vote"
);
}
/// An empty committee cannot approve anything. Both arms have to say so: the full-quorum arm
/// derives its threshold from the electorate, so with nobody eligible it would compare 0
/// approvals against a threshold of 0 and call that unanimous.
#[test]
fn an_empty_electorate_settles_nothing() {
assert_eq!(
ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(0, 0, 0, 0), true),
VoteOutcome::Pending,
"a full-quorum proposal must not pass with no eligible voters"
);
assert_eq!(
ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(0, 0, 0, 0), false),
VoteOutcome::Pending
);
}
#[test]
fn rejection_is_decided_once_approval_is_unreachable() {
// Threshold is 2 of 3, so two rejections leave at most one approval available.
assert_eq!(
ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(0, 2, 3, 0), false),
VoteOutcome::Rejected
);
assert_eq!(
ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(0, 1, 3, 0), false),
VoteOutcome::Pending,
"one rejection still leaves two approvals reachable"
);
}
#[test]
fn a_single_rejection_sinks_a_full_quorum_proposal() {
assert_eq!(
ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(2, 1, 3, 0), true),
VoteOutcome::Rejected
);
}
fn pending_proposal(id: ProposalId, kind: ProposalKindTag) -> Proposal {
let now = Utc::now();
Proposal {
id,
kind,
initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(1),
created_at: SqliteTimestamp::from(now),
expires_at: SqliteTimestamp::from(now + Duration::days(1)),
status: ProposalStatus::Pending,
}
}
/// The mock earns its keep here: reaching quorum must flip the stored status to
/// `Approved` exactly once. Signature verification stays real -- only the database is
/// stubbed out.
#[tokio::test]
async fn reaching_quorum_marks_the_proposal_approved() {
let id = ProposalId::from_raw(1);
let voter = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(1);
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let signature = key
.sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
.expect("signing a vote must succeed");
let public_key = key.public_key().to_bytes();
let mut store = MockProposalStore::new();
store
.expect_load()
.returning(move |id| Ok(pending_proposal(id, ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey)));
store.expect_has_voted().returning(|_, _| Ok(false));
store
.expect_operator_public_key()
.returning(move |_| Ok(public_key.clone()));
store.expect_record_vote().returning(|_| Ok(()));
store.expect_is_recovery_active().returning(|| Ok(false));
store.expect_tally().returning(|_| Ok(tally(1, 0, 1, 0)));
store
.expect_set_status()
.withf(move |got, status| *got == id && *status == ProposalStatus::Approved)
.times(1)
.returning(|_, _| Ok(()));
store
.expect_load_kind()
.returning(|_, _| Ok(crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind::TriggerRekey));
let mut manager =
ProposalManager::with_store(Arc::new(store), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus());
let outcome = manager
.cast_vote(id, voter, true, signature.to_bytes())
.await
.expect("a valid vote must be accepted");
assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Approved);
}
/// A vote that does not reach the threshold must leave the stored status alone.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_vote_short_of_quorum_does_not_touch_the_status() {
let id = ProposalId::from_raw(7);
let voter = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(2);
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let signature = key
.sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
.expect("signing a vote must succeed");
let public_key = key.public_key().to_bytes();
let mut store = MockProposalStore::new();
store
.expect_load()
.returning(move |id| Ok(pending_proposal(id, ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient)));
store.expect_has_voted().returning(|_, _| Ok(false));
store
.expect_operator_public_key()
.returning(move |_| Ok(public_key.clone()));
store.expect_record_vote().returning(|_| Ok(()));
store.expect_is_recovery_active().returning(|| Ok(false));
store.expect_tally().returning(|_| Ok(tally(1, 0, 3, 0)));
store.expect_set_status().never();
let mut manager =
ProposalManager::with_store(Arc::new(store), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus());
let outcome = manager
.cast_vote(id, voter, true, signature.to_bytes())
.await
.expect("a valid vote must be accepted");
assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Pending);
}
/// Drives one `cast_vote` on a proposal of the given `kind` through a mocked store and
/// returns the outcome. `recovery_active` decides what `is_recovery_active` reports;
/// `expected_status` is the status a settled outcome must be persisted under, or `None` for
/// a caller that expects the vote to leave the proposal pending.
///
/// `set_status` carries an argument matcher but no `.times()`, and `None` relaxes even the
/// matcher: the caller's own `assert_eq!` on the outcome is what pins the behaviour, so a
/// regression fails on a readable diff rather than on a mockall cardinality panic that hides
/// what the actor actually computed.
async fn settle_vote_with(
kind: ProposalKindTag,
tally: Tally,
recovery_active: bool,
expected_status: Option<ProposalStatus>,
) -> VoteOutcome {
let id = ProposalId::from_raw(11);
let voter = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(1);
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let signature = key
.sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
.expect("signing a vote must succeed");
let public_key = key.public_key().to_bytes();
let mut store = MockProposalStore::new();
store
.expect_load()
.returning(move |id| Ok(pending_proposal(id, kind)));
store.expect_has_voted().returning(|_, _| Ok(false));
store
.expect_operator_public_key()
.returning(move |_| Ok(public_key.clone()));
store.expect_record_vote().returning(|_| Ok(()));
store
.expect_is_recovery_active()
.returning(move || Ok(recovery_active));
store.expect_tally().returning(move |_| Ok(tally));
store
.expect_set_status()
.withf(move |_, status| {
expected_status
.as_ref()
.is_none_or(|expected| status == expected)
})
.returning(|_, _| Ok(()));
store.expect_load_kind().returning(move |_, _| {
Ok(match kind {
ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey => crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind::TriggerRekey,
ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient => {
crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(
crate::db::proposal::approve_sdk_client::Settings { client_id: 1 },
)
}
ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator => crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(
crate::db::proposal::replace_operator::Settings {
old_operator_id: OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(1),
new_pubkey: vec![0u8; 32],
},
),
other => unreachable!("settle_vote_with has no load_kind fixture for {other:?}"),
})
});
let mut manager =
ProposalManager::with_store(Arc::new(store), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus());
manager
.cast_vote(id, voter, true, signature.to_bytes())
.await
.expect("a valid vote must be accepted")
}
/// The full-quorum rejection path is insensitive to electorate size by construction:
/// `threshold == total_eligible` there, so `total_eligible - threshold` is always 0 and any
/// single rejection settles the proposal, whether or not recovery operators are (wrongly)
/// counted. This does not exercise the electorate-narrowing fix -- see
/// `unanimous_ordinary_rejection_rejects_a_non_full_quorum_proposal_while_recovery_is_awake`
/// below for the test that does -- it just pins that `cast_vote` still writes `Rejected`
/// through `settle` for a full-quorum kind.
#[tokio::test]
async fn unanimous_rejection_settles_a_full_quorum_rekey_via_cast_vote() {
let outcome = settle_vote_with(
ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey,
tally(0, 3, 3, 2),
/* recovery_active */ true,
Some(ProposalStatus::Rejected),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Rejected);
}
/// §3.3 full quorum for a rekey means every *ordinary* operator, not every identity on file.
#[tokio::test]
async fn unanimous_ordinary_approval_approves_a_rekey_while_recovery_is_awake() {
let outcome = settle_vote_with(
ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey,
tally(3, 0, 3, 2),
/* recovery_active */ true,
Some(ProposalStatus::Approved),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Approved);
}
/// §3.5: recovery operators do not vote on `ApproveSdkClient`, so they must not inflate its
/// electorate. Before the fix, `total_eligible` counted them anyway (5, not 3), so the
/// rejection test `reject > total_eligible - threshold` became `3 > 5 - 2 = 3`, which is
/// false -- three unanimous rejections left the proposal `Pending` forever, since a fourth
/// vote could never arrive. After the fix, `total_eligible` is 3 and the same test becomes
/// `3 > 3 - 2 = 1`, which settles it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn unanimous_ordinary_rejection_rejects_a_non_full_quorum_proposal_while_recovery_is_awake() {
let outcome = settle_vote_with(
ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient,
tally(0, 3, 3, 2),
/* recovery_active */ true,
Some(ProposalStatus::Rejected),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Rejected);
}
/// §3.5/§3.6: `ReplaceOperator` is the one kind recovery may vote on, so it is the only kind
/// where whether recovery is awake is observable at all -- for every other kind
/// `narrow_electorate` zeroes `total_recovery` regardless of `is_recovery_active`, short-
/// circuiting before that call. A sleeping recovery electorate must not raise the bar here:
/// with 1 ordinary operator and 2 (asleep) recovery operators, the lone ordinary approval
/// must already reach full quorum.
#[tokio::test]
async fn sleeping_recovery_operators_do_not_count_towards_quorum() {
let outcome = settle_vote_with(
ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator,
tally(1, 0, 1, 2),
/* recovery_active */ false,
Some(ProposalStatus::Approved),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Approved);
}
/// The sequence the whole-branch review worked through, on a `ReplaceOperator` with 3
/// ordinary and 2 recovery operators (§3.3: full quorum). Both recovery operators approve
/// while awake; one ordinary operator approves; another ordinary operator then cancels the
/// wake-up -- `cancel_wakeup` cancels an uncancelled request whether or not its window has
/// elapsed, so the committee goes straight back to sleep with its votes on the record; a
/// second ordinary operator approves.
///
/// The store now reports 4 approvals, 2 of them from a committee that is no longer eligible.
/// Narrowing the electorate has to drop those votes along with the voters: what is left is 2
/// of 3 ordinary approvals, and a full quorum needs all three. Counting the electorate down
/// to 3 while keeping all 4 votes would replace an operator on two ordinary approvals.
#[tokio::test]
async fn recovery_votes_leave_with_the_committee_that_cast_them() {
let outcome = settle_vote_with(
ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator,
mixed_tally(
/* ordinary_approve */ 2, /* ordinary_reject */ 0,
/* recovery_approve */ 2, /* recovery_reject */ 0,
/* total_ordinary */ 3, /* total_recovery */ 2,
),
/* recovery_active */ false,
None,
)
.await;
assert_eq!(
outcome,
VoteOutcome::Pending,
"two of three ordinary approvals must not carry a full-quorum proposal, whatever a \
sleeping recovery committee voted earlier"
);
}

327
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/vault/mod.rs
View File

@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
use crate::{
actors::proposal_manager::events::ProposalApproved,
crypto::{
KeyCell, derive_key,
KeyCell,
encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
integrity::{self, v1::HmacSha256},
},
db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory, RootKeyHistoryId},
schema::{self},
proposal::ProposalKind,
schema,
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
@@ -19,7 +21,7 @@ use diesel::{
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages, prelude::Message};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
@@ -90,7 +92,6 @@ pub struct Vault {
events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
#[messages]
impl Vault {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let state = {
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ impl Vault {
Ok(Self { db, state, events })
}
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple vaults write
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race conditions if multiple vaults write
// additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
async fn get_new_nonce(
pool: &db::DatabasePool,
@@ -158,33 +159,37 @@ impl Vault {
State::Sealed { .. } => Err(Error::Sealed),
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl Vault {
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, mut seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(&self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
}
let salt = v1::generate_salt();
let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
// Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default();
let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| {
let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice();
// Generate salt (kept for schema compat)
let root_key_salt = v1::generate_salt();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|rk| {
seal_key
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, rk.as_slice())
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
Error::Encryption(err)
})
})?;
let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
let root_key_history_id = conn
.transaction(async |conn| {
let root_key_history_id = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
@@ -194,7 +199,7 @@ impl Vault {
root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes.clone(),
schema_version: 1,
salt: salt.to_vec(),
salt: root_key_salt.to_vec(),
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(&mut *conn)
@@ -217,58 +222,55 @@ impl Vault {
});
info!("Vault bootstrapped successfully");
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await;
if let Err(err) = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await {
error!(?err, "Failed to publish Bootstrapped event");
}
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, mut seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id,
} = &self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let root_key_history_id = *root_key_history_id;
// We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
// We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive work
let current_key = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await?
};
let salt = &current_key.salt;
let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
let nonce =
Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut root_key_bytes = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key_bytes)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
Error::InvalidKey
})?;
let root_key = KeyCell::try_from(root_key_bytes).map_err(|()| {
error!("Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?,
root_key,
});
info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
@@ -277,6 +279,76 @@ impl Vault {
Ok(())
}
/// Re-encrypts the root key with `new_seal_key`, updating its `root_key_history` row in
/// place. Called after a Shamir re-key, so the old seal key is no longer sufficient to
/// unseal. The root key itself does not change, so its row identity (and the nonce counter
/// and integrity envelopes bound to it) must not change either.
#[message]
pub async fn rekey_root_key(&mut self, mut new_seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let new_nonce = Nonce::default();
let new_salt = v1::generate_salt();
let new_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|rk| {
new_seal_key
.encrypt(&new_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, rk.as_slice())
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Fatal rekey error");
Error::Encryption(err)
})
})?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
// The root key is unchanged, so its row keeps its identity: `data_encryption_nonce`
// keeps counting up, and every integrity envelope stays bound to the same key version.
// Only the seal-key material is replaced, retiring the previous one. `tag` and
// `schema_version` are deliberately left untouched: the seal-key encryption scheme
// itself is unchanged by a re-key, so there is nothing new for them to describe.
let rows_updated = update(schema::root_key_history::table)
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
.set((
schema::root_key_history::ciphertext.eq(new_ciphertext),
schema::root_key_history::root_key_encryption_nonce.eq(new_nonce.to_vec()),
schema::root_key_history::salt.eq(new_salt.to_vec()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
if rows_updated == 0 {
error!(
"Broken database: rekey matched no root_key_history row id={:#?}",
root_key_history_id
);
return Err(Error::BrokenDatabase);
}
info!("Vault root key rekeyed successfully");
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
};
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
}
// Server-side cryptographic operations
#[messages]
impl Vault {
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
@@ -354,12 +426,10 @@ impl Vault {
root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let mut hmac = root_key
.0
.read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
});
let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
});
hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_raw().to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input);
@@ -383,29 +453,69 @@ impl Vault {
return Ok(false);
}
let mut hmac = root_key
.0
.read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
});
let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
});
hmac.update(&key_version.to_raw().to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input);
Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
impl Message<ProposalApproved> for Vault {
type Reply = ();
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
/// Every subscriber sees every approval and acts only on the kinds it owns.
async fn handle(
&mut self,
msg: ProposalApproved,
_ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(settings) = msg.kind else {
return;
};
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
if let Err(error) = self.approve_sdk_client(settings.client_id).await {
error!(
?error,
proposal_id = msg.id.to_raw(),
"Failed to execute an approved proposal"
);
}
}
}
impl Vault {
/// Attests an approved SDK client with the root key.
///
/// Builds the envelope from its parts rather than calling `integrity::sign_entity`,
/// which would have this actor ask itself for a signature and deadlock.
async fn approve_sdk_client(&mut self, client_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
use crate::peers::client::ClientCredentials;
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
// Cloned so the connection does not hold a borrow of `self` across `sign_integrity`.
let db = self.db.clone();
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let pubkey_bytes: Vec<u8> = schema::program_client::table
.find(client_id)
.select(schema::program_client::public_key)
.first(&mut conn)
.await?;
let pubkey =
authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey_bytes.as_slice()).map_err(|()| Error::InvalidKey)?;
let credentials = ClientCredentials { pubkey };
let (entity_id, mac_input) = integrity::envelope_input(&credentials, client_id);
let (key_version, mac) = self.sign_integrity(mac_input)?;
integrity::store_envelope::<ClientCredentials>(&mut conn, entity_id, key_version, mac)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -413,8 +523,6 @@ impl Vault {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::actors::GlobalActors;
use crate::db::models::RootKeyHistory;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::SafeCellHandle as _;
use super::*;
@@ -422,8 +530,7 @@ mod tests {
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
actor.bootstrap(KeyCell::from([0u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
actor
}
@@ -432,12 +539,12 @@ mod tests {
async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let root_key_history_id = match actor.state {
State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
}) => root_key_history_id,
_ => panic!("expected unsealed state"),
let State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
}) = actor.state
else {
panic!("expected unsealed state");
};
let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
@@ -471,4 +578,96 @@ mod tests {
"next write must advance nonce"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn rekey_does_not_restart_the_data_nonce_counter() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let before = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"before-rekey".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
actor.rekey_root_key(KeyCell::from([7u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
let after = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"after-rekey".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
// One root key, one row: the root key never changed, so its history did not fork.
let rows: i64 = schema::root_key_history::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(rows, 1, "a seal-key re-key must not append a root key row");
// Fetch each nonce by its own id, rather than `eq_any` (whose row order is
// unspecified), and assert the counter strictly advanced. A weaker `assert_ne!` would
// still pass if the counter reset, as long as the two nonces happened to differ.
let before_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.find(before)
.select(schema::aead_encrypted::current_nonce)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let after_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.find(after)
.select(schema::aead_encrypted::current_nonce)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
after_nonce > before_nonce,
"nonce counter must keep advancing across a rekey, not reset"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn rekey_invalidates_the_old_seal_key() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
actor.rekey_root_key(KeyCell::from([7u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
actor.seal().await.unwrap();
// A no-op rekey would leave the old seal key working; it must not.
let err = actor
.try_unseal(KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]))
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, Error::InvalidKey),
"old seal key must no longer unseal after a rekey, got {err:?}"
);
// A failed unseal must leave the sealed state intact: the new seal key must still be
// able to unseal on the next attempt.
actor.try_unseal(KeyCell::from([7u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn integrity_envelopes_survive_a_rekey() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let mac_input = b"operator_credentials/1".to_vec();
let (key_version, mac) = actor.sign_integrity(mac_input.clone()).unwrap();
actor.rekey_root_key(KeyCell::from([9u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
assert!(
actor
.verify_integrity(mac_input, mac, key_version)
.unwrap(),
"a seal-key re-key must not invalidate existing attestations"
);
}
}

923
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/vault_coordinator/mod.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,923 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages, prelude::Message};
use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore as _};
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::{
proposal_manager::events::ProposalApproved,
vault::{Bootstrap, RekeyRootKey, TryUnseal, Vault},
},
crypto::{KeyCell, derive_key, encryption::v1::Nonce, shamir, shamir::shamir_threshold},
db::{
self, models,
proposal::{ProposalKind, replace_operator},
schema,
},
};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Already coordinating a bootstrap")]
AlreadyBootstrapping,
#[error("Already coordinating an unseal")]
AlreadyUnsealing,
#[error("Rekey not in progress")]
NotRekeying,
#[error("Bootstrap not in progress")]
NotBootstrapping,
#[error("Unseal not in progress")]
NotUnsealing,
#[error("Operator already contributed")]
DuplicateContribution,
#[error("Operator not found in database")]
OperatorNotFound,
#[error("Invalid passphrase (decryption failed)")]
InvalidPassphrase,
#[error("Shamir error: {0}")]
Shamir(String),
#[error("Database connection error: {0}")]
DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Encryption error")]
Encryption,
#[error("Vault error")]
VaultError,
#[error("Two-operator vaults require at least one recovery share")]
TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery,
#[error("Broken database")]
BrokenDatabase,
#[error("A committee must have at least one ordinary operator")]
EmptyCommittee,
#[error("Recovery operators are sleeping")]
RecoveryNotActive,
}
// Passphrases stored as plain Vec<u8> (not SafeCell) so CoordinatorState is Sync.
// They are ephemeral and dropped immediately after use.
enum CoordinatorState {
Idle,
Bootstrapping {
declared_count: usize,
recovery_count: usize,
passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
},
Unsealing {
threshold: usize,
ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
},
/// Shamir re-key after `replace_operator` or `trigger_rekey` is approved (§3.3).
/// Collects new passphrases from all current operators, then generates a fresh seal key,
/// re-splits it, and re-encrypts the vault root key.
Rekeying {
ordinary_count: usize,
recovery_count: usize,
passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
},
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct VaultCoordinator {
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
state: CoordinatorState,
}
impl VaultCoordinator {
pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, vault: ActorRef<Vault>) -> Self {
Self {
db,
vault,
state: CoordinatorState::Idle,
}
}
}
const SHARE_AAD: &[u8] = b"arbiter/shamir-share/v1";
fn encrypt_share(
passphrase_bytes: Vec<u8>,
share: &[u8],
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>), Error> {
let mut share_salt = vec![0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut share_salt);
let mut passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase_bytes);
let mut share_seal_key = derive_key(&mut passphrase_cell, &share_salt);
let nonce = Nonce::default();
let encrypted_share = share_seal_key
.encrypt(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, share)
.map_err(|_| Error::Encryption)?;
Ok((encrypted_share, nonce.to_vec(), share_salt))
}
fn decrypt_share(
passphrase_bytes: Vec<u8>,
encrypted_share: Vec<u8>,
share_nonce_bytes: &[u8],
share_salt: &[u8],
operator_id: i32,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(share_nonce_bytes).map_err(|()| {
error!(operator_id, "Invalid nonce in DB");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase_bytes);
let mut share_seal_key = derive_key(&mut passphrase_cell, share_salt);
let mut share_buffer = SafeCell::new(encrypted_share);
share_seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, &mut share_buffer)
.map_err(|_| Error::InvalidPassphrase)?;
Ok(share_buffer.read().clone())
}
/// Records the threshold of the split that produced the stored shares.
async fn store_threshold(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection, threshold: usize) -> Result<(), Error> {
// A threshold that doesn't fit in the column is a bug, not a real empty-committee refusal.
let threshold = i32::try_from(threshold).map_err(|_| Error::BrokenDatabase)?;
let rows_updated = diesel::update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
.set(schema::arbiter_settings::shamir_threshold.eq(Some(threshold)))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
// The singleton row always exists (up.sql seeds it), so anything else means the update did
// not land -- bootstrap would then report success while the threshold stays NULL forever.
if rows_updated != 1 {
return Err(Error::BrokenDatabase);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Reads back the threshold recorded at bootstrap or re-key time.
async fn load_threshold(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection) -> Result<usize, Error> {
let stored: Option<i32> = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.select(schema::arbiter_settings::shamir_threshold)
.first(conn)
.await?;
// A missing or out-of-range value here means the recorded threshold is corrupt, not that the
// committee is genuinely empty -- `EmptyCommittee` is reserved for the real domain refusal.
stored
.and_then(|threshold| usize::try_from(threshold).ok())
.ok_or(Error::BrokenDatabase)
}
/// §3.4: Split the seal key across ordinary + recovery operators.
/// Threshold = `shamir_threshold(ordinary_count)`; total shares = ordinary + recovery.
/// When `ordinary_count` == 1 (threshold = 1), vsss-rs does not support a proper split,
/// so each share is the seal key itself — any single participant can reconstruct.
async fn finalize_bootstrap(
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let ordinary_count = ordinary_passphrases.len();
let recovery_count = recovery_passphrases.len();
let total = ordinary_count + recovery_count;
let threshold = shamir_threshold(ordinary_count).ok_or(Error::EmptyCommittee)?;
let mut seal_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut seal_key_bytes);
// threshold == 1 means any single share reconstructs the key (degenerate split).
// vsss-rs requires threshold >= 2, so we store the key directly in this case.
let shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = if threshold >= 2 {
shamir::split_key(threshold, total, &seal_key_bytes, OsRng)
.map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
} else {
std::iter::repeat_with(|| seal_key_bytes.to_vec()).take(total).collect()
};
let seal_key = KeyCell::from(seal_key_bytes);
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let mut shares_iter = shares.into_iter();
for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
let share = shares_iter
.next()
.expect("split_key returned enough shares");
let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
diesel::replace_into(schema::operator::table)
.values((
schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)),
schema::operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
schema::operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
schema::operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
schema::operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
let share = shares_iter
.next()
.expect("split_key returned enough shares");
let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
diesel::replace_into(schema::recovery_operator::table)
.values((
schema::recovery_operator::id.eq(recovery_id_raw),
schema::recovery_operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
schema::recovery_operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
schema::recovery_operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
schema::recovery_operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
store_threshold(&mut conn, threshold).await?;
vault.ask(Bootstrap { seal_key }).await.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Vault bootstrap failed");
Error::VaultError
})?;
Ok(())
}
/// §3.5: Unseal using any threshold-sized mix of ordinary + recovery shares.
async fn finalize_unseal(
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
// Determine whether shares were stored as raw keys (threshold=1) or vsss-rs splits (threshold>=2).
let threshold = load_threshold(&mut conn).await?;
let mut shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
let (encrypted_share, share_nonce_bytes, share_salt): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) =
schema::operator::table
.filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)))
.select((
schema::operator::share,
schema::operator::share_nonce,
schema::operator::share_salt,
))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::OperatorNotFound)?;
shares.push(decrypt_share(
passphrase_bytes,
encrypted_share,
&share_nonce_bytes,
&share_salt,
operator_id_raw,
)?);
}
for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
let (encrypted_share, share_nonce_bytes, share_salt): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) =
schema::recovery_operator::table
.find(recovery_id_raw)
.select((
schema::recovery_operator::share,
schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce,
schema::recovery_operator::share_salt,
))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::OperatorNotFound)?;
shares.push(decrypt_share(
passphrase_bytes,
encrypted_share,
&share_nonce_bytes,
&share_salt,
recovery_id_raw,
)?);
}
// When threshold==1, shares are raw 32-byte seal keys (vsss-rs cannot split 1-of-N).
// Any single decrypted share is the key itself.
let seal_key_bytes: [u8; 32] = if threshold <= 1 {
let raw = shares
.into_iter()
.next()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Shamir("No shares available".into()))?;
raw.try_into()
.map_err(|_| Error::Shamir("Invalid share length".into()))?
} else {
shamir::combine_shares(&shares).map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
};
let seal_key = KeyCell::from(seal_key_bytes);
vault.ask(TryUnseal { seal_key }).await.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Vault unseal failed");
Error::VaultError
})?;
Ok(())
}
/// §3.3: Generate a fresh seal key, split across current operators, re-encrypt the vault root key.
/// Called after `replace_operator` or `trigger_rekey` is approved and all contributors submit.
async fn finalize_rekey(
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let ordinary_count = ordinary_passphrases.len();
let recovery_count = recovery_passphrases.len();
let total = ordinary_count + recovery_count;
let threshold = shamir_threshold(ordinary_count).ok_or(Error::EmptyCommittee)?;
let mut new_seal_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut new_seal_key_bytes);
let shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = if threshold >= 2 {
shamir::split_key(threshold, total, &new_seal_key_bytes, OsRng)
.map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
} else {
std::iter::repeat_with(|| new_seal_key_bytes.to_vec())
.take(total)
.collect()
};
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let mut shares_iter = shares.into_iter();
for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
let share = shares_iter
.next()
.expect("split_key returned enough shares");
let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
diesel::replace_into(schema::operator::table)
.values((
schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)),
schema::operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
schema::operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
schema::operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
schema::operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
let share = shares_iter
.next()
.expect("split_key returned enough shares");
let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
diesel::replace_into(schema::recovery_operator::table)
.values((
schema::recovery_operator::id.eq(recovery_id_raw),
schema::recovery_operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
schema::recovery_operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
schema::recovery_operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
schema::recovery_operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
store_threshold(&mut conn, threshold).await?;
drop(conn);
let new_seal_key = KeyCell::from(new_seal_key_bytes);
vault
.ask(RekeyRootKey { new_seal_key })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Vault rekey failed");
Error::VaultError
})?;
Ok(())
}
#[messages]
impl VaultCoordinator {
/// Phase 1 of multi-operator bootstrap: declare the committee size.
#[message]
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "kameo requires messages to be async")]
pub async fn start_bootstrap(
&mut self,
operator_id: i32,
declared_count: usize,
recovery_count: usize,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let _ = operator_id; // fixme!: any authenticated operator may announce the committee size. the first call wins
if !matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping);
}
if declared_count == 0 {
return Err(Error::EmptyCommittee);
}
if declared_count == 2 && recovery_count == 0 {
return Err(Error::TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery);
}
self.state = CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
declared_count,
recovery_count,
passphrases: HashMap::new(),
recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
};
Ok(())
}
/// Phase 2 of multi-operator bootstrap: ordinary operator contributes a passphrase.
/// Returns Ok(true) when all ordinary + recovery operators contributed and bootstrap finalized.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_bootstrap(
&mut self,
operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
declared_count,
recovery_count,
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapping);
};
if passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
if passphrases.len() < *declared_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
return Ok(false);
}
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
..
} = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
else {
unreachable!()
};
finalize_bootstrap(
self.db.clone(),
self.vault.clone(),
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
)
.await?;
Ok(true)
}
/// Phase 2 of multi-operator bootstrap: recovery operator contributes a passphrase.
/// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors are in and bootstrap finalized.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_recovery_bootstrap(
&mut self,
recovery_operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
declared_count,
recovery_count,
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapping);
};
if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
if passphrases.len() < *declared_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
return Ok(false);
}
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
..
} = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
else {
unreachable!()
};
finalize_bootstrap(
self.db.clone(),
self.vault.clone(),
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
)
.await?;
Ok(true)
}
/// Contribute a passphrase for vault unseal (ordinary operator).
/// Returns Ok(true) when threshold reached and vault is unsealed.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_unseal(
&mut self,
operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
self.ensure_unsealing_state().await?;
let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
threshold,
ordinary_passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotUnsealing);
};
if ordinary_passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
ordinary_passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
if ordinary_passphrases.len() + recovery_passphrases.len() < *threshold {
return Ok(false);
}
self.do_finalize_unseal().await
}
/// Contribute a passphrase for vault unseal (recovery operator, §3.5).
/// Recovery operators may contribute during unseal when recovery is active.
/// Returns Ok(true) when threshold reached and vault is unsealed.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_recovery_unseal(
&mut self,
recovery_operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
if !db::recovery::is_active(&mut conn).await? {
return Err(Error::RecoveryNotActive);
}
}
self.ensure_unsealing_state().await?;
let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
threshold,
ordinary_passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotUnsealing);
};
if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
if ordinary_passphrases.len() + recovery_passphrases.len() < *threshold {
return Ok(false);
}
self.do_finalize_unseal().await
}
}
impl VaultCoordinator {
/// Initializes `CoordinatorState::Unsealing` on first call if still `Idle`.
/// Threshold comes from the recorded split parameters (§3.4), not from a live row count.
async fn ensure_unsealing_state(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
if matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let threshold = load_threshold(&mut conn).await?;
drop(conn);
self.state = CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
threshold,
ordinary_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
};
}
Ok(())
}
/// Moves state back to Idle and calls finalize_unseal.
async fn do_finalize_unseal(&mut self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
ordinary_passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
..
} = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
else {
unreachable!()
};
finalize_unseal(
self.db.clone(),
self.vault.clone(),
ordinary_passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
)
.await?;
Ok(true)
}
async fn do_finalize_rekey(&mut self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
..
} = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
else {
unreachable!()
};
finalize_rekey(
self.db.clone(),
self.vault.clone(),
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
)
.await?;
Ok(true)
}
}
#[messages]
impl VaultCoordinator {
/// Begin Shamir re-key after a key-rotation proposal is approved (§3.3).
/// Queries the current operator and recovery operator counts from the DB,
/// then transitions to Rekeying state awaiting contributions from all of them.
#[message]
pub async fn start_rekey(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.ensure_idle()?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let ordinary_count: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
let recovery_count: i64 = schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
self.state = CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
ordinary_count: ordinary_count as usize,
recovery_count: recovery_count as usize,
passphrases: HashMap::new(),
recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
};
Ok(())
}
/// Contribute an ordinary operator passphrase for the re-key.
/// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors have submitted and the re-key is complete.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_rekey(
&mut self,
operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
ordinary_count,
recovery_count,
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotRekeying);
};
if passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase.read().to_vec());
if passphrases.len() < *ordinary_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
return Ok(false);
}
self.do_finalize_rekey().await
}
/// Contribute a recovery operator passphrase for the re-key.
/// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors have submitted and the re-key is complete.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_recovery_rekey(
&mut self,
recovery_operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
ordinary_count,
recovery_count,
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotRekeying);
};
if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase.read().to_vec());
if passphrases.len() < *ordinary_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
return Ok(false);
}
self.do_finalize_rekey().await
}
}
impl Message<ProposalApproved> for VaultCoordinator {
type Reply = ();
/// Every subscriber sees every approval and acts only on the kinds it owns.
async fn handle(
&mut self,
msg: ProposalApproved,
_ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
let result = match msg.kind {
ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(settings) => self.replace_operator(&settings).await,
ProposalKind::TriggerRekey => self.start_rekey().await,
_ => return,
};
if let Err(error) = result {
error!(
?error,
proposal_id = msg.id.to_raw(),
"Failed to execute an approved proposal"
);
}
}
}
impl VaultCoordinator {
/// The coordinator runs one ceremony at a time; anything that starts a new one has to say
/// so before it changes any state the ceremony depends on.
const fn ensure_idle(&self) -> Result<(), Error> {
if matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping)
}
}
/// Replaces the operator's public key in place, keeping their id and history, drops the
/// share that key no longer matches, then begins a coordinated re-key (§3.3).
async fn replace_operator(
&mut self,
settings: &replace_operator::Settings,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
// Checked before anything is written. The re-key is what gives the replaced operator
// a share they can use; if the coordinator is mid-ceremony, `start_rekey` refuses, and
// swapping the key and destroying the share first would leave that operator locked
// out with no re-key running and nothing to undo it -- the caller only logs the error.
self.ensure_idle()?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
diesel::update(schema::operator_identity::table)
.filter(schema::operator_identity::id.eq(settings.old_operator_id))
.set(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(&settings.new_pubkey))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
// Drop the stale Shamir share; finalize_rekey stores a fresh one.
diesel::delete(schema::operator::table)
.filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(settings.old_operator_id)))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
drop(conn);
self.start_rekey().await
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{CoordinatorState, Error, VaultCoordinator};
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Vault},
db::{self, models::OperatorIdentityId, proposal::replace_operator, schema},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, dsl::insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
use std::collections::HashMap;
/// An approved `ReplaceOperator` that arrives while another ceremony is running must
/// change nothing. Swapping the public key and deleting the share are only safe because a
/// re-key follows and hands the operator a share for the new key; when `start_rekey`
/// refuses, the operator would otherwise be left holding a key with no share, and the
/// caller does nothing with the error but log it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_refused_rekey_leaves_the_operator_untouched() {
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
let old_key = rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec();
let operator_id: OperatorIdentityId = insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(&old_key))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::operator::table)
.values((
schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id)),
schema::operator::share.eq(vec![1u8; 32]),
schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(vec![2u8; 24]),
schema::operator::share_salt.eq(vec![3u8; 32]),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let vault = Vault::spawn(
Vault::new(pool.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap(),
);
let mut coordinator = VaultCoordinator::new(pool.clone(), vault);
coordinator.state = CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
ordinary_count: 2,
recovery_count: 0,
passphrases: HashMap::new(),
recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
};
let result = coordinator
.replace_operator(&replace_operator::Settings {
old_operator_id: operator_id,
new_pubkey: vec![9u8; 32],
})
.await;
assert!(
matches!(result, Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping)),
"a busy coordinator must refuse the replacement, got {result:?}"
);
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
let stored_key: Vec<u8> = schema::operator_identity::table
.find(operator_id)
.select(schema::operator_identity::public_key)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
stored_key, old_key,
"the public key must not be swapped when no re-key can follow"
);
let shares: i64 = schema::operator::table
.filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id)))
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(shares, 1, "the operator's share must not be destroyed");
}
}

12
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/encryption/v1.rs
View File

@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let mut password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key1 = derive_key(password, &salt);
let mut key2 = derive_key(password2, &salt);
let mut key1 = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
let mut key2 = derive_key(&mut password2, &salt);
let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
@@ -77,10 +77,10 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn successful_derive() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
let mut key = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
let key_reader = key.0.read();
assert_ne!(key_reader.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);

99
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/governance.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
//! Canonical encoding and verification of governance vote signatures (§3.3).
use crate::db::models::ProposalId;
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, SigningContext};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum VerifyError {
#[error("Malformed operator public key")]
PublicKey,
#[error("Malformed vote signature")]
Signature,
#[error("Signature does not match this vote")]
Mismatch,
}
/// Canonical bytes an operator signs when voting: `proposal_id` as i64 big-endian,
/// followed by the approve flag as one byte.
///
/// The flag is part of the message on purpose: without it an approval could be
/// replayed as a rejection of the same proposal.
#[must_use]
pub fn vote_message(proposal_id: ProposalId, approve: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut message = Vec::with_capacity(9);
message.extend_from_slice(&i64::from(proposal_id.to_raw()).to_be_bytes());
message.push(u8::from(approve));
message
}
/// Verifies a vote signature against an operator's stored public key.
pub fn verify_vote(
public_key: &[u8],
proposal_id: ProposalId,
approve: bool,
signature: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), VerifyError> {
let public_key = authn::PublicKey::try_from(public_key).map_err(|()| VerifyError::PublicKey)?;
let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(signature).map_err(|()| VerifyError::Signature)?;
if public_key.verify_message(
&vote_message(proposal_id, approve),
SigningContext::GovernanceVote,
&signature,
) {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(VerifyError::Mismatch)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{VerifyError, verify_vote, vote_message};
use crate::db::models::ProposalId;
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{SigningContext, SigningKey};
#[test]
fn vote_message_is_the_id_then_the_approve_flag() {
let message = vote_message(ProposalId::from_raw(0x0102), true);
assert_eq!(message, vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 1]);
}
#[test]
fn verify_vote_accepts_a_matching_signature() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let id = ProposalId::from_raw(42);
let signature = key
.sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
.unwrap();
verify_vote(
&key.public_key().to_bytes(),
id,
true,
&signature.to_bytes(),
)
.expect("a signature over this exact vote must verify");
}
/// The decisive one: an approval must not verify as a rejection of the same
/// proposal, or a captured vote could be replayed with its meaning flipped.
#[test]
fn verify_vote_rejects_a_flipped_approve_flag() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let id = ProposalId::from_raw(42);
let signature = key
.sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
verify_vote(
&key.public_key().to_bytes(),
id,
false,
&signature.to_bytes()
),
Err(VerifyError::Mismatch)
));
}
}

40
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs
View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use crate::{
actors::vault::{self, GetState, SignIntegrity, Vault, VerifyIntegrity},
db::{
self,
models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope, RootKeyHistoryId},
schema::integrity_envelope,
},
};
@@ -109,11 +109,7 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
entity: &E,
entity_id: impl IntoId,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
let (entity_id, mac_input) = envelope_input::<E>(entity, entity_id);
let (key_version, mac) =
vault
@@ -124,6 +120,31 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
_ => Error::VaultSend,
})?;
store_envelope::<E>(conn, entity_id, key_version, mac)
.await
.map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
Ok(())
}
/// The entity id and the bytes the root key covers, as a pair.
///
/// Split out of [`sign_entity`] so the `Vault` actor can build an envelope from inside a
/// message handler, where asking itself for a signature would deadlock.
pub fn envelope_input<E: Integrable>(entity: &E, entity_id: impl IntoId) -> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) {
let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
(entity_id, mac_input)
}
/// Stores the integrity envelope for one entity, replacing any envelope it already has.
pub async fn store_envelope<E: Integrable>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
entity_id: Vec<u8>,
key_version: RootKeyHistoryId,
mac: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
.values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
@@ -143,8 +164,7 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
integrity_envelope::mac.eq(mac),
))
.execute(conn)
.await
.map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
.await?;
Ok(())
}
@@ -215,8 +235,6 @@ mod tests {
},
db::{self, schema},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
#[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
struct DummyEntity {
@@ -235,7 +253,7 @@ mod tests {
);
actor
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
seal_key: crate::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();

23
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
use encryption::v1::Nonce;
use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
use chacha20poly1305::{
@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ use rand::{
};
pub mod encryption;
pub mod governance;
pub mod integrity;
pub mod shamir;
pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
@@ -20,6 +22,15 @@ impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
Self(value)
}
}
impl From<[u8; 32]> for KeyCell {
fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|key: &mut Key| {
key.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
});
Self(cell)
}
}
impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
type Error = ();
@@ -28,7 +39,7 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
return Err(());
}
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
});
Ok(Self(cell))
@@ -37,7 +48,7 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
impl KeyCell {
pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
let key = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng)
.expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
@@ -94,7 +105,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
}
/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
pub fn derive_key(password: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &[u8]) -> KeyCell {
let params = {
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
@@ -132,10 +143,10 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn encrypt_decrypt() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
let mut key = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
let associated_data = b"associated data";
let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();

60
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/shamir.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
use vsss_rs::Gf256;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ShamirError {
#[error("Failed to split key: {0}")]
Split(String),
#[error("Failed to combine shares: {0}")]
Combine(String),
}
/// Split `key` into `total` shares where any `threshold` shares can reconstruct it.
/// Each returned Vec<u8> is a share with format [`identifier_byte`, `value_bytes`...].
pub fn split_key(
threshold: usize,
total: usize,
key: &[u8; 32],
rng: impl rand_core::RngCore + rand_core::CryptoRng,
) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, ShamirError> {
Gf256::split_array(threshold, total, key.as_slice(), rng)
.map_err(|e| ShamirError::Split(format!("{e:?}")))
}
/// Returns the minimum number of shares required to reconstruct the secret
/// for a committee of `n` operators, or `None` for an empty committee.
#[must_use]
pub const fn shamir_threshold(n: usize) -> Option<usize> {
match n {
0 => None,
1 => Some(1),
2 => Some(2),
n => Some(n / 2 + 1),
}
}
/// Reconstruct the secret from `threshold` or more shares.
pub fn combine_shares(shares: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ShamirError> {
let bytes = Gf256::combine_array(shares)
.map_err(|e| ShamirError::Combine(format!("{e:?}")))?;
<[u8; 32]>::try_from(bytes.as_slice())
.map_err(|_| ShamirError::Combine("unexpected reconstructed key length".to_owned()))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::shamir_threshold;
#[test]
fn empty_committee_has_no_threshold() {
assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(0), None);
}
#[test]
fn threshold_follows_the_ordinary_quorum() {
// ARCHITECTURE.md §3.1/§3.4: 1 decides alone, 2 need consensus, N needs N/2 + 1.
assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(1), Some(1));
assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(2), Some(2));
assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(3), Some(2));
assert_eq!(shamir_threshold(4), Some(3));
}
}

12
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/functions.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
//! Typed bindings for the SQLite scalar functions used in Diesel expressions.
use diesel::sql_types::Text;
diesel::define_sql_function! {
/// SQLite `unixepoch(modifier)` -- seconds since the Unix epoch.
///
/// Declared so timestamp comparisons are built by the query DSL instead of by
/// `format!`-ing a SQL fragment: the argument becomes a bind parameter and the
/// result type is checked against the column it is compared with.
fn unixepoch(modifier: Text) -> Integer;
}

140
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/mod.rs
View File

@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::info;
pub mod functions;
pub mod models;
pub mod proposal;
pub mod recovery;
pub mod schema;
pub type DatabaseConnection = SyncConnectionWrapper<SqliteConnection>;
@@ -56,25 +59,39 @@ fn database_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, DatabaseSetupError> {
Ok(db_path)
}
/// The pragmas `SQLite` scopes to one connection. They are defined once and run on every
/// connection that reaches the database -- the migration connection below and each pooled
/// connection in `create_pool` -- because a value set on one connection is invisible to the
/// next, and every real write happens on a pooled one.
const CONNECTION_PRAGMAS: &str = "
-- sleep if the database is busy; this corresponds to up to 9 seconds sleeping time.
-- see https://fractaledmind.github.io/2023/09/07/enhancing-rails-sqlite-fine-tuning/
PRAGMA busy_timeout = 9000;
-- fsync only in critical moments
PRAGMA synchronous = NORMAL;
-- write WAL changes back every 1000 pages, for an in average 1MB WAL file.
-- May affect readers if number is increased
PRAGMA wal_autocheckpoint = 1000;
-- sqlite foreign keys are disabled by default, enable them for safety
PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
-- overwrite freed pages instead of leaving encrypted shares, nonces and salts
-- readable in the file
PRAGMA secure_delete = ON;
";
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info", skip(conn))]
fn db_config(conn: &mut SqliteConnection) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
// fsync only in critical moments
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA synchronous = NORMAL;")?;
// write WAL changes back every 1000 pages, for an in average 1MB WAL file.
// May affect readers if number is increased
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_autocheckpoint = 1000;")?;
conn.batch_execute(CONNECTION_PRAGMAS)?;
// The rest belong to the database file rather than the connection, so the one-shot
// migration connection is the right and only place for them.
// free some space by truncating possibly massive WAL files from the last run
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE);")?;
// sqlite foreign keys are disabled by default, enable them for safety
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;")?;
// better space reclamation
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA auto_vacuum = FULL;")?;
// secure delete, overwrite deleted content with zeros to prevent recovery
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA secure_delete = ON;")?;
Ok(())
}
@@ -98,12 +115,17 @@ fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
/// # Panics
/// Panics if the database path is not valid UTF-8.
pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
database_path()?
// Matched rather than `unwrap_or`, whose argument is evaluated even when `url` is `Some`:
// `database_path` resolves the real home directory and creates `~/.arbiter` as a side
// effect, so an eager call reaches the developer's home from every test that passes an
// explicit temp path, and fails outright wherever no home directory is writable.
let database_url = match url {
Some(url) => url.to_owned(),
None => database_path()?
.to_str()
.expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_owned(),
);
};
initialize_database(&database_url)?;
@@ -112,13 +134,13 @@ pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetu
Box::pin(async move {
let mut conn = DatabaseConnection::establish(url).await?;
// see https://fractaledmind.github.io/2023/09/07/enhancing-rails-sqlite-fine-tuning/
// sleep if the database is busy, this corresponds to up to 9 seconds sleeping time.
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout = 9000;")
// better write-concurrency; a property of the file, but harmless to reassert
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;")
.await
.map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?;
// better write-concurrency
conn.batch_execute("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;")
// The migration connection setting these is not enough: SQLite scopes them to
// one connection, and every real query runs on a pooled one.
conn.batch_execute(CONNECTION_PRAGMAS)
.await
.map_err(diesel::ConnectionError::CouldntSetupConfiguration)?;
@@ -154,3 +176,83 @@ pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
.await
.expect("Failed to create test database pool")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _,
dsl::insert_into,
result::{DatabaseErrorKind, Error as DieselError},
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
/// `operator.id` references `operator_identity(id)`. Without `PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON`
/// on the pooled connection, SQLite accepts a share row for an operator that does not exist.
#[tokio::test]
async fn pooled_connections_enforce_foreign_keys() {
let pool = create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
let result = insert_into(schema::operator::table)
.values((
schema::operator::id.eq(4242),
schema::operator::share.eq(vec![0u8; 32]),
schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(vec![0u8; 24]),
schema::operator::share_salt.eq(vec![0u8; 32]),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await;
// Specifically a foreign-key violation, not any error: a `NOT NULL` failure or a
// renamed column would also make `result.is_err()` true without proving the pragma
// is what rejected the insert.
assert!(
matches!(
result,
Err(DieselError::DatabaseError(
DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation,
_
))
),
"expected a foreign-key violation for a dangling operator_identity reference, got {result:?}"
);
}
#[derive(diesel::QueryableByName)]
struct PragmaValue {
#[diesel(sql_type = diesel::sql_types::Integer)]
value: i32,
}
async fn pragma(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, name: &str) -> i32 {
diesel::sql_query(format!("select {name} as value from pragma_{name}()"))
.get_result::<PragmaValue>(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
.value
}
/// `foreign_keys` had to be repeated on the pooled connection because `SQLite` scopes it
/// there; its siblings in `CONNECTION_PRAGMAS` are scoped the same way and were being
/// left behind on the migration connection. `secure_delete` is the one that matters in a
/// key-custody database: off by default, it leaves freed pages holding encrypted shares,
/// nonces and salts readable in the file.
#[tokio::test]
async fn pooled_connections_carry_the_shared_pragmas() {
let pool = create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
pragma(&mut conn, "secure_delete").await,
1,
"freed pages must be overwritten on the connection that does the writing"
);
assert_eq!(
pragma(&mut conn, "synchronous").await,
1,
"synchronous must be NORMAL (1), not the default FULL (2)"
);
assert_eq!(pragma(&mut conn, "foreign_keys").await, 1);
}
}

105
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/models.rs
View File

@@ -9,16 +9,18 @@ use crate::db::schema::{
integrity_envelope, root_key_history, tls_history,
};
use crate::db::proposal::ProposalKindTag;
use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
use restructed::Models;
pub mod types {
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use diesel::{
backend::Backend,
deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow},
expression::AsExpression,
serialize::{IsNull, ToSql},
sql_types::Integer,
sql_types::{Integer, Text},
sqlite::{Sqlite, SqliteType},
};
@@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ pub mod types {
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
mut bytes: <Sqlite as Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err(format!(
@@ -141,6 +143,42 @@ pub mod types {
declare_id!(TlsHistoryId);
declare_id!(EvmWalletId);
declare_id!(ClientId);
declare_id!(ProposalId);
declare_id!(RecoveryOperatorIdentityId);
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, AsExpression, FromSqlRow)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Text)]
pub enum ProposalStatus {
Pending,
Approved,
Rejected,
}
impl ToSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalStatus {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
let s: &str = match self {
Self::Pending => "pending",
Self::Approved => "approved",
Self::Rejected => "rejected",
};
<str as ToSql<Text, Sqlite>>::to_sql(s, out)
}
}
impl FromSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalStatus {
fn from_sql(bytes: <Sqlite as Backend>::RawValue<'_>) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let s = <String as FromSql<Text, Sqlite>>::from_sql(bytes)?;
match s.as_str() {
"pending" => Ok(Self::Pending),
"approved" => Ok(Self::Approved),
"rejected" => Ok(Self::Rejected),
other => Err(format!("Unknown proposal status: {other}").into()),
}
}
}
}
pub use types::*;
@@ -225,19 +263,22 @@ pub struct EvmWallet {
#[view(
NewEvmWalletAccess,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
omit(id, created_at, revoked_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
#[view(
CoreEvmWalletAccess,
derive(Insertable),
omit(created_at),
omit(created_at, revoked_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmWalletAccess {
pub id: i32,
pub wallet_id: EvmWalletId,
pub client_id: i32,
// Grants, transaction logs, and persistent-grant proposals reference this row
// `on delete restrict`, so revocation cannot delete it -- it marks it revoked instead.
pub revoked_at: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
@@ -285,6 +326,7 @@ pub struct Operator {
pub id: OperatorId,
pub share: Vec<u8>,
pub share_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub share_salt: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
@@ -437,3 +479,58 @@ pub struct IntegrityEnvelope {
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Identifiable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct Proposal {
pub id: ProposalId,
pub kind: ProposalKindTag,
pub initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub status: ProposalStatus,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct NewProposal {
pub kind: ProposalKindTag,
pub initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
// status defaults to 'pending' at the DB layer
pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Identifiable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProposalVote {
pub id: i32,
pub proposal_id: ProposalId,
pub operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
pub approve: bool,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
pub voted_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct NewProposalVote {
pub proposal_id: ProposalId,
pub operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
pub approve: bool,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::recovery_proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct NewRecoveryProposalVote {
pub proposal_id: ProposalId,
pub recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
pub approve: bool,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::recovery_wakeup_request, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct NewRecoveryWakeupRequest {
pub requested_by: OperatorIdentityId,
}

48
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/approve_sdk_client.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
//! Approving an SDK client so it may authenticate against the vault.
use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag};
use crate::db::{
DatabaseConnection, models::ProposalId, schema::proposal_approve_sdk_client as table,
};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, Insertable, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, Queryable, Selectable,
SelectableHelper as _, sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = table, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct Settings {
pub client_id: i32,
}
pub struct ApproveSdkClient;
impl Proposal for ApproveSdkClient {
const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient;
type Settings = Settings;
async fn insert(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
settings: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
diesel::insert_into(table::table)
.values((table::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id), settings))
.execute(conn)
.await
.map(drop)
}
async fn load(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
table::table
.find(proposal_id)
.select(Settings::as_select())
.first(conn)
.await
}
}

49
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/grant_wallet_access.rs Normal file
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//! Granting an SDK client visibility of a wallet.
use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag};
use crate::db::{
DatabaseConnection, models::ProposalId, schema::proposal_grant_wallet_access as table,
};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, Insertable, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, Queryable, Selectable,
SelectableHelper as _, sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = table, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct Settings {
pub wallet_id: i32,
pub client_id: i32,
}
pub struct GrantWalletAccess;
impl Proposal for GrantWalletAccess {
const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::GrantWalletAccess;
type Settings = Settings;
async fn insert(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
settings: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
diesel::insert_into(table::table)
.values((table::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id), settings))
.execute(conn)
.await
.map(drop)
}
async fn load(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
table::table
.find(proposal_id)
.select(Settings::as_select())
.first(conn)
.await
}
}

249
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/mod.rs Normal file
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//! Governed actions and the parameters they carry.
//!
//! Laid out the way [`crate::evm::policies::Policy`] is: a unit type per kind, its
//! parameters as an associated `Settings`, and the persistence for those parameters
//! implemented next to them. Everything downstream is generic over [`Proposal`], so a
//! new kind is a new module plus one arm in each dispatcher -- nothing else in the
//! codebase has to learn about it.
use crate::db::{DatabaseConnection, models::ProposalId};
use diesel::{
QueryResult,
backend::Backend,
deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow},
expression::AsExpression,
serialize::ToSql,
sql_types::Text,
sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use strum::{Display, EnumDiscriminants, EnumString, IntoStaticStr};
pub mod approve_sdk_client;
pub mod grant_wallet_access;
pub mod one_off_transaction;
pub mod persistent_grant;
pub mod replace_operator;
pub mod trigger_rekey;
pub use approve_sdk_client::ApproveSdkClient;
pub use grant_wallet_access::GrantWalletAccess;
pub use one_off_transaction::OneOffTransaction;
pub use persistent_grant::PersistentGrant;
pub use replace_operator::ReplaceOperator;
pub use trigger_rekey::TriggerRekey;
/// A governed action that owns the child table holding its parameters.
pub trait Proposal: Sized {
/// The value stored in `proposal.kind` for this action.
const KIND: ProposalKindTag;
/// Parameters the action is voted on with.
type Settings: Send + Sync + 'static;
/// Writes the child row carrying `settings`.
fn insert(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
settings: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<()>> + Send;
/// Reads the child row back. A missing row surfaces as [`diesel::result::Error::NotFound`],
/// which is what a proposal without its parameters is.
fn load(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Self::Settings>> + Send;
}
/// Parameters of a proposal, in the one shape that can cross the actor boundary.
///
/// Every variant holds the `Settings` of the matching [`Proposal`] implementation, so
/// the two cannot drift.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(
name(ProposalKindTag),
vis(pub),
derive(Display, EnumString, IntoStaticStr, AsExpression, FromSqlRow),
diesel(sql_type = Text),
strum(serialize_all = "snake_case")
)]
pub enum ProposalKind {
ApproveSdkClient(approve_sdk_client::Settings),
GrantWalletAccess(grant_wallet_access::Settings),
ReplaceOperator(replace_operator::Settings),
TriggerRekey,
ApprovePersistentGrant(Box<persistent_grant::Settings>),
ApproveOneOffTransaction(Box<one_off_transaction::Settings>),
}
impl ProposalKindTag {
/// Key-rotation proposals require every operator to approve (§3.3).
#[must_use]
pub const fn requires_full_quorum(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::ReplaceOperator | Self::TriggerRekey)
}
/// §3.5: recovery operators weigh in on operator replacement and nothing else.
#[must_use]
pub const fn recovery_may_vote(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::ReplaceOperator)
}
}
/// Pins every implementation to the variant it is dispatched from. Without this a
/// mistyped `KIND` would compile and only show up as a proposal stored under the
/// wrong `proposal.kind`.
const _: () = {
assert!(
matches!(ApproveSdkClient::KIND, ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient),
"ApproveSdkClient::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient"
);
assert!(
matches!(GrantWalletAccess::KIND, ProposalKindTag::GrantWalletAccess),
"GrantWalletAccess::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::GrantWalletAccess"
);
assert!(
matches!(ReplaceOperator::KIND, ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator),
"ReplaceOperator::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator"
);
assert!(
matches!(TriggerRekey::KIND, ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey),
"TriggerRekey::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey"
);
assert!(
matches!(
PersistentGrant::KIND,
ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant
),
"PersistentGrant::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant"
);
assert!(
matches!(
OneOffTransaction::KIND,
ProposalKindTag::ApproveOneOffTransaction
),
"OneOffTransaction::KIND must be ProposalKindTag::ApproveOneOffTransaction"
);
};
/// Writes the child row carrying this proposal's parameters.
///
/// The only place the create path has to know every kind; each arm hands straight off
/// to the implementation that owns the table.
pub async fn insert_kind(
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
proposal_id: ProposalId,
kind: &ProposalKind,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
match kind {
ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(s) => ApproveSdkClient::insert(proposal_id, s, conn).await,
ProposalKind::GrantWalletAccess(s) => GrantWalletAccess::insert(proposal_id, s, conn).await,
ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(s) => ReplaceOperator::insert(proposal_id, s, conn).await,
ProposalKind::TriggerRekey => TriggerRekey::insert(proposal_id, &(), conn).await,
ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(s) => {
PersistentGrant::insert(proposal_id, s, conn).await
}
ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(s) => {
OneOffTransaction::insert(proposal_id, s, conn).await
}
}
}
/// Reads the parameters back for a `proposal.kind` that is only known at runtime.
pub async fn load_kind(
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
proposal_id: ProposalId,
tag: ProposalKindTag,
) -> QueryResult<ProposalKind> {
Ok(match tag {
ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient => {
ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(ApproveSdkClient::load(proposal_id, conn).await?)
}
ProposalKindTag::GrantWalletAccess => {
ProposalKind::GrantWalletAccess(GrantWalletAccess::load(proposal_id, conn).await?)
}
ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator => {
ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(ReplaceOperator::load(proposal_id, conn).await?)
}
ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey => {
TriggerRekey::load(proposal_id, conn).await?;
ProposalKind::TriggerRekey
}
ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant => ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(Box::new(
PersistentGrant::load(proposal_id, conn).await?,
)),
ProposalKindTag::ApproveOneOffTransaction => ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(
Box::new(OneOffTransaction::load(proposal_id, conn).await?),
),
})
}
impl ToSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalKindTag {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
<str as ToSql<Text, Sqlite>>::to_sql(<&'static str>::from(*self), out)
}
}
impl FromSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalKindTag {
fn from_sql(bytes: <Sqlite as Backend>::RawValue<'_>) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let s = <String as FromSql<Text, Sqlite>>::from_sql(bytes)?;
s.parse()
.map_err(|_| format!("Unknown proposal kind: {s}").into())
}
}
/// SQLite has no unsigned integers; the column is `BigInt`, so a value that does not
/// round-trip is a corrupt row rather than something to silently wrap.
pub(crate) fn as_i64(value: u64) -> QueryResult<i64> {
i64::try_from(value).map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::SerializationError(Box::new(Overflow)))
}
pub(crate) fn as_u64(value: i64) -> QueryResult<u64> {
u64::try_from(value)
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(Overflow)))
}
pub(crate) fn fixed_bytes<const N: usize>(
bytes: &[u8],
column: &'static str,
) -> QueryResult<[u8; N]> {
<[u8; N]>::try_from(bytes)
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(WrongLength(column))))
}
/// Reads a fixed-width column into an array, labelling failures with the column it came
/// from.
///
/// The label is taken from the field itself, so renaming a column cannot leave a stale
/// name behind in the error -- which is the whole reason this is a macro and not a
/// second argument.
///
/// - `fixed!(row.column)` for a `Vec<u8>` field
/// - `fixed!(opt row.column)` for a `Option<Vec<u8>>` one
/// - `fixed!(binding)` for a local
macro_rules! fixed {
(opt $src:ident.$field:ident) => {
$src.$field
.as_deref()
.map(|value| $crate::db::proposal::fixed_bytes(value, stringify!($field)))
.transpose()
};
($src:ident.$field:ident) => {
$crate::db::proposal::fixed_bytes(&$src.$field, stringify!($field))
};
($binding:ident) => {
$crate::db::proposal::fixed_bytes(&$binding, stringify!($binding))
};
}
pub(crate) use fixed;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("value does not fit a SQLite integer")]
struct Overflow;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("column {0} has the wrong byte length")]
struct WrongLength(&'static str);

138
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/one_off_transaction.rs Normal file
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//! Signing a single EIP-1559 transaction.
use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag, as_i64, as_u64, fixed};
use crate::db::{
DatabaseConnection,
models::ProposalId,
schema::{proposal_one_off_transaction, proposal_one_off_transaction_result},
};
use diesel::{
Insertable, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, Queryable, Selectable, SelectableHelper as _,
sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Settings {
pub client_id: i32,
pub wallet_address: [u8; 20],
pub chain_id: u64,
pub nonce: u64,
pub gas_limit: u64,
pub max_fee_per_gas: u128,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128,
pub to: [u8; 20],
pub value: [u8; 32],
pub input: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = proposal_one_off_transaction, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
struct Row {
proposal_id: ProposalId,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Vec<u8>,
chain_id: i64,
nonce: i64,
gas_limit: i64,
max_fee_per_gas: Vec<u8>,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: Vec<u8>,
to_address: Vec<u8>,
value: Vec<u8>,
input: Vec<u8>,
}
impl Row {
fn new(proposal_id: ProposalId, settings: &Settings) -> QueryResult<Self> {
Ok(Self {
proposal_id,
client_id: settings.client_id,
wallet_address: settings.wallet_address.to_vec(),
chain_id: as_i64(settings.chain_id)?,
nonce: as_i64(settings.nonce)?,
gas_limit: as_i64(settings.gas_limit)?,
max_fee_per_gas: settings.max_fee_per_gas.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: settings.max_priority_fee_per_gas.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
to_address: settings.to.to_vec(),
value: settings.value.to_vec(),
input: settings.input.clone(),
})
}
fn into_settings(self) -> QueryResult<Settings> {
Ok(Settings {
client_id: self.client_id,
wallet_address: fixed!(self.wallet_address)?,
chain_id: as_u64(self.chain_id)?,
nonce: as_u64(self.nonce)?,
gas_limit: as_u64(self.gas_limit)?,
max_fee_per_gas: u128::from_be_bytes(fixed!(self.max_fee_per_gas)?),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128::from_be_bytes(fixed!(self.max_priority_fee_per_gas)?),
to: fixed!(self.to_address)?,
value: fixed!(self.value)?,
input: self.input,
})
}
}
pub struct OneOffTransaction;
impl Proposal for OneOffTransaction {
const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::ApproveOneOffTransaction;
type Settings = Settings;
async fn insert(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
settings: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
diesel::insert_into(proposal_one_off_transaction::table)
.values(&Row::new(proposal_id, settings)?)
.execute(conn)
.await
.map(drop)
}
async fn load(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
let row: Row = proposal_one_off_transaction::table
.find(proposal_id)
.select(Row::as_select())
.first(conn)
.await?;
row.into_settings()
}
}
/// The signature the vault produced for an approved transaction.
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = proposal_one_off_transaction_result, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
struct SignatureRow {
proposal_id: ProposalId,
r: Vec<u8>,
s: Vec<u8>,
y_parity: i32,
}
/// Records the signature produced for an approved transaction, by component, so what
/// came back is as readable as what was signed.
pub async fn store_signature(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
signature: &alloy::signers::Signature,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
diesel::insert_into(proposal_one_off_transaction_result::table)
.values(&SignatureRow {
proposal_id,
r: signature.r().to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec(),
s: signature.s().to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec(),
y_parity: i32::from(signature.v()),
})
.execute(conn)
.await
.map(drop)
}

271
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/persistent_grant.rs Normal file
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//! Creating a standing EVM grant.
use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag, as_i64, as_u64, fixed};
use crate::db::{
DatabaseConnection,
models::ProposalId,
schema::{
proposal_persistent_grant, proposal_persistent_grant_ether,
proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target, proposal_persistent_grant_token,
proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit,
},
};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, Insertable, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult,
Queryable, Selectable, SelectableHelper as _, sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Settings {
pub wallet_access_id: i32,
pub chain_id: u64,
pub valid_from_secs: Option<i64>,
pub valid_until_secs: Option<i64>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<[u8; 32]>,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<[u8; 32]>,
pub rate_limit: Option<RateLimit>,
pub specific: Specific,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RateLimit {
pub count: u32,
pub window_secs: i64,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct VolumeLimit {
pub max_volume: [u8; 32],
pub window_secs: i64,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Specific {
EtherTransfer {
targets: Vec<[u8; 20]>,
limit: VolumeLimit,
},
TokenTransfer {
token_contract: [u8; 20],
receiver: Option<[u8; 20]>,
volume_limits: Vec<VolumeLimit>,
},
}
/// Shared settings, mirroring `evm_basic_grant`.
#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = proposal_persistent_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
struct BaseRow {
proposal_id: ProposalId,
wallet_access_id: i32,
chain_id: i64,
valid_from: Option<i64>,
valid_until: Option<i64>,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
rate_limit_count: Option<i32>,
rate_limit_window_secs: Option<i64>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = proposal_persistent_grant_ether, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
struct EtherRow {
proposal_id: ProposalId,
window_secs: i64,
max_volume: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
struct NewEtherTarget {
proposal_id: ProposalId,
address: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = proposal_persistent_grant_token, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
struct TokenRow {
proposal_id: ProposalId,
token_contract: Vec<u8>,
receiver: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
struct NewTokenLimit {
proposal_id: ProposalId,
window_secs: i64,
max_volume: Vec<u8>,
}
impl BaseRow {
fn new(proposal_id: ProposalId, settings: &Settings) -> QueryResult<Self> {
Ok(Self {
proposal_id,
wallet_access_id: settings.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: as_i64(settings.chain_id)?,
valid_from: settings.valid_from_secs,
valid_until: settings.valid_until_secs,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: settings.max_gas_fee_per_gas.map(|v| v.to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: settings.max_priority_fee_per_gas.map(|v| v.to_vec()),
// SQLite stores integers signed; a rate-limit count is a `u32`, so it
// round-trips through the bit pattern rather than a fallible range check.
rate_limit_count: settings.rate_limit.map(|r| r.count.cast_signed()),
rate_limit_window_secs: settings.rate_limit.map(|r| r.window_secs),
})
}
fn into_settings(self, specific: Specific) -> QueryResult<Settings> {
Ok(Settings {
wallet_access_id: self.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: as_u64(self.chain_id)?,
valid_from_secs: self.valid_from,
valid_until_secs: self.valid_until,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: fixed!(opt self.max_gas_fee_per_gas)?,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: fixed!(opt self.max_priority_fee_per_gas)?,
rate_limit: self.rate_limit_count.zip(self.rate_limit_window_secs).map(
|(count, window_secs)| RateLimit {
count: count.cast_unsigned(),
window_secs,
},
),
specific,
})
}
}
pub struct PersistentGrant;
impl Proposal for PersistentGrant {
const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant;
type Settings = Settings;
async fn insert(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
settings: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
diesel::insert_into(proposal_persistent_grant::table)
.values(&BaseRow::new(proposal_id, settings)?)
.execute(conn)
.await?;
match &settings.specific {
Specific::EtherTransfer { targets, limit } => {
diesel::insert_into(proposal_persistent_grant_ether::table)
.values(&EtherRow {
proposal_id,
window_secs: limit.window_secs,
max_volume: limit.max_volume.to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
// Row at a time: SQLite has no multi-row VALUES clause in diesel-async.
for address in targets {
diesel::insert_into(proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target::table)
.values(&NewEtherTarget {
proposal_id,
address: address.to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
}
Specific::TokenTransfer {
token_contract,
receiver,
volume_limits,
} => {
diesel::insert_into(proposal_persistent_grant_token::table)
.values(&TokenRow {
proposal_id,
token_contract: token_contract.to_vec(),
receiver: receiver.map(|r| r.to_vec()),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
for limit in volume_limits {
diesel::insert_into(proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit::table)
.values(&NewTokenLimit {
proposal_id,
window_secs: limit.window_secs,
max_volume: limit.max_volume.to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
async fn load(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
let base: BaseRow = proposal_persistent_grant::table
.find(proposal_id)
.select(BaseRow::as_select())
.first(conn)
.await?;
let ether: Option<EtherRow> = proposal_persistent_grant_ether::table
.find(proposal_id)
.select(EtherRow::as_select())
.first(conn)
.await
.optional()?;
let specific = if let Some(ether) = ether {
let addresses: Vec<Vec<u8>> = proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target::table
.filter(proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id))
.select(proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target::address)
.load(conn)
.await?;
let targets = addresses
.iter()
.map(|address| fixed!(address))
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
Specific::EtherTransfer {
targets,
limit: VolumeLimit {
max_volume: fixed!(ether.max_volume)?,
window_secs: ether.window_secs,
},
}
} else {
let token: TokenRow = proposal_persistent_grant_token::table
.find(proposal_id)
.select(TokenRow::as_select())
.first(conn)
.await?;
let rows: Vec<(i64, Vec<u8>)> = proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit::table
.filter(proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id))
.select((
proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit::window_secs,
proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit::max_volume,
))
.load(conn)
.await?;
let volume_limits = rows
.into_iter()
.map(|(window_secs, max_volume)| {
Ok(VolumeLimit {
max_volume: fixed!(max_volume)?,
window_secs,
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
Specific::TokenTransfer {
token_contract: fixed!(token.token_contract)?,
receiver: fixed!(opt token.receiver)?,
volume_limits,
}
};
base.into_settings(specific)
}
}

51
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/replace_operator.rs Normal file
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//! Replacing an operator's key, which also triggers a Shamir re-key (§3.3).
use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag};
use crate::db::{
DatabaseConnection,
models::{OperatorIdentityId, ProposalId},
schema::proposal_replace_operator as table,
};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, Insertable, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, Queryable, Selectable,
SelectableHelper as _, sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = table, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct Settings {
pub old_operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
pub new_pubkey: Vec<u8>,
}
pub struct ReplaceOperator;
impl Proposal for ReplaceOperator {
const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator;
type Settings = Settings;
async fn insert(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
settings: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
diesel::insert_into(table::table)
.values((table::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id), settings))
.execute(conn)
.await
.map(drop)
}
async fn load(
proposal_id: ProposalId,
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
table::table
.find(proposal_id)
.select(Settings::as_select())
.first(conn)
.await
}
}

28
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/trigger_rekey.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
//! A Shamir re-key over the current operator set (§3.3).
use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag};
use crate::db::{DatabaseConnection, models::ProposalId};
use diesel::QueryResult;
pub struct TriggerRekey;
impl Proposal for TriggerRekey {
const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey;
type Settings = ();
async fn insert(
_proposal_id: ProposalId,
_settings: &Self::Settings,
_conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
Ok(())
}
async fn load(
_proposal_id: ProposalId,
_conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
Ok(())
}
}

102
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/recovery.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
//! Whether the recovery committee is awake.
//!
//! §3.6: a wake-up request opens a dispute window; recovery powers only become active once
//! that window has elapsed without cancellation. Both the proposal manager (for voting) and
//! the vault coordinator (for unsealing) gate on this, so the rule lives in one place.
use crate::db::{functions::unixepoch, schema};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _,
dsl::{exists, select},
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
/// Recovery operators stay asleep for this long after a wake-up is requested, so the other
/// operators have time to dispute it (§3.6).
pub const WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS: i32 = 14 * 24 * 60 * 60;
/// True when an uncancelled wake-up request is older than the dispute window.
pub async fn is_active(
conn: &mut crate::db::DatabaseConnection,
) -> Result<bool, diesel::result::Error> {
select(exists(
schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table
.filter(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.is_null())
.filter(
schema::recovery_wakeup_request::requested_at
.le(unixepoch("now") - WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS),
),
))
.get_result(conn)
.await
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS, is_active};
use crate::db::{self, schema};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
/// `recovery_wakeup_request.requested_by` references `operator_identity(id)`, and pooled
/// connections enforce foreign keys, so every wake-up row needs a real identity behind it.
async fn insert_operator(pool: &db::DatabasePool) -> i32 {
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![7u8; 32]))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
/// Pins `.filter(requested_at.le(...))`: a wake-up requested moments ago must not be
/// active yet, even though nothing has cancelled it. Deleting that filter turns this
/// assertion false without touching any other test in the suite.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_recent_wakeup_is_not_yet_active() {
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let operator_id = insert_operator(&pool).await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
diesel::sql_query(format!(
"INSERT INTO recovery_wakeup_request (requested_by, requested_at) \
VALUES ({operator_id}, unixepoch('now'))"
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!is_active(&mut conn).await.unwrap(),
"a wake-up requested moments ago must still be asleep"
);
}
/// Pins `.filter(cancelled_at.is_null())`: a cancelled wake-up must not count towards
/// activity even once its original request has outlived the dispute window. Deleting
/// that filter turns this assertion false without touching any other test in the suite.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_cancelled_wakeup_is_not_active_even_past_the_window() {
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let operator_id = insert_operator(&pool).await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
diesel::sql_query(format!(
"INSERT INTO recovery_wakeup_request \
(requested_by, requested_at, cancelled_by, cancelled_at) \
VALUES ({operator_id}, unixepoch('now') - {WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS} - 1, \
{operator_id}, unixepoch('now'))"
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!is_active(&mut conn).await.unwrap(),
"a cancelled wake-up must not activate recovery even past the window"
);
}
}

193
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/schema.rs
View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ diesel::table! {
id -> Integer,
root_key_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
tls_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
shamir_threshold -> Nullable<Integer>,
}
}
@@ -135,6 +136,7 @@ diesel::table! {
id -> Integer,
wallet_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer,
revoked_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@ diesel::table! {
id -> Nullable<Integer>,
share -> Binary,
share_nonce -> Binary,
share_salt -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
@@ -171,6 +174,165 @@ diesel::table! {
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal (id) {
id -> Integer,
kind -> Text,
initiator_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
expires_at -> Integer,
status -> Text,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_approve_sdk_client (proposal_id) {
proposal_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_grant_wallet_access (proposal_id) {
proposal_id -> Integer,
wallet_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_replace_operator (proposal_id) {
proposal_id -> Integer,
old_operator_id -> Integer,
new_pubkey -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_one_off_transaction (proposal_id) {
proposal_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer,
wallet_address -> Binary,
chain_id -> BigInt,
nonce -> BigInt,
gas_limit -> BigInt,
max_fee_per_gas -> Binary,
max_priority_fee_per_gas -> Binary,
to_address -> Binary,
value -> Binary,
input -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id) {
proposal_id -> Integer,
wallet_access_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> BigInt,
valid_from -> Nullable<BigInt>,
valid_until -> Nullable<BigInt>,
max_gas_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
max_priority_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
rate_limit_count -> Nullable<Integer>,
rate_limit_window_secs -> Nullable<BigInt>,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_persistent_grant_ether (proposal_id) {
proposal_id -> Integer,
window_secs -> BigInt,
max_volume -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target (id) {
id -> Integer,
proposal_id -> Integer,
address -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_persistent_grant_token (proposal_id) {
proposal_id -> Integer,
token_contract -> Binary,
receiver -> Nullable<Binary>,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit (id) {
id -> Integer,
proposal_id -> Integer,
window_secs -> BigInt,
max_volume -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_one_off_transaction_result (proposal_id) {
proposal_id -> Integer,
r -> Binary,
s -> Binary,
y_parity -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
recovery_operator (id) {
id -> Integer,
share -> Binary,
share_nonce -> Binary,
share_salt -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
recovery_operator_identity (id) {
id -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
recovery_wakeup_request (id) {
id -> Integer,
requested_by -> Integer,
requested_at -> Integer,
cancelled_by -> Nullable<Integer>,
cancelled_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
}
}
diesel::table! {
recovery_proposal_vote (id) {
id -> Integer,
proposal_id -> Integer,
recovery_operator_id -> Integer,
approve -> Bool,
signature -> Binary,
voted_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_vote (id) {
id -> Integer,
proposal_id -> Integer,
operator_id -> Integer,
approve -> Bool,
signature -> Binary,
voted_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
program_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
@@ -224,9 +386,38 @@ diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> evm_wallet (wallet_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> program_client (client_id));
diesel::joinable!(operator -> operator_identity (id));
diesel::joinable!(program_client -> client_metadata (metadata_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal -> operator_identity (initiator_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_one_off_transaction_result -> proposal_one_off_transaction (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_approve_sdk_client -> proposal (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_grant_wallet_access -> proposal (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_replace_operator -> proposal (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_one_off_transaction -> proposal (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_persistent_grant -> proposal (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_persistent_grant_ether -> proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_persistent_grant_token -> proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_vote -> proposal (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_vote -> operator_identity (operator_id));
diesel::joinable!(recovery_operator -> recovery_operator_identity (id));
diesel::joinable!(recovery_proposal_vote -> proposal (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(recovery_proposal_vote -> recovery_operator_identity (recovery_operator_id));
diesel::joinable!(recovery_wakeup_request -> operator_identity (requested_by));
diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
aead_encrypted,
proposal_one_off_transaction_result,
proposal_approve_sdk_client,
proposal_grant_wallet_access,
proposal_replace_operator,
proposal_one_off_transaction,
proposal_persistent_grant,
proposal_persistent_grant_ether,
proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target,
proposal_persistent_grant_token,
proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit,
recovery_operator,
recovery_operator_identity,
recovery_wakeup_request,
recovery_proposal_vote,
arbiter_settings,
client_metadata,
client_metadata_history,
@@ -244,6 +435,8 @@ diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
operator,
operator_identity,
program_client,
proposal,
proposal_vote,
root_key_history,
tls_history,
);

85
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/mod.rs
View File

@@ -352,16 +352,17 @@ impl Engine {
mod tests {
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use rstest::rstest;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
self, DatabaseConnection, models,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog,
SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema,
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::policies::{
@@ -380,6 +381,7 @@ mod tests {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(5),
client_id: 20,
revoked_at: None,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
},
chain: CHAIN_ID,
@@ -403,10 +405,85 @@ mod tests {
}
}
/// Creates the parent chain a fresh `evm_wallet_access` row needs under foreign-key
/// enforcement (a root key, an aead-encrypted secret, a wallet, and a client) and
/// returns the new access row's id.
async fn seed_wallet_access(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
salt: vec![0u8; 16],
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
.values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
current_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
associated_root_key_id: root_key_id,
created_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let wallet_id: EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec()),
schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
))
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
.values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
.returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let client_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
.values((
schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.returning(schema::program_client::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
))
.returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
async fn insert_basic_grant(
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
shared: &SharedGrantSettings,
) -> EvmBasicGrant {
// The seeded id deliberately wins over `shared.wallet_access_id`: every other field
// below is read from `shared`, but a caller-supplied access id would almost never
// reference a row that actually exists under foreign-key enforcement.
let wallet_access_id = seed_wallet_access(conn).await;
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
@@ -415,7 +492,7 @@ mod tests {
)]
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: shared.wallet_access_id,
wallet_access_id,
chain_id: shared.chain.into(),
valid_from: shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
@@ -579,7 +656,7 @@ mod tests {
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: basic_grant.id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_access_id: basic_grant.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: super::utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::ZERO).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),

86
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/ether_transfer/tests.rs
View File

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
use crate::{
db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
self, DatabaseConnection, models,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog,
SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema,
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
},
evm::{
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ use crate::{
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
const WALLET_ACCESS_ID: i32 = 1;
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, value: U256) -> EvalContext {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(10),
client_id: 20,
revoked_at: None,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
},
chain: CHAIN_ID,
@@ -45,10 +47,82 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, value: U256) -> EvalContext {
}
}
/// Creates the parent chain a fresh `evm_wallet_access` row needs under foreign-key
/// enforcement (a root key, an aead-encrypted secret, a wallet, and a client) and returns
/// the new access row's id.
async fn seed_wallet_access(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
salt: vec![0u8; 16],
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
.values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
current_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
associated_root_key_id: root_key_id,
created_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let wallet_id: EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec()),
schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
))
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
.values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
.returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let client_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
.values((
schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.returning(schema::program_client::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
))
.returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicGrant {
let wallet_access_id = seed_wallet_access(conn).await;
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_access_id,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
@@ -161,7 +235,7 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_when_volume_within_limit() {
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_access_id: basic.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(500u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
@@ -203,7 +277,7 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_access_id: basic.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_000u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
@@ -246,7 +320,7 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_access_id: basic.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(900u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),

115
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/token_transfers/tests.rs
View File

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
use crate::{
db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
self, DatabaseConnection, models,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
schema,
schema::evm_basic_grant,
},
evm::{
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ use alloy::{
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
// DAI on Ethereum mainnet — present in the static token registry
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, calldata: Bytes) -> EvalContext {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(10),
client_id: 20,
revoked_at: None,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
},
chain: CHAIN_ID,
@@ -58,10 +60,82 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, calldata: Bytes) -> EvalContext {
}
}
/// Creates the parent chain a fresh `evm_wallet_access` row needs under foreign-key
/// enforcement (a root key, an aead-encrypted secret, a wallet, and a client) and returns
/// the new access row's id.
async fn seed_wallet_access(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
salt: vec![0u8; 16],
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
.values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
current_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
associated_root_key_id: root_key_id,
created_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let wallet_id: EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec()),
schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
))
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
.values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
.returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let client_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
.values((
schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.returning(schema::program_client::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
))
.returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicGrant {
let wallet_access_id = seed_wallet_access(conn).await;
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_access_id,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
@@ -77,6 +151,27 @@ async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicG
.unwrap()
}
/// `evm_token_transfer_log.log_id` references the shared `evm_transaction_log` table, so
/// tests recording a token transfer need a real row there to point at.
async fn insert_transaction_log(
conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
basic: &EvmBasicGrant,
eth_value: U256,
) -> i32 {
insert_into(schema::evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(models::NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: basic.id,
wallet_access_id: basic.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(eth_value).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.returning(schema::evm_transaction_log::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
fn make_settings(target: Option<Address>, max_volume: Option<u64>) -> Settings {
Settings {
token_contract: DAI,
@@ -241,10 +336,11 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_volume_at_exact_limit() {
.unwrap();
// Record a past transfer of 900, with current transfer 100 => exactly 1000 limit
insert_into(db::schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(db::models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
let log_id = insert_transaction_log(&mut conn, &basic, U256::from(900u64)).await;
insert_into(schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
log_id,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
@@ -285,10 +381,11 @@ async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(db::schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(db::models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
let log_id = insert_transaction_log(&mut conn, &basic, U256::from(1_000u64)).await;
insert_into(schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
log_id,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID.into(),
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),

2
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/safe_signer.rs
View File

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for SafeSigner {
/// Returns the protected key bytes and the derived Ethereum address.
pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::Rng) -> (SafeCell<[u8; 32]>, Address) {
loop {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|w: &mut [u8; 32]| {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|w: &mut [u8; 32]| {
rng.fill_bytes(w);
});

25
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator.rs
View File

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ use tracing::{error, info, warn};
mod auth;
mod evm;
mod governance;
mod inbound;
mod outbound;
mod sdk_client;
@@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ async fn dispatch_inner(
warn!("Unsupported post-auth operator auth request");
Err(Status::invalid_argument("Unsupported operator request"))
}
OperatorRequestPayload::Governance(req) => governance::dispatch(actor, req).await,
}
}
@@ -127,14 +129,23 @@ pub async fn start(
let (oob_sender, oob_receiver) = mpsc::channel(16);
let oob_adapter = OutOfBandAdapter(oob_sender);
let actor = {
let started = {
let transport = auth::AuthTransportAdapter::new(&mut bi, &mut request_tracker);
match crate::peers::operator::start(&mut conn, transport, Box::new(oob_adapter)).await {
Ok(actor) => actor,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "Operator connection failed");
return;
}
crate::peers::operator::start(&mut conn, transport, Box::new(oob_adapter)).await
};
let actor = match started {
Ok(actor) => actor,
// §3.5: a recovery operator is turned away from the session rather than failing. Say so
// on the stream, so it does not look like the server dropped the connection.
Err(e @ crate::peers::operator::Error::RecoveryOperatorHasNoSession) => {
info!("Recovery operator connection closed after the vault gate");
let _ = bi.send(Err(Status::permission_denied(e.to_string()))).await;
return;
}
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "Operator connection failed");
return;
}
};

256
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/governance.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
use crate::{
actors::proposal_manager::{Error as ProposalError, VoteOutcome},
db::models::{OperatorIdentityId, ProposalId},
db::proposal::{
ProposalKind, approve_sdk_client, grant_wallet_access, one_off_transaction,
persistent_grant, replace_operator,
},
peers::operator::{
OperatorSession,
session::handlers::{HandleCastVote, HandleCreateProposal, HandleQueryPending},
},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::operator::{
governance::{
self as proto_gov, CreateProposalRequest, QueryPendingRequest, QueryPendingResponse,
VoteOutcome as ProtoVoteOutcome, create_proposal_request::Kind as ProtoKind,
request::Payload as GovRequestPayload, response::Payload as GovResponsePayload,
},
operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
const fn wrap(payload: GovResponsePayload) -> OperatorResponsePayload {
OperatorResponsePayload::Governance(proto_gov::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
}
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: proto_gov::Request,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let Some(payload) = req.payload else {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Missing governance request payload",
));
};
match payload {
GovRequestPayload::Create(req) => handle_create(actor, req).await,
GovRequestPayload::Vote(req) => handle_vote(actor, req).await,
GovRequestPayload::Query(QueryPendingRequest {}) => handle_query(actor).await,
}
}
async fn handle_create(
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: CreateProposalRequest,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let kind = match req.kind {
Some(ProtoKind::ApproveSdkClient(p)) => {
ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(approve_sdk_client::Settings {
client_id: p.client_id,
})
}
Some(ProtoKind::GrantWalletAccess(p)) => {
ProposalKind::GrantWalletAccess(grant_wallet_access::Settings {
wallet_id: p.wallet_id,
client_id: p.client_id,
})
}
Some(ProtoKind::ReplaceOperator(p)) => {
ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(replace_operator::Settings {
old_operator_id: OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(p.old_operator_id),
new_pubkey: p.new_pubkey,
})
}
Some(ProtoKind::TriggerRekey(())) => ProposalKind::TriggerRekey,
Some(ProtoKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(p)) => {
ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(Box::new(parse_persistent_grant(p)?))
}
Some(ProtoKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(p)) => {
ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(Box::new(parse_one_off_transaction(p)?))
}
None => return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing proposal kind")),
};
let proposal_id = actor
.ask(HandleCreateProposal {
kind,
ttl_secs: req.ttl_secs,
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
warn!(?e, "create_proposal failed");
Status::internal("Failed to create proposal")
})?;
Ok(Some(wrap(GovResponsePayload::Created(
proto_gov::CreateProposalResponse {
proposal_id: proposal_id.to_raw(),
},
))))
}
/// Validates the grant where the request enters, so a malformed one is refused before
/// any operator votes on it instead of failing after quorum.
fn parse_persistent_grant(
p: proto_gov::ApprovePersistentGrantPayload,
) -> Result<persistent_grant::Settings, Status> {
use proto_gov::approve_persistent_grant_payload::Specific;
let volume =
|l: proto_gov::VolumeLimitProto| -> Result<persistent_grant::VolumeLimit, Status> {
Ok(persistent_grant::VolumeLimit {
max_volume: fixed(&l.max_volume, "max_volume must be 32 bytes")?,
window_secs: l.window_secs,
})
};
let specific = match p.specific {
Some(Specific::EtherTransfer(spec)) => {
let targets = spec
.targets
.iter()
.map(|target| fixed(target, "ether transfer target must be 20 bytes"))
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
let limit = spec
.limit
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("missing ether transfer limit"))?;
persistent_grant::Specific::EtherTransfer {
targets,
limit: volume(limit)?,
}
}
Some(Specific::TokenTransfer(spec)) => {
let volume_limits = spec
.volume_limits
.into_iter()
.map(volume)
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
persistent_grant::Specific::TokenTransfer {
token_contract: fixed(&spec.token_contract, "token_contract must be 20 bytes")?,
receiver: spec
.target
.map(|t| fixed(&t, "token transfer target must be 20 bytes"))
.transpose()?,
volume_limits,
}
}
None => return Err(Status::invalid_argument("missing grant specific")),
};
Ok(persistent_grant::Settings {
wallet_access_id: p.wallet_access_id,
chain_id: p.chain_id,
valid_from_secs: p.valid_from_secs,
valid_until_secs: p.valid_until_secs,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: p
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|v| fixed(&v, "max_gas_fee_per_gas must be 32 bytes"))
.transpose()?,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: p
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|v| fixed(&v, "max_priority_fee_per_gas must be 32 bytes"))
.transpose()?,
rate_limit: p.rate_limit.map(|r| persistent_grant::RateLimit {
count: r.count,
window_secs: r.window_secs,
}),
specific,
})
}
fn fixed<const N: usize>(bytes: &[u8], message: &'static str) -> Result<[u8; N], Status> {
<[u8; N]>::try_from(bytes).map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument(message))
}
/// Validates the transaction where the request enters, so a malformed one is refused
/// before any operator votes on it instead of failing after quorum.
fn parse_one_off_transaction(
p: proto_gov::ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload,
) -> Result<one_off_transaction::Settings, Status> {
Ok(one_off_transaction::Settings {
client_id: p.client_id,
wallet_address: fixed(&p.wallet_address, "wallet_address must be 20 bytes")?,
chain_id: p.chain_id,
nonce: p.nonce,
gas_limit: p.gas_limit,
max_fee_per_gas: u128::from_be_bytes(fixed(
&p.max_fee_per_gas,
"max_fee_per_gas must be 16 bytes",
)?),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128::from_be_bytes(fixed(
&p.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
"max_priority_fee_per_gas must be 16 bytes",
)?),
to: fixed(&p.to, "to must be 20 bytes")?,
value: fixed(&p.value, "value must be 32 bytes")?,
input: p.input,
})
}
async fn handle_vote(
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: proto_gov::CastVoteRequest,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = actor
.ask(HandleCastVote {
proposal_id: ProposalId::from_raw(req.proposal_id),
approve: req.approve,
signature: req.signature,
})
.await;
let outcome = match result {
Ok(VoteOutcome::Pending) => ProtoVoteOutcome::Pending,
Ok(VoteOutcome::Approved) => ProtoVoteOutcome::Approved,
Ok(VoteOutcome::Rejected) => ProtoVoteOutcome::Rejected,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::AlreadyVoted)) => {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Already voted on this proposal"));
}
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::InvalidSignature)) => {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid vote signature"));
}
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::ProposalNotFound)) => {
return Err(Status::not_found("Proposal not found"));
}
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::Unavailable)) => {
return Err(Status::unavailable("Proposal manager is unavailable"));
}
Err(e) => {
warn!(?e, "cast_vote failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to cast vote"));
}
};
Ok(Some(wrap(GovResponsePayload::Voted(
proto_gov::VoteResponse {
outcome: outcome.into(),
},
))))
}
async fn handle_query(
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let summaries = actor.ask(HandleQueryPending {}).await.unwrap_or_default();
let proposals = summaries
.into_iter()
.map(|s| proto_gov::ProposalSummary {
id: s.id.to_raw(),
kind: <&'static str>::from(s.kind).to_owned(),
initiator_id: s.initiator_id.to_raw(),
expires_at: s.expires_at.0.timestamp(),
approve_count: s.approve_count,
reject_count: s.reject_count,
})
.collect();
Ok(Some(wrap(GovResponsePayload::Pending(
QueryPendingResponse { proposals },
))))
}

84
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/vault.rs
View File

@@ -1,19 +1,30 @@
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
peers::operator::{OperatorSession, session::handlers::HandleQueryVaultState},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
proto::operator::{
operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault, request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload,
peers::operator::{
OperatorSession,
session::{
Error as SessionError,
handlers::{
HandleContributeRecoveryRekeyPassphrase, HandleContributeRekeyPassphrase,
HandleQueryVaultState,
},
},
},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::operator::{
operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault,
rekey::{self as proto_rekey, RekeyResult as ProtoRekeyResult},
request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
response::Payload as VaultResponsePayload,
},
},
proto::shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
@@ -33,6 +44,7 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
match payload {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(()) => handle_query_vault_state(actor).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Rekey(req) => handle_rekey(actor, req).await,
VaultRequestPayload::Unseal(_) | VaultRequestPayload::Bootstrap(_) => {
Err(Status::permission_denied(
"Vault is already unsealed; unseal/bootstrap not permitted in session",
@@ -41,6 +53,58 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
}
}
/// A re-key share belongs to exactly one role (§3.3), so a contribution from the wrong one is a
/// policy answer and must not reach the peer as an opaque `internal`.
fn rekey_status<M>(err: SendError<M, SessionError>, context: &'static str) -> Status {
match err {
SendError::HandlerError(err @ SessionError::RoleNotPermitted) => {
Status::permission_denied(err.to_string())
}
err => {
warn!(?err, "{context}");
Status::internal(context)
}
}
}
async fn handle_rekey(
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: proto_rekey::Request,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
use arbiter_proto::proto::operator::vault::rekey::request::Payload as RekeyPayload;
let payload = req
.payload
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing rekey payload"))?;
let done: bool = match payload {
RekeyPayload::ContributePassphrase(cp) => actor
.ask(HandleContributeRekeyPassphrase {
passphrase: cp.passphrase,
})
.await
.map_err(|e| rekey_status(e, "Rekey contribution failed"))?,
RekeyPayload::ContributeRecoveryPassphrase(crp) => actor
.ask(HandleContributeRecoveryRekeyPassphrase {
passphrase: crp.passphrase,
})
.await
.map_err(|e| rekey_status(e, "Rekey recovery contribution failed"))?,
};
let proto_result = if done {
ProtoRekeyResult::Success
} else {
ProtoRekeyResult::AwaitingContributions
};
Ok(Some(wrap_vault_response(VaultResponsePayload::Rekey(
proto_rekey::Response {
result: proto_result.into(),
},
))))
}
async fn handle_query_vault_state(
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {

59
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/vault_gate/inbound.rs
View File

@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{Convert, TryConvert},
peers::operator::vault_gate::{
self as vault_gate, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleHandshake, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey,
self as vault_gate, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey, HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase,
HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase, HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase,
HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase, HandleDeclareCommittee, HandleHandshake,
HandleUnsealEncryptedKey,
},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::operator::{
operator_request::Payload as OperatorRequestPayload,
vault::{
self as proto_vault,
bootstrap::{self as proto_bootstrap},
bootstrap::{self as proto_bootstrap, request::Payload as BootstrapRequestPayload},
request::Payload as VaultRequestPayload,
unseal::{self as proto_unseal, request::Payload as UnsealRequestPayload},
},
@@ -50,6 +53,9 @@ impl TryConvert for VaultRequestPayload {
Self::QueryState(()) => Ok(vault_gate::Inbound::HandleVaultState),
Self::Unseal(req) => req.try_convert(),
Self::Bootstrap(req) => req.try_convert(),
Self::Rekey(_) => Err(Status::permission_denied(
"Rekey requires an authenticated session",
)),
}
}
}
@@ -73,6 +79,20 @@ impl TryConvert for UnsealRequestPayload {
match self {
Self::Start(start) => start.try_convert(),
Self::EncryptedKey(key) => Ok(key.convert()),
Self::ContributePassphrase(cp) => Ok(
vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase(
HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase {
passphrase: cp.passphrase,
},
),
),
Self::ContributeRecoveryPassphrase(crp) => Ok(
vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase(
HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase {
passphrase: crp.passphrase,
},
),
),
}
}
}
@@ -107,12 +127,43 @@ impl TryConvert for proto_bootstrap::Request {
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
self.encrypted_key
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing bootstrap encrypted key"))?
self.payload
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing bootstrap payload"))?
.try_convert()
}
}
impl TryConvert for BootstrapRequestPayload {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;
fn try_convert(self) -> Result<vault_gate::Inbound, Status> {
match self {
Self::EncryptedKey(key) => key.try_convert(),
Self::DeclareCommittee(dc) => Ok(
vault_gate::Inbound::HandleDeclareCommittee(HandleDeclareCommittee {
count: dc.count as usize,
recovery_count: dc.recovery_count as usize,
}),
),
Self::ContributePassphrase(cp) => Ok(
vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase(
HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase {
passphrase: cp.passphrase,
},
),
),
Self::ContributeRecoveryPassphrase(crp) => Ok(
vault_gate::Inbound::HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase(
HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase {
passphrase: crp.passphrase,
},
),
),
}
}
}
impl TryConvert for proto_bootstrap::BootstrapEncryptedKey {
type Output = vault_gate::Inbound;
type Error = Status;

84
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/operator/vault_gate/outbound.rs
View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ use crate::{
peers::operator::vault_gate::{self as vault_gate},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
operator::{
operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
vault::{
@@ -17,6 +16,7 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
},
},
},
shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
};
use tonic::Status;
@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
Err(vault_gate::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped) => {
ProtoBootstrapResult::AlreadyBootstrapped
}
Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "bootstrap failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to bootstrap vault"));
@@ -110,6 +113,85 @@ impl TryConvert for vault_gate::Outbound {
};
Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))
}
Self::HandleDeclareCommittee(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(()) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
// A role refusal is a policy answer, not a server fault, so it leaves the
// gate as `PERMISSION_DENIED` rather than as an opaque `internal`.
Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "declare committee failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to declare committee"));
}
};
Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))
}
Self::HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(true) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Ok(false) => ProtoBootstrapResult::AwaitingContributions,
Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "contribute bootstrap passphrase failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to contribute bootstrap passphrase"));
}
};
Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))
}
Self::HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(true) => ProtoBootstrapResult::Success,
Ok(false) => ProtoBootstrapResult::AwaitingContributions,
Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "contribute recovery bootstrap passphrase failed");
return Err(Status::internal(
"Failed to contribute recovery bootstrap passphrase",
));
}
};
Ok(wrap_bootstrap_response(proto_result))
}
Self::HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(true) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Ok(false) => ProtoUnsealResult::AwaitingContributions,
Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "contribute unseal passphrase failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to contribute unseal passphrase"));
}
};
Ok(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Result(
proto_result.into(),
)))
}
Self::HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase(result) => {
let proto_result = match result {
Ok(true) => ProtoUnsealResult::Success,
Ok(false) => ProtoUnsealResult::AwaitingContributions,
Err(err @ vault_gate::Error::RoleNotPermitted) => {
return Err(Status::permission_denied(err.to_string()));
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(?err, "contribute recovery unseal passphrase failed");
return Err(Status::internal(
"Failed to contribute recovery unseal passphrase",
));
}
};
Ok(wrap_unseal_response(UnsealResponsePayload::Result(
proto_result.into(),
)))
}
}
}
}

6
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/client/auth.rs
View File

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use crate::{
schema::program_client,
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, SigningContext};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ where
let signature = expect_message(transport, |req: Inbound| match req {
Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => Some(signature),
_ => None,
Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { .. } => None,
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ where
Error::Transport
})?;
if !pubkey.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature) {
if !pubkey.verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Client, &signature) {
error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}

4
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/auth/mod.rs
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
use super::{Credentials, OperatorConnection};
use super::{AuthenticatedOperator, OperatorConnection};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut OperatorConnection,
transport: &mut T,
) -> Result<Credentials, Error>
) -> Result<AuthenticatedOperator, Error>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
{

181
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/auth/state.rs
View File

@@ -1,32 +1,35 @@
use super::{
super::{Credentials, OperatorConnection},
super::{AuthenticatedOperator, Credentials, OperatorConnection, RecoveryCredentials},
Error,
};
use crate::{
actors::bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
db::{DatabasePool, schema::operator_identity},
actors::bootstrap::VerifyToken,
db::{
DatabasePool,
schema::{arbiter_settings, operator_identity, recovery_operator_identity},
},
peers::operator::auth::Outbound,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, SigningContext};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection as _, RunQueryDsl};
use tracing::error;
pub(super) struct ChallengeRequest {
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
pub(crate) struct ChallengeRequest {
pub(crate) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(crate) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
pub(super) struct ChallengeContext {
pub(super) challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub(super) pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub(super) bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
pub(super) struct ChallengeSolution {
pub(super) solution: Vec<u8>,
pub(crate) struct ChallengeSolution {
pub(crate) solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
@@ -34,7 +37,7 @@ smlang::statemachine!(
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(Credentials),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthenticatedOperator),
}
);
@@ -56,6 +59,27 @@ async fn get_client_id(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<O
})
}
async fn get_recovery_operator_id(
db: &DatabasePool,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<Option<i32>, Error> {
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
recovery_operator_identity::table
.filter(recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
.select(recovery_operator_identity::id)
.first::<i32>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})
}
async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
@@ -63,17 +87,32 @@ async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<i3
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(operator_identity::table)
.values((operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),))
.returning(operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
conn.transaction(async move |conn| {
// The database is authoritative on whether bootstrap has completed: `Vault::bootstrap`
// commits `root_key_id` before it publishes `events::Bootstrapped`, and `Bootstrapper`
// only learns of that two mailbox hops later. Re-checking it here, in the same
// transaction as the insert, closes that window deterministically instead of trusting
// a token that verified against `Bootstrapper`'s possibly-stale in-memory state.
let already_bootstrapped: bool = arbiter_settings::table
.select(arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
.first::<Option<i32>>(&mut *conn)
.await?
.is_some();
Ok(id)
if already_bootstrapped {
error!("Bootstrap token used to register after the vault was already bootstrapped");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(operator_identity::table)
.values((operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),))
.returning(operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Ok(id)
})
.await
}
pub(super) struct AuthContext<'a, T: ?Sized> {
@@ -100,12 +139,14 @@ where
bootstrap_token,
}: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
// Verify pubkey is registered (unless bootstrapping)
if bootstrap_token.is_none() {
let id = get_client_id(&self.conn.db, &pubkey).await?;
if id.is_none() {
return Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey);
}
// Verify pubkey is registered in either identity table (unless bootstrapping)
if bootstrap_token.is_none()
&& get_client_id(&self.conn.db, &pubkey).await?.is_none()
&& get_recovery_operator_id(&self.conn.db, &pubkey)
.await?
.is_none()
{
return Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey);
}
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
@@ -127,8 +168,6 @@ where
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
@@ -137,13 +176,13 @@ where
bootstrap_token,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<Credentials, Self::Error> {
) -> Result<AuthenticatedOperator, Self::Error> {
let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!("Failed to decode signature in challenge solution");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
let valid = pubkey.verify(challenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT, &signature);
let valid = pubkey.verify(challenge, SigningContext::Operator, &signature);
if !valid {
self.transport
@@ -153,20 +192,21 @@ where
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
// Resolve client id: bootstrap (consume token + register) or lookup
let id = match bootstrap_token {
// Resolve the peer's role: bootstrap (verify token, then register as an ordinary
// operator) or look the key up in whichever identity table holds it.
let authenticated = match bootstrap_token {
Some(token) => {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
.ask(VerifyToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
error!(?e, "Failed to verify bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to verify bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
@@ -178,11 +218,59 @@ where
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
register_key(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await?
let id = match register_key(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await {
Ok(id) => id,
// `register_key` refuses a token that verified here but lost the race
// against bootstrap. Reported to the peer exactly like the refusal above,
// so that operator sees a protocol error rather than a handshake that
// stops with nothing on the wire.
Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken) => {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
Err(err) => return Err(err),
};
AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(Credentials {
id,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
})
}
None => {
// The tables are searched in this order, so a key registered in both resolves
// as `Ordinary` and could never submit its recovery share. Nothing enforces
// that the two sets are disjoint: `unique` is per table, and the only writer
// today is `register_key` above -- `recovery_operator_identity` has no
// registration path yet. Whoever builds one must refuse a key that
// `operator_identity` already holds, and vice versa, or §3.5's "separate peer
// type" holds only by convention.
if let Some(id) = get_client_id(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await? {
AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(Credentials {
id,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
})
} else {
// `prepare_challenge` already found the key in one of the tables, so
// arriving here means it was removed mid-handshake. Reported to the peer
// for the same reason `InvalidBootstrapToken` is above: an operator that
// has sent its solution sees a protocol error rather than a handshake that
// stops with nothing on the wire.
let Some(id) = get_recovery_operator_id(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await? else {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
return Err(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey);
};
AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(RecoveryCredentials {
id,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
})
}
}
None => get_client_id(&self.conn.db, pubkey)
.await?
.ok_or(Error::UnregisteredPublicKey)?,
};
self.transport
@@ -190,9 +278,6 @@ where
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(Credentials {
id,
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
})
Ok(authenticated)
}
}

43
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/mod.rs
View File

@@ -33,6 +33,26 @@ impl Integrable for Credentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "operator_credentials";
}
/// §3.5: recovery operators are a separate peer type with their own identity table. Their
/// attestation kind differs from an ordinary operator's so the two id spaces cannot collide.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hashable)]
pub struct RecoveryCredentials {
pub id: i32,
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
impl Integrable for RecoveryCredentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "recovery_operator_credentials";
}
/// The outcome of an operator handshake. The variant, not a field, decides what the peer may
/// do — so no call site can pass an unauthenticated recovery id.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum AuthenticatedOperator {
Ordinary(Credentials),
Recovery(RecoveryCredentials),
}
// Messages, sent by operator to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
@@ -62,6 +82,12 @@ pub enum Error {
Transport,
#[error("database error: {0}")]
Database(DatabaseError),
/// §3.5: a recovery operator's authority stops at the vault gate. It has no operator
/// session, because a session is the whole ordinary-governance surface -- wallets, grants,
/// SDK clients, proposals -- which §3.5 puts out of a recovery operator's reach. Named
/// rather than folded into `Internal`, so a policy refusal is not logged as a fault.
#[error("recovery operators do not have an operator session")]
RecoveryOperatorHasNoSession,
#[error("internal: {0}")]
Internal(String),
}
@@ -108,7 +134,7 @@ async fn should_run_gate(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
async fn run_vault_gate<T>(
props: &OperatorConnection,
transport: &mut T,
auth_creds: Credentials,
auth_creds: AuthenticatedOperator,
) -> Result<(), Error>
where
T: Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
@@ -168,18 +194,27 @@ where
T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send,
T: Bi<vault_gate::Inbound, Result<vault_gate::Outbound, vault_gate::Error>> + Send,
{
let creds = authenticate(props, &mut transport).await?;
let authenticated = authenticate(props, &mut transport).await?;
// should run vault gate only if sealed / unbootstrapped
if should_run_gate(&props.actors.vault).await? {
run_vault_gate(props, &mut transport, creds.clone()).await?;
// §3.5 lets a recovery operator take part in unsealing, and the gate is where that
// happens, so both roles run it. The gate decides per message which role may send it.
run_vault_gate(props, &mut transport, authenticated.clone()).await?;
}
// Past the gate the connection turns into an ordinary operator session, which a recovery
// operator may not have.
let AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(creds) = &authenticated else {
return Err(Error::RecoveryOperatorHasNoSession);
};
// checking the integrity
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, &creds).await?;
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.vault, creds).await?;
Ok(OperatorSession::spawn(OperatorSession::new(
props.clone(),
authenticated.clone(),
oob_sender,
)))
}

741
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/session/handlers.rs
View File

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
use super::{Error, OperatorSession};
use crate::db::models::{OperatorIdentityId, ProposalId};
use crate::{
actors::{
evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, OperatorCreateGrant, OperatorListGrants,
SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, OperatorCreateGrant, OperatorDeleteGrant,
OperatorListGrants, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
},
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
vault::VaultState,
@@ -122,22 +123,23 @@ impl OperatorSession {
}
#[message]
pub(crate) fn handle_grant_delete(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
// match self
// .props
// .actors
// .evm
// .ask(OperatorDeleteGrant { grant_id })
// .await
// {
// Ok(()) => Ok(()),
// Err(err) => {
// error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
// Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
// }
// }
let _ = grant_id;
todo!()
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(
&mut self,
grant_id: i32,
) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(OperatorDeleteGrant { grant_id })
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
@@ -175,41 +177,27 @@ impl OperatorSession {
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
.await?;
grant_wallet_access(&mut conn, entries).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// A revoke that matched fewer rows than it named did not do what the operator asked:
/// the id was never granted, or someone revoked it first. Answering `Ok` there tells the
/// operator access is cut off when nothing changed. The rows that did match stay revoked
/// -- rolling them back to report the shortfall would leave live access behind.
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<i32>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
.await?;
let revoked = revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &entries).await?;
if revoked != entries.len() {
return Err(Error::PartialRevoke {
requested: entries.len(),
revoked,
});
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -217,9 +205,10 @@ impl OperatorSession {
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
@@ -227,6 +216,81 @@ impl OperatorSession {
}
}
/// Grants access, reviving a previously revoked row rather than leaving it shadowed:
/// `uniq_wallet_access` is a unique index on `(wallet_id, client_id)`, so a plain insert
/// would conflict forever on a row that was revoked but never deleted.
///
/// Reviving restores visibility and nothing else: [`revoke_wallet_access`] closes the grants
/// that hung off the access, so a persistent grant takes its own vote again (§3.2).
pub(crate) async fn grant_wallet_access(
conn: &mut crate::db::DatabaseConnection,
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
use crate::db::{models::SqliteTimestamp, schema::evm_wallet_access};
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict((evm_wallet_access::wallet_id, evm_wallet_access::client_id))
.do_update()
.set(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(None::<SqliteTimestamp>))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
}
Ok(())
})
.await
}
/// Marks access rows revoked by their own id rather than deleting them, and revokes every
/// grant that hangs off them. Returns how many access rows this call revoked.
///
/// The wire carries `WalletAccessEntry.id` values, so filtering by `wallet_id` here would
/// revoke every client's access to that wallet. Deleting is not an option: `evm_basic_grant`,
/// `evm_transaction_log`, and `proposal_persistent_grant` all reference this row
/// `on delete restrict`, so an access that was ever granted, signed with, or proposed
/// against can never be deleted -- only marked revoked.
///
/// The dependent grants have to go with it. `grant_wallet_access` revives a revoked row by
/// its id, and grant lookup keys on `wallet_access_id` alone, so leaving the grants live
/// would make a later re-grant restore every persistent grant the access ever held, with its
/// original volume and rate limits. §3.2 votes visibility and a persistent grant separately;
/// a committee that approves visibility must not silently hand back signing authority it did
/// not vote on. The filter names every requested id, not just the rows this call flipped, so
/// an access revoked before this fix has its orphaned grants closed too.
pub(crate) async fn revoke_wallet_access(
conn: &mut crate::db::DatabaseConnection,
ids: &[i32],
) -> Result<usize, diesel::result::Error> {
use crate::db::{
models::SqliteTimestamp,
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_wallet_access},
};
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
let now = SqliteTimestamp::now();
let revoked = diesel::update(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq_any(ids))
.filter(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
.set(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(now.clone()))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
diesel::update(evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(evm_basic_grant::wallet_access_id.eq_any(ids))
.filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.set(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(now))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Ok(revoked)
})
.await
}
#[messages]
impl OperatorSession {
#[message(ctx)]
@@ -278,3 +342,590 @@ impl OperatorSession {
Ok(clients)
}
}
#[messages]
impl OperatorSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_create_proposal(
&mut self,
kind: crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind,
ttl_secs: Option<u32>,
) -> Result<ProposalId, Error> {
use crate::actors::proposal_manager::CreateProposal;
let initiator_id = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(self.ordinary_id()?);
self.props
.actors
.proposal_manager
.ask(CreateProposal { kind, initiator_id, ttl_secs })
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "create_proposal failed");
Error::internal("Failed to create proposal")
})
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_cast_vote(
&mut self,
proposal_id: ProposalId,
approve: bool,
signature: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<crate::actors::proposal_manager::VoteOutcome, crate::actors::proposal_manager::Error> {
use crate::actors::proposal_manager::CastVote;
let operator_id = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(
self.ordinary_id()
.map_err(|_| crate::actors::proposal_manager::Error::NotAllowedForRecoveryOperator)?,
);
self.props
.actors
.proposal_manager
.ask(CastVote { proposal_id, operator_id, approve, signature })
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
SendError::HandlerError(e) => e,
_ => crate::actors::proposal_manager::Error::Unavailable,
})
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_pending(
&mut self,
) -> Vec<crate::actors::proposal_manager::ProposalSummary> {
use crate::actors::proposal_manager::QueryPending;
let Ok(id) = self.ordinary_id() else {
// The pending list is per ordinary operator; a recovery operator has no view of it.
return Vec::new();
};
let operator_id = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(id);
self.props
.actors
.proposal_manager
.ask(QueryPending { operator_id })
.await
.unwrap_or_default()
}
}
#[messages]
impl OperatorSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_contribute_rekey_passphrase(
&mut self,
passphrase: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
use crate::actors::vault_coordinator::ContributeRekey;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
let operator_id = self.ordinary_id()?;
self.props
.actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeRekey {
operator_id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(passphrase),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
}
/// §3.3: a re-key refreshes every share, recovery shares included, so a recovery operator
/// has one to contribute here.
///
/// It cannot reach this handler yet: `peers::operator::start` refuses a recovery peer an
/// operator session, because a session carries the whole ordinary-governance surface that
/// §3.5 keeps out of a recovery operator's hands. Until a recovery-scoped session exists,
/// this refuses every caller -- which is the safe direction, and the id it would use comes
/// from the handshake either way.
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_contribute_recovery_rekey_passphrase(
&mut self,
passphrase: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
use crate::actors::vault_coordinator::ContributeRecoveryRekey;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
let recovery_operator_id = self.recovery_id()?;
self.props
.actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeRecoveryRekey {
recovery_operator_id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(passphrase),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{grant_wallet_access, revoke_wallet_access};
use crate::db::{self, models, schema};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, dsl::insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
/// Inserts a fresh root key, an aead-encrypted wallet secret, and the wallet itself.
/// Returns the wallet's id and its 20-byte address.
async fn seed_wallet(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection) -> (models::EvmWalletId, Vec<u8>) {
let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
salt: vec![0u8; 16],
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
.values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
current_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
associated_root_key_id: root_key_id,
created_at: chrono::Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let address = rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec();
let wallet_id: models::EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(address.clone()),
schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
))
.returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap();
(wallet_id, address)
}
async fn seed_client_metadata(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
.values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
.returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
/// Inserts a `program_client` row under the given `client_metadata` row, keyed by its
/// own random public key.
async fn seed_client(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection, metadata_id: i32) -> i32 {
insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
.values((
schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
))
.returning(schema::program_client::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
/// Inserts an access row directly, for fixtures that need one to already exist.
/// Production code grants access through [`grant_wallet_access`].
async fn insert_wallet_access(
conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection,
wallet_id: models::EvmWalletId,
client_id: i32,
) -> i32 {
insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
.values((
schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
))
.returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
/// The grants that grant lookup would treat as live for this access: the exact filter
/// `EtherTransfer::try_find_grant` and `TokenTransfer::try_find_grant` apply.
async fn live_grants_for(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection, access_id: i32) -> Vec<i32> {
schema::evm_basic_grant::table
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::wallet_access_id.eq(access_id))
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.select(schema::evm_basic_grant::id)
.load(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
/// Two clients share one wallet. Revoking one access row must leave the other alone,
/// and must mark the row revoked rather than deleting it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoking_one_access_leaves_the_other_client_alone() {
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
let first_client = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
let second_client = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
let first_access = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, first_client).await;
let _second_access = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, second_client).await;
let removed = revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[first_access])
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(removed, 1);
let active: Vec<i32> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
.select(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id)
.load(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
active,
vec![second_client],
"revoking one access row removed another client's access"
);
let total: i64 = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
total, 2,
"revoking an access row must mark it revoked, not delete it"
);
// The count `handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access` answers on: a second revoke of the same
// id, like a revoke of an id that never existed, changes nothing and must say so.
let again = revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[first_access])
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(again, 0, "an already revoked access must report no rows");
}
/// The bug this round fixes: once an access has been used for a grant, a signed
/// transaction, or a proposed persistent grant, three tables reference
/// `evm_wallet_access` `on delete restrict`, so deleting the row is no longer possible
/// once foreign keys are enforced. Revoking must still succeed by marking it revoked.
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoking_an_access_with_grant_log_and_proposal_succeeds() {
use crate::db::proposal::{Proposal as _, persistent_grant, persistent_grant::PersistentGrant};
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
let access_id = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, client_id).await;
// A grant against this access...
let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(models::NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: access_id,
chain_id: 1u64.into(),
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit_count: None,
rate_limit_window_secs: None,
revoked_at: None,
})
.returning(schema::evm_basic_grant::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// ...a signed transaction against that grant...
insert_into(schema::evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(models::NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
wallet_access_id: access_id,
chain_id: 1u64.into(),
eth_value: vec![0u8; 32],
signed_at: models::SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// ...and a persistent-grant proposal that named this access before it was voted on.
let operator_id: models::OperatorIdentityId =
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let proposal_id: models::ProposalId = insert_into(schema::proposal::table)
.values(&models::NewProposal {
kind: db::proposal::ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant,
initiator_id: operator_id,
expires_at: models::SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::days(1)),
})
.returning(schema::proposal::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
PersistentGrant::insert(
proposal_id,
&persistent_grant::Settings {
wallet_access_id: access_id,
chain_id: 1,
valid_from_secs: None,
valid_until_secs: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
specific: persistent_grant::Specific::EtherTransfer {
targets: vec![[0u8; 20]],
limit: persistent_grant::VolumeLimit {
max_volume: [0u8; 32],
window_secs: 3600,
},
},
},
&mut conn,
)
.await
.unwrap();
// Before this round's fix, this would fail with a foreign-key violation.
let removed = revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(removed, 1);
let revoked_at: Option<models::SqliteTimestamp> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.find(access_id)
.select(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
revoked_at.is_some(),
"the row must be marked revoked, not deleted"
);
}
/// A revoked access must no longer resolve through the lookup `shared_analyze_transaction`
/// and `client_sign_transaction` share -- otherwise the SDK client keeps signing after
/// the operator believes it has been cut off.
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoked_access_no_longer_authorizes_signing() {
use crate::actors::{
GlobalActors,
evm::{EvmActor, SignTransactionError},
vault::Vault,
};
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
eips::eip2930::AccessList,
primitives::{Address, Bytes, TxKind, U256},
};
use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
let (wallet_id, address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
let access_id = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, client_id).await;
drop(conn);
let vault = Vault::spawn(
Vault::new(pool.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap(),
);
let mut evm_actor = EvmActor::new(vault, pool.clone());
let transaction = TxEip1559 {
chain_id: 1,
nonce: 0,
gas_limit: 21_000,
max_fee_per_gas: 0,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 0,
to: TxKind::Call(Address::ZERO),
value: U256::ZERO,
input: Bytes::new(),
access_list: AccessList::default(),
};
let wallet_address = Address::from_slice(&address);
// The paired positive case: while the access stands, both lookups resolve it and the
// calls fail further along (no grant, sealed vault) rather than at the access filter.
// Without this, a filter that rejected every row would pass the assertions below.
let live_analyze = evm_actor
.shared_analyze_transaction(client_id, wallet_address, transaction.clone())
.await;
assert!(
!matches!(live_analyze, Err(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)),
"a live access must resolve through shared_analyze_transaction: {live_analyze:?}"
);
let live_sign = evm_actor
.client_sign_transaction(client_id, wallet_address, transaction.clone())
.await;
assert!(
!matches!(live_sign, Err(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)),
"a live access must resolve through client_sign_transaction: {live_sign:?}"
);
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
drop(conn);
// Both lookups resolve access the same way; both must reject the revoked row before
// ever touching the vault (neither call bootstraps one).
let analyze_result = evm_actor
.shared_analyze_transaction(client_id, wallet_address, transaction.clone())
.await;
assert!(
matches!(analyze_result, Err(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)),
"a revoked access must not authorize shared_analyze_transaction: {analyze_result:?}"
);
let sign_result = evm_actor
.client_sign_transaction(client_id, wallet_address, transaction)
.await;
assert!(
matches!(sign_result, Err(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)),
"a revoked access must not authorize client_sign_transaction: {sign_result:?}"
);
}
/// Re-granting a revoked access must restore it rather than silently doing nothing:
/// `uniq_wallet_access` is a unique index on `(wallet_id, client_id)`, so a plain insert
/// would conflict on the revoked row forever.
#[tokio::test]
async fn regranting_a_revoked_access_restores_it() {
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
let access_id = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, client_id).await;
revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
grant_wallet_access(
&mut conn,
vec![models::NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id,
client_id,
}],
)
.await
.unwrap();
let revoked_at: Option<models::SqliteTimestamp> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.find(access_id)
.select(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
revoked_at.is_none(),
"re-granting a revoked access must clear revoked_at"
);
let total: i64 = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
total, 1,
"re-granting a revoked access must revive the existing row, not add a second one"
);
}
/// §3.2 puts wallet visibility and a persistent grant to two separate votes. Reviving a
/// revoked access restores visibility, and must restore nothing else: grant lookup keys on
/// `wallet_access_id` with `revoked_at is null`, so a grant left open when the access was
/// cut off would come back live -- with its original volume and rate limits -- the moment
/// the id revives. `EvmActor::grant_wallet_access` executes an approved `GrantWalletAccess`
/// proposal, so that would hand signing authority back to a committee that voted only on
/// visibility.
#[tokio::test]
async fn regranting_an_access_does_not_revive_its_grants() {
let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
let entry = || models::NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id,
client_id,
};
grant_wallet_access(&mut conn, vec![entry()]).await.unwrap();
let access_id: i32 = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id))
.filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
.select(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// The row every persistent grant hangs off: the specific ether- or token-transfer
// rows reference it, so liveness is decided here.
let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(models::NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_access_id: access_id,
chain_id: 1u64.into(),
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit_count: None,
rate_limit_window_secs: None,
revoked_at: None,
})
.returning(schema::evm_basic_grant::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
live_grants_for(&mut conn, access_id).await,
vec![grant_id],
"the seeded grant must start out live, or the assertions below prove nothing"
);
revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
assert!(
live_grants_for(&mut conn, access_id).await.is_empty(),
"revoking an access must revoke the grants that hang off it"
);
grant_wallet_access(&mut conn, vec![entry()]).await.unwrap();
let revoked_at: Option<models::SqliteTimestamp> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.find(access_id)
.select(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
revoked_at.is_none(),
"re-granting must restore visibility for the access itself"
);
assert!(
live_grants_for(&mut conn, access_id).await.is_empty(),
"re-granting an access must not revive the grants it held before revocation"
);
}
}

38
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/session/mod.rs
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
use super::{OutOfBand, OperatorConnection};
use super::{AuthenticatedOperator, OutOfBand, OperatorConnection};
use crate::{
actors::{
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
@@ -19,6 +19,17 @@ pub enum Error {
#[error("State transition failed")]
State,
/// §3.5: the ordinary and recovery roles reach for different handlers here. A refusal is a
/// policy answer, so it is named rather than folded into `Internal` beside real faults.
#[error("This operator role may not perform that action")]
RoleNotPermitted,
/// Fewer access rows were revoked than the request named. Like `RoleNotPermitted` this is
/// an answer about the request, not a fault, so it is named rather than folded into
/// `Internal`.
#[error("Revoked {revoked} of {requested} wallet access entries")]
PartialRevoke { requested: usize, revoked: usize },
#[error("Internal error: {message}")]
Internal { message: Cow<'static, str> },
}
@@ -51,6 +62,7 @@ pub struct PendingClientApproval {
pub struct OperatorSession {
props: OperatorConnection,
credentials: AuthenticatedOperator,
sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>,
@@ -59,11 +71,31 @@ pub struct OperatorSession {
pub mod handlers;
impl OperatorSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: OperatorConnection, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
pub(crate) fn new(props: OperatorConnection, credentials: AuthenticatedOperator, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
Self {
props,
credentials,
sender,
pending_client_approvals: Default::default(),
pending_client_approvals: HashMap::default(),
}
}
/// The id of the ordinary operator on the other end, or a refusal.
///
/// Read from the handshake, never from a request body, so a peer cannot act under an id it
/// did not authenticate as.
const fn ordinary_id(&self) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match &self.credentials {
AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(credentials) => Ok(credentials.id),
AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(_) => Err(Error::RoleNotPermitted),
}
}
/// The id of the recovery operator on the other end, or a refusal. See `ordinary_id`.
const fn recovery_id(&self) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match &self.credentials {
AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(credentials) => Ok(credentials.id),
AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(_) => Err(Error::RoleNotPermitted),
}
}
}

197
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/vault_gate/mod.rs
View File

@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
use super::Credentials;
use super::AuthenticatedOperator;
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{self, Bootstrap, GetState, TryUnseal, VaultState, events},
vault_coordinator::{
ContributeBootstrap, ContributeRecoveryBootstrap, ContributeRecoveryUnseal,
ContributeUnseal, StartBootstrap,
},
},
crypto::integrity::{self},
crypto::{KeyCell, integrity::{self}},
db::DatabasePool,
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
@@ -17,6 +21,9 @@ use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey, SharedSecret};
pub use VaultGateMessage as Inbound;
pub use VaultGateMessageReply as Outbound;
pub mod state;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -29,6 +36,12 @@ pub enum Error {
#[error("State transition failed")]
State,
/// §3.5: ordinary and recovery operators hold different shares of the same split, so each
/// contribution belongs to exactly one of the two roles. A refusal here is a policy answer
/// and is kept out of `Internal`, which carries genuine faults.
#[error("This operator role may not perform that vault action")]
RoleNotPermitted,
#[error("Internal error: {0}")]
Internal(String),
}
@@ -43,7 +56,7 @@ pub struct HandshakeResponse {
}
pub struct VaultGate {
pub auth_creds: Credentials,
pub auth_creds: AuthenticatedOperator,
pub promotion_tx: Option<oneshot::Sender<Result<(), Error>>>,
pub state: State,
pub actors: GlobalActors,
@@ -52,7 +65,7 @@ pub struct VaultGate {
impl VaultGate {
pub fn new(
auth_creds: Credentials,
auth_creds: AuthenticatedOperator,
actors: GlobalActors,
db: DatabasePool,
promotion_tx: oneshot::Sender<Result<(), Error>>,
@@ -93,16 +106,33 @@ impl Actor for VaultGate {
}
impl VaultGate {
/// The id of the ordinary operator on the other end, or a refusal.
///
/// The id is read from the handshake rather than from the request body, so a peer cannot
/// name an operator it did not authenticate as.
const fn ordinary_id(&self) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match &self.auth_creds {
AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(credentials) => Ok(credentials.id),
AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(_) => Err(Error::RoleNotPermitted),
}
}
/// The id of the recovery operator on the other end, or a refusal. See `ordinary_id`.
const fn recovery_id(&self) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match &self.auth_creds {
AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(credentials) => Ok(credentials.id),
AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(_) => Err(Error::RoleNotPermitted),
}
}
fn decrypt_key(
secret: &SharedSecret,
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
) -> Result<KeyCell, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
@@ -110,7 +140,9 @@ impl VaultGate {
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(()) => Ok(key_buffer),
Ok(()) => KeyCell::try_from(key_buffer).map_err(|()| {
error!("Decrypted key material has unexpected length");
}),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
@@ -119,7 +151,7 @@ impl VaultGate {
}
}
#[messages(messages = Inbound, replies = Outbound)]
#[messages(enum)]
impl VaultGate {
#[message]
pub fn handle_handshake(
@@ -141,6 +173,13 @@ impl VaultGate {
})
}
/// Deliberately open to both roles, unlike `handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key` below.
///
/// Handing over the whole seal key to open a sealed vault is participating in unsealing,
/// which §3.5 grants a recovery operator, and the peer has to hold that key already -- it
/// gains nothing here it did not bring. Bootstrap is the opposite: it *chooses* the key for
/// a vault that has none, which is sole custody of the root key and belongs to no §3.5
/// power. The reasoning that admits one does not admit the other.
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
@@ -152,17 +191,14 @@ impl VaultGate {
return Err(Error::State);
};
let Ok(seal_key_buffer) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data)
else {
let Ok(seal_key) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data) else {
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
};
match self
.actors
.vault
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.ask(TryUnseal { seal_key })
.await
{
Ok(()) => {
@@ -181,6 +217,10 @@ impl VaultGate {
}
}
/// §3.4/§3.5: bootstrapping picks the root key for a vault that has none, so whoever gets
/// here holds sole custody until the committee splits it. That is not one of a recovery
/// operator's two powers, and the check comes first because the vault commits before this
/// handler could refuse anything afterwards.
#[message]
pub async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
@@ -188,21 +228,20 @@ impl VaultGate {
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let _ = self.ordinary_id()?;
let State::ReadyForExchange { secret, .. } = &self.state else {
return Err(Error::State);
};
let Ok(seal_key_buffer) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data)
else {
let Ok(seal_key) = Self::decrypt_key(secret, &nonce, &ciphertext, &associated_data) else {
return Err(Error::InvalidKey);
};
match self
.actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.ask(Bootstrap { seal_key })
.await
{
Ok(()) => {
@@ -234,6 +273,97 @@ impl VaultGate {
Ok(answer)
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_declare_committee(
&mut self,
count: usize,
recovery_count: usize,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let operator_id = self.ordinary_id()?;
self.actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id,
declared_count: count,
recovery_count,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_contribute_bootstrap_passphrase(
&mut self,
passphrase: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let operator_id = self.ordinary_id()?;
let passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase);
self.actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeBootstrap {
operator_id,
passphrase: passphrase_cell,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_contribute_recovery_bootstrap_passphrase(
&mut self,
passphrase: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let recovery_operator_id = self.recovery_id()?;
let passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase);
self.actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeRecoveryBootstrap {
recovery_operator_id,
passphrase: passphrase_cell,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_contribute_unseal_passphrase(
&mut self,
passphrase: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let operator_id = self.ordinary_id()?;
let passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase);
self.actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeUnseal {
operator_id,
passphrase: passphrase_cell,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_contribute_recovery_unseal_passphrase(
&mut self,
passphrase: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let recovery_operator_id = self.recovery_id()?;
let passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase);
self.actors
.vault_coordinator
.ask(ContributeRecoveryUnseal {
recovery_operator_id,
passphrase: passphrase_cell,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("VaultCoordinator unavailable"))
}
}
impl Message<events::Bootstrapped> for VaultGate {
@@ -250,13 +380,28 @@ impl Message<events::Bootstrapped> for VaultGate {
.get()
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::internal("DB unavailable"))?;
integrity::sign_entity(
&mut conn,
&self.actors.vault,
&self.auth_creds,
self.auth_creds.id,
)
.await
// Each role signs under its own `Integrable::KIND`, so the two id spaces cannot
// collide in `integrity_envelope`.
match &self.auth_creds {
AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(credentials) => {
integrity::sign_entity(
&mut conn,
&self.actors.vault,
credentials,
credentials.id,
)
.await
}
AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(credentials) => {
integrity::sign_entity(
&mut conn,
&self.actors.vault,
credentials,
credentials.id,
)
.await
}
}
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to sign integrity envelope on bootstrap");
Error::internal("Integrity sign failed")

13
server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/client/auth.rs
View File

@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn::{self, AuthChallenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT},
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use super::common::{ChannelTransport, spawn_actors};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, SigningContext};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
transport::{Receiver, Sender},
@@ -74,7 +71,7 @@ async fn insert_registered_client(
fn sign_client_challenge(key: &SigningKey<MlDsa87>, challenge: &AuthChallenge) -> authn::Signature {
let challenge = challenge.format();
key.signing_key()
.sign_deterministic(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.sign_deterministic(&challenge, SigningContext::Client.as_bytes())
.unwrap()
.into()
}
@@ -96,11 +93,11 @@ async fn insert_bootstrap_sentinel_operator(db: &db::DatabasePool) {
async fn spawn_test_actors(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> GlobalActors {
insert_bootstrap_sentinel_operator(db).await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();

33
server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/common/mod.rs
View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
dead_code,
reason = "Common test utilities that may not be used in every test"
)]
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Error, Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{GlobalActors, vault::Vault},
@@ -19,12 +18,42 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
.await
.unwrap();
actor
.bootstrap(SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()))
.bootstrap(arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]))
.await
.unwrap();
actor
}
/// Spawns a full `GlobalActors` for a test, backing `Bootstrapper`'s token file with a
/// throwaway temp directory rather than the real `~/.arbiter` -- a test must never be able to
/// reach, let alone write to, the developer's real bootstrap token file.
pub(crate) async fn spawn_actors(db: db::DatabasePool) -> GlobalActors {
let home = tempfile::tempdir().expect("failed to create a temp home directory for a test");
GlobalActors::spawn_in(db, home.path())
.await
.expect("failed to spawn GlobalActors for a test")
}
/// Retries `probe` until it yields a value, then returns it.
///
/// Effects that travel over the message bus are not visible the moment the publishing call
/// returns: `Publish` only enqueues to the bus's mailbox, which then delivers to each
/// subscriber's mailbox in turn. A test observing such an effect waits for it instead of
/// reading straight after the call that triggered it.
pub(crate) async fn eventually<T, F, Fut>(what: &str, mut probe: F) -> T
where
F: FnMut() -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = Option<T>>,
{
for _ in 0..100 {
if let Some(value) = probe().await {
return value;
}
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(20)).await;
}
panic!("{what} did not happen within 2s");
}
pub(crate) async fn root_key_history_id(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> i32 {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let id = schema::arbiter_settings::table

1350
server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/governance.rs Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

553
server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/operator/auth.rs
View File

@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn::{self, AuthChallenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT},
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use super::common::{ChannelTransport, bootstrapped_vault, eventually, spawn_actors};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, SigningContext};
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{GlobalActors, bootstrap::GetToken, vault::Bootstrap},
actors::{
bootstrap::GetToken,
vault::{self, Bootstrap},
},
crypto::integrity,
db::{self, schema},
peers::operator::{self, Credentials, OperatorConnection, auth, vault_gate},
peers::operator::{
self, AuthenticatedOperator, Credentials, OperatorConnection, auth, vault_gate,
},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
@@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ fn sign_operator_challenge(
) -> authn::Signature {
let challenge = challenge.format();
key.signing_key()
.sign_deterministic(&challenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT)
.sign_deterministic(&challenge, SigningContext::Operator.as_bytes())
.unwrap()
.into()
}
@@ -153,14 +155,7 @@ impl Sender<auth::Inbound> for StartTestTransport {
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn bootstrap_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
@@ -203,22 +198,156 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_token_auth() {
.expect("should receive auth result");
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess)));
task.await.unwrap().unwrap();
let authenticated = task.await.unwrap().unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let stored_pubkey: Vec<u8> = schema::operator_identity::table
.select(schema::operator_identity::public_key)
.first::<Vec<u8>>(&mut conn)
let (stored_id, stored_pubkey): (i32, Vec<u8>) = schema::operator_identity::table
.select((
schema::operator_identity::id,
schema::operator_identity::public_key,
))
.first::<(i32, Vec<u8>)>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(stored_pubkey, verifying_key(&new_key).encode().0.to_vec());
// A key registered through the bootstrap token is an ordinary operator, carrying the id its
// registration wrote. Asserted here because this is the file's only bootstrap-arm check on
// what `authenticate` actually returns.
match authenticated {
AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(creds) => assert_eq!(creds.id, stored_id),
AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(creds) => panic!(
"expected the ordinary role, got a recovery operator with id {}",
creds.id
),
}
}
/// A multi-operator committee must all register with the same bootstrap token before bootstrap
/// completes, so verifying the token must not consume it. This is the reachability bug fixed by
/// replacing `consume_token` with `verify_token`.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
pub async fn bootstrap_token_registers_every_committee_member() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
for _ in 0..2 {
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let actors_for_task = actors.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors_for_task);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some(token.clone()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
};
let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&new_key, &challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive auth result");
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess)));
task.await.unwrap().unwrap();
}
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let registered: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(registered, 2);
// Bootstrap has not completed: the token must still be valid.
assert_eq!(
actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap(),
Some(token)
);
}
/// `GlobalActors` must subscribe `Bootstrapper` to `events::Bootstrapped` on the message bus.
/// Without that one registration the token stays valid forever in production, which is the
/// defect this task exists to fix, and no other test notices: the test below drives the event
/// handler directly, and the `challenge_auth` family never re-reads the token after
/// bootstrapping. This one goes the whole way round -- real `Vault::bootstrap`, real bus --
/// and waits for the effect rather than reading straight after the call, because `Publish`
/// only enqueues to the bus's mailbox.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn bootstrapped_event_retires_the_token_through_the_message_bus() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
assert!(
actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().is_some(),
"the token must exist before the vault is bootstrapped"
);
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
eventually("the bootstrap token to be retired", || async {
actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(GetToken)
.await
.unwrap()
.is_none()
.then_some(())
})
.await;
}
/// Once the vault reports `Bootstrapped`, the token is retired: further registrations must be
/// rejected even with a token that verified successfully moments earlier.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn bootstrap_token_rejected_after_bootstrapped_event() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
// Drive the Bootstrapper's own event handler directly rather than through
// `actors.vault.ask(Bootstrap { .. })` + the message bus: bus delivery is fire-and-forget,
// so asserting on it would be racy. The handler under test is the same either way.
actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(vault::events::Bootstrapped)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().is_none());
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
@@ -231,7 +360,7 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_owned()),
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -267,15 +396,154 @@ pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
assert_eq!(count, 0);
}
/// `register_key`'s database gate must refuse a registration once `arbiter_settings.root_key_id`
/// is set, even when `Bootstrapper`'s own in-memory token has not yet been retired -- exactly
/// the two-mailbox-hop window between `Vault::bootstrap`'s commit and the `Bootstrapped` event
/// reaching `Bootstrapper` in production. "database bootstrapped, Bootstrapper not yet notified"
/// is reproduced deterministically by bootstrapping a throwaway `Vault` wired to its own message
/// bus: it commits `root_key_id` in the same database without ever publishing to the bus
/// `actors.bootstrapper` is registered on, so `actors.bootstrapper`'s token is left untouched.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn bootstrap_token_rejected_once_the_database_is_bootstrapped() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
// From Bootstrapper's point of view the token still verifies: it never received an event.
assert_eq!(
actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap(),
Some(token.clone())
);
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
};
let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&new_key, &challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// The refusal has to reach the peer, not just the task's return value: a registration
// refused after the database was bootstrapped must look like the refusal of a token that
// never verified, rather than a handshake that stops with nothing on the wire.
let refusal = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("the refusal must be sent to the peer");
assert!(matches!(refusal, Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)));
assert!(matches!(
task.await.unwrap(),
Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
));
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let count: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&new_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_owned()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
};
let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&new_key, &challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// The reference behaviour the refusal above has to match: a token that never verified is
// reported to the peer. Pinned here so the two refusal paths cannot drift apart again.
let refusal = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("the refusal must be sent to the peer");
assert!(matches!(refusal, Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)));
assert!(matches!(
task.await.unwrap(),
Err(auth::Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
));
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let count: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -356,12 +624,12 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth() {
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -430,11 +698,11 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed() {
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -506,3 +774,230 @@ pub async fn challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
Err(auth::Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
));
}
/// §3.5: a recovery operator is a separate peer type. Its key resolves against
/// `recovery_operator_identity`, and authentication reports the recovery role.
///
/// An ordinary operator is registered alongside it so the recovery key is not simply the only
/// key on file: the handshake has to reach the recovery table while `operator_identity` is
/// populated. Both tables autoincrement from 1, so the fixture also pushes the authenticating
/// recovery operator to id 2 -- with one row in each table an id taken from the wrong table
/// would still read as 1, and only the variant would be under test.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn recovery_operator_authenticates_with_its_own_identity() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
let ordinary_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let other_recovery_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let recovery_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let recovery_pubkey_bytes = authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&recovery_key)).to_bytes();
let recovery_id: i32 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values((schema::operator_identity::public_key
.eq(authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&ordinary_key)).to_bytes()),))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
.values((schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key
.eq(authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&other_recovery_key)).to_bytes()),))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
.values((schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(recovery_pubkey_bytes),))
.returning(schema::recovery_operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
};
assert_eq!(
recovery_id, 2,
"the fixture must give the authenticating recovery operator an id no ordinary \
operator holds, or the id assertion below cannot discriminate"
);
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&recovery_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: None,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
};
let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&recovery_key, &challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive auth result");
assert!(matches!(response, Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthSuccess)));
let authenticated = task
.await
.unwrap()
.expect("recovery operator should authenticate");
match authenticated {
AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(creds) => assert_eq!(creds.id, recovery_id),
AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(creds) => panic!(
"expected the recovery role, got the ordinary operator with id {}",
creds.id
),
}
}
/// A key present in neither identity table is still rejected: accepting a key found in either
/// table must not degrade into accepting any key at all. Both tables hold a row so the refusal
/// cannot come from an empty lookup.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn unknown_key_is_rejected_when_both_tables_are_populated() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
let ordinary_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let recovery_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values((schema::operator_identity::public_key
.eq(authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&ordinary_key)).to_bytes()),))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
.values((schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key
.eq(authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&recovery_key)).to_bytes()),))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
let unknown_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&unknown_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: None,
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
task.await.unwrap(),
Err(auth::Error::UnregisteredPublicKey)
));
}
/// `verify_solution` resolves the recovery id only after the peer has sent its solution, so a
/// recovery row removed between challenge and solution reaches that refusal. It has to be sent
/// on the transport, like the `InvalidBootstrapToken` refusals in the arm above: an operator
/// that has answered the challenge sees a protocol error rather than a handshake that stops
/// with nothing on the wire.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn recovery_key_removed_mid_handshake_is_refused_on_the_wire() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
let recovery_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
let recovery_pubkey_bytes = authn::PublicKey::from(verifying_key(&recovery_key)).to_bytes();
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
.values((
schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(recovery_pubkey_bytes.clone()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (mut server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let db_for_task = db.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut props = OperatorConnection::new(db_for_task, actors);
auth::authenticate(&mut props, &mut server_transport).await
});
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: verifying_key(&recovery_key).into(),
bootstrap_token: None,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => challenge,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
};
// The challenge has been issued and the solution has not been sent, so the server cannot
// have read the table again yet: the row is gone by the time `verify_solution` looks.
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
diesel::delete(
schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
.filter(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(recovery_pubkey_bytes)),
)
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let signature = sign_operator_challenge(&recovery_key, &challenge);
test_transport
.send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let refusal = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("the refusal must be sent to the peer");
assert!(matches!(refusal, Err(auth::Error::UnregisteredPublicKey)));
assert!(matches!(
task.await.unwrap(),
Err(auth::Error::UnregisteredPublicKey)
));
}

35
server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/operator/unseal.rs
View File

@@ -1,15 +1,10 @@
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn,
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use super::common::spawn_actors;
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{Bootstrap, Seal},
},
actors::vault::{Bootstrap, Seal},
db,
peers::operator::{
Credentials,
AuthenticatedOperator, Credentials,
vault_gate::{
Error as VaultGateError, HandleHandshake, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, VaultGate,
},
@@ -22,19 +17,19 @@ use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
async fn setup_sealed_gate(
seal_key: &[u8],
seal_key: &[u8; 32],
) -> (
db::DatabasePool,
kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
oneshot::Receiver<Result<(), VaultGateError>>,
) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let actors = spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
actors
.vault
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(seal_key.to_vec()),
seal_key: arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from(*seal_key),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -42,7 +37,7 @@ async fn setup_sealed_gate(
let (promotion_tx, promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
let pubkey = authn::SigningKey::generate().public_key();
let auth_creds = Credentials { id: 1, pubkey };
let auth_creds = AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(Credentials { id: 1, pubkey });
let gate = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(auth_creds, actors, db.clone(), promotion_tx));
(db, gate, promotion_rx)
@@ -50,7 +45,7 @@ async fn setup_sealed_gate(
async fn client_dh_encrypt(
gate: &kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
key_to_send: &[u8],
key_to_send: &[u8; 32],
) -> HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
@@ -83,7 +78,7 @@ async fn client_dh_encrypt(
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn unseal_success() {
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, seal_key).await;
@@ -95,10 +90,10 @@ pub async fn unseal_success() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key-padded-to-32-bytes!!!!").await;
let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(
@@ -112,7 +107,7 @@ pub async fn unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
@@ -143,11 +138,11 @@ pub async fn unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {
let seal_key = b"real-seal-key";
let seal_key = b"real-seal-key-padded-to-32bytes!";
let (_db, gate, _promotion_rx) = setup_sealed_gate(seal_key).await;
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&gate, b"wrong-key-padded-to-32-bytes!!!!").await;
let response = gate.ask(encrypted_key).await;
assert!(matches!(

2
server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/vault/concurrency.rs
View File

@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
.await
.unwrap();
decryptor
.try_unseal(SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()))
.try_unseal(arbiter_server::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]))
.await
.unwrap();

699
server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/vault/lifecycle.rs
View File

@@ -1,16 +1,36 @@
use crate::common;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn,
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{Error, Vault},
vault::{Error, GetState, Vault, VaultState},
vault_coordinator::{
ContributeBootstrap, ContributeRecoveryBootstrap, ContributeRecoveryUnseal,
ContributeUnseal, Error as CoordinatorError, StartBootstrap, VaultCoordinator,
},
},
crypto::encryption::v1::{Nonce, ROOT_KEY_TAG},
crypto::{KeyCell, encryption::v1::{Nonce, ROOT_KEY_TAG}},
db::{self, models, schema},
peers::operator::{
AuthenticatedOperator, Credentials, RecoveryCredentials,
vault_gate::{
Error as VaultGateError, HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey,
HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase, HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase,
HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase, HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase,
HandleDeclareCommittee, HandleHandshake, VaultGate,
},
},
};
use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, insert_into, sql_query};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
@@ -20,7 +40,7 @@ async fn test_bootstrap() {
.await
.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let seal_key = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -43,7 +63,7 @@ async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let seal_key2 = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let seal_key2 = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::AlreadyBootstrapped));
}
@@ -105,7 +125,7 @@ async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let seal_key = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
@@ -129,13 +149,674 @@ async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
.await
.unwrap();
let bad_key = SafeCell::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec());
let bad_key = KeyCell::from([1u8; 32]);
let err = actor.try_unseal(bad_key).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidKey));
let good_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
let good_key = KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]);
actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn two_operator_vault_requires_recovery_share() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let bus = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
let vault_ref = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus).await.unwrap());
let coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db, vault_ref));
let err = coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: 1,
declared_count: 2,
recovery_count: 0,
})
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(
err,
kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(CoordinatorError::TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery)
),
"expected TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery, got {err:?}"
);
}
/// §3.4: Bootstrap with 1 ordinary + 1 recovery operator produces a valid 1-of-2 Shamir split.
/// Both ordinary and recovery shares are stored; the vault can be unsealed with either one.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn recovery_share_stored_and_used_for_unseal() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let bus = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
let vault_ref = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus).await.unwrap());
let coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref.clone()));
// Register one ordinary operator and one recovery operator in the DB
let ordinary_id: i32 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![1u8; 32]))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
};
let recovery_id: i32 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![2u8; 32]))
.returning(schema::recovery_operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
};
// Declare committee: 1 ordinary + 1 recovery
coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: ordinary_id,
declared_count: 1,
recovery_count: 1,
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Recovery operator contributes first — bootstrap should not finalize yet
let done = coordinator
.ask(ContributeRecoveryBootstrap {
recovery_operator_id: recovery_id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"recovery-pass".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(!done, "should not finalize with only recovery passphrase");
// Ordinary operator contributes — now bootstrap finalizes
let done = coordinator
.ask(ContributeBootstrap {
operator_id: ordinary_id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"ordinary-pass".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(done, "should finalize once all contributors are in");
// After bootstrap, vault is Unsealed (seal key still in memory).
let state = vault_ref.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(state, VaultState::Unsealed);
// Verify recovery_operator row was created
let recovery_share_count: i64 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
schema::recovery_operator::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
};
assert_eq!(recovery_share_count, 1);
// Simulate restart: drop vault and coordinator, create fresh vault (comes up Sealed).
drop(coordinator);
drop(vault_ref);
let bus2 = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
let vault_ref2 = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus2).await.unwrap());
let state = vault_ref2.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(state, VaultState::Sealed);
// §3.6: the recovery operator's share only counts once a wake-up request has stood
// uncancelled for the full dispute window, so back-date one here before unsealing.
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
sql_query(format!(
"INSERT INTO recovery_wakeup_request (requested_by, requested_at) \
VALUES ({ordinary_id}, unixepoch('now') - 14*24*3600 - 1)"
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
// §3.5: Unseal using ONLY the recovery operator share (threshold = shamir_threshold(1) = 1).
let coordinator2 = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref2.clone()));
let done = coordinator2
.ask(ContributeRecoveryUnseal {
recovery_operator_id: recovery_id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"recovery-pass".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(done, "recovery share alone should satisfy threshold");
let state = vault_ref2.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(state, VaultState::Unsealed);
}
/// A committee of zero ordinary operators used to reach `shamir_threshold(0)` and panic,
/// taking the global coordinator down with it.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn empty_committee_is_rejected_without_panicking() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let bus = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
let vault_ref = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus).await.unwrap());
let coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db, vault_ref));
let err = coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: 1,
declared_count: 0,
recovery_count: 1,
})
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(
err,
kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(CoordinatorError::EmptyCommittee)
),
"expected EmptyCommittee, got {err:?}"
);
// The actor must still be alive to serve the next caller.
let err = coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: 1,
declared_count: 0,
recovery_count: 0,
})
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(
err,
kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(CoordinatorError::EmptyCommittee)
));
}
/// An approved-but-unfinished operator replacement deletes a share row. The unseal threshold
/// must still describe the split that is actually stored, not the surviving row count.
///
/// Four ordinary operators give a real 3-of-4 `vsss-rs` split (`shamir_threshold(4) == 3`).
/// Deleting one share row leaves 3 rows, and `shamir_threshold(3) == 2` -- a *different* number
/// from the recorded threshold. A recount-based unseal would therefore finalize one contribution
/// early, combine only 2 shares of a 3-of-4 split, and fail to reconstruct the seal key.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn unseal_threshold_survives_a_deleted_share_row() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let bus = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
let vault_ref = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus).await.unwrap());
let coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref));
// Four ordinary operators: threshold is 3-of-4.
let mut ids = Vec::new();
for n in 1..=4u8 {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let id: i32 = insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![n; 32]))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
ids.push(id);
}
coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: ids[0],
declared_count: 4,
recovery_count: 0,
})
.await
.unwrap();
for (n, id) in ids.iter().enumerate() {
coordinator
.ask(ContributeBootstrap {
operator_id: *id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(format!("pass-{n}").into_bytes()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
}
let stored: Option<i32> = {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
schema::arbiter_settings::table
.select(schema::arbiter_settings::shamir_threshold)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
};
assert_eq!(stored, Some(3), "bootstrap must record the split threshold");
// Simulate the aborted replacement: one share row is gone, leaving 3 of the 4 shares.
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
diesel::delete(schema::operator::table)
.filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(ids[3])))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
// Restart and unseal with the three surviving operators' original passphrases.
drop(coordinator);
let bus2 = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
let vault_ref2 = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus2).await.unwrap());
let coordinator2 = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref2.clone()));
let done = coordinator2
.ask(ContributeUnseal {
operator_id: ids[0],
passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"pass-0".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(!done, "one share must not be enough for a 3-of-4 split");
let done = coordinator2
.ask(ContributeUnseal {
operator_id: ids[1],
passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"pass-1".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!done,
"two shares must not be enough for a 3-of-4 split -- a recount would wrongly finalize here"
);
let done = coordinator2
.ask(ContributeUnseal {
operator_id: ids[2],
passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"pass-2".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(done, "three shares must reconstruct a 3-of-4 split");
assert_eq!(
vault_ref2.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap(),
VaultState::Unsealed
);
}
/// §3.6: recovery operators are asleep by default. Without a wake-up whose 14-day dispute
/// window has elapsed, their share must not count towards an unseal.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn sleeping_recovery_operator_cannot_contribute_to_unseal() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let bus = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
let vault_ref = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus).await.unwrap());
let coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref.clone()));
let ordinary_id: i32 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![1u8; 32]))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
};
let recovery_id: i32 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![2u8; 32]))
.returning(schema::recovery_operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
};
coordinator
.ask(StartBootstrap {
operator_id: ordinary_id,
declared_count: 1,
recovery_count: 1,
})
.await
.unwrap();
coordinator
.ask(ContributeRecoveryBootstrap {
recovery_operator_id: recovery_id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"recovery-pass".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
coordinator
.ask(ContributeBootstrap {
operator_id: ordinary_id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"ordinary-pass".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Restart so the vault comes up Sealed.
drop(coordinator);
drop(vault_ref);
let bus2 = GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus();
let vault_ref2 = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), bus2).await.unwrap());
let coordinator2 = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(db.clone(), vault_ref2.clone()));
let err = coordinator2
.ask(ContributeRecoveryUnseal {
recovery_operator_id: recovery_id,
passphrase: SafeCell::new(b"recovery-pass".to_vec()),
})
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(
err,
kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(CoordinatorError::RecoveryNotActive)
),
"expected RecoveryNotActive, got {err:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
vault_ref2.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap(),
VaultState::Sealed,
"a sleeping recovery operator unsealed the vault"
);
}
type PromotionRx = oneshot::Receiver<Result<(), VaultGateError>>;
/// One `VaultGate` per authenticated role against a shared `GlobalActors`, which is what
/// `peers::operator::start` builds for two connected peers.
struct RoleGates {
ordinary: kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
recovery: kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
ordinary_id: i32,
recovery_id: i32,
/// Held only so the gates' promotion channels stay open for the fixture's lifetime.
_promotions: (PromotionRx, PromotionRx),
}
/// Registers one ordinary and one recovery identity, then spawns a gate for each.
async fn spawn_role_gates(db: &db::DatabasePool, actors: &GlobalActors) -> RoleGates {
let ordinary_pubkey = authn::SigningKey::generate().public_key();
let recovery_pubkey = authn::SigningKey::generate().public_key();
let ordinary_id: i32 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(ordinary_pubkey.to_bytes()))
.returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
};
let recovery_id: i32 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::recovery_operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key.eq(recovery_pubkey.to_bytes()))
.returning(schema::recovery_operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap()
};
let (ordinary_promotion_tx, ordinary_promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
let ordinary = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(
AuthenticatedOperator::Ordinary(Credentials {
id: ordinary_id,
pubkey: ordinary_pubkey,
}),
actors.clone(),
db.clone(),
ordinary_promotion_tx,
));
let (recovery_promotion_tx, recovery_promotion_rx) = oneshot::channel();
let recovery = VaultGate::spawn(VaultGate::new(
AuthenticatedOperator::Recovery(RecoveryCredentials {
id: recovery_id,
pubkey: recovery_pubkey,
}),
actors.clone(),
db.clone(),
recovery_promotion_tx,
));
RoleGates {
ordinary,
recovery,
ordinary_id,
recovery_id,
_promotions: (ordinary_promotion_rx, recovery_promotion_rx),
}
}
/// Runs the gate's X25519 handshake and encrypts `seal_key` to the shared secret, producing the
/// message a peer would send to bootstrap the vault. Mirrors `tests/operator/unseal.rs`'s
/// `client_dh_encrypt`, which does the same for the unseal side.
async fn bootstrap_key_for(
gate: &kameo::actor::ActorRef<VaultGate>,
seal_key: &[u8; 32],
) -> HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
let response = gate
.ask(HandleHandshake {
client_pubkey: client_public,
})
.await
.unwrap();
let shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&response.server_pubkey);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let nonce = XNonce::from([0u8; 24]);
let associated_data = b"bootstrap";
let mut ciphertext = seal_key.to_vec();
cipher
.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut ciphertext)
.unwrap();
HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey {
nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
ciphertext,
associated_data: associated_data.to_vec(),
}
}
/// Asserts a gate turned a request down on the peer's role rather than on anything else --
/// notably not on coordinator state, which is what an unguarded handler would have reported.
#[track_caller]
fn assert_role_refused<T: std::fmt::Debug, M>(
what: &str,
result: Result<T, kameo::error::SendError<M, VaultGateError>>,
) {
match result {
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(VaultGateError::RoleNotPermitted)) => {}
other => panic!("{what}: expected RoleNotPermitted, got {other:?}"),
}
}
/// §3.5: which committee seat a passphrase fills is decided by the handshake, not by the
/// request, so neither role can spend the other's slot.
///
/// Neither request carries an operator id, so the ordinary peer has nothing left to forge; the
/// point of running the bootstrap to completion afterwards is that its refusal left the
/// recovery seat empty rather than filling it under a chosen id.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn ordinary_operator_cannot_contribute_a_recovery_share() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = common::spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
let gates = spawn_role_gates(&db, &actors).await;
assert_eq!(
gates.ordinary_id, gates.recovery_id,
"the two ids must collide for the attestation check at the end to mean anything"
);
gates
.ordinary
.ask(HandleDeclareCommittee {
count: 1,
recovery_count: 1,
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert_role_refused(
"an ordinary operator contributed a recovery share",
gates
.ordinary
.ask(HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase {
passphrase: b"forged-recovery-pass".to_vec(),
})
.await,
);
assert_role_refused(
"a recovery operator contributed an ordinary share",
gates
.recovery
.ask(HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase {
passphrase: b"forged-ordinary-pass".to_vec(),
})
.await,
);
// The recovery seat is still empty: had the forged contribution landed, this one would come
// back as a duplicate instead of being accepted.
let done = gates
.recovery
.ask(HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase {
passphrase: b"recovery-pass".to_vec(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(!done, "the ordinary share is still outstanding");
let done = gates
.ordinary
.ask(HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase {
passphrase: b"ordinary-pass".to_vec(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(done, "both seats are filled, so bootstrap must finalize");
assert_eq!(
actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap(),
VaultState::Unsealed
);
// Both peers hold the same id in their own table (asserted above), so only the attestation
// kind tells the two envelopes apart. Two rows means the recovery peer signed as itself
// rather than overwriting the ordinary operator's attestation.
let kinds = common::eventually("both bootstrap attestations are written", || {
let db = db.clone();
async move {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let mut kinds: Vec<String> = schema::integrity_envelope::table
.select(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind)
.load(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
kinds.sort();
(kinds.len() == 2).then_some(kinds)
}
})
.await;
assert_eq!(
kinds,
vec![
"operator_credentials".to_owned(),
"recovery_operator_credentials".to_owned(),
]
);
}
/// Every gate action that belongs to one role refuses the other, and refuses it before the
/// action takes effect.
///
/// The vault is left unbootstrapped and the coordinator idle on purpose: an unguarded handler
/// would reach the vault or the coordinator and come back with `State`, `NotBootstrapping` or
/// `NotUnsealing`, so `RoleNotPermitted` can only come from the role check itself.
///
/// §3.4/§3.5: `HandleBootstrapEncryptedKey` matters most here. It hands the vault a root key of
/// the peer's choosing, and the window it needs -- an unbootstrapped vault that already holds
/// recovery identity rows -- is exactly the state committee formation has to pass through.
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn vault_gate_refuses_the_actions_of_the_other_role() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = common::spawn_actors(db.clone()).await;
let gates = spawn_role_gates(&db, &actors).await;
assert_role_refused(
"a recovery operator declared the committee",
gates
.recovery
.ask(HandleDeclareCommittee {
count: 1,
recovery_count: 1,
})
.await,
);
// A key the vault would have accepted, negotiated through the gate's own handshake -- so
// the refusal comes from the role and not from a malformed request.
let seized_key = bootstrap_key_for(&gates.recovery, b"recovery-seized-32-byte-seal-key").await;
assert_role_refused(
"a recovery operator bootstrapped the vault",
gates.recovery.ask(seized_key).await,
);
assert_role_refused(
"a recovery operator contributed an ordinary bootstrap share",
gates
.recovery
.ask(HandleContributeBootstrapPassphrase {
passphrase: b"forged-ordinary-pass".to_vec(),
})
.await,
);
assert_role_refused(
"an ordinary operator contributed a recovery bootstrap share",
gates
.ordinary
.ask(HandleContributeRecoveryBootstrapPassphrase {
passphrase: b"forged-recovery-pass".to_vec(),
})
.await,
);
assert_role_refused(
"a recovery operator contributed an ordinary unseal share",
gates
.recovery
.ask(HandleContributeUnsealPassphrase {
passphrase: b"forged-ordinary-pass".to_vec(),
})
.await,
);
assert_role_refused(
"an ordinary operator contributed a recovery unseal share",
gates
.ordinary
.ask(HandleContributeRecoveryUnsealPassphrase {
passphrase: b"forged-recovery-pass".to_vec(),
})
.await,
);
// Nothing above took effect: the refusals came before the vault and the coordinator.
assert_eq!(
actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await.unwrap(),
VaultState::Unbootstrapped,
"a refused request still reached the vault"
);
}

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