server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-14-171124-0000_init/up.sql

@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ create table if not exists evm_wallet_access (
     id integer not null primary key,
     wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet (id) on delete cascade,
     client_id integer not null references program_client (id) on delete cascade,
+    revoked_at integer, -- unix timestamp when revoked, null = still active
     created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
 ) STRICT;
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/evm/mod.rs

@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
             .first(&mut conn)
             .await
             .optional()
@@ -261,6 +262,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
             .first(&mut conn)
             .await
             .optional()
@@ -323,11 +325,19 @@ impl EvmActor {
     ) -> Result<(), Error> {
         let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
 
+        // Revives a previously revoked row instead of conflicting on it forever:
+        // `uniq_wallet_access` is a unique index on `(wallet_id, client_id)`.
         insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
             .values((
                 schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(EvmWalletId::from_raw(settings.wallet_id)),
                 schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(settings.client_id),
             ))
+            .on_conflict((
+                schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id,
+                schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id,
+            ))
+            .do_update()
+            .set(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(None::<models::SqliteTimestamp>))
             .execute(&mut conn)
             .await
             .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/mod.rs

@@ -164,7 +164,11 @@ pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
-    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, dsl::insert_into};
+    use diesel::{
+        ExpressionMethods as _,
+        dsl::insert_into,
+        result::{DatabaseErrorKind, Error as DieselError},
+    };
     use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 
     /// `operator.id` references `operator_identity(id)`. Without `PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON`
@@ -184,9 +188,18 @@ mod tests {
             .execute(&mut conn)
             .await;
 
+        // Specifically a foreign-key violation, not any error: a `NOT NULL` failure or a
+        // renamed column would also make `result.is_err()` true without proving the pragma
+        // is what rejected the insert.
         assert!(
-            result.is_err(),
-            "insert with a dangling operator_identity reference was accepted"
+            matches!(
+                result,
+                Err(DieselError::DatabaseError(
+                    DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation,
+                    _
+                ))
+            ),
+            "expected a foreign-key violation for a dangling operator_identity reference, got {result:?}"
         );
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/models.rs

@@ -263,19 +263,22 @@ pub struct EvmWallet {
 #[view(
     NewEvmWalletAccess,
     derive(Insertable),
-    omit(id, created_at),
+    omit(id, created_at, revoked_at),
     attributes_with = "deriveless"
 )]
 #[view(
     CoreEvmWalletAccess,
     derive(Insertable),
-    omit(created_at),
+    omit(created_at, revoked_at),
     attributes_with = "deriveless"
 )]
 pub struct EvmWalletAccess {
     pub id: i32,
     pub wallet_id: EvmWalletId,
     pub client_id: i32,
+    // Grants, transaction logs, and persistent-grant proposals reference this row
+    // `on delete restrict`, so revocation cannot delete it -- it marks it revoked instead.
+    pub revoked_at: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
 }
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/schema.rs

@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ diesel::table! {
         id -> Integer,
         wallet_id -> Integer,
         client_id -> Integer,
+        revoked_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
         created_at -> Integer,
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/mod.rs

@@ -381,6 +381,7 @@ mod tests {
                 id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
                 wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(5),
                 client_id: 20,
+                revoked_at: None,
                 created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
             },
             chain: CHAIN_ID,
@@ -478,6 +479,9 @@ mod tests {
         conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
         shared: &SharedGrantSettings,
     ) -> EvmBasicGrant {
+        // The seeded id deliberately wins over `shared.wallet_access_id`: every other field
+        // below is read from `shared`, but a caller-supplied access id would almost never
+        // reference a row that actually exists under foreign-key enforcement.
         let wallet_access_id = seed_wallet_access(conn).await;
 
         #[expect(

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/ether_transfer/tests.rs

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, value: U256) -> EvalContext {
             id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
             wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(10),
             client_id: 20,
+            revoked_at: None,
             created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
         },
         chain: CHAIN_ID,

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/token_transfers/tests.rs

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, calldata: Bytes) -> EvalContext {
             id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
             wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(10),
             client_id: 20,
+            revoked_at: None,
             created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
         },
         chain: CHAIN_ID,

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/peers/operator/session/handlers.rs

@@ -177,20 +177,7 @@ impl OperatorSession {
         entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
     ) -> Result<(), Error> {
         let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
-        conn.transaction(async |conn| {
-            use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
-
-            for entry in entries {
-                diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
-                    .values(&entry)
-                    .on_conflict_do_nothing()
-                    .execute(&mut *conn)
-                    .await?;
-            }
-
-            Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
-        })
-        .await?;
+        grant_wallet_access(&mut conn, entries).await?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -211,6 +198,7 @@ impl OperatorSession {
         use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
         let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
         let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
+            .filter(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
             .select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
             .load::<_>(&mut conn)
             .await?;
@@ -218,16 +206,47 @@ impl OperatorSession {
     }
 }
 
-/// Deletes access rows by their own id. The wire carries `WalletAccessEntry.id` values, so
-/// filtering by `wallet_id` here would revoke every client's access to that wallet.
+/// Grants access, reviving a previously revoked row rather than leaving it shadowed:
+/// `uniq_wallet_access` is a unique index on `(wallet_id, client_id)`, so a plain insert
+/// would conflict forever on a row that was revoked but never deleted.
+pub(crate) async fn grant_wallet_access(
+    conn: &mut crate::db::DatabaseConnection,
+    entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
+) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
+    use crate::db::{models::SqliteTimestamp, schema::evm_wallet_access};
+
+    conn.transaction(async |conn| {
+        for entry in entries {
+            diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
+                .values(&entry)
+                .on_conflict((evm_wallet_access::wallet_id, evm_wallet_access::client_id))
+                .do_update()
+                .set(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(None::<SqliteTimestamp>))
+                .execute(&mut *conn)
+                .await?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    })
+    .await
+}
+
+/// Marks access rows revoked by their own id rather than deleting them. The wire carries
+/// `WalletAccessEntry.id` values, so filtering by `wallet_id` here would revoke every
+/// client's access to that wallet. Deleting is not an option: `evm_basic_grant`,
+/// `evm_transaction_log`, and `proposal_persistent_grant` all reference this row
+/// `on delete restrict`, so an access that was ever granted, signed with, or proposed
+/// against can never be deleted -- only marked revoked.
 pub(crate) async fn revoke_wallet_access(
     conn: &mut crate::db::DatabaseConnection,
     ids: &[i32],
 ) -> Result<usize, diesel::result::Error> {
-    use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
+    use crate::db::{models::SqliteTimestamp, schema::evm_wallet_access};
 
-    diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
+    diesel::update(evm_wallet_access::table)
         .filter(evm_wallet_access::id.eq_any(ids))
+        .filter(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
+        .set(evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
         .execute(conn)
         .await
 }
@@ -385,18 +404,15 @@ impl OperatorSession {
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::revoke_wallet_access;
+    use super::{grant_wallet_access, revoke_wallet_access};
     use crate::db::{self, models, schema};
 
     use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, dsl::insert_into};
     use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 
-    /// Two clients share one wallet. Revoking one access row must leave the other alone.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn revoking_one_access_leaves_the_other_client_alone() {
-        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
-
+    /// Inserts a fresh root key, an aead-encrypted wallet secret, and the wallet itself.
+    /// Returns the wallet's id and its 20-byte address.
+    async fn seed_wallet(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection) -> (models::EvmWalletId, Vec<u8>) {
         let root_key_id: models::RootKeyHistoryId = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
             .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
                 ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
@@ -407,7 +423,7 @@ mod tests {
                 salt: vec![0u8; 16],
             })
             .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .get_result(conn)
             .await
             .unwrap();
 
@@ -421,81 +437,323 @@ mod tests {
                 created_at: chrono::Utc::now().into(),
             })
             .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .get_result(conn)
             .await
             .unwrap();
 
+        let address = rand::random::<[u8; 20]>().to_vec();
         let wallet_id: models::EvmWalletId = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
             .values((
-                schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(vec![0u8; 20]),
+                schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(address.clone()),
                 schema::evm_wallet::aead_encrypted_id.eq(aead_id),
             ))
             .returning(schema::evm_wallet::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .get_result(conn)
             .await
             .unwrap();
 
-        let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
+        (wallet_id, address)
+    }
+
+    async fn seed_client_metadata(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection) -> i32 {
+        insert_into(schema::client_metadata::table)
             .values(schema::client_metadata::name.eq("test"))
             .returning(schema::client_metadata::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .get_result(conn)
             .await
-            .unwrap();
+            .unwrap()
+    }
 
-        let first_client: i32 = insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
+    /// Inserts a `program_client` row under the given `client_metadata` row, keyed by its
+    /// own random public key.
+    async fn seed_client(conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection, metadata_id: i32) -> i32 {
+        insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
             .values((
-                schema::program_client::public_key.eq(vec![1u8; 32]),
+                schema::program_client::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()),
                 schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
             ))
             .returning(schema::program_client::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .get_result(conn)
             .await
-            .unwrap();
+            .unwrap()
+    }
 
-        let second_client: i32 = insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::program_client::public_key.eq(vec![2u8; 32]),
-                schema::program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::program_client::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let first_access: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
+    /// Inserts an access row directly, for fixtures that need one to already exist.
+    /// Production code grants access through [`grant_wallet_access`].
+    async fn insert_wallet_access(
+        conn: &mut db::DatabaseConnection,
+        wallet_id: models::EvmWalletId,
+        client_id: i32,
+    ) -> i32 {
+        insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
             .values((
                 schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(first_client),
+                schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id),
             ))
             .returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .get_result(conn)
             .await
-            .unwrap();
+            .unwrap()
+    }
 
-        let _second_access: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet_id),
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(second_client),
-            ))
-            .returning(schema::evm_wallet_access::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
+    /// Two clients share one wallet. Revoking one access row must leave the other alone,
+    /// and must mark the row revoked rather than deleting it.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn revoking_one_access_leaves_the_other_client_alone() {
+        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
+
+        let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
+        let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
+        let first_client = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
+        let second_client = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
+
+        let first_access = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, first_client).await;
+        let _second_access = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, second_client).await;
 
         let removed = revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[first_access])
             .await
             .unwrap();
         assert_eq!(removed, 1);
 
-        let survivors: Vec<i32> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
+        let active: Vec<i32> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at.is_null())
             .select(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id)
             .load(&mut conn)
             .await
             .unwrap();
         assert_eq!(
-            survivors,
+            active,
             vec![second_client],
             "revoking one access row removed another client's access"
         );
+
+        let total: i64 = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
+            .count()
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            total, 2,
+            "revoking an access row must mark it revoked, not delete it"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The bug this round fixes: once an access has been used for a grant, a signed
+    /// transaction, or a proposed persistent grant, three tables reference
+    /// `evm_wallet_access` `on delete restrict`, so deleting the row is no longer possible
+    /// once foreign keys are enforced. Revoking must still succeed by marking it revoked.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn revoking_an_access_with_grant_log_and_proposal_succeeds() {
+        use crate::db::proposal::{Proposal as _, persistent_grant, persistent_grant::PersistentGrant};
+
+        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
+
+        let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
+        let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
+        let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
+        let access_id = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, client_id).await;
+
+        // A grant against this access...
+        let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
+            .values(models::NewEvmBasicGrant {
+                wallet_access_id: access_id,
+                chain_id: 1u64.into(),
+                valid_from: None,
+                valid_until: None,
+                max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
+                max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
+                rate_limit_count: None,
+                rate_limit_window_secs: None,
+                revoked_at: None,
+            })
+            .returning(schema::evm_basic_grant::id)
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // ...a signed transaction against that grant...
+        insert_into(schema::evm_transaction_log::table)
+            .values(models::NewEvmTransactionLog {
+                grant_id,
+                wallet_access_id: access_id,
+                chain_id: 1u64.into(),
+                eth_value: vec![0u8; 32],
+                signed_at: models::SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now()),
+            })
+            .execute(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // ...and a persistent-grant proposal that named this access before it was voted on.
+        let operator_id: models::OperatorIdentityId =
+            insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
+                .values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>().to_vec()))
+                .returning(schema::operator_identity::id)
+                .get_result(&mut conn)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+        let proposal_id: models::ProposalId = insert_into(schema::proposal::table)
+            .values(&models::NewProposal {
+                kind: db::proposal::ProposalKindTag::ApprovePersistentGrant,
+                initiator_id: operator_id,
+                expires_at: models::SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::days(1)),
+            })
+            .returning(schema::proposal::id)
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        PersistentGrant::insert(
+            proposal_id,
+            &persistent_grant::Settings {
+                wallet_access_id: access_id,
+                chain_id: 1,
+                valid_from_secs: None,
+                valid_until_secs: None,
+                max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
+                max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
+                rate_limit: None,
+                specific: persistent_grant::Specific::EtherTransfer {
+                    targets: vec![[0u8; 20]],
+                    limit: persistent_grant::VolumeLimit {
+                        max_volume: [0u8; 32],
+                        window_secs: 3600,
+                    },
+                },
+            },
+            &mut conn,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Before this round's fix, this would fail with a foreign-key violation.
+        let removed = revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(removed, 1);
+
+        let revoked_at: Option<models::SqliteTimestamp> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
+            .find(access_id)
+            .select(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at)
+            .first(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            revoked_at.is_some(),
+            "the row must be marked revoked, not deleted"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A revoked access must no longer resolve through the lookup `shared_analyze_transaction`
+    /// and `client_sign_transaction` share -- otherwise the SDK client keeps signing after
+    /// the operator believes it has been cut off.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn revoked_access_no_longer_authorizes_signing() {
+        use crate::actors::{
+            GlobalActors,
+            evm::{EvmActor, SignTransactionError},
+            vault::Vault,
+        };
+        use alloy::{
+            consensus::TxEip1559,
+            eips::eip2930::AccessList,
+            primitives::{Address, Bytes, TxKind, U256},
+        };
+        use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
+
+        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
+
+        let (wallet_id, address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
+        let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
+        let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
+        let access_id = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, client_id).await;
+
+        revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
+        drop(conn);
+
+        let vault = Vault::spawn(
+            Vault::new(pool.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+        );
+        let mut evm_actor = EvmActor::new(vault, pool.clone());
+
+        let transaction = TxEip1559 {
+            chain_id: 1,
+            nonce: 0,
+            gas_limit: 21_000,
+            max_fee_per_gas: 0,
+            max_priority_fee_per_gas: 0,
+            to: TxKind::Call(Address::ZERO),
+            value: U256::ZERO,
+            input: Bytes::new(),
+            access_list: AccessList::default(),
+        };
+        let wallet_address = Address::from_slice(&address);
+
+        // Both lookups resolve access the same way; both must reject the revoked row before
+        // ever touching the vault (neither call bootstraps one).
+        let analyze_result = evm_actor
+            .shared_analyze_transaction(client_id, wallet_address, transaction.clone())
+            .await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(analyze_result, Err(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)),
+            "a revoked access must not authorize shared_analyze_transaction: {analyze_result:?}"
+        );
+
+        let sign_result = evm_actor
+            .client_sign_transaction(client_id, wallet_address, transaction)
+            .await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(sign_result, Err(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)),
+            "a revoked access must not authorize client_sign_transaction: {sign_result:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Re-granting a revoked access must restore it rather than silently doing nothing:
+    /// `uniq_wallet_access` is a unique index on `(wallet_id, client_id)`, so a plain insert
+    /// would conflict on the revoked row forever.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn regranting_a_revoked_access_restores_it() {
+        let pool = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
+
+        let (wallet_id, _address) = seed_wallet(&mut conn).await;
+        let metadata_id = seed_client_metadata(&mut conn).await;
+        let client_id = seed_client(&mut conn, metadata_id).await;
+        let access_id = insert_wallet_access(&mut conn, wallet_id, client_id).await;
+
+        revoke_wallet_access(&mut conn, &[access_id]).await.unwrap();
+
+        grant_wallet_access(
+            &mut conn,
+            vec![models::NewEvmWalletAccess {
+                wallet_id,
+                client_id,
+            }],
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let revoked_at: Option<models::SqliteTimestamp> = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
+            .find(access_id)
+            .select(schema::evm_wallet_access::revoked_at)
+            .first(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            revoked_at.is_none(),
+            "re-granting a revoked access must clear revoked_at"
+        );
+
+        let total: i64 = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
+            .count()
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            total, 1,
+            "re-granting a revoked access must revive the existing row, not add a second one"
+        );
     }
 }