refactor(server): reogranized actors, context, and db modules into <dir>/mod.rs structure

.vscode/settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+{
+    "git.enabled": false
+}

.woodpecker/server-audit.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ when:
       include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
 
 steps:
-  - name: test
+  - name: audit
     image: jdxcode/mise:latest
     directory: server
     environment:

.woodpecker/server-lint.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+when:
+  - event: pull_request
+    path:
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+  - event: push
+    branch: main
+    path:
+      include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
+
+steps:
+  - name: lint
+    image: jdxcode/mise:latest
+    directory: server
+    environment:
+      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+      CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
+      CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
+    volumes:
+      - cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
+      - cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
+    commands:
+      - apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
+      - mise install rust 
+      - mise install protoc
+      - mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings

.woodpecker/server-vet.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ when:
       include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
 
 steps:
-  - name: test
+  - name: vet
     image: jdxcode/mise:latest
     directory: server
     environment:

mise.lock

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ backend = "cargo:cargo-features"
 version = "0.11.1"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
 
+[[tools."cargo:cargo-insta"]]
+version = "1.46.3"
+backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
+
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
 version = "0.9.126"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"

mise.toml

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
 "cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.6", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = false }
 "cargo:cargo-audit" = "0.22.1"
 "cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
-
 flutter = "3.38.9-stable"
 protoc = "29.6"
-rust = "1.93.1"
+"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy"}
 "cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.11.1"
 "cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
 "cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
+"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.46.3"

protobufs/arbiter.proto

@@ -3,65 +3,14 @@ syntax = "proto3";
 package arbiter;
 
 import "auth.proto";
-
+import "client.proto";
-message ClientRequest {
+import "user_agent.proto";
-  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
-    CertRotationAck cert_rotation_ack = 2;
-  }
-}
-
-message ClientResponse {
-  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
-    CertRotationNotification cert_rotation_notification = 2;
-  }
-}
-
-message UserAgentRequest {
-  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
-    CertRotationAck cert_rotation_ack = 2;
-  }
-}
-message UserAgentResponse {
-  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
-    CertRotationNotification cert_rotation_notification = 2;
-  }
-}
 
 message ServerInfo {
   string version = 1;
   bytes cert_public_key = 2;
 }
 
-// TLS Certificate Rotation Protocol
-message CertRotationNotification {
-  // New public certificate (DER-encoded)
-  bytes new_cert = 1;
-
-  // Unix timestamp when rotation will be executed (if all ACKs received)
-  int64 rotation_scheduled_at = 2;
-
-  // Unix timestamp deadline for ACK (7 days from now)
-  int64 ack_deadline = 3;
-
-  // Rotation ID for tracking
-  int32 rotation_id = 4;
-}
-
-message CertRotationAck {
-  // Rotation ID (from CertRotationNotification)
-  int32 rotation_id = 1;
-
-  // Client public key for identification
-  bytes client_public_key = 2;
-
-  // Confirmation that client saved the new certificate
-  bool cert_saved = 3;
-}
-
 service ArbiterService {
   rpc Client(stream ClientRequest) returns (stream ClientResponse);
   rpc UserAgent(stream UserAgentRequest) returns (stream UserAgentResponse);

protobufs/client.proto

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+syntax = "proto3";
+
+package arbiter;
+
+import "auth.proto";
+
+message ClientRequest {
+  oneof payload {
+    arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
+  }
+}
+
+message ClientResponse {
+  oneof payload {
+    arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
+  }
+}

protobufs/google/protobuf/timestamp.proto

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-// Protocol Buffers - Google's data interchange format
-// Copyright 2008 Google Inc.  All rights reserved.
-//
-// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
-// met:
-//
-//     * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-//     * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
-// copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
-// in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-// distribution.
-//     * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
-// contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
-// this software without specific prior written permission.
-
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package google.protobuf;
-
-option csharp_namespace = "Google.Protobuf.WellKnownTypes";
-option cc_enable_arenas = true;
-option go_package = "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb";
-option java_package = "com.google.protobuf";
-option java_outer_classname = "TimestampProto";
-option java_multiple_files = true;
-option objc_class_prefix = "GPB";
-
-// A Timestamp represents a point in time independent of any time zone or local
-// calendar, encoded as a count of seconds and fractions of seconds at
-// nanosecond resolution. The count is relative to an epoch at UTC midnight on
-// January 1, 1970, in the proleptic Gregorian calendar which extends the
-// Gregorian calendar backwards to year one.
-message Timestamp {
-  // Represents seconds of UTC time since Unix epoch
-  // 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z. Must be from 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z to
-  // 9999-12-31T23:59:59Z inclusive.
-  int64 seconds = 1;
-
-  // Non-negative fractions of a second at nanosecond resolution. Negative
-  // second values with fractions must still have non-negative nanos values
-  // that count forward in time. Must be from 0 to 999,999,999
-  // inclusive.
-  int32 nanos = 2;
-}

protobufs/unseal.proto

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package arbiter.unseal;
-
-message UserAgentKeyRequest {}
-
-message ServerKeyResponse {
-  bytes pubkey = 1;
-}
-message UserAgentSealedKey {
-  bytes sealed_key = 1;
-  bytes pubkey = 2;
-  bytes nonce = 3;
-}

protobufs/user_agent.proto

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+syntax = "proto3";
+
+package arbiter;
+
+import "auth.proto";
+import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
+
+message UnsealStart {
+  bytes client_pubkey = 1;
+}
+
+message UnsealStartResponse {
+  bytes server_pubkey = 1;
+}
+message UnsealEncryptedKey {
+  bytes nonce = 1;
+  bytes ciphertext = 2;
+  bytes associated_data = 3;
+}
+
+enum UnsealResult {
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
+  UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
+}
+
+enum VaultState {
+  VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
+  VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
+  VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
+  VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
+}
+
+message UserAgentRequest {
+  oneof payload {
+    arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
+    UnsealStart unseal_start = 2;
+    UnsealEncryptedKey unseal_encrypted_key = 3;
+    google.protobuf.Empty query_vault_state = 4;
+  }
+}
+message UserAgentResponse {
+  oneof payload {
+    arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
+    UnsealStartResponse unseal_start_response = 2;
+    UnsealResult unseal_result = 3;
+    VaultState vault_state = 4;
+  }
+}

server/Cargo.lock

@@ -63,8 +63,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "hex",
  "kameo",
  "prost",
- "prost-build",
- "serde_json",
  "tokio",
  "tonic",
  "tonic-prost",
@@ -86,21 +84,25 @@ dependencies = [
  "diesel_migrations",
  "ed25519-dalek",
  "futures",
- "hex",
+ "insta",
  "kameo",
  "memsafe",
  "miette",
  "rand",
  "rcgen",
+ "restructed",
  "rustls",
  "secrecy",
  "smlang",
+ "strum",
  "test-log",
  "thiserror",
  "tokio",
  "tokio-stream",
  "tonic",
  "tracing",
+ "tracing-subscriber",
+ "x25519-dalek",
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
@@ -118,6 +120,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "blake2",
  "cpufeatures 0.2.17",
  "password-hash",
+ "zeroize",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ checksum = "3109e49b1e4909e9db6515a30c633684d68cdeaa252f215214cb4fa1a5bfee2c"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
  "synstructure",
 ]
 
@@ -156,7 +159,7 @@ checksum = "7b18050c2cd6fe86c3a76584ef5e0baf286d038cda203eb6223df2cc413565f7"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -167,7 +170,7 @@ checksum = "9035ad2d096bed7955a320ee7e2230574d28fd3c3a0f186cbea1ff3c7eed5dbb"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -428,6 +431,18 @@ dependencies = [
  "cc",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "console"
+version = "0.15.11"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "054ccb5b10f9f2cbf51eb355ca1d05c2d279ce1804688d0db74b4733a5aeafd8"
+dependencies = [
+ "encode_unicode",
+ "libc",
+ "once_cell",
+ "windows-sys 0.59.0",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "core-foundation-sys"
 version = "0.8.7"
@@ -487,6 +502,21 @@ dependencies = [
  "hybrid-array",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "curve25519-dalek"
+version = "4.1.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "97fb8b7c4503de7d6ae7b42ab72a5a59857b4c937ec27a3d4539dba95b5ab2be"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "cpufeatures 0.2.17",
+ "curve25519-dalek-derive",
+ "fiat-crypto 0.2.9",
+ "rustc_version",
+ "subtle",
+ "zeroize",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "curve25519-dalek"
 version = "5.0.0-pre.6"
@@ -497,7 +527,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "cpufeatures 0.2.17",
  "curve25519-dalek-derive",
  "digest 0.11.0",
- "fiat-crypto",
+ "fiat-crypto 0.3.0",
  "rustc_version",
  "subtle",
  "zeroize",
@@ -511,7 +541,7 @@ checksum = "f46882e17999c6cc590af592290432be3bce0428cb0d5f8b6715e4dc7b383eb3"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -535,7 +565,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
  "strsim",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -546,7 +576,7 @@ checksum = "d38308df82d1080de0afee5d069fa14b0326a88c14f15c5ccda35b4a6c414c81"
 dependencies = [
  "darling_core",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -633,7 +663,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "dsl_auto_type",
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -653,7 +683,7 @@ version = "0.3.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "fe2444076b48641147115697648dc743c2c00b61adade0f01ce67133c7babe8c"
 dependencies = [
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -685,7 +715,7 @@ checksum = "97369cbbc041bc366949bc74d34658d6cda5621039731c6310521892a3a20ae0"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -705,7 +735,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "heck",
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -735,7 +765,7 @@ version = "3.0.0-pre.6"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "053618a4c3d3bc24f188aa660ae75a46eeab74ef07fb415c61431e5e7cd4749b"
 dependencies = [
- "curve25519-dalek",
+ "curve25519-dalek 5.0.0-pre.6",
  "ed25519",
  "rand_core 0.10.0",
  "sha2",
@@ -749,6 +779,12 @@ version = "1.15.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "48c757948c5ede0e46177b7add2e67155f70e33c07fea8284df6576da70b3719"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "encode_unicode"
+version = "1.0.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "34aa73646ffb006b8f5147f3dc182bd4bcb190227ce861fc4a4844bf8e3cb2c0"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "equivalent"
 version = "1.0.2"
@@ -771,6 +807,12 @@ version = "2.3.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "37909eebbb50d72f9059c3b6d82c0463f2ff062c9e95845c43a6c9c0355411be"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "fiat-crypto"
+version = "0.2.9"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "28dea519a9695b9977216879a3ebfddf92f1c08c05d984f8996aecd6ecdc811d"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "fiat-crypto"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -879,7 +921,7 @@ checksum = "e835b70203e41293343137df5c0664546da5745f82ec9b84d40be8336958447b"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1186,6 +1228,18 @@ dependencies = [
  "generic-array",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "insta"
+version = "1.46.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e82db8c87c7f1ccecb34ce0c24399b8a73081427f3c7c50a5d597925356115e4"
+dependencies = [
+ "console",
+ "once_cell",
+ "similar",
+ "tempfile",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "is_ci"
 version = "1.2.0"
@@ -1251,7 +1305,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "heck",
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1362,7 +1416,7 @@ checksum = "db5b29714e950dbb20d5e6f74f9dcec4edbcc1067bb7f8ed198c097b8c1a818b"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1435,6 +1489,15 @@ dependencies = [
  "minimal-lexical",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "nu-ansi-term"
+version = "0.50.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "7957b9740744892f114936ab4a57b3f487491bbeafaf8083688b16841a4240e5"
+dependencies = [
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "num-bigint"
 version = "0.4.6"
@@ -1583,7 +1646,7 @@ checksum = "6e918e4ff8c4549eb882f14b3a4bc8c8bc93de829416eacf579f1207a8fbf861"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1634,7 +1697,31 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "479ca8adacdd7ce8f1fb39ce9ecccbfe93a3f1344b3d0d97f20bc0196208f62b"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "proc-macro-error"
+version = "1.0.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "da25490ff9892aab3fcf7c36f08cfb902dd3e71ca0f9f9517bea02a73a5ce38c"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro-error-attr",
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 1.0.109",
+ "version_check",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "proc-macro-error-attr"
+version = "1.0.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a1be40180e52ecc98ad80b184934baf3d0d29f979574e439af5a55274b35f869"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "version_check",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1673,7 +1760,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "pulldown-cmark",
  "pulldown-cmark-to-cmark",
  "regex",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
  "tempfile",
 ]
 
@@ -1687,7 +1774,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "itertools",
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1813,6 +1900,18 @@ version = "0.8.9"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "a96887878f22d7bad8a3b6dc5b7440e0ada9a245242924394987b21cf2210a4c"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "restructed"
+version = "0.2.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8f6f6e863d7d9d318699737c043d560dce1ea3cb6f5c78e0a3f0d1f257c73dfc"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro-error",
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ring"
 version = "0.17.14"
@@ -1973,7 +2072,7 @@ checksum = "d540f220d3187173da220f885ab66608367b6574e925011a9353e4badda91d79"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2046,6 +2145,12 @@ version = "0.3.8"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e320a6c5ad31d271ad523dcf3ad13e2767ad8b1cb8f047f75a8aeaf8da139da2"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "similar"
+version = "2.7.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "bbbb5d9659141646ae647b42fe094daf6c6192d1620870b449d9557f748b2daa"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "slab"
 version = "0.4.12"
@@ -2113,6 +2218,27 @@ version = "0.11.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "7da8b5736845d9f2fcb837ea5d9e2628564b3b043a70948a3f0b778838c5fb4f"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "strum"
+version = "0.27.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "af23d6f6c1a224baef9d3f61e287d2761385a5b88fdab4eb4c6f11aeb54c4bcf"
+dependencies = [
+ "strum_macros",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "strum_macros"
+version = "0.27.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "7695ce3845ea4b33927c055a39dc438a45b059f7c1b3d91d38d10355fb8cbca7"
+dependencies = [
+ "heck",
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "subtle"
 version = "2.6.1"
@@ -2153,9 +2279,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "syn"
-version = "2.0.116"
+version = "2.0.115"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3df424c70518695237746f84cede799c9c58fcb37450d7b23716568cc8bc69cb"
+checksum = "6e614ed320ac28113fa64972c4262d5dbc89deacdfd00c34a3e4cea073243c12"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
@@ -2176,7 +2302,7 @@ checksum = "728a70f3dbaf5bab7f0c4b1ac8d7ae5ea60a4b5549c8a5914361c99147a709d2"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2220,7 +2346,7 @@ checksum = "be35209fd0781c5401458ab66e4f98accf63553e8fae7425503e92fdd319783b"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2250,7 +2376,7 @@ checksum = "ebc4ee7f67670e9b64d05fa4253e753e016c6c95ff35b89b7941d6b856dec1d5"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2319,7 +2445,7 @@ checksum = "af407857209536a95c8e56f8231ef2c2e2aff839b22e07a1ffcbc617e9db9fa5"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2429,7 +2555,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "prettyplease",
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2454,7 +2580,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "prost-build",
  "prost-types",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
  "tempfile",
  "tonic-build",
 ]
@@ -2509,7 +2635,7 @@ checksum = "7490cfa5ec963746568740651ac6781f701c9c5ea257c58e057f3ba8cf69e8da"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2519,6 +2645,18 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "db97caf9d906fbde555dd62fa95ddba9eecfd14cb388e4f491a66d74cd5fb79a"
 dependencies = [
  "once_cell",
+ "valuable",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "tracing-log"
+version = "0.2.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ee855f1f400bd0e5c02d150ae5de3840039a3f54b025156404e34c23c03f47c3"
+dependencies = [
+ "log",
+ "once_cell",
+ "tracing-core",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2528,12 +2666,15 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "2f30143827ddab0d256fd843b7a66d164e9f271cfa0dde49142c5ca0ca291f1e"
 dependencies = [
  "matchers",
+ "nu-ansi-term",
  "once_cell",
  "regex-automata",
  "sharded-slab",
+ "smallvec",
  "thread_local",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-core",
+ "tracing-log",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2556,9 +2697,9 @@ checksum = "dbc4bc3a9f746d862c45cb89d705aa10f187bb96c76001afab07a0d35ce60142"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-ident"
-version = "1.0.24"
+version = "1.0.23"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e6e4313cd5fcd3dad5cafa179702e2b244f760991f45397d14d4ebf38247da75"
+checksum = "537dd038a89878be9b64dd4bd1b260315c1bb94f4d784956b81e27a088d9a09e"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-linebreak"
@@ -2616,6 +2757,12 @@ dependencies = [
  "wasm-bindgen",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "valuable"
+version = "0.1.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ba73ea9cf16a25df0c8caa16c51acb937d5712a8429db78a3ee29d5dcacd3a65"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "vcpkg"
 version = "0.2.15"
@@ -2693,7 +2840,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "bumpalo",
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
  "wasm-bindgen-shared",
 ]
 
@@ -2783,7 +2930,7 @@ checksum = "053e2e040ab57b9dc951b72c264860db7eb3b0200ba345b4e4c3b14f67855ddf"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2794,7 +2941,7 @@ checksum = "3f316c4a2570ba26bbec722032c4099d8c8bc095efccdc15688708623367e358"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2830,6 +2977,15 @@ dependencies = [
  "windows-targets 0.52.6",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "windows-sys"
+version = "0.59.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "1e38bc4d79ed67fd075bcc251a1c39b32a1776bbe92e5bef1f0bf1f8c531853b"
+dependencies = [
+ "windows-targets 0.52.6",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "windows-sys"
 version = "0.60.2"
@@ -3013,7 +3169,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "heck",
  "indexmap",
  "prettyplease",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
  "wasm-metadata",
  "wit-bindgen-core",
  "wit-component",
@@ -3029,7 +3185,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "prettyplease",
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
- "syn 2.0.116",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
  "wit-bindgen-core",
  "wit-bindgen-rust",
 ]
@@ -3071,6 +3227,18 @@ dependencies = [
  "wasmparser",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "x25519-dalek"
+version = "2.0.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c7e468321c81fb07fa7f4c636c3972b9100f0346e5b6a9f2bd0603a52f7ed277"
+dependencies = [
+ "curve25519-dalek 4.1.3",
+ "rand_core 0.6.4",
+ "serde",
+ "zeroize",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "x509-parser"
 version = "0.18.1"
@@ -3103,6 +3271,20 @@ name = "zeroize"
 version = "1.8.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b97154e67e32c85465826e8bcc1c59429aaaf107c1e4a9e53c8d8ccd5eff88d0"
+dependencies = [
+ "zeroize_derive",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "zeroize_derive"
+version = "1.4.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "85a5b4158499876c763cb03bc4e49185d3cccbabb15b33c627f7884f43db852e"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.115",
+]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "zmij"

server/crates/arbiter-proto/Cargo.toml

@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ prost = "0.14.3"
 kameo.workspace = true
 
 [build-dependencies]
-prost-build = "0.14.3"
-serde_json = "1"
 tonic-prost-build = "0.14.3"
 
 

server/crates/arbiter-proto/build.rs

@@ -1,15 +1,21 @@
+use tonic_prost_build::configure;
+
 static PROTOBUF_DIR: &str = "../../../protobufs";
 
 fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-    let proto_files = vec![
-        format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
-        format!("{}/auth.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
-    ];
 
-    // Компилируем protobuf (tonic-prost-build автоматически использует prost_types для google.protobuf)
+    println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={PROTOBUF_DIR}");
-    tonic_prost_build::configure()
+
+    configure()
         .message_attribute(".", "#[derive(::kameo::Reply)]")
-        .compile_protos(&proto_files, &[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()])?;
+        .compile_protos(
+            &[
+                format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
+                format!("{}/auth.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
+            ],
+            &[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()],
+        )
         
+        .unwrap();
     Ok(())
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/Cargo.toml

@@ -5,13 +5,7 @@ edition = "2024"
 repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
 
 [dependencies]
-diesel = { version = "2.3.6", features = [
+diesel = { version = "2.3.6", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
-    "sqlite",
-    "uuid",
-    "time",
-    "chrono",
-    "serde_json",
-] }
 diesel-async = { version = "0.7.4", features = [
     "bb8",
     "migrations",
@@ -21,6 +15,7 @@ diesel-async = { version = "0.7.4", features = [
 ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
 arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
 tracing.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
 tonic.workspace = true
 tokio.workspace = true
 rustls.workspace = true
@@ -43,10 +38,13 @@ rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
 chrono.workspace = true
 memsafe = "0.4.0"
 zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
-argon2 = { version = "0.5", features = ["std"] }
 kameo.workspace = true
-hex = "0.4.3"
+x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
-chacha20poly1305 = "0.10.1"
+chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
+argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
+restructed = "0.2.2"
+strum = { version = "0.27.2", features = ["derive"] }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
+insta = "1.46.3"
 test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-13-155546-0000_add_tls_rotation/down.sql

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
--- Rollback TLS rotation tables
-
--- Удалить добавленную колонку из arbiter_settings
-ALTER TABLE arbiter_settings DROP COLUMN current_cert_id;
-
--- Удалить таблицы в обратном порядке
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tls_rotation_history;
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rotation_client_acks;
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tls_rotation_state;
-DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_tls_certificates_active;
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tls_certificates;

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-13-155546-0000_add_tls_rotation/up.sql

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
--- История всех сертификатов
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_certificates (
-    id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    cert BLOB NOT NULL,              -- DER-encoded
-    cert_key BLOB NOT NULL,          -- PEM-encoded
-    not_before INTEGER NOT NULL,     -- Unix timestamp
-    not_after INTEGER NOT NULL,      -- Unix timestamp
-    created_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT(unixepoch('now')),
-    is_active BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0  -- Только один active=1
-) STRICT;
-
-CREATE INDEX idx_tls_certificates_active ON tls_certificates(is_active, not_after);
-
--- Tracking процесса ротации
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_rotation_state (
-    id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY CHECK(id = 1),  -- Singleton
-    state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT('normal') CHECK(state IN ('normal', 'initiated', 'waiting_acks', 'ready')),
-    new_cert_id INTEGER REFERENCES tls_certificates(id),
-    initiated_at INTEGER,
-    timeout_at INTEGER  -- Таймаут для ожидания ACKs (initiated_at + 7 дней)
-) STRICT;
-
--- Tracking ACKs от клиентов
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rotation_client_acks (
-    rotation_id INTEGER NOT NULL,    -- Ссылка на new_cert_id
-    client_key TEXT NOT NULL,        -- Публичный ключ клиента (hex)
-    ack_received_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT(unixepoch('now')),
-    PRIMARY KEY (rotation_id, client_key)
-) STRICT;
-
--- Audit trail событий ротации
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_rotation_history (
-    id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    cert_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES tls_certificates(id),
-    event_type TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(event_type IN ('created', 'rotation_initiated', 'acks_complete', 'activated', 'timeout')),
-    timestamp INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT(unixepoch('now')),
-    details TEXT  -- JSON с доп. информацией
-) STRICT;
-
--- Миграция существующего сертификата
-INSERT INTO tls_certificates (id, cert, cert_key, not_before, not_after, is_active, created_at)
-SELECT
-    1,
-    cert,
-    cert_key,
-    unixepoch('now') as not_before,
-    unixepoch('now') + (90 * 24 * 60 * 60) as not_after,  -- 90 дней
-    1 as is_active,
-    unixepoch('now')
-FROM arbiter_settings WHERE id = 1;
-
--- Инициализация rotation_state
-INSERT INTO tls_rotation_state (id, state) VALUES (1, 'normal');
-
--- Добавить ссылку на текущий сертификат
-ALTER TABLE arbiter_settings ADD COLUMN current_cert_id INTEGER REFERENCES tls_certificates(id);
-UPDATE arbiter_settings SET current_cert_id = 1 WHERE id = 1;

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-14-171124-0000_init/up.sql

@@ -1,22 +1,40 @@
-create table if not exists aead_encrypted (
+create table if not exists root_key_history (
     id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
-    current_nonce integer not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
+    -- root key stored as aead encrypted artifact, with only difference that it's decrypted by unseal key (derived from user password)
+    root_key_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented. Used for encrypting root key
+    data_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- nonce used for encrypting with key itself
     ciphertext blob not null,
     tag blob not null,
-    schema_version integer not null default(1) -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
+    schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
+    salt blob not null -- for key deriviation 
 ) STRICT;
 
+create table if not exists aead_encrypted (
+    id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
+    current_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
+    ciphertext blob not null,
+    tag blob not null,
+    schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
+    associated_root_key_id integer not null references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT,
+    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
+) STRICT;
+
+create unique index if not exists uniq_nonce_per_root_key on aead_encrypted (
+    current_nonce,
+    associated_root_key_id
+);
+
 -- This is a singleton
 create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
     id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1
-    root_key_id integer references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
+    root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
     cert_key blob not null,
     cert blob not null
 ) STRICT;
 
 create table if not exists useragent_client (
     id integer not null primary key,
-    nonce integer not null default (1), -- used for auth challenge
+    nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
     public_key blob not null,
     created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
     updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
@@ -24,7 +42,7 @@ create table if not exists useragent_client (
 
 create table if not exists program_client (
     id integer not null primary key,
-    nonce integer not null default (1), -- used for auth challenge
+    nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
     public_key blob not null,
     created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
     updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-16-160000-0000_add_argon2_salt/down.sql

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
--- Remove argon2_salt column
-ALTER TABLE aead_encrypted DROP COLUMN argon2_salt;

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-16-160000-0000_add_argon2_salt/up.sql

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
--- Add argon2_salt column to store password derivation salt
-ALTER TABLE aead_encrypted ADD COLUMN argon2_salt TEXT;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors.rs

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-pub mod user_agent;
-pub mod client;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/bootstrap.rs

@@ -1,19 +1,13 @@
 use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH, home_path};
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, QueryDsl};
+use diesel::QueryDsl;
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 use kameo::{Actor, messages};
-use memsafe::MemSafe;
 use miette::Diagnostic;
 use rand::{RngExt, distr::StandardUniform, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
-use secrecy::SecretString;
 use thiserror::Error;
 use tracing::info;
-use zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};
 
-use crate::{
+use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
-    context::{self, ServerContext},
-    db::{self, DatabasePool, schema},
-};
 
 const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
 
@@ -34,7 +28,7 @@ pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
 }
 
 #[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum BootstrapError {
+pub enum Error {
     #[error("Database error: {0}")]
     #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::bootstrap::database))]
     Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
@@ -49,12 +43,12 @@ pub enum BootstrapError {
 }
 
 #[derive(Actor)]
-pub struct BootstrapActor {
+pub struct Bootstrapper {
     token: Option<String>,
 }
 
-impl BootstrapActor {
+impl Bootstrapper {
-    pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, BootstrapError> {
+    pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
         let mut conn = db.get().await?;
 
         let row_count: i64 = schema::useragent_client::table
@@ -75,15 +69,10 @@ impl BootstrapActor {
 
         Ok(Self { token })
     }
-
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
-        self.token.clone()
-    }
 }
 
 #[messages]
-impl BootstrapActor {
+impl Bootstrapper {
     #[message]
     pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
         match &self.token {
@@ -102,3 +91,11 @@ impl BootstrapActor {
         }
     }
 }
+
+#[messages]
+impl Bootstrapper {
+    #[message]
+    pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
+        self.token.clone()
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/keyholder/encryption.rs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+pub mod v1;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/keyholder/encryption/v1.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+use std::ops::Deref as _;
+
+use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2, password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt};
+use chacha20poly1305::{
+    AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
+    aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload},
+};
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+use rand::{
+    Rng as _, SeedableRng,
+    rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
+};
+
+pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
+pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
+
+pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct Nonce([u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
+impl Nonce {
+    pub fn increment(&mut self) {
+        for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
+            if self.0[i] == 0xFF {
+                self.0[i] = 0;
+            } else {
+                self.0[i] += 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        self.0.to_vec()
+    }
+}
+impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce {
+    type Error = ();
+
+    fn try_from(value: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        if value.len() != NONCE_LENGTH {
+            return Err(());
+        }
+        let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LENGTH];
+        nonce.copy_from_slice(value);
+        Ok(Self(nonce))
+    }
+}
+
+pub struct KeyCell(pub MemSafe<Key>);
+impl From<MemSafe<Key>> for KeyCell {
+    fn from(value: MemSafe<Key>) -> Self {
+        Self(value)
+    }
+}
+impl TryFrom<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
+    type Error = ();
+
+    fn try_from(mut value: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        let value = value.read().unwrap();
+        if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
+            return Err(());
+        }
+        let mut cell = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
+        {
+            let mut cell_write = cell.write().unwrap();
+            let cell_slice: &mut [u8] = cell_write.as_mut();
+            cell_slice.copy_from_slice(&value);
+        }
+        Ok(Self(cell))
+    }
+}
+
+impl KeyCell {
+    pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
+        let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
+        {
+            let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
+            let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
+
+            let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
+            rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
+        }
+
+        key.into()
+    }
+
+    pub fn encrypt_in_place(
+        &mut self,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        associated_data: &[u8],
+        mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
+        let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
+        cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
+    }
+    pub fn decrypt_in_place(
+        &mut self,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        associated_data: &[u8],
+        buffer: &mut MemSafe<Vec<u8>>,
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
+        let mut buffer = buffer.write().unwrap();
+        let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
+        cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
+    }
+
+    pub fn encrypt(
+        &mut self,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        associated_data: &[u8],
+        plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
+        let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+        let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
+
+        let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
+            nonce,
+            Payload {
+                msg: plaintext.as_ref(),
+                aad: associated_data,
+            },
+        )?;
+        Ok(ciphertext)
+    }
+}
+
+pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
+
+pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
+    let mut salt = Salt::default();
+    let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
+    salt
+}
+
+/// User password might be of different length, have not enough entropy, etc...
+/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
+pub fn derive_seal_key(mut password: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
+    let params = argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap();
+    let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
+    let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
+    {
+        let password_source = password.read().unwrap();
+        let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
+        let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
+
+        hasher
+            .hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
+            .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    key.into()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use memsafe::MemSafe;
+
+    #[test]
+    pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
+        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
+        let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        let password2 = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        let salt = generate_salt();
+
+        let mut key1 = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
+        let mut key2 = derive_seal_key(password2, &salt);
+
+        let key1_reader = key1.0.read().unwrap();
+        let key2_reader = key2.0.read().unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    pub fn successful_derive() {
+        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
+        let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        let salt = generate_salt();
+
+        let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
+        let key_reader = key.0.read().unwrap();
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+
+        assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
+        static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
+        let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        let salt = generate_salt();
+
+        let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
+        let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
+        let associated_data = b"associated data";
+        let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();
+
+        key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
+
+        let mut buffer = MemSafe::new(buffer).unwrap();
+
+        key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let buffer = buffer.read().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    // We should fuzz this
+    pub fn test_nonce_increment() {
+        let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
+        nonce.increment();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            nonce.0,
+            [
+                0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/keyholder/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
+use diesel::{
+    ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
+    dsl::{insert_into, update},
+};
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
+use tracing::{error, info};
+
+use crate::db::{
+    self,
+    models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
+    schema::{self},
+};
+use encryption::v1::{self, KeyCell, Nonce};
+
+pub mod encryption;
+
+#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
+#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub))]
+enum State {
+    #[default]
+    Unbootstrapped,
+    Sealed {
+        root_key_history_id: i32,
+    },
+    Unsealed {
+        root_key_history_id: i32,
+        root_key: KeyCell,
+    },
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::already_bootstrapped))]
+    AlreadyBootstrapped,
+    #[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::not_bootstrapped))]
+    NotBootstrapped,
+    #[error("Invalid key provided")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::invalid_key))]
+    InvalidKey,
+
+    #[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::aead_not_found))]
+    NotFound,
+
+    #[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::encryption_error))]
+    Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
+
+    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::database_error))]
+    DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
+
+    #[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::database_transaction_error))]
+    DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+
+    #[error("Broken database")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::broken_database))]
+    BrokenDatabase,
+}
+
+/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
+/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
+/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
+#[derive(Actor)]
+pub struct KeyHolder {
+    db: db::DatabasePool,
+    state: State,
+}
+
+#[messages]
+impl KeyHolder {
+    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
+        let state = {
+            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
+
+            let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
+                .left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                .select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
+                .get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            match root_key_history {
+                Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
+                    root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id,
+                },
+                None => State::Unbootstrapped,
+            }
+        };
+
+        Ok(Self { db, state })
+    }
+
+    // Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple keyholders write
+    // additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
+    async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
+
+        let nonce = conn
+            .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
+                Box::pin(async move {
+                    let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
+                        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
+                        .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
+                        .first(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    let mut nonce =
+                        v1::Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+                            error!(
+                                "Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
+                                root_key_id
+                            );
+                            Error::BrokenDatabase
+                        })?;
+                    nonce.increment();
+
+                    update(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
+                        .set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    Result::<_, Error>::Ok(nonce)
+                })
+            })
+            .await?;
+
+        Ok(nonce)
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
+            return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
+        }
+        let salt = v1::generate_salt();
+        let mut seal_key = v1::derive_seal_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
+        let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
+
+        // Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
+        let root_key_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
+        let data_encryption_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
+
+        let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = {
+            let root_key_reader = root_key.0.read().unwrap();
+            let root_key_reader = root_key_reader.as_slice();
+            seal_key
+                .encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
+                .map_err(|err| {
+                    error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
+                    Error::Encryption(err)
+                })?
+        };
+
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+
+        let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
+        let root_key_history_id = conn
+            .transaction(|conn| {
+                Box::pin(async move {
+                    let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                        .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
+                            ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext,
+                            tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
+                            root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
+                            data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes,
+                            schema_version: 1,
+                            salt: salt.to_vec(),
+                        })
+                        .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
+                        .get_result(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
+                        .set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id)
+                })
+            })
+            .await?;
+
+        self.state = State::Unsealed {
+            root_key,
+            root_key_history_id,
+        };
+
+        info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully");
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let State::Sealed {
+            root_key_history_id,
+        } = &self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        // We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
+        let current_key = {
+            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+            schema::root_key_history::table
+                .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
+                .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
+                .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+                .first(&mut conn)
+                .await?
+        };
+
+        let salt = &current_key.salt;
+        let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+            error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
+            Error::BrokenDatabase
+        })?;
+        let mut seal_key = v1::derive_seal_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
+
+        let mut root_key = MemSafe::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
+
+        let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(
+            |_| {
+                error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
+                Error::BrokenDatabase
+            },
+        )?;
+
+        seal_key
+            .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
+            .map_err(|err| {
+                error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
+                Error::InvalidKey
+            })?;
+
+        self.state = State::Unsealed {
+            root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
+            root_key: v1::KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
+                error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
+                Error::BrokenDatabase
+            })?,
+        };
+
+        info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully");
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    // Decrypts the `aead_encrypted` entry with the given ID and returns the plaintext
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
+            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+            schema::aead_encrypted::table
+                .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+                .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
+                .first(&mut conn)
+                .await
+                .optional()?
+                .ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
+        };
+
+        let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+            error!(
+                "Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
+                aead_id
+            );
+            Error::BrokenDatabase
+        })?;
+        let mut output = MemSafe::new(row.ciphertext).unwrap();
+        root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
+        Ok(output)
+    }
+
+    // Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed {
+            root_key,
+            root_key_history_id,
+        } = &mut self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        // Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
+        // Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
+        let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
+
+        let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write().unwrap();
+        let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
+        root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
+
+        let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
+
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+        let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
+            .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
+                ciphertext,
+                tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
+                current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
+                schema_version: 1,
+                associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
+                created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() as i32,
+            })
+            .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .await?;
+
+        Ok(aead_id)
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub fn get_state(&self) -> StateDiscriminants {
+        self.state.discriminant()
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed {
+            root_key_history_id,
+            ..
+        } = &self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+        self.state = State::Sealed {
+            root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
+        };
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use diesel::SelectableHelper;
+    use diesel::dsl::insert_into;
+    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+    use memsafe::MemSafe;
+
+    use crate::db::{self, models::ArbiterSetting};
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    async fn seed_settings(pool: &db::DatabasePool) {
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
+        insert_into(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
+            .values(&ArbiterSetting {
+                id: 1,
+                root_key_id: None,
+                cert_key: vec![],
+                cert: vec![],
+            })
+            .execute(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
+        seed_settings(db).await;
+        let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+        let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
+        actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
+        actor
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    #[test_log::test]
+    async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
+        let root_key_history_id = match actor.state {
+            State::Unsealed {
+                root_key_history_id,
+                ..
+            } => root_key_history_id,
+            _ => panic!("expected unsealed state"),
+        };
+
+        let n1 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let n2 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
+
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+        let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
+            .select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+            .first(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
+
+        let id = actor
+            .create_new(MemSafe::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()).unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+            .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id))
+            .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+            .first(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(),
+            "next write must advance nonce"
+        );
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
+use miette::Diagnostic;
+use thiserror::Error;
+
+use crate::{
+    actors::{bootstrap::Bootstrapper, keyholder::KeyHolder},
+    db,
+};
+
+pub mod bootstrap;
+pub mod client;
+pub mod keyholder;
+pub mod user_agent;
+
+#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
+pub enum SpawnError {
+    #[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(SpawnError::Bootstrapper))]
+    Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
+
+    #[error("Failed to spawn KeyHolder actor")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(SpawnError::KeyHolder))]
+    KeyHolder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
+}
+
+/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct GlobalActors {
+    pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
+}
+
+impl GlobalActors {
+    pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
+            key_holder: KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?),
+        })
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/mod.rs

@@ -1,100 +1,51 @@
-use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::{ops::DerefMut, sync::Mutex};
 
-use arbiter_proto::{
+use arbiter_proto::proto::{
-    proto::{
+    UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult, UnsealStart, UnsealStartResponse, UserAgentResponse,
-        UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
+    auth::{
-        auth::{
+        self, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk, ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage,
-            self, AuthChallengeRequest, ClientMessage, ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage,
+        server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
-            client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
-            server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
-        },
-        user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
-        user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
     },
-    transport::Bi,
+    user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
 };
+use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, dsl::update};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
-use futures::StreamExt;
+use kameo::{Actor, error::SendError, messages};
-use kameo::{
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
-    Actor,
-    actor::{ActorRef, Spawn},
-    error::SendError,
-    messages,
-    prelude::Context,
-};
-use tokio::sync::mpsc;
 use tokio::sync::mpsc::Sender;
-use tonic::{Status, transport::Server};
+use tonic::Status;
-use tracing::{debug, error, info};
+use tracing::{error, info};
+use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
 
 use crate::{
     ServerContext,
-    actors::user_agent::auth::AuthChallenge,
+    actors::{
-    context::bootstrap::{BootstrapActor, ConsumeToken},
+        GlobalActors,
+        bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
+        keyholder::{self, TryUnseal},
+        user_agent::state::{
+            ChallengeContext, DummyContext, UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine,
+            UserAgentStates,
+        },
+    },
     db::{self, schema},
     errors::GrpcStatusExt,
 };
 
-#[derive(Debug)]
+mod state;
-pub struct ChallengeContext {
-    challenge: AuthChallenge,
-    key: VerifyingKey,
-}
 
-// Request context with deserialized public key for state machine.
+mod transport;
-// This intermediate struct is needed because the state machine branches depending on presence of bootstrap token,
+pub(crate) use transport::handle_user_agent;
-// but we want to have the deserialized key in both branches.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct AuthRequestContext {
-    pubkey: VerifyingKey,
-    bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
-}
-
-smlang::statemachine!(
-    name: UserAgent,
-    derive_states: [Debug],
-    custom_error: false,
-    transitions: {
-        *Init + AuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) / auth_request_context =  ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext),
-        ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) + ReceivedBootstrapToken = Authenticated,
-
-        ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) + SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) / move_challenge = WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext),
-
-        WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedGoodSolution = Authenticated,
-        WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedBadSolution = AuthError, // block further transitions, but connection should close anyway
-    }
-);
-
-pub struct DummyContext;
-impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
-    #[allow(missing_docs)]
-    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
-    fn move_challenge(
-        &mut self,
-        state_data: &AuthRequestContext,
-        event_data: ChallengeContext,
-    ) -> Result<ChallengeContext, ()> {
-        Ok(event_data)
-    }
-
-    #[allow(missing_docs)]
-    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
-    fn auth_request_context(
-        &mut self,
-        event_data: AuthRequestContext,
-    ) -> Result<AuthRequestContext, ()> {
-        Ok(event_data)
-    }
-}
 
 #[derive(Actor)]
 pub struct UserAgentActor {
     db: db::DatabasePool,
-    bootstapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
+    actors: GlobalActors,
     state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
-    tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
+    // will be used in future
+    _tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
 }
 
 impl UserAgentActor {
@@ -104,22 +55,22 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
     ) -> Self {
         Self {
             db: context.db.clone(),
-            bootstapper: context.bootstrapper.clone(),
+            actors: context.actors.clone(),
             state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
-            tx,
+            _tx: tx,
         }
     }
 
-    pub(crate) fn new_manual(
+    pub fn new_manual(
         db: db::DatabasePool,
-        bootstapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
+        actors: GlobalActors,
         tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
     ) -> Self {
         Self {
             db,
-            bootstapper,
+            actors,
             state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
-            tx,
+            _tx: tx,
         }
     }
 
@@ -137,7 +88,8 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
         token: String,
     ) -> Result<UserAgentResponse, Status> {
         let token_ok: bool = self
-            .bootstapper
+            .actors
+            .bootstrapper
             .ask(ConsumeToken { token })
             .await
             .map_err(|e| {
@@ -165,14 +117,14 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
 
         self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBootstrapToken)?;
 
-        Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(auth::AuthOk {})))
+        Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
     }
 
     async fn auth_with_challenge(&mut self, pubkey: VerifyingKey, pubkey_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Output {
         let nonce: Option<i32> = {
             let mut db_conn = self.db.get().await.to_status()?;
             db_conn
-                .transaction(|conn| {
+                .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
                     Box::pin(async move {
                         let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
                             .filter(
@@ -259,26 +211,133 @@ fn auth_response(payload: ServerAuthPayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
     }
 }
 
+fn unseal_response(payload: UserAgentResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
+    UserAgentResponse {
+        payload: Some(payload),
+    }
+}
+
 #[messages]
 impl UserAgentActor {
-    #[message(ctx)]
+    #[message]
-    pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_request(
+    pub async fn handle_unseal_request(&mut self, req: UnsealStart) -> Output {
-        &mut self,
+        let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
-        req: AuthChallengeRequest,
+        let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
-        ctx: &mut Context<Self, Output>,
+
-    ) -> Output {
+        let client_pubkey_bytes: [u8; 32] = req
+            .client_pubkey
+            .try_into()
+            .map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("client_pubkey must be 32 bytes"))?;
+
+        let client_public_key = PublicKey::from(client_pubkey_bytes);
+
+        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
+            secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
+            client_public_key,
+        }))?;
+
+        Ok(unseal_response(
+            UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(UnsealStartResponse {
+                server_pubkey: public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+            }),
+        ))
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(&mut self, req: UnsealEncryptedKey) -> Output {
+        let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
+            error!("Received unseal encrypted key in invalid state");
+            return Err(Status::failed_precondition(
+                "Invalid state for unseal encrypted key",
+            ));
+        };
+        let ephemeral_secret = {
+            let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
+            let secret = secret_lock.take();
+            match secret {
+                Some(secret) => secret,
+                None => {
+                    drop(secret_lock);
+                    error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
+                    self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                    return Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
+                        UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
+                    )));
+                }
+            }
+        };
+
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(&req.nonce);
+
+        let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&unseal_context.client_public_key);
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
+
+        let mut seal_key_buffer = MemSafe::new(req.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
+
+        let decryption_result = {
+            let mut write_handle = seal_key_buffer.write().unwrap();
+            let write_handle = write_handle.deref_mut();
+            cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, &req.associated_data, write_handle)
+        };
+
+        match decryption_result {
+            Ok(_) => {
+                match self
+                    .actors
+                    .key_holder
+                    .ask(TryUnseal {
+                        seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
+                    })
+                    .await
+                {
+                    Ok(_) => {
+                        info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
+                        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
+                        Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
+                            UnsealResult::Success.into(),
+                        )))
+                    }
+                    Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
+                        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                        Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
+                            UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
+                        )))
+                    }
+                    Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
+                        error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
+                        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                        Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
+                            UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
+                        )))
+                    }
+                    Err(err) => {
+                        error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
+                        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                        Err(Status::internal("Vault is not available"))
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt unseal key");
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                Ok(unseal_response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
+                    UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
+                )))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_request(&mut self, req: AuthChallengeRequest) -> Output {
         let pubkey = req.pubkey.as_array().ok_or(Status::invalid_argument(
             "Expected pubkey to have specific length",
         ))?;
-        let pubkey = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey).map_err(|err| {
+        let pubkey = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey).map_err(|_err| {
             error!(?pubkey, "Failed to convert to VerifyingKey");
             Status::invalid_argument("Failed to convert pubkey to VerifyingKey")
         })?;
 
-        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::AuthRequest(AuthRequestContext {
+        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::AuthRequest)?;
-            pubkey,
-            bootstrap_token: req.bootstrap_token.clone(),
-        }))?;
 
         match req.bootstrap_token {
             Some(token) => self.auth_with_bootstrap_token(pubkey, token).await,
@@ -286,11 +345,10 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
         }
     }
 
-    #[message(ctx)]
+    #[message]
     pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_solution(
         &mut self,
         solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
-        ctx: &mut Context<Self, Output>,
     ) -> Output {
         let (valid, challenge_context) = self.verify_challenge_solution(&solution)?;
 
@@ -300,7 +358,7 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
                 "Client provided valid solution to authentication challenge"
             );
             self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedGoodSolution)?;
-            Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(auth::AuthOk {})))
+            Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
         } else {
             error!("Client provided invalid solution to authentication challenge");
             self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBadSolution)?;
@@ -308,67 +366,3 @@ impl UserAgentActor {
         }
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use arbiter_proto::proto::{
-        UserAgentResponse,
-        auth::{AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk},
-        user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
-    };
-    use kameo::actor::Spawn;
-
-    use crate::{
-        actors::user_agent::HandleAuthChallengeRequest, context::bootstrap::BootstrapActor, db,
-    };
-
-    use super::UserAgentActor;
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    #[test_log::test]
-    pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        // explicitly not installing any user_agent pubkeys
-        let bootstrapper = BootstrapActor::new(&db).await.unwrap(); // this will create bootstrap token
-        let token = bootstrapper.get_token().unwrap();
-
-        let bootstrapper_ref = BootstrapActor::spawn(bootstrapper);
-        let user_agent = UserAgentActor::new_manual(
-            db.clone(),
-            bootstrapper_ref,
-            tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0, // dummy channel, we won't actually send responses in this test
-        );
-        let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
-
-        // simulate client sending auth request with bootstrap token
-        let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
-        let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
-
-        let result = user_agent_ref
-            .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
-                req: AuthChallengeRequest {
-                    pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
-                    bootstrap_token: Some(token),
-                },
-            })
-            .await
-            .expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
-
-        // auth succeeded
-        assert_eq!(
-            result,
-            UserAgentResponse {
-                payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
-                    arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
-                        payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
-                            AuthOk {},
-                        )),
-                    },
-                )),
-            }
-        );
-    }
-}
-
-mod transport;
-pub(crate) use transport::handle_user_agent;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/state.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+
+use arbiter_proto::proto::auth::AuthChallenge;
+use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
+use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
+
+/// Context for state machine with validated key and sent challenge
+/// Challenge is then transformed to bytes using shared function and verified
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct ChallengeContext {
+    pub challenge: AuthChallenge,
+    pub key: VerifyingKey,
+}
+
+pub struct UnsealContext {
+    pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
+    pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
+}
+
+smlang::statemachine!(
+    name: UserAgent,
+    custom_error: false,
+    transitions: {
+        *Init + AuthRequest =  ReceivedAuthRequest,
+        ReceivedAuthRequest + ReceivedBootstrapToken = Idle,
+
+        ReceivedAuthRequest + SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) / move_challenge = WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext),
+
+        WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedGoodSolution = Idle,
+        WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedBadSolution = AuthError, // block further transitions, but connection should close anyway
+
+        Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
+        WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
+        WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
+    }
+);
+
+pub struct DummyContext;
+impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
+    #[allow(missing_docs)]
+    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
+    fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
+        Ok(event_data)
+    }
+
+    #[allow(missing_docs)]
+    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
+    fn move_challenge(&mut self, event_data: ChallengeContext) -> Result<ChallengeContext, ()> {
+        Ok(event_data)
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/transport.rs

@@ -1,13 +1,8 @@
 use super::UserAgentActor;
 use arbiter_proto::proto::{
     UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
-    auth::{
+    auth::{ClientMessage as ClientAuthMessage, client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload},
-        self, AuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk, ClientMessage,
-        ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage, client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
-        server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
-    },
     user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
-    user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
 };
 use futures::StreamExt;
 use kameo::{
@@ -19,7 +14,10 @@ use tonic::Status;
 use tracing::error;
 
 use crate::{
-    actors::user_agent::{HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution},
+    actors::user_agent::{
+        HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey,
+        HandleUnsealRequest,
+    },
     context::ServerContext,
 };
 
@@ -59,28 +57,30 @@ async fn process_message(
         Status::invalid_argument("Expected message with payload")
     })?;
 
-    let UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientMessage {
+    match msg {
-        payload: Some(client_message),
+        UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientAuthMessage {
-    }) = msg
+            payload: Some(ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(req)),
-    else {
+        }) => actor
-        error!(
-            actor = "useragent",
-            "Received unexpected message type during authentication"
-        );
-        return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
-            "Expected AuthMessage with ClientMessage payload",
-        ));
-    };
-
-    match client_message {
-        ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(req) => actor
             .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest { req })
             .await
             .map_err(into_status),
-        ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(solution) => actor
+        UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientAuthMessage {
+            payload: Some(ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(solution)),
+        }) => actor
             .ask(HandleAuthChallengeSolution { solution })
             .await
             .map_err(into_status),
+        UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealStart(unseal_start) => actor
+            .ask(HandleUnsealRequest { req: unseal_start })
+            .await
+            .map_err(into_status),
+        UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealEncryptedKey(unseal_encrypted_key) => actor
+            .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
+                req: unseal_encrypted_key,
+            })
+            .await
+            .map_err(into_status),
+        _ => Err(Status::invalid_argument("Expected message with payload")),
     }
 }
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context.rs

@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use std::time::Duration;
-
-use diesel::OptionalExtension as _;
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
-use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
-use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
-use miette::Diagnostic;
-use rand::rngs::StdRng;
-use secrecy::{ExposeSecret, SecretBox};
-use smlang::statemachine;
-use thiserror::Error;
-use tokio::sync::{watch, RwLock};
-use zeroize::Zeroizing;
-
-use crate::{
-    context::{
-        bootstrap::{BootstrapActor, generate_token},
-        lease::LeaseHandler,
-        tls::{RotationState, RotationTask, TlsDataRaw, TlsManager},
-    },
-    db::{
-        self,
-        models::ArbiterSetting,
-        schema::{self, arbiter_settings},
-    },
-};
-
-pub(crate) mod bootstrap;
-pub(crate) mod lease;
-pub(crate) mod tls;
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum InitError {
-    #[error("Database setup failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_setup))]
-    DatabaseSetup(#[from] db::DatabaseSetupError),
-
-    #[error("Connection acquire failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_pool))]
-    DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
-
-    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_query))]
-    DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-
-    #[error("TLS initialization failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::tls_init))]
-    Tls(#[from] tls::TlsInitError),
-
-    #[error("Bootstrap token generation failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::bootstrap_token))]
-    BootstrapToken(#[from] bootstrap::BootstrapError),
-
-    #[error("I/O Error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::io))]
-    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
-}
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum UnsealError {
-    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::database_pool))]
-    Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
-
-    #[error("Query error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::database_query))]
-    Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-
-    #[error("Decryption failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::decryption))]
-    DecryptionFailed(#[from] crate::crypto::CryptoError),
-
-    #[error("Invalid state for unseal")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::invalid_state))]
-    InvalidState,
-
-    #[error("Missing salt in database")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::missing_salt))]
-    MissingSalt,
-
-    #[error("No root key configured in database")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::unseal::no_root_key))]
-    NoRootKey,
-}
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum SealError {
-    #[error("Invalid state for seal")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::seal::invalid_state))]
-    InvalidState,
-}
-
-/// Secure in-memory storage for root encryption key
-///
-/// Uses `secrecy` crate for automatic zeroization on drop to prevent key material
-/// from remaining in memory after use. SecretBox provides heap-allocated secret
-/// storage that implements Send + Sync for safe use in async contexts.
-pub struct KeyStorage {
-    /// 32-byte root key protected by SecretBox
-    key: SecretBox<[u8; 32]>,
-}
-
-impl KeyStorage {
-    /// Create new KeyStorage from a 32-byte root key
-    pub fn new(key: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            key: SecretBox::new(Box::new(key)),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Access the key for cryptographic operations
-    pub fn key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
-        self.key.expose_secret()
-    }
-}
-
-// Drop автоматически реализован через secrecy::Zeroize
-// который зануляет память при освобождении
-
-statemachine! {
-    name: Server,
-    transitions: {
-        *NotBootstrapped + Bootstrapped = Sealed,
-        Sealed + Unsealed(KeyStorage) / move_key = Ready(KeyStorage),
-        Ready(KeyStorage) + Sealed / dispose_key = Sealed,
-    }
-}
-pub struct _Context;
-impl ServerStateMachineContext for _Context {
-    /// Move key from unseal event into Ready state
-    fn move_key(&mut self, event_data: KeyStorage) -> Result<KeyStorage, ()> {
-        // Просто перемещаем KeyStorage из event в state
-        // Без клонирования - event data consumed
-        Ok(event_data)
-    }
-
-    /// Securely dispose of key when sealing
-    #[allow(missing_docs)]
-    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
-    fn dispose_key(&mut self, _state_data: &KeyStorage) -> Result<(), ()> {
-        // KeyStorage будет dropped после state transition
-        // secrecy::Zeroize зануляет память автоматически
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-pub(crate) struct _ServerContextInner {
-    pub db: db::DatabasePool,
-    pub state: RwLock<ServerStateMachine<_Context>>,
-    pub rng: StdRng,
-    pub tls: Arc<TlsManager>,
-    pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
-    pub rotation_state: RwLock<RotationState>,
-    pub rotation_acks: Arc<RwLock<HashSet<VerifyingKey>>>,
-    pub user_agent_leases: LeaseHandler<VerifyingKey>,
-    pub client_leases: LeaseHandler<VerifyingKey>,
-}
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub(crate) struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
-
-impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
-    type Target = _ServerContextInner;
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        &self.0
-    }
-}
-
-impl ServerContext {
-    /// Check if all active clients have acknowledged the rotation
-    pub async fn check_rotation_ready(&self) -> bool {
-        // TODO: Implement proper rotation readiness check
-        // For now, return false as placeholder
-        false
-    }
-
-    async fn load_tls(
-        db: &db::DatabasePool,
-        settings: Option<&ArbiterSetting>,
-    ) -> Result<TlsManager, InitError> {
-        match settings {
-            Some(s) if s.current_cert_id.is_some() => {
-                // Load active certificate from tls_certificates table
-                Ok(TlsManager::load_from_db(
-                    db.clone(),
-                    s.current_cert_id.unwrap(),
-                )
-                .await?)
-            }
-            Some(s) => {
-                // Legacy migration: extract validity and save to new table
-                let tls_data_raw = TlsDataRaw {
-                    cert: s.cert.clone(),
-                    key: s.cert_key.clone(),
-                };
-
-                // For legacy certificates, use current time as not_before
-                // and current time + 90 days as not_after
-                let not_before = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
-                let not_after = not_before + (90 * 24 * 60 * 60); // 90 days
-
-                Ok(TlsManager::new_from_legacy(
-                    db.clone(),
-                    tls_data_raw,
-                    not_before,
-                    not_after,
-                )
-                .await?)
-            }
-            None => {
-                // First startup - generate new certificate
-                Ok(TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
-        let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-        let rng = rand::make_rng();
-
-        let settings = arbiter_settings::table
-            .first::<ArbiterSetting>(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .optional()?;
-
-        drop(conn);
-
-        // Load TLS manager
-        let tls = Self::load_tls(&db, settings.as_ref()).await?;
-
-        // Load rotation state from database
-        let rotation_state = RotationState::load_from_db(&db)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_or(RotationState::Normal);
-
-        let bootstrap_token = generate_token().await?;
-
-        let mut state = ServerStateMachine::new(_Context);
-
-        if let Some(settings) = &settings
-            && settings.root_key_id.is_some()
-        {
-            // TODO: pass the encrypted root key to the state machine and let it handle decryption and transition to Sealed
-            let _ = state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped);
-        }
-
-        // Create shutdown channel for rotation task
-        let (rotation_shutdown_tx, rotation_shutdown_rx) = watch::channel(false);
-
-        // Initialize bootstrap actor
-        let bootstrapper = BootstrapActor::spawn(BootstrapActor::new(&db).await?);
-
-        let context = Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
-            db: db.clone(),
-            rng,
-            tls: Arc::new(tls),
-            state: RwLock::new(state),
-            bootstrapper,
-            rotation_state: RwLock::new(rotation_state),
-            rotation_acks: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashSet::new())),
-            user_agent_leases: Default::default(),
-            client_leases: Default::default(),
-        });
-
-        Ok(Self(context))
-    }
-
-    /// Unseal vault with password
-    pub async fn unseal(&self, password: &str) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
-        use crate::crypto::root_key;
-        use diesel::QueryDsl as _;
-
-        // 1. Get root_key_id from settings
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
-        let settings: db::models::ArbiterSetting = schema::arbiter_settings::table
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let root_key_id = settings.root_key_id.ok_or(UnsealError::NoRootKey)?;
-
-        // 2. Load encrypted root key
-        let encrypted: db::models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
-            .find(root_key_id)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let salt = encrypted
-            .argon2_salt
-            .as_ref()
-            .ok_or(UnsealError::MissingSalt)?;
-
-        drop(conn);
-
-        // 3. Decrypt root key using password
-        let root_key = root_key::decrypt_root_key(&encrypted, password, salt)
-            .map_err(UnsealError::DecryptionFailed)?;
-
-        // 4. Create secure storage
-        let key_storage = KeyStorage::new(root_key);
-
-        // 5. Transition state machine
-        let mut state = self.state.write().await;
-        state
-            .process_event(ServerEvents::Unsealed(key_storage))
-            .map_err(|_| UnsealError::InvalidState)?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Seal the server (lock the key)
-    pub async fn seal(&self) -> Result<(), SealError> {
-        let mut state = self.state.write().await;
-        state
-            .process_event(ServerEvents::Sealed)
-            .map_err(|_| SealError::InvalidState)?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_keystorage_creation() {
-        let key = [42u8; 32];
-        let storage = KeyStorage::new(key);
-        assert_eq!(storage.key()[0], 42);
-        assert_eq!(storage.key().len(), 32);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_keystorage_zeroization() {
-        let key = [99u8; 32];
-        {
-            let _storage = KeyStorage::new(key);
-            // storage будет dropped здесь
-        }
-        // После drop SecretBox должен зануляеть память
-        // Это проверяется автоматически через secrecy::Zeroize
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_state_machine_transitions() {
-        let mut state = ServerStateMachine::new(_Context);
-
-        // Начальное состояние
-        assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::NotBootstrapped));
-
-        // Bootstrapped transition
-        state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::Sealed));
-
-        // Unsealed transition
-        let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([1u8; 32]);
-        state
-            .process_event(ServerEvents::Unsealed(key_storage))
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::Ready(_)));
-
-        // Sealed transition
-        state.process_event(ServerEvents::Sealed).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(state.state(), &ServerStates::Sealed));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_move_key_callback() {
-        let mut ctx = _Context;
-        let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([7u8; 32]);
-        let result = ctx.move_key(key_storage);
-        assert!(result.is_ok());
-        assert_eq!(result.unwrap().key()[0], 7);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_dispose_key_callback() {
-        let mut ctx = _Context;
-        let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([13u8; 32]);
-        let result = ctx.dispose_key(&key_storage);
-        assert!(result.is_ok());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_invalid_state_transitions() {
-        let mut state = ServerStateMachine::new(_Context);
-
-        // Попытка unseal без bootstrap
-        let key_storage = KeyStorage::new([1u8; 32]);
-        let result = state.process_event(ServerEvents::Unsealed(key_storage));
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-
-        // Правильный путь
-        state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped).unwrap();
-
-        // Попытка повторного bootstrap
-        let result = state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped);
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/lease.rs

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use dashmap::DashSet;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Default)]
-struct LeaseStorage<T: Eq + std::hash::Hash>(Arc<DashSet<T>>);
-
-// A lease that automatically releases the item when dropped
-pub struct Lease<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> {
-    item: T,
-    storage: LeaseStorage<T>,
-}
-impl<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> Drop for Lease<T> {
-    fn drop(&mut self) {
-        self.storage.0.remove(&self.item);
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Default)]
-pub struct LeaseHandler<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> {
-    storage: LeaseStorage<T>,
-}
-
-impl<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> LeaseHandler<T> {
-    pub fn new() -> Self {
-        Self {
-            storage: LeaseStorage(Arc::new(DashSet::new())),
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn acquire(&self, item: T) -> Result<Lease<T>, ()> {
-        if self.storage.0.insert(item.clone()) {
-            Ok(Lease {
-                item,
-                storage: self.storage.clone(),
-            })
-        } else {
-            Err(())
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Get all currently leased items
-    pub fn get_all(&self) -> Vec<T> {
-        self.storage.0.iter().map(|entry| entry.clone()).collect()
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use diesel::OptionalExtension as _;
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
+use miette::Diagnostic;
+use thiserror::Error;
+
+use crate::{
+    actors::GlobalActors,
+    context::tls::{TlsDataRaw, TlsManager},
+    db::{self, models::ArbiterSetting, schema::arbiter_settings},
+};
+
+pub mod tls;
+
+#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
+pub enum InitError {
+    #[error("Database setup failed: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_setup))]
+    DatabaseSetup(#[from] db::DatabaseSetupError),
+
+    #[error("Connection acquire failed: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_pool))]
+    DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
+
+    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_query))]
+    DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+
+    #[error("TLS initialization failed: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::tls_init))]
+    Tls(#[from] tls::TlsInitError),
+
+    #[error("Actor spawn failed: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::actor_spawn))]
+    ActorSpawn(#[from] crate::actors::SpawnError),
+
+    #[error("I/O Error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::io))]
+    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
+}
+
+pub struct _ServerContextInner {
+    pub db: db::DatabasePool,
+    pub tls: TlsManager,
+    pub actors: GlobalActors,
+}
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
+
+impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
+    type Target = _ServerContextInner;
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        &self.0
+    }
+}
+
+impl ServerContext {
+    async fn load_tls(
+        db: &mut db::DatabaseConnection,
+        settings: Option<&ArbiterSetting>,
+    ) -> Result<TlsManager, InitError> {
+        match &settings {
+            Some(settings) => {
+                let tls_data_raw = TlsDataRaw {
+                    cert: settings.cert.clone(),
+                    key: settings.cert_key.clone(),
+                };
+
+                Ok(TlsManager::new(Some(tls_data_raw)).await?)
+            }
+            None => {
+                let tls = TlsManager::new(None).await?;
+                let tls_data_raw = tls.bytes();
+
+                diesel::insert_into(arbiter_settings::table)
+                    .values(&ArbiterSetting {
+                        id: 1,
+                        root_key_id: None,
+                        cert_key: tls_data_raw.key,
+                        cert: tls_data_raw.cert,
+                    })
+                    .execute(db)
+                    .await?;
+
+                Ok(tls)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
+        let mut conn = db.get().await?;
+
+        let settings = arbiter_settings::table
+            .first::<ArbiterSetting>(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .optional()?;
+
+        let tls = Self::load_tls(&mut conn, settings.as_ref()).await?;
+
+        drop(conn);
+
+        Ok(Self(Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
+            actors: GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await?,
+            db,
+            tls,
+        })))
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/tls.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+use std::string::FromUtf8Error;
+
+use miette::Diagnostic;
+use rcgen::{Certificate, KeyPair};
+use rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer;
+use thiserror::Error;
+
+#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
+pub enum TlsInitError {
+    #[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_generation))]
+    KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
+
+    #[error("Key invalid format: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_invalid_format))]
+    KeyInvalidFormat(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
+
+    #[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")]
+    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_deserialization))]
+    KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
+}
+
+pub struct TlsData {
+    pub cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
+    pub keypair: KeyPair,
+}
+
+pub struct TlsDataRaw {
+    pub cert: Vec<u8>,
+    pub key: Vec<u8>,
+}
+impl TlsDataRaw {
+    pub fn serialize(cert: &TlsData) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            cert: cert.cert.as_ref().to_vec(),
+            key: cert.keypair.serialize_pem().as_bytes().to_vec(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn deserialize(&self) -> Result<TlsData, TlsInitError> {
+        let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&self.cert).into_owned();
+
+        let key = String::from_utf8(self.key.clone()).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyInvalidFormat)?;
+
+        let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&key).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
+
+        Ok(TlsData { cert, keypair })
+    }
+}
+
+fn generate_cert(key: &KeyPair) -> Result<Certificate, rcgen::Error> {
+    let params =
+        rcgen::CertificateParams::new(vec!["arbiter.local".to_string(), "localhost".to_string()])?;
+
+    params.self_signed(key)
+}
+
+// TODO: Implement cert rotation
+pub struct TlsManager {
+    data: TlsData,
+}
+
+impl TlsManager {
+    pub async fn new(data: Option<TlsDataRaw>) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
+        match data {
+            Some(raw) => {
+                let tls_data = raw.deserialize()?;
+                Ok(Self { data: tls_data })
+            }
+            None => {
+                let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
+                let cert = generate_cert(&keypair)?;
+                let tls_data = TlsData {
+                    cert: cert.der().clone(),
+                    keypair,
+                };
+                Ok(Self { data: tls_data })
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn bytes(&self) -> TlsDataRaw {
+        TlsDataRaw::serialize(&self.data)
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/tls/mod.rs

@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use std::string::FromUtf8Error;
-
-use miette::Diagnostic;
-use rcgen::{Certificate, KeyPair};
-use rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer;
-use thiserror::Error;
-use tokio::sync::RwLock;
-
-use crate::db;
-
-pub mod rotation;
-
-pub use rotation::{RotationError, RotationState, RotationTask};
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-#[expect(clippy::enum_variant_names)]
-pub enum TlsInitError {
-    #[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_generation))]
-    KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
-
-    #[error("Key invalid format: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_invalid_format))]
-    KeyInvalidFormat(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
-
-    #[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_deserialization))]
-    KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
-}
-
-pub struct TlsData {
-    pub cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
-    pub keypair: KeyPair,
-}
-
-pub struct TlsDataRaw {
-    pub cert: Vec<u8>,
-    pub key: Vec<u8>,
-}
-impl TlsDataRaw {
-    pub fn serialize(cert: &TlsData) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            cert: cert.cert.as_ref().to_vec(),
-            key: cert.keypair.serialize_pem().as_bytes().to_vec(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn deserialize(&self) -> Result<TlsData, TlsInitError> {
-        let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&self.cert).into_owned();
-
-        let key =
-            String::from_utf8(self.key.clone()).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyInvalidFormat)?;
-
-        let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&key).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
-
-        Ok(TlsData { cert, keypair })
-    }
-}
-
-/// Metadata about a certificate including validity period
-pub struct CertificateMetadata {
-    pub cert_id: i32,
-    pub cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
-    pub keypair: Arc<KeyPair>,
-    pub not_before: i64,
-    pub not_after: i64,
-    pub created_at: i64,
-}
-
-pub(crate) fn generate_cert(key: &KeyPair) -> Result<(Certificate, i64, i64), rcgen::Error> {
-    let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(vec![
-        "arbiter.local".to_string(),
-        "localhost".to_string(),
-    ])?;
-
-    // Set validity period: 90 days from now
-    let not_before = chrono::Utc::now();
-    let not_after = not_before + chrono::Duration::days(90);
-
-    // Note: rcgen doesn't directly expose not_before/not_after setting in all versions
-    // For now, we'll generate the cert and track validity separately
-    let cert = params.self_signed(key)?;
-
-    Ok((cert, not_before.timestamp(), not_after.timestamp()))
-}
-
-// Certificate rotation enabled
-pub(crate) struct TlsManager {
-    // Current active certificate (atomic replacement via RwLock)
-    current_cert: Arc<RwLock<CertificateMetadata>>,
-
-    // Database pool for persistence
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-}
-
-impl TlsManager {
-    /// Create new TlsManager with a generated certificate
-    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
-        let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
-        let (cert, not_before, not_after) = generate_cert(&keypair)?;
-        let cert_der = cert.der().clone();
-
-        // For initial creation, cert_id will be set after DB insert
-        let metadata = CertificateMetadata {
-            cert_id: 0, // Temporary, will be updated after DB insert
-            cert: cert_der,
-            keypair: Arc::new(keypair),
-            not_before,
-            not_after,
-            created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
-        };
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            current_cert: Arc::new(RwLock::new(metadata)),
-            db,
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Load TlsManager from database with specific certificate ID
-    pub async fn load_from_db(db: db::DatabasePool, cert_id: i32) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
-        // TODO: Load certificate from database
-        // For now, return error - will be implemented when database access is ready
-        Err(TlsInitError::KeyGeneration(rcgen::Error::CouldNotParseCertificate))
-    }
-
-    /// Create from legacy TlsDataRaw format
-    pub async fn new_from_legacy(
-        db: db::DatabasePool,
-        data: TlsDataRaw,
-        not_before: i64,
-        not_after: i64,
-    ) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
-        let tls_data = data.deserialize()?;
-
-        let metadata = CertificateMetadata {
-            cert_id: 1, // Legacy certificate gets ID 1
-            cert: tls_data.cert,
-            keypair: Arc::new(tls_data.keypair),
-            not_before,
-            not_after,
-            created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
-        };
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            current_cert: Arc::new(RwLock::new(metadata)),
-            db,
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Get current certificate data
-    pub async fn get_certificate(&self) -> (CertificateDer<'static>, Arc<KeyPair>) {
-        let cert = self.current_cert.read().await;
-        (cert.cert.clone(), cert.keypair.clone())
-    }
-
-    /// Replace certificate atomically
-    pub async fn replace_certificate(&self, new_cert: CertificateMetadata) -> Result<(), TlsInitError> {
-        let mut cert = self.current_cert.write().await;
-        *cert = new_cert;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Check if certificate is expiring soon
-    pub async fn check_expiration(&self, threshold_secs: i64) -> bool {
-        let cert = self.current_cert.read().await;
-        let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
-        cert.not_after - now < threshold_secs
-    }
-
-    /// Get certificate metadata for rotation logic
-    pub async fn get_certificate_metadata(&self) -> CertificateMetadata {
-        let cert = self.current_cert.read().await;
-        CertificateMetadata {
-            cert_id: cert.cert_id,
-            cert: cert.cert.clone(),
-            keypair: cert.keypair.clone(),
-            not_before: cert.not_before,
-            not_after: cert.not_after,
-            created_at: cert.created_at,
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn bytes(&self) -> TlsDataRaw {
-        // This method is now async-compatible but we keep sync interface
-        // TODO: Make this async or remove if not needed
-        TlsDataRaw {
-            cert: vec![],
-            key: vec![],
-        }
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/tls/rotation.rs

@@ -1,552 +0,0 @@
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use std::time::Duration;
-
-use diesel::prelude::*;
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
-use miette::Diagnostic;
-use rcgen::KeyPair;
-use thiserror::Error;
-use tokio::sync::watch;
-use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
-
-use crate::context::ServerContext;
-use crate::db::models::{NewRotationClientAck, NewTlsCertificate, NewTlsRotationHistory};
-use crate::db::schema::{rotation_client_acks, tls_certificates, tls_rotation_history, tls_rotation_state};
-use crate::db::DatabasePool;
-
-use super::{generate_cert, CertificateMetadata, TlsInitError};
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum RotationError {
-    #[error("Certificate generation failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::cert_generation))]
-    CertGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
-
-    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::database))]
-    Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-
-    #[error("TLS initialization error: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::tls_init))]
-    TlsInit(#[from] TlsInitError),
-
-    #[error("Invalid rotation state: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::invalid_state))]
-    InvalidState(String),
-
-    #[error("No active certificate found")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::rotation::no_active_cert))]
-    NoActiveCertificate,
-}
-
-/// Состояние процесса ротации сертификата
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub enum RotationState {
-    /// Обычная работа, ротация не требуется
-    Normal,
-
-    /// Ротация инициирована, новый сертификат сгенерирован
-    RotationInitiated {
-        initiated_at: i64,
-        new_cert_id: i32,
-    },
-
-    /// Ожидание подтверждений (ACKs) от клиентов
-    WaitingForAcks {
-        new_cert_id: i32,
-        initiated_at: i64,
-        timeout_at: i64,
-    },
-
-    /// Все ACK получены или таймаут истёк, готов к ротации
-    ReadyToRotate {
-        new_cert_id: i32,
-    },
-}
-
-impl RotationState {
-    /// Загрузить состояние из базы данных
-    pub async fn load_from_db(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_rotation_state::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        let state_record: (i32, String, Option<i32>, Option<i32>, Option<i32>) =
-            tls_rotation_state
-                .select((id, state, new_cert_id, initiated_at, timeout_at))
-                .filter(id.eq(1))
-                .first(&mut conn)
-                .await?;
-
-        let rotation_state = match state_record.1.as_str() {
-            "normal" => RotationState::Normal,
-            "initiated" => {
-                let cert_id = state_record.2.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("Initiated state missing new_cert_id".into())
-                })?;
-                let init_at = state_record.3.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("Initiated state missing initiated_at".into())
-                })?;
-                RotationState::RotationInitiated {
-                    initiated_at: init_at as i64,
-                    new_cert_id: cert_id,
-                }
-            }
-            "waiting_acks" => {
-                let cert_id = state_record.2.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("WaitingForAcks state missing new_cert_id".into())
-                })?;
-                let init_at = state_record.3.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("WaitingForAcks state missing initiated_at".into())
-                })?;
-                let timeout = state_record.4.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("WaitingForAcks state missing timeout_at".into())
-                })?;
-                RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
-                    new_cert_id: cert_id,
-                    initiated_at: init_at as i64,
-                    timeout_at: timeout as i64,
-                }
-            }
-            "ready" => {
-                let cert_id = state_record.2.ok_or_else(|| {
-                    RotationError::InvalidState("Ready state missing new_cert_id".into())
-                })?;
-                RotationState::ReadyToRotate {
-                    new_cert_id: cert_id,
-                }
-            }
-            other => {
-                return Err(RotationError::InvalidState(format!(
-                    "Unknown state: {}",
-                    other
-                )))
-            }
-        };
-
-        Ok(rotation_state)
-    }
-
-    /// Сохранить состояние в базу данных
-    pub async fn save_to_db(&self, db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_rotation_state::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        let (state_str, cert_id, init_at, timeout) = match self {
-            RotationState::Normal => ("normal", None, None, None),
-            RotationState::RotationInitiated {
-                initiated_at: init,
-                new_cert_id: cert,
-            } => ("initiated", Some(*cert), Some(*init as i32), None),
-            RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
-                new_cert_id: cert,
-                initiated_at: init,
-                timeout_at: timeout_val,
-            } => (
-                "waiting_acks",
-                Some(*cert),
-                Some(*init as i32),
-                Some(*timeout_val as i32),
-            ),
-            RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id: cert } => ("ready", Some(*cert), None, None),
-        };
-
-        diesel::update(tls_rotation_state.filter(id.eq(1)))
-            .set((
-                state.eq(state_str),
-                new_cert_id.eq(cert_id),
-                initiated_at.eq(init_at),
-                timeout_at.eq(timeout),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-/// Фоновый таск для автоматической ротации сертификатов
-pub struct RotationTask {
-    context: Arc<crate::context::_ServerContextInner>,
-    check_interval: Duration,
-    rotation_threshold: Duration,
-    ack_timeout: Duration,
-    shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
-}
-
-impl RotationTask {
-    /// Создать новый rotation task
-    pub fn new(
-        context: Arc<crate::context::_ServerContextInner>,
-        check_interval: Duration,
-        rotation_threshold: Duration,
-        ack_timeout: Duration,
-        shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
-    ) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            context,
-            check_interval,
-            rotation_threshold,
-            ack_timeout,
-            shutdown_rx,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Запустить фоновый таск мониторинга и ротации
-    pub async fn run(mut self) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        info!("Starting TLS certificate rotation task");
-
-        loop {
-            tokio::select! {
-                _ = tokio::time::sleep(self.check_interval) => {
-                    if let Err(e) = self.check_and_process().await {
-                        error!("Rotation task error: {}", e);
-                    }
-                }
-                _ = self.shutdown_rx.changed() => {
-                    info!("Rotation task shutting down");
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Проверить текущее состояние и выполнить необходимые действия
-    async fn check_and_process(&self) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        let state = self.context.rotation_state.read().await.clone();
-
-        match state {
-            RotationState::Normal => {
-                // Проверить, нужна ли ротация
-                self.check_expiration_and_initiate().await?;
-            }
-            RotationState::RotationInitiated { new_cert_id, .. } => {
-                // Автоматически перейти в WaitingForAcks
-                self.transition_to_waiting_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
-            }
-            RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
-                new_cert_id,
-                timeout_at,
-                ..
-            } => {
-                self.handle_waiting_for_acks(new_cert_id, timeout_at).await?;
-            }
-            RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id } => {
-                self.execute_rotation(new_cert_id).await?;
-            }
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Проверить срок действия сертификата и инициировать ротацию если нужно
-    async fn check_expiration_and_initiate(&self) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        let threshold_secs = self.rotation_threshold.as_secs() as i64;
-
-        if self.context.tls.check_expiration(threshold_secs).await {
-            info!("Certificate expiring soon, initiating rotation");
-            self.initiate_rotation().await?;
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Инициировать ротацию: сгенерировать новый сертификат и сохранить в БД
-    pub async fn initiate_rotation(&self) -> Result<i32, RotationError> {
-        info!("Initiating certificate rotation");
-
-        // 1. Генерация нового сертификата
-        let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
-        let (cert, not_before, not_after) = generate_cert(&keypair)?;
-        let cert_der = cert.der().clone();
-
-        // 2. Сохранение в БД (is_active = false, пока не активирован)
-        let new_cert_id = self
-            .save_new_certificate(&cert_der, &keypair, not_before, not_after)
-            .await?;
-
-        info!(new_cert_id, "New certificate generated and saved");
-
-        // 3. Обновление rotation_state
-        let new_state = RotationState::RotationInitiated {
-            initiated_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
-            new_cert_id,
-        };
-        *self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
-        new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
-
-        // 4. Логирование в audit trail
-        self.log_rotation_event(new_cert_id, "rotation_initiated", None)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(new_cert_id)
-    }
-
-    /// Перейти в состояние WaitingForAcks и разослать уведомления
-    async fn transition_to_waiting_acks(&self, new_cert_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        info!(new_cert_id, "Transitioning to WaitingForAcks state");
-
-        let initiated_at = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
-        let timeout_at = initiated_at + self.ack_timeout.as_secs() as i64;
-
-        // Обновить состояние
-        let new_state = RotationState::WaitingForAcks {
-            new_cert_id,
-            initiated_at,
-            timeout_at,
-        };
-        *self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
-        new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
-
-        // TODO: Broadcast уведомлений клиентам
-        // self.broadcast_rotation_notification(new_cert_id, timeout_at).await?;
-
-        info!(timeout_at, "Rotation notifications sent, waiting for ACKs");
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Обработка состояния WaitingForAcks: проверка ACKs и таймаута
-    async fn handle_waiting_for_acks(
-        &self,
-        new_cert_id: i32,
-        timeout_at: i64,
-    ) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
-
-        // Проверить таймаут
-        if now > timeout_at {
-            let missing = self.get_missing_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
-            warn!(
-                missing_count = missing.len(),
-                "Rotation ACK timeout reached, proceeding with rotation"
-            );
-
-            // Переход в ReadyToRotate
-            let new_state = RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id };
-            *self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
-            new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
-
-            self.log_rotation_event(
-                new_cert_id,
-                "timeout",
-                Some(format!("Missing ACKs from {} clients", missing.len())),
-            )
-            .await?;
-
-            return Ok(());
-        }
-
-        // Проверить, все ли ACK получены
-        let missing = self.get_missing_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
-
-        if missing.is_empty() {
-            info!("All clients acknowledged, ready to rotate");
-
-            let new_state = RotationState::ReadyToRotate { new_cert_id };
-            *self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
-            new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
-
-            self.log_rotation_event(new_cert_id, "acks_complete", None)
-                .await?;
-        } else {
-            let time_remaining = timeout_at - now;
-            debug!(
-                missing_count = missing.len(),
-                time_remaining,
-                "Waiting for rotation ACKs"
-            );
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Выполнить атомарную ротацию сертификата
-    async fn execute_rotation(&self, new_cert_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        info!(new_cert_id, "Executing certificate rotation");
-
-        // 1. Загрузить новый сертификат из БД
-        let new_cert = self.load_certificate(new_cert_id).await?;
-
-        // 2. Атомарная замена в TlsManager
-        self.context
-            .tls
-            .replace_certificate(new_cert)
-            .await
-            .map_err(RotationError::TlsInit)?;
-
-        // 3. Обновить БД: старый is_active=false, новый is_active=true
-        self.activate_certificate(new_cert_id).await?;
-
-        // 4. TODO: Отключить всех клиентов
-        // self.disconnect_all_clients().await?;
-
-        // 5. Очистить rotation_state
-        let new_state = RotationState::Normal;
-        *self.context.rotation_state.write().await = new_state.clone();
-        new_state.save_to_db(&self.context.db).await?;
-
-        // 6. Очистить ACKs
-        self.context.rotation_acks.write().await.clear();
-        self.clear_rotation_acks(new_cert_id).await?;
-
-        // 7. Логирование
-        self.log_rotation_event(new_cert_id, "activated", None)
-            .await?;
-
-        info!(new_cert_id, "Certificate rotation completed successfully");
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Сохранить новый сертификат в БД
-    async fn save_new_certificate(
-        &self,
-        cert_der: &[u8],
-        keypair: &KeyPair,
-        cert_not_before: i64,
-        cert_not_after: i64,
-    ) -> Result<i32, RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_certificates::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        let new_cert = NewTlsCertificate {
-            cert: cert_der.to_vec(),
-            cert_key: keypair.serialize_pem().as_bytes().to_vec(),
-            not_before: cert_not_before as i32,
-            not_after: cert_not_after as i32,
-            is_active: false,
-        };
-
-        diesel::insert_into(tls_certificates)
-            .values(&new_cert)
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        // Получить ID последней вставленной записи
-        let cert_id: i32 = diesel::select(diesel::dsl::sql::<diesel::sql_types::Integer>(
-            "last_insert_rowid()",
-        ))
-        .first(&mut conn)
-        .await?;
-
-        self.log_rotation_event(cert_id, "created", None).await?;
-
-        Ok(cert_id)
-    }
-
-    /// Загрузить сертификат из БД
-    async fn load_certificate(&self, cert_id: i32) -> Result<CertificateMetadata, RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_certificates::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        let cert_record: (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, i32, i32, i32) = tls_certificates
-            .select((cert, cert_key, not_before, not_after, created_at))
-            .filter(id.eq(cert_id))
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let cert_der = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(cert_record.0);
-        let key_pem = String::from_utf8(cert_record.1)
-            .map_err(|e| RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Invalid key encoding: {}", e)))?;
-        let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&key_pem)?;
-
-        Ok(CertificateMetadata {
-            cert_id,
-            cert: cert_der,
-            keypair: Arc::new(keypair),
-            not_before: cert_record.2 as i64,
-            not_after: cert_record.3 as i64,
-            created_at: cert_record.4 as i64,
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Активировать сертификат (установить is_active=true)
-    async fn activate_certificate(&self, cert_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_certificates::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        // Деактивировать все сертификаты
-        diesel::update(tls_certificates)
-            .set(is_active.eq(false))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        // Активировать новый
-        diesel::update(tls_certificates.filter(id.eq(cert_id)))
-            .set(is_active.eq(true))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Получить список клиентов, которые ещё не отправили ACK
-    async fn get_missing_acks(&self, rotation_id: i32) -> Result<Vec<VerifyingKey>, RotationError> {
-        // TODO: Реализовать получение списка всех активных клиентов
-        // и вычитание тех, кто уже отправил ACK
-
-        // Пока возвращаем пустой список
-        Ok(Vec::new())
-    }
-
-    /// Очистить ACKs для данной ротации из БД
-    async fn clear_rotation_acks(&self, rotation_id: i32) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::rotation_client_acks::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        diesel::delete(rotation_client_acks.filter(rotation_id.eq(rotation_id)))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Записать событие в audit trail
-    async fn log_rotation_event(
-        &self,
-        history_cert_id: i32,
-        history_event_type: &str,
-        history_details: Option<String>,
-    ) -> Result<(), RotationError> {
-        use crate::db::schema::tls_rotation_history::dsl::*;
-
-        let mut conn = self.context.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-            RotationError::InvalidState(format!("Failed to get DB connection: {}", e))
-        })?;
-
-        let new_history = NewTlsRotationHistory {
-            cert_id: history_cert_id,
-            event_type: history_event_type.to_string(),
-            details: history_details,
-        };
-
-        diesel::insert_into(tls_rotation_history)
-            .values(&new_history)
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/aead.rs

@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-use chacha20poly1305::{
-    aead::{Aead, KeyInit},
-    ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce,
-};
-
-use super::CryptoError;
-
-/// Encrypt plaintext with AEAD (ChaCha20Poly1305)
-///
-/// Returns (ciphertext, tag) on success
-pub fn encrypt(
-    plaintext: &[u8],
-    key: &[u8; 32],
-    nonce: &[u8; 12],
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
-    let cipher_key = Key::from_slice(key);
-    let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(cipher_key);
-    let nonce_array = Nonce::from_slice(nonce);
-
-    cipher
-        .encrypt(nonce_array, plaintext)
-        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::AeadEncryption(e.to_string()))
-}
-
-/// Decrypt ciphertext with AEAD (ChaCha20Poly1305)
-///
-/// The ciphertext должен содержать tag (последние 16 bytes)
-pub fn decrypt(
-    ciphertext_with_tag: &[u8],
-    key: &[u8; 32],
-    nonce: &[u8; 12],
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
-    let cipher_key = Key::from_slice(key);
-    let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(cipher_key);
-    let nonce_array = Nonce::from_slice(nonce);
-
-    cipher
-        .decrypt(nonce_array, ciphertext_with_tag)
-        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::AeadDecryption(e.to_string()))
-}
-
-/// Generate nonce from counter
-///
-/// Converts i32 counter to 12-byte nonce (big-endian encoding)
-pub fn nonce_from_counter(counter: i32) -> [u8; 12] {
-    let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
-    nonce[8..12].copy_from_slice(&counter.to_be_bytes());
-    nonce
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_aead_encrypt_decrypt_round_trip() {
-        let plaintext = b"Hello, World! This is a secret message.";
-        let key = [42u8; 32];
-        let nonce = nonce_from_counter(1);
-
-        // Encrypt
-        let ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Verify ciphertext is different from plaintext
-        assert_ne!(ciphertext.as_slice(), plaintext);
-
-        // Decrypt
-        let decrypted = decrypt(&ciphertext, &key, &nonce).expect("Decryption failed");
-
-        // Verify round-trip
-        assert_eq!(decrypted.as_slice(), plaintext);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_aead_decrypt_with_wrong_key() {
-        let plaintext = b"Secret data";
-        let key = [1u8; 32];
-        let wrong_key = [2u8; 32];
-        let nonce = nonce_from_counter(1);
-
-        let ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Attempt decrypt with wrong key
-        let result = decrypt(&ciphertext, &wrong_key, &nonce);
-
-        // Should fail
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_aead_decrypt_with_wrong_nonce() {
-        let plaintext = b"Secret data";
-        let key = [1u8; 32];
-        let nonce = nonce_from_counter(1);
-        let wrong_nonce = nonce_from_counter(2);
-
-        let ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Attempt decrypt with wrong nonce
-        let result = decrypt(&ciphertext, &key, &wrong_nonce);
-
-        // Should fail
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_nonce_generation_from_counter() {
-        let nonce1 = nonce_from_counter(1);
-        let nonce2 = nonce_from_counter(2);
-        let nonce_max = nonce_from_counter(i32::MAX);
-
-        // Verify nonces are different
-        assert_ne!(nonce1, nonce2);
-
-        // Verify nonce format (first 8 bytes should be zero, last 4 contain counter)
-        assert_eq!(&nonce1[0..8], &[0u8; 8]);
-        assert_eq!(&nonce1[8..12], &1i32.to_be_bytes());
-
-        assert_eq!(&nonce_max[8..12], &i32::MAX.to_be_bytes());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_aead_tampered_ciphertext() {
-        let plaintext = b"Important message";
-        let key = [7u8; 32];
-        let nonce = nonce_from_counter(5);
-
-        let mut ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, &key, &nonce).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Tamper with ciphertext (flip a bit)
-        if let Some(byte) = ciphertext.get_mut(5) {
-            *byte ^= 0x01;
-        }
-
-        // Attempt decrypt - should fail due to authentication tag mismatch
-        let result = decrypt(&ciphertext, &key, &nonce);
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-pub mod aead;
-pub mod root_key;
-
-use miette::Diagnostic;
-use thiserror::Error;
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
-pub enum CryptoError {
-    #[error("AEAD encryption failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::aead_encryption))]
-    AeadEncryption(String),
-
-    #[error("AEAD decryption failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::aead_decryption))]
-    AeadDecryption(String),
-
-    #[error("Key derivation failed: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::key_derivation))]
-    KeyDerivation(String),
-
-    #[error("Invalid nonce: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::invalid_nonce))]
-    InvalidNonce(String),
-
-    #[error("Invalid key format: {0}")]
-    #[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::crypto::invalid_key))]
-    InvalidKey(String),
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/root_key.rs

@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
-use argon2::{
-    password_hash::{rand_core::OsRng, PasswordHasher, SaltString},
-    Argon2, PasswordHash, PasswordVerifier,
-};
-
-use crate::db::models::AeadEncrypted;
-
-use super::{aead, CryptoError};
-
-/// Encrypt root key with user password
-///
-/// Uses Argon2id for password derivation and ChaCha20Poly1305 for encryption
-pub fn encrypt_root_key(
-    root_key: &[u8; 32],
-    password: &str,
-    nonce_counter: i32,
-) -> Result<(AeadEncrypted, String), CryptoError> {
-    // Derive key from password using Argon2
-    let (derived_key, salt) = derive_key_from_password(password)?;
-
-    // Generate nonce from counter
-    let nonce = aead::nonce_from_counter(nonce_counter);
-
-    // Encrypt root key
-    let ciphertext_with_tag = aead::encrypt(root_key, &derived_key, &nonce)?;
-
-    // Extract tag (last 16 bytes)
-    let tag_start = ciphertext_with_tag
-        .len()
-        .checked_sub(16)
-        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::AeadEncryption("Ciphertext too short".into()))?;
-
-    let ciphertext = ciphertext_with_tag[..tag_start].to_vec();
-    let tag = ciphertext_with_tag[tag_start..].to_vec();
-
-    let aead_encrypted = AeadEncrypted {
-        id: 1, // Will be set by database
-        current_nonce: nonce_counter,
-        ciphertext,
-        tag,
-        schema_version: 1, // Current version
-        argon2_salt: Some(salt.clone()),
-    };
-
-    Ok((aead_encrypted, salt))
-}
-
-/// Decrypt root key with user password
-///
-/// Verifies password hash and decrypts using ChaCha20Poly1305
-pub fn decrypt_root_key(
-    encrypted: &AeadEncrypted,
-    password: &str,
-    salt: &str,
-) -> Result<[u8; 32], CryptoError> {
-    // Derive key from password using stored salt
-    let derived_key = derive_key_with_salt(password, salt)?;
-
-    // Generate nonce from counter
-    let nonce = aead::nonce_from_counter(encrypted.current_nonce);
-
-    // Reconstruct ciphertext with tag
-    let mut ciphertext_with_tag = encrypted.ciphertext.clone();
-    ciphertext_with_tag.extend_from_slice(&encrypted.tag);
-
-    // Decrypt
-    let plaintext = aead::decrypt(&ciphertext_with_tag, &derived_key, &nonce)?;
-
-    // Verify length
-    if plaintext.len() != 32 {
-        return Err(CryptoError::InvalidKey(format!(
-            "Expected 32 bytes, got {}",
-            plaintext.len()
-        )));
-    }
-
-    // Convert to fixed-size array
-    let mut root_key = [0u8; 32];
-    root_key.copy_from_slice(&plaintext);
-
-    Ok(root_key)
-}
-
-/// Derive 32-byte key from password using Argon2id
-///
-/// Generates new random salt and returns (derived_key, salt_string)
-fn derive_key_from_password(password: &str) -> Result<([u8; 32], String), CryptoError> {
-    let salt = SaltString::generate(&mut OsRng);
-
-    let argon2 = Argon2::default();
-
-    let password_hash = argon2
-        .hash_password(password.as_bytes(), &salt)
-        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyDerivation(e.to_string()))?;
-
-    // Extract hash output (32 bytes)
-    let hash_output = password_hash
-        .hash
-        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::KeyDerivation("No hash output".into()))?;
-
-    let hash_bytes = hash_output.as_bytes();
-
-    if hash_bytes.len() != 32 {
-        return Err(CryptoError::KeyDerivation(format!(
-            "Expected 32 bytes, got {}",
-            hash_bytes.len()
-        )));
-    }
-
-    let mut key = [0u8; 32];
-    key.copy_from_slice(hash_bytes);
-
-    Ok((key, salt.to_string()))
-}
-
-/// Derive 32-byte key from password using existing salt
-fn derive_key_with_salt(password: &str, salt_str: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], CryptoError> {
-    let argon2 = Argon2::default();
-
-    // Parse salt
-    let salt =
-        SaltString::from_b64(salt_str).map_err(|e| CryptoError::InvalidKey(e.to_string()))?;
-
-    let password_hash = argon2
-        .hash_password(password.as_bytes(), &salt)
-        .map_err(|e| CryptoError::KeyDerivation(e.to_string()))?;
-
-    // Extract hash output
-    let hash_output = password_hash
-        .hash
-        .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::KeyDerivation("No hash output".into()))?;
-
-    let hash_bytes = hash_output.as_bytes();
-
-    if hash_bytes.len() != 32 {
-        return Err(CryptoError::KeyDerivation(format!(
-            "Expected 32 bytes, got {}",
-            hash_bytes.len()
-        )));
-    }
-
-    let mut key = [0u8; 32];
-    key.copy_from_slice(hash_bytes);
-
-    Ok(key)
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_root_key_encrypt_decrypt_round_trip() {
-        let root_key = [42u8; 32];
-        let password = "super_secret_password_123";
-        let nonce_counter = 1;
-
-        // Encrypt
-        let (encrypted, salt) =
-            encrypt_root_key(&root_key, password, nonce_counter).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Verify structure
-        assert_eq!(encrypted.current_nonce, nonce_counter);
-        assert_eq!(encrypted.schema_version, 1);
-        assert_eq!(encrypted.tag.len(), 16); // AEAD tag size
-
-        // Decrypt
-        let decrypted =
-            decrypt_root_key(&encrypted, password, &salt).expect("Decryption failed");
-
-        // Verify round-trip
-        assert_eq!(decrypted, root_key);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_decrypt_with_wrong_password() {
-        let root_key = [99u8; 32];
-        let correct_password = "correct_password";
-        let wrong_password = "wrong_password";
-        let nonce_counter = 1;
-
-        // Encrypt with correct password
-        let (encrypted, salt) =
-            encrypt_root_key(&root_key, correct_password, nonce_counter).expect("Encryption failed");
-
-        // Attempt decrypt with wrong password
-        let result = decrypt_root_key(&encrypted, wrong_password, &salt);
-
-        // Should fail due to authentication tag mismatch
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_password_derivation_different_salts() {
-        let password = "same_password";
-
-        // Derive key twice - should produce different salts
-        let (key1, salt1) = derive_key_from_password(password).expect("Derivation 1 failed");
-        let (key2, salt2) = derive_key_from_password(password).expect("Derivation 2 failed");
-
-        // Salts should be different (randomly generated)
-        assert_ne!(salt1, salt2);
-
-        // Keys should be different (due to different salts)
-        assert_ne!(key1, key2);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_password_derivation_with_same_salt() {
-        let password = "test_password";
-
-        // Generate key and salt
-        let (key1, salt) = derive_key_from_password(password).expect("Derivation failed");
-
-        // Derive key again with same salt
-        let key2 = derive_key_with_salt(password, &salt).expect("Re-derivation failed");
-
-        // Keys should be identical
-        assert_eq!(key1, key2);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_different_nonce_produces_different_ciphertext() {
-        let root_key = [77u8; 32];
-        let password = "password123";
-
-        let (encrypted1, salt1) = encrypt_root_key(&root_key, password, 1).expect("Encryption 1 failed");
-        let (encrypted2, salt2) = encrypt_root_key(&root_key, password, 2).expect("Encryption 2 failed");
-
-        // Different nonces should produce different ciphertexts
-        assert_ne!(encrypted1.ciphertext, encrypted2.ciphertext);
-
-        // But both should decrypt correctly
-        let decrypted1 = decrypt_root_key(&encrypted1, password, &salt1).expect("Decryption 1 failed");
-        let decrypted2 = decrypt_root_key(&encrypted2, password, &salt2).expect("Decryption 2 failed");
-
-        assert_eq!(decrypted1, root_key);
-        assert_eq!(decrypted2, root_key);
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/mod.rs

@@ -1,12 +1,7 @@
-use std::sync::Arc;
+use diesel::{Connection as _, SqliteConnection, connection::SimpleConnection as _};
-
-use diesel::{
-    Connection as _, SqliteConnection,
-    connection::{SimpleConnection as _, TransactionManager},
-};
 use diesel_async::{
     AsyncConnection, SimpleAsyncConnection,
-    pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig, RecyclingMethod},
+    pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig},
     sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
 };
 use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
@@ -134,7 +129,6 @@ pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetu
     Ok(pool)
 }
 
-#[cfg(test)]
 pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
     use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/models.rs

@@ -1,33 +1,58 @@
 #![allow(unused)]
 #![allow(clippy::all)]
 
-use crate::db::schema::{self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings};
+use crate::db::schema::{self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, root_key_history};
 use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
+use restructed::Models;
 
 pub mod types {
     use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
     pub struct SqliteTimestamp(DateTime<Utc>);
 }
 
-#[derive(Queryable, Selectable, Debug, Insertable)]
+#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
+#[view(
+    NewAeadEncrypted,
+    derive(Insertable),
+    omit(id),
+    attributes_with = "deriveless"
+)]
 #[diesel(table_name = aead_encrypted, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
 pub struct AeadEncrypted {
     pub id: i32,
-    pub current_nonce: i32,
     pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
     pub tag: Vec<u8>,
+    pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>,
     pub schema_version: i32,
-    pub argon2_salt: Option<String>,
+    pub associated_root_key_id: i32, // references root_key_history.id
+    pub created_at: i32,
+}
+
+#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
+#[diesel(table_name = root_key_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
+#[view(
+    NewRootKeyHistory,
+    derive(Insertable),
+    omit(id),
+    attributes_with = "deriveless"
+)]
+pub struct RootKeyHistory {
+    pub id: i32,
+    pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
+    pub tag: Vec<u8>,
+    pub root_key_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
+    pub data_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
+    pub schema_version: i32,
+    pub salt: Vec<u8>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
 #[diesel(table_name = arbiter_settings, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
 pub struct ArbiterSetting {
     pub id: i32,
-    pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references aead_encrypted.id
+    pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references root_key_history.id
     pub cert_key: Vec<u8>,
     pub cert: Vec<u8>,
-    pub current_cert_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_certificates.id
 }
 
 #[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
@@ -49,70 +74,3 @@ pub struct UseragentClient {
     pub created_at: i32,
     pub updated_at: i32,
 }
-
-// TLS Certificate Rotation Models
-
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_certificates, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct TlsCertificate {
-    pub id: i32,
-    pub cert: Vec<u8>,
-    pub cert_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub not_before: i32,
-    pub not_after: i32,
-    pub created_at: i32,
-    pub is_active: bool,
-}
-
-#[derive(Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_certificates)]
-pub struct NewTlsCertificate {
-    pub cert: Vec<u8>,
-    pub cert_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub not_before: i32,
-    pub not_after: i32,
-    pub is_active: bool,
-}
-
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_rotation_state, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct TlsRotationState {
-    pub id: i32,
-    pub state: String,
-    pub new_cert_id: Option<i32>,
-    pub initiated_at: Option<i32>,
-    pub timeout_at: Option<i32>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::rotation_client_acks, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct RotationClientAck {
-    pub rotation_id: i32,
-    pub client_key: String,
-    pub ack_received_at: i32,
-}
-
-#[derive(Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::rotation_client_acks)]
-pub struct NewRotationClientAck {
-    pub rotation_id: i32,
-    pub client_key: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_rotation_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct TlsRotationHistory {
-    pub id: i32,
-    pub cert_id: i32,
-    pub event_type: String,
-    pub timestamp: i32,
-    pub details: Option<String>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::tls_rotation_history)]
-pub struct NewTlsRotationHistory {
-    pub cert_id: i32,
-    pub event_type: String,
-    pub details: Option<String>,
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/schema.rs

@@ -3,11 +3,12 @@
 diesel::table! {
     aead_encrypted (id) {
         id -> Integer,
-        current_nonce -> Integer,
+        current_nonce -> Binary,
         ciphertext -> Binary,
         tag -> Binary,
         schema_version -> Integer,
-        argon2_salt -> Nullable<Text>,
+        associated_root_key_id -> Integer,
+        created_at -> Integer,
     }
 }
 
@@ -17,7 +18,6 @@ diesel::table! {
         root_key_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
         cert_key -> Binary,
         cert -> Binary,
-        current_cert_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
     }
 }
 
@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ diesel::table! {
     }
 }
 
+diesel::table! {
+    root_key_history (id) {
+        id -> Integer,
+        root_key_encryption_nonce -> Binary,
+        data_encryption_nonce -> Binary,
+        ciphertext -> Binary,
+        tag -> Binary,
+        schema_version -> Integer,
+        salt -> Binary,
+    }
+}
+
 diesel::table! {
     useragent_client (id) {
         id -> Integer,
@@ -41,59 +53,13 @@ diesel::table! {
     }
 }
 
-diesel::table! {
+diesel::joinable!(aead_encrypted -> root_key_history (associated_root_key_id));
-    tls_certificates (id) {
+diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> root_key_history (root_key_id));
-        id -> Integer,
-        cert -> Binary,
-        cert_key -> Binary,
-        not_before -> Integer,
-        not_after -> Integer,
-        created_at -> Integer,
-        is_active -> Bool,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    tls_rotation_state (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        state -> Text,
-        new_cert_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
-        initiated_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
-        timeout_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    rotation_client_acks (rotation_id, client_key) {
-        rotation_id -> Integer,
-        client_key -> Text,
-        ack_received_at -> Integer,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::table! {
-    tls_rotation_history (id) {
-        id -> Integer,
-        cert_id -> Integer,
-        event_type -> Text,
-        timestamp -> Integer,
-        details -> Nullable<Text>,
-    }
-}
-
-diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> aead_encrypted (root_key_id));
-diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_certificates (current_cert_id));
-diesel::joinable!(tls_rotation_state -> tls_certificates (new_cert_id));
-diesel::joinable!(rotation_client_acks -> tls_certificates (rotation_id));
-diesel::joinable!(tls_rotation_history -> tls_certificates (cert_id));
 
 diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
     aead_encrypted,
     arbiter_settings,
     program_client,
+    root_key_history,
     useragent_client,
-    tls_certificates,
-    tls_rotation_state,
-    rotation_client_acks,
-    tls_rotation_history,
 );

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/errors.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ pub trait GrpcStatusExt<T> {
 
 impl<T> GrpcStatusExt<T> for Result<T, diesel::result::Error> {
     fn to_status(self) -> Result<T, Status> {
-         self.map_err(|e| {
+        self.map_err(|e| {
             error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
             Status::internal("Database error")
         })

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
-#![allow(unused)]
+#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
-
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
 use arbiter_proto::{
     proto::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse, UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
     transport::BiStream,
@@ -18,9 +15,8 @@ use crate::{
 };
 
 pub mod actors;
-mod context;
+pub mod context;
-mod crypto;
+pub mod db;
-mod db;
 mod errors;
 
 const DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE: usize = 1000;
@@ -29,6 +25,12 @@ pub struct Server {
     context: ServerContext,
 }
 
+impl Server {
+    pub fn new(context: ServerContext) -> Self {
+        Self { context }
+    }
+}
+
 #[async_trait]
 impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for Server {
     type UserAgentStream = ReceiverStream<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/main.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+use arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterServiceServer;
+use arbiter_server::{Server, context::ServerContext, db};
+use tracing::info;
+
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> miette::Result<()> {
+    tracing_subscriber::fmt()
+        .with_env_filter(
+            tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("info")),
+        )
+        .init();
+
+    info!("Starting arbiter server");
+
+    info!("Initializing database");
+    let db = db::create_pool(None).await?;
+    info!("Database ready");
+
+    info!("Initializing server context");
+    let context = ServerContext::new(db).await?;
+    info!("Server context ready");
+
+    let addr = "[::1]:50051".parse().expect("valid address");
+    info!(%addr, "Starting gRPC server");
+
+    tonic::transport::Server::builder()
+        .add_service(ArbiterServiceServer::new(Server::new(context)))
+        .serve(addr)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| miette::miette!("gRPC server error: {e}"))?;
+
+    unreachable!("gRPC server should run indefinitely");
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/common/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
+    db::{self, models::ArbiterSetting, schema},
+};
+use diesel::{QueryDsl, insert_into};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+
+pub async fn seed_settings(pool: &db::DatabasePool) {
+    let mut conn = pool.get().await.unwrap();
+    insert_into(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
+        .values(&ArbiterSetting {
+            id: 1,
+            root_key_id: None,
+            cert_key: vec![],
+            cert: vec![],
+        })
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+}
+
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
+    seed_settings(db).await;
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    actor
+        .bootstrap(MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    actor
+}
+
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub async fn root_key_history_id(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> i32 {
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let id = schema::arbiter_settings::table
+        .select(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
+        .first::<Option<i32>>(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    id.expect("root_key_id should be set after bootstrap")
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+mod common;
+
+#[path = "keyholder/concurrency.rs"]
+mod concurrency;
+#[path = "keyholder/lifecycle.rs"]
+mod lifecycle;
+#[path = "keyholder/storage.rs"]
+mod storage;

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/concurrency.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
+
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Error, KeyHolder},
+    db::{self, models, schema},
+};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::sql_query};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+use tokio::task::JoinSet;
+
+use crate::common;
+
+async fn write_concurrently(
+    actor: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    prefix: &'static str,
+    count: usize,
+) -> Vec<(i32, Vec<u8>)> {
+    let mut set = JoinSet::new();
+    for i in 0..count {
+        let actor = actor.clone();
+        set.spawn(async move {
+            let plaintext = format!("{prefix}-{i}").into_bytes();
+            let id = actor
+                .ask(CreateNew {
+                    plaintext: MemSafe::new(plaintext.clone()).unwrap(),
+                })
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            (id, plaintext)
+        });
+    }
+
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(count);
+    while let Some(res) = set.join_next().await {
+        out.push(res.unwrap());
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn concurrent_create_new_no_duplicate_nonces_() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
+
+    let writes = write_concurrently(actor, "nonce-unique", 32).await;
+    assert_eq!(writes.len(), 32);
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let rows: Vec<models::AeadEncrypted> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+        .load(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(rows.len(), 32);
+
+    let nonces: Vec<&Vec<u8>> = rows.iter().map(|r| &r.current_nonce).collect();
+    let unique: HashSet<&Vec<u8>> = nonces.iter().copied().collect();
+    assert_eq!(nonces.len(), unique.len(), "all nonces must be unique");
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn concurrent_create_new_root_nonce_never_moves_backward() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
+
+    write_concurrently(actor, "root-max", 24).await;
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let rows: Vec<models::AeadEncrypted> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+        .load(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let max_nonce = rows
+        .iter()
+        .map(|r| r.current_nonce.clone())
+        .max()
+        .expect("at least one row");
+
+    let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
+        .select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, max_nonce);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let root_key_history_id = common::root_key_history_id(&db).await;
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let before_count: i64 = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let before_root_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
+        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
+        .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    sql_query(
+        "CREATE TRIGGER fail_aead_insert BEFORE INSERT ON aead_encrypted BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'forced test failure'); END;",
+    )
+    .execute(&mut conn)
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+    drop(conn);
+
+    let err = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(b"should fail".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::DatabaseTransaction(_)));
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    sql_query("DROP TRIGGER fail_aead_insert;")
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let after_count: i64 = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        before_count, after_count,
+        "failed insert must not create row"
+    );
+
+    let after_root_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
+        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
+        .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        after_root_nonce > before_root_nonce,
+        "current behavior allows nonce gap on failed insert"
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
+
+    let writes = write_concurrently(actor, "roundtrip", 40).await;
+    let expected: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>> = writes.into_iter().collect();
+
+    let mut decryptor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    decryptor
+        .try_unseal(MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    for (id, plaintext) in expected {
+        let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/lifecycle.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::keyholder::{Error, KeyHolder},
+    db::{self, models, schema},
+};
+use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+
+use crate::common;
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_bootstrap() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    common::seed_settings(&db).await;
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+
+    let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
+    actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
+        .select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(row.schema_version, 1);
+    assert_eq!(
+        row.tag,
+        arbiter_server::actors::keyholder::encryption::v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG
+    );
+    assert!(!row.ciphertext.is_empty());
+    assert!(!row.salt.is_empty());
+    assert_eq!(
+        row.data_encryption_nonce,
+        arbiter_server::actors::keyholder::encryption::v1::Nonce::default().to_vec()
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let seal_key2 = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
+    let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::AlreadyBootstrapped));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    common::seed_settings(&db).await;
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
+
+    let err = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(b"data".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    common::seed_settings(&db).await;
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
+
+    let err = actor.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    drop(actor);
+
+    let mut actor2 = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
+    let err = actor2.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
+    let aead_id = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    drop(actor);
+
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
+    actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
+
+    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let plaintext = b"important data";
+    let aead_id = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    drop(actor);
+
+    let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+
+    let bad_key = MemSafe::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec()).unwrap();
+    let err = actor.try_unseal(bad_key).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidKey));
+
+    let good_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
+    actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
+
+    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/storage.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+use std::collections::HashSet;
+
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::keyholder::{Error, encryption::v1},
+    db::{self, models, schema},
+};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+
+use crate::common;
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
+    let aead_id = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let err = actor.decrypt(9999).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotFound));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let plaintext = b"same content";
+    let id1 = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let id2 = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let row1: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id1))
+        .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let row2: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id2))
+        .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_ne!(row1.ciphertext, row2.ciphertext);
+
+    let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1).await.unwrap();
+    let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(*d1.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+    assert_eq!(*d2.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn test_nonce_never_reused() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+
+    let n = 5;
+    for i in 0..n {
+        actor
+            .create_new(MemSafe::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()).unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let rows: Vec<models::AeadEncrypted> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+        .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+        .load(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(rows.len(), n);
+
+    let nonces: Vec<&Vec<u8>> = rows.iter().map(|r| &r.current_nonce).collect();
+    let unique: HashSet<&Vec<u8>> = nonces.iter().copied().collect();
+    assert_eq!(nonces.len(), unique.len(), "all nonces must be unique");
+
+    for (i, row) in rows.iter().enumerate() {
+        let mut expected = v1::Nonce::default();
+        for _ in 0..=i {
+            expected.increment();
+        }
+        assert_eq!(row.current_nonce, expected.to_vec(), "nonce {i} mismatch");
+    }
+
+    let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
+        .select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+        .first(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let last_nonce = &rows.last().unwrap().current_nonce;
+    assert_eq!(&root_row.data_encryption_nonce, last_nonce);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let root_key_history_id = common::root_key_history_id(&db).await;
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    update(
+        schema::root_key_history::table
+            .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id)),
+    )
+    .set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(vec![1, 2, 3]))
+    .execute(&mut conn)
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+    drop(conn);
+
+    let err = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(b"must fail".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
+
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let id = actor
+        .create_new(MemSafe::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()).unwrap())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    update(schema::aead_encrypted::table.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id)))
+        .set(schema::aead_encrypted::current_nonce.eq(vec![7, 8]))
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    drop(conn);
+
+    let err = actor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+mod common;
+
+#[path = "user_agent/auth.rs"]
+mod auth;
+#[path = "user_agent/unseal.rs"]
+mod unseal;

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent/auth.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+use arbiter_proto::proto::{
+    UserAgentResponse,
+    auth::{self, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk},
+    user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
+};
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::{
+        GlobalActors,
+        bootstrap::GetToken,
+        user_agent::{HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution, UserAgentActor},
+    },
+    db::{self, schema},
+};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, insert_into};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
+use kameo::actor::Spawn;
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
+    let db =db::create_test_pool().await;
+    crate::common::seed_settings(&db).await;
+
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
+    let user_agent =
+        UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0);
+    let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
+
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
+
+    let result = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
+            req: AuthChallengeRequest {
+                pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
+                bootstrap_token: Some(token),
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        result,
+        UserAgentResponse {
+            payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
+                arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
+                    payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
+                        AuthOk {},
+                    )),
+                },
+            )),
+        }
+    );
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+    let stored_pubkey: Vec<u8> = schema::useragent_client::table
+        .select(schema::useragent_client::public_key)
+        .first::<Vec<u8>>(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(stored_pubkey, new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec());
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    crate::common::seed_settings(&db).await;
+
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let user_agent =
+        UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0);
+    let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
+
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
+
+    let result = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
+            req: AuthChallengeRequest {
+                pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
+                bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_string()),
+            },
+        })
+        .await;
+
+    match result {
+        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(status)) => {
+            assert_eq!(status.code(), tonic::Code::InvalidArgument);
+            insta::assert_debug_snapshot!(status, @r#"
+                Status {
+                    code: InvalidArgument,
+                    message: "Invalid bootstrap token",
+                    source: None,
+                }
+                "#);
+        }
+        Err(other) => {
+            panic!("Expected SendError::HandlerError, got {other:?}");
+        }
+        Ok(_) => {
+            panic!("Expected error due to invalid bootstrap token, but got success");
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    crate::common::seed_settings(&db).await;
+
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let user_agent =
+        UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0);
+    let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
+
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
+
+    {
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+        insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
+            .values(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()))
+            .execute(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    let result = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
+            req: AuthChallengeRequest {
+                pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
+                bootstrap_token: None,
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
+
+    let UserAgentResponse {
+        payload:
+            Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
+                payload:
+                    Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthChallenge(challenge)),
+            })),
+    } = result
+    else {
+        panic!("Expected auth challenge response, got {result:?}");
+    };
+
+    let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(&challenge);
+    let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
+    let serialized_signature = signature.to_bytes().to_vec();
+
+    let result = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleAuthChallengeSolution {
+            solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution {
+                signature: serialized_signature,
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        result,
+        UserAgentResponse {
+            payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
+                arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
+                    payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
+                        AuthOk {},
+                    )),
+                },
+            )),
+        }
+    );
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent/unseal.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+use arbiter_proto::proto::{
+    UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult, UnsealStart, auth::AuthChallengeRequest,
+    user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
+};
+use arbiter_server::{
+    actors::{
+        GlobalActors,
+        bootstrap::GetToken,
+        keyholder::{Bootstrap, Seal},
+        user_agent::{
+            HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleUnsealEncryptedKey, HandleUnsealRequest,
+            UserAgentActor,
+        },
+    },
+    db,
+};
+use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
+use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
+use memsafe::MemSafe;
+use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
+
+async fn setup_authenticated_user_agent(
+    seal_key: &[u8],
+) -> (arbiter_server::db::DatabasePool, ActorRef<UserAgentActor>) {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    crate::common::seed_settings(&db).await;
+
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    actors
+        .key_holder
+        .ask(Bootstrap {
+            seal_key_raw: MemSafe::new(seal_key.to_vec()).unwrap(),
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    actors.key_holder.ask(Seal).await.unwrap();
+
+    let user_agent =
+        UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors.clone(), tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0);
+    let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
+
+    let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
+    let auth_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
+            req: AuthChallengeRequest {
+                pubkey: auth_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
+                bootstrap_token: Some(token),
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    (db, user_agent_ref)
+}
+
+async fn client_dh_encrypt(
+    user_agent_ref: &ActorRef<UserAgentActor>,
+    key_to_send: &[u8],
+) -> UnsealEncryptedKey {
+    let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
+    let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
+
+    let response = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
+            req: UnsealStart {
+                client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let server_pubkey = match response.payload.unwrap() {
+        UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(resp) => resp.server_pubkey,
+        other => panic!("Expected UnsealStartResponse, got {other:?}"),
+    };
+    let server_public = PublicKey::from(<[u8; 32]>::try_from(server_pubkey.as_slice()).unwrap());
+
+    let shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&server_public);
+    let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
+    let nonce = XNonce::from([0u8; 24]);
+    let associated_data = b"unseal";
+    let mut ciphertext = key_to_send.to_vec();
+    cipher
+        .encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut ciphertext)
+        .unwrap();
+
+    UnsealEncryptedKey {
+        nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
+        ciphertext,
+        associated_data: associated_data.to_vec(),
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_unseal_success() {
+    let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
+    let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(seal_key).await;
+
+    let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, seal_key).await;
+
+    let response = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        response.payload.unwrap(),
+        UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::Success.into()),
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
+    let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(b"correct-key").await;
+
+    let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, b"wrong-key").await;
+
+    let response = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        response.payload.unwrap(),
+        UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
+    let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(b"test-key").await;
+
+    let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
+    let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
+
+    user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
+            req: UnsealStart {
+                client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let response = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey {
+            req: UnsealEncryptedKey {
+                nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
+                ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
+                associated_data: vec![],
+            },
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        response.payload.unwrap(),
+        UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_unseal_start_without_auth_fails() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    crate::common::seed_settings(&db).await;
+
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let user_agent =
+        UserAgentActor::new_manual(db.clone(), actors, tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0);
+    let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
+
+    let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
+    let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
+
+    let result = user_agent_ref
+        .ask(HandleUnsealRequest {
+            req: UnsealStart {
+                client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
+            },
+        })
+        .await;
+
+    match result {
+        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(status)) => {
+            assert_eq!(status.code(), tonic::Code::Internal);
+        }
+        other => panic!("Expected state machine error, got {other:?}"),
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[test_log::test]
+pub async fn test_unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {
+    let seal_key = b"real-seal-key";
+    let (_db, user_agent_ref) = setup_authenticated_user_agent(seal_key).await;
+
+    {
+        let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, b"wrong-key").await;
+
+        let response = user_agent_ref
+            .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            response.payload.unwrap(),
+            UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
+        );
+    }
+
+    {
+        let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&user_agent_ref, seal_key).await;
+
+        let response = user_agent_ref
+            .ask(HandleUnsealEncryptedKey { req: encrypted_key })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            response.payload.unwrap(),
+            UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::Success.into()),
+        );
+    }
+}

server/supply-chain/audits.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 
 # cargo-vet audits file
 
+[[audits.similar]]
+who = "hdbg <httpdebugger@protonmail.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "2.2.1"
+
 [[audits.test-log]]
 who = "hdbg <httpdebugger@protonmail.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -11,6 +16,12 @@ who = "hdbg <httpdebugger@protonmail.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.2.18 -> 0.2.19"
 
+[[trusted.cc]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 55123 # rust-lang-owner
+start = "2022-10-29"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
 [[trusted.h2]]
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 user-id = 359 # Sean McArthur (seanmonstar)
@@ -29,6 +40,12 @@ user-id = 359 # Sean McArthur (seanmonstar)
 start = "2022-01-15"
 end = "2027-02-14"
 
+[[trusted.libc]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 55123 # rust-lang-owner
+start = "2024-08-15"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
 [[trusted.rustix]]
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 user-id = 6825 # Dan Gohman (sunfishcode)
@@ -46,3 +63,33 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 user-id = 3618 # David Tolnay (dtolnay)
 start = "2019-03-01"
 end = "2027-02-14"
+
+[[trusted.thread_local]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 2915 # Amanieu d'Antras (Amanieu)
+start = "2019-09-07"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
+[[trusted.toml]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 6743 # Ed Page (epage)
+start = "2022-12-14"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
+[[trusted.toml_parser]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 6743 # Ed Page (epage)
+start = "2025-07-08"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
+[[trusted.tonic-build]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 10
+start = "2019-09-10"
+end = "2027-02-16"
+
+[[trusted.windows-sys]]
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+user-id = 64539 # Kenny Kerr (kennykerr)
+start = "2021-11-15"
+end = "2027-02-16"

server/supply-chain/config.toml

@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/supply-chain/main/audits.toml"
 [imports.mozilla]
 url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mozilla/supply-chain/main/audits.toml"
 
+[imports.zcash]
+url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/rust-ecosystem/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
 [[exemptions.addr2line]]
 version = "0.25.1"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -41,10 +44,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.1.89"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.autocfg]]
-version = "1.5.0"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.aws-lc-rs]]
 version = "1.15.4"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -193,10 +192,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.2.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.dunce]]
-version = "1.0.5"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.dyn-clone]]
 version = "1.0.20"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -209,10 +204,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "3.0.0-pre.6"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.errno]]
-version = "0.3.14"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.fiat-crypto]]
 version = "0.3.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -261,10 +252,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "1.4.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.http-body]]
-version = "1.0.1"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.http-body-util]]
 version = "0.1.3"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -329,10 +316,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.19.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.libc]]
-version = "0.2.181"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.libsqlite3-sys]]
 version = "0.35.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -525,10 +508,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.1.27"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.rustc_version]]
-version = "0.4.1"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.rusticata-macros]]
 version = "4.1.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -545,10 +524,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.103.9"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.rustversion]]
-version = "1.0.22"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.scoped-futures]]
 version = "0.1.4"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -653,10 +628,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "2.0.18"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.thread_local]]
-version = "1.1.9"
-criteria = "safe-to-run"
-
 [[exemptions.time]]
 version = "0.3.47"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -689,14 +660,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.7.18"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.toml]]
-version = "0.9.11+spec-1.1.0"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
-[[exemptions.toml_parser]]
-version = "1.0.6+spec-1.1.0"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.tonic]]
 version = "0.14.3"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -741,10 +704,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.3.22"
 criteria = "safe-to-run"
 
-[[exemptions.try-lock]]
-version = "0.2.5"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.typenum]]
 version = "1.19.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -769,10 +728,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "1.20.0"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.want]]
-version = "0.3.1"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.wasi]]
 version = "0.11.1+wasi-snapshot-preview1"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -817,10 +772,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.59.3"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.windows-link]]
-version = "0.2.1"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.windows-result]]
 version = "0.4.1"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -829,18 +780,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.5.1"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.windows-sys]]
-version = "0.52.0"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
-[[exemptions.windows-sys]]
-version = "0.60.2"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
-[[exemptions.windows-sys]]
-version = "0.61.2"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.windows-targets]]
 version = "0.52.6"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -925,10 +864,6 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.5.2"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 
-[[exemptions.zeroize]]
-version = "1.8.2"
-criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
-
 [[exemptions.zmij]]
 version = "1.0.20"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"

server/supply-chain/imports.lock

@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ user-id = 359
 user-login = "seanmonstar"
 user-name = "Sean McArthur"
 
+[[publisher.libc]]
+version = "0.2.182"
+when = "2026-02-13"
+user-id = 55123
+user-login = "rust-lang-owner"
+
 [[publisher.rustix]]
 version = "1.1.3"
 when = "2025-12-23"
@@ -63,12 +69,33 @@ user-login = "dtolnay"
 user-name = "David Tolnay"
 
 [[publisher.syn]]
-version = "2.0.114"
+version = "2.0.115"
-when = "2026-01-07"
+when = "2026-02-12"
 user-id = 3618
 user-login = "dtolnay"
 user-name = "David Tolnay"
 
+[[publisher.thread_local]]
+version = "1.1.9"
+when = "2025-06-12"
+user-id = 2915
+user-login = "Amanieu"
+user-name = "Amanieu d'Antras"
+
+[[publisher.toml]]
+version = "0.9.12+spec-1.1.0"
+when = "2026-02-10"
+user-id = 6743
+user-login = "epage"
+user-name = "Ed Page"
+
+[[publisher.toml_parser]]
+version = "1.0.8+spec-1.1.0"
+when = "2026-02-12"
+user-id = 6743
+user-login = "epage"
+user-name = "Ed Page"
+
 [[publisher.unicode-width]]
 version = "0.1.14"
 when = "2024-09-19"
@@ -120,6 +147,34 @@ version = "0.244.0"
 when = "2026-01-06"
 trusted-publisher = "github:bytecodealliance/wasm-tools"
 
+[[publisher.windows-sys]]
+version = "0.52.0"
+when = "2023-11-15"
+user-id = 64539
+user-login = "kennykerr"
+user-name = "Kenny Kerr"
+
+[[publisher.windows-sys]]
+version = "0.59.0"
+when = "2024-07-30"
+user-id = 64539
+user-login = "kennykerr"
+user-name = "Kenny Kerr"
+
+[[publisher.windows-sys]]
+version = "0.60.2"
+when = "2025-06-12"
+user-id = 64539
+user-login = "kennykerr"
+user-name = "Kenny Kerr"
+
+[[publisher.windows-sys]]
+version = "0.61.2"
+when = "2025-10-06"
+user-id = 64539
+user-login = "kennykerr"
+user-name = "Kenny Kerr"
+
 [[publisher.wit-bindgen]]
 version = "0.51.0"
 when = "2026-01-12"
@@ -265,6 +320,12 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "1.1.2"
 notes = "Contains `unsafe` code but it's well-documented and scoped to what it's intended to be doing. Otherwise a well-focused and straightforward crate."
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.cipher]]
+who = "Andrew Brown <andrew.brown@intel.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.4.4"
+notes = "Most unsafe is hidden by `inout` dependency; only remaining unsafe is raw-splitting a slice and an unreachable hint. Older versions of this regularly reach ~150k daily downloads."
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.core-foundation-sys]]
 who = "Dan Gohman <dev@sunfishcode.online>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -279,6 +340,23 @@ who = "Nick Fitzgerald <fitzgen@gmail.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.2.4 -> 0.2.5"
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.errno]]
+who = "Dan Gohman <dev@sunfishcode.online>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.3.0"
+notes = "This crate uses libc and windows-sys APIs to get and set the raw OS error value."
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.errno]]
+who = "Dan Gohman <dev@sunfishcode.online>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.0 -> 0.3.1"
+notes = "Just a dependency version bump and a bug fix for redox"
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.errno]]
+who = "Dan Gohman <dev@sunfishcode.online>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.9 -> 0.3.10"
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.fastrand]]
 who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -385,11 +463,28 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.4.1 -> 0.5.0"
 notes = "Minor changes for a `no_std` upgrade but otherwise everything looks as expected."
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.http-body]]
+who = "Pat Hickey <phickey@fastly.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.http-body]]
+who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.0-rc.2 -> 1.0.0"
+notes = "Only minor changes made for a stable release."
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.iana-time-zone-haiku]]
 who = "Dan Gohman <dev@sunfishcode.online>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.1.2"
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.inout]]
+who = "Andrew Brown <andrew.brown@intel.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.1.3"
+notes = "A part of RustCrypto/utils, this crate is designed to handle unsafe buffers and carefully documents the safety concerns throughout. Older versions of this tally up to ~130k daily downloads."
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.leb128fmt]]
 who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -443,6 +538,24 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.8.5 -> 0.8.9"
 notes = "No new unsafe code, just refactorings."
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.nu-ansi-term]]
+who = "Pat Hickey <phickey@fastly.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.46.0"
+notes = "one use of unsafe to call windows specific api to get console handle."
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.nu-ansi-term]]
+who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.46.0 -> 0.50.1"
+notes = "Lots of stylistic/rust-related chanegs, plus new features, but nothing out of the ordrinary."
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.nu-ansi-term]]
+who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.50.1 -> 0.50.3"
+notes = "CI changes, Rust changes, nothing out of the ordinary."
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.num-traits]]
 who = "Andrew Brown <andrew.brown@intel.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -537,12 +650,38 @@ criteria = "safe-to-run"
 delta = "0.2.16 -> 0.2.18"
 notes = "Standard macro changes, nothing out of place"
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.tracing-log]]
+who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.1.3"
+notes = """
+This is a standard adapter between the `log` ecosystem and the `tracing`
+ecosystem. There's one `unsafe` block in this crate and it's well-scoped.
+"""
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.tracing-log]]
+who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.1.3 -> 0.2.0"
+notes = "Nothing out of the ordinary, a typical major version update and nothing awry."
+
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.try-lock]]
+who = "Pat Hickey <phickey@fastly.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.2.4"
+notes = "Implements a concurrency primitive with atomics, and is not obviously incorrect"
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.vcpkg]]
 who = "Pat Hickey <phickey@fastly.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.2.15"
 notes = "no build.rs, no macros, no unsafe. It reads the filesystem and makes copies of DLLs into OUT_DIR."
 
+[[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.want]]
+who = "Pat Hickey <phickey@fastly.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.3.0"
+
 [[audits.bytecode-alliance.audits.wasm-metadata]]
 who = "Alex Crichton <alex@alexcrichton.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -591,6 +730,13 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.243.0 -> 0.244.0"
 notes = "The Bytecode Alliance is the author of this crate"
 
+[[audits.google.audits.autocfg]]
+who = "Manish Goregaokar <manishearth@google.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.4.0"
+notes = "Contains no unsafe"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
 [[audits.google.audits.base64]]
 who = "amarjotgill <amarjotgill@google.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -719,6 +865,89 @@ delta = "0.2.9 -> 0.2.13"
 notes = "Audited at https://fxrev.dev/946396"
 aggregated-from = "https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/fuchsia/+/refs/heads/main/third_party/rust_crates/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
 
+[[audits.google.audits.proc-macro-error-attr]]
+who = "George Burgess IV <gbiv@google.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.0.4"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/third_party/rust_crates/+/refs/heads/main/cargo-vet/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rand_core]]
+who = "Lukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.6.4"
+notes = """
+For more detailed unsafe review notes please see https://crrev.com/c/6362797
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Lukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.0.14"
+notes = """
+Grepped for `-i cipher`, `-i crypto`, `'\bfs\b'``, `'\bnet\b'``, `'\bunsafe\b'``
+and there were no hits except for:
+
+* Using trivially-safe `unsafe` in test code:
+
+    ```
+    tests/test_const.rs:unsafe fn _unsafe() {}
+    tests/test_const.rs:const _UNSAFE: () = unsafe { _unsafe() };
+    ```
+
+* Using `unsafe` in a string:
+
+    ```
+    src/constfn.rs:            "unsafe" => Qualifiers::Unsafe,
+    ```
+
+* Using `std::fs` in `build/build.rs` to write `${OUT_DIR}/version.expr`
+  which is later read back via `include!` used in `src/lib.rs`.
+
+Version `1.0.6` of this crate has been added to Chromium in
+https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/28841c33c77833cc30b286f9ae24c97e7a8f4057
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Adrian Taylor <adetaylor@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.14 -> 1.0.15"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "danakj <danakj@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.15 -> 1.0.16"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Dustin J. Mitchell <djmitche@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.16 -> 1.0.17"
+notes = "Just updates windows compat"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Liza Burakova <liza@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.17 -> 1.0.18"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Dustin J. Mitchell <djmitche@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.18 -> 1.0.19"
+notes = "No unsafe, just doc changes"
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.19 -> 1.0.20"
+notes = "Only minor updates to documentation and the mock today used for testing."
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
 [[audits.google.audits.smallvec]]
 who = "Manish Goregaokar <manishearth@google.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -736,6 +965,28 @@ Previously reviewed during security review and the audit is grandparented in.
 """
 aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
 
+[[audits.google.audits.strum]]
+who = "danakj@chromium.org"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.25.0"
+notes = """
+Reviewed in https://crrev.com/c/5171063
+
+Previously reviewed during security review and the audit is grandparented in.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
+[[audits.google.audits.strum_macros]]
+who = "danakj@chromium.org"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.25.3"
+notes = """
+Reviewed in https://crrev.com/c/5171063
+
+Previously reviewed during security review and the audit is grandparented in.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/rust/chromium_crates_io/supply-chain/audits.toml?format=TEXT"
+
 [[audits.mozilla.wildcard-audits.core-foundation-sys]]
 who = "Bobby Holley <bobbyholley@gmail.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -812,6 +1063,12 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.2.3 -> 0.2.4"
 aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
 
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.errno]]
+who = "Mike Hommey <mh+mozilla@glandium.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.1 -> 0.3.3"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
 [[audits.mozilla.audits.fastrand]]
 who = "Mike Hommey <mh+mozilla@glandium.org>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -929,6 +1186,16 @@ yet, but it's all valid. Otherwise it's a pretty simple crate.
 """
 aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
 
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.rustc_version]]
+who = "Nika Layzell <nika@thelayzells.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.4.0"
+notes = """
+Use of powerful capabilities is limited to invoking `rustc -vV` to get version
+information for parsing version information.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mozilla/cargo-vet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
 [[audits.mozilla.audits.serde_spanned]]
 who = "Ben Dean-Kawamura <bdk@mozilla.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -955,6 +1222,12 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "1.1.0 -> 1.3.0"
 aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
 
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.similar]]
+who = "Nika Layzell <nika@thelayzells.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "2.2.1 -> 2.7.0"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mozilla/cargo-vet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
 [[audits.mozilla.audits.smallvec]]
 who = "Erich Gubler <erichdongubler@gmail.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -967,6 +1240,30 @@ criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 delta = "0.10.0 -> 0.11.1"
 aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
 
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.strum]]
+who = "Teodor Tanasoaia <ttanasoaia@mozilla.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.25.0 -> 0.26.3"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.strum]]
+who = "Erich Gubler <erichdongubler@gmail.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.26.3 -> 0.27.1"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.strum_macros]]
+who = "Teodor Tanasoaia <ttanasoaia@mozilla.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.25.3 -> 0.26.4"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.strum_macros]]
+who = "Erich Gubler <erichdongubler@gmail.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.26.4 -> 0.27.1"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
 [[audits.mozilla.audits.synstructure]]
 who = "Nika Layzell <nika@thelayzells.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
@@ -1038,3 +1335,153 @@ who = "Jan-Erik Rediger <jrediger@mozilla.com>"
 criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
 version = "0.1.5"
 aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mozilla/glean/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.windows-link]]
+who = "Mark Hammond <mhammond@skippinet.com.au>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "0.1.1"
+notes = "A microsoft crate allowing unsafe calls to windows apis."
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.windows-link]]
+who = "Erich Gubler <erichdongubler@gmail.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.1.1 -> 0.2.0"
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.mozilla.audits.zeroize]]
+who = "Benjamin Beurdouche <beurdouche@mozilla.com>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.8.1"
+notes = """
+This code DOES contain unsafe code required to internally call volatiles
+for deleting data. This is expected and documented behavior.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/raw-file/tip/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.autocfg]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.4.0 -> 1.5.0"
+notes = "Filesystem change is to remove the generated LLVM IR output file after probing."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.dunce]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+version = "1.0.5"
+notes = """
+Does what it says on the tin. No `unsafe`, and the only IO is `std::fs::canonicalize`.
+Path and string handling looks plausibly correct.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.errno]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.3 -> 0.3.8"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.errno]]
+who = "Daira-Emma Hopwood <daira@jacaranda.org>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.8 -> 0.3.9"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.errno]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.10 -> 0.3.11"
+notes = "The `__errno` location for vxworks and cygwin looks correct from a quick search."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/wallet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.errno]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.11 -> 0.3.13"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.errno]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.13 -> 0.3.14"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.http-body]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.0 -> 1.0.1"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.inout]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.1.3 -> 0.1.4"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/wallet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.rustc_version]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.4.0 -> 0.4.1"
+notes = "Changes to `Command` usage are to add support for `RUSTC_WRAPPER`."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.20 -> 1.0.21"
+notes = "Build script change is to fix building with `-Zfmt-debug=none`."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.rustversion]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.0.21 -> 1.0.22"
+notes = "Changes to generated code are to prepend a clippy annotation."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/wallet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.strum]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.27.1 -> 0.27.2"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.strum_macros]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.27.1 -> 0.27.2"
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.try-lock]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.2.4 -> 0.2.5"
+notes = "Bumps MSRV to remove unsafe code block."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.want]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.3.0 -> 0.3.1"
+notes = """
+Migrates to `try-lock 0.2.4` to replace some unsafe APIs that were not marked
+`unsafe` (but that were being used safely).
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/zcash/master/qa/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.windows-link]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "0.2.0 -> 0.2.1"
+notes = "No code changes at all."
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/librustzcash/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"
+
+[[audits.zcash.audits.zeroize]]
+who = "Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>"
+criteria = "safe-to-deploy"
+delta = "1.8.1 -> 1.8.2"
+notes = """
+Changes to `unsafe` code are to alter how `core::mem::size_of` is named; no actual changes
+to the `unsafe` logic.
+"""
+aggregated-from = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zcash/wallet/main/supply-chain/audits.toml"