67 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
CleverWild
099f76166e feat(PoC): terrors crate usage
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2026-03-15 21:11:23 +01:00
CleverWild
66026e903a feat(poc): complete terrors PoC with main scenarios 2026-03-15 19:24:49 +01:00
CleverWild
3360d3c8c7 feat(poc): add db and auth modules with terrors error chains 2026-03-15 19:24:21 +01:00
CleverWild
02980468db feat(poc): add terrors PoC crate scaffold and error types
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-15 19:21:55 +01:00
84978afd58 fix(clippy): forbidden methods
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2026-03-14 17:08:59 +00:00
CleverWild
4cb5b303dc security: audit some crates
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2026-03-14 17:58:36 +01:00
8fde3cec41 Merge pull request 'feat(user-agent-auth): add RSA and ECDSA auth key types' (#29) from feat-min-RSA-&-ECDSA-auth-pipeline into main
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Reviewed-on: #29
Reviewed-by: Stas <business@jexter.tech>
2026-03-14 14:41:46 +00:00
17ac195c5d clippy: fix
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2026-03-14 14:30:46 +01:00
c1c5d14133 fix(rustc): config toolchaing mismatch
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2026-03-14 14:13:15 +01:00
47144bdf81 feat(auth): limited RSA support for signing
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see server/clippy.toml
2026-03-14 13:57:13 +01:00
42760bbd79 revert(auth): remove RSA support from authentication and related components
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2026-03-14 13:23:06 +01:00
d29bca853b chore: squash migrations 2026-03-14 13:22:47 +01:00
f8d27a1454 refactor(config): specify target for Windows in profile.dev settings
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2026-03-14 12:40:37 +01:00
6030f30901 feat(user-agent-auth): add RSA and ECDSA auth key types
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Extend user-agent authentication to support Ed25519, ECDSA (secp256k1), and RSA (PSS+SHA-256) with minimal protocol and storage changes. Add key_type to auth requests and useragent_client, update key parsing/signature verification paths, and keep backward compatibility by treating UNSPECIFIED as Ed25519.
2026-03-14 12:14:30 +01:00
a3c401194f fix: my having come back 2026-03-13 16:59:37 +01:00
hdbg
6386510f52 merge: evm into main
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2026-03-12 16:29:00 +01:00
ec36e5c2ea Merge pull request 'refactor(server::client::auth): Approval flow for first-time connections and simplified to keep state on stack' (#26) from push-xxmwpvvwnllx into main
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Reviewed-on: #26
2026-03-12 15:22:09 +00:00
hdbg
ba86d18250 refactor(server::client::auth): removed state machine and added approval flow coordination
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2026-03-12 16:12:19 +01:00
hdbg
606a1f3774 feat(server::{router, useragent}): inter-actor approval coordination 2026-03-11 20:07:06 +01:00
hdbg
b3a67ffc00 feat(server::client): proper connect error 2026-03-11 17:58:44 +01:00
hdbg
168290040c feat(server::client): approval flow through user-agent on first-time client connects 2026-03-11 16:31:58 +01:00
hdbg
2b27da224e housekeeping: linter
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2026-03-11 14:51:54 +01:00
hdbg
9e92b168ba tests(evm::engine): basic policies tests 2026-03-11 14:50:32 +01:00
hdbg
bd159c35e8 docs: add EVM Policy Engine section
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2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
b3e378b5fc fix(evm::engine): added shared settings check in vet_transaction 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
b7c4f2e735 feat(evm): add find_all_grants to Policy trait with shared auto_type queries 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
4a5dd3eea7 feat(protobuf): EVM grants and signing definitions 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
5af6d8dd9c housekeeping: linter 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
5dfe390ac3 feat(evm): add grant management and transaction signing 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
43c7b211c3 feat(server::evm::engine): return meaning on error path 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
c5f9cfcaa0 feat(server::evm::engine): initial wiring of all components -- we now can evaluate transactions 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
67fce6f06a feat(server::evm): more criterion types 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
191b126462 feat(server): initial EVM functionality impl 2026-03-11 14:08:33 +01:00
hdbg
cb05407bb6 feat(server): broker agent for inter-actor coordination
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2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
4beb34764d Merge pull request 'refactor(server::{user_agent, client}): move auth part to separate function to not to pollute actor session with one-time concerns' (#24) from push-upvpzwvlwyvs into main
Reviewed-on: #24
2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
hdbg
4b4a8f4489 refactor: consolidate auth messages into client and user_agent packages 2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
hdbg
54d0fe0505 refactor(server::{user_agent, client}): move auth part to separate function to not to pollute actor session with one-time concerns 2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
hdbg
06f4d628db chore(server): update Cargo.lock dependencies 2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
hdbg
657f47e32f refactor(transport): convert Bi trait to use async_trait 2026-03-11 14:08:15 +01:00
hdbg
86f8feb291 tests(user-agent): basic auth tests similar to server 2026-03-11 14:07:46 +01:00
hdbg
6deec731e2 feat(useragent): initial connection impl 2026-03-11 14:07:46 +01:00
hdbg
f5a5c62181 refactor(transport): simplify converters 2026-03-11 14:07:46 +01:00
hdbg
b8afd94b21 refactor(transport): implemented Bi stream based abstraction for actor communication with next loop override 2026-03-11 14:07:46 +01:00
hdbg
7b57965952 housekeeping(useragent): rename 2026-03-11 14:07:06 +01:00
hdbg
9dca7aff27 feat(proto): add URL parsing and TLS certificate management 2026-03-11 14:07:06 +01:00
hdbg
4d1f047baf misc: create license and readme 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
925c7a211f refactor(server): reogranized actors, context, and db modules into <dir>/mod.rs structure 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
d81120f59c refactor(server::tests): moved integration-like tests into tests/ 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
e118eceb85 refactor(server): separated global actors into their own handle 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
4a84fe9339 refactor(server): actors reorganization & linter fixes 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
c6e13dc476 feat(keyholder): add seal method and unseal integration tests 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
8f5d4cc385 feat(server::user-agent): Unseal implemented 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
2ffd60973d test(keyholder): remove unused imports from test modules 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
08af101b2e fix(ci): add protoc installation for lints 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
bb58868333 fix(ci): add clippy installation in mise.toml 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
b05cdeec66 refactor(actors): rename BootstrapActor to Bootstrapper 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
9ec465706a chore(supply-chain): update cargo-vet audits and trusted publishers 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
46a3c1768c feat(server::key_holder): unique index on (root_key_id, nonce) to avoid nonce reuse 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
6c8a67c520 feat(server::key_holder): ability to remotely get current state 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
bbaed3fb97 refactor(keyholder): rename KeyHolderActor to KeyHolder and optimize db connection lifetime 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
4700bc407e security(server::key_holder): replaced nonce-caching with exclusive transaction fetching nonce from the database 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
281fbcb31d feat(server): UserAgent seal/unseal 2026-03-11 14:05:42 +01:00
hdbg
a55221573b feat(unseal): add unseal protocol support for user agents 2026-03-11 14:03:46 +01:00
hdbg
45acb45a05 feat(server): boot mechanism 2026-03-11 14:03:46 +01:00
hdbg
11f1caa6da ci: add server linting pipeline for Rust code quality checks 2026-03-11 14:03:46 +01:00
hdbg
f769c9119b test(user-agent): add challenge-response auth flow test 2026-03-11 14:03:45 +01:00
hdbg
1145642255 tests(server): UserAgent invalid bootstrap token 2026-03-11 14:03:45 +01:00
162 changed files with 30781 additions and 1870 deletions

5
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -1 +1,4 @@
target/
target/
scripts/__pycache__/
.DS_Store
.cargo/config.toml

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@@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
{
"git.enabled": false
}

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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ when:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
steps:
- name: test
- name: audit
image: jdxcode/mise:latest
directory: server
environment:

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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
when:
- event: pull_request
path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
- event: push
branch: main
path:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
steps:
- name: lint
image: jdxcode/mise:latest
directory: server
environment:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_TARGET_DIR: /usr/local/cargo/target
CARGO_HOME: /usr/local/cargo/registry
volumes:
- cargo-target:/usr/local/cargo/target
- cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry
commands:
- apt-get update && apt-get install -y pkg-config
- mise install rust
- mise install protoc
- mise exec rust -- cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings

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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ when:
include: ['.woodpecker/server-*.yaml', 'server/**']
steps:
- name: test
- name: vet
image: jdxcode/mise:latest
directory: server
environment:

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Arbiter is a permissioned signing service for cryptocurrency wallets. It runs as a background service on the user's machine with an optional client application for vault management.
**Core principle:** The vault NEVER exposes key material. It only produces signatures when a request satisfies the configured policies.
---
## 1. Peer Types

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@@ -4,6 +4,52 @@ This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the archi
---
## Client Connection Flow
### New Client Approval
When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected user agents are asked to approve the connection. The first agent to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest]
B --> C{pubkey in DB?}
C -- yes --> D[Read nonce\nIncrement nonce in DB]
D --> G
C -- no --> E[Ask all UserAgents:\nClientConnectionRequest]
E --> F{First response}
F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection])
F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nUserAgent requests]
F2 --> F3[INSERT client\nnonce = 1]
F3 --> G[Send AuthChallenge\nwith nonce]
G --> H[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
H --> I{Signature valid?}
I -- no --> Z
I -- yes --> J([Session started])
```
### Known Issue: Concurrent Registration Race (TOCTOU)
Two connections presenting the same previously-unknown public key can race through the approval flow simultaneously:
1. Both check the DB → neither is registered.
2. Both request approval from user agents → both receive approval.
3. Both `INSERT` the client record → the second insert silently overwrites the first, resetting the nonce.
This means the first connection's nonce is invalidated by the second, causing its challenge verification to fail. A fix requires either serialising new-client registration (e.g. an in-memory lock keyed on pubkey) or replacing the separate check + insert with an `INSERT OR IGNORE` / upsert guarded by a unique constraint on `public_key`.
### Nonce Semantics
The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it is always one ahead of the nonce last issued in a challenge.
- **New client:** inserted with `nonce = 1`; the first challenge is issued with `nonce = 0`.
- **Existing client:** the current DB value is read and used as the challenge nonce, then immediately incremented within the same exclusive transaction, preventing replay.
---
## Cryptography
### Authentication
@@ -27,6 +73,82 @@ This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the archi
---
## EVM Policy Engine
### Overview
The EVM engine classifies incoming transactions, enforces grant constraints, and records executions. It is the sole path through which a wallet key is used for signing.
The central abstraction is the `Policy` trait. Each implementation handles one semantic transaction category and owns its own database tables for grant storage and transaction logging.
### Transaction Evaluation Flow
`Engine::evaluate_transaction` runs the following steps in order:
1. **Classify** — Each registered policy's `analyze(context)` inspects the transaction fields (`chain`, `to`, `value`, `calldata`). The first one returning `Some(meaning)` wins. If none match, the transaction is rejected as `UnsupportedTransactionType`.
2. **Find grant**`Policy::try_find_grant` queries for a non-revoked grant covering this wallet, client, chain, and target address.
3. **Check shared constraints**`check_shared_constraints` runs in the engine before any policy-specific logic. It enforces the validity window, gas fee caps, and transaction count rate limit (see below).
4. **Evaluate**`Policy::evaluate` checks the decoded meaning against the grant's policy-specific constraints and returns any violations.
5. **Record** — If `RunKind::Execution` and there are no violations, the engine writes to `evm_transaction_log` and calls `Policy::record_transaction` for any policy-specific logging (e.g., token transfer volume).
### Policy Trait
| Method | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `analyze` | Pure — classifies a transaction into a typed `Meaning`, or `None` if this policy doesn't apply |
| `evaluate` | Checks the `Meaning` against a `Grant`; returns a list of `EvalViolation`s |
| `create_grant` | Inserts policy-specific rows; returns the specific grant ID |
| `try_find_grant` | Finds a matching non-revoked grant for the given `EvalContext` |
| `find_all_grants` | Returns all non-revoked grants (used for listing) |
| `record_transaction` | Persists policy-specific data after execution |
`analyze` and `evaluate` are intentionally separate: classification is pure and cheap, while evaluation may involve DB queries (e.g., fetching past transfer volume).
### Registered Policies
**EtherTransfer** — plain ETH transfers (empty calldata)
- Grant requires: allowlist of recipient addresses + one volumetric rate limit (max ETH over a time window)
- Violations: recipient not in allowlist, cumulative ETH volume exceeded
**TokenTransfer** — ERC-20 `transfer(address,uint256)` calls
- Recognised by ABI-decoding the `transfer(address,uint256)` selector against a static registry of known token contracts (`arbiter_tokens_registry`)
- Grant requires: token contract address, optional recipient restriction, zero or more volumetric rate limits
- Violations: recipient mismatch, any volumetric limit exceeded
### Grant Model
Every grant has two layers:
- **Shared (`evm_basic_grant`)** — wallet, chain, validity period, gas fee caps, transaction count rate limit. One row per grant regardless of type.
- **Specific** — policy-owned tables (`evm_ether_transfer_grant`, `evm_token_transfer_grant`, etc.) holding type-specific configuration.
`find_all_grants` uses a `#[diesel::auto_type]` base join between the specific and shared tables, then batch-loads related rows (targets, volume limits) in two additional queries to avoid N+1.
The engine exposes `list_all_grants` which collects across all policy types into `Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>` via a blanket `From<Grant<S>> for Grant<SpecificGrant>` conversion.
### Shared Constraints (enforced by the engine)
These are checked centrally in `check_shared_constraints` before policy evaluation:
| Constraint | Fields | Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| Validity window | `valid_from`, `valid_until` | Emits `InvalidTime` if current time is outside the range |
| Gas fee cap | `max_gas_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas` | Emits `GasLimitExceeded` if either cap is breached |
| Tx count rate limit | `rate_limit` (`count` + `window`) | Counts rows in `evm_transaction_log` within the window; emits `RateLimitExceeded` if at or above the limit |
---
### Known Limitations
- **Only EIP-1559 transactions are supported.** Legacy and EIP-2930 types are rejected outright.
- **No opaque-calldata (unknown contract) grant type.** The architecture describes a category for unrecognised contracts, but no policy implements it yet. Any transaction that is not a plain ETH transfer or a known ERC-20 transfer is unconditionally rejected.
- **Token registry is static.** Tokens are recognised only if they appear in the hard-coded `arbiter_tokens_registry` crate. There is no mechanism to register additional contracts at runtime.
- **Nonce management is not implemented.** The architecture lists nonce deduplication as a core responsibility, but no nonce tracking or enforcement exists yet.
---
## Memory Protection
The unsealed root key must be held in a hardened memory cell resistant to dumps, page swaps, and hibernation.

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LICENSE Normal file
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5. Submission of Contributions. Unless You explicitly state otherwise,
any Contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the Work
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Notwithstanding the above, nothing herein shall supersede or modify
the terms of any separate license agreement you may have executed
with Licensor regarding such Contributions.
6. Trademarks. This License does not grant permission to use the trade
names, trademarks, service marks, or product names of the Licensor,
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8. Limitation of Liability. In no event and under no legal theory,
whether in tort (including negligence), contract, or otherwise,
unless required by applicable law (such as deliberate and grossly
negligent acts) or agreed to in writing, shall any Contributor be
liable to You for damages, including any direct, indirect, special,
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result of this License or out of the use or inability to use the
Work (including but not limited to damages for loss of goodwill,
work stoppage, computer failure or malfunction, or any and all
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9. Accepting Warranty or Additional Liability. While redistributing
the Work or Derivative Works thereof, You may choose to offer,
and charge a fee for, acceptance of support, warranty, indemnity,
or other liability obligations and/or rights consistent with this
License. However, in accepting such obligations, You may act only
on Your own behalf and on Your sole responsibility, not on behalf
of any other Contributor, and only if You agree to indemnify,
defend, and hold each Contributor harmless for any liability
incurred by, or claims asserted against, such Contributor by reason
of your accepting any such warranty or additional liability.
END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Copyright 2026 MarketTakers
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.

13
README.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# Arbiter
> Policy-first multi-client wallet daemon, allowing permissioned transactions across blockchains
## Security warning
Arbiter can't meaningfully protect against host compromise. Potential attack flow:
- Attacker steals TLS keys from database
- Pretends to be server; just accepts user agent challenge solutions
- Pretend to be in sealed state and performing DH with client
- Steals user password and derives seal key
While this attack is highly targetive, it's still possible.
> This software is experimental. Do not use with funds you cannot afford to lose.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
Extension Discovery Cache
=========================
This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
packages that contains extensions for other packages.
DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
----------------------
* Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
* Do write to this folder.
If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
Use package `extension_discovery`
---------------------------------
If you want to access information from this folder.
Feel free to delete this folder
-------------------------------
Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
need to do please file a bug.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{"version":2,"entries":[{"package":"app","rootUri":"../","packageUri":"lib/"}]}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
{
"configVersion": 2,
"packages": [
{
"name": "async",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/async-2.13.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "boolean_selector",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/boolean_selector-2.1.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "characters",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/characters-1.4.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "clock",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/clock-1.1.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "collection",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/collection-1.19.1",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "cupertino_icons",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/cupertino_icons-1.0.8",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "fake_async",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/fake_async-1.3.3",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.3"
},
{
"name": "flutter",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8"
},
{
"name": "flutter_lints",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/flutter_lints-6.0.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8"
},
{
"name": "flutter_test",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter_test",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8"
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker-11.0.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.2"
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker_flutter_testing-3.0.10",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.2"
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker_testing",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker_testing-3.0.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.2"
},
{
"name": "lints",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/lints-6.1.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8"
},
{
"name": "matcher",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/matcher-0.12.17",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "material_color_utilities",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/material_color_utilities-0.11.1",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "2.17"
},
{
"name": "meta",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/meta-1.17.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.5"
},
{
"name": "path",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/path-1.9.1",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "sky_engine",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/bin/cache/pkg/sky_engine",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.8"
},
{
"name": "source_span",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/source_span-1.10.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "stack_trace",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stack_trace-1.12.1",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.4"
},
{
"name": "stream_channel",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stream_channel-2.1.4",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.3"
},
{
"name": "string_scanner",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/string_scanner-1.4.1",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "term_glyph",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/term_glyph-1.2.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "test_api",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/test_api-0.7.7",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.5"
},
{
"name": "vector_math",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vector_math-2.2.0",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.1"
},
{
"name": "vm_service",
"rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vm_service-15.0.2",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.5"
},
{
"name": "app",
"rootUri": "../",
"packageUri": "lib/",
"languageVersion": "3.10"
}
],
"generator": "pub",
"generatorVersion": "3.10.8",
"flutterRoot": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable",
"flutterVersion": "3.38.9",
"pubCache": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache"
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
{
"roots": [
"app"
],
"packages": [
{
"name": "app",
"version": "1.0.0+1",
"dependencies": [
"cupertino_icons",
"flutter"
],
"devDependencies": [
"flutter_lints",
"flutter_test"
]
},
{
"name": "flutter_lints",
"version": "6.0.0",
"dependencies": [
"lints"
]
},
{
"name": "flutter_test",
"version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": [
"clock",
"collection",
"fake_async",
"flutter",
"leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
"matcher",
"meta",
"path",
"stack_trace",
"stream_channel",
"test_api",
"vector_math"
]
},
{
"name": "cupertino_icons",
"version": "1.0.8",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "flutter",
"version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": [
"characters",
"collection",
"material_color_utilities",
"meta",
"sky_engine",
"vector_math"
]
},
{
"name": "lints",
"version": "6.1.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "stream_channel",
"version": "2.1.4",
"dependencies": [
"async"
]
},
{
"name": "meta",
"version": "1.17.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "collection",
"version": "1.19.1",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
"version": "3.0.10",
"dependencies": [
"flutter",
"leak_tracker",
"leak_tracker_testing",
"matcher",
"meta"
]
},
{
"name": "vector_math",
"version": "2.2.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "stack_trace",
"version": "1.12.1",
"dependencies": [
"path"
]
},
{
"name": "clock",
"version": "1.1.2",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "fake_async",
"version": "1.3.3",
"dependencies": [
"clock",
"collection"
]
},
{
"name": "path",
"version": "1.9.1",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "matcher",
"version": "0.12.17",
"dependencies": [
"async",
"meta",
"stack_trace",
"term_glyph",
"test_api"
]
},
{
"name": "test_api",
"version": "0.7.7",
"dependencies": [
"async",
"boolean_selector",
"collection",
"meta",
"source_span",
"stack_trace",
"stream_channel",
"string_scanner",
"term_glyph"
]
},
{
"name": "sky_engine",
"version": "0.0.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "material_color_utilities",
"version": "0.11.1",
"dependencies": [
"collection"
]
},
{
"name": "characters",
"version": "1.4.0",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "async",
"version": "2.13.0",
"dependencies": [
"collection",
"meta"
]
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker_testing",
"version": "3.0.2",
"dependencies": [
"leak_tracker",
"matcher",
"meta"
]
},
{
"name": "leak_tracker",
"version": "11.0.2",
"dependencies": [
"clock",
"collection",
"meta",
"path",
"vm_service"
]
},
{
"name": "term_glyph",
"version": "1.2.2",
"dependencies": []
},
{
"name": "string_scanner",
"version": "1.4.1",
"dependencies": [
"source_span"
]
},
{
"name": "source_span",
"version": "1.10.2",
"dependencies": [
"collection",
"path",
"term_glyph"
]
},
{
"name": "boolean_selector",
"version": "2.1.2",
"dependencies": [
"source_span",
"string_scanner"
]
},
{
"name": "vm_service",
"version": "15.0.2",
"dependencies": []
}
],
"configVersion": 1
}

1
app/.dart_tool/version Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
3.38.9

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
// This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable
FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app
COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true
FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build
FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0
FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1
DART_OBFUSCATION=false
TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true
TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false
PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
#!/bin/sh
# This is a generated file; do not edit or check into version control.
export "FLUTTER_ROOT=/Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable"
export "FLUTTER_APPLICATION_PATH=/Users/kaska/Documents/Projects/Major/arbiter/app"
export "COCOAPODS_PARALLEL_CODE_SIGN=true"
export "FLUTTER_BUILD_DIR=build"
export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NAME=1.0.0"
export "FLUTTER_BUILD_NUMBER=1"
export "DART_OBFUSCATION=false"
export "TRACK_WIDGET_CREATION=true"
export "TREE_SHAKE_ICONS=false"
export "PACKAGE_CONFIG=.dart_tool/package_config.json"

View File

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
name: app
description: "A new Flutter project."
# The following line prevents the package from being accidentally published to
# pub.dev using `flutter pub publish`. This is preferred for private packages.
publish_to: 'none' # Remove this line if you wish to publish to pub.dev
# The following defines the version and build number for your application.
# A version number is three numbers separated by dots, like 1.2.43
# followed by an optional build number separated by a +.
# Both the version and the builder number may be overridden in flutter
# build by specifying --build-name and --build-number, respectively.
# In Android, build-name is used as versionName while build-number used as versionCode.
# Read more about Android versioning at https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/versioning
# In iOS, build-name is used as CFBundleShortVersionString while build-number is used as CFBundleVersion.
# Read more about iOS versioning at
# https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/CoreFoundationKeys.html
# In Windows, build-name is used as the major, minor, and patch parts
# of the product and file versions while build-number is used as the build suffix.
version: 1.0.0+1
environment:
sdk: ^3.10.8
# Dependencies specify other packages that your package needs in order to work.
# To automatically upgrade your package dependencies to the latest versions
# consider running `flutter pub upgrade --major-versions`. Alternatively,
# dependencies can be manually updated by changing the version numbers below to
# the latest version available on pub.dev. To see which dependencies have newer
# versions available, run `flutter pub outdated`.
dependencies:
flutter:
sdk: flutter
# The following adds the Cupertino Icons font to your application.
# Use with the CupertinoIcons class for iOS style icons.
cupertino_icons: ^1.0.8
dev_dependencies:
flutter_test:
sdk: flutter
# The "flutter_lints" package below contains a set of recommended lints to
# encourage good coding practices. The lint set provided by the package is
# activated in the `analysis_options.yaml` file located at the root of your
# package. See that file for information about deactivating specific lint
# rules and activating additional ones.
flutter_lints: ^6.0.0
# For information on the generic Dart part of this file, see the
# following page: https://dart.dev/tools/pub/pubspec
# The following section is specific to Flutter packages.
flutter:
# The following line ensures that the Material Icons font is
# included with your application, so that you can use the icons in
# the material Icons class.
uses-material-design: true
# To add assets to your application, add an assets section, like this:
# assets:
# - images/a_dot_burr.jpeg
# - images/a_dot_ham.jpeg
# An image asset can refer to one or more resolution-specific "variants", see
# https://flutter.dev/to/resolution-aware-images
# For details regarding adding assets from package dependencies, see
# https://flutter.dev/to/asset-from-package
# To add custom fonts to your application, add a fonts section here,
# in this "flutter" section. Each entry in this list should have a
# "family" key with the font family name, and a "fonts" key with a
# list giving the asset and other descriptors for the font. For
# example:
# fonts:
# - family: Schyler
# fonts:
# - asset: fonts/Schyler-Regular.ttf
# - asset: fonts/Schyler-Italic.ttf
# style: italic
# - family: Trajan Pro
# fonts:
# - asset: fonts/TrajanPro.ttf
# - asset: fonts/TrajanPro_Bold.ttf
# weight: 700
#
# For details regarding fonts from package dependencies,
# see https://flutter.dev/to/font-from-package

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ backend = "cargo:cargo-features"
version = "0.11.1"
backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-insta"]]
version = "1.46.3"
backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
version = "0.9.126"
backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
@@ -51,6 +55,15 @@ backend = "aqua:protocolbuffers/protobuf/protoc"
"platforms.macos-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:312f04713946921cc0187ef34df80241ddca1bab6f564c636885fd2cc90d3f88", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-osx-x86_64.zip"}
"platforms.windows-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f6f7", url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"}
[[tools.python]]
version = "3.14.3"
backend = "core:python"
"platforms.linux-arm64" = { checksum = "sha256:be0f4dc2932f762292b27d46ea7d3e8e66ddf3969a5eb0254a229015ed402625", url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260303/cpython-3.14.3+20260303-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"}
"platforms.linux-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:0a73413f89efd417871876c9accaab28a9d1e3cd6358fbfff171a38ec99302f0", url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260303/cpython-3.14.3+20260303-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"}
"platforms.macos-arm64" = { checksum = "sha256:4703cdf18b26798fde7b49b6b66149674c25f97127be6a10dbcf29309bdcdcdb", url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260303/cpython-3.14.3+20260303-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"}
"platforms.macos-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:76f1cc26e3d262eae8ca546a93e8bded10cf0323613f7e246fea2e10a8115eb7", url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260303/cpython-3.14.3+20260303-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"}
"platforms.windows-x64" = { checksum = "sha256:950c5f21a015c1bdd1337f233456df2470fab71e4d794407d27a84cb8b9909a0", url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260303/cpython-3.14.3+20260303-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"}
[[tools.rust]]
version = "1.93.0"
backend = "core:rust"

View File

@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@
"cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.6", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = false }
"cargo:cargo-audit" = "0.22.1"
"cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
flutter = "3.38.9-stable"
protoc = "29.6"
rust = "1.93.0"
"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy"}
"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.11.1"
"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.46.3"
python = "3.14.3"

View File

@@ -2,30 +2,8 @@ syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter;
import "auth.proto";
message ClientRequest {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
}
}
message ClientResponse {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
}
}
message UserAgentRequest {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ClientMessage auth_message = 1;
}
}
message UserAgentResponse {
oneof payload {
arbiter.auth.ServerMessage auth_message = 1;
}
}
import "client.proto";
import "user_agent.proto";
message ServerInfo {
string version = 1;
@@ -33,6 +11,6 @@ message ServerInfo {
}
service ArbiterService {
rpc Client(stream ClientRequest) returns (stream ClientResponse);
rpc UserAgent(stream UserAgentRequest) returns (stream UserAgentResponse);
rpc Client(stream arbiter.client.ClientRequest) returns (stream arbiter.client.ClientResponse);
rpc UserAgent(stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentRequest) returns (stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentResponse);
}

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.auth;
import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
}
message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1;
int32 nonce = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {
bytes signature = 1;
}
message AuthOk {}
message ClientMessage {
oneof payload {
AuthChallengeRequest auth_challenge_request = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution auth_challenge_solution = 2;
}
}
message ServerMessage {
oneof payload {
AuthChallenge auth_challenge = 1;
AuthOk auth_ok = 2;
}
}

47
protobufs/client.proto Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.client;
import "evm.proto";
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
}
message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1;
int32 nonce = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {
bytes signature = 1;
}
message AuthOk {}
message ClientRequest {
oneof payload {
AuthChallengeRequest auth_challenge_request = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution auth_challenge_solution = 2;
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionRequest evm_sign_transaction = 3;
}
}
message ClientConnectError {
enum Code {
UNKNOWN = 0;
APPROVAL_DENIED = 1;
NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE = 2;
}
Code code = 1;
}
message ClientResponse {
oneof payload {
AuthChallenge auth_challenge = 1;
AuthOk auth_ok = 2;
ClientConnectError client_connect_error = 5;
arbiter.evm.EvmSignTransactionResponse evm_sign_transaction = 3;
arbiter.evm.EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse evm_analyze_transaction = 4;
}
}

216
protobufs/evm.proto Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.evm;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
enum EvmError {
EVM_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
EVM_ERROR_VAULT_SEALED = 1;
EVM_ERROR_INTERNAL = 2;
}
message WalletEntry {
bytes address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
}
message WalletList {
repeated WalletEntry wallets = 1;
}
message WalletCreateResponse {
oneof result {
WalletEntry wallet = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
message WalletListResponse {
oneof result {
WalletList wallets = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
// --- Grant types ---
message TransactionRateLimit {
uint32 count = 1;
int64 window_secs = 2;
}
message VolumeRateLimit {
bytes max_volume = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
int64 window_secs = 2;
}
message SharedSettings {
int32 wallet_id = 1;
uint64 chain_id = 2;
optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_from = 3;
optional google.protobuf.Timestamp valid_until = 4;
optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 5; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional TransactionRateLimit rate_limit = 7;
}
message EtherTransferSettings {
repeated bytes targets = 1; // list of 20-byte Ethereum addresses
VolumeRateLimit limit = 2;
}
message TokenTransferSettings {
bytes token_contract = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
optional bytes target = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address; absent means any recipient allowed
repeated VolumeRateLimit volume_limits = 3;
}
message SpecificGrant {
oneof grant {
EtherTransferSettings ether_transfer = 1;
TokenTransferSettings token_transfer = 2;
}
}
message EtherTransferMeaning {
bytes to = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes value = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
}
message TokenInfo {
string symbol = 1;
bytes address = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
uint64 chain_id = 3;
}
// Mirror of token_transfers::Meaning
message TokenTransferMeaning {
TokenInfo token = 1;
bytes to = 2; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes value = 3; // U256 as big-endian bytes
}
// Mirror of policies::SpecificMeaning
message SpecificMeaning {
oneof meaning {
EtherTransferMeaning ether_transfer = 1;
TokenTransferMeaning token_transfer = 2;
}
}
// --- Eval error types ---
message GasLimitExceededViolation {
optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 1; // U256 as big-endian bytes
optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 2; // U256 as big-endian bytes
}
message EvalViolation {
oneof kind {
bytes invalid_target = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
GasLimitExceededViolation gas_limit_exceeded = 2;
google.protobuf.Empty rate_limit_exceeded = 3;
google.protobuf.Empty volumetric_limit_exceeded = 4;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_time = 5;
google.protobuf.Empty invalid_transaction_type = 6;
}
}
// Transaction was classified but no grant covers it
message NoMatchingGrantError {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
}
// Transaction was classified and a grant was found, but constraints were violated
message PolicyViolationsError {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
repeated EvalViolation violations = 2;
}
// top-level error returned when transaction evaluation fails
message TransactionEvalError {
oneof kind {
google.protobuf.Empty contract_creation_not_supported = 1;
google.protobuf.Empty unsupported_transaction_type = 2;
NoMatchingGrantError no_matching_grant = 3;
PolicyViolationsError policy_violations = 4;
}
}
// --- UserAgent grant management ---
message EvmGrantCreateRequest {
int32 client_id = 1;
SharedSettings shared = 2;
SpecificGrant specific = 3;
}
message EvmGrantCreateResponse {
oneof result {
int32 grant_id = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
message EvmGrantDeleteRequest {
int32 grant_id = 1;
}
message EvmGrantDeleteResponse {
oneof result {
google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
// Basic grant info returned in grant listings
message GrantEntry {
int32 id = 1;
int32 client_id = 2;
SharedSettings shared = 3;
SpecificGrant specific = 4;
}
message EvmGrantListRequest {
optional int32 wallet_id = 1;
}
message EvmGrantListResponse {
oneof result {
EvmGrantList grants = 1;
EvmError error = 2;
}
}
message EvmGrantList {
repeated GrantEntry grants = 1;
}
// --- Client transaction operations ---
message EvmSignTransactionRequest {
bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction (unsigned)
}
// oneof because signing and evaluation happen atomically — a signing failure
// is always either an eval error or an internal error, never a partial success
message EvmSignTransactionResponse {
oneof result {
bytes signature = 1; // 65-byte signature: r[32] || s[32] || v[1]
TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
EvmError error = 3;
}
}
message EvmAnalyzeTransactionRequest {
bytes wallet_address = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
bytes rlp_transaction = 2; // RLP-encoded EIP-1559 transaction
}
message EvmAnalyzeTransactionResponse {
oneof result {
SpecificMeaning meaning = 1;
TransactionEvalError eval_error = 2;
EvmError error = 3;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.unseal;
message UserAgentKeyRequest {}
message ServerKeyResponse {
bytes pubkey = 1;
}
message UserAgentSealedKey {
bytes sealed_key = 1;
bytes pubkey = 2;
bytes nonce = 3;
}

144
protobufs/user_agent.proto Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
import "evm.proto";
enum KeyType {
KEY_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 1;
KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1 = 2;
KEY_TYPE_RSA = 3;
}
// --- SDK client management ---
enum SdkClientError {
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS = 1;
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_NOT_FOUND = 2;
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_HAS_RELATED_DATA = 3; // hard-delete blocked by FK (client has grants or transaction logs)
SDK_CLIENT_ERROR_INTERNAL = 4;
}
message SdkClientApproveRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1; // 32-byte ed25519 public key
}
message SdkClientRevokeRequest {
int32 client_id = 1;
}
message SdkClientEntry {
int32 id = 1;
bytes pubkey = 2;
int32 created_at = 3;
}
message SdkClientList {
repeated SdkClientEntry clients = 1;
}
message SdkClientApproveResponse {
oneof result {
SdkClientEntry client = 1;
SdkClientError error = 2;
}
}
message SdkClientRevokeResponse {
oneof result {
google.protobuf.Empty ok = 1;
SdkClientError error = 2;
}
}
message SdkClientListResponse {
oneof result {
SdkClientList clients = 1;
SdkClientError error = 2;
}
}
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
KeyType key_type = 3;
}
message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1;
int32 nonce = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {
bytes signature = 1;
}
message AuthOk {}
message UnsealStart {
bytes client_pubkey = 1;
}
message UnsealStartResponse {
bytes server_pubkey = 1;
}
message UnsealEncryptedKey {
bytes nonce = 1;
bytes ciphertext = 2;
bytes associated_data = 3;
}
enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
}
enum VaultState {
VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
}
message UserAgentRequest {
oneof payload {
AuthChallengeRequest auth_challenge_request = 1;
AuthChallengeSolution auth_challenge_solution = 2;
UnsealStart unseal_start = 3;
UnsealEncryptedKey unseal_encrypted_key = 4;
google.protobuf.Empty query_vault_state = 5;
google.protobuf.Empty evm_wallet_create = 6;
google.protobuf.Empty evm_wallet_list = 7;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateRequest evm_grant_create = 8;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteRequest evm_grant_delete = 9;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListRequest evm_grant_list = 10;
// field 11 reserved: was client_connection_response (online approval removed)
SdkClientApproveRequest sdk_client_approve = 12;
SdkClientRevokeRequest sdk_client_revoke = 13;
google.protobuf.Empty sdk_client_list = 14;
}
}
message UserAgentResponse {
oneof payload {
AuthChallenge auth_challenge = 1;
AuthOk auth_ok = 2;
UnsealStartResponse unseal_start_response = 3;
UnsealResult unseal_result = 4;
VaultState vault_state = 5;
arbiter.evm.WalletCreateResponse evm_wallet_create = 6;
arbiter.evm.WalletListResponse evm_wallet_list = 7;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantCreateResponse evm_grant_create = 8;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantDeleteResponse evm_grant_delete = 9;
arbiter.evm.EvmGrantListResponse evm_grant_list = 10;
// fields 11, 12 reserved: were client_connection_request, client_connection_cancel (online approval removed)
SdkClientApproveResponse sdk_client_approve = 13;
SdkClientRevokeResponse sdk_client_revoke = 14;
SdkClientListResponse sdk_client_list = 15;
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Fetch the Uniswap default token list and emit Rust `TokenInfo` statics.
Usage:
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py # fetch from IPFS
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json # local file
python3 gen_erc20_registry.py tokens.json out.rs # custom output file
"""
import json
import re
import sys
import unicodedata
import urllib.request
UNISWAP_URL = "https://ipfs.io/ipns/tokens.uniswap.org"
SOLANA_CHAIN_ID = 501000101
IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+")
def load_tokens(source=None):
if source:
with open(source) as f:
return json.load(f)
req = urllib.request.Request(
UNISWAP_URL,
headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "gen_tokens/1.0"},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp:
return json.loads(resp.read())
def escape(s: str) -> str:
return s.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
def to_screaming_case(name: str) -> str:
normalized = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", name or "")
ascii_name = normalized.encode("ascii", "ignore").decode("ascii")
snake = IDENTIFIER_RE.sub("_", ascii_name).strip("_").upper()
if not snake:
snake = "TOKEN"
if snake[0].isdigit():
snake = f"TOKEN_{snake}"
return snake
def static_name_for_token(token: dict, used_names: set[str]) -> str:
base = to_screaming_case(token.get("name", ""))
if base not in used_names:
used_names.add(base)
return base
address = token["address"]
suffix = f"{token['chainId']}_{address[2:].upper()[-8:]}"
candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}"
i = 2
while candidate in used_names:
candidate = f"{base}_{suffix}_{i}"
i += 1
used_names.add(candidate)
return candidate
def main():
source = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
output = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "generated_tokens.rs"
data = load_tokens(source)
tokens = data["tokens"]
# Deduplicate by (chainId, address)
seen = set()
unique = []
for t in tokens:
key = (t["chainId"], t["address"].lower())
if key not in seen:
seen.add(key)
unique.append(t)
unique.sort(key=lambda t: (t["chainId"], t.get("symbol", "").upper()))
evm_tokens = [t for t in unique if t["chainId"] != SOLANA_CHAIN_ID]
ver = data["version"]
lines = []
w = lines.append
w(
f"// Auto-generated from Uniswap token list v{ver['major']}.{ver['minor']}.{ver['patch']}"
)
w(f"// {len(evm_tokens)} tokens")
w("// DO NOT EDIT - regenerate with gen_erc20_registry.py")
w("")
used_static_names = set()
token_statics = []
for t in evm_tokens:
static_name = static_name_for_token(t, used_static_names)
token_statics.append((static_name, t))
for static_name, t in token_statics:
addr = t["address"]
name = escape(t.get("name", ""))
symbol = escape(t.get("symbol", ""))
decimals = t.get("decimals", 18)
logo = t.get("logoURI")
chain = t["chainId"]
logo_val = f'Some("{escape(logo)}")' if logo else "None"
w(f"pub static {static_name}: TokenInfo = TokenInfo {{")
w(f' name: "{name}",')
w(f' symbol: "{symbol}",')
w(f" decimals: {decimals},")
w(f' contract: address!("{addr}"),')
w(f" chain: {chain},")
w(f" logo_uri: {logo_val},")
w("};")
w("")
w("pub static TOKENS: &[&TokenInfo] = &[")
for static_name, _ in token_statics:
w(f" &{static_name},")
w("];")
w("")
w("pub fn get_token(")
w(" chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId,")
w(" address: alloy::primitives::Address,")
w(") -> Option<&'static TokenInfo> {")
w(" match (chain_id, address) {")
for static_name, t in token_statics:
w(
f' ({t["chainId"]}, addr) if addr == address!("{t["address"]}") => Some(&{static_name}),'
)
w(" _ => None,")
w(" }")
w("}")
w("")
with open(output, "w") as f:
f.write("\n".join(lines))
print(f"Wrote {len(token_statics)} tokens to {output}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

13
server/.cargo/audit.toml Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
[advisories]
# RUSTSEC-2023-0071: Marvin Attack timing side-channel in rsa crate.
# No fixed version is available upstream.
# RSA support is required for Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager
# (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.security.credentials.keycredentialmanager.requestcreateasync),
# which only issues RSA-2048 keys.
# Mitigations in place:
# - Signing uses BlindedSigningKey (PSS+SHA-256), which applies blinding to
# protect the private key from timing recovery during signing.
# - RSA decryption is never performed; we only verify public-key signatures.
# - The attack requires local, high-resolution timing access against the
# signing process, which is not exposed in our threat model.
ignore = ["RUSTSEC-2023-0071"]

3591
server/Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,15 +1,20 @@
[workspace]
members = [
"crates/arbiter-client",
"crates/arbiter-proto",
"crates/arbiter-server",
"crates/arbiter-useragent",
"crates/*",
]
resolver = "3"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
disallowed-methods = "deny"
[workspace.dependencies]
tonic = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["deflate", "gzip", "tls-connect-info", "zstd"] }
tonic = { version = "0.14.3", features = [
"deflate",
"gzip",
"tls-connect-info",
"zstd",
] }
tracing = "0.1.44"
tokio = { version = "1.49.0", features = ["full"] }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
@@ -24,3 +29,17 @@ futures = "0.3.31"
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
kameo = "0.19.2"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
alloy = "1.7.3"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
"aws_lc_rs",
"pem",
"x509-parser",
"zeroize",
], default-features = false }
k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
sha2 = "0.10"
spki = "0.7"

9
server/clippy.toml Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
disallowed-methods = [
# RSA decryption is forbidden: the rsa crate has RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack).
# We only use RSA for Windows Hello (KeyCredentialManager) public-key verification — decryption
# is never required and must not be introduced.
{ path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
{ path = "rsa::RsaPrivateKey::decrypt_blinded", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). Only PSS signing/verification is permitted." },
{ path = "rsa::traits::Decryptor::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
{ path = "rsa::traits::RandomizedDecryptor::decrypt_with_rng", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt_with_rng() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
]

View File

@@ -3,5 +3,20 @@ name = "arbiter-client"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
license = "Apache-2.0"
[lints]
workspace = true
[dependencies]
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
alloy.workspace = true
tonic.workspace = true
tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
tokio.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
http = "1.4.0"
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.9", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
async-trait.workspace = true

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,272 @@
pub fn add(left: u64, right: u64) -> u64 {
left + right
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::TxSigner,
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
format_challenge,
proto::{
arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient,
client::{
AuthChallengeRequest, AuthChallengeSolution, ClientRequest, ClientResponse,
client_connect_error, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
evm::{
EvmSignTransactionRequest, evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as SignResponseResult,
},
},
url::ArbiterUrl,
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ConnectError {
#[error("Could not establish connection")]
Connection(#[from] tonic::transport::Error),
#[error("Invalid server URI")]
InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
#[error("Invalid CA certificate")]
InvalidCaCert(#[from] webpki::Error),
#[error("gRPC error")]
Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
#[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
MissingAuthChallenge,
#[error("Client approval denied by User Agent")]
ApprovalDenied,
#[error("No User Agents online to approve client")]
NoUserAgentsOnline,
#[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
UnexpectedAuthResponse,
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
enum ClientSignError {
#[error("Transport channel closed")]
ChannelClosed,
#[test]
fn it_works() {
let result = add(2, 2);
assert_eq!(result, 4);
#[error("Connection closed by server")]
ConnectionClosed,
#[error("Invalid response payload")]
InvalidResponse,
#[error("Remote signing was rejected")]
Rejected,
}
struct ClientTransport {
sender: mpsc::Sender<ClientRequest>,
receiver: tonic::Streaming<ClientResponse>,
}
impl ClientTransport {
async fn send(&mut self, request: ClientRequest) -> std::result::Result<(), ClientSignError> {
self.sender
.send(request)
.await
.map_err(|_| ClientSignError::ChannelClosed)
}
async fn recv(&mut self) -> std::result::Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
match self.receiver.message().await {
Ok(Some(resp)) => Ok(resp),
Ok(None) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
}
}
}
pub struct ArbiterSigner {
transport: Mutex<ClientTransport>,
address: Address,
chain_id: Option<ChainId>,
}
impl ArbiterSigner {
pub async fn connect_grpc(
url: ArbiterUrl,
key: ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
address: Address,
) -> std::result::Result<Self, ConnectError> {
let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned();
let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);
// NOTE: We intentionally keep the same URL construction strategy as the user-agent crate
// to avoid behavior drift between the two clients.
let channel = tonic::transport::Channel::from_shared(format!("{}:{}", url.host, url.port))?
.tls_config(tls)?
.connect()
.await?;
let mut client = ArbiterServiceClient::new(channel);
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(16);
let response_stream = client.client(ReceiverStream::new(rx)).await?.into_inner();
let mut transport = ClientTransport {
sender: tx,
receiver: response_stream,
};
authenticate(&mut transport, key).await?;
Ok(Self {
transport: Mutex::new(transport),
address,
chain_id: None,
})
}
async fn sign_transaction_via_arbiter(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
if let Some(chain_id) = self.chain_id
&& !tx.set_chain_id_checked(chain_id)
{
return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
signer: chain_id,
tx: tx.chain_id().unwrap(),
});
}
let mut rlp_transaction = Vec::new();
tx.encode_for_signing(&mut rlp_transaction);
let request = ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::EvmSignTransaction(
EvmSignTransactionRequest {
wallet_address: self.address.as_slice().to_vec(),
rlp_transaction,
},
)),
};
let mut transport = self.transport.lock().await;
transport.send(request).await.map_err(Error::other)?;
let response = transport.recv().await.map_err(Error::other)?;
let payload = response
.payload
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other(ClientSignError::InvalidResponse))?;
let ClientResponsePayload::EvmSignTransaction(sign_response) = payload else {
return Err(Error::other(ClientSignError::InvalidResponse));
};
let Some(result) = sign_response.result else {
return Err(Error::other(ClientSignError::InvalidResponse));
};
match result {
SignResponseResult::Signature(bytes) => {
Signature::try_from(bytes.as_slice()).map_err(Error::other)
}
SignResponseResult::EvalError(_) | SignResponseResult::Error(_) => {
Err(Error::other(ClientSignError::Rejected))
}
}
}
}
async fn authenticate(
transport: &mut ClientTransport,
key: ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
) -> std::result::Result<(), ConnectError> {
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
},
)),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| ConnectError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?;
let response = transport
.recv()
.await
.map_err(|_| ConnectError::MissingAuthChallenge)?;
let payload = response.payload.ok_or(ConnectError::MissingAuthChallenge)?;
match payload {
ClientResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(challenge) => {
let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let signature = key.sign(&challenge_payload).to_bytes().to_vec();
transport
.send(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(
AuthChallengeSolution { signature },
)),
})
.await
.map_err(|_| ConnectError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?;
// Current server flow does not emit `AuthOk` for SDK clients, so we proceed after
// sending the solution. If authentication fails, the first business request will return
// a `ClientConnectError` or the stream will close.
Ok(())
}
ClientResponsePayload::ClientConnectError(err) => {
match client_connect_error::Code::try_from(err.code)
.unwrap_or(client_connect_error::Code::Unknown)
{
client_connect_error::Code::ApprovalDenied => Err(ConnectError::ApprovalDenied),
client_connect_error::Code::NoUserAgentsOnline => {
Err(ConnectError::NoUserAgentsOnline)
}
client_connect_error::Code::Unknown => Err(ConnectError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
}
}
_ => Err(ConnectError::UnexpectedAuthResponse),
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Signer for ArbiterSigner {
async fn sign_hash(&self, _hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
Err(Error::other(
"hash-only signing is not supported for ArbiterSigner; use transaction signing",
))
}
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
fn chain_id(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
self.chain_id
}
fn set_chain_id(&mut self, chain_id: Option<ChainId>) {
self.chain_id = chain_id;
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl TxSigner<Signature> for ArbiterSigner {
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
async fn sign_transaction(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_transaction_via_arbiter(tx).await
}
}

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ name = "arbiter-proto"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
license = "Apache-2.0"
[dependencies]
tonic.workspace = true
@@ -12,9 +13,25 @@ hex = "0.4.3"
tonic-prost = "0.14.3"
prost = "0.14.3"
kameo.workspace = true
url = "2.5.8"
miette.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
base64 = "0.22.1"
prost-types.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true
[build-dependencies]
tonic-prost-build = "0.14.3"
protoc-bin-vendored = "3"
[dev-dependencies]
rstest.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
rcgen.workspace = true
[package.metadata.cargo-shear]
ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost", "kameo"]

View File

@@ -3,16 +3,25 @@ use tonic_prost_build::configure;
static PROTOBUF_DIR: &str = "../../../protobufs";
fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
if std::env::var("PROTOC").is_err() {
println!("cargo:warning=PROTOC environment variable not set, using vendored protoc");
let protoc = protoc_bin_vendored::protoc_bin_path().unwrap();
unsafe { std::env::set_var("PROTOC", protoc) };
}
println!("cargo::rerun-if-changed={PROTOBUF_DIR}");
configure()
.message_attribute(".", "#[derive(::kameo::Reply)]")
.compile_protos(
&[
format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/auth.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/user_agent.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/client.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/evm.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
],
&[PROTOBUF_DIR.to_string()],
)
.unwrap();
Ok(())
}

View File

@@ -1,19 +1,28 @@
use crate::proto::auth::AuthChallenge;
pub mod transport;
pub mod url;
use base64::{Engine, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
pub mod proto {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");
pub mod auth {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.auth");
pub mod user_agent {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent");
}
pub mod client {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.client");
}
pub mod evm {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.evm");
}
}
pub mod transport;
pub static BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH: &'static str = "bootstrap_token";
pub static BOOTSTRAP_PATH: &str = "bootstrap_token";
pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
static ARBITER_HOME: &'static str = ".arbiter";
static ARBITER_HOME: &str = ".arbiter";
let home_dir = std::env::home_dir().ok_or(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
"can not get home directory",
@@ -25,7 +34,7 @@ pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
Ok(arbiter_home)
}
pub fn format_challenge(challenge: &AuthChallenge) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", challenge.nonce, hex::encode(&challenge.pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes().to_vec()
pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes()
}

View File

@@ -1,46 +1,309 @@
use futures::{Stream, StreamExt};
use tokio::sync::mpsc::{self, error::SendError};
use tonic::{Status, Streaming};
//! Transport-facing abstractions for protocol/session code.
//!
//! This module separates three concerns:
//!
//! - protocol/session logic wants a small duplex interface ([`Bi`])
//! - transport adapters push concrete stream items to an underlying IO layer
//! - transport boundaries translate between protocol-facing and transport-facing
//! item types via direction-specific converters
//!
//! [`Bi`] is intentionally minimal and transport-agnostic:
//! - [`Bi::recv`] yields inbound protocol messages
//! - [`Bi::send`] accepts outbound protocol/domain items
//!
//! # Generic Ordering Rule
//!
//! This module uses a single convention consistently: when a type or trait is
//! parameterized by protocol message directions, the generic parameters are
//! declared as `Inbound` first, then `Outbound`.
//!
//! For [`Bi`], that means `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>`:
//! - `recv() -> Option<Inbound>`
//! - `send(Outbound)`
//!
//! For adapter types that are parameterized by direction-specific converters,
//! inbound-related converter parameters are declared before outbound-related
//! converter parameters.
//!
//! [`RecvConverter`] and [`SendConverter`] are infallible conversion traits used
//! by adapters to map between protocol-facing and transport-facing item types.
//! The traits themselves are not result-aware; adapters decide how transport
//! errors are handled before (or instead of) conversion.
//!
//! [`grpc::GrpcAdapter`] combines:
//! - a tonic inbound stream
//! - a Tokio sender for outbound transport items
//! - a [`RecvConverter`] for the receive path
//! - a [`SendConverter`] for the send path
//!
//! [`DummyTransport`] is a no-op implementation useful for tests and local actor
//! execution where no real network stream exists.
//!
//! # Component Interaction
//!
//! ```text
//! inbound (network -> protocol)
//! ============================
//!
//! tonic::Streaming<RecvTransport>
//! -> grpc::GrpcAdapter::recv()
//! |
//! +--> on `Ok(item)`: RecvConverter::convert(RecvTransport) -> Inbound
//! +--> on `Err(status)`: log error and close stream (`None`)
//! -> Bi::recv()
//! -> protocol/session actor
//!
//! outbound (protocol -> network)
//! ==============================
//!
//! protocol/session actor
//! -> Bi::send(Outbound)
//! -> grpc::GrpcAdapter::send()
//! |
//! +--> SendConverter::convert(Outbound) -> SendTransport
//! -> Tokio mpsc::Sender<SendTransport>
//! -> tonic response stream
//! ```
//!
//! # Design Notes
//!
//! - `send()` returns [`Error`] only for transport delivery failures (for
//! example, when the outbound channel is closed).
//! - [`grpc::GrpcAdapter`] logs tonic receive errors and treats them as stream
//! closure (`None`).
//! - When protocol-facing and transport-facing types are identical, use
//! [`IdentityRecvConverter`] / [`IdentitySendConverter`].
use std::marker::PhantomData;
// Abstraction for stream for sans-io capabilities
pub trait Bi<T, U>: Stream<Item = Result<T, Status>> + Send + Sync + 'static {
type Error;
fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<U, Status>,
) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = Result<(), Self::Error>> + Send;
use async_trait::async_trait;
/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Transport channel is closed")]
ChannelClosed,
#[error("Unexpected message received")]
UnexpectedMessage,
}
// Bi-directional stream abstraction for handling gRPC streaming requests and responses
pub struct BiStream<T, U> {
pub request_stream: Streaming<T>,
pub response_sender: mpsc::Sender<Result<U, Status>>,
}
impl<T, U> Stream for BiStream<T, U>
/// Receives one message from `transport` and extracts a value from it using
/// `extractor`. Returns [`Error::ChannelClosed`] if the transport closes and
/// [`Error::UnexpectedMessage`] if `extractor` returns `None`.
pub async fn expect_message<T, Inbound, Outbound, Target, F>(
transport: &mut T,
extractor: F,
) -> Result<Target, Error>
where
T: Send + 'static,
U: Send + 'static,
T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
F: FnOnce(Inbound) -> Option<Target>,
{
type Item = Result<T, Status>;
let msg = transport.recv().await.ok_or(Error::ChannelClosed)?;
extractor(msg).ok_or(Error::UnexpectedMessage)
}
fn poll_next(
mut self: std::pin::Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut std::task::Context<'_>,
) -> std::task::Poll<Option<Self::Item>> {
self.request_stream.poll_next_unpin(cx)
/// Minimal bidirectional transport abstraction used by protocol code.
///
/// `Bi<Inbound, Outbound>` models a duplex channel with:
/// - inbound items of type `Inbound` read via [`Bi::recv`]
/// - outbound items of type `Outbound` written via [`Bi::send`]
#[async_trait]
pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Send + Sync + 'static {
async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error>;
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound>;
}
/// Converts transport-facing inbound items into protocol-facing inbound items.
pub trait RecvConverter: Send + Sync + 'static {
type Input;
type Output;
fn convert(&self, item: Self::Input) -> Self::Output;
}
/// Converts protocol/domain outbound items into transport-facing outbound items.
pub trait SendConverter: Send + Sync + 'static {
type Input;
type Output;
fn convert(&self, item: Self::Input) -> Self::Output;
}
/// A [`RecvConverter`] that forwards values unchanged.
pub struct IdentityRecvConverter<T> {
_marker: PhantomData<T>,
}
impl<T> IdentityRecvConverter<T> {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
_marker: PhantomData,
}
}
}
impl<T, U> Bi<T, U> for BiStream<T, U>
where
T: Send + 'static,
U: Send + 'static,
{
type Error = SendError<Result<U, Status>>;
async fn send(&mut self, item: Result<U, Status>) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
self.response_sender.send(item).await
impl<T> Default for IdentityRecvConverter<T> {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
impl<T> RecvConverter for IdentityRecvConverter<T>
where
T: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
type Input = T;
type Output = T;
fn convert(&self, item: Self::Input) -> Self::Output {
item
}
}
/// A [`SendConverter`] that forwards values unchanged.
pub struct IdentitySendConverter<T> {
_marker: PhantomData<T>,
}
impl<T> IdentitySendConverter<T> {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
_marker: PhantomData,
}
}
}
impl<T> Default for IdentitySendConverter<T> {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
impl<T> SendConverter for IdentitySendConverter<T>
where
T: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
type Input = T;
type Output = T;
fn convert(&self, item: Self::Input) -> Self::Output {
item
}
}
/// gRPC-specific transport adapters and helpers.
pub mod grpc {
use async_trait::async_trait;
use futures::StreamExt;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tonic::Streaming;
use super::{Bi, Error, RecvConverter, SendConverter};
/// [`Bi`] adapter backed by a tonic gRPC bidirectional stream.
///
/// Tonic receive errors are logged and treated as stream closure (`None`).
/// The receive converter is only invoked for successful inbound transport
/// items.
pub struct GrpcAdapter<InboundConverter, OutboundConverter>
where
InboundConverter: RecvConverter,
OutboundConverter: SendConverter,
{
sender: mpsc::Sender<OutboundConverter::Output>,
receiver: Streaming<InboundConverter::Input>,
inbound_converter: InboundConverter,
outbound_converter: OutboundConverter,
}
impl<InboundTransport, Inbound, InboundConverter, OutboundConverter>
GrpcAdapter<InboundConverter, OutboundConverter>
where
InboundConverter: RecvConverter<Input = InboundTransport, Output = Inbound>,
OutboundConverter: SendConverter,
{
pub fn new(
sender: mpsc::Sender<OutboundConverter::Output>,
receiver: Streaming<InboundTransport>,
inbound_converter: InboundConverter,
outbound_converter: OutboundConverter,
) -> Self {
Self {
sender,
receiver,
inbound_converter,
outbound_converter,
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<InboundConverter, OutboundConverter> Bi<InboundConverter::Output, OutboundConverter::Input>
for GrpcAdapter<InboundConverter, OutboundConverter>
where
InboundConverter: RecvConverter,
OutboundConverter: SendConverter,
OutboundConverter::Input: Send + 'static,
OutboundConverter::Output: Send + 'static,
{
#[tracing::instrument(level = "trace", skip(self, item))]
async fn send(&mut self, item: OutboundConverter::Input) -> Result<(), Error> {
let outbound = self.outbound_converter.convert(item);
self.sender
.send(outbound)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::ChannelClosed)
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "trace", skip(self))]
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<InboundConverter::Output> {
match self.receiver.next().await {
Some(Ok(item)) => Some(self.inbound_converter.convert(item)),
Some(Err(error)) => {
tracing::error!(error = ?error, "grpc transport recv failed; closing stream");
None
}
None => None,
}
}
}
}
/// No-op [`Bi`] transport for tests and manual actor usage.
///
/// `send` drops all items and succeeds. [`Bi::recv`] never resolves and therefore
/// does not busy-wait or spuriously close the stream.
pub struct DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
_marker: PhantomData<(Inbound, Outbound)>,
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound> DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
_marker: PhantomData,
}
}
}
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Default for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound> {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for DummyTransport<Inbound, Outbound>
where
Inbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
Outbound: Send + Sync + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, _item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
Ok(())
}
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
None
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
use std::fmt::Display;
use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_URL_SAFE};
use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter";
const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert";
const BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY: &str = "bootstrap_token";
pub struct ArbiterUrl {
pub host: String,
pub port: u16,
pub ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
pub bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
impl Display for ArbiterUrl {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
let mut base = format!(
"{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://{}:{}?{CERT_QUERY_KEY}={}",
self.host,
self.port,
BASE64_URL_SAFE.encode(&self.ca_cert)
);
if let Some(token) = &self.bootstrap_token {
base.push_str(&format!("&{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY}={}", token));
}
f.write_str(&base)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Invalid URL scheme, expected '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")]
#[diagnostic(
code(arbiter::url::invalid_scheme),
help("The URL must start with '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://'")
)]
InvalidScheme,
#[error("Missing host in URL")]
#[diagnostic(
code(arbiter::url::missing_host),
help("The URL must include a host, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:<port>'")
)]
MissingHost,
#[error("Missing port in URL")]
#[diagnostic(
code(arbiter::url::missing_port),
help("The URL must include a port, e.g., '{ARBITER_URL_SCHEME}://127.0.0.1:1234'")
)]
MissingPort,
#[error("Missing 'cert' query parameter in URL")]
#[diagnostic(
code(arbiter::url::missing_cert),
help("The URL must include a 'cert' query parameter")
)]
MissingCert,
#[error("Invalid base64 in 'cert' query parameter: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::url::invalid_cert_base64))]
InvalidCertBase64(#[from] base64::DecodeError),
}
impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a str> for ArbiterUrl {
type Error = Error;
fn try_from(value: &'a str) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let url = url::Url::parse(value).map_err(|_| Error::InvalidScheme)?;
if url.scheme() != ARBITER_URL_SCHEME {
return Err(Error::InvalidScheme);
}
let host = url.host_str().ok_or(Error::MissingHost)?.to_string();
let port = url.port().ok_or(Error::MissingPort)?;
let cert_str = url
.query_pairs()
.find(|(k, _)| k == CERT_QUERY_KEY)
.ok_or(Error::MissingCert)?
.1;
let cert = BASE64_URL_SAFE.decode(cert_str.as_ref())?;
let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&cert).into_owned();
let bootstrap_token = url
.query_pairs()
.find(|(k, _)| k == BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_QUERY_KEY)
.map(|(_, v)| v.to_string());
Ok(ArbiterUrl {
host,
port,
ca_cert: cert,
bootstrap_token,
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed;
use rstest::rstest;
use super::*;
#[rstest]
fn test_parsing_correctness(
#[values("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "192.168.1.1", "some.domain.com")] host: &str,
#[values(None, Some("token123".to_string()))] bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
) {
let cert = generate_simple_self_signed(&["Arbiter CA".into()]).unwrap();
let cert = cert.cert.der();
let url = ArbiterUrl {
host: host.to_string(),
port: 1234,
ca_cert: cert.clone().into_owned(),
bootstrap_token,
};
let url_str = url.to_string();
let parsed_url = ArbiterUrl::try_from(url_str.as_str()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host, parsed_url.host);
assert_eq!(url.port, parsed_url.port);
assert_eq!(url.ca_cert.to_vec(), parsed_url.ca_cert.to_vec());
assert_eq!(url.bootstrap_token, parsed_url.bootstrap_token);
}
}

BIN
server/crates/arbiter-server/.DS_Store vendored Normal file

Binary file not shown.

View File

@@ -3,15 +3,13 @@ name = "arbiter-server"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
repository = "https://git.markettakers.org/MarketTakers/arbiter"
license = "Apache-2.0"
[lints]
workspace = true
[dependencies]
diesel = { version = "2.3.6", features = [
"sqlite",
"uuid",
"time",
"chrono",
"serde_json",
] }
diesel = { version = "2.3.6", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
diesel-async = { version = "0.7.4", features = [
"bb8",
"migrations",
@@ -21,7 +19,9 @@ diesel-async = { version = "0.7.4", features = [
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
tonic.workspace = true
tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
tokio.workspace = true
rustls.workspace = true
smlang.workspace = true
@@ -34,16 +34,24 @@ futures.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
dashmap = "6.1.0"
rand.workspace = true
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
"aws_lc_rs",
"pem",
"x509-parser",
"zeroize",
], default-features = false }
rcgen.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
memsafe = "0.4.0"
zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
kameo.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
restructed = "0.2.2"
strum = { version = "0.27.2", features = ["derive"] }
pem = "3.0.6"
k256.workspace = true
rsa.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
spki.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
[dev-dependencies]
insta = "1.46.3"
test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }

View File

@@ -1,31 +1,159 @@
create table if not exists aead_encrypted (
create table if not exists root_key_history (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
current_nonce integer not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
-- root key stored as aead encrypted artifact, with only difference that it's decrypted by unseal key (derived from user password)
root_key_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented. Used for encrypting root key
data_encryption_nonce blob not null default(1), -- nonce used for encrypting with key itself
ciphertext blob not null,
tag blob not null,
schema_version integer not null default(1) -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
salt blob not null -- for key deriviation
) STRICT;
create table if not exists aead_encrypted (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
current_nonce blob not null default(1), -- if re-encrypted, this should be incremented
ciphertext blob not null,
tag blob not null,
schema_version integer not null default(1), -- server would need to reencrypt, because this means that we have changed algorithm
associated_root_key_id integer not null references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_nonce_per_root_key on aead_encrypted (
current_nonce,
associated_root_key_id
);
create table if not exists tls_history (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY,
cert text not null,
cert_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
ca_cert text not null,
ca_key text not null, -- PEM Encoded private key
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
-- This is a singleton
create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
id INTEGER not null PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- singleton row, id must be 1
root_key_id integer references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
cert_key blob not null,
cert blob not null
root_key_id integer references root_key_history (id) on delete RESTRICT, -- if null, means wasn't bootstrapped yet
tls_id integer references tls_history (id) on delete RESTRICT
) STRICT;
insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing; -- ensure singleton row exists
create table if not exists useragent_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default (1), -- used for auth challenge
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
key_type integer not null default(1), -- 1=Ed25519, 2=ECDSA(secp256k1)
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create table if not exists program_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default (1), -- used for auth challenge
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
) STRICT;
create table if not exists evm_wallet (
id integer not null primary key,
address blob not null, -- 20-byte Ethereum address
aead_encrypted_id integer not null references aead_encrypted (id) on delete RESTRICT,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_address on evm_wallet (address);
create unique index if not exists uniq_evm_wallet_aead on evm_wallet (aead_encrypted_id);
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_limit (
id integer not null primary key,
window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
) STRICT;
-- Shared grant properties: client scope, timeframe, fee caps, and rate limit
create table if not exists evm_basic_grant (
id integer not null primary key,
wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet(id) on delete restrict,
client_id integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict,
chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
valid_from integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no lower bound
valid_until integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no upper bound
max_gas_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
max_priority_fee_per_gas blob, -- big-endian 32-byte U256, null = unlimited
rate_limit_count integer, -- max transactions in window, null = unlimited
rate_limit_window_secs integer, -- window duration in seconds, null = unlimited
revoked_at integer, -- unix timestamp when revoked, null = still active
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
-- Shared transaction log for all EVM grants, used for rate limit tracking and auditing
create table if not exists evm_transaction_log (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_basic_grant(id) on delete restrict,
client_id integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict,
wallet_id integer not null references evm_wallet(id) on delete restrict,
chain_id integer not null,
eth_value blob not null, -- always present on any EVM tx
signed_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
create index if not exists idx_evm_basic_grant_wallet_chain on evm_basic_grant(client_id, wallet_id, chain_id);
-- ===============================
-- ERC20 token transfer grant
-- ===============================
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_grant (
id integer not null primary key,
basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant(id) on delete cascade,
token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
receiver blob -- 20-byte recipient address or null if every recipient allowed
) STRICT;
-- Per-window volume limits for token transfer grants
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant(id) on delete cascade,
window_secs integer not null, -- window duration in seconds
max_volume blob not null -- big-endian 32-byte U256
) STRICT;
-- Log table for token transfer grant usage
create table if not exists evm_token_transfer_log (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_token_transfer_grant(id) on delete restrict,
log_id integer not null references evm_transaction_log(id) on delete restrict,
chain_id integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
token_contract blob not null, -- 20-byte ERC20 contract address
recipient_address blob not null, -- 20-byte recipient address
value blob not null, -- big-endian 32-byte U256
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_grant on evm_token_transfer_log(grant_id);
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_log_id on evm_token_transfer_log(log_id);
create index if not exists idx_token_transfer_log_chain on evm_token_transfer_log(chain_id);
-- ===============================
-- Ether transfer grant (uses base log)
-- ===============================
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant (
id integer not null primary key,
basic_grant_id integer not null unique references evm_basic_grant(id) on delete cascade,
limit_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_limit(id) on delete restrict
) STRICT;
-- Specific recipient addresses for an ether transfer grant
create table if not exists evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (
id integer not null primary key,
grant_id integer not null references evm_ether_transfer_grant(id) on delete cascade,
address blob not null -- 20-byte recipient address
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_ether_transfer_target on evm_ether_transfer_grant_target(grant_id, address);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS program_client_public_key_unique;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX program_client_public_key_unique
ON program_client (public_key);

View File

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
pub mod user_agent;
pub mod client;

View File

@@ -1,40 +1,37 @@
use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, QueryDsl};
use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use miette::Diagnostic;
use rand::{RngExt, distr::StandardUniform, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use secrecy::SecretString;
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::info;
use zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};
use crate::{
context::{self, ServerContext},
db::{self, DatabasePool, schema},
use rand::{
RngExt,
distr::{Alphanumeric},
make_rng,
rngs::StdRng,
};
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
let token: String = rng
.sample_iter::<char, _>(StandardUniform)
.take(TOKEN_LENGTH)
.fold(Default::default(), |mut accum, char| {
let token: String = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
Default::default(),
|mut accum, char| {
accum += char.to_string().as_str();
accum
});
},
);
tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
Ok(token)
}
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum BootstrapError {
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::bootstrap::database))]
Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
@@ -49,12 +46,12 @@ pub enum BootstrapError {
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct BootstrapActor {
pub struct Bootstrapper {
token: Option<String>,
}
impl BootstrapActor {
pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, BootstrapError> {
impl Bootstrapper {
pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let row_count: i64 = schema::useragent_client::table
@@ -64,10 +61,9 @@ impl BootstrapActor {
drop(conn);
let token = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?;
info!(%token, "Generated bootstrap token");
tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
Some(token)
} else {
None
@@ -75,15 +71,10 @@ impl BootstrapActor {
Ok(Self { token })
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
self.token.clone()
}
}
#[messages]
impl BootstrapActor {
impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
match &self.token {
@@ -102,3 +93,11 @@ impl BootstrapActor {
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn get_token(&self) -> Option<String> {
self.token.clone()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse},
transport::Bi,
};
use crate::ServerContext;
pub(crate) async fn handle_client(
_context: ServerContext,
_bistream: impl Bi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
) {
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
format_challenge,
proto::client::{
AuthChallenge, AuthChallengeSolution, ClientConnectError, ClientRequest, ClientResponse,
client_connect_error::Code as ConnectErrorCode,
client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
transport::expect_message,
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::client::ClientConnection,
db::{self, schema::program_client},
};
use super::session::ClientSession;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Unexpected message payload")]
UnexpectedMessagePayload,
#[error("Invalid client public key length")]
InvalidClientPubkeyLength,
#[error("Invalid client public key encoding")]
InvalidAuthPubkeyEncoding,
#[error("Database pool unavailable")]
DatabasePoolUnavailable,
#[error("Database operation failed")]
DatabaseOperationFailed,
#[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
InvalidChallengeSolution,
#[error("Client not registered")]
NotRegistered,
#[error("Internal error")]
InternalError,
#[error("Transport error")]
Transport,
}
/// Atomically reads and increments the nonce for a known client.
/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
async fn get_nonce(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
) -> Result<Option<(i32, i32)>, Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey_bytes.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let Some((client_id, current_nonce)) = program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
.await
.optional()?
else {
return Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(None);
};
update(program_client::table)
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.set(program_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Ok(Some((client_id, current_nonce)))
})
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn challenge_client(
props: &mut ClientConnection,
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
nonce: i32,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let challenge = AuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec(),
nonce,
};
props
.transport
.send(Ok(ClientResponse {
payload: Some(ClientResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(challenge.clone())),
}))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
let AuthChallengeSolution { signature } =
expect_message(&mut *props.transport, |req: ClientRequest| {
match req.payload? {
ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(s) => Some(s),
_ => None,
}
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to receive challenge solution");
Error::Transport
})?;
let formatted = format_challenge(nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let sig = signature.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
error!("Invalid signature length");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
pubkey.verify_strict(&formatted, &sig).map_err(|_| {
error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
Ok(())
}
fn connect_error_code(err: &Error) -> ConnectErrorCode {
match err {
Error::NotRegistered => ConnectErrorCode::ApprovalDenied,
_ => ConnectErrorCode::Unknown,
}
}
async fn authenticate(props: &mut ClientConnection) -> Result<(VerifyingKey, i32), Error> {
let Some(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(challenge)),
}) = props.transport.recv().await
else {
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
let pubkey_bytes = challenge
.pubkey
.as_array()
.ok_or(Error::InvalidClientPubkeyLength)?;
let pubkey =
VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey_bytes).map_err(|_| Error::InvalidAuthPubkeyEncoding)?;
let (client_id, nonce) = match get_nonce(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
Some((client_id, nonce)) => (client_id, nonce),
None => return Err(Error::NotRegistered),
};
challenge_client(props, pubkey, nonce).await?;
Ok((pubkey, client_id))
}
pub async fn authenticate_and_create(mut props: ClientConnection) -> Result<ClientSession, Error> {
match authenticate(&mut props).await {
Ok((_pubkey, client_id)) => Ok(ClientSession::new(props, client_id)),
Err(err) => {
let code = connect_error_code(&err);
let _ = props
.transport
.send(Ok(ClientResponse {
payload: Some(ClientResponsePayload::ClientConnectError(
ClientConnectError { code: code.into() },
)),
}))
.await;
Err(err)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse},
transport::Bi,
};
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::session::ClientSession},
db,
};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ClientError {
#[error("Expected message with payload")]
MissingRequestPayload,
#[error("Unexpected request payload")]
UnexpectedRequestPayload,
#[error("State machine error")]
StateTransitionFailed,
#[error("Connection registration failed")]
ConnectionRegistrationFailed,
#[error(transparent)]
Auth(#[from] auth::Error),
}
pub type Transport = Box<dyn Bi<ClientRequest, Result<ClientResponse, ClientError>> + Send>;
pub struct ClientConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) transport: Transport,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl ClientConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, transport: Transport, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self {
db,
transport,
actors,
}
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub async fn connect_client(props: ClientConnection) {
match auth::authenticate_and_create(props).await {
Ok(session) => {
ClientSession::spawn(session);
info!("Client authenticated, session started");
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Authentication failed, closing connection");
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, rlp::Decodable};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
ClientRequest, ClientResponse, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
evm::{
EvmError, EvmSignTransactionResponse, evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as SignResult,
},
};
use kameo::Actor;
use tokio::select;
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
client::{ClientConnection, ClientError},
evm::ClientSignTransaction,
router::RegisterClient,
},
db,
};
pub struct ClientSession {
props: ClientConnection,
client_id: i32,
}
impl ClientSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: i32) -> Self {
Self { props, client_id }
}
pub async fn process_transport_inbound(&mut self, req: ClientRequest) -> Output {
let msg = req.payload.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(actor = "client", "Received message with no payload");
ClientError::MissingRequestPayload
})?;
match msg {
ClientRequestPayload::EvmSignTransaction(sign_req) => {
let wallet_address: [u8; 20] = sign_req
.wallet_address
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| ClientError::UnexpectedRequestPayload)?;
let mut rlp_bytes: &[u8] = &sign_req.rlp_transaction;
let tx = TxEip1559::decode(&mut rlp_bytes)
.map_err(|_| ClientError::UnexpectedRequestPayload)?;
let result = self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id: self.client_id,
wallet_address: Address::from_slice(&wallet_address),
transaction: tx,
})
.await;
let response_result = match result {
Ok(signature) => SignResult::Signature(signature.as_bytes().to_vec()),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "client sign transaction failed");
SignResult::Error(EvmError::Internal.into())
}
};
Ok(ClientResponse {
payload: Some(ClientResponsePayload::EvmSignTransaction(
EvmSignTransactionResponse {
result: Some(response_result),
},
)),
})
}
_ => Err(ClientError::UnexpectedRequestPayload),
}
}
}
type Output = Result<ClientResponse, ClientError>;
impl Actor for ClientSession {
type Args = Self;
type Error = ClientError;
async fn on_start(
args: Self::Args,
this: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props
.actors
.router
.ask(RegisterClient { actor: this })
.await
.map_err(|_| ClientError::ConnectionRegistrationFailed)?;
Ok(args)
}
async fn next(
&mut self,
_actor_ref: kameo::prelude::WeakActorRef<Self>,
mailbox_rx: &mut kameo::prelude::MailboxReceiver<Self>,
) -> Option<kameo::mailbox::Signal<Self>> {
loop {
select! {
signal = mailbox_rx.recv() => {
return signal;
}
msg = self.props.transport.recv() => {
match msg {
Some(request) => {
match self.process_transport_inbound(request).await {
Ok(resp) => {
if self.props.transport.send(Ok(resp)).await.is_err() {
error!(actor = "client", reason = "channel closed", "send.failed");
return Some(kameo::mailbox::Signal::Stop);
}
}
Err(err) => {
let _ = self.props.transport.send(Err(err)).await;
return Some(kameo::mailbox::Signal::Stop);
}
}
}
None => {
info!(actor = "client", "transport.closed");
return Some(kameo::mailbox::Signal::Stop);
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
impl ClientSession {
pub fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
use arbiter_proto::transport::DummyTransport;
let transport: super::Transport = Box::new(DummyTransport::new());
let props = ClientConnection::new(db, transport, actors);
Self {
props,
client_id: 0,
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
db::{self, DatabasePool, models::{self, EvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp}, schema},
evm::{
self, RunKind,
policies::{
FullGrant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
},
};
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Wallet not found")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::wallet_not_found))]
WalletNotFound,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::database))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Database pool error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::pool))]
Pool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::keyholder))]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::keyholder_send))]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Signing error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::signing))]
Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
#[error("Policy error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::sign::vet))]
Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::keyholder))]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::keyholder_send))]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::database))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Database pool error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::database_pool))]
DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Grant creation error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::evm::creation))]
Creation(#[from] evm::CreationError),
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct EvmActor {
pub keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub db: DatabasePool,
pub rng: StdRng,
pub engine: evm::Engine,
}
impl EvmActor {
pub fn new(keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
// is it safe to seed rng from system once?
// todo: audit
let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone());
Self { keyholder, db, rng, engine }
}
}
#[messages]
impl EvmActor {
#[message]
pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<Address, Error> {
let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);
// Move raw key bytes into a Vec<u8> MemSafe for KeyHolder
let plaintext = {
let reader = key_cell.read().expect("MemSafe read");
MemSafe::new(reader.to_vec()).expect("MemSafe allocation")
};
let aead_id: i32 = self
.keyholder
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
.values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
})
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(address)
}
#[message]
pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<Address>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let rows: Vec<models::EvmWallet> = schema::evm_wallet::table
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
.load(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(rows
.into_iter()
.map(|w| Address::from_slice(&w.address))
.collect())
}
}
#[messages]
impl EvmActor {
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_create_grant(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
basic: SharedGrantSettings,
grant: SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, evm::CreationError> {
match grant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => {
self.engine
.create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(client_id, FullGrant { basic, specific: settings })
.await
}
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => {
self.engine
.create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(client_id, FullGrant { basic, specific: settings })
.await
}
}
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
.set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_list_grants(
&mut self,
wallet_id: Option<i32>,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmBasicGrant>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let mut query = schema::evm_basic_grant::table
.select(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.into_boxed();
if let Some(wid) = wallet_id {
query = query.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::wallet_id.eq(wid));
}
Ok(query.load(&mut conn).await?)
}
#[message]
pub async fn shared_analyze_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<SpecificMeaning, SignTransactionError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
drop(conn);
let meaning = self.engine
.evaluate_transaction(wallet.id, client_id, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.await?;
Ok(meaning)
}
#[message]
pub async fn client_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
mut transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let wallet = schema::evm_wallet::table
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
.filter(schema::evm_wallet::address.eq(wallet_address.as_slice()))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()?
.ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
drop(conn);
let raw_key: MemSafe<Vec<u8>> = self
.keyholder
.ask(Decrypt { aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id })
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::KeyholderSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_memsafe(raw_key)?;
self.engine
.evaluate_transaction(wallet.id, client_id, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
.await?;
use alloy::network::TxSignerSync as _;
Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
}
}

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pub mod v1;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
use std::ops::Deref as _;
use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2, password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt};
use chacha20poly1305::{
AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload},
};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use rand::{
Rng as _, SeedableRng,
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct Nonce([u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
impl Nonce {
pub fn increment(&mut self) {
for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
if self.0[i] == 0xFF {
self.0[i] = 0;
} else {
self.0[i] += 1;
break;
}
}
}
pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.0.to_vec()
}
}
impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(value: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
if value.len() != NONCE_LENGTH {
return Err(());
}
let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LENGTH];
nonce.copy_from_slice(value);
Ok(Self(nonce))
}
}
pub struct KeyCell(pub MemSafe<Key>);
impl From<MemSafe<Key>> for KeyCell {
fn from(value: MemSafe<Key>) -> Self {
Self(value)
}
}
impl TryFrom<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
type Error = ();
fn try_from(mut value: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let value = value.read().unwrap();
if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
return Err(());
}
let mut cell = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let mut cell_write = cell.write().unwrap();
let cell_slice: &mut [u8] = cell_write.as_mut();
cell_slice.copy_from_slice(&value);
}
Ok(Self(cell))
}
}
impl KeyCell {
pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
}
key.into()
}
pub fn encrypt_in_place(
&mut self,
nonce: &Nonce,
associated_data: &[u8],
mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
}
pub fn decrypt_in_place(
&mut self,
nonce: &Nonce,
associated_data: &[u8],
buffer: &mut MemSafe<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let mut buffer = buffer.write().unwrap();
let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
}
pub fn encrypt(
&mut self,
nonce: &Nonce,
associated_data: &[u8],
plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let key_reader = self.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
nonce,
Payload {
msg: plaintext.as_ref(),
aad: associated_data,
},
)?;
Ok(ciphertext)
}
}
pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
let mut salt = Salt::default();
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
salt
}
/// User password might be of different length, have not enough entropy, etc...
/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
pub fn derive_seal_key(mut password: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
let params = argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap();
let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
let mut key = MemSafe::new(Key::default()).unwrap();
{
let password_source = password.read().unwrap();
let mut key_buffer = key.write().unwrap();
let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
hasher
.hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
.unwrap();
}
key.into()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
#[test]
pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let password2 = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key1 = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
let mut key2 = derive_seal_key(password2, &salt);
let key1_reader = key1.0.read().unwrap();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read().unwrap();
assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
}
#[test]
pub fn successful_derive() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
let key_reader = key.0.read().unwrap();
let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
}
#[test]
pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = MemSafe::new(PASSWORD.to_vec()).unwrap();
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_seal_key(password, &salt);
let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
let associated_data = b"associated data";
let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();
key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
.unwrap();
assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
let mut buffer = MemSafe::new(buffer).unwrap();
key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
.unwrap();
let buffer = buffer.read().unwrap();
assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
}
#[test]
// We should fuzz this
pub fn test_nonce_increment() {
let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
nonce.increment();
assert_eq!(
nonce.0,
[
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
]
);
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
dsl::{insert_into, update},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
};
use encryption::v1::{self, KeyCell, Nonce};
pub mod encryption;
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
},
Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
root_key: KeyCell,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::already_bootstrapped))]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::not_bootstrapped))]
NotBootstrapped,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::invalid_key))]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::aead_not_found))]
NotFound,
#[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::encryption_error))]
Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::database_error))]
DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::database_transaction_error))]
DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Broken database")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::keyholder::broken_database))]
BrokenDatabase,
}
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct KeyHolder {
db: db::DatabasePool,
state: State,
}
#[messages]
impl KeyHolder {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let state = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
.select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
.get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
match root_key_history {
Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id,
},
None => State::Unbootstrapped,
}
};
Ok(Self { db, state })
}
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple keyholders write
// additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
let nonce = conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
.select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
.first(conn)
.await?;
let mut nonce =
v1::Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
root_key_id
);
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
nonce.increment();
update(schema::root_key_history::table)
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
.set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(nonce)
})
})
.await?;
Ok(nonce)
}
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
}
let salt = v1::generate_salt();
let mut seal_key = v1::derive_seal_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
// Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
let root_key_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
let data_encryption_nonce = v1::Nonce::default();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = {
let root_key_reader = root_key.0.read().unwrap();
let root_key_reader = root_key_reader.as_slice();
seal_key
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
Error::Encryption(err)
})?
};
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
let root_key_history_id = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext,
tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes,
schema_version: 1,
salt: salt.to_vec(),
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
.set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id)
})
})
.await?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
};
info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully");
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id,
} = &self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
// We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
let current_key = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
.select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
.select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await?
};
let salt = &current_key.salt;
let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut seal_key = v1::derive_seal_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
let mut root_key = MemSafe::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(
|_| {
error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
Error::BrokenDatabase
},
)?;
seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
Error::InvalidKey
})?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
root_key: v1::KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?,
};
info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully");
Ok(())
}
// Decrypts the `aead_encrypted` entry with the given ID and returns the plaintext
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<MemSafe<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::aead_encrypted::table
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()?
.ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
};
let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
aead_id
);
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut output = MemSafe::new(row.ciphertext).unwrap();
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
Ok(output)
}
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
// Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
// Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write().unwrap();
let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
.values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
ciphertext,
tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
schema_version: 1,
associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
created_at: Utc::now().into()
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(aead_id)
}
#[message]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> StateDiscriminants {
self.state.discriminant()
}
#[message]
pub fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = &self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
};
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use diesel::SelectableHelper;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::db::{self};
use super::*;
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
actor
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let root_key_history_id = match actor.state {
State::Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} => root_key_history_id,
_ => panic!("expected unsealed state"),
};
let n1 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
let n2 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
.select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
let id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id))
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(),
"next write must advance nonce"
);
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use miette::Diagnostic;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, keyholder::KeyHolder, router::MessageRouter},
db,
};
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod client;
mod evm;
pub mod keyholder;
pub mod router;
pub mod user_agent;
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum SpawnError {
#[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
#[diagnostic(code(SpawnError::Bootstrapper))]
Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn KeyHolder actor")]
#[diagnostic(code(SpawnError::KeyHolder))]
KeyHolder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
}
/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct GlobalActors {
pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
pub router: ActorRef<MessageRouter>,
pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
}
impl GlobalActors {
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let key_holder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?);
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
key_holder,
router: MessageRouter::spawn(MessageRouter::default()),
})
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorId, ActorRef},
messages,
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
};
use tracing::info;
use crate::actors::{client::session::ClientSession, user_agent::session::UserAgentSession};
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct MessageRouter {
pub user_agents: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
}
impl Actor for MessageRouter {
type Args = Self;
type Error = ();
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(args)
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.user_agents.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "MessageRouter",
event = "useragent.disconnected"
);
} else if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(?id, actor = "MessageRouter", event = "client.disconnected");
} else {
info!(
?id,
actor = "MessageRouter",
event = "unknown.actor.disconnected"
);
}
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
#[messages]
impl MessageRouter {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_user_agent(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "MessageRouter", event = "useragent.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.user_agents.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_client(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<ClientSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "MessageRouter", event = "client.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.clients.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,369 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
auth::{
self, AuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk, ClientMessage,
ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage, client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
},
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use futures::StreamExt;
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorRef, Spawn},
error::SendError,
messages,
prelude::Context,
};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio::sync::mpsc::Sender;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
ServerContext,
context::bootstrap::{BootstrapActor, ConsumeToken},
db::{self, schema},
errors::GrpcStatusExt,
};
/// Context for state machine with validated key and sent challenge
/// Challenge is then transformed to bytes using shared function and verified
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChallengeContext {
challenge: AuthChallenge,
key: VerifyingKey,
}
// Request context with deserialized public key for state machine.
// This intermediate struct is needed because the state machine branches depending on presence of bootstrap token,
// but we want to have the deserialized key in both branches.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct AuthRequestContext {
pubkey: VerifyingKey,
bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
derive_states: [Debug],
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) / auth_request_context = ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext),
ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) + ReceivedBootstrapToken = Authenticated,
ReceivedAuthRequest(AuthRequestContext) + SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) / move_challenge = WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext),
WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedGoodSolution = Authenticated,
WaitingForChallengeSolution(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedBadSolution = AuthError, // block further transitions, but connection should close anyway
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn move_challenge(
&mut self,
state_data: &AuthRequestContext,
event_data: ChallengeContext,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn auth_request_context(
&mut self,
event_data: AuthRequestContext,
) -> Result<AuthRequestContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct UserAgentActor {
db: db::DatabasePool,
bootstapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
}
impl UserAgentActor {
pub(crate) fn new(
context: ServerContext,
tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
db: context.db.clone(),
bootstapper: context.bootstrapper.clone(),
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
tx,
}
}
pub(crate) fn new_manual(
db: db::DatabasePool,
bootstapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
tx: Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
db,
bootstapper,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
tx,
}
}
fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), Status> {
self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "State transition failed");
Status::internal("State machine error")
})?;
Ok(())
}
async fn auth_with_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
token: String,
) -> Result<UserAgentResponse, Status> {
let token_ok: bool = self
.bootstapper
.ask(ConsumeToken { token })
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?pubkey, "Failed to consume bootstrap token: {e}");
Status::internal("Bootstrap token consumption failed")
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!(?pubkey, "Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid bootstrap token"));
}
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.to_status()?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(1),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.to_status()?;
}
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBootstrapToken)?;
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
}
async fn auth_with_challenge(&mut self, pubkey: VerifyingKey, pubkey_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Output {
let nonce: Option<i32> = {
let mut db_conn = self.db.get().await.to_status()?;
db_conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
.filter(
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
)
.select(schema::useragent_client::nonce)
.first::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::useragent_client::table)
.filter(
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
)
.set(schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(current_nonce)
})
})
.await
.optional()
.to_status()?
};
let Some(nonce) = nonce else {
error!(?pubkey, "Public key not found in database");
return Err(Status::unauthenticated("Public key not registered"));
};
let challenge = auth::AuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
nonce: nonce,
};
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::SentChallenge(ChallengeContext {
challenge: challenge.clone(),
key: pubkey,
}))?;
info!(
?pubkey,
?challenge,
"Sent authentication challenge to client"
);
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthChallenge(challenge)))
}
fn verify_challenge_solution(
&self,
solution: &auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<(bool, &ChallengeContext), Status> {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForChallengeSolution(challenge_context) = self.state.state()
else {
error!("Received challenge solution in invalid state");
return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Invalid state for challenge solution",
));
};
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(&challenge_context.challenge);
let signature = solution.signature.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid signature length");
Status::invalid_argument("Invalid signature length")
})?;
let valid = challenge_context
.key
.verify_strict(&formatted_challenge, &signature)
.is_ok();
Ok((valid, challenge_context))
}
}
type Output = Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>;
fn auth_response(payload: ServerAuthPayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(AuthServerMessage {
payload: Some(payload),
})),
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentActor {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_request(
&mut self,
req: AuthChallengeRequest,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Output>,
) -> Output {
let pubkey = req.pubkey.as_array().ok_or(Status::invalid_argument(
"Expected pubkey to have specific length",
))?;
let pubkey = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey).map_err(|err| {
error!(?pubkey, "Failed to convert to VerifyingKey");
Status::invalid_argument("Failed to convert pubkey to VerifyingKey")
})?;
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::AuthRequest(AuthRequestContext {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: req.bootstrap_token.clone(),
}))?;
match req.bootstrap_token {
Some(token) => self.auth_with_bootstrap_token(pubkey, token).await,
None => self.auth_with_challenge(pubkey, req.pubkey).await,
}
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn handle_auth_challenge_solution(
&mut self,
solution: auth::AuthChallengeSolution,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Output>,
) -> Output {
let (valid, challenge_context) = self.verify_challenge_solution(&solution)?;
if valid {
info!(
?challenge_context,
"Client provided valid solution to authentication challenge"
);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedGoodSolution)?;
Ok(auth_response(ServerAuthPayload::AuthOk(AuthOk {})))
} else {
error!("Client provided invalid solution to authentication challenge");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedBadSolution)?;
Err(Status::unauthenticated("Invalid challenge solution"))
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UserAgentResponse, auth::{AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk},
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use kameo::actor::Spawn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::HandleAuthChallengeRequest, context::bootstrap::BootstrapActor, db,
};
use super::UserAgentActor;
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
// explicitly not installing any user_agent pubkeys
let bootstrapper = BootstrapActor::new(&db).await.unwrap(); // this will create bootstrap token
let token = bootstrapper.get_token().unwrap();
let bootstrapper_ref = BootstrapActor::spawn(bootstrapper);
let user_agent = UserAgentActor::new_manual(
db.clone(),
bootstrapper_ref,
tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1).0, // dummy channel, we won't actually send responses in this test
);
let user_agent_ref = UserAgentActor::spawn(user_agent);
// simulate client sending auth request with bootstrap token
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let result = user_agent_ref
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest {
req: AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
},
})
.await
.expect("Shouldn't fail to send message");
// auth succeeded
assert_eq!(
result,
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthMessage(
arbiter_proto::proto::auth::ServerMessage {
payload: Some(arbiter_proto::proto::auth::server_message::Payload::AuthOk(
AuthOk {},
)),
},
)),
}
);
}
}
mod transport;
pub(crate) use transport::handle_user_agent;

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@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{
AuthChallengeRequest, AuthChallengeSolution, KeyType as ProtoKeyType, UserAgentRequest,
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
};
use tracing::error;
use crate::actors::user_agent::{
UserAgentConnection,
auth::state::{AuthContext, AuthPublicKey, AuthStateMachine},
session::UserAgentSession,
};
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Unexpected message payload")]
UnexpectedMessagePayload,
#[error("Invalid client public key length")]
InvalidClientPubkeyLength,
#[error("Invalid client public key encoding")]
InvalidAuthPubkeyEncoding,
#[error("Database pool unavailable")]
DatabasePoolUnavailable,
#[error("Database operation failed")]
DatabaseOperationFailed,
#[error("Public key not registered")]
PublicKeyNotRegistered,
#[error("Transport error")]
Transport,
#[error("Invalid bootstrap token")]
InvalidBootstrapToken,
#[error("Bootstrapper actor unreachable")]
BootstrapperActorUnreachable,
#[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
InvalidChallengeSolution,
}
mod state;
use state::*;
fn parse_pubkey(key_type: ProtoKeyType, pubkey: Vec<u8>) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Error> {
match key_type {
// UNSPECIFIED treated as Ed25519 for backward compatibility
ProtoKeyType::Unspecified | ProtoKeyType::Ed25519 => {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_array().ok_or(Error::InvalidClientPubkeyLength)?;
let key = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(pubkey_bytes)
.map_err(|_| Error::InvalidAuthPubkeyEncoding)?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(key))
}
ProtoKeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => {
// Public key is sent as 33-byte SEC1 compressed point
let key = k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_sec1_bytes(&pubkey)
.map_err(|_| Error::InvalidAuthPubkeyEncoding)?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(key))
}
ProtoKeyType::Rsa => {
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
let key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&pubkey)
.map_err(|_| Error::InvalidAuthPubkeyEncoding)?;
Ok(AuthPublicKey::Rsa(key))
}
}
}
fn parse_auth_event(payload: UserAgentRequestPayload) -> Result<AuthEvents, Error> {
match payload {
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: None,
key_type,
}) => {
let kt = ProtoKeyType::try_from(key_type).unwrap_or(ProtoKeyType::Unspecified);
Ok(AuthEvents::AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest {
pubkey: parse_pubkey(kt, pubkey)?,
}))
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
key_type,
}) => {
let kt = ProtoKeyType::try_from(key_type).unwrap_or(ProtoKeyType::Unspecified);
Ok(AuthEvents::BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest {
pubkey: parse_pubkey(kt, pubkey)?,
token,
}))
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(AuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => {
Ok(AuthEvents::ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution {
solution: signature,
}))
}
_ => Err(Error::UnexpectedMessagePayload),
}
}
pub async fn authenticate(props: &mut UserAgentConnection) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Error> {
let mut state = AuthStateMachine::new(AuthContext::new(props));
loop {
// `state` holds a mutable reference to `props` so we can't access it directly here
let transport = state.context_mut().conn.transport.as_mut();
let Some(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(payload),
}) = transport.recv().await
else {
return Err(Error::Transport);
};
let event = parse_auth_event(payload)?;
match state.process_event(event).await {
Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(key)) => return Ok(key.clone()),
Err(AuthError::ActionFailed(err)) => {
error!(?err, "State machine action failed");
return Err(err);
}
Err(AuthError::GuardFailed(err)) => {
error!(?err, "State machine guard failed");
return Err(err);
}
Err(AuthError::InvalidEvent) => {
error!("Invalid event for current state");
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
Err(AuthError::TransitionsFailed) => {
error!("Invalid state transition");
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
_ => (),
}
}
}
pub async fn authenticate_and_create(
mut props: UserAgentConnection,
) -> Result<UserAgentSession, Error> {
let _key = authenticate(&mut props).await?;
let session = UserAgentSession::new(props);
Ok(session)
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{
AuthChallenge, UserAgentResponse, user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use tracing::error;
use super::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{bootstrap::ConsumeToken, user_agent::UserAgentConnection},
db::{models::KeyType, schema},
};
/// Abstraction over Ed25519 / ECDSA-secp256k1 / RSA public keys used during the auth handshake.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub enum AuthPublicKey {
Ed25519(ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey),
/// Compressed SEC1 public key; signature bytes are raw 64-byte (r||s).
EcdsaSecp256k1(k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey),
/// RSA-2048+ public key (Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager); signature bytes are PSS+SHA-256.
Rsa(rsa::RsaPublicKey),
}
impl AuthPublicKey {
/// Canonical bytes stored in DB and echoed back in the challenge.
/// Ed25519: raw 32 bytes. ECDSA: SEC1 compressed 33 bytes. RSA: DER-encoded SPKI.
pub fn to_stored_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(k) => k.to_bytes().to_vec(),
// SEC1 compressed (33 bytes) is the natural compact format for secp256k1
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(k) => k.to_encoded_point(true).as_bytes().to_vec(),
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(k) => {
use rsa::pkcs8::EncodePublicKey as _;
k.to_public_key_der()
.expect("rsa SPKI encoding is infallible")
.to_vec()
}
}
}
pub fn key_type(&self) -> KeyType {
match self {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(_) => KeyType::Ed25519,
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(_) => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(_) => KeyType::Rsa,
}
}
}
pub struct ChallengeRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
pub token: String,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge: AuthChallenge,
pub key: AuthPublicKey,
}
pub struct ChallengeSolution {
pub solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) [async verify_bootstrap_token] / provide_key_bootstrap = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) [async verify_solution] / provide_key = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
}
);
async fn create_nonce(db: &crate::db::DatabasePool, pubkey_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let current_nonce = schema::useragent_client::table
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.to_vec()))
.select(schema::useragent_client::nonce)
.first::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::useragent_client::table)
.filter(schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.to_vec()))
.set(schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(current_nonce)
})
})
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?
.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(?pubkey_bytes, "Public key not found in database");
Error::PublicKeyNotRegistered
})
}
async fn register_key(db: &crate::db::DatabasePool, pubkey: &AuthPublicKey) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let key_type = pubkey.key_type();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
diesel::insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
schema::useragent_client::nonce.eq(1),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
Ok(())
}
pub struct AuthContext<'a> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
}
impl<'a> AuthContext<'a> {
pub fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection) -> Self {
Self { conn }
}
}
impl AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_> {
type Error = Error;
async fn verify_solution(
&self,
ChallengeContext { challenge, key }: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: &ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<bool, Self::Error> {
let formatted = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let valid = match key {
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(vk) => {
let sig = solution.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid Ed25519 signature length");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify_strict(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(vk) => {
use k256::ecdsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let sig = k256::ecdsa::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid ECDSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
vk.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(pk) => {
use rsa::signature::Verifier as _;
let verifying_key = rsa::pss::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha256>::new(pk.clone());
let sig = rsa::pss::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!(?solution, "Invalid RSA signature bytes");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
verifying_key.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
}
};
Ok(valid)
}
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
let stored_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
let nonce = create_nonce(&self.conn.db, &stored_bytes).await?;
let challenge = AuthChallenge {
pubkey: stored_bytes,
nonce,
};
self.conn
.transport
.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(challenge.clone())),
}))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge,
key: pubkey,
})
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
&self,
BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: &BootstrapAuthRequest,
) -> Result<bool, Self::Error> {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::BootstrapperActorUnreachable
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
register_key(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await?;
Ok(true)
}
fn provide_key_bootstrap(
&mut self,
event_data: BootstrapAuthRequest,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
Ok(event_data.pubkey)
}
fn provide_key(
&mut self,
state_data: &ChallengeContext,
_: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
// ChallengeContext.key cannot be taken by value because smlang passes it by ref;
// we reconstruct stored bytes and return them wrapped in Ed25519 placeholder.
// Session uses only the raw bytes, so we carry them via a Vec<u8>.
// IMPORTANT: do NOT simplify this by storing the key type separately — the
// `AuthPublicKey` enum IS the source of truth for key bytes and type.
//
// smlang state-machine trait requires returning an owned value from `provide_key`,
// but `state_data` is only available by shared reference here. We extract the
// stored bytes and re-wrap as the correct variant so the caller can call
// `to_stored_bytes()` / `key_type()` without losing information.
let bytes = state_data.challenge.pubkey.clone();
let key_type = state_data.key.key_type();
let rebuilt = match key_type {
crate::db::models::KeyType::Ed25519 => {
let arr: &[u8; 32] = bytes
.as_slice()
.try_into()
.expect("ed25519 pubkey must be 32 bytes in challenge");
AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(
ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(arr)
.expect("key was already validated in parse_auth_event"),
)
}
crate::db::models::KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => {
// bytes are SEC1 compressed (33 bytes produced by to_encoded_point(true))
AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(
k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_sec1_bytes(&bytes)
.expect("ecdsa key was already validated in parse_auth_event"),
)
}
crate::db::models::KeyType::Rsa => {
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
AuthPublicKey::Rsa(
rsa::RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&bytes)
.expect("rsa key was already validated in parse_auth_event"),
)
}
};
Ok(rebuilt)
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
transport::Bi,
};
use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, user_agent::session::UserAgentSession},
db::{self},
};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, PartialEq)]
pub enum TransportResponseError {
#[error("Expected message with payload")]
MissingRequestPayload,
#[error("Unexpected request payload")]
UnexpectedRequestPayload,
#[error("Invalid state for unseal encrypted key")]
InvalidStateForUnsealEncryptedKey,
#[error("client_pubkey must be 32 bytes")]
InvalidClientPubkeyLength,
#[error("State machine error")]
StateTransitionFailed,
#[error("Vault is not available")]
KeyHolderActorUnreachable,
#[error(transparent)]
Auth(#[from] auth::Error),
#[error("Failed registering connection")]
ConnectionRegistrationFailed,
}
pub type Transport =
Box<dyn Bi<UserAgentRequest, Result<UserAgentResponse, TransportResponseError>> + Send>;
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
db: db::DatabasePool,
actors: GlobalActors,
transport: Transport,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors, transport: Transport) -> Self {
Self {
db,
actors,
transport,
}
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub async fn connect_user_agent(props: UserAgentConnection) {
match auth::authenticate_and_create(props).await {
Ok(session) => {
UserAgentSession::spawn(session);
info!("User authenticated, session started");
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Authentication failed, closing connection");
}
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,587 @@
use std::{ops::DerefMut, sync::Mutex};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm as evm_proto,
user_agent::{
SdkClientApproveRequest, SdkClientApproveResponse, SdkClientEntry,
SdkClientError as ProtoSdkClientError, SdkClientList, SdkClientListResponse,
SdkClientRevokeRequest, SdkClientRevokeResponse, UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult,
UnsealStart, UnsealStartResponse, UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
sdk_client_approve_response, sdk_client_list_response, sdk_client_revoke_response,
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, dsl::insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use kameo::{Actor, error::SendError, prelude::Context};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use tokio::select;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::{
actors::{
evm::{Generate, ListWallets},
keyholder::{self, TryUnseal},
router::RegisterUserAgent,
user_agent::{TransportResponseError, UserAgentConnection},
},
db::schema::program_client,
};
mod state;
use state::{DummyContext, UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine, UserAgentStates};
// Error for consumption by other actors
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, PartialEq)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("User agent session ended due to connection loss")]
ConnectionLost,
#[error("User agent session ended due to unexpected message")]
UnexpectedMessage,
}
pub struct UserAgentSession {
props: UserAgentConnection,
state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
}
impl UserAgentSession {
pub(crate) fn new(props: UserAgentConnection) -> Self {
Self {
props,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
}
}
fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), TransportResponseError> {
self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "State transition failed");
TransportResponseError::StateTransitionFailed
})?;
Ok(())
}
async fn send_msg<Reply: kameo::Reply>(
&mut self,
msg: UserAgentResponsePayload,
_ctx: &mut Context<Self, Reply>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.props
.transport
.send(Ok(response(msg)))
.await
.map_err(|_| {
error!(
actor = "useragent",
reason = "channel closed",
"send.failed"
);
Error::ConnectionLost
})
}
async fn expect_msg<Extractor, Msg, Reply>(
&mut self,
extractor: Extractor,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, Reply>,
) -> Result<Msg, Error>
where
Extractor: FnOnce(UserAgentRequestPayload) -> Option<Msg>,
Reply: kameo::Reply,
{
let msg = self.props.transport.recv().await.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(
actor = "useragent",
reason = "channel closed",
"recv.failed"
);
ctx.stop();
Error::ConnectionLost
})?;
msg.payload.and_then(extractor).ok_or_else(|| {
error!(
actor = "useragent",
reason = "unexpected message",
"recv.failed"
);
ctx.stop();
Error::UnexpectedMessage
})
}
}
impl UserAgentSession {
pub async fn process_transport_inbound(&mut self, req: UserAgentRequest) -> Output {
let msg = req.payload.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(actor = "useragent", "Received message with no payload");
TransportResponseError::MissingRequestPayload
})?;
match msg {
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealStart(unseal_start) => {
self.handle_unseal_request(unseal_start).await
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealEncryptedKey(unseal_encrypted_key) => {
self.handle_unseal_encrypted_key(unseal_encrypted_key).await
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmWalletCreate(_) => self.handle_evm_wallet_create().await,
UserAgentRequestPayload::EvmWalletList(_) => self.handle_evm_wallet_list().await,
UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientApprove(req) => {
self.handle_sdk_client_approve(req).await
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientRevoke(req) => {
self.handle_sdk_client_revoke(req).await
}
UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientList(_) => self.handle_sdk_client_list().await,
_ => Err(TransportResponseError::UnexpectedRequestPayload),
}
}
}
type Output = Result<UserAgentResponse, TransportResponseError>;
fn response(payload: UserAgentResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponse {
UserAgentResponse {
payload: Some(payload),
}
}
impl UserAgentSession {
async fn handle_unseal_request(&mut self, req: UnsealStart) -> Output {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
let client_pubkey_bytes: [u8; 32] = req
.client_pubkey
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| TransportResponseError::InvalidClientPubkeyLength)?;
let client_public_key = PublicKey::from(client_pubkey_bytes);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
client_public_key,
}))?;
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(
UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
},
)))
}
async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(&mut self, req: UnsealEncryptedKey) -> Output {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received unseal encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(TransportResponseError::InvalidStateForUnsealEncryptedKey);
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
match secret {
Some(secret) => secret,
None => {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)));
}
}
};
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(&req.nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&unseal_context.client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut seal_key_buffer = MemSafe::new(req.ciphertext.clone()).unwrap();
let decryption_result = {
let mut write_handle = seal_key_buffer.write().unwrap();
let write_handle = write_handle.deref_mut();
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, &req.associated_data, write_handle)
};
match decryption_result {
Ok(_) => {
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(_) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::Success.into(),
)))
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)))
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(TransportResponseError::KeyHolderActorUnreachable)
}
}
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(
UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into(),
)))
}
}
}
}
impl UserAgentSession {
async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Output {
use evm_proto::wallet_create_response::Result as CreateResult;
let result = match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => CreateResult::Wallet(evm_proto::WalletEntry {
address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
}),
Err(err) => CreateResult::Error(map_evm_error("wallet create", err).into()),
};
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmWalletCreate(
evm_proto::WalletCreateResponse {
result: Some(result),
},
)))
}
async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Output {
use evm_proto::wallet_list_response::Result as ListResult;
let result = match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => ListResult::Wallets(evm_proto::WalletList {
wallets: wallets
.into_iter()
.map(|addr| evm_proto::WalletEntry {
address: addr.as_slice().to_vec(),
})
.collect(),
}),
Err(err) => ListResult::Error(map_evm_error("wallet list", err).into()),
};
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::EvmWalletList(
evm_proto::WalletListResponse {
result: Some(result),
},
)))
}
}
impl UserAgentSession {
async fn handle_sdk_client_approve(&mut self, req: SdkClientApproveRequest) -> Output {
use sdk_client_approve_response::Result as ApproveResult;
if req.pubkey.len() != 32 {
return Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientApprove(
SdkClientApproveResponse {
result: Some(ApproveResult::Error(ProtoSdkClientError::Internal.into())),
},
)));
}
let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap_or_default()
.as_secs() as i32;
let mut conn = match self.props.db.get().await {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(e) => {
error!(?e, "Failed to get DB connection for sdk_client_approve");
return Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientApprove(
SdkClientApproveResponse {
result: Some(ApproveResult::Error(ProtoSdkClientError::Internal.into())),
},
)));
}
};
let pubkey_bytes = req.pubkey.clone();
let insert_result = insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes),
program_client::nonce.eq(1), // pre-incremented; challenge will use nonce=0
program_client::created_at.eq(now),
program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await;
match insert_result {
Ok(_) => {
match program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.order(program_client::id.desc())
.select((
program_client::id,
program_client::public_key,
program_client::created_at,
))
.first::<(i32, Vec<u8>, i32)>(&mut conn)
.await
{
Ok((id, pubkey, created_at)) => Ok(response(
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientApprove(SdkClientApproveResponse {
result: Some(ApproveResult::Client(SdkClientEntry {
id,
pubkey,
created_at,
})),
}),
)),
Err(e) => {
error!(?e, "Failed to fetch inserted SDK client");
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientApprove(
SdkClientApproveResponse {
result: Some(ApproveResult::Error(
ProtoSdkClientError::Internal.into(),
)),
},
)))
}
}
}
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(
diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::UniqueViolation,
_,
)) => Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientApprove(
SdkClientApproveResponse {
result: Some(ApproveResult::Error(
ProtoSdkClientError::AlreadyExists.into(),
)),
},
))),
Err(e) => {
error!(?e, "Failed to insert SDK client");
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientApprove(
SdkClientApproveResponse {
result: Some(ApproveResult::Error(ProtoSdkClientError::Internal.into())),
},
)))
}
}
}
async fn handle_sdk_client_list(&mut self) -> Output {
let mut conn = match self.props.db.get().await {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(e) => {
error!(?e, "Failed to get DB connection for sdk_client_list");
return Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientList(
SdkClientListResponse {
result: Some(sdk_client_list_response::Result::Error(
ProtoSdkClientError::Internal.into(),
)),
},
)));
}
};
match program_client::table
.select((
program_client::id,
program_client::public_key,
program_client::created_at,
))
.load::<(i32, Vec<u8>, i32)>(&mut conn)
.await
{
Ok(rows) => Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientList(
SdkClientListResponse {
result: Some(sdk_client_list_response::Result::Clients(SdkClientList {
clients: rows
.into_iter()
.map(|(id, pubkey, created_at)| SdkClientEntry {
id,
pubkey,
created_at,
})
.collect(),
})),
},
))),
Err(e) => {
error!(?e, "Failed to list SDK clients");
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientList(
SdkClientListResponse {
result: Some(sdk_client_list_response::Result::Error(
ProtoSdkClientError::Internal.into(),
)),
},
)))
}
}
}
async fn handle_sdk_client_revoke(&mut self, req: SdkClientRevokeRequest) -> Output {
use sdk_client_revoke_response::Result as RevokeResult;
let mut conn = match self.props.db.get().await {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(e) => {
error!(?e, "Failed to get DB connection for sdk_client_revoke");
return Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientRevoke(
SdkClientRevokeResponse {
result: Some(RevokeResult::Error(ProtoSdkClientError::Internal.into())),
},
)));
}
};
match diesel::delete(program_client::table)
.filter(program_client::id.eq(req.client_id))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
{
Ok(0) => Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientRevoke(
SdkClientRevokeResponse {
result: Some(RevokeResult::Error(ProtoSdkClientError::NotFound.into())),
},
))),
Ok(_) => Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientRevoke(
SdkClientRevokeResponse {
result: Some(RevokeResult::Ok(())),
},
))),
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(
diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation,
_,
)) => Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientRevoke(
SdkClientRevokeResponse {
result: Some(RevokeResult::Error(
ProtoSdkClientError::HasRelatedData.into(),
)),
},
))),
Err(e) => {
error!(?e, "Failed to delete SDK client");
Ok(response(UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientRevoke(
SdkClientRevokeResponse {
result: Some(RevokeResult::Error(ProtoSdkClientError::Internal.into())),
},
)))
}
}
}
}
fn map_evm_error<M>(op: &str, err: SendError<M, crate::actors::evm::Error>) -> evm_proto::EvmError {
use crate::actors::{evm::Error as EvmError, keyholder::Error as KhError};
match err {
SendError::HandlerError(EvmError::Keyholder(KhError::NotBootstrapped)) => {
evm_proto::EvmError::VaultSealed
}
SendError::HandlerError(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM {op} failed");
evm_proto::EvmError::Internal
}
_ => {
error!("EVM actor unreachable during {op}");
evm_proto::EvmError::Internal
}
}
}
impl Actor for UserAgentSession {
type Args = Self;
type Error = TransportResponseError;
async fn on_start(
args: Self::Args,
this: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
args.props
.actors
.router
.ask(RegisterUserAgent {
actor: this.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to register user agent connection with router");
TransportResponseError::ConnectionRegistrationFailed
})?;
Ok(args)
}
async fn next(
&mut self,
_actor_ref: kameo::prelude::WeakActorRef<Self>,
mailbox_rx: &mut kameo::prelude::MailboxReceiver<Self>,
) -> Option<kameo::mailbox::Signal<Self>> {
loop {
select! {
signal = mailbox_rx.recv() => {
return signal;
}
msg = self.props.transport.recv() => {
match msg {
Some(request) => {
match self.process_transport_inbound(request).await {
Ok(response) => {
if self.props.transport.send(Ok(response)).await.is_err() {
error!(actor = "useragent", reason = "channel closed", "send.failed");
return Some(kameo::mailbox::Signal::Stop);
}
}
Err(err) => {
let _ = self.props.transport.send(Err(err)).await;
return Some(kameo::mailbox::Signal::Stop);
}
}
}
None => {
info!(actor = "useragent", "transport.closed");
return Some(kameo::mailbox::Signal::Stop);
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
impl UserAgentSession {
pub fn new_test(db: crate::db::DatabasePool, actors: crate::actors::GlobalActors) -> Self {
use arbiter_proto::transport::DummyTransport;
let transport: super::Transport = Box::new(DummyTransport::new());
let props = UserAgentConnection::new(db, actors, transport);
Self {
props,
state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
}
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

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@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
use super::UserAgentActor;
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
auth::{
self, AuthChallenge, AuthChallengeRequest, AuthOk, ClientMessage,
ServerMessage as AuthServerMessage, client_message::Payload as ClientAuthPayload,
server_message::Payload as ServerAuthPayload,
},
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use futures::StreamExt;
use kameo::{
actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _},
error::SendError,
};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{HandleAuthChallengeRequest, HandleAuthChallengeSolution},
context::ServerContext,
};
pub(crate) async fn handle_user_agent(
context: ServerContext,
mut req_stream: tonic::Streaming<UserAgentRequest>,
tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>,
) {
let actor = UserAgentActor::spawn(UserAgentActor::new(context, tx.clone()));
while let Some(Ok(req)) = req_stream.next().await
&& actor.is_alive()
{
match process_message(&actor, req).await {
Ok(resp) => {
if tx.send(Ok(resp)).await.is_err() {
error!(actor = "useragent", "Failed to send response to client");
break;
}
}
Err(status) => {
let _ = tx.send(Err(status)).await;
break;
}
}
}
actor.kill();
}
async fn process_message(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentActor>,
req: UserAgentRequest,
) -> Result<UserAgentResponse, Status> {
let msg = req.payload.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(actor = "useragent", "Received message with no payload");
Status::invalid_argument("Expected message with payload")
})?;
let UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthMessage(ClientMessage {
payload: Some(client_message),
}) = msg
else {
error!(
actor = "useragent",
"Received unexpected message type during authentication"
);
return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Expected AuthMessage with ClientMessage payload",
));
};
match client_message {
ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(req) => actor
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeRequest { req })
.await
.map_err(into_status),
ClientAuthPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(solution) => actor
.ask(HandleAuthChallengeSolution { solution })
.await
.map_err(into_status),
}
}
fn into_status<M>(e: SendError<M, Status>) -> Status {
match e {
SendError::HandlerError(status) => status,
_ => {
error!(actor = "useragent", "Failed to send message to actor");
Status::internal("session failure")
}
}
}

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@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use diesel::OptionalExtension as _;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use miette::Diagnostic;
use rand::rngs::StdRng;
use smlang::statemachine;
use thiserror::Error;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use crate::{
context::{
bootstrap::{BootstrapActor, generate_token},
lease::LeaseHandler,
tls::{TlsDataRaw, TlsManager},
},
db::{
self,
models::ArbiterSetting,
schema::{self, arbiter_settings},
},
};
pub(crate) mod bootstrap;
pub(crate) mod lease;
pub(crate) mod tls;
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum InitError {
#[error("Database setup failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_setup))]
DatabaseSetup(#[from] db::DatabaseSetupError),
#[error("Connection acquire failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_pool))]
DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_query))]
DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("TLS initialization failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::tls_init))]
Tls(#[from] tls::TlsInitError),
#[error("Bootstrap token generation failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::bootstrap_token))]
BootstrapToken(#[from] bootstrap::BootstrapError),
#[error("I/O Error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::io))]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
}
// TODO: Placeholder for secure root key cell implementation
pub struct KeyStorage;
statemachine! {
name: Server,
transitions: {
*NotBootstrapped + Bootstrapped = Sealed,
Sealed + Unsealed(KeyStorage) / move_key = Ready(KeyStorage),
Ready(KeyStorage) + Sealed / dispose_key = Sealed,
}
}
pub struct _Context;
impl ServerStateMachineContext for _Context {
fn move_key(&mut self, _event_data: KeyStorage) -> Result<KeyStorage, ()> {
todo!()
}
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
fn dispose_key(&mut self, _state_data: &KeyStorage) -> Result<(), ()> {
todo!()
}
}
pub(crate) struct _ServerContextInner {
pub db: db::DatabasePool,
pub state: RwLock<ServerStateMachine<_Context>>,
pub rng: StdRng,
pub tls: TlsManager,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<BootstrapActor>,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub(crate) struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
type Target = _ServerContextInner;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.0
}
}
impl ServerContext {
async fn load_tls(
db: &mut db::DatabaseConnection,
settings: Option<&ArbiterSetting>,
) -> Result<TlsManager, InitError> {
match &settings {
Some(settings) => {
let tls_data_raw = TlsDataRaw {
cert: settings.cert.clone(),
key: settings.cert_key.clone(),
};
Ok(TlsManager::new(Some(tls_data_raw)).await?)
}
None => {
let tls = TlsManager::new(None).await?;
let tls_data_raw = tls.bytes();
diesel::insert_into(arbiter_settings::table)
.values(&ArbiterSetting {
id: 1,
root_key_id: None,
cert_key: tls_data_raw.key,
cert: tls_data_raw.cert,
})
.execute(db)
.await?;
Ok(tls)
}
}
}
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let rng = rand::make_rng();
let settings = arbiter_settings::table
.first::<ArbiterSetting>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()?;
let tls = Self::load_tls(&mut conn, settings.as_ref()).await?;
drop(conn);
let mut state = ServerStateMachine::new(_Context);
if let Some(settings) = &settings
&& settings.root_key_id.is_some()
{
// TODO: pass the encrypted root key to the state machine and let it handle decryption and transition to Sealed
let _ = state.process_event(ServerEvents::Bootstrapped);
}
Ok(Self(Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
bootstrapper: BootstrapActor::spawn(BootstrapActor::new(&db).await?),
db,
rng,
tls,
state: RwLock::new(state),
})))
}
}

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use dashmap::DashSet;
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
struct LeaseStorage<T: Eq + std::hash::Hash>(Arc<DashSet<T>>);
// A lease that automatically releases the item when dropped
pub struct Lease<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> {
item: T,
storage: LeaseStorage<T>,
}
impl<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> Drop for Lease<T> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.storage.0.remove(&self.item);
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
pub struct LeaseHandler<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> {
storage: LeaseStorage<T>,
}
impl<T: Clone + std::hash::Hash + Eq> LeaseHandler<T> {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
storage: LeaseStorage(Arc::new(DashSet::new())),
}
}
pub fn acquire(&self, item: T) -> Result<Lease<T>, ()> {
if self.storage.0.insert(item.clone()) {
Ok(Lease {
item,
storage: self.storage.clone(),
})
} else {
Err(())
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use miette::Diagnostic;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors,
context::tls::TlsManager,
db::{self},
};
pub mod tls;
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum InitError {
#[error("Database setup failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_setup))]
DatabaseSetup(#[from] db::DatabaseSetupError),
#[error("Connection acquire failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_pool))]
DatabasePool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::database_query))]
DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("TLS initialization failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::tls_init))]
Tls(#[from] tls::InitError),
#[error("Actor spawn failed: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::actor_spawn))]
ActorSpawn(#[from] crate::actors::SpawnError),
#[error("I/O Error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::init::io))]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
}
pub struct _ServerContextInner {
pub db: db::DatabasePool,
pub tls: TlsManager,
pub actors: GlobalActors,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
type Target = _ServerContextInner;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.0
}
}
impl ServerContext {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
Ok(Self(Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
actors: GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await?,
tls: TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?,
db,
})))
}
}

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,36 @@
use std::string::FromUtf8Error;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use miette::Diagnostic;
use rcgen::{Certificate, KeyPair};
use rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer;
use pem::Pem;
use rcgen::{
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose,
};
use rustls::pki_types::{pem::PemObject};
use thiserror::Error;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
use crate::db::{
self,
models::{NewTlsHistory, TlsHistory},
schema::{
arbiter_settings,
tls_history::{self},
},
};
const ENCODE_CONFIG: pem::EncodeConfig = {
let line_ending = match cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
true => pem::LineEnding::CRLF,
false => pem::LineEnding::LF,
};
pem::EncodeConfig::new().set_line_ending(line_ending)
};
#[derive(Error, Debug, Diagnostic)]
pub enum TlsInitError {
pub enum InitError {
#[error("Key generation error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_generation))]
KeyGeneration(#[from] rcgen::Error),
@@ -19,71 +42,211 @@ pub enum TlsInitError {
#[error("Key deserialization error: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::key_deserialization))]
KeyDeserializationError(rcgen::Error),
#[error("Database error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::database_error))]
DatabaseError(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Pem deserialization error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::pem_deserialization))]
PemDeserializationError(#[from] rustls::pki_types::pem::Error),
#[error("Database pool acquire error during TLS initialization: {0}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::tls_init::database_pool_acquire))]
DatabasePoolAcquire(#[from] db::PoolError),
}
pub struct TlsData {
pub cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
pub keypair: KeyPair,
pub type PemCert = String;
pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer) -> PemCert {
pem::encode_config(
&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()),
ENCODE_CONFIG,
)
}
pub struct TlsDataRaw {
pub cert: Vec<u8>,
pub key: Vec<u8>,
#[allow(unused)]
struct SerializedTls {
cert_pem: PemCert,
cert_key_pem: String,
}
impl TlsDataRaw {
pub fn serialize(cert: &TlsData) -> Self {
Self {
cert: cert.cert.as_ref().to_vec(),
key: cert.keypair.serialize_pem().as_bytes().to_vec(),
}
struct TlsCa {
issuer: Issuer<'static, KeyPair>,
cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
}
impl TlsCa {
fn generate() -> Result<Self, InitError> {
let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance CA".into()])?;
params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
params.key_usages = vec![
KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign,
KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign,
KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
];
let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance CA");
params.distinguished_name = dn;
let certified_issuer = CertifiedIssuer::self_signed(params, keypair)?;
let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem();
let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(
&certified_issuer.pem(),
KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem.as_ref()).unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
Ok(Self {
issuer,
cert: certified_issuer.der().clone(),
})
}
fn generate_leaf(&self) -> Result<TlsCert, InitError> {
let cert_key = KeyPair::generate()?;
let mut params = CertificateParams::new(["Arbiter Instance Leaf".into()])?;
params.is_ca = IsCa::NoCa;
params.key_usages = vec![
KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
KeyUsagePurpose::KeyEncipherment,
];
let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
dn.push(DnType::CommonName, "Arbiter Instance Leaf");
params.distinguished_name = dn;
let new_cert = params.signed_by(&cert_key, &self.issuer)?;
Ok(TlsCert {
cert: new_cert,
cert_key,
})
}
pub fn deserialize(&self) -> Result<TlsData, TlsInitError> {
let cert = CertificateDer::from_slice(&self.cert).into_owned();
#[allow(unused)]
fn serialize(&self) -> Result<SerializedTls, InitError> {
let cert_key_pem = self.issuer.key().serialize_pem();
Ok(SerializedTls {
cert_pem: encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert),
cert_key_pem,
})
}
let key =
String::from_utf8(self.key.clone()).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyInvalidFormat)?;
let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&key).map_err(TlsInitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
Ok(TlsData { cert, keypair })
#[allow(unused)]
fn try_deserialize(cert_pem: &str, cert_key_pem: &str) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
let keypair =
KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem).map_err(InitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(cert_pem, keypair)?;
Ok(Self {
issuer,
cert: CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(cert_pem.as_bytes())?,
})
}
}
fn generate_cert(key: &KeyPair) -> Result<Certificate, rcgen::Error> {
let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(vec![
"arbiter.local".to_string(),
"localhost".to_string(),
])?;
params.self_signed(key)
struct TlsCert {
cert: Certificate,
cert_key: KeyPair,
}
// TODO: Implement cert rotation
pub(crate) struct TlsManager {
data: TlsData,
pub struct TlsManager {
cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
keypair: KeyPair,
ca_cert: CertificateDer<'static>,
_db: db::DatabasePool,
}
impl TlsManager {
pub async fn new(data: Option<TlsDataRaw>) -> Result<Self, TlsInitError> {
match data {
Some(raw) => {
let tls_data = raw.deserialize()?;
Ok(Self { data: tls_data })
}
None => {
let keypair = KeyPair::generate()?;
let cert = generate_cert(&keypair)?;
let tls_data = TlsData {
cert: cert.der().clone(),
keypair,
pub async fn generate_new(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
let ca = TlsCa::generate()?;
let new_cert = ca.generate_leaf()?;
{
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async {
let new_tls_history = NewTlsHistory {
cert: new_cert.cert.pem(),
cert_key: new_cert.cert_key.serialize_pem(),
ca_cert: encode_cert_to_pem(&ca.cert),
ca_key: ca.issuer.key().serialize_pem(),
};
let inserted_tls_history: i32 = diesel::insert_into(tls_history::table)
.values(&new_tls_history)
.returning(tls_history::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
diesel::update(arbiter_settings::table)
.set(arbiter_settings::tls_id.eq(inserted_tls_history))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
}
Ok(Self {
cert: new_cert.cert.der().clone(),
keypair: new_cert.cert_key,
ca_cert: ca.cert,
_db: db.clone(),
})
}
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
let cert_data: Option<TlsHistory> = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
arbiter_settings::table
.left_join(tls_history::table)
.select(Option::<TlsHistory>::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await?
};
match cert_data {
Some(data) => {
let try_load = || -> Result<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let keypair = KeyPair::from_pem(&data.cert_key)?;
let cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.cert.as_bytes())?;
let ca_cert = CertificateDer::from_pem_slice(data.ca_cert.as_bytes())?;
Ok(Self {
cert,
keypair,
ca_cert,
_db: db.clone(),
})
};
Ok(Self { data: tls_data })
match try_load() {
Ok(manager) => Ok(manager),
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("Failed to load existing TLS certs: {e}. Generating new ones.");
Self::generate_new(&db).await
}
}
}
None => Self::generate_new(&db).await,
}
}
pub fn bytes(&self) -> TlsDataRaw {
TlsDataRaw::serialize(&self.data)
pub fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
&self.cert
}
pub fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
&self.ca_cert
}
pub fn cert_pem(&self) -> PemCert {
encode_cert_to_pem(&self.cert)
}
pub fn key_pem(&self) -> String {
self.keypair.serialize_pem()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,7 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use diesel::{
Connection as _, SqliteConnection,
connection::{SimpleConnection as _, TransactionManager},
};
use diesel::{Connection as _, SqliteConnection, connection::SimpleConnection as _};
use diesel_async::{
AsyncConnection, SimpleAsyncConnection,
pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig, RecyclingMethod},
pooled_connection::{AsyncDieselConnectionManager, ManagerConfig},
sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
};
use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
@@ -22,30 +17,30 @@ pub type DatabasePool = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::Pool<DatabaseConne
pub type PoolInitError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::PoolError;
pub type PoolError = diesel_async::pooled_connection::bb8::RunError;
static DB_FILE: &'static str = "arbiter.sqlite";
static DB_FILE: &str = "arbiter.sqlite";
const MIGRATIONS: EmbeddedMigrations = embed_migrations!("migrations");
#[derive(Error, Diagnostic, Debug)]
pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
#[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::home_dir_error))]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::home_dir))]
HomeDir(std::io::Error),
#[error(transparent)]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::connection_error))]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::connection))]
Connection(diesel::ConnectionError),
#[error(transparent)]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::concurrency_error))]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::concurrency))]
ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
#[error(transparent)]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::migration_error))]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::migration))]
Migration(Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>),
#[error(transparent)]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::pool_error))]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter::db::pool))]
Pool(#[from] PoolInitError),
}
@@ -96,12 +91,12 @@ fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
#[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(format!(
"{}?mode=rwc",
(database_path()?
let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
database_path()?
.to_str()
.expect("database path is not valid UTF-8"))
));
.expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_string(),
);
initialize_database(&database_url)?;
@@ -134,17 +129,16 @@ pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetu
Ok(pool)
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
let tempfile_name = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), 16);
let file = std::env::temp_dir().join(tempfile_name);
let url = format!(
"{}?mode=rwc",
file.to_str().expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
);
let url = file
.to_str()
.expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_string();
create_pool(Some(&url))
.await

View File

@@ -1,49 +1,339 @@
#![allow(unused)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
use crate::db::schema::{self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings};
use crate::db::schema::{
self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_transaction_log, evm_wallet,
root_key_history, tls_history,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
use restructed::Models;
pub mod types {
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
pub struct SqliteTimestamp(DateTime<Utc>);
}
use diesel::{
deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow},
expression::AsExpression,
serialize::{IsNull, ToSql},
sql_types::Integer,
sqlite::{Sqlite, SqliteType},
};
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
#[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
pub struct SqliteTimestamp(pub DateTime<Utc>);
impl SqliteTimestamp {
pub fn now() -> Self {
SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())
}
}
impl From<chrono::DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from(dt: chrono::DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
SqliteTimestamp(dt)
}
}
impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for chrono::DateTime<Utc> {
fn from(ts: SqliteTimestamp) -> Self {
ts.0
}
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
let unix_timestamp = self.0.timestamp() as i32;
out.set_value(unix_timestamp);
Ok(IsNull::No)
}
}
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err(format!(
"Expected Integer type for SqliteTimestamp, got {:?}",
bytes.value_type()
)
.into());
};
let unix_timestamp = bytes.read_long();
let datetime =
DateTime::from_timestamp(unix_timestamp, 0).ok_or("Timestamp is out of bounds")?;
Ok(SqliteTimestamp(datetime))
}
}
/// Key algorithm stored in the `useragent_client.key_type` column.
/// Values must stay stable — they are persisted in the database.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, strum::FromRepr)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum KeyType {
Ed25519 = 1,
EcdsaSecp256k1 = 2,
Rsa = 3,
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
out.set_value(*self as i32);
Ok(IsNull::No)
}
}
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err("Expected Integer for KeyType".into());
};
let discriminant = bytes.read_long();
KeyType::from_repr(discriminant as i32)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("Unknown KeyType discriminant: {discriminant}").into())
}
}
}
pub use types::*;
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[view(
NewAeadEncrypted,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
#[diesel(table_name = aead_encrypted, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct AeadEncrypted {
pub id: i32,
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
pub tag: Vec<u8>,
pub current_nonce: i32,
pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub schema_version: i32,
pub associated_root_key_id: i32, // references root_key_history.id
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = arbiter_settings, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ArbiterSetting {
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = root_key_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewRootKeyHistory,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct RootKeyHistory {
pub id: i32,
pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references aead_encrypted.id
pub cert_key: Vec<u8>,
pub cert: Vec<u8>,
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
pub tag: Vec<u8>,
pub root_key_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub data_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub schema_version: i32,
pub salt: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = tls_history, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewTlsHistory,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct TlsHistory {
pub id: i32,
pub cert: String,
pub cert_key: String, // PEM Encoded private key
pub ca_cert: String, // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing
pub ca_key: String, // PEM Encoded public key for cert signing
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = arbiter_settings, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ArbiterSettings {
pub id: i32,
pub root_key_id: Option<i32>, // references root_key_history.id
pub tls_id: Option<i32>, // references tls_history.id
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_wallet, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmWallet,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmWallet {
pub id: i32,
pub address: Vec<u8>,
pub aead_encrypted_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::program_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProgramClient {
pub id: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub nonce: i32,
pub created_at: i32,
pub updated_at: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::useragent_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct UseragentClient {
pub id: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub nonce: i32,
pub created_at: i32,
pub updated_at: i32,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub key_type: KeyType,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferLimit {
pub id: i32,
pub window_secs: i32,
pub max_volume: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_basic_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmBasicGrant,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmBasicGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub wallet_id: i32, // references evm_wallet.id
pub client_id: i32, // references program_client.id
pub chain_id: i32,
pub valid_from: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub valid_until: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub rate_limit_count: Option<i32>,
pub rate_limit_window_secs: Option<i32>,
pub revoked_at: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_transaction_log, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTransactionLog,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTransactionLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub client_id: i32,
pub wallet_id: i32,
pub chain_id: i32,
pub eth_value: Vec<u8>,
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmEtherTransferGrant,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub basic_grant_id: i32,
pub limit_id: i32, // references evm_ether_transfer_limit.id
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub address: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_grant, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferGrant,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferGrant {
pub id: i32,
pub basic_grant_id: i32,
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
pub receiver: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub window_secs: i32,
pub max_volume: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_token_transfer_log, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
NewEvmTokenTransferLog,
derive(Insertable),
omit(id, created_at),
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmTokenTransferLog {
pub id: i32,
pub grant_id: i32,
pub log_id: i32,
pub chain_id: i32,
pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
pub recipient_address: Vec<u8>,
pub value: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}

View File

@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@
diesel::table! {
aead_encrypted (id) {
id -> Integer,
current_nonce -> Integer,
current_nonce -> Binary,
ciphertext -> Binary,
tag -> Binary,
schema_version -> Integer,
associated_root_key_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
@@ -14,8 +16,100 @@ diesel::table! {
arbiter_settings (id) {
id -> Integer,
root_key_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
cert_key -> Binary,
cert -> Binary,
tls_id -> Nullable<Integer>,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_basic_grant (id) {
id -> Integer,
wallet_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer,
valid_from -> Nullable<Integer>,
valid_until -> Nullable<Integer>,
max_gas_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
max_priority_fee_per_gas -> Nullable<Binary>,
rate_limit_count -> Nullable<Integer>,
rate_limit_window_secs -> Nullable<Integer>,
revoked_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_grant (id) {
id -> Integer,
basic_grant_id -> Integer,
limit_id -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
address -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_ether_transfer_limit (id) {
id -> Integer,
window_secs -> Integer,
max_volume -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_grant (id) {
id -> Integer,
basic_grant_id -> Integer,
token_contract -> Binary,
receiver -> Nullable<Binary>,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_log (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
log_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer,
token_contract -> Binary,
recipient_address -> Binary,
value -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
window_secs -> Integer,
max_volume -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_transaction_log (id) {
id -> Integer,
grant_id -> Integer,
client_id -> Integer,
wallet_id -> Integer,
chain_id -> Integer,
eth_value -> Binary,
signed_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
evm_wallet (id) {
id -> Integer,
address -> Binary,
aead_encrypted_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
@@ -29,6 +123,29 @@ diesel::table! {
}
}
diesel::table! {
root_key_history (id) {
id -> Integer,
root_key_encryption_nonce -> Binary,
data_encryption_nonce -> Binary,
ciphertext -> Binary,
tag -> Binary,
schema_version -> Integer,
salt -> Binary,
}
}
diesel::table! {
tls_history (id) {
id -> Integer,
cert -> Text,
cert_key -> Text,
ca_cert -> Text,
ca_key -> Text,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
useragent_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
@@ -36,14 +153,38 @@ diesel::table! {
public_key -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
key_type -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> aead_encrypted (root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(aead_encrypted -> root_key_history (associated_root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> root_key_history (root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_history (tls_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_basic_grant -> evm_wallet (wallet_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_basic_grant -> program_client (client_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant -> evm_basic_grant (basic_grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant -> evm_ether_transfer_limit (limit_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target -> evm_ether_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_grant -> evm_basic_grant (basic_grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_log -> evm_token_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_log -> evm_transaction_log (log_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit -> evm_token_transfer_grant (grant_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet -> aead_encrypted (aead_encrypted_id));
diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
aead_encrypted,
arbiter_settings,
evm_basic_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target,
evm_ether_transfer_limit,
evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
evm_transaction_log,
evm_wallet,
program_client,
root_key_history,
tls_history,
useragent_client,
);

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::error;
pub trait GrpcStatusExt<T> {
fn to_status(self) -> Result<T, Status>;
}
impl<T> GrpcStatusExt<T> for Result<T, diesel::result::Error> {
fn to_status(self) -> Result<T, Status> {
self.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Status::internal("Database error")
})
}
}
impl<T> GrpcStatusExt<T> for Result<T, crate::db::PoolError> {
fn to_status(self) -> Result<T, Status> {
self.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Status::internal("Database pool error")
})
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
use alloy::sol;
sol! {
interface IERC20 {
event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);
event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 value);
function totalSupply() external view returns (uint256);
function balanceOf(address account) external view returns (uint256);
function transfer(address to, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256);
function approve(address spender, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
}
}
sol! {
/// ERC-721: Non-Fungible Token Standard.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IERC721 {
event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 indexed tokenId);
event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed approved, uint256 indexed tokenId);
event ApprovalForAll(address indexed owner, address indexed operator, bool approved);
function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256 balance);
function ownerOf(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (address owner);
function safeTransferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function safeTransferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId, bytes calldata data) external;
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function approve(address to, uint256 tokenId) external;
function setApprovalForAll(address operator, bool approved) external;
function getApproved(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (address operator);
function isApprovedForAll(address owner, address operator) external view returns (bool);
}
}
sol! {
/// Wrapped Ether — the only functions beyond ERC-20 that matter.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IWETH {
function deposit() external payable;
function withdraw(uint256 wad) external;
}
}
sol! {
/// Permit2 — Uniswap's canonical token approval manager.
/// Replaces per-contract ERC-20 approve() with a single approval hub.
#[derive(Debug)]
interface IPermit2 {
struct TokenPermissions {
address token;
uint256 amount;
}
struct PermitSingle {
TokenPermissions details;
address spender;
uint256 sigDeadline;
}
struct PermitBatch {
TokenPermissions[] details;
address spender;
uint256 sigDeadline;
}
struct AllowanceTransferDetails {
address from;
address to;
uint160 amount;
address token;
}
function approve(address token, address spender, uint160 amount, uint48 expiration) external;
function permit(address owner, PermitSingle calldata permitSingle, bytes calldata signature) external;
function permit(address owner, PermitBatch calldata permitBatch, bytes calldata signature) external;
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint160 amount, address token) external;
function transferFrom(AllowanceTransferDetails[] calldata transferDetails) external;
function allowance(address user, address token, address spender)
external view returns (uint160 amount, uint48 expiration, uint48 nonce);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer;
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{TxKind, U256},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::{
db::{
self,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::{self, evm_transaction_log},
},
evm::policies::{
DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, FullGrant, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
},
};
pub mod policies;
mod utils;
/// Errors that can only occur once the transaction meaning is known (during policy evaluation)
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum PolicyError {
#[error("Database connection pool error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::policy_error::pool))]
Pool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database returned error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::policy_error::database))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Transaction violates policy: {0:?}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::policy_error::violation))]
Violations(Vec<EvalViolation>),
#[error("No matching grant found")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::policy_error::no_matching_grant))]
NoMatchingGrant,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum VetError {
#[error("Contract creation transactions are not supported")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::vet_error::contract_creation_unsupported))]
ContractCreationNotSupported,
#[error("Engine can't classify this transaction")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::vet_error::unsupported))]
UnsupportedTransactionType,
#[error("Policy evaluation failed: {1}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::vet_error::evaluated))]
Evaluated(SpecificMeaning, #[source] PolicyError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum SignError {
#[error("Database connection pool error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::database_error))]
Pool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database returned error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::database_error))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum AnalyzeError {
#[error("Engine doesn't support granting permissions for contract creation")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::analyze_error::contract_creation_not_supported))]
ContractCreationNotSupported,
#[error("Unsupported transaction type")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::analyze_error::unsupported_transaction_type))]
UnsupportedTransactionType,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum CreationError {
#[error("Database connection pool error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::creation_error::database_error))]
Pool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database returned error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::creation_error::database_error))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, miette::Diagnostic)]
pub enum ListGrantsError {
#[error("Database connection pool error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::list_grants_error::pool))]
Pool(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database returned error")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::list_grants_error::database))]
Database(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
}
/// Controls whether a transaction should be executed or only validated
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RunKind {
/// Validate and record the transaction
Execution,
/// Validate only, do not record
CheckOnly,
}
async fn check_shared_constraints(
context: &EvalContext,
shared: &SharedGrantSettings,
shared_grant_id: DatabaseID,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let now = Utc::now();
// Validity window
if shared.valid_from.is_some_and(|t| now < t)
|| shared.valid_until.is_some_and(|t| now > t)
{
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTime);
}
// Gas fee caps
let fee_exceeded = shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.is_some_and(|cap| U256::from(context.max_fee_per_gas) > cap);
let priority_exceeded = shared.max_priority_fee_per_gas.is_some_and(|cap| {
U256::from(context.max_priority_fee_per_gas) > cap
});
if fee_exceeded || priority_exceeded {
violations.push(EvalViolation::GasLimitExceeded {
max_gas_fee_per_gas: shared.max_gas_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: shared.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
});
}
// Transaction count rate limit
if let Some(rate_limit) = &shared.rate_limit {
let window_start = SqliteTimestamp(now - rate_limit.window);
let count: i64 = evm_transaction_log::table
.filter(evm_transaction_log::grant_id.eq(shared_grant_id))
.filter(evm_transaction_log::signed_at.ge(window_start))
.count()
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
if count >= rate_limit.count as i64 {
violations.push(EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded);
}
}
Ok(violations)
}
// Supporting only EIP-1559 transactions for now, but we can easily extend this to support legacy transactions if needed
pub struct Engine {
db: db::DatabasePool,
}
impl Engine {
async fn vet_transaction<P: Policy>(
&self,
context: EvalContext,
meaning: &P::Meaning,
run_kind: RunKind,
) -> Result<(), PolicyError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
.await?
.ok_or(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant)?;
let mut violations =
check_shared_constraints(&context, &grant.shared, grant.shared_grant_id, &mut conn)
.await?;
violations.extend(P::evaluate(&context, meaning, &grant, &mut conn).await?);
if !violations.is_empty() {
return Err(PolicyError::Violations(violations));
} else if run_kind == RunKind::Execution {
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let log_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(&NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: grant.shared_grant_id,
client_id: context.client_id,
wallet_id: context.wallet_id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(context.value).to_vec(),
signed_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(evm_transaction_log::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
P::record_transaction(&context, meaning, log_id, &grant, conn).await?;
QueryResult::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl Engine {
pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Self {
Self { db }
}
pub async fn create_grant<P: Policy>(
&self,
client_id: i32,
full_grant: FullGrant<P::Settings>,
) -> Result<i32, CreationError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let id = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use schema::evm_basic_grant;
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_id: full_grant.basic.wallet_id,
chain_id: full_grant.basic.chain as i32,
client_id,
valid_from: full_grant.basic.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: full_grant.basic.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.basic
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.basic
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
rate_limit_count: full_grant
.basic
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.count as i32),
rate_limit_window_secs: full_grant
.basic
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.window.num_seconds() as i32),
revoked_at: None,
})
.returning(evm_basic_grant::all_columns)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await
})
})
.await?;
Ok(id)
}
pub async fn list_all_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, ListGrantsError> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let mut grants: Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>> = Vec::new();
grants.extend(
EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut conn)
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
shared_grant_id: g.shared_grant_id,
shared: g.shared,
settings: SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(g.settings),
}),
);
grants.extend(
TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut conn)
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|g| Grant {
id: g.id,
shared_grant_id: g.shared_grant_id,
shared: g.shared,
settings: SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(g.settings),
}),
);
Ok(grants)
}
pub async fn evaluate_transaction(
&self,
wallet_id: i32,
client_id: i32,
transaction: TxEip1559,
run_kind: RunKind,
) -> Result<SpecificMeaning, VetError> {
let TxKind::Call(to) = transaction.to else {
return Err(VetError::ContractCreationNotSupported);
};
let context = policies::EvalContext {
wallet_id,
client_id,
chain: transaction.chain_id,
to,
value: transaction.value,
calldata: transaction.input.clone(),
max_fee_per_gas: transaction.max_fee_per_gas,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: transaction.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
};
if let Some(meaning) = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context) {
return match self
.vet_transaction::<EtherTransfer>(context, &meaning, run_kind)
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(meaning.into()),
Err(e) => Err(VetError::Evaluated(meaning.into(), e)),
};
}
if let Some(meaning) = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context) {
return match self
.vet_transaction::<TokenTransfer>(context, &meaning, run_kind)
.await
{
Ok(()) => Ok(meaning.into()),
Err(e) => Err(VetError::Evaluated(meaning.into(), e)),
};
}
Err(VetError::UnsupportedTransactionType)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
use std::fmt::Display;
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, ChainId, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, result::QueryResult, sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use miette::Diagnostic;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
db::models::{self, EvmBasicGrant},
evm::utils,
};
pub mod ether_transfer;
pub mod token_transfers;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct EvalContext {
// Which wallet is this transaction for
pub client_id: i32,
pub wallet_id: i32,
// The transaction data
pub chain: ChainId,
pub to: Address,
pub value: U256,
pub calldata: Bytes,
// Gas pricing (EIP-1559)
pub max_fee_per_gas: u128,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error, Diagnostic)]
pub enum EvalViolation {
#[error("This grant doesn't allow transactions to the target address {target}")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::invalid_target))]
InvalidTarget { target: Address },
#[error("Gas limit exceeded for this grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::gas_limit_exceeded))]
GasLimitExceeded {
max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
},
#[error("Rate limit exceeded for this grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::rate_limit_exceeded))]
RateLimitExceeded,
#[error("Transaction exceeds volumetric limits of the grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::volumetric_limit_exceeded))]
VolumetricLimitExceeded,
#[error("Transaction is outside of the grant's validity period")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::invalid_time))]
InvalidTime,
#[error("Transaction type is not allowed by this grant")]
#[diagnostic(code(arbiter_server::evm::eval_violation::invalid_transaction_type))]
InvalidTransactionType,
}
pub type DatabaseID = i32;
pub struct Grant<PolicySettings> {
pub id: DatabaseID,
pub shared_grant_id: DatabaseID, // ID of the basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
pub shared: SharedGrantSettings,
pub settings: PolicySettings,
}
pub trait Policy: Sized {
type Settings: Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificGrant>;
type Meaning: Display + std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync + 'static + Into<SpecificMeaning>;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning>;
// Evaluate whether a transaction with the given meaning complies with the provided grant, and return any violations if not
// Empty vector means transaction is compliant with the grant
fn evaluate(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>>> + Send;
// Create a new grant in the database based on the provided grant details, and return its ID
fn create_grant(
basic: &models::EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = QueryResult<DatabaseID>> + Send;
// Try to find an existing grant that matches the transaction context, and return its details if found
// Additionally, return ID of basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>>> + Send;
// Return all non-revoked grants, eagerly loading policy-specific settings
fn find_all_grants(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<Vec<Grant<Self::Settings>>>> + Send;
// Records, updates or deletes rate limits
// In other words, records grant-specific things after transaction is executed
fn record_transaction(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
log_id: i32,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> impl Future<Output = QueryResult<()>> + Send;
}
pub enum ReceiverTarget {
Specific(Vec<Address>), // only allow transfers to these addresses
Any, // allow transfers to any address
}
// Classification of what transaction does
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum SpecificMeaning {
EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Meaning),
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Meaning),
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct TransactionRateLimit {
pub count: u32,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct VolumeRateLimit {
pub max_volume: U256,
pub window: Duration,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
pub wallet_id: i32,
pub chain: ChainId,
pub valid_from: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub valid_until: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
pub rate_limit: Option<TransactionRateLimit>,
}
impl SharedGrantSettings {
fn try_from_model(model: EvmBasicGrant) -> QueryResult<Self> {
Ok(Self {
wallet_id: model.wallet_id,
chain: model.chain_id as u64, // safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants
valid_from: model.valid_from.map(Into::into),
valid_until: model.valid_until.map(Into::into),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: model
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))
.transpose()?,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: model
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))
.transpose()?,
rate_limit: match (model.rate_limit_count, model.rate_limit_window_secs) {
(Some(count), Some(window_secs)) => Some(TransactionRateLimit {
count: count as u32,
window: Duration::seconds(window_secs as i64),
}),
_ => None,
},
})
}
pub async fn query_by_id(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
id: i32,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<Self> {
use crate::db::schema::evm_basic_grant;
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = evm_basic_grant::table
.select(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(id))
.first::<EvmBasicGrant>(conn)
.await?;
Self::try_from_model(basic_grant)
}
}
pub enum SpecificGrant {
EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Settings),
TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings),
}
pub struct FullGrant<PolicyGrant> {
pub basic: SharedGrantSettings,
pub specific: PolicyGrant,
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fmt::Display;
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, JoinOnDsl, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, EvmEtherTransferLimit,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_transaction_log};
use crate::evm::policies::{
Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
};
use crate::{
db::{
models::{self, NewEvmEtherTransferGrant, NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget},
schema::{evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target},
},
evm::{policies::Policy, utils},
};
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
evm_ether_transfer_grant::table.inner_join(
evm_basic_grant::table.on(evm_ether_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(evm_basic_grant::id)),
)
}
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
// Plain ether transfer
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {
to: Address,
value: U256,
}
impl Display for Meaning {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "Ether transfer of {} to {}", self.value, self.to)
}
}
impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
fn from(val: Meaning) -> SpecificMeaning {
SpecificMeaning::EtherTransfer(val)
}
}
// A grant for ether transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
pub struct Settings {
target: Vec<Address>,
limit: VolumeRateLimit,
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(val)
}
}
async fn query_relevant_past_transaction(
grant_id: i32,
longest_window: Duration,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)>> {
let past_transactions: Vec<(Vec<u8>, SqliteTimestamp)> = evm_transaction_log::table
.filter(evm_transaction_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id))
.filter(
evm_transaction_log::signed_at.ge(SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() - longest_window)),
)
.select((
evm_transaction_log::eth_value,
evm_transaction_log::signed_at,
))
.load(db)
.await?;
let past_transaction: Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)> = past_transactions
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(value_bytes, timestamp)| {
let value = utils::bytes_to_u256(&value_bytes)?;
Some((value, timestamp.0))
})
.collect();
Ok(past_transaction)
}
async fn check_rate_limits(
grant: &Grant<Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let window = grant.settings.limit.window;
let past_transaction = query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.id, window, db).await?;
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - grant.settings.limit.window;
let cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transaction
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
.fold(U256::default(), |acc, (value, _)| acc + *value);
if cumulative_volume > grant.settings.limit.max_volume {
violations.push(EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded);
}
Ok(violations)
}
pub struct EtherTransfer;
impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
type Settings = Settings;
type Meaning = Meaning;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning> {
if !context.calldata.is_empty() {
return None;
}
Some(Meaning {
to: context.to,
value: context.value,
})
}
async fn evaluate(
_: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
// Check if the target address is within the grant's allowed targets
if !grant.settings.target.contains(&meaning.to) {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target: meaning.to });
}
let rate_violations = check_rate_limits(grant, db).await?;
violations.extend(rate_violations);
Ok(violations)
}
async fn create_grant(
basic: &models::EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<DatabaseID> {
let limit_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_limit::table)
.values(NewEvmEtherTransferLimit {
window_secs: grant.limit.window.num_seconds() as i32,
max_volume: utils::u256_to_bytes(grant.limit.max_volume).to_vec(),
})
.returning(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmEtherTransferGrant {
basic_grant_id: basic.id,
limit_id,
})
.returning(evm_ether_transfer_grant::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
for target in &grant.target {
insert_into(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table)
.values(NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget {
grant_id,
address: target.to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Ok(grant_id)
}
async fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let target_bytes = context.to.to_vec();
// Find a grant where:
// 1. The basic grant's wallet_id and client_id match the context
// 2. Any of the grant's targets match the context's `to` address
let grant: Option<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant)> = evm_ether_transfer_grant::table
.inner_join(evm_basic_grant::table)
.inner_join(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table)
.filter(
evm_basic_grant::wallet_id
.eq(context.wallet_id)
.and(evm_basic_grant::client_id.eq(context.client_id))
.and(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.and(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::address.eq(&target_bytes)),
)
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmEtherTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.first(conn)
.await
.optional()?;
let Some((basic_grant, grant)) = grant else {
return Ok(None);
};
let target_bytes: Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget> = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
.select(EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget::as_select())
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq(grant.id))
.load(conn)
.await?;
let limit: EvmEtherTransferLimit = evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq(grant.limit_id))
.select(EvmEtherTransferLimit::as_select())
.first::<EvmEtherTransferLimit>(conn)
.await?;
// Convert bytes back to Address
let targets: Vec<Address> = target_bytes
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|target| {
// TODO: Handle invalid addresses more gracefully
let arr: [u8; 20] = target.address.try_into().ok()?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
})
.collect();
let settings = Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume)
.map_err(|err| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err)))?,
window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
},
};
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: grant.id,
shared_grant_id: grant.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
settings,
}))
}
async fn record_transaction(
_context: &EvalContext,
_: &Self::Meaning,
_log_id: i32,
_grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
_conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<()> {
// Basic log is sufficient
Ok(())
}
async fn find_all_grants(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let grants: Vec<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant)> = grant_join()
.filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmEtherTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.load(conn)
.await?;
if grants.is_empty() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
let grant_ids: Vec<i32> = grants.iter().map(|(_, g)| g.id).collect();
let limit_ids: Vec<i32> = grants.iter().map(|(_, g)| g.limit_id).collect();
let all_targets: Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget> = evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq_any(&grant_ids))
.select(EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let all_limits: Vec<EvmEtherTransferLimit> = evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
.filter(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq_any(&limit_ids))
.select(EvmEtherTransferLimit::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let mut targets_by_grant: HashMap<i32, Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget>> = HashMap::new();
for target in all_targets {
targets_by_grant
.entry(target.grant_id)
.or_default()
.push(target);
}
let limits_by_id: HashMap<i32, EvmEtherTransferLimit> =
all_limits.into_iter().map(|l| (l.id, l)).collect();
grants
.into_iter()
.map(|(basic, specific)| {
let targets: Vec<Address> = targets_by_grant
.get(&specific.id)
.map(|v| v.as_slice())
.unwrap_or_default()
.iter()
.filter_map(|t| {
let arr: [u8; 20] = t.address.clone().try_into().ok()?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
})
.collect();
let limit = limits_by_id
.get(&specific.limit_id)
.ok_or(diesel::result::Error::NotFound)?;
Ok(Grant {
id: specific.id,
shared_grant_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic)?,
settings: Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(
|e| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(e)),
)?,
window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
},
},
})
})
.collect()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::{
policies::{
EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
const WALLET_ID: i32 = 1;
const CLIENT_ID: i32 = 2;
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const ALLOWED: Address = address!("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111");
const OTHER: Address = address!("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222");
fn ctx(to: Address, value: U256) -> EvalContext {
EvalContext {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
to,
value,
calldata: Bytes::new(),
max_fee_per_gas: 0,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 0,
}
}
async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicGrant {
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit_count: None,
rate_limit_window_secs: None,
revoked_at: revoked.then(|| SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())),
})
.returning(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
fn make_settings(targets: Vec<Address>, max_volume: u64) -> Settings {
Settings {
target: targets,
limit: VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(max_volume),
window: Duration::hours(1),
},
}
}
fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
}
}
// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn analyze_matches_empty_calldata() {
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1_000u64))).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m.to, ALLOWED);
assert_eq!(m.value, U256::from(1_000u64));
}
#[test]
fn analyze_rejects_nonempty_calldata() {
let context = EvalContext {
calldata: Bytes::from(vec![0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]),
..ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64))
};
assert!(EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).is_none());
}
// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_for_allowed_target() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(v.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_disallowed_target() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000),
};
let context = ctx(OTHER, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { .. }))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_when_volume_within_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000);
let grant_id = EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(500u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000);
let grant_id = EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_001u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000);
let grant_id = EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
// Exactly at the limit — the check is `>`, so this should not violate
insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_000u64)).to_vec(),
signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: grant_id,
shared_grant_id: basic.id,
shared: shared(),
settings,
};
let context = ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(100u64));
let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = EtherTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
!v.iter()
.any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded))
);
}
// ── try_find_grant ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let found = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_some());
let g = found.unwrap();
assert_eq!(g.settings.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
assert_eq!(g.settings.limit.max_volume, U256::from(1_000_000u64));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_revoked_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let found = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1u64)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_wrong_target_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let found = EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(OTHER, U256::from(1u64)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(all.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_excludes_revoked() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 1_000_000);
let active = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&active, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let revoked = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&revoked, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.target, vec![ALLOWED]);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_multiple_targets() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(vec![ALLOWED, OTHER], 1_000_000);
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.target.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.limit.max_volume, U256::from(1_000_000u64));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_multiple_grants() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic1 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic1, &make_settings(vec![ALLOWED], 500), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let basic2 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
EtherTransfer::create_grant(&basic2, &make_settings(vec![OTHER], 1_000), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = EtherTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 2);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, U256},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, prelude::*};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, NewEvmTokenTransferGrant,
NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
evm_token_transfer_grant::table.inner_join(
evm_basic_grant::table.on(evm_token_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(evm_basic_grant::id)),
)
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {
token: &'static TokenInfo,
to: Address,
value: U256,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for Meaning {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(
f,
"Transfer of {} {} to {}",
self.value, self.token.symbol, self.to
)
}
}
impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
fn from(val: Meaning) -> SpecificMeaning {
SpecificMeaning::TokenTransfer(val)
}
}
// A grant for token transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
pub struct Settings {
token_contract: Address,
target: Option<Address>,
volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit>,
}
impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(val)
}
}
async fn query_relevant_past_transfers(
grant_id: i32,
longest_window: Duration,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)>> {
let past_logs: Vec<(Vec<u8>, SqliteTimestamp)> = evm_token_transfer_log::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id))
.filter(
evm_token_transfer_log::created_at
.ge(SqliteTimestamp(chrono::Utc::now() - longest_window)),
)
.select((
evm_token_transfer_log::value,
evm_token_transfer_log::created_at,
))
.load(db)
.await?;
let past_transfers: Vec<(U256, DateTime<Utc>)> = past_logs
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(value_bytes, timestamp)| {
let value = utils::bytes_to_u256(&value_bytes)?;
Some((value, timestamp.0))
})
.collect();
Ok(past_transfers)
}
async fn check_volume_rate_limits(
grant: &Grant<Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
let Some(longest_window) = grant.settings.volume_limits.iter().map(|l| l.window).max() else {
return Ok(violations);
};
let past_transfers = query_relevant_past_transfers(grant.id, longest_window, db).await?;
for limit in &grant.settings.volume_limits {
let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - limit.window;
let cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transfers
.iter()
.filter(|(_, timestamp)| timestamp >= &window_start)
.fold(U256::default(), |acc, (value, _)| acc + *value);
if cumulative_volume > limit.max_volume {
violations.push(EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded);
break;
}
}
Ok(violations)
}
pub struct TokenTransfer;
impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
type Settings = Settings;
type Meaning = Meaning;
fn analyze(context: &EvalContext) -> Option<Self::Meaning> {
let token = nonfungible::get_token(context.chain, context.to)?;
let decoded = transferCall::abi_decode_raw_validate(&context.calldata).ok()?;
Some(Meaning {
token,
to: decoded.to,
value: decoded.value,
})
}
async fn evaluate(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
db: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<EvalViolation>> {
let mut violations = Vec::new();
// erc20 transfer shouldn't carry eth value
if !context.value.is_zero() {
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType);
return Ok(violations);
}
if let Some(allowed) = grant.settings.target
&& allowed != meaning.to
{
violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { target: meaning.to });
}
let rate_violations = check_volume_rate_limits(grant, db).await?;
violations.extend(rate_violations);
Ok(violations)
}
async fn create_grant(
basic: &EvmBasicGrant,
grant: &Self::Settings,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<DatabaseID> {
// Store the specific receiver as bytes (None means any receiver is allowed)
let receiver: Option<Vec<u8>> = grant.target.map(|addr| addr.to_vec());
let grant_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_token_transfer_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferGrant {
basic_grant_id: basic.id,
token_contract: grant.token_contract.to_vec(),
receiver,
})
.returning(evm_token_transfer_grant::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
for limit in &grant.volume_limits {
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
grant_id,
window_secs: limit.window.num_seconds() as i32,
max_volume: utils::u256_to_bytes(limit.max_volume).to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Ok(grant_id)
}
async fn try_find_grant(
context: &EvalContext,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Option<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let token_contract_bytes = context.to.to_vec();
let grant: Option<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant)> = grant_join()
.filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.filter(evm_basic_grant::wallet_id.eq(context.wallet_id))
.filter(evm_basic_grant::client_id.eq(context.client_id))
.filter(evm_token_transfer_grant::token_contract.eq(&token_contract_bytes))
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmTokenTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.first(conn)
.await
.optional()?;
let Some((basic_grant, token_grant)) = grant else {
return Ok(None);
};
let volume_limits_db: Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit> =
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq(token_grant.id))
.select(EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = volume_limits_db
.into_iter()
.map(|row| {
Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(|err| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
})?,
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
let token_contract: [u8; 20] = token_grant.token_contract.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid token contract address length".into(),
)
})?;
let target: Option<Address> = match token_grant.receiver {
None => None,
Some(bytes) => {
let arr: [u8; 20] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid receiver address length".into(),
)
})?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
}
};
let settings = Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
};
Ok(Some(Grant {
id: token_grant.id,
shared_grant_id: token_grant.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
settings,
}))
}
async fn record_transaction(
context: &EvalContext,
meaning: &Self::Meaning,
log_id: i32,
grant: &Grant<Self::Settings>,
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<()> {
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id: grant.id,
log_id,
chain_id: context.chain as i32,
token_contract: context.to.to_vec(),
recipient_address: meaning.to.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(meaning.value).to_vec(),
})
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn find_all_grants(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
) -> QueryResult<Vec<Grant<Self::Settings>>> {
let grants: Vec<(EvmBasicGrant, EvmTokenTransferGrant)> = grant_join()
.filter(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.is_null())
.select((
EvmBasicGrant::as_select(),
EvmTokenTransferGrant::as_select(),
))
.load(conn)
.await?;
if grants.is_empty() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
let grant_ids: Vec<i32> = grants.iter().map(|(_, g)| g.id).collect();
let all_volume_limits: Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit> =
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
.filter(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq_any(&grant_ids))
.select(EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit::as_select())
.load(conn)
.await?;
let mut limits_by_grant: HashMap<i32, Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit>> = HashMap::new();
for limit in all_volume_limits {
limits_by_grant
.entry(limit.grant_id)
.or_default()
.push(limit);
}
grants
.into_iter()
.map(|(basic, specific)| {
let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = limits_by_grant
.get(&specific.id)
.map(|v| v.as_slice())
.unwrap_or_default()
.iter()
.map(|row| {
Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(|e| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(e))
})?,
window: Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
})
})
.collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
let token_contract: [u8; 20] =
specific.token_contract.clone().try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid token contract address length".into(),
)
})?;
let target: Option<Address> = match &specific.receiver {
None => None,
Some(bytes) => {
let arr: [u8; 20] = bytes.clone().try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
"Invalid receiver address length".into(),
)
})?;
Some(Address::from(arr))
}
};
Ok(Grant {
id: specific.id,
shared_grant_id: specific.basic_grant_id,
shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic)?,
settings: Settings {
token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
target,
volume_limits,
},
})
})
.collect()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use alloy::sol_types::SolCall;
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::evm_basic_grant,
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, VolumeRateLimit},
utils,
};
use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
// DAI on Ethereum mainnet — present in the static token registry
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const DAI: Address = address!("6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F");
const WALLET_ID: i32 = 1;
const CLIENT_ID: i32 = 2;
const RECIPIENT: Address = address!("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa");
const OTHER: Address = address!("bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb");
const UNKNOWN_TOKEN: Address = address!("cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc");
/// Encode `transfer(to, value)` raw params (no 4-byte selector).
/// `abi_decode_raw_validate` expects exactly this format.
fn transfer_calldata(to: Address, value: U256) -> Bytes {
let mut raw = Vec::new();
transferCall { to, value }.abi_encode_raw(&mut raw);
Bytes::from(raw)
}
fn ctx(to: Address, calldata: Bytes) -> EvalContext {
EvalContext {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
to,
value: U256::ZERO,
calldata,
max_fee_per_gas: 0,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 0,
}
}
async fn insert_basic(conn: &mut DatabaseConnection, revoked: bool) -> EvmBasicGrant {
insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
client_id: CLIENT_ID,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit_count: None,
rate_limit_window_secs: None,
revoked_at: revoked.then(|| SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())),
})
.returning(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
.get_result(conn)
.await
.unwrap()
}
fn make_settings(target: Option<Address>, max_volume: Option<u64>) -> Settings {
Settings {
token_contract: DAI,
target,
volume_limits: max_volume
.map(|v| {
vec![VolumeRateLimit {
max_volume: U256::from(v),
window: Duration::hours(1),
}]
})
.unwrap_or_default(),
}
}
fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
SharedGrantSettings {
wallet_id: WALLET_ID,
chain: CHAIN_ID,
valid_from: None,
valid_until: None,
max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
rate_limit: None,
}
}
// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn analyze_known_token_valid_calldata() {
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, calldata)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m.to, RECIPIENT);
assert_eq!(m.value, U256::from(100u64));
}
#[test]
fn analyze_unknown_token_returns_none() {
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(UNKNOWN_TOKEN, calldata)).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn analyze_invalid_calldata_returns_none() {
let calldata = Bytes::from(vec![0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]);
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, calldata)).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn analyze_empty_calldata_returns_none() {
assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, Bytes::new())).is_none());
}
// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_nonzero_eth_value() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let mut context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
context.value = U256::from(1u64); // ETH attached to an ERC-20 call
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&EvalContext { value: U256::ZERO, ..context.clone() })
.unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(v.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType)));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_any_recipient_when_no_restriction() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(v.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_matching_restricted_recipient() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(v.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_wrong_restricted_recipient() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), None),
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(OTHER, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(v.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::InvalidTarget { .. })));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_passes_volume_within_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(1_000));
let grant_id = TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
// Record a past transfer of 500 (within 1000 limit)
use crate::db::{models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog, schema::evm_token_transfer_log};
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(500u64)).to_vec(),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant { id: grant_id, shared_grant_id: basic.id, shared: shared(), settings };
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(!v.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded)));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_rejects_volume_over_limit() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(1_000));
let grant_id = TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
use crate::db::{models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog, schema::evm_token_transfer_log};
insert_into(evm_token_transfer_log::table)
.values(NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
grant_id,
log_id: 0,
chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
token_contract: DAI.to_vec(),
recipient_address: RECIPIENT.to_vec(),
value: utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::from(1_001u64)).to_vec(),
})
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let grant = Grant { id: grant_id, shared_grant_id: basic.id, shared: shared(), settings };
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(v.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded)));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evaluate_no_volume_limits_always_passes() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let grant = Grant {
id: 999,
shared_grant_id: 999,
shared: shared(),
settings: make_settings(None, None), // no volume limits
};
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(u64::MAX));
let context = ctx(DAI, calldata);
let m = TokenTransfer::analyze(&context).unwrap();
let v = TokenTransfer::evaluate(&context, &m, &grant, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(!v.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, EvalViolation::VolumetricLimitExceeded)));
}
// ── try_find_grant ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), Some(5_000));
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
let found = TokenTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(DAI, calldata), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_some());
let g = found.unwrap();
assert_eq!(g.settings.token_contract, DAI);
assert_eq!(g.settings.target, Some(RECIPIENT));
assert_eq!(g.settings.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(g.settings.volume_limits[0].max_volume, U256::from(5_000u64));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_revoked_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, None);
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(1u64));
let found = TokenTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(DAI, calldata), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn try_find_grant_unknown_token_returns_none() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, None);
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
// Query with a different token contract
let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(1u64));
let found = TokenTransfer::try_find_grant(&ctx(UNKNOWN_TOKEN, calldata), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(found.is_none());
}
// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert!(all.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_excludes_revoked() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(1_000));
let active = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&active, &settings, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
let revoked = insert_basic(&mut conn, true).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&revoked, &settings, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_loads_volume_limits() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let basic = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
let settings = make_settings(None, Some(9_999));
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&basic, &settings, &mut *conn).await.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.volume_limits.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(all[0].settings.volume_limits[0].max_volume, U256::from(9_999u64));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn find_all_grants_multiple_grants_batch_loaded() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let b1 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&b1, &make_settings(None, Some(1_000)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let b2 = insert_basic(&mut conn, false).await;
TokenTransfer::create_grant(&b2, &make_settings(Some(RECIPIENT), Some(2_000)), &mut *conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let all = TokenTransfer::find_all_grants(&mut *conn).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(all.len(), 2);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::{TxSigner, TxSignerSync},
primitives::{Address, ChainId, Signature, B256},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer, SignerSync, utils::secret_key_to_address},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use k256::ecdsa::{self, signature::hazmat::PrehashSigner, RecoveryId, SigningKey};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
/// An Ethereum signer that stores its secp256k1 secret key inside a
/// hardware-protected [`MemSafe`] cell.
///
/// The underlying memory page is kept non-readable/non-writable at rest.
/// Access is temporarily elevated only for the duration of each signing
/// operation, then immediately revoked.
///
/// Because [`MemSafe::read`] requires `&mut self` while the [`Signer`] trait
/// requires `&self`, the cell is wrapped in a [`Mutex`].
pub struct SafeSigner {
key: Mutex<MemSafe<SigningKey>>,
address: Address,
chain_id: Option<ChainId>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for SafeSigner {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("SafeSigner")
.field("address", &self.address)
.field("chain_id", &self.chain_id)
.finish()
}
}
/// Generates a secp256k1 secret key directly inside a [`MemSafe`] cell.
///
/// Random bytes are written in-place into protected memory, then validated
/// as a legal scalar on the secp256k1 curve (the scalar must be in
/// `[1, n)` where `n` is the curve order — roughly 1-in-2^128 chance of
/// rejection, but we retry to be correct).
///
/// Returns the protected key bytes and the derived Ethereum address.
pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::Rng) -> (MemSafe<[u8; 32]>, Address) {
loop {
let mut cell = MemSafe::new([0u8; 32]).expect("MemSafe allocation");
{
let mut w = cell.write().expect("MemSafe write");
rng.fill_bytes(w.as_mut());
}
let reader = cell.read().expect("MemSafe read");
if let Ok(sk) = SigningKey::from_slice(reader.as_ref()) {
let address = secret_key_to_address(&sk);
drop(reader);
return (cell, address);
}
}
}
impl SafeSigner {
/// Reconstructs a `SafeSigner` from key material held in a [`MemSafe`] buffer.
///
/// The key bytes are read from protected memory, parsed as a secp256k1
/// scalar, and immediately moved into a new [`MemSafe`] cell. The raw
/// bytes are never exposed outside this function.
pub fn from_memsafe(mut cell: MemSafe<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self> {
let reader = cell.read().map_err(Error::other)?;
let sk = SigningKey::from_slice(reader.as_slice()).map_err(Error::other)?;
drop(reader);
Self::new(sk)
}
/// Creates a new `SafeSigner` by moving the signing key into a protected
/// memory region.
pub fn new(key: SigningKey) -> Result<Self> {
let address = secret_key_to_address(&key);
let cell = MemSafe::new(key).map_err(Error::other)?;
Ok(Self {
key: Mutex::new(cell),
address,
chain_id: None,
})
}
fn sign_hash_inner(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
let mut cell = self.key.lock().expect("SafeSigner mutex poisoned");
let reader = cell.read().map_err(Error::other)?;
let sig: (ecdsa::Signature, RecoveryId) = reader.sign_prehash(hash.as_ref())?;
Ok(sig.into())
}
fn sign_tx_inner(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
if let Some(chain_id) = self.chain_id
&& !tx.set_chain_id_checked(chain_id)
{
return Err(Error::TransactionChainIdMismatch {
signer: chain_id,
tx: tx.chain_id().unwrap(),
});
}
self.sign_hash_inner(&tx.signature_hash()).map_err(Error::other)
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Signer for SafeSigner {
#[inline]
async fn sign_hash(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_hash_inner(hash)
}
#[inline]
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
#[inline]
fn chain_id(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
self.chain_id
}
#[inline]
fn set_chain_id(&mut self, chain_id: Option<ChainId>) {
self.chain_id = chain_id;
}
}
impl SignerSync for SafeSigner {
#[inline]
fn sign_hash_sync(&self, hash: &B256) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_hash_inner(hash)
}
#[inline]
fn chain_id_sync(&self) -> Option<ChainId> {
self.chain_id
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl TxSigner<Signature> for SafeSigner {
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
async fn sign_transaction(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_tx_inner(tx)
}
}
impl TxSignerSync<Signature> for SafeSigner {
fn address(&self) -> Address {
self.address
}
fn sign_transaction_sync(
&self,
tx: &mut dyn SignableTransaction<Signature>,
) -> Result<Signature> {
self.sign_tx_inner(tx)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use alloy::signers::local::PrivateKeySigner;
#[test]
fn sign_and_recover() {
let pk = PrivateKeySigner::random();
let key = pk.into_credential();
let signer = SafeSigner::new(key).unwrap();
let message = b"hello arbiter";
let sig = signer.sign_message_sync(message).unwrap();
let recovered = sig.recover_address_from_msg(message).unwrap();
assert_eq!(recovered, Signer::address(&signer));
}
#[test]
fn chain_id_roundtrip() {
let pk = PrivateKeySigner::random();
let key = pk.into_credential();
let mut signer = SafeSigner::new(key).unwrap();
assert_eq!(Signer::chain_id(&signer), None);
signer.set_chain_id(Some(1337));
assert_eq!(Signer::chain_id(&signer), Some(1337));
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
use alloy::primitives::U256;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
#[error("Expected {expected} bytes but got {actual} bytes")]
pub struct LengthError {
pub expected: usize,
pub actual: usize,
}
pub fn u256_to_bytes(value: U256) -> [u8; 32] {
value.to_le_bytes()
}
pub fn bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().ok()?;
Some(U256::from_le_bytes(bytes))
}
pub fn try_bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(LengthError {
expected: 32,
actual: bytes.len(),
}))
})?;
Ok(U256::from_le_bytes(bytes))
}

View File

@@ -1,62 +1,201 @@
#![allow(unused)]
use std::sync::Arc;
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse, UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
transport::BiStream,
proto::{
client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse},
user_agent::{UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
},
transport::{IdentityRecvConverter, SendConverter, grpc},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tonic::{Request, Response, Status};
use tracing::info;
use crate::{
actors::{client::handle_client, user_agent::handle_user_agent},
actors::{
client::{self, ClientConnection as ClientConnectionProps, ClientError, connect_client},
user_agent::{self, TransportResponseError, UserAgentConnection, connect_user_agent},
},
context::ServerContext,
};
pub mod actors;
mod context;
mod db;
mod errors;
pub mod context;
pub mod db;
pub mod evm;
const DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE: usize = 1000;
struct UserAgentGrpcSender;
impl SendConverter for UserAgentGrpcSender {
type Input = Result<UserAgentResponse, TransportResponseError>;
type Output = Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>;
fn convert(&self, item: Self::Input) -> Self::Output {
match item {
Ok(message) => Ok(message),
Err(err) => Err(user_agent_error_status(err)),
}
}
}
struct ClientGrpcSender;
impl SendConverter for ClientGrpcSender {
type Input = Result<ClientResponse, ClientError>;
type Output = Result<ClientResponse, Status>;
fn convert(&self, item: Self::Input) -> Self::Output {
match item {
Ok(message) => Ok(message),
Err(err) => Err(client_error_status(err)),
}
}
}
fn client_error_status(value: ClientError) -> Status {
match value {
ClientError::MissingRequestPayload | ClientError::UnexpectedRequestPayload => {
Status::invalid_argument("Expected message with payload")
}
ClientError::StateTransitionFailed => Status::internal("State machine error"),
ClientError::Auth(ref err) => client_auth_error_status(err),
ClientError::ConnectionRegistrationFailed => {
Status::internal("Connection registration failed")
}
}
}
fn client_auth_error_status(value: &client::auth::Error) -> Status {
use client::auth::Error;
match value {
Error::UnexpectedMessagePayload | Error::InvalidClientPubkeyLength => {
Status::invalid_argument(value.to_string())
}
Error::InvalidAuthPubkeyEncoding => {
Status::invalid_argument("Failed to convert pubkey to VerifyingKey")
}
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution => Status::unauthenticated(value.to_string()),
Error::NotRegistered => Status::permission_denied(value.to_string()),
Error::Transport => Status::internal("Transport error"),
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable => Status::internal("Database pool error"),
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed => Status::internal("Database error"),
Error::InternalError => Status::internal("Internal error"),
}
}
fn user_agent_error_status(value: TransportResponseError) -> Status {
match value {
TransportResponseError::MissingRequestPayload
| TransportResponseError::UnexpectedRequestPayload => {
Status::invalid_argument("Expected message with payload")
}
TransportResponseError::InvalidStateForUnsealEncryptedKey => {
Status::failed_precondition("Invalid state for unseal encrypted key")
}
TransportResponseError::InvalidClientPubkeyLength => {
Status::invalid_argument("client_pubkey must be 32 bytes")
}
TransportResponseError::StateTransitionFailed => Status::internal("State machine error"),
TransportResponseError::KeyHolderActorUnreachable => {
Status::internal("Vault is not available")
}
TransportResponseError::Auth(ref err) => auth_error_status(err),
TransportResponseError::ConnectionRegistrationFailed => {
Status::internal("Failed registering connection")
}
}
}
fn auth_error_status(value: &user_agent::auth::Error) -> Status {
use user_agent::auth::Error;
match value {
Error::UnexpectedMessagePayload | Error::InvalidClientPubkeyLength => {
Status::invalid_argument(value.to_string())
}
Error::InvalidAuthPubkeyEncoding => {
Status::invalid_argument("Failed to convert pubkey to VerifyingKey")
}
Error::PublicKeyNotRegistered | Error::InvalidChallengeSolution => {
Status::unauthenticated(value.to_string())
}
Error::InvalidBootstrapToken => Status::invalid_argument("Invalid bootstrap token"),
Error::Transport => Status::internal("Transport error"),
Error::BootstrapperActorUnreachable => {
Status::internal("Bootstrap token consumption failed")
}
Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable => Status::internal("Database pool error"),
Error::DatabaseOperationFailed => Status::internal("Database error"),
}
}
pub struct Server {
context: ServerContext,
}
impl Server {
pub fn new(context: ServerContext) -> Self {
Self { context }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for Server {
type UserAgentStream = ReceiverStream<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>;
type ClientStream = ReceiverStream<Result<ClientResponse, Status>>;
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
async fn client(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<ClientRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::ClientStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE);
tokio::spawn(handle_client(
self.context.clone(),
BiStream {
request_stream: req_stream,
response_sender: tx,
},
));
let transport = grpc::GrpcAdapter::new(
tx,
req_stream,
IdentityRecvConverter::<ClientRequest>::new(),
ClientGrpcSender,
);
let props = ClientConnectionProps::new(
self.context.db.clone(),
Box::new(transport),
self.context.actors.clone(),
);
tokio::spawn(connect_client(props));
info!(event = "connection established", "grpc.client");
Ok(Response::new(ReceiverStream::new(rx)))
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
async fn user_agent(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<UserAgentRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::UserAgentStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(DEFAULT_CHANNEL_SIZE);
tokio::spawn(handle_user_agent(self.context.clone(), req_stream, tx));
let transport = grpc::GrpcAdapter::new(
tx,
req_stream,
IdentityRecvConverter::<UserAgentRequest>::new(),
UserAgentGrpcSender,
);
let props = UserAgentConnection::new(
self.context.db.clone(),
self.context.actors.clone(),
Box::new(transport),
);
tokio::spawn(connect_user_agent(props));
info!(event = "connection established", "grpc.user_agent");
Ok(Response::new(ReceiverStream::new(rx)))
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use arbiter_proto::{proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterServiceServer, url::ArbiterUrl};
use arbiter_server::{Server, actors::bootstrap::GetToken, context::ServerContext, db};
use miette::miette;
use tonic::transport::{Identity, ServerTlsConfig};
use tracing::info;
const PORT: u16 = 50051;
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> miette::Result<()> {
tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(
tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
.unwrap_or_else(|_| tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("info")),
)
.init();
info!("Starting arbiter server");
let db = db::create_pool(None).await?;
info!("Database ready");
let context = ServerContext::new(db).await?;
let addr: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{PORT}").parse().expect("valid address");
info!(%addr, "Starting gRPC server");
let url = ArbiterUrl {
host: addr.ip().to_string(),
port: addr.port(),
ca_cert: context.tls.ca_cert().clone().into_owned(),
bootstrap_token: context.actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap(),
};
info!(%url, "Server URL");
let tls = ServerTlsConfig::new().identity(Identity::from_pem(
context.tls.cert_pem(),
context.tls.key_pem(),
));
tonic::transport::Server::builder()
.tls_config(tls)
.map_err(|err| miette!("Faild to setup TLS: {err}"))?
.add_service(ArbiterServiceServer::new(Server::new(context)))
.serve(addr)
.await
.map_err(|e| miette::miette!("gRPC server error: {e}"))?;
unreachable!("gRPC server should run indefinitely");
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
mod common;
#[path = "client/auth.rs"]
mod auth;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{Address, Bytes, TxKind, U256},
rlp::Encodable,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
AuthChallengeRequest, AuthChallengeSolution, ClientRequest,
client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
},
evm::EvmSignTransactionRequest,
};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use arbiter_server::actors::GlobalActors;
use arbiter_server::{
actors::client::{ClientConnection, connect_client},
db::{self, schema},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), Box::new(server_transport), actors);
let task = tokio::spawn(connect_client(props));
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
test_transport
.send(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Auth fails, connect_client returns, transport drops
task.await.unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
.values(schema::program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), Box::new(server_transport), actors);
let task = tokio::spawn(connect_client(props));
// Send challenge request
test_transport
.send(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Read the challenge response
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp.payload {
Some(ClientResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(c)) => c,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
// Sign the challenge and send solution
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
test_transport
.send(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Auth completes, session spawned
task.await.unwrap();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_evm_sign_request_payload_is_handled() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::program_client::table)
.values(schema::program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), Box::new(server_transport), actors);
let task = tokio::spawn(connect_client(props));
test_transport
.send(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp.payload {
Some(ClientResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(c)) => c,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
test_transport
.send(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
task.await.unwrap();
let tx = TxEip1559 {
chain_id: 1,
nonce: 0,
gas_limit: 21_000,
max_fee_per_gas: 1,
max_priority_fee_per_gas: 1,
to: TxKind::Call(Address::from_slice(&[0x11; 20])),
value: U256::ZERO,
input: Bytes::new(),
access_list: Default::default(),
};
let mut rlp_transaction = Vec::new();
tx.encode(&mut rlp_transaction);
test_transport
.send(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::EvmSignTransaction(
EvmSignTransactionRequest {
wallet_address: [0x22; 20].to_vec(),
rlp_transaction,
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive sign response");
match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp.payload {
Some(ClientResponsePayload::EvmSignTransaction(_)) => {}
other => panic!("Expected EvmSignTransaction response, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Error};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
db::{self, schema},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actor
.bootstrap(MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
actor
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn root_key_history_id(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> i32 {
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let id = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.select(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
.first::<Option<i32>>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
id.expect("root_key_id should be set after bootstrap")
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub struct ChannelTransport<T, Y> {
receiver: mpsc::Receiver<T>,
sender: mpsc::Sender<Y>,
}
impl<T, Y> ChannelTransport<T, Y> {
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn new() -> (Self, ChannelTransport<Y, T>) {
let (tx1, rx1) = mpsc::channel(10);
let (tx2, rx2) = mpsc::channel(10);
(
Self {
receiver: rx1,
sender: tx2,
},
ChannelTransport {
receiver: rx2,
sender: tx1,
},
)
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Y> Bi<T, Y> for ChannelTransport<T, Y>
where
T: Send + 'static,
Y: Send + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Y) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.sender
.send(item)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::ChannelClosed)
}
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<T> {
self.receiver.recv().await
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
mod common;
#[path = "keyholder/concurrency.rs"]
mod concurrency;
#[path = "keyholder/lifecycle.rs"]
mod lifecycle;
#[path = "keyholder/storage.rs"]
mod storage;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Error, KeyHolder},
db::{self, models, schema},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::sql_query};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use tokio::task::JoinSet;
use crate::common;
async fn write_concurrently(
actor: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
prefix: &'static str,
count: usize,
) -> Vec<(i32, Vec<u8>)> {
let mut set = JoinSet::new();
for i in 0..count {
let actor = actor.clone();
set.spawn(async move {
let plaintext = format!("{prefix}-{i}").into_bytes();
let id = actor
.ask(CreateNew {
plaintext: MemSafe::new(plaintext.clone()).unwrap(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
(id, plaintext)
});
}
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(count);
while let Some(res) = set.join_next().await {
out.push(res.unwrap());
}
out
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn concurrent_create_new_no_duplicate_nonces_() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
let writes = write_concurrently(actor, "nonce-unique", 32).await;
assert_eq!(writes.len(), 32);
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let rows: Vec<models::AeadEncrypted> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.load(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(rows.len(), 32);
let nonces: Vec<&Vec<u8>> = rows.iter().map(|r| &r.current_nonce).collect();
let unique: HashSet<&Vec<u8>> = nonces.iter().copied().collect();
assert_eq!(nonces.len(), unique.len(), "all nonces must be unique");
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn concurrent_create_new_root_nonce_never_moves_backward() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
write_concurrently(actor, "root-max", 24).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let rows: Vec<models::AeadEncrypted> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.load(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let max_nonce = rows
.iter()
.map(|r| r.current_nonce.clone())
.max()
.expect("at least one row");
let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
.select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, max_nonce);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn insert_failure_does_not_create_partial_row() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let root_key_history_id = common::root_key_history_id(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let before_count: i64 = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let before_root_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
sql_query(
"CREATE TRIGGER fail_aead_insert BEFORE INSERT ON aead_encrypted BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'forced test failure'); END;",
)
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let err = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"should fail".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::DatabaseTransaction(_)));
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
sql_query("DROP TRIGGER fail_aead_insert;")
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let after_count: i64 = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
before_count, after_count,
"failed insert must not create row"
);
let after_root_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
after_root_nonce > before_root_nonce,
"current behavior allows nonce gap on failed insert"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn decrypt_roundtrip_after_high_concurrency() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await);
let writes = write_concurrently(actor, "roundtrip", 40).await;
let expected: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>> = writes.into_iter().collect();
let mut decryptor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
decryptor
.try_unseal(MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
for (id, plaintext) in expected {
let mut decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{Error, KeyHolder},
db::{self, models, schema},
};
use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::common;
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_bootstrap() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
.select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(row.schema_version, 1);
assert_eq!(
row.tag,
arbiter_server::actors::keyholder::encryption::v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG
);
assert!(!row.ciphertext.is_empty());
assert!(!row.salt.is_empty());
assert_eq!(
row.data_encryption_nonce,
arbiter_server::actors::keyholder::encryption::v1::Nonce::default().to_vec()
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_bootstrap_rejects_double() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let seal_key2 = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
let err = actor.bootstrap(seal_key2).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::AlreadyBootstrapped));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_create_new_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
let err = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"data".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_decrypt_before_bootstrap_fails() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
let err = actor.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_new_restores_sealed_state() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
drop(actor);
let mut actor2 = KeyHolder::new(db).await.unwrap();
let err = actor2.decrypt(1).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotBootstrapped));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_unseal_correct_password() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"survive a restart";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.try_unseal(seal_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_unseal_wrong_then_correct_password() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"important data";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
drop(actor);
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let bad_key = MemSafe::new(b"wrong-password".to_vec()).unwrap();
let err = actor.try_unseal(bad_key).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidKey));
let good_key = MemSafe::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
actor.try_unseal(good_key).await.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
use std::collections::HashSet;
use arbiter_server::{
actors::keyholder::{Error, encryption::v1},
db::{self, models, schema},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use crate::common;
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_create_decrypt_roundtrip() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"hello arbiter";
let aead_id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let mut decrypted = actor.decrypt(aead_id).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*decrypted.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_decrypt_nonexistent_returns_not_found() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let err = actor.decrypt(9999).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::NotFound));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_ciphertext_differs_across_entries() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let plaintext = b"same content";
let id1 = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let id2 = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(plaintext.to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let row1: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id1))
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let row2: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id2))
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_ne!(row1.ciphertext, row2.ciphertext);
let mut d1 = actor.decrypt(id1).await.unwrap();
let mut d2 = actor.decrypt(id2).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(*d1.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
assert_eq!(*d2.read().unwrap(), plaintext);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_nonce_never_reused() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let n = 5;
for i in 0..n {
actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(format!("secret {i}").into_bytes()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
}
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let rows: Vec<models::AeadEncrypted> = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.load(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(rows.len(), n);
let nonces: Vec<&Vec<u8>> = rows.iter().map(|r| &r.current_nonce).collect();
let unique: HashSet<&Vec<u8>> = nonces.iter().copied().collect();
assert_eq!(nonces.len(), unique.len(), "all nonces must be unique");
for (i, row) in rows.iter().enumerate() {
let mut expected = v1::Nonce::default();
for _ in 0..=i {
expected.increment();
}
assert_eq!(row.current_nonce, expected.to_vec(), "nonce {i} mismatch");
}
let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
.select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
let last_nonce = &rows.last().unwrap().current_nonce;
assert_eq!(&root_row.data_encryption_nonce, last_nonce);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn broken_db_nonce_format_fails_closed() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let root_key_history_id = common::root_key_history_id(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
update(
schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id)),
)
.set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(vec![1, 2, 3]))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let err = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"must fail".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = common::bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let id = actor
.create_new(MemSafe::new(b"decrypt target".to_vec()).unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
update(schema::aead_encrypted::table.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id)))
.set(schema::aead_encrypted::current_nonce.eq(vec![7, 8]))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let err = actor.decrypt(id).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::BrokenDatabase));
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
mod common;
#[path = "user_agent/auth.rs"]
mod auth;
#[path = "user_agent/sdk_client.rs"]
mod sdk_client;
#[path = "user_agent/unseal.rs"]
mod unseal;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{
AuthChallengeRequest, AuthChallengeSolution, KeyType as ProtoKeyType, UserAgentRequest,
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
bootstrap::GetToken,
user_agent::{UserAgentConnection, connect_user_agent},
},
db::{self, schema},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
use super::common::ChannelTransport;
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let token = actors.bootstrapper.ask(GetToken).await.unwrap().unwrap();
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let props = UserAgentConnection::new(db.clone(), actors, Box::new(server_transport));
let task = tokio::spawn(connect_user_agent(props));
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
test_transport
.send(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: Some(token),
key_type: ProtoKeyType::Ed25519.into(),
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
task.await.unwrap();
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let stored_pubkey: Vec<u8> = schema::useragent_client::table
.select(schema::useragent_client::public_key)
.first::<Vec<u8>>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(stored_pubkey, new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec());
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let props = UserAgentConnection::new(db.clone(), actors, Box::new(server_transport));
let task = tokio::spawn(connect_user_agent(props));
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
test_transport
.send(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_string()),
key_type: ProtoKeyType::Ed25519.into(),
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Auth fails, connect_user_agent returns, transport drops
task.await.unwrap();
// Verify no key was registered
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let count: i64 = schema::useragent_client::table
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
// Pre-register key with key_type
{
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
.values((
schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes.clone()),
schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
}
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
let props = UserAgentConnection::new(db.clone(), actors, Box::new(server_transport));
let task = tokio::spawn(connect_user_agent(props));
// Send challenge request
test_transport
.send(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes,
bootstrap_token: None,
key_type: ProtoKeyType::Ed25519.into(),
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Read the challenge response
let response = test_transport
.recv()
.await
.expect("should receive challenge");
let challenge = match response {
Ok(resp) => match resp.payload {
Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::AuthChallenge(c)) => c,
other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
},
Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
};
// Sign the challenge and send solution
let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);
test_transport
.send(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::AuthChallengeSolution(
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
// Auth completes, session spawned
task.await.unwrap();
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{
SdkClientApproveRequest, SdkClientError as ProtoSdkClientError, SdkClientRevokeRequest,
UserAgentRequest, sdk_client_approve_response, sdk_client_list_response,
sdk_client_revoke_response, user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{GlobalActors, user_agent::session::UserAgentSession},
db,
};
/// Shared helper: create a session and register a client pubkey via sdk_client_approve.
async fn make_session(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> UserAgentSession {
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
UserAgentSession::new_test(db.clone(), actors)
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_sdk_client_approve_registers_client() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut session = make_session(&db).await;
let pubkey = [0x42u8; 32];
let response = session
.process_transport_inbound(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientApprove(
SdkClientApproveRequest {
pubkey: pubkey.to_vec(),
},
)),
})
.await
.expect("handler should succeed");
let entry = match response.payload.unwrap() {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientApprove(resp) => match resp.result.unwrap() {
sdk_client_approve_response::Result::Client(e) => e,
sdk_client_approve_response::Result::Error(e) => {
panic!("Expected Client, got error {:?}", e)
}
},
other => panic!("Expected SdkClientApprove, got {other:?}"),
};
assert_eq!(entry.pubkey, pubkey.to_vec());
assert!(entry.id > 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_sdk_client_approve_duplicate_returns_already_exists() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut session = make_session(&db).await;
let pubkey = [0x11u8; 32];
let req = UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientApprove(
SdkClientApproveRequest {
pubkey: pubkey.to_vec(),
},
)),
};
session
.process_transport_inbound(req.clone())
.await
.unwrap();
let response = session
.process_transport_inbound(req)
.await
.expect("second insert should not panic");
match response.payload.unwrap() {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientApprove(resp) => match resp.result.unwrap() {
sdk_client_approve_response::Result::Error(code) => {
assert_eq!(code, ProtoSdkClientError::AlreadyExists as i32);
}
sdk_client_approve_response::Result::Client(_) => {
panic!("Expected AlreadyExists error for duplicate pubkey")
}
},
other => panic!("Expected SdkClientApprove, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_sdk_client_list_shows_registered_clients() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut session = make_session(&db).await;
let pubkey_a = [0x0Au8; 32];
let pubkey_b = [0x0Bu8; 32];
for pubkey in [pubkey_a, pubkey_b] {
session
.process_transport_inbound(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientApprove(
SdkClientApproveRequest {
pubkey: pubkey.to_vec(),
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
}
let response = session
.process_transport_inbound(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientList(())),
})
.await
.expect("list should succeed");
let clients = match response.payload.unwrap() {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientList(resp) => match resp.result.unwrap() {
sdk_client_list_response::Result::Clients(list) => list.clients,
sdk_client_list_response::Result::Error(e) => {
panic!("Expected Clients, got error {:?}", e)
}
},
other => panic!("Expected SdkClientList, got {other:?}"),
};
assert_eq!(clients.len(), 2);
let pubkeys: Vec<Vec<u8>> = clients.into_iter().map(|e| e.pubkey).collect();
assert!(pubkeys.contains(&pubkey_a.to_vec()));
assert!(pubkeys.contains(&pubkey_b.to_vec()));
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_sdk_client_revoke_removes_client() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut session = make_session(&db).await;
let pubkey = [0xBBu8; 32];
// Register a client and get its id
let approve_response = session
.process_transport_inbound(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientApprove(
SdkClientApproveRequest {
pubkey: pubkey.to_vec(),
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let client_id = match approve_response.payload.unwrap() {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientApprove(resp) => match resp.result.unwrap() {
sdk_client_approve_response::Result::Client(e) => e.id,
sdk_client_approve_response::Result::Error(e) => panic!("approve failed: {:?}", e),
},
other => panic!("{other:?}"),
};
// Revoke the client
let revoke_response = session
.process_transport_inbound(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientRevoke(
SdkClientRevokeRequest { client_id },
)),
})
.await
.expect("revoke should succeed");
match revoke_response.payload.unwrap() {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientRevoke(resp) => match resp.result.unwrap() {
sdk_client_revoke_response::Result::Ok(_) => {}
sdk_client_revoke_response::Result::Error(e) => {
panic!("Expected Ok, got error {:?}", e)
}
},
other => panic!("Expected SdkClientRevoke, got {other:?}"),
}
// List should now be empty
let list_response = session
.process_transport_inbound(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientList(())),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let clients = match list_response.payload.unwrap() {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientList(resp) => match resp.result.unwrap() {
sdk_client_list_response::Result::Clients(list) => list.clients,
sdk_client_list_response::Result::Error(e) => panic!("list error: {:?}", e),
},
other => panic!("{other:?}"),
};
assert!(clients.is_empty(), "client should be removed after revoke");
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_sdk_client_revoke_not_found_returns_error() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut session = make_session(&db).await;
let response = session
.process_transport_inbound(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClientRevoke(
SdkClientRevokeRequest { client_id: 9999 },
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
match response.payload.unwrap() {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClientRevoke(resp) => match resp.result.unwrap() {
sdk_client_revoke_response::Result::Error(code) => {
assert_eq!(code, ProtoSdkClientError::NotFound as i32);
}
sdk_client_revoke_response::Result::Ok(_) => {
panic!("Expected NotFound error for missing client_id")
}
},
other => panic!("Expected SdkClientRevoke, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn test_sdk_client_approve_rejected_client_cannot_auth() {
// Verify the core flow: only pre-approved clients can authenticate
use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{
AuthChallengeRequest, ClientRequest, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi as _;
use arbiter_server::actors::client::{ClientConnection, connect_client};
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = super::common::ChannelTransport::<_, _>::new();
let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), Box::new(server_transport), actors.clone());
let task = tokio::spawn(connect_client(props));
test_transport
.send(ClientRequest {
payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::AuthChallengeRequest(
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: pubkey_bytes.clone(),
},
)),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = test_transport.recv().await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert!(
matches!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
ClientResponsePayload::ClientConnectError(_)
),
"unregistered client should be rejected"
);
task.await.unwrap();
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::{
UnsealEncryptedKey, UnsealResult, UnsealStart, UserAgentRequest,
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
};
use arbiter_server::{
actors::{
GlobalActors,
keyholder::{Bootstrap, Seal},
user_agent::session::UserAgentSession,
},
db,
};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
async fn setup_sealed_user_agent(
seal_key: &[u8],
) -> (db::DatabasePool, UserAgentSession) {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
actors
.key_holder
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: MemSafe::new(seal_key.to_vec()).unwrap(),
})
.await
.unwrap();
actors.key_holder.ask(Seal).await.unwrap();
let session = UserAgentSession::new_test(db.clone(), actors);
(db, session)
}
async fn client_dh_encrypt(
user_agent: &mut UserAgentSession,
key_to_send: &[u8],
) -> UnsealEncryptedKey {
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
let response = user_agent
.process_transport_inbound(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealStart(UnsealStart {
client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
})),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let server_pubkey = match response.payload.unwrap() {
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealStartResponse(resp) => resp.server_pubkey,
other => panic!("Expected UnsealStartResponse, got {other:?}"),
};
let server_public = PublicKey::from(<[u8; 32]>::try_from(server_pubkey.as_slice()).unwrap());
let shared_secret = client_secret.diffie_hellman(&server_public);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let nonce = XNonce::from([0u8; 24]);
let associated_data = b"unseal";
let mut ciphertext = key_to_send.to_vec();
cipher
.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut ciphertext)
.unwrap();
UnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
ciphertext,
associated_data: associated_data.to_vec(),
}
}
fn unseal_key_request(req: UnsealEncryptedKey) -> UserAgentRequest {
UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealEncryptedKey(req)),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_success() {
let seal_key = b"test-seal-key";
let (_db, mut user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(seal_key).await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&mut user_agent, seal_key).await;
let response = user_agent
.process_transport_inbound(unseal_key_request(encrypted_key))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::Success.into()),
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_wrong_seal_key() {
let (_db, mut user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(b"correct-key").await;
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&mut user_agent, b"wrong-key").await;
let response = user_agent
.process_transport_inbound(unseal_key_request(encrypted_key))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_corrupted_ciphertext() {
let (_db, mut user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(b"test-key").await;
let client_secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let client_public = PublicKey::from(&client_secret);
user_agent
.process_transport_inbound(UserAgentRequest {
payload: Some(UserAgentRequestPayload::UnsealStart(UnsealStart {
client_pubkey: client_public.as_bytes().to_vec(),
})),
})
.await
.unwrap();
let response = user_agent
.process_transport_inbound(unseal_key_request(UnsealEncryptedKey {
nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
associated_data: vec![],
}))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
pub async fn test_unseal_retry_after_invalid_key() {
let seal_key = b"real-seal-key";
let (_db, mut user_agent) = setup_sealed_user_agent(seal_key).await;
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&mut user_agent, b"wrong-key").await;
let response = user_agent
.process_transport_inbound(unseal_key_request(encrypted_key))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::InvalidKey.into()),
);
}
{
let encrypted_key = client_dh_encrypt(&mut user_agent, seal_key).await;
let response = user_agent
.process_transport_inbound(unseal_key_request(encrypted_key))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.payload.unwrap(),
UserAgentResponsePayload::UnsealResult(UnsealResult::Success.into()),
);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
[package]
name = "arbiter-terrors-poc"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
[dependencies]
terrors = "0.3"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
use crate::errors::{InternalError1, InternalError2, InvalidSignature, NotRegistered};
use terrors::OneOf;
use crate::errors::ProtoError;
// Each sub-call's error type already implements DrainInto<ProtoError>, so we convert
// directly to ProtoError without broaden — no turbofish needed anywhere.
//
// Call chain:
// load_config() → OneOf<(InternalError2,)> → ProtoError::from
// get_nonce() → OneOf<(InternalError1, InternalError2)> → ProtoError::from
// verify_sig() → OneOf<(InvalidSignature,)> → ProtoError::from
pub fn process_request(id: u32, sig: &str) -> Result<String, ProtoError> {
if id == 0 {
return Err(ProtoError::NotRegistered);
}
let config = load_config(id).map_err(ProtoError::from)?;
let nonce = crate::db::get_nonce(id).map_err(ProtoError::from)?;
verify_signature(nonce, sig).map_err(ProtoError::from)?;
Ok(format!("config={config} nonce={nonce} sig={sig}"))
}
// Simulates loading a config value.
// id=97 triggers InternalError2 ("config read failed").
fn load_config(id: u32) -> Result<String, OneOf<(InternalError2,)>> {
if id == 97 {
return Err(OneOf::new(InternalError2("config read failed".to_owned())));
}
Ok(format!("cfg-{id}"))
}
pub fn verify_signature(_nonce: u32, sig: &str) -> Result<(), OneOf<(InvalidSignature,)>> {
if sig != "ok" {
return Err(OneOf::new(InvalidSignature));
}
Ok(())
}
type AuthError = OneOf<(
NotRegistered,
InvalidSignature,
InternalError1,
InternalError2,
)>;
pub fn authenticate(id: u32, sig: &str) -> Result<u32, AuthError> {
if id == 0 {
return Err(OneOf::new(NotRegistered));
}
// Return type AuthError lets the compiler infer the broaden target.
let nonce = crate::db::get_nonce(id).map_err(OneOf::broaden)?;
verify_signature(nonce, sig).map_err(OneOf::broaden)?;
Ok(nonce)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn verify_signature_ok() {
assert!(verify_signature(42, "ok").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn verify_signature_bad() {
let err = verify_signature(42, "bad").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.narrow::<crate::errors::InvalidSignature, _>().is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn authenticate_success() {
assert_eq!(authenticate(1, "ok").unwrap(), 42);
}
#[test]
fn authenticate_not_registered() {
let err = authenticate(0, "ok").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.narrow::<crate::errors::NotRegistered, _>().is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn authenticate_invalid_signature() {
let err = authenticate(1, "bad").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.narrow::<crate::errors::InvalidSignature, _>().is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn authenticate_internal_error1() {
let err = authenticate(99, "ok").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.narrow::<crate::errors::InternalError1, _>().is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn authenticate_internal_error2() {
let err = authenticate(98, "ok").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.narrow::<crate::errors::InternalError2, _>().is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn process_request_success() {
let result = process_request(1, "ok").unwrap();
assert!(result.contains("nonce=42"));
}
#[test]
fn process_request_not_registered() {
let err = process_request(0, "ok").unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, crate::errors::ProtoError::NotRegistered));
}
#[test]
fn process_request_invalid_signature() {
let err = process_request(1, "bad").unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, crate::errors::ProtoError::InvalidSignature));
}
#[test]
fn process_request_internal_from_config() {
// id=97 → load_config returns InternalError2
let err = process_request(97, "ok").unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, crate::errors::ProtoError::Internal(ref msg) if msg == "config read failed")
);
}
#[test]
fn process_request_internal_from_db() {
// id=99 → get_nonce returns InternalError1
let err = process_request(99, "ok").unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, crate::errors::ProtoError::Internal(ref msg) if msg == "db pool unavailable")
);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
use crate::errors::{InternalError1, InternalError2};
use terrors::OneOf;
// Simulates fetching a nonce from a database.
// id=99 → InternalError1 (pool unavailable)
// id=98 → InternalError2 (query timeout)
pub fn get_nonce(id: u32) -> Result<u32, OneOf<(InternalError1, InternalError2)>> {
match id {
99 => Err(OneOf::new(InternalError1("db pool unavailable".to_owned()))),
98 => Err(OneOf::new(InternalError2("query timeout".to_owned()))),
_ => Ok(42),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn get_nonce_returns_nonce_for_valid_id() {
assert_eq!(get_nonce(1).unwrap(), 42);
}
#[test]
fn get_nonce_returns_internal_error1_for_sentinel() {
let err = get_nonce(99).unwrap_err();
let internal = err.narrow::<crate::errors::InternalError1, _>().unwrap();
assert_eq!(internal.0, "db pool unavailable");
}
#[test]
fn get_nonce_returns_internal_error2_for_sentinel() {
let err = get_nonce(98).unwrap_err();
let e = err.narrow::<crate::errors::InternalError1, _>().unwrap_err();
let internal = e.take::<crate::errors::InternalError2>();
assert_eq!(internal.0, "query timeout");
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
use terrors::OneOf;
// Wire boundary type — what would go into a proto response
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum ProtoError {
NotRegistered,
InvalidSignature,
Internal(String), // Or Box<dyn Error>, who cares?
}
// Internal terrors types
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct NotRegistered;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct InvalidSignature;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct InternalError1(pub String);
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct InternalError2(pub String);
// Errors can be scattered across the codebase as long as they implement Into<ProtoError>
impl From<NotRegistered> for ProtoError {
fn from(_: NotRegistered) -> Self {
ProtoError::NotRegistered
}
}
impl From<InvalidSignature> for ProtoError {
fn from(_: InvalidSignature) -> Self {
ProtoError::InvalidSignature
}
}
impl From<InternalError1> for ProtoError {
fn from(e: InternalError1) -> Self {
ProtoError::Internal(e.0)
}
}
impl From<InternalError2> for ProtoError {
fn from(e: InternalError2) -> Self {
ProtoError::Internal(e.0)
}
}
/// Private helper trait for converting from OneOf<T...> where each T can be converted
/// into the target type `O` by recursively narrowing until a match is found.
///
/// IDK why this isn't already in terrors.
trait DrainInto<O>: terrors::TypeSet + Sized {
fn drain(e: OneOf<Self>) -> O;
}
macro_rules! impl_drain_into {
($head:ident) => {
impl<$head, O> DrainInto<O> for ($head,)
where
$head: Into<O> + 'static,
{
fn drain(e: OneOf<($head,)>) -> O {
e.take().into()
}
}
};
($head:ident, $($tail:ident),+) => {
impl<$head, $($tail),+, O> DrainInto<O> for ($head, $($tail),+)
where
$head: Into<O> + 'static,
($($tail,)+): DrainInto<O>,
{
fn drain(e: OneOf<($head, $($tail),+)>) -> O {
match e.narrow::<$head, _>() {
Ok(h) => h.into(),
Err(rest) => <($($tail,)+)>::drain(rest),
}
}
}
impl_drain_into!($($tail),+);
};
}
// Generates impls for all tuple sizes from 1 up to 7 (restricted by terrors internal impl).
// Each invocation produces one impl then recurses on the tail.
impl_drain_into!(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I);
// Blanket From impl: body delegates to the recursive drain.
impl<E: DrainInto<ProtoError>> From<OneOf<E>> for ProtoError {
fn from(e: OneOf<E>) -> Self {
E::drain(e)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn not_registered_converts_to_proto() {
let e: ProtoError = NotRegistered.into();
assert!(matches!(e, ProtoError::NotRegistered));
}
#[test]
fn invalid_signature_converts_to_proto() {
let e: ProtoError = InvalidSignature.into();
assert!(matches!(e, ProtoError::InvalidSignature));
}
#[test]
fn internal_converts_to_proto() {
let e: ProtoError = InternalError1("boom".into()).into();
assert!(matches!(e, ProtoError::Internal(msg) if msg == "boom"));
}
#[test]
fn one_of_remainder_converts_to_proto_invalid_signature() {
use terrors::OneOf;
let e: OneOf<(InvalidSignature, InternalError1)> = OneOf::new(InvalidSignature);
let proto = ProtoError::from(e);
assert!(matches!(proto, ProtoError::InvalidSignature));
}
#[test]
fn one_of_remainder_converts_to_proto_internal() {
use terrors::OneOf;
let e: OneOf<(InvalidSignature, InternalError1)> =
OneOf::new(InternalError1("db fail".into()));
let proto = ProtoError::from(e);
assert!(matches!(proto, ProtoError::Internal(msg) if msg == "db fail"));
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
mod auth;
mod db;
mod errors;
use errors::ProtoError;
fn run(id: u32, sig: &str) {
print!("authenticate(id={id}, sig={sig:?}) => ");
match auth::authenticate(id, sig) {
Ok(nonce) => println!("Ok(nonce={nonce})"),
Err(e) => match e.narrow::<errors::NotRegistered, _>() {
Ok(_) => println!("Err(NotRegistered) — handled locally"),
Err(remaining) => {
let proto = ProtoError::from(remaining);
println!("Err(ProtoError::{proto:?}) — forwarded to wire");
}
},
}
}
fn run_process(id: u32, sig: &str) {
print!("process_request(id={id}, sig={sig:?}) => ");
match auth::process_request(id, sig) {
Ok(s) => println!("Ok({s})"),
Err(e) => println!("Err(ProtoError::{e:?})"),
}
}
fn main() {
println!("=== authenticate ===");
run(0, "ok"); // NotRegistered
run(1, "bad"); // InvalidSignature
run(99, "ok"); // InternalError1
run(98, "ok"); // InternalError2
run(1, "ok"); // success
println!("\n=== process_request (Try chain) ===");
run_process(0, "ok"); // NotRegistered (guard, no I/O)
run_process(97, "ok"); // InternalError2 from load_config
run_process(99, "ok"); // InternalError1 from get_nonce
run_process(1, "bad"); // InvalidSignature from verify_signature
run_process(1, "ok"); // success
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
[package]
name = "arbiter-tokens-registry"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
[dependencies]
alloy.workspace = true

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
pub mod nonfungible;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, ChainId, address};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct TokenInfo {
pub name: &'static str,
pub symbol: &'static str,
pub decimals: u32,
pub contract: Address,
pub chain: ChainId,
pub logo_uri: Option<&'static str>,
}
include!("tokens.rs");

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