feat(server): implement useragent_delete_grant hard delete cleanup

mise.lock

@@ -48,10 +48,6 @@ backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
 version = "1.46.3"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
 
-[[tools."cargo:cargo-mutants"]]
-version = "27.0.0"
-backend = "cargo:cargo-mutants"
-
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
 version = "0.9.126"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
@@ -115,37 +111,30 @@ backend = "core:python"
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64"]
 checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
 url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
-provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
 checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
 url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
-provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
 checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
 url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
-provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
 checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
 url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
-provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
 checksum = "sha256:c43aecde4a663aebff99b9b83da0efec506479f1c3f98331442f33d2c43501f9"
 url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
-provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.macos-x64"]
 checksum = "sha256:9ab41dbc2f100a2a45d1833b9c11165f51051c558b5213eda9a9731d5948a0c0"
 url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
-provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.windows-x64"]
 checksum = "sha256:bbe19034b35b0267176a7442575ae7dc6343480fd4d35598cb7700173d431e09"
 url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
-provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [[tools.rust]]
 version = "1.93.0"

mise.toml

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ protoc = "29.6"
 python = "3.14.3"
 ast-grep = "0.42.0"
 "cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.9"
-"cargo:cargo-mutants" = "27.0.0"
 
 [tasks.codegen]
 sources = ['protobufs/*.proto', 'protobufs/**/*.proto']

protobufs/shared/evm.proto

@@ -36,10 +36,6 @@ message GasLimitExceededViolation {
 }
 
 message EvalViolation {
-  message ChainIdMismatch {
-    uint64 expected = 1;
-    uint64 actual = 2;
-  }
   oneof kind {
     bytes invalid_target = 1; // 20-byte Ethereum address
     GasLimitExceededViolation gas_limit_exceeded = 2;
@@ -47,8 +43,6 @@ message EvalViolation {
     google.protobuf.Empty volumetric_limit_exceeded = 4;
     google.protobuf.Empty invalid_time = 5;
     google.protobuf.Empty invalid_transaction_type = 6;
-
-    ChainIdMismatch chain_id_mismatch = 7;
   }
 }
 

server/.cargo/mutants.toml

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-test_tool = "nextest"

server/.gitignore

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-mutants.out/
-mutants.out.old/

server/Cargo.lock

@@ -742,27 +742,23 @@ dependencies = [
  "insta",
  "k256",
  "kameo",
- "macro_rules_attribute",
  "memsafe",
- "mutants",
- "paste",
  "pem",
- "proptest",
+ "postcard",
  "prost",
  "prost-types",
  "rand 0.10.0",
  "rcgen",
  "restructed",
  "rsa",
- "rstest",
  "rustls",
  "secrecy",
+ "serde",
  "serde_with",
  "sha2 0.10.9",
  "smlang",
  "spki",
  "strum 0.28.0",
- "subtle",
  "test-log",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "tokio",
@@ -1061,6 +1057,15 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "atomic-polyfill"
+version = "1.0.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8cf2bce30dfe09ef0bfaef228b9d414faaf7e563035494d7fe092dba54b300f4"
+dependencies = [
+ "critical-section",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "atomic-waker"
 version = "1.1.2"
@@ -1451,6 +1456,15 @@ dependencies = [
  "cc",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "cobs"
+version = "0.3.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "0fa961b519f0b462e3a3b4a34b64d119eeaca1d59af726fe450bbba07a9fc0a1"
+dependencies = [
+ "thiserror 2.0.18",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "console"
 version = "0.15.11"
@@ -1558,6 +1572,12 @@ dependencies = [
  "cfg-if",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "critical-section"
+version = "1.2.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "790eea4361631c5e7d22598ecd5723ff611904e3344ce8720784c93e3d83d40b"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "crossbeam-utils"
 version = "0.8.21"
@@ -2023,6 +2043,18 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "embedded-io"
+version = "0.4.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ef1a6892d9eef45c8fa6b9e0086428a2cca8491aca8f787c534a3d6d0bcb3ced"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "embedded-io"
+version = "0.6.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "edd0f118536f44f5ccd48bcb8b111bdc3de888b58c74639dfb034a357d0f206d"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "encode_unicode"
 version = "1.0.0"
@@ -2440,6 +2472,15 @@ dependencies = [
  "tracing",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "hash32"
+version = "0.2.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "b0c35f58762feb77d74ebe43bdbc3210f09be9fe6742234d573bacc26ed92b67"
+dependencies = [
+ "byteorder",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "hashbrown"
 version = "0.12.3"
@@ -2474,6 +2515,20 @@ dependencies = [
  "serde_core",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "heapless"
+version = "0.7.17"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "cdc6457c0eb62c71aac4bc17216026d8410337c4126773b9c5daba343f17964f"
+dependencies = [
+ "atomic-polyfill",
+ "hash32",
+ "rustc_version 0.4.1",
+ "serde",
+ "spin",
+ "stable_deref_trait",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "heck"
 version = "0.5.0"
@@ -3059,22 +3114,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "macro_rules_attribute"
-version = "0.2.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "65049d7923698040cd0b1ddcced9b0eb14dd22c5f86ae59c3740eab64a676520"
-dependencies = [
- "macro_rules_attribute-proc_macro",
- "paste",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "macro_rules_attribute-proc_macro"
-version = "0.2.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "670fdfda89751bc4a84ac13eaa63e205cf0fd22b4c9a5fbfa085b63c1f1d3a30"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "matchers"
 version = "0.2.0"
@@ -3197,12 +3236,6 @@ version = "0.10.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "1d87ecb2933e8aeadb3e3a02b828fed80a7528047e68b4f424523a0981a3a084"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "mutants"
-version = "0.0.4"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "add0ac067452ff1aca8c5002111bd6b1c895baee6e45fcbc44e0193aea17be56"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "nom"
 version = "7.1.3"
@@ -3556,6 +3589,19 @@ version = "1.13.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "c33a9471896f1c69cecef8d20cbe2f7accd12527ce60845ff44c153bb2a21b49"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "postcard"
+version = "1.1.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "6764c3b5dd454e283a30e6dfe78e9b31096d9e32036b5d1eaac7a6119ccb9a24"
+dependencies = [
+ "cobs",
+ "embedded-io 0.4.0",
+ "embedded-io 0.6.1",
+ "heapless",
+ "serde",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "potential_utf"
 version = "0.1.4"
@@ -3667,9 +3713,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "proptest"
-version = "1.11.0"
+version = "1.10.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4b45fcc2344c680f5025fe57779faef368840d0bd1f42f216291f0dc4ace4744"
+checksum = "37566cb3fdacef14c0737f9546df7cfeadbfbc9fef10991038bf5015d0c80532"
 dependencies = [
  "bit-set",
  "bit-vec",
@@ -4744,6 +4790,9 @@ name = "spin"
 version = "0.9.8"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "6980e8d7511241f8acf4aebddbb1ff938df5eebe98691418c4468d0b72a96a67"
+dependencies = [
+ "lock_api",
+]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "spki"

server/Cargo.toml

@@ -44,4 +44,3 @@ sha2 = "0.10"
 spki = "0.7"
 prost = "0.14.3"
 miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
-mutants = "0.0.4"

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/wallets/evm.rs

@@ -59,10 +59,6 @@ pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet {
 }
 
 impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
-    #[expect(
-        dead_code,
-        reason = "constructor may be used in future extensions, e.g. to support wallet listing"
-    )]
     pub(crate) fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
         Self {
             transport,

server/crates/arbiter-server/Cargo.toml

@@ -58,14 +58,10 @@ prost-types.workspace = true
 prost.workspace = true
 arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
 anyhow = "1.0.102"
+postcard = { version = "1.1.3", features = ["use-std"] }
+serde = { version = "1.0.228", features = ["derive"] }
 serde_with = "3.18.0"
-mutants.workspace = true
-subtle = "2.6.1"
-macro_rules_attribute = "0.2.2"
-paste = "1.0.15"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 insta = "1.46.3"
-proptest = "1.11.0"
-rstest.workspace = true
 test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/bootstrap.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 use kameo::{Actor, messages};
 
 use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
-use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
 use thiserror::Error;
 
 use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
@@ -45,14 +44,14 @@ pub struct Bootstrapper {
 
 impl Bootstrapper {
     pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
-        let row_count: i64 = {
         let mut conn = db.get().await?;
 
-            schema::useragent_client::table
+        let row_count: i64 = schema::useragent_client::table
             .count()
             .get_result(&mut conn)
-                .await?
-        };
+            .await?;
+
+        drop(conn);
 
         let token = if row_count == 0 {
             let token = generate_token().await?;
@@ -70,13 +69,7 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
     #[message]
     pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
         match &self.token {
-            Some(expected) => {
-                let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
-                let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
-
-                let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
-                bool::from(choice)
-            }
+            Some(expected) => *expected == token,
             None => false,
         }
     }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/auth.rs

@@ -9,16 +9,14 @@ use diesel::{
 };
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
 use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
-use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
+use kameo::error::SendError;
 use tracing::error;
 
 use crate::{
     actors::{
-        client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, ClientProfile},
+        client::{ClientConnection, ClientProfile},
         flow_coordinator::{self, RequestClientApproval},
-        keyholder::KeyHolder,
     },
-    crypto::integrity::{self, Verified, verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor},
     db::{
         self,
         models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
@@ -32,8 +30,6 @@ pub enum Error {
     DatabasePoolUnavailable,
     #[error("Database operation failed")]
     DatabaseOperationFailed,
-    #[error("Integrity check failed")]
-    IntegrityCheckFailed,
     #[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
     InvalidChallengeSolution,
     #[error("Client approval request failed")]
@@ -42,13 +38,6 @@ pub enum Error {
     Transport,
 }
 
-impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
-    fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
-        error!(?e, "Database error");
-        Self::DatabaseOperationFailed
-    }
-}
-
 #[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum ApproveError {
     #[error("Internal error")]
@@ -76,36 +65,17 @@ pub enum Outbound {
     AuthSuccess,
 }
 
-/// Returns the current nonce and client ID for a registered client.
-/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
-async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
-    db: &db::DatabasePool,
-    pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
-) -> Result<Option<(i32, i32)>, Error> {
-    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
-    })?;
-    program_client::table
-        .filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
-        .select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
-        .first::<(i32, i32)>(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .optional()
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
-            Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-        })
+pub struct ClientInfo {
+    pub id: i32,
+    pub current_nonce: i32,
 }
 
-/// Atomically increments the nonce and re-signs the integrity envelope.
-/// Returns the new nonce, which is used as the challenge nonce.
-async fn create_nonce(
+/// Atomically reads and increments the nonce for a known client.
+/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
+async fn get_client_and_nonce(
     db: &db::DatabasePool,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
     pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
-) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+) -> Result<Option<ClientInfo>, Error> {
     let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
 
     let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
@@ -114,35 +84,34 @@ async fn create_nonce(
     })?;
 
     conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
-        let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
         Box::pin(async move {
-            let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(program_client::table)
+            let Some((client_id, current_nonce)) = program_client::table
                 .filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
-                .set(program_client::nonce.eq(program_client::nonce + 1))
-                .returning((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
-                .get_result(conn)
+                .select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
+                .first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
+                .await
+                .optional()?
+            else {
+                return Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(None);
+            };
+
+            update(program_client::table)
+                .filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
+                .set(program_client::nonce.eq(current_nonce + 1))
+                .execute(conn)
                 .await?;
 
-            integrity::sign_entity(
-                conn,
-                &keyholder,
-                &ClientCredentials {
-                    pubkey: *pubkey,
-                    nonce: new_nonce,
-                },
-                id,
-            )
+            Ok(Some(ClientInfo {
+                id: client_id,
+                current_nonce,
+            }))
+        })
+    })
     .await
     .map_err(|e| {
-                error!(?e, "Integrity sign failed after nonce update");
+        error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
         Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-            })?
-            .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-            Ok(new_nonce)
     })
-    })
-    .await
 }
 
 async fn approve_new_client(
@@ -170,23 +139,15 @@ async fn approve_new_client(
 
 async fn insert_client(
     db: &db::DatabasePool,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
     pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
     metadata: &ClientMetadata,
-) -> Result<Verified<i32>, Error> {
+) -> Result<i32, Error> {
     use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
-    let metadata = metadata.clone();
-
     let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
         error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
         Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
     })?;
 
-    conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
-        let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
-        Box::pin(async move {
-            const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
-
     let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
         .values((
             client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
@@ -194,40 +155,29 @@ async fn insert_client(
             client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
         ))
         .returning(client_metadata::id)
-                .get_result::<i32>(conn)
-                .await?;
+        .get_result::<i32>(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            error!(error = ?e, "Failed to insert client metadata");
+            Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
+        })?;
 
     let client_id = insert_into(program_client::table)
         .values((
             program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
             program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-                    program_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
+            program_client::nonce.eq(1), // pre-incremented; challenge uses 0
         ))
         .on_conflict_do_nothing()
         .returning(program_client::id)
-                .get_result::<i32>(conn)
-                .await?;
-
-            let verified_id = integrity::sign_entity(
-                conn,
-                &keyholder,
-                &ClientCredentials {
-                    pubkey: *pubkey,
-                    nonce: NONCE_START,
-                },
-                client_id,
-            )
+        .get_result::<i32>(&mut conn)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| {
-                error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new client key");
+            error!(error = ?e, "Failed to insert client metadata");
             Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-            })?
-            .unqualify_origin();
+        })?;
 
-            Ok(verified_id)
-        })
-    })
-    .await
+    Ok(client_id)
 }
 
 async fn sync_client_metadata(
@@ -337,10 +287,7 @@ where
     Ok(())
 }
 
-pub async fn authenticate<T>(
-    props: &mut ClientConnection,
-    transport: &mut T,
-) -> Result<Verified<i32>, Error>
+pub async fn authenticate<T>(props: &mut ClientConnection, transport: &mut T) -> Result<i32, Error>
 where
     T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
 {
@@ -348,29 +295,8 @@ where
         return Err(Error::Transport);
     };
 
-    // fixme! triage needed: probable regretion since in match->Some get_current_nonce_and_id called only once instead of twice
-    let client_id = match get_current_nonce_and_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
-        Some((nonce, id)) => {
-            let mut db_conn = props.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-                error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-                Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
-            })?;
-
-            integrity::verify_entity(
-                &mut db_conn,
-                &props.actors.key_holder,
-                ClientCredentials { pubkey, nonce },
-                id,
-            )
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| {
-                error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
-                Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
-            })?
-            .inherit()
-            .entity_id
-            .unqualify_origin()
-        }
+    let info = match get_client_and_nonce(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
+        Some(nonce) => nonce,
         None => {
             approve_new_client(
                 &props.actors,
@@ -380,13 +306,16 @@ where
                 },
             )
             .await?;
-            insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
+            let client_id = insert_client(&props.db, &pubkey, &metadata).await?;
+            ClientInfo {
+                id: client_id,
+                current_nonce: 0,
+            }
         }
     };
 
-    sync_client_metadata(&props.db, *client_id, &metadata).await?;
-    let challenge_nonce = create_nonce(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
-    challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge_nonce).await?;
+    sync_client_metadata(&props.db, info.id, &metadata).await?;
+    challenge_client(transport, pubkey, info.current_nonce).await?;
 
     transport
         .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
@@ -396,5 +325,5 @@ where
             Error::Transport
         })?;
 
-    Ok(client_id)
+    Ok(info.id)
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/mod.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ use tracing::{error, info};
 
 use crate::{
     actors::{GlobalActors, client::session::ClientSession},
-    crypto::integrity::{Integrable, hashing::Hashable},
     db,
 };
 
@@ -14,22 +13,6 @@ pub struct ClientProfile {
     pub metadata: ClientMetadata,
 }
 
-pub struct ClientCredentials {
-    pub pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
-    pub nonce: i32,
-}
-
-impl Integrable for ClientCredentials {
-    const KIND: &'static str = "client_credentials";
-}
-
-impl Hashable for ClientCredentials {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self.pubkey.as_bytes());
-        self.nonce.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}
-
 pub struct ClientConnection {
     pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
     pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/session.rs

@@ -5,25 +5,23 @@ use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
 
 use crate::{
     actors::{
+        GlobalActors,
         client::ClientConnection,
         evm::{ClientSignTransaction, SignTransactionError},
         flow_coordinator::RegisterClient,
         keyholder::KeyHolderState,
     },
-    crypto::integrity::Verified,
+    db,
     evm::VetError,
 };
 
-#[cfg(test)]
-use crate::{actors::GlobalActors, db};
-
 pub struct ClientSession {
     props: ClientConnection,
-    client_id: Verified<i32>,
+    client_id: i32,
 }
 
 impl ClientSession {
-    pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: Verified<i32>) -> Self {
+    pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: i32) -> Self {
         Self { props, client_id }
     }
 }
@@ -56,7 +54,7 @@ impl ClientSession {
             .actors
             .evm
             .ask(ClientSignTransaction {
-                client_id: *self.client_id,
+                client_id: self.client_id,
                 wallet_address,
                 transaction,
             })
@@ -94,12 +92,11 @@ impl Actor for ClientSession {
 }
 
 impl ClientSession {
-    #[cfg(test)]
     pub fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
         let props = ClientConnection::new(db, actors);
         Self {
             props,
-            client_id: Verified::new_unchecked(0),
+            client_id: 0,
         }
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/evm/mod.rs

@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
 use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
 use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
+    BoolExpressionMethods as _, ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl,
+    SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
 };
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection as _, RunQueryDsl};
 use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
 use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
 
 use crate::{
     actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
-    crypto::integrity::{self, Integrable, Verified, hashing::Hashable},
+    crypto::integrity,
     db::{
         DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
         models::{self},
@@ -26,37 +27,11 @@ use crate::{
 
 pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
 
-/// Hashable structure for wallet integrity protection.
-/// Binds the encrypted private key to the wallet address using HMAC.
-pub struct EvmWalletIntegrity {
-    pub address: Vec<u8>,       // 20-byte Ethereum address
-    pub aead_encrypted_id: i32, // Reference to encrypted key material
-}
-
-impl Hashable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(&self.address);
-        hasher.update(self.aead_encrypted_id.to_be_bytes());
-    }
-}
-
-impl Integrable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
-    const KIND: &'static str = "evm_wallet";
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum SignTransactionError {
     #[error("Wallet not found")]
     WalletNotFound,
 
-    #[error("Wallet integrity check failed")]
-    WalletIntegrityCheckFailed,
-
-    #[error(
-        "Decrypted key does not correspond to wallet address (CRITICAL: possible key substitution attack)"
-    )]
-    KeyAddressMismatch,
-
     #[error("Database error: {0}")]
     Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
 
@@ -71,9 +46,6 @@ pub enum SignTransactionError {
 
     #[error("Policy error: {0}")]
     Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
-
-    #[error("Integrity error: {0}")]
-    Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -117,7 +89,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
 #[messages]
 impl EvmActor {
     #[message]
-    pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(Verified<i32>, Address), Error> {
+    pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
         let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);
 
         let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
@@ -129,7 +101,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?;
 
         let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        let wallet_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
+        let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
             .values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
                 address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
                 aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
@@ -139,17 +111,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .await
             .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
 
-        // Sign integrity envelope to bind encrypted key to wallet address
-        let wallet_integrity = EvmWalletIntegrity {
-            address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
-            aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
-        };
-        let verified_wallet_id =
-            integrity::sign_entity(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, &wallet_integrity, wallet_id)
-                .await?
-                .unqualify_origin();
-
-        Ok((verified_wallet_id, address))
+        Ok((wallet_id, address))
     }
 
     #[message]
@@ -175,7 +137,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
         &mut self,
         basic: SharedGrantSettings,
         grant: SpecificGrant,
-    ) -> Result<integrity::Verified<i32>, Error> {
+    ) -> Result<i32, Error> {
         match grant {
             SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self
                 .engine
@@ -197,28 +159,115 @@ impl EvmActor {
     }
 
     #[message]
-    pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        // let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        // let keyholder = self.keyholder.clone();
+    pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
 
-        // diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| {
-        //     Box::pin(async move {
-        //         diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
-        //             .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
-        //             .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
-        //             .execute(conn)
-        //             .await?;
+        // We intentionally perform a hard delete here to avoid leaving revoked grants and their
+        // related rows as long-lived DB garbage. We also don't rely on SQLite FK cascades because
+        // they can be disabled per-connection.
+        conn.transaction(|conn| {
+            Box::pin(async move {
+                // First, resolve policy-specific rows by basic grant id.
+                let token_grant_id: Option<i32> = schema::evm_token_transfer_grant::table
+                    .select(schema::evm_token_transfer_grant::id)
+                    .filter(schema::evm_token_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(grant_id))
+                    .first::<i32>(conn)
+                    .await
+                    .optional()?;
 
-        //         let signed = integrity::evm::load_signed_grant_by_basic_id(conn, grant_id).await?;
+                let ether_grant: Option<(i32, i32)> = schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant::table
+                    .select((
+                        schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant::id,
+                        schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant::limit_id,
+                    ))
+                    .filter(schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(grant_id))
+                    .first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
+                    .await
+                    .optional()?;
 
-        //         diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(())
-        //     })
-        // })
-        // .await
-        // .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+                // Token-transfer: logs must be deleted before transaction logs (FK restrict).
+                if let Some(token_grant_id) = token_grant_id {
+                    diesel::delete(
+                        schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table
+                            .filter(schema::evm_token_transfer_log::grant_id.eq(token_grant_id)),
+                    )
+                    .execute(conn)
+                    .await?;
 
-        // Ok(())
-        todo!()
+                    diesel::delete(schema::evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table.filter(
+                        schema::evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq(token_grant_id),
+                    ))
+                    .execute(conn)
+                    .await?;
+
+                    diesel::delete(
+                        schema::evm_token_transfer_grant::table
+                            .filter(schema::evm_token_transfer_grant::id.eq(token_grant_id)),
+                    )
+                    .execute(conn)
+                    .await?;
+                }
+
+                // Shared transaction logs for any grant kind.
+                diesel::delete(
+                    schema::evm_transaction_log::table
+                        .filter(schema::evm_transaction_log::grant_id.eq(grant_id)),
+                )
+                .execute(conn)
+                .await?;
+
+                // Ether-transfer: delete targets, grant row, then its limit row.
+                if let Some((ether_grant_id, limit_id)) = ether_grant {
+                    diesel::delete(schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table.filter(
+                        schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq(ether_grant_id),
+                    ))
+                    .execute(conn)
+                    .await?;
+
+                    diesel::delete(
+                        schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant::table
+                            .filter(schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant::id.eq(ether_grant_id)),
+                    )
+                    .execute(conn)
+                    .await?;
+
+                    diesel::delete(
+                        schema::evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
+                            .filter(schema::evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq(limit_id)),
+                    )
+                    .execute(conn)
+                    .await?;
+                }
+
+                // Integrity envelopes are not FK-constrained; delete only grant-related kinds to
+                // avoid accidentally deleting other entities that share the same integer ID.
+                let entity_id = grant_id.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
+                diesel::delete(
+                    schema::integrity_envelope::table
+                        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(entity_id))
+                        .filter(
+                            schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind
+                                .eq("EtherTransfer")
+                                .or(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("TokenTransfer")),
+                        ),
+                )
+                .execute(conn)
+                .await?;
+
+                // Finally remove the basic grant row itself (idempotent if it doesn't exist).
+                diesel::delete(
+                    schema::evm_basic_grant::table.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id)),
+                )
+                .execute(conn)
+                .await?;
+
+                diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(())
+            })
+        })
+        .await
+        .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+
+        Ok(())
     }
 
     #[message]
@@ -246,23 +295,9 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .optional()
             .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
             .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
-
-        // Verify wallet integrity envelope
-        let wallet = integrity::verify_entity(
-            &mut conn,
-            &self.keyholder,
-            EvmWalletIntegrity {
-                address: wallet.address.clone(),
-                aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
-            },
-            wallet.id,
-        )
-        .await
-        .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::WalletIntegrityCheckFailed)?;
-
         let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
             .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.entity_id))
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
             .first(&mut conn)
             .await
@@ -295,23 +330,9 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .optional()
             .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
             .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
-
-        // Verify wallet integrity envelope to ensure encrypted key is bound to address
-        let wallet = integrity::verify_entity(
-            &mut conn,
-            &self.keyholder,
-            EvmWalletIntegrity {
-                address: wallet.address.clone(),
-                aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
-            },
-            wallet.id,
-        )
-        .await
-        .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::WalletIntegrityCheckFailed)?;
-
         let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
             .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.entity_id))
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
             .first(&mut conn)
             .await
@@ -330,12 +351,6 @@ impl EvmActor {
 
         let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
 
-        // Verify that the decrypted key's derived address matches the wallet address
-        // This prevents an attacker from substituting one wallet's key with another's even if they compromised the DB
-        if signer.address() != wallet_address {
-            return Err(SignTransactionError::KeyAddressMismatch);
-        }
-
         self.engine
             .evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
             .await?;
@@ -344,3 +359,6 @@ impl EvmActor {
         Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/evm/tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, dsl::insert_into};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
+
+use crate::{
+    actors::{evm::EvmActor, keyholder::KeyHolder},
+    db::{self, models, schema},
+};
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn delete_ether_grant_cleans_related_tables() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
+    let mut actor = EvmActor::new(keyholder, db.clone());
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    let basic_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmBasicGrant {
+            wallet_access_id: 1,
+            chain_id: 1,
+            valid_from: None,
+            valid_until: None,
+            max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
+            max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
+            rate_limit_count: None,
+            rate_limit_window_secs: None,
+            revoked_at: None,
+        })
+        .returning(schema::evm_basic_grant::id)
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let limit_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_ether_transfer_limit::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmEtherTransferLimit {
+            window_secs: 60,
+            max_volume: vec![1],
+        })
+        .returning(schema::evm_ether_transfer_limit::id)
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let ether_grant_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmEtherTransferGrant {
+            basic_grant_id: basic_id,
+            limit_id,
+        })
+        .returning(schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant::id)
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    insert_into(schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget {
+            grant_id: ether_grant_id,
+            address: vec![0u8; 20],
+        })
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    insert_into(schema::evm_transaction_log::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmTransactionLog {
+            grant_id: basic_id,
+            wallet_access_id: 1,
+            chain_id: 1,
+            eth_value: vec![0],
+            signed_at: models::SqliteTimestamp::now(),
+        })
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    insert_into(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
+        .values(&models::NewIntegrityEnvelope {
+            entity_kind: "EtherTransfer".to_owned(),
+            entity_id: basic_id.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
+            payload_version: 1,
+            key_version: 1,
+            mac: vec![0u8; 32],
+        })
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    drop(conn);
+
+    actor.useragent_delete_grant(basic_id).await.unwrap();
+
+    // Idempotency: second delete should be a no-op.
+    actor.useragent_delete_grant(basic_id).await.unwrap();
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    let basic_count: i64 = schema::evm_basic_grant::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(basic_count, 0);
+
+    let ether_grant_count: i64 = schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(ether_grant_count, 0);
+
+    let target_count: i64 = schema::evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(target_count, 0);
+
+    let limit_count: i64 = schema::evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(limit_count, 0);
+
+    let log_count: i64 = schema::evm_transaction_log::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(log_count, 0);
+
+    let envelope_count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
+        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("EtherTransfer"))
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(envelope_count, 0);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn delete_token_grant_cleans_related_tables() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
+    let mut actor = EvmActor::new(keyholder, db.clone());
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    let basic_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmBasicGrant {
+            wallet_access_id: 1,
+            chain_id: 1,
+            valid_from: None,
+            valid_until: None,
+            max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
+            max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
+            rate_limit_count: None,
+            rate_limit_window_secs: None,
+            revoked_at: None,
+        })
+        .returning(schema::evm_basic_grant::id)
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let token_grant_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_token_transfer_grant::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmTokenTransferGrant {
+            basic_grant_id: basic_id,
+            token_contract: vec![1u8; 20],
+            receiver: None,
+        })
+        .returning(schema::evm_token_transfer_grant::id)
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    insert_into(schema::evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
+            grant_id: token_grant_id,
+            window_secs: 60,
+            max_volume: vec![1],
+        })
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    insert_into(schema::evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit {
+            grant_id: token_grant_id,
+            window_secs: 3600,
+            max_volume: vec![2],
+        })
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let tx_log_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_transaction_log::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmTransactionLog {
+            grant_id: basic_id,
+            wallet_access_id: 1,
+            chain_id: 1,
+            eth_value: vec![0],
+            signed_at: models::SqliteTimestamp::now(),
+        })
+        .returning(schema::evm_transaction_log::id)
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    insert_into(schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table)
+        .values(&models::NewEvmTokenTransferLog {
+            grant_id: token_grant_id,
+            log_id: tx_log_id,
+            chain_id: 1,
+            token_contract: vec![1u8; 20],
+            recipient_address: vec![2u8; 20],
+            value: vec![3],
+        })
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    insert_into(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
+        .values(&models::NewIntegrityEnvelope {
+            entity_kind: "TokenTransfer".to_owned(),
+            entity_id: basic_id.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
+            payload_version: 1,
+            key_version: 1,
+            mac: vec![0u8; 32],
+        })
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    drop(conn);
+
+    actor.useragent_delete_grant(basic_id).await.unwrap();
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    let basic_count: i64 = schema::evm_basic_grant::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(basic_count, 0);
+
+    let token_grant_count: i64 = schema::evm_token_transfer_grant::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(token_grant_count, 0);
+
+    let token_limits_count: i64 = schema::evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(token_limits_count, 0);
+
+    let token_logs_count: i64 = schema::evm_token_transfer_log::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(token_logs_count, 0);
+
+    let tx_logs_count: i64 = schema::evm_transaction_log::table
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(tx_logs_count, 0);
+
+    let envelope_count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
+        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("TokenTransfer"))
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(envelope_count, 0);
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/auth.rs

@@ -30,26 +30,17 @@ pub enum Error {
 }
 
 impl Error {
-    #[track_caller]
-    pub(super) fn internal(details: impl Into<String>, err: &impl std::fmt::Debug) -> Self {
-        let details = details.into();
-        let caller = std::panic::Location::caller();
-        error!(
-            caller_file = %caller.file(),
-            caller_line = caller.line(),
-            caller_column = caller.column(),
-            details = %details,
-            error = ?err,
-            "Internal error"
-        );
-
-        Self::Internal { details }
+    fn internal(details: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        Self::Internal {
+            details: details.into(),
+        }
     }
 }
 
 impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
     fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
-        Self::internal("Database error", &e)
+        error!(?e, "Database error");
+        Self::internal("Database error")
     }
 }
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/auth/state.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
 use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
+use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
 use tracing::error;
 
 use super::Error;
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use crate::{
         keyholder::KeyHolder,
         user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentCredentials, auth::Outbound},
     },
-    crypto::integrity,
+    crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
     db::{DatabasePool, schema::useragent_client},
 };
 
@@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
     db: &DatabasePool,
     key: &AuthPublicKey,
 ) -> Result<(i32, i32), Error> {
-    let mut db_conn = db
-        .get()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
+    let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
+        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
+        Error::internal("Database unavailable")
+    })?;
     db_conn
         .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
             Box::pin(async move {
@@ -65,7 +65,10 @@ async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
         })
         .await
         .optional()
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
+            Error::internal("Database operation failed")
+        })?
         .ok_or_else(|| {
             error!(?key, "Public key not found in database");
             Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
@@ -77,14 +80,14 @@ async fn verify_integrity(
     keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
     pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
 ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let mut db_conn = db
-        .get()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
+    let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
+        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
+        Error::internal("Database unavailable")
+    })?;
 
     let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?;
 
-    let attestation_status = integrity::check_entity_attestation(
+    let result = integrity::verify_entity(
         &mut db_conn,
         keyholder,
         &UserAgentCredentials {
@@ -94,17 +97,13 @@ async fn verify_integrity(
         id,
     )
     .await
-    .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Integrity verification failed", &e))?;
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
+        Error::internal("Integrity verification failed")
+    })?;
+
+    Ok(())
 
-    use integrity::AttestationStatus as AS;
-    // SAFETY (policy): challenge auth must work in both vault states.
-    // While sealed, integrity checks can only report `Unavailable` because key material is not
-    // accessible. While unsealed, the same check can report `Attested`.
-    // This path intentionally accepts both outcomes to keep challenge auth available across state
-    // transitions; stricter verification is enforced in sensitive post-auth flows.
-    match attestation_status {
-        AS::Attested | AS::Unavailable => Ok(()),
-    }
 }
 
 async fn create_nonce(
@@ -112,10 +111,10 @@ async fn create_nonce(
     keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
     pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
 ) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-    let mut db_conn = db
-        .get()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
+    let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
+        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
+        Error::internal("Database unavailable")
+    })?;
     let new_nonce = db_conn
         .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
             Box::pin(async move {
@@ -126,7 +125,10 @@ async fn create_nonce(
                     .returning((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
                     .get_result(conn)
                     .await
-                    .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?;
+                    .map_err(|e| {
+                        error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
+                        Error::internal("Database operation failed")
+                    })?;
 
                 integrity::sign_entity(
                     conn,
@@ -138,8 +140,10 @@ async fn create_nonce(
                     id,
                 )
                 .await
-                .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database error", &e))?
-                .drop_verification_provenance();
+                .map_err(|e| {
+                    error!(?e, "Integrity signature update failed");
+                    Error::internal("Database error")
+                })?;
 
                 Result::<_, Error>::Ok(new_nonce)
             })
@@ -155,10 +159,10 @@ async fn register_key(
 ) -> Result<(), Error> {
     let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
     let key_type = pubkey.key_type();
-    let mut conn = db
-        .get()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
+        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
+        Error::internal("Database unavailable")
+    })?;
 
     conn.transaction(|conn| {
         Box::pin(async move {
@@ -173,32 +177,22 @@ async fn register_key(
                 .returning(useragent_client::id)
                 .get_result(conn)
                 .await
-                .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?;
+                .map_err(|e| {
+                    error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
+                    Error::internal("Database operation failed")
+                })?;
 
-            if let Err(e) = integrity::sign_entity(
-                conn,
-                keyholder,
-                &UserAgentCredentials {
+            let entity = UserAgentCredentials {
                 pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
                 nonce: NONCE_START,
-                },
-                id,
-            )
+            };
+
+            integrity::sign_entity(conn, &keyholder, &entity, id)
                 .await
-            {
-                match e {
-                    integrity::Error::Keyholder(
-                        crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped,
-                    ) => {
-                        // IMPORTANT: bootstrap-token auth must work before the vault has a root key.
-                        // We intentionally allow creating the DB row first and backfill envelopes
-                        // after bootstrap/unseal to keep the bootstrap flow possible.
-                    }
-                    other => {
-                        return Err(Error::internal("Failed to register public key", &other));
-                    }
-                }
-            }
+                .map_err(|e| {
+                    error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new user-agent key");
+                    Error::internal("Failed to register public key")
+                })?;
 
             Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
         })
@@ -261,7 +255,10 @@ where
                 token: token.clone(),
             })
             .await
-            .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token", &e))?;
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
+                Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
+            })?;
 
         if !token_ok {
             error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/mod.rs

@@ -1,23 +1,59 @@
 use crate::{
-    actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile},
-    crypto::integrity::Integrable,
-    db::{self, models::KeyType},
+    actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile}, crypto::integrity::Integrable, db::{self, models::KeyType}
 };
 
+fn serialize_ecdsa<S>(key: &k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
+where
+    S: serde::Serializer,
+{
+    // Serialize as hex string for easier debugging (33 bytes compressed SEC1 format)
+    let key = key.to_encoded_point(true);
+    let bytes = key.as_bytes();
+    serializer.serialize_bytes(bytes)
+}
+
+fn deserialize_ecdsa<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey, D::Error>
+where
+    D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
+{
+    struct EcdsaVisitor;
+
+    impl<'de> serde::de::Visitor<'de> for EcdsaVisitor {
+        type Value = k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey;
+
+        fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> std::fmt::Result {
+            formatter.write_str("a compressed SEC1-encoded ECDSA public key")
+        }
+
+        fn visit_bytes<E>(self, v: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Value, E>
+        where
+            E: serde::de::Error,
+        {
+            let point = k256::EncodedPoint::from_bytes(v)
+                .map_err(|_| E::custom("invalid compressed SEC1 format"))?;
+            k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_encoded_point(&point)
+                .map_err(|_| E::custom("invalid ECDSA public key"))
+        }
+    }
+
+    deserializer.deserialize_bytes(EcdsaVisitor)
+}
+
 /// Abstraction over Ed25519 / ECDSA-secp256k1 / RSA public keys used during the auth handshake.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize)]
 pub enum AuthPublicKey {
     Ed25519(ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey),
     /// Compressed SEC1 public key; signature bytes are raw 64-byte (r||s).
+    #[serde(serialize_with = "serialize_ecdsa", deserialize_with = "deserialize_ecdsa")]
     EcdsaSecp256k1(k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey),
     /// RSA-2048+ public key (Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager); signature bytes are PSS+SHA-256.
     Rsa(rsa::RsaPublicKey),
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug)]
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
 pub struct UserAgentCredentials {
     pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
-    pub nonce: i32,
+    pub nonce: i32
 }
 
 impl Integrable for UserAgentCredentials {
@@ -102,19 +138,5 @@ pub mod auth;
 pub mod session;
 
 pub use auth::authenticate;
+use serde::Serialize;
 pub use session::UserAgentSession;
-
-use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
-
-impl Hashable for AuthPublicKey {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self.to_stored_bytes());
-    }
-}
-
-impl Hashable for UserAgentCredentials {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.pubkey.hash(hasher);
-        self.nonce.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/session/connection.rs

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use kameo::prelude::Context;
 use tracing::{error, info};
 use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
 
+use crate::actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer;
 use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
 use crate::actors::user_agent::session::Error;
 use crate::db::models::{
@@ -17,10 +18,6 @@ use crate::db::models::{
 };
 use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
 use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
-use crate::{
-    actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
-    crypto::integrity::{self, Verified},
-};
 use crate::{
     actors::{
         evm::{
@@ -32,67 +29,11 @@ use crate::{
             UserAgentSession,
             state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
         },
-        user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentCredentials},
     },
-    db::schema::useragent_client,
     safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
 };
 
-fn is_vault_sealed_from_evm<M>(err: &SendError<M, crate::actors::evm::Error>) -> bool {
-    matches!(
-        err,
-        SendError::HandlerError(crate::actors::evm::Error::Keyholder(
-            keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped
-        )) | SendError::HandlerError(crate::actors::evm::Error::Integrity(
-            crate::crypto::integrity::Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
-        ))
-    )
-}
-
 impl UserAgentSession {
-    async fn backfill_useragent_integrity(&self) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
-        let keyholder = self.props.actors.key_holder.clone();
-
-        conn.transaction(|conn| {
-            Box::pin(async move {
-                let rows: Vec<(i32, i32, Vec<u8>, crate::db::models::KeyType)> =
-                    useragent_client::table
-                        .select((
-                            useragent_client::id,
-                            useragent_client::nonce,
-                            useragent_client::public_key,
-                            useragent_client::key_type,
-                        ))
-                        .load(conn)
-                        .await?;
-
-                for (id, nonce, public_key, key_type) in rows {
-                    let pubkey = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, public_key)).map_err(|e| {
-                        Error::internal(format!("Invalid user-agent key in db: {e}"))
-                    })?;
-
-                    integrity::sign_entity(
-                        conn,
-                        &keyholder,
-                        &UserAgentCredentials { pubkey, nonce },
-                        id,
-                    )
-                    .await
-                    .map_err(|e| {
-                        Error::internal(format!("Failed to backfill user-agent integrity: {e}"))
-                    })?
-                    .drop_verification_provenance();
-                }
-
-                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
-            })
-        })
-        .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
     fn take_unseal_secret(&mut self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), Error> {
         let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
             error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
@@ -250,7 +191,6 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
             .await
         {
             Ok(_) => {
-                self.backfill_useragent_integrity().await?;
                 info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
                 self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
                 Ok(())
@@ -312,7 +252,6 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
             .await
         {
             Ok(_) => {
-                self.backfill_useragent_integrity().await?;
                 info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
                 self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
                 Ok(())
@@ -358,9 +297,7 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
 #[messages]
 impl UserAgentSession {
     #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(
-        &mut self,
-    ) -> Result<(Verified<i32>, Address), Error> {
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
         match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
             Ok(address) => Ok(address),
             Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
@@ -388,15 +325,12 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
 #[messages]
 impl UserAgentSession {
     #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(
-        &mut self,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, GrantMutationError> {
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
         match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
             Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
-            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
             Err(err) => {
                 error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
-                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
+                Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
             }
         }
     }
@@ -406,7 +340,7 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
         &mut self,
         basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
         grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
-    ) -> Result<Verified<i32>, GrantMutationError> {
+    ) -> Result<i32, GrantMutationError> {
         match self
             .props
             .actors
@@ -415,7 +349,6 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
             .await
         {
             Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
-            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
             Err(err) => {
                 error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
                 Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
@@ -432,13 +365,10 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
             .props
             .actors
             .evm
-            .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant {
-                _grant_id: grant_id,
-            })
+            .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
             .await
         {
             Ok(()) => Ok(()),
-            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
             Err(err) => {
                 error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
                 Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs

@@ -1,34 +1,23 @@
-use crate::actors::keyholder;
-use hmac::Hmac;
+use crate::{actors::keyholder, crypto::KeyCell,safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _};
+use chacha20poly1305::Key;
+use hmac::{Hmac, Mac as _};
+use serde::Serialize;
 use sha2::Sha256;
-use std::future::Future;
-use std::ops::Deref;
-use std::pin::Pin;
 
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
 use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
 use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
 use sha2::Digest as _;
 
-pub mod hashing;
-pub mod verified;
-use self::hashing::Hashable;
-
 use crate::{
     actors::keyholder::{KeyHolder, SignIntegrity, VerifyIntegrity},
     db::{
         self,
-        models::{IntegrityEnvelope as IntegrityEnvelopeRow, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
+        models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
         schema::integrity_envelope,
     },
 };
 
-pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
-pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
-
-pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
-pub use self::verified::{Nested, Root, VerificationOrigin, Verified};
-
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum Error {
     #[error("Database error: {0}")]
@@ -54,93 +43,76 @@ pub enum Error {
 
     #[error("Integrity MAC mismatch for entity {entity_kind}")]
     MacMismatch { entity_kind: &'static str },
+
+    #[error("Payload serialization error: {0}")]
+    PayloadSerialization(#[from] postcard::Error),
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-#[must_use]
 pub enum AttestationStatus {
     Attested,
     Unavailable,
 }
 
-pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
+pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
+pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
+
+pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
+
+pub trait Integrable: Serialize {
     const KIND: &'static str;
     const VERSION: i32 = 1;
 }
 
-impl<T: Integrable> Integrable for &T {
-    const KIND: &'static str = T::KIND;
-    const VERSION: i32 = T::VERSION;
+fn payload_hash(payload: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
+    Sha256::digest(payload).into()
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct EntityId(Vec<u8>);
+fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
+    out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+    out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
+}
 
-impl Deref for EntityId {
-    type Target = [u8];
+fn build_mac_input(
+    entity_kind: &str,
+    entity_id: &[u8],
+    payload_version: i32,
+    payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
+) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
+    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
+    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
+    out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
+    out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
+    out
+}
 
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        &self.0
+pub trait IntoId {
+    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8>;
+}
+
+impl IntoId for i32 {
+    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        self.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
     }
 }
 
-impl From<i32> for EntityId {
-    fn from(value: i32) -> Self {
-        Self(value.to_be_bytes().to_vec())
+impl IntoId for &'_ [u8] {
+    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        self.to_vec()
     }
 }
 
-impl From<&'_ [u8]> for EntityId {
-    fn from(bytes: &'_ [u8]) -> Self {
-        Self(bytes.to_vec())
-    }
-}
-
-pub async fn lookup_verified<E, Id, C, F, Fut>(
-    conn: &mut C,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    entity_id: Id,
-    load: F,
-) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error>
-where
-    C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    E: Integrable,
-    Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
-    F: FnOnce(&mut C) -> Fut,
-    Fut: Future<Output = Result<E, db::DatabaseError>>,
-{
-    let entity = load(conn).await?;
-    verify_entity(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id).await
-}
-
-pub async fn lookup_verified_from_query<E, Id, C, F>(
-    conn: &mut C,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    load: F,
-) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error>
-where
-    C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite> + Send,
-    E: Integrable,
-    Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
-    F: for<'a> FnOnce(
-        &'a mut C,
-    ) -> Pin<
-        Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<(Id, E), db::DatabaseError>> + Send + 'a>,
-    >,
-{
-    let (entity_id, entity) = load(conn).await?;
-    verify_entity(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id).await
-}
-
-pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
+pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
     conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
     keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
     entity: &E,
-    as_entity_id: Id,
-) -> Result<Verified<Id, Nested<E>>, Error> {
-    let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
+    entity_id: impl IntoId,
+) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    let payload = postcard::to_stdvec(entity)?;
+    let payload_hash = payload_hash(&payload);
 
-    let entity_id = as_entity_id.clone().into();
+    let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
 
     let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
 
@@ -155,7 +127,7 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
     insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
         .values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
             entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
-            entity_id: entity_id.to_vec(),
+            entity_id: entity_id,
             payload_version: E::VERSION ,
             key_version,
             mac: mac.to_vec(),
@@ -174,25 +146,23 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
         .await
         .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
 
-    Ok(Verified::<Id, Nested<E>>::new(as_entity_id))
+    Ok(())
 }
 
-pub async fn check_entity_attestation<E: Integrable>(
+pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
     conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
     keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
     entity: &E,
-    entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
+    entity_id: impl IntoId,
 ) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
-    let entity_id = entity_id.into();
-    let envelope: IntegrityEnvelopeRow = integrity_envelope::table
+    let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
+    let envelope: IntegrityEnvelope = integrity_envelope::table
         .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
-        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id))
+        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&entity_id))
         .first(conn)
         .await
         .map_err(|err| match err {
-            diesel::result::Error::NotFound => Error::MissingEnvelope {
-                entity_kind: E::KIND,
-            },
+            diesel::result::Error::NotFound => Error::MissingEnvelope { entity_kind: E::KIND },
             other => Error::Database(db::DatabaseError::from(other)),
         })?;
 
@@ -204,8 +174,14 @@ pub async fn check_entity_attestation<E: Integrable>(
         });
     }
 
-    let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
-    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash);
+    let payload = postcard::to_stdvec(entity)?;
+    let payload_hash = payload_hash(&payload);
+    let mac_input = build_mac_input(
+        E::KIND,
+        &entity_id,
+        envelope.payload_version,
+        &payload_hash,
+    );
 
     let result = keyholder
         .ask(VerifyIntegrity {
@@ -213,107 +189,131 @@ pub async fn check_entity_attestation<E: Integrable>(
             expected_mac: envelope.mac,
             key_version: envelope.key_version,
         })
-        .await;
+        .await
+        ;
 
     match result {
         Ok(true) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested),
-        Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
-            entity_kind: E::KIND,
-        }),
-        Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)) => {
-            Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable)
-        }
+        Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch { entity_kind: E::KIND }),
+        Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
         Err(_) => Err(Error::KeyholderSend),
     }
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, crate::VerifiedFields!)]
-#[repr(C)]
-pub struct Entity<E, Id> {
-    pub entity: E,
-    pub entity_id: Id,
-}
-
-impl<E, Id> Deref for Entity<E, Id> {
-    type Target = E;
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        &self.entity
-    }
-}
-
-pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
-    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    entity: E,
-    entity_id: Id,
-) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
-    match check_entity_attestation(conn, keyholder, &entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
-        AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(Entity {
-            entity,
-            entity_id,
-        })),
-        AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)),
-    }
-}
-
-pub async fn verify_entity_ref<'e, E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
-    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    entity: &'e E,
-    entity_id: Id,
-) -> Result<Verified<Entity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
-    match check_entity_attestation(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
-        AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<Entity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(Entity {
-            entity,
-            entity_id,
-        })),
-        AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)),
-    }
-}
-
-pub async fn delete_envelope<E: Integrable>(
-    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
-) -> Result<usize, Error> {
-    let entity_id = entity_id.into();
-
-    let affected = diesel::delete(
-        integrity_envelope::table
-            .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
-            .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id)),
-    )
-    .execute(conn)
-    .await
-    .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-    Ok(affected)
-}
-
-fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
-    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
-    payload.hash(&mut hasher);
-    hasher.finalize().into()
-}
-
-fn build_mac_input(
-    entity_kind: &str,
-    entity_id: &[u8],
-    payload_version: i32,
-    payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
-) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
-    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
-    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
-    out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
-    out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
-    out
-}
-
-fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
-    out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
-    out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
-mod tests;
+mod tests {
+    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
+    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+    use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
+
+    use crate::{
+        actors::keyholder::{Bootstrap, KeyHolder},
+        db::{self, schema},
+        safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+    };
+
+    use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
+
+    #[derive(Clone, serde::Serialize)]
+    struct DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: i32,
+        payload: Vec<u8>,
+    }
+
+    impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
+        const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
+    }
+
+    async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<KeyHolder> {
+        let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
+        actor
+            .ask(Bootstrap {
+                seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        actor
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
+
+        let entity = DummyEntity {
+            payload_version: 1,
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+        };
+
+        sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID).await.unwrap();
+
+        let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
+            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
+            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
+            .count()
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
+        verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID).await.unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
+
+        let entity = DummyEntity {
+            payload_version: 1,
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+        };
+
+        sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID).await.unwrap();
+
+        diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
+            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
+            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
+            .set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
+            .execute(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
+
+        let entity = DummyEntity {
+            payload_version: 1,
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+        };
+
+        sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID).await.unwrap();
+
+        let tampered = DummyEntity {
+            payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
+            ..entity
+        };
+
+        let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/hashing.rs

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-use hmac::digest::Digest;
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-
-/// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
-pub trait Hashable {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H);
-}
-
-macro_rules! impl_numeric {
-($($t:ty),*) => {
-    $(
-        impl Hashable for $t {
-            fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-                hasher.update(&self.to_be_bytes());
-            }
-        }
-    )*
-};
-}
-
-impl_numeric!(u8, u16, u32, u64, i8, i16, i32, i64);
-
-impl Hashable for &[u8] {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self);
-    }
-}
-
-impl Hashable for String {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self.as_bytes());
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for Vec<T> {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        let ref_sorted = {
-            let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
-            sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
-            sorted
-        };
-        for item in ref_sorted {
-            item.hash(hasher);
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for HashSet<T> {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        let ref_sorted = {
-            let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
-            sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
-            sorted
-        };
-        for item in ref_sorted {
-            item.hash(hasher);
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Option<T> {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        match self {
-            Some(value) => {
-                hasher.update([1]);
-                value.hash(hasher);
-            }
-            None => hasher.update([0]),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for Box<T> {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.as_ref().hash(hasher);
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T: Hashable> Hashable for &T {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        (*self).hash(hasher);
-    }
-}
-
-impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::Address {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self.as_slice());
-    }
-}
-
-impl Hashable for alloy::primitives::U256 {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self.to_be_bytes::<32>());
-    }
-}
-
-impl Hashable for chrono::Duration {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self.num_seconds().to_be_bytes());
-    }
-}
-
-impl Hashable for chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self.timestamp_millis().to_be_bytes());
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/tests.rs

@@ -1,298 +0,0 @@
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
-use sha2::Digest;
-
-use crate::{
-    actors::keyholder::{Bootstrap, KeyHolder},
-    db::{self, schema},
-    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
-};
-
-use super::hashing::Hashable;
-use super::{
-    Error, Integrable, check_entity_attestation, lookup_verified, lookup_verified_from_query,
-    sign_entity, verify_entity,
-};
-
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-struct DummyEntity {
-    payload_version: i32,
-    payload: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-impl Hashable for DummyEntity {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.payload_version.hash(hasher);
-        self.payload.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}
-impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
-    const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
-}
-
-async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<KeyHolder> {
-    let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
-    actor
-        .ask(Bootstrap {
-            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    actor
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
-        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
-        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
-        .count()
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
-    let _ = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
-        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
-        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
-        .set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
-        .execute(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-    assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    let tampered = DummyEntity {
-        payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
-        ..entity
-    };
-
-    let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-    assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn strict_verify_fails_closed_while_sealed() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-41";
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-    drop(keyholder);
-
-    let sealed_keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
-
-    let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-    assert!(matches!(
-        err,
-        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
-    ));
-
-    let err = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| async {
-        Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
-            payload_version: 1,
-            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap_err();
-    assert!(matches!(
-        err,
-        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
-    ));
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn lookup_verified_supports_loaded_aggregate() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 77;
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    let verified = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| async {
-        Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
-            payload_version: 1,
-            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap();
-
-    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn extension_trait_lookup_verified_required_works() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 79;
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    let verified = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| {
-        Box::pin(async {
-            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
-                payload_version: 1,
-                payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-            })
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap();
-
-    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
-}
-
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn lookup_verified_from_query_helpers_work() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 80;
-
-    let entity = DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: 1,
-        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-    };
-
-    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
-
-    let verified = lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &keyholder, |_| {
-        Box::pin(async {
-            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>((
-                ENTITY_ID,
-                DummyEntity {
-                    payload_version: 1,
-                    payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-                },
-            ))
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap();
-
-    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
-
-    drop(keyholder);
-    let sealed_keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
-
-    let err = lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, |_| {
-        Box::pin(async {
-            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>((
-                ENTITY_ID,
-                DummyEntity {
-                    payload_version: 1,
-                    payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-                },
-            ))
-        })
-    })
-    .await
-    .unwrap_err();
-
-    assert!(matches!(
-        err,
-        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
-    ));
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/verified.rs

@@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
-use std::ops::Deref;
-
-use super::Integrable;
-
-mod private {
-    pub trait Sealed {}
-}
-
-/// Marker trait for type-level verification provenance.
-///
-/// This trait is intentionally sealed so external code cannot invent arbitrary
-/// provenance tags and bypass the intended type-level guarantees.
-pub trait VerificationOrigin: private::Sealed {
-    type Origin: VerificationOrigin;
-}
-
-/// Root provenance marker for values directly produced by integrity APIs.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Default)]
-pub struct Root;
-
-/// Nested provenance marker carrying the source integrable type and previous
-/// provenance marker in the chain.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
-pub struct Nested<From, P: VerificationOrigin = Root>(core::marker::PhantomData<(From, P)>);
-
-impl private::Sealed for Root {}
-impl VerificationOrigin for Root {
-    type Origin = Self;
-}
-
-impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> private::Sealed for Nested<T, P> {}
-impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> VerificationOrigin for Nested<T, P> {
-    type Origin = P;
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-#[repr(transparent)]
-#[must_use = "Verified<T> is a proof-bearing wrapper; use self.drop_verification_provenance() to explicitly discard integrity provenance when needed"]
-pub struct Verified<T, O: VerificationOrigin = Root> {
-    inner: T,
-    origin: core::marker::PhantomData<O>,
-}
-
-impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> AsRef<Verified<T, O>> for Verified<&T, O> {
-    fn as_ref(&self) -> &Verified<T, O> {
-        // SAFETY: `Verified<T>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so `&T`
-        // and `&Verified<T>` have identical layout.
-        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<T, Verified<T, O>>(self.inner) }
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T, U: Integrable, O: VerificationOrigin> Deref for Verified<T, Nested<U, O>> {
-    type Target = Verified<T, O::Origin>;
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        // SAFETY: `Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so `&Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>`
-        // and `&Nested<U, O>` have identical layout.
-        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<Self, Verified<T, O::Origin>>(self) }
-    }
-}
-impl<T> Deref for Verified<T, Root> {
-    type Target = T;
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        &self.inner
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> Verified<T, O> {
-    /// Unwraps the verified value, discarding the integrity provenance.
-    ///
-    /// The name is intentionally verbose — call sites where provenance is
-    /// dropped should be easy to find and audit.
-    pub fn drop_verification_provenance(self) -> T {
-        self.inner
-    }
-
-    /// Downgrades the origin provenance to any lower nestedness level,
-    /// e.g. `Verified<T, Nested<Other>>` to `Verified<T, Root>`.
-    pub fn unqualify_origin<Target: VerificationOrigin>(self) -> Verified<T, Target>
-    where
-        O: VerificationOrigin<Origin = Target>,
-    {
-        Verified {
-            inner: self.inner,
-            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Constructs a `Verified<T>` by wrapping a `T`.
-    pub(super) fn new(value: T) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            inner: value,
-            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Constructs a `Verified<T>` from a raw value without performing any
-    /// integrity check. Only available in test builds; use the integrity
-    /// module's functions to obtain a `Verified<T>` in production code.
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    pub(crate) fn new_unchecked(value: T) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            inner: value,
-            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Reinterprets `&T` as `&Verified<T>`.
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
-    pub(super) fn from_ref(from: &T) -> &Self {
-        // SAFETY: `Self` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`.
-        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<T, Self>(from) }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Bit-copies `value: From` into a `To`, suppressing the source destructor so
-/// the destination owns the bytes.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// The caller must guarantee that `From` and `To` have identical in-memory
-/// layout — the raw bytes that encode a valid `From` must also encode a valid
-/// `To`.
-///
-/// A `union` is used instead of [`std::mem::transmute`] because `transmute`
-/// rejects generic source/destination types at the call site even when their
-/// sizes are provably equal at monomorphization time.
-#[allow(dead_code)]
-#[inline]
-pub const unsafe fn reinterpret_layout<From, To>(value: From) -> To {
-    const {
-        assert!(
-            ::std::mem::size_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::size_of::<To>(),
-            "reinterpret_layout: source and destination must have identical size"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            ::std::mem::align_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::align_of::<To>(),
-            "reinterpret_layout: source and destination must have identical alignment"
-        );
-    }
-    union Reinterpret<A, B> {
-        from: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop<A>,
-        to: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop<B>,
-    }
-    // SAFETY: caller guarantees layout equivalence (see fn docs). The union
-    // write-read copies the raw bytes of `value` into a `To` slot, and
-    // `ManuallyDrop` on the source side suppresses its destructor so the
-    // destination owns the bytes unambiguously — no double-drop is possible.
-    unsafe {
-        ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop::into_inner(
-            Reinterpret {
-                from: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop::new(value),
-            }
-            .to,
-        )
-    }
-}
-
-/// Reinterprets `&From` as `&To` via a layout-preserving pointer cast.
-///
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// Same invariants as [`reinterpret_layout`].
-#[inline]
-pub const unsafe fn reinterpret_layout_ref<From, To>(value: &From) -> &To {
-    const {
-        assert!(
-            ::std::mem::size_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::size_of::<To>(),
-            "reinterpret_layout_ref: source and destination must have identical size"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            ::std::mem::align_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::align_of::<To>(),
-            "reinterpret_layout_ref: source and destination must have identical alignment"
-        );
-    }
-    // SAFETY: caller guarantees layout equivalence (see fn docs). A reference
-    // cast between identically-laid-out types produces a reference with the
-    // same address and lifetime, which is sound.
-    unsafe { &*(value as *const From as *const To) }
-}
-
-/// Implemented on `Verified<T>` by [`VerifiedFields!`], exposing the field-wise counterpart.
-///
-/// ## Disclaimer
-/// Do not implement this trait manually. It is intended to be implemented only
-/// by the `VerifiedFields!` macro, which generates the necessary layout
-/// guarantees for sound pointer casts.
-///
-/// ## Soundness
-/// When [`verify_entity`][crate::crypto::integrity::verify_entity] attests an
-/// entity, it returns `Verified<T>` — an aggregate proof over the whole value.
-/// This trait converts that wrapper into `Counterpart` (e.g.
-/// `VerifiedMyStruct`), where every field is individually wrapped in
-/// [`Verified`], allowing verified data to flow into functions that require
-/// `Verified<FieldType>` without re-verifying.
-///
-/// ## Safety
-/// The conversion is a zero-cost reinterpretation — no copying (beyond a
-/// bitwise move in the owned variant) or HMAC work occurs. Soundness rests on
-/// identical memory layout between `Verified<T>` and `Counterpart`:
-///
-/// - `T` carries `#[repr(C)]` (enforced by `@require_repr` in the macro).
-/// - `T` does **not** carry `packed` (enforced by `@reject_packed`).
-/// - `Counterpart` also carries `#[repr(C)]`, with the same fields in the same
-///   order.
-/// - Each `Verified<F>` field is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, so its size
-///   and alignment match `F` exactly.
-/// - `Verified<T>` itself is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`.
-///
-/// As an additional machine-checked guard, [`reinterpret_layout`] and
-/// [`reinterpret_layout_ref`] assert size/align equality of the two types at
-/// monomorphization time.
-///
-/// The trait is implemented directly on `Verified<T>` (not on `T`), so no
-/// `Deref`-coercion or auto-ref stripping is needed at call sites — the impl
-/// is unambiguous.
-pub trait VerifiedFieldsAccessor {
-    /// The field-wise verified counterpart, e.g. `VerifiedMyStruct`.
-    type Counterpart;
-
-    /// Reinterprets `&self` as `&Counterpart` via a layout-preserving pointer cast.
-    ///
-    /// No data is copied and no re-verification occurs. The returned reference
-    /// borrows from `self` and has the same lifetime.
-    fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart;
-
-    /// Consumes `self` and returns `Counterpart` via a layout-preserving
-    /// bitwise move.
-    ///
-    /// The original `Verified<T>` is moved without running its destructor
-    /// (there is none — `Verified` is a transparent wrapper with no heap
-    /// allocation), and the returned counterpart owns the original bytes. No
-    /// re-verification occurs.
-    fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart;
-}
-
-// todo! rewrite macro_rules to derive crate
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! VerifiedFields {
-    // --- Entry point (no source generics) ---
-    (
-        $(#$attr:tt)*
-        $vis:vis struct $name:ident
-        {
-            $(
-                $field_vis:vis $field_name:ident : $field_ty:ty
-            ),* $(,)?
-        }
-    ) => {
-        // Attribute-list checks run in isolation — they only receive the attrs,
-        // not the struct body.
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$(#$attr)*]);
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$(#$attr)*]);
-
-        paste::paste! {
-            #[doc = concat!(
-                "Field-wise verified counterpart of [`", stringify!($name), "`]."
-            )]
-            //
-            // `#[repr(C)]` is required for the pointer casts in `inherit_ref`
-            // and `inherit` to be sound. Both the source struct (enforced by
-            // `@require_repr`) and this counterpart carry `#[repr(C)]`, which
-            // guarantees matching field offsets. Combined with each
-            // `Verified<F>` being `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, the two
-            // structs have identical memory layout.
-            //
-            // `#[repr(transparent)]` is not usable here because it only permits
-            // a single non-ZST field; multi-field structs would fail to compile.
-            #[repr(C)]
-            $vis struct [<Verified $name>]<P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
-            {
-                $(
-                    $field_vis $field_name : $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$field_ty, P>
-                ),*
-            }
-
-            impl<P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
-                $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor
-                for $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$name, P>
-            {
-                type Counterpart = [<Verified $name>]<P>;
-
-                fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart {
-                    // SAFETY: `Self` is `Verified<T>` (transparent over
-                    // `T #[repr(C)]`) and `Self::Counterpart` is `#[repr(C)]`
-                    // with the same fields in the same order, each wrapped in
-                    // a `#[repr(transparent)]` `Verified<F>`. The two types
-                    // therefore have identical memory layout, which
-                    // `reinterpret_layout_ref` re-checks as size/align
-                    // equality at monomorphization.
-                    unsafe {
-                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout_ref::<
-                            Self,
-                            Self::Counterpart,
-                        >(self)
-                    }
-                }
-
-                fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart {
-                    // SAFETY: identical layout — see `inherit_ref`. The owned
-                    // helper additionally suppresses the source destructor so
-                    // the returned counterpart owns the original bytes (no
-                    // double-drop is possible).
-                    unsafe {
-                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout::<
-                            Self,
-                            Self::Counterpart,
-                        >(self)
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    };
-
-    // --- Entry point (source has generics) ---
-    (
-        $(#$attr:tt)*
-        $vis:vis struct $name:ident <$($gen:tt),*>
-        {
-            $(
-                $field_vis:vis $field_name:ident : $field_ty:ty
-            ),* $(,)?
-        }
-    ) => {
-        // Attribute-list checks run in isolation — they only receive the attrs,
-        // not the struct body.
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$(#$attr)*]);
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$(#$attr)*]);
-
-        paste::paste! {
-            #[doc = concat!(
-                "Field-wise verified counterpart of [`", stringify!($name), "`]."
-            )]
-            //
-            // `#[repr(C)]` is required for the pointer casts in `inherit_ref`
-            // and `inherit` to be sound. Both the source struct (enforced by
-            // `@require_repr`) and this counterpart carry `#[repr(C)]`, which
-            // guarantees matching field offsets. Combined with each
-            // `Verified<F>` being `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, the two
-            // structs have identical memory layout.
-            //
-            // `#[repr(transparent)]` is not usable here because it only permits
-            // a single non-ZST field; multi-field structs would fail to compile.
-            #[repr(C)]
-            $vis struct [<Verified $name>]<$($gen),*, P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
-            {
-                $(
-                    $field_vis $field_name : $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$field_ty, P>
-                ),*
-            }
-
-            impl<$($gen),*, P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
-                $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor
-                for $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$name<$($gen),*>, P>
-            {
-                type Counterpart = [<Verified $name>]<$($gen),*, P>;
-
-                fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart {
-                    // SAFETY: `Self` is `Verified<T>` (transparent over
-                    // `T #[repr(C)]`) and `Self::Counterpart` is `#[repr(C)]`
-                    // with the same fields in the same order, each wrapped in
-                    // a `#[repr(transparent)]` `Verified<F>`. The two types
-                    // therefore have identical memory layout, which
-                    // `reinterpret_layout_ref` re-checks as size/align
-                    // equality at monomorphization.
-                    unsafe {
-                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout_ref::<
-                            Self,
-                            Self::Counterpart,
-                        >(self)
-                    }
-                }
-
-                fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart {
-                    // SAFETY: identical layout — see `inherit_ref`. The owned
-                    // helper additionally suppresses the source destructor so
-                    // the returned counterpart owns the original bytes (no
-                    // double-drop is possible).
-                    unsafe {
-                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout::<
-                            Self,
-                            Self::Counterpart,
-                        >(self)
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    };
-
-    // --- @require_repr: ensure `#[repr(C)]` appears in the attribute list ---
-    (@require_repr [#[repr(C)] $($rest:tt)*]) => {};
-    (@require_repr [#$other:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$($rest)*]);
-    };
-    (@require_repr []) => {
-        ::std::compile_error!(
-            "VerifiedFields requires `#[repr(C)]` on the struct to guarantee field layout"
-        );
-    };
-
-    // --- @reject_packed: walk attrs and reject any `#[repr(..., packed, ...)]`.
-    //
-    // Without this, a packed struct would still fail at monomorphization via
-    // the const assertions inside the `reinterpret_layout*` helpers, but the
-    // diagnostic would be much harder to read. `align(N)` is *not* rejected
-    // here because const assertions catch alignment mismatches cleanly, and
-    // forbidding it would be unnecessarily restrictive.
-    (@reject_packed [#[repr($($inner:tt)*)] $($rest:tt)*]) => {
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed_inner [$($inner)*]);
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$($rest)*]);
-    };
-    (@reject_packed [#$other:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$($rest)*]);
-    };
-    (@reject_packed []) => {};
-
-    (@reject_packed_inner [packed $($rest:tt)*]) => {
-        ::std::compile_error!(
-            "VerifiedFields does not support packed layouts; the generated \
-             counterpart would not share layout with the source struct"
-        );
-    };
-    (@reject_packed_inner [$first:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
-        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed_inner [$($rest)*]);
-    };
-    (@reject_packed_inner []) => {};
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
-    #[repr(C)]
-    #[derive(Default, Clone)]
-    pub struct MyStruct<T> {
-        pub field1: String,
-        pub field2: T,
-    }
-
-    fn verify<T>(t: T) -> Verified<T> {
-        Verified {
-            inner: t,
-            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
-        }
-    }
-
-    // --- inherit_ref ---
-
-    // Verifies that `inherit_ref` returns a reference to the same memory
-    // address, confirming that no copy is made and the cast is purely a
-    // reinterpretation.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_ref_is_same_address() {
-        let v = verify(MyStruct {
-            field1: "hello".into(),
-            field2: 42u32,
-        });
-        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
-        assert_eq!(
-            &v as *const _ as *const u8, fields as *const _ as *const u8,
-            "inherit_ref must return a pointer to the same memory, not a copy"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // Verifies that field values are correctly accessible after `inherit_ref`.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_ref_field_values() {
-        let v = verify(MyStruct {
-            field1: "hello".into(),
-            field2: 99u32,
-        });
-        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
-        assert_eq!(*fields.field1, "hello");
-        assert_eq!(*fields.field2, 99u32);
-    }
-
-    // Verifies that casting the counterpart back to `Verified<T>` via a raw
-    // pointer lands on the original address — confirms the round-trip is a
-    // pure reinterpretation.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_ref_cast_roundtrip() {
-        let v = verify(MyStruct {
-            field1: "x".into(),
-            field2: 7u32,
-        });
-        let fields: &VerifiedMyStruct<u32, Root> = v.inherit_ref();
-        let back_ptr =
-            fields as *const VerifiedMyStruct<u32, Root> as *const Verified<MyStruct<u32>>;
-        assert_eq!(
-            back_ptr as *const u8, &v as *const _ as *const u8,
-            "cast of counterpart must point back to the same Verified<T>"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // ZST fields must still produce a counterpart with identical layout — the
-    // const asserts in `reinterpret_layout_ref` guard this at monomorphization.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_ref_with_zst_field() {
-        #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
-        #[repr(C)]
-        struct WithZst {
-            pub unit: (),
-            pub val: u64,
-        }
-
-        let v = Verified::<WithZst>::new_unchecked(WithZst { unit: (), val: 777 });
-        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
-        assert_eq!(*fields.val, 777);
-        assert_eq!(*fields.unit, ());
-    }
-
-    // --- inherit ---
-
-    // Verifies that `inherit` preserves field values in the owned counterpart.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_field_values() {
-        let v = verify(MyStruct {
-            field1: "world".into(),
-            field2: 1234u64,
-        });
-        let VerifiedMyStruct { field1, field2 } = v.inherit();
-        assert_eq!(*field1, "world");
-        assert_eq!(*field2, 1234u64);
-    }
-
-    // Verifies that `inherit` does not double-drop the inner value.
-    // If `ManuallyDrop` handling is wrong, running under Miri or with a drop
-    // counter catches a double-free.
-    #[test]
-    fn inherit_no_double_drop() {
-        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-
-        static DROP_COUNT: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
-
-        struct DropCounter;
-        impl Drop for DropCounter {
-            fn drop(&mut self) {
-                DROP_COUNT.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
-            }
-        }
-
-        #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
-        #[repr(C)]
-        struct WithDrop {
-            pub val: DropCounter,
-        }
-
-        DROP_COUNT.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
-        {
-            let v = Verified::<WithDrop>::new_unchecked(WithDrop { val: DropCounter });
-            let _ = v.inherit();
-        }
-        assert_eq!(
-            DROP_COUNT.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
-            1,
-            "DropCounter must be dropped exactly once"
-        );
-    }
-
-    // --- Verified::from_ref ---
-
-    #[test]
-    fn from_ref_is_same_address() {
-        let val = 42u32;
-        let verified: &Verified<u32> = Verified::from_ref(&val);
-        assert_eq!(
-            &val as *const u32 as *const u8, verified as *const _ as *const u8,
-            "from_ref must alias the original reference, not copy the value"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn from_ref_value_preserved() {
-        let val = String::from("test");
-        let verified: &Verified<String> = Verified::from_ref(&val);
-        assert_eq!(**verified, "test");
-    }
-
-    // --- AsRef<Verified<T>> for Verified<&T> ---
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verified_ref_as_ref_is_same_address() {
-        let val = 99u32;
-        let vref: Verified<&u32> = Verified::new_unchecked(&val);
-        let v: &Verified<u32> = vref.as_ref();
-        assert_eq!(
-            &val as *const u32 as *const u8, v as *const _ as *const u8,
-            "AsRef<Verified<T>> for Verified<&T> must alias the referent, not copy it"
-        );
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs

@@ -102,21 +102,11 @@ impl KeyCell {
     }
 }
 
+/// User password might be of different length, have not enough entropy, etc...
 /// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
 pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
-    let params = {
-        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
-        {
-            argon2::Params::new(8, 1, 1, None).unwrap()
-        }
-
-        #[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
-        {
-            argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap()
-        }
-    };
-
     #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+    let params = argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap();
     let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
     let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
     password.read_inline(|password_source| {

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/mod.rs

@@ -133,7 +133,6 @@ pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetu
     Ok(pool)
 }
 
-#[mutants::skip]
 pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
     use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/mod.rs

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
 
 use crate::{
     actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
-    crypto::integrity::{self, Verified, VerifiedEntity, verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor},
+    crypto::integrity,
     db::{
         self, DatabaseError,
         models::{
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ use crate::{
         schema::{self, evm_transaction_log},
     },
     evm::policies::{
-        CombinedSettings, DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy,
-        SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
+        DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, CombinedSettings, SharedGrantSettings,
+        SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
         token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
     },
 };
@@ -90,14 +90,6 @@ async fn check_shared_constraints(
     let mut violations = Vec::new();
     let now = Utc::now();
 
-    if shared.chain != context.chain {
-        violations.push(EvalViolation::MismatchingChainId {
-            expected: shared.chain,
-            actual: context.chain,
-        });
-        return Ok(violations);
-    }
-
     // Validity window
     if shared.valid_from.is_some_and(|t| now < t) || shared.valid_until.is_some_and(|t| now > t) {
         violations.push(EvalViolation::InvalidTime);
@@ -153,39 +145,12 @@ impl Engine {
     {
         let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
 
-        let verified_settings =
-            match integrity::lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, |conn| {
-                let context = context.clone();
-                Box::pin(async move {
-                    let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, conn)
-                        .await
-                        .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
-                        .ok_or_else(|| DatabaseError::from(diesel::result::Error::NotFound))?;
-
-                    Ok::<_, DatabaseError>((grant.common_settings_id, grant.settings))
-                })
-            })
-            .await
-            {
-                Ok(verified) => verified,
-                Err(integrity::Error::Database(DatabaseError::Connection(
-                    diesel::result::Error::NotFound,
-                ))) => return Err(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant),
-                Err(err) => return Err(PolicyError::Integrity(err)),
-            };
-
-        let mut grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
+        let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
             .await
             .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
             .ok_or(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant)?;
 
-        // IMPORTANT: policy evaluation uses extra non-integrity fields from Grant
-        // (e.g., per-policy ids), so we currently reload Grant after the query-native
-        // integrity check over canonicalized settings.
-        grant.settings = verified_settings
-            .inherit()
-            .entity
-            .drop_verification_provenance();
+        integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
 
         let mut violations = check_shared_constraints(
             &context,
@@ -241,7 +206,7 @@ impl Engine {
     pub async fn create_grant<P: Policy>(
         &self,
         full_grant: CombinedSettings<P::Settings>,
-    ) -> Result<Verified<i32>, DatabaseError>
+    ) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError>
     where
         P::Settings: Clone,
     {
@@ -285,23 +250,27 @@ impl Engine {
 
                     P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await?;
 
-                    let verified_entity_id =
-                        integrity::sign_entity(conn, &keyholder, &full_grant, basic_grant.id)
+                    integrity::sign_entity(
+                        conn,
+                        &keyholder,
+                        &full_grant,
+                    basic_grant.id,
+                    )
                     .await
                     .map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
 
-                    QueryResult::Ok(verified_entity_id)
+                    QueryResult::Ok(basic_grant.id)
                 })
             })
             .await?;
 
-        Ok(id.unqualify_origin())
+        Ok(id)
     }
 
     async fn list_one_kind<Kind: Policy, Y>(
         &self,
         conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<Grant<Y>>, ListError>
+    ) -> Result<impl Iterator<Item = Grant<Y>>, ListError>
     where
         Y: From<Kind::Settings>,
     {
@@ -309,32 +278,16 @@ impl Engine {
             .await
             .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
 
-        let mut verified_grants = Vec::with_capacity(all_grants.len());
-
-        // Verify integrity of all grants before returning any results.
-        for grant in all_grants {
-            let VerifiedEntity {
-                entity: verified_settings,
-                entity_id: _,
-            } = integrity::verify_entity(
-                conn,
-                &self.keyholder,
-                grant.settings,
-                grant.common_settings_id,
-            )
-            .await?
-            .inherit();
-
-            verified_grants.push(Grant {
-                id: grant.id,
-                common_settings_id: grant.common_settings_id,
-                settings: verified_settings
-                    .drop_verification_provenance()
-                    .generalize(),
-            });
+        // Verify integrity of all grants before returning any results
+        for grant in &all_grants {
+            integrity::verify_entity(conn, &self.keyholder, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
         }
 
-        Ok(verified_grants)
+        Ok(all_grants.into_iter().map(|g| Grant {
+            id: g.id,
+            common_settings_id: g.common_settings_id,
+            settings: g.settings.generalize(),
+        }))
     }
 
     pub async fn list_all_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, ListError> {
@@ -389,255 +342,3 @@ impl Engine {
         Err(VetError::UnsupportedTransactionType)
     }
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
-    use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
-    use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
-    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-    use rstest::rstest;
-
-    use crate::db::{
-        self, DatabaseConnection,
-        models::{
-            EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
-        },
-        schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
-    };
-    use crate::evm::policies::{
-        EvalContext, EvalViolation, SharedGrantSettings, TransactionRateLimit,
-    };
-
-    use super::check_shared_constraints;
-
-    const WALLET_ACCESS_ID: i32 = 1;
-    const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
-    const RECIPIENT: Address = address!("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111");
-
-    fn context() -> EvalContext {
-        EvalContext {
-            target: EvmWalletAccess {
-                id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
-                wallet_id: 10,
-                client_id: 20,
-                created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
-            },
-            chain: CHAIN_ID,
-            to: RECIPIENT,
-            value: U256::ZERO,
-            calldata: Bytes::new(),
-            max_fee_per_gas: 100,
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: 10,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn shared_settings() -> SharedGrantSettings {
-        SharedGrantSettings {
-            wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
-            chain: CHAIN_ID,
-            valid_from: None,
-            valid_until: None,
-            max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
-            rate_limit: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    async fn insert_basic_grant(
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-        shared: &SharedGrantSettings,
-    ) -> EvmBasicGrant {
-        insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
-            .values(NewEvmBasicGrant {
-                wallet_access_id: shared.wallet_access_id,
-                chain_id: shared.chain as i32,
-                valid_from: shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
-                valid_until: shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
-                max_gas_fee_per_gas: shared
-                    .max_gas_fee_per_gas
-                    .map(|fee| super::utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
-                max_priority_fee_per_gas: shared
-                    .max_priority_fee_per_gas
-                    .map(|fee| super::utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
-                rate_limit_count: shared.rate_limit.as_ref().map(|limit| limit.count as i32),
-                rate_limit_window_secs: shared
-                    .rate_limit
-                    .as_ref()
-                    .map(|limit| limit.window.num_seconds() as i32),
-                revoked_at: None,
-            })
-            .returning(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
-            .get_result(conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    #[rstest]
-    #[case::matching_chain(CHAIN_ID, false)]
-    #[case::mismatching_chain(CHAIN_ID + 1, true)]
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_chain_id(
-        #[case] context_chain: u64,
-        #[case] expect_mismatch: bool,
-    ) {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let context = EvalContext {
-            chain: context_chain,
-            ..context()
-        };
-
-        let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context, &shared_settings(), 999, &mut *conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            violations
-                .iter()
-                .any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::MismatchingChainId { .. })),
-            expect_mismatch
-        );
-
-        if expect_mismatch {
-            assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
-        } else {
-            assert!(violations.is_empty());
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[rstest]
-    #[case::valid_from_in_bounds(Some(Utc::now() - Duration::hours(1)), None, false)]
-    #[case::valid_from_out_of_bounds(Some(Utc::now() + Duration::hours(1)), None, true)]
-    #[case::valid_until_in_bounds(None, Some(Utc::now() + Duration::hours(1)), false)]
-    #[case::valid_until_out_of_bounds(None, Some(Utc::now() - Duration::hours(1)), true)]
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_validity_window(
-        #[case] valid_from: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
-        #[case] valid_until: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
-        #[case] expect_invalid_time: bool,
-    ) {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let shared = SharedGrantSettings {
-            valid_from,
-            valid_until,
-            ..shared_settings()
-        };
-
-        let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context(), &shared, 999, &mut *conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            violations
-                .iter()
-                .any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::InvalidTime)),
-            expect_invalid_time
-        );
-
-        if expect_invalid_time {
-            assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
-        } else {
-            assert!(violations.is_empty());
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[rstest]
-    #[case::max_fee_within_limit(Some(U256::from(100u64)), None, 100, 10, false)]
-    #[case::max_fee_exceeded(Some(U256::from(99u64)), None, 100, 10, true)]
-    #[case::priority_fee_within_limit(None, Some(U256::from(10u64)), 100, 10, false)]
-    #[case::priority_fee_exceeded(None, Some(U256::from(9u64)), 100, 10, true)]
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_gas_fee_caps(
-        #[case] max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
-        #[case] max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
-        #[case] actual_max_fee_per_gas: u128,
-        #[case] actual_max_priority_fee_per_gas: u128,
-        #[case] expect_gas_limit_violation: bool,
-    ) {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let context = EvalContext {
-            max_fee_per_gas: actual_max_fee_per_gas,
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: actual_max_priority_fee_per_gas,
-            ..context()
-        };
-
-        let shared = SharedGrantSettings {
-            max_gas_fee_per_gas,
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas,
-            ..shared_settings()
-        };
-        let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context, &shared, 999, &mut *conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            violations
-                .iter()
-                .any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::GasLimitExceeded { .. })),
-            expect_gas_limit_violation
-        );
-
-        if expect_gas_limit_violation {
-            assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
-        } else {
-            assert!(violations.is_empty());
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[rstest]
-    #[case::under_rate_limit(2, false)]
-    #[case::at_rate_limit(1, true)]
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn check_shared_constraints_enforces_rate_limit(
-        #[case] rate_limit_count: u32,
-        #[case] expect_rate_limit_violation: bool,
-    ) {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let shared = SharedGrantSettings {
-            rate_limit: Some(TransactionRateLimit {
-                count: rate_limit_count,
-                window: Duration::hours(1),
-            }),
-            ..shared_settings()
-        };
-
-        let basic_grant = insert_basic_grant(&mut conn, &shared).await;
-
-        insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
-            .values(NewEvmTransactionLog {
-                grant_id: basic_grant.id,
-                wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
-                chain_id: CHAIN_ID as i32,
-                eth_value: super::utils::u256_to_bytes(U256::ZERO).to_vec(),
-                signed_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
-            })
-            .execute(&mut *conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let violations = check_shared_constraints(&context(), &shared, basic_grant.id, &mut *conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            violations
-                .iter()
-                .any(|violation| matches!(violation, EvalViolation::RateLimitExceeded)),
-            expect_rate_limit_violation
-        );
-
-        if expect_rate_limit_violation {
-            assert_eq!(violations.len(), 1);
-        } else {
-            assert!(violations.is_empty());
-        }
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies.rs

@@ -7,12 +7,11 @@ use diesel::{
 };
 use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
 
+use serde::Serialize;
 use thiserror::Error;
 
 use crate::{
-    crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
-    db::models::{self, EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess},
-    evm::utils,
+    crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable, db::models::{self, EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess}, evm::utils
 };
 
 pub mod ether_transfer;
@@ -56,14 +55,11 @@ pub enum EvalViolation {
 
     #[error("Transaction type is not allowed by this grant")]
     InvalidTransactionType,
-
-    #[error("Mismatching chain ID")]
-    MismatchingChainId { expected: ChainId, actual: ChainId },
 }
 
 pub type DatabaseID = i32;
 
-#[derive(Debug)]
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
 pub struct Grant<PolicySettings> {
     pub id: DatabaseID,
     pub common_settings_id: DatabaseID, // ID of the basic grant for shared-logic checks like rate limits and validity periods
@@ -127,19 +123,19 @@ pub enum SpecificMeaning {
     TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Meaning),
 }
 
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize)]
 pub struct TransactionRateLimit {
     pub count: u32,
     pub window: Duration,
 }
 
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize)]
 pub struct VolumeRateLimit {
     pub max_volume: U256,
     pub window: Duration,
 }
 
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize)]
 pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
     pub wallet_access_id: i32,
     pub chain: ChainId,
@@ -200,7 +196,7 @@ pub enum SpecificGrant {
     TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings),
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
 pub struct CombinedSettings<PolicyGrant> {
     pub shared: SharedGrantSettings,
     pub specific: PolicyGrant,
@@ -220,37 +216,3 @@ impl<P: Integrable> Integrable for CombinedSettings<P> {
     const VERSION: i32 = P::VERSION;
 }
 
-use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
-
-impl Hashable for TransactionRateLimit {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.count.hash(hasher);
-        self.window.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}
-
-impl Hashable for VolumeRateLimit {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.max_volume.hash(hasher);
-        self.window.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}
-
-impl Hashable for SharedGrantSettings {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.wallet_access_id.hash(hasher);
-        self.chain.hash(hasher);
-        self.valid_from.hash(hasher);
-        self.valid_until.hash(hasher);
-        self.max_gas_fee_per_gas.hash(hasher);
-        self.max_priority_fee_per_gas.hash(hasher);
-        self.rate_limit.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}
-
-impl<P: Hashable> Hashable for CombinedSettings<P> {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.shared.hash(hasher);
-        self.specific.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/ether_transfer/mod.rs

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
 }
 
 // A grant for ether transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize)]
 pub struct Settings {
     pub target: Vec<Address>,
     pub limit: VolumeRateLimit,
@@ -61,15 +61,6 @@ impl Integrable for Settings {
     const KIND: &'static str = "EtherTransfer";
 }
 
-use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
-
-impl Hashable for Settings {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.target.hash(hasher);
-        self.limit.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}
-
 impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
     fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
         SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(val)
@@ -110,8 +101,7 @@ async fn check_rate_limits(
     let mut violations = Vec::new();
     let window = grant.settings.specific.limit.window;
 
-    let past_transaction =
-        query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.common_settings_id, window, db).await?;
+    let past_transaction = query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.id, window, db).await?;
 
     let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - grant.settings.specific.limit.window;
     let prospective_cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transaction
@@ -250,20 +240,21 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
             })
             .collect();
 
+        let settings = Settings {
+            target: targets,
+            limit: VolumeRateLimit {
+                max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume)
+                    .map_err(|err| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err)))?,
+                window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
+            },
+        };
+
         Ok(Some(Grant {
             id: grant.id,
             common_settings_id: grant.basic_grant_id,
             settings: CombinedSettings {
                 shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
-                specific: Settings {
-                    target: targets,
-                    limit: VolumeRateLimit {
-                        max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(|err| {
-                            diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
-                        })?,
-                        window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
-                    },
-                },
+                specific: settings,
             },
         }))
     }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/ether_transfer/tests.rs

@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
     }
 }
 
+// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
 #[test]
 fn analyze_matches_empty_calldata() {
     let m = EtherTransfer::analyze(&ctx(ALLOWED, U256::from(1_000u64))).unwrap();
@@ -100,6 +102,8 @@ fn analyze_rejects_nonempty_calldata() {
     assert!(EtherTransfer::analyze(&context).is_none());
 }
 
+// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn evaluate_passes_for_allowed_target() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
@@ -272,6 +276,8 @@ async fn evaluate_passes_at_exactly_volume_limit() {
     );
 }
 
+// ── try_find_grant ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn try_find_grant_roundtrip() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
@@ -330,36 +336,7 @@ async fn try_find_grant_wrong_target_returns_none() {
     assert!(found.is_none());
 }
 
-proptest::proptest! {
-    #[test]
-    fn target_order_does_not_affect_hash(
-        raw_addrs in proptest::collection::vec(proptest::prelude::any::<[u8; 20]>(), 0..8),
-        seed in proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(),
-        max_volume in proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(),
-        window_secs in 1i64..=86400,
-    ) {
-        use rand::{SeedableRng, seq::SliceRandom};
-        use sha2::Digest;
-        use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
-
-        let addrs: Vec<Address> = raw_addrs.iter().map(|b| Address::from(*b)).collect();
-        let mut shuffled = addrs.clone();
-        shuffled.shuffle(&mut rand::rngs::StdRng::seed_from_u64(seed));
-
-        let limit = VolumeRateLimit {
-            max_volume: U256::from(max_volume),
-            window: Duration::seconds(window_secs),
-        };
-
-        let mut h1 = sha2::Sha256::new();
-        Settings { target: addrs, limit: limit.clone() }.hash(&mut h1);
-
-        let mut h2 = sha2::Sha256::new();
-        Settings { target: shuffled, limit }.hash(&mut h2);
-
-        proptest::prop_assert_eq!(h1.finalize(), h2.finalize());
-    }
-}
+// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/token_transfers/mod.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 
+use alloy::{
+    primitives::{Address, U256},
+    sol_types::SolCall,
+};
+use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
+use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
+use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
+use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, prelude::*};
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+use serde::Serialize;
+
 use crate::db::schema::{
     evm_basic_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_log,
     evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
@@ -20,16 +32,6 @@ use crate::{
     },
     evm::policies::CombinedSettings,
 };
-use alloy::{
-    primitives::{Address, U256},
-    sol_types::SolCall,
-};
-use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
-use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
-use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
-use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods, prelude::*};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
 
 use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
 
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
 }
 
 // A grant for token transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
 pub struct Settings {
     pub token_contract: Address,
     pub target: Option<Address>,
@@ -71,17 +73,6 @@ pub struct Settings {
 impl Integrable for Settings {
     const KIND: &'static str = "TokenTransfer";
 }
-
-use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
-
-impl Hashable for Settings {
-    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        self.token_contract.hash(hasher);
-        self.target.hash(hasher);
-        self.volume_limits.hash(hasher);
-    }
-}
-
 impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
     fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
         SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(val)
@@ -286,16 +277,18 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
             }
         };
 
+        let settings = Settings {
+            token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
+            target,
+            volume_limits,
+        };
+
         Ok(Some(Grant {
             id: token_grant.id,
             common_settings_id: token_grant.basic_grant_id,
             settings: CombinedSettings {
                 shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
-                specific: Settings {
-                    token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
-                    target,
-                    volume_limits,
-                },
+                specific: settings,
             },
         }))
     }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/token_transfers/tests.rs

@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
     }
 }
 
+// ── analyze ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
 #[test]
 fn analyze_known_token_valid_calldata() {
     let calldata = transfer_calldata(RECIPIENT, U256::from(100u64));
@@ -126,6 +128,8 @@ fn analyze_empty_calldata_returns_none() {
     assert!(TokenTransfer::analyze(&ctx(DAI, Bytes::new())).is_none());
 }
 
+// ── evaluate ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn evaluate_rejects_nonzero_eth_value() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
@@ -408,39 +412,7 @@ async fn try_find_grant_unknown_token_returns_none() {
     assert!(found.is_none());
 }
 
-proptest::proptest! {
-    #[test]
-    fn volume_limits_order_does_not_affect_hash(
-        raw_limits in proptest::collection::vec(
-            (proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(), 1i64..=86400),
-            0..8,
-        ),
-        seed in proptest::prelude::any::<u64>(),
-    ) {
-        use rand::{SeedableRng, seq::SliceRandom};
-        use sha2::Digest;
-        use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
-
-        let limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = raw_limits
-            .iter()
-            .map(|(max_vol, window_secs)| VolumeRateLimit {
-                max_volume: U256::from(*max_vol),
-                window: Duration::seconds(*window_secs),
-            })
-            .collect();
-
-        let mut shuffled = limits.clone();
-        shuffled.shuffle(&mut rand::rngs::StdRng::seed_from_u64(seed));
-
-        let mut h1 = sha2::Sha256::new();
-        Settings { token_contract: DAI, target: None, volume_limits: limits }.hash(&mut h1);
-
-        let mut h2 = sha2::Sha256::new();
-        Settings { token_contract: DAI, target: None, volume_limits: shuffled }.hash(&mut h2);
-
-        proptest::prop_assert_eq!(h1.finalize(), h2.finalize());
-    }
-}
+// ── find_all_grants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn find_all_grants_empty_db() {

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/client/auth.rs

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ use tracing::warn;
 
 use crate::{
     actors::client::{self, ClientConnection, auth},
-    crypto::integrity::Verified,
     grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
 };
 
@@ -69,7 +68,6 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
                 auth::Error::ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Internal)
                 | auth::Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
                 | auth::Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-                | auth::Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
                 | auth::Error::Transport => ProtoAuthResult::Internal,
             }
             .into(),
@@ -201,7 +199,7 @@ pub async fn start(
     conn: &mut ClientConnection,
     bi: &mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
     request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
-) -> Result<Verified<i32>, auth::Error> {
+) -> Result<i32, auth::Error> {
     let mut transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
     client::auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/common/outbound.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
         EvalViolation as ProtoEvalViolation, GasLimitExceededViolation, NoMatchingGrantError,
         PolicyViolationsError, SpecificMeaning as ProtoSpecificMeaning,
         TokenInfo as ProtoTokenInfo, TransactionEvalError as ProtoTransactionEvalError,
-        eval_violation as proto_eval_violation, eval_violation::Kind as ProtoEvalViolationKind,
+        eval_violation::Kind as ProtoEvalViolationKind,
         specific_meaning::Meaning as ProtoSpecificMeaningKind,
         transaction_eval_error::Kind as ProtoTransactionEvalErrorKind,
     },
@@ -79,12 +79,6 @@ impl Convert for EvalViolation {
             EvalViolation::InvalidTransactionType => {
                 ProtoEvalViolationKind::InvalidTransactionType(())
             }
-            EvalViolation::MismatchingChainId { expected, actual } => {
-                ProtoEvalViolationKind::ChainIdMismatch(proto_eval_violation::ChainIdMismatch {
-                    expected,
-                    actual,
-                })
-            }
         };
 
         ProtoEvalViolation { kind: Some(kind) }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/user_agent/evm.rs

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ async fn handle_wallet_create(
 ) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
     let result = match actor.ask(HandleEvmWalletCreate {}).await {
         Ok((wallet_id, address)) => WalletCreateResult::Wallet(WalletEntry {
-            id: wallet_id.drop_verification_provenance(),
+            id: wallet_id,
             address: address.to_vec(),
         }),
         Err(err) => {
@@ -121,9 +121,6 @@ async fn handle_grant_list(
                 })
                 .collect(),
         }),
-        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed)) => {
-            EvmGrantListResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::VaultSealed.into())
-        }
         Err(err) => {
             warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to list EVM grants");
             EvmGrantListResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
@@ -150,7 +147,7 @@ async fn handle_grant_create(
         .try_convert()?;
 
     let result = match actor.ask(HandleGrantCreate { basic, grant }).await {
-        Ok(grant_id) => EvmGrantCreateResult::GrantId(grant_id.drop_verification_provenance()),
+        Ok(grant_id) => EvmGrantCreateResult::GrantId(grant_id),
         Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed)) => {
             EvmGrantCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::VaultSealed.into())
         }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
+#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
 use crate::context::ServerContext;
 
-#[macro_use]
-extern crate macro_rules_attribute;
-
 pub mod actors;
 pub mod context;
 pub mod crypto;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/main.rs

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ use tracing::info;
 const PORT: u16 = 50051;
 
 #[tokio::main]
-#[mutants::skip]
 async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     aws_lc_rs::default_provider().install_default().unwrap();
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/utils.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-use std::ops::Deref;
-
 struct DeferClosure<F: FnOnce()> {
     f: Option<F>,
 }
@@ -16,19 +14,3 @@ impl<F: FnOnce()> Drop for DeferClosure<F> {
 pub fn defer<F: FnOnce()>(f: F) -> impl Drop + Sized {
     DeferClosure { f: Some(f) }
 }
-
-/// A trait for casting between two transparently wrapped types with identical memory layouts.
-///
-/// [`ReinterpretWrapper`] enables zero-cost conversions between two types (`Self` and `Counterpart`)
-/// that wrap the same underlying data but differ in how that data is presented. Both types must
-/// transparently wrap the same "deref target" and provide bidirectional `AsRef` conversions.
-pub trait ReinterpretWrapper<Counterpart>
-where
-    Self: Deref<Target = Self::Inner> + AsRef<Counterpart>,
-    Counterpart: Deref<Target = Self::Inner> + AsRef<Self>,
-{
-    /// The shared target type that both `Self` and `Counterpart` transparently wrap.
-    type Inner;
-    /// Reinterprets `Self` as `Counterpart`.
-    fn reinterpret(self) -> Counterpart;
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/client/auth.rs

@@ -1,14 +1,9 @@
 use arbiter_proto::ClientMetadata;
 use arbiter_proto::transport::{Receiver, Sender};
+use arbiter_server::actors::GlobalActors;
 use arbiter_server::{
-    actors::{
-        GlobalActors,
-        client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, auth, connect_client},
-        keyholder::Bootstrap,
-    },
-    crypto::integrity,
-    db::{self, schema},
-    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+    actors::client::{ClientConnection, auth, connect_client},
+    db,
 };
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, NullableExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, insert_into};
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
@@ -26,8 +21,7 @@ fn metadata(name: &str, description: Option<&str>, version: Option<&str>) -> Cli
 
 async fn insert_registered_client(
     db: &db::DatabasePool,
-    actors: &GlobalActors,
-    pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
+    pubkey: Vec<u8>,
     metadata: &ClientMetadata,
 ) {
     use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
@@ -43,64 +37,23 @@ async fn insert_registered_client(
         .get_result(&mut conn)
         .await
         .unwrap();
-    let client_id: i32 = insert_into(program_client::table)
+    insert_into(program_client::table)
         .values((
-            program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec()),
+            program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey),
             program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
         ))
-        .returning(program_client::id)
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let _ = integrity::sign_entity(
-        &mut conn,
-        &actors.key_holder,
-        &ClientCredentials { pubkey, nonce: 1 },
-        client_id,
-    )
-    .await
-    .unwrap();
-}
-
-async fn insert_bootstrap_sentinel_useragent(db: &db::DatabasePool) {
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-    let sentinel_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng())
-        .verifying_key()
-        .to_bytes()
-        .to_vec();
-
-    insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
-        .values((
-            schema::useragent_client::public_key.eq(sentinel_key),
-            schema::useragent_client::key_type.eq(1i32),
-        ))
         .execute(&mut conn)
         .await
         .unwrap();
 }
 
-async fn spawn_test_actors(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> GlobalActors {
-    insert_bootstrap_sentinel_useragent(db).await;
-
-    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
-    actors
-        .key_holder
-        .ask(Bootstrap {
-            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec()),
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-    actors
-}
-
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
 
     let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
-    let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
     let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
     let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
         let mut server_transport = server_transport;
@@ -125,19 +78,20 @@ pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
 
     let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
 
     insert_registered_client(
         &db,
-        &actors,
-        new_key.verifying_key(),
+        pubkey_bytes.clone(),
         &metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
     )
     .await;
 
     let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+
     let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
     let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
         let mut server_transport = server_transport;
@@ -193,13 +147,34 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
+
     let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
     let requested = metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0"));
 
-    insert_registered_client(&db, &actors, new_key.verifying_key(), &requested).await;
-
-    let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
+    {
+        use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+        let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
+            .values((
+                client_metadata::name.eq(&requested.name),
+                client_metadata::description.eq(&requested.description),
+                client_metadata::version.eq(&requested.version),
+            ))
+            .returning(client_metadata::id)
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        insert_into(program_client::table)
+            .values((
+                program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec()),
+                program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
+            ))
+            .execute(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+    }
 
     let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
     let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -250,18 +225,33 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
     let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
+    let actors = GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+    let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
+
     let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
 
-    insert_registered_client(
-        &db,
-        &actors,
-        new_key.verifying_key(),
-        &metadata("client", Some("old"), Some("1.0.0")),
-    )
-    .await;
-
-    let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
+    {
+        use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+        let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
+            .values((
+                client_metadata::name.eq("client"),
+                client_metadata::description.eq(Some("old")),
+                client_metadata::version.eq(Some("1.0.0")),
+            ))
+            .returning(client_metadata::id)
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        insert_into(program_client::table)
+            .values((
+                program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec()),
+                program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
+            ))
+            .execute(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+    }
 
     let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
     let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -332,59 +322,3 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
         );
     }
 }
-
-#[tokio::test]
-#[test_log::test]
-pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch() {
-    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-    let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
-
-    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
-    let requested = metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0"));
-
-    {
-        use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        let metadata_id: i32 = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
-            .values((
-                client_metadata::name.eq(&requested.name),
-                client_metadata::description.eq(&requested.description),
-                client_metadata::version.eq(&requested.version),
-            ))
-            .returning(client_metadata::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        insert_into(program_client::table)
-            .values((
-                program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec()),
-                program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-    }
-
-    let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
-    let props = ClientConnection::new(db.clone(), actors);
-    let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
-        let mut server_transport = server_transport;
-        connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
-    });
-
-    test_transport
-        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
-            metadata: requested,
-        })
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let response = test_transport
-        .recv()
-        .await
-        .expect("should receive auth rejection");
-    assert!(matches!(response, Err(auth::Error::IntegrityCheckFailed)));
-
-    task.await.unwrap();
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent/auth.rs

@@ -139,8 +139,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
             id,
         )
         .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
+        .unwrap();
     }
 
     let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
@@ -279,8 +278,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
             id,
         )
         .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .drop_verification_provenance();
+        .unwrap();
     }
 
     let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();

server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent/unseal.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ use arbiter_server::{
     safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
 };
 use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, insert_into};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
 use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};