feat(integrity): introduce sealed provenance markers for Verified

Reviewed-on: #77

.gitattributes

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-* text=auto eol=lf

.gitignore

@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ scripts/__pycache__/
 .DS_Store
 .cargo/config.toml
 .vscode/
-docs/superpowers
+docs/

AGENTS.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ This file provides guidance to Codex (Codex.ai/code) when working with code in t
 
 Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
 - **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
-- **`operator/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
+- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
 - **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
 
 The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, die
 |---|---|
 | `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
 | `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
-| `arbiter-operator` | Rust client library for the operator side of the gRPC protocol |
+| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
 | `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
 
 ### Common Commands
@@ -66,11 +66,11 @@ cargo insta review
 The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
 
 - **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
-- **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
+- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
-- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between operators and SDK clients.
+- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
 - **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
 
-Per-connection actors live under `actors/operator/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
+Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
 
 **Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
 
@@ -100,41 +100,20 @@ diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migration
 diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
 ```
 
-### Code Conventions
+## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
 
-**`#[must_use]` Attribute:**
+The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
-Apply the `#[must_use]` attribute to return types of functions where the return value is critical and should not be accidentally ignored. This is commonly used for:
 
-- Methods that return `bool` indicating success/failure or validation state
+Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
-- Any function where ignoring the return value indicates a logic error
-
-Do not apply `#[must_use]` redundantly to items (types or functions) that are already annotated with `#[must_use]`.
-
-Example:
-
-```rust
-#[must_use]
-pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
-    // verification logic
-}
-```
-
-This forces callers to either use the return value or explicitly ignore it with `let _ = ...;`, preventing silent failures.
-
-## Operator (Flutter + Rinf at `operator/`)
-
-The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `operator/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-operator` for the gRPC client.
-
-Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `operator/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
 
 ```sh
-cd operator && rinf gen
+cd useragent && rinf gen
 ```
 
 ### Common Commands
 
 ```sh
-cd operator
+cd useragent
 
 # Run the app (macOS or Windows)
 flutter run
@@ -146,4 +125,4 @@ rinf gen
 flutter analyze
 ```
 
-The Rinf Rust entry point is `operator/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `operator/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.
+The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Arbiter is a permissioned signing service for cryptocurrency wallets. It runs as
 
 Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers:
 
-- **Operator** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies).
+- **User Agent** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies).
 - **SDK Client** — A consumer of signing capabilities, typically an automation tool. In the future, this could include a browser-based wallet.
 - **Recovery Operator** — A dormant recovery participant with narrowly scoped authority used only for custody recovery and operator replacement.
 
@@ -22,32 +22,30 @@ Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers:
 All peers authenticate via public-key cryptography using a challenge-response protocol:
 
 1. The peer sends its public key and requests a challenge.
-2. The server looks up the key in its database. If found, it generates a fresh challenge from random bytes plus the current timestamp.
+2. The server looks up the key in its database. If found, it increments the nonce and returns a challenge (replay-attack protection).
-3. The peer signs the canonical challenge payload with its private key and sends the signature back.
+3. The peer signs the challenge with its private key and sends the signature back.
 4. The server verifies the signature:
    - **Pass:** The connection is considered authenticated.
    - **Fail:** The server closes the connection.
 
-Authentication challenges are per-connection, ephemeral values. They are not persisted in the peer tables, and peer records store no challenge state.
+### 2.2 User Agent Bootstrap
 
-### 2.2 Operator Bootstrap
+On first run — when no User Agents are registered — the server generates a one-time bootstrap token. It is made available in two ways:
 
-On first run — when no Operators are registered — the server generates a one-time bootstrap token. It is made available in two ways:
+- **Local setup:** Written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` for automatic discovery by a co-located User Agent.
-
-- **Local setup:** Written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` for automatic discovery by a co-located Operator.
 - **Remote setup:** Printed to the server's console output.
 
-The first Operator must present this token alongside the standard challenge-response to complete registration.
+The first User Agent must present this token alongside the standard challenge-response to complete registration.
 
 ### 2.3 SDK Client Registration
 
-There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approved by an already-registered Operator.
+There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approved by an already-registered User Agent.
 
 ---
 
 ## 3. Multi-Operator Governance
 
-When more than one Operator is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision.
+When more than one User Agent is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision.
 
 ### 3.1 Voting Rules
 
@@ -165,13 +163,13 @@ In both cases, committee formation is a coordinated process. Arbiter does not al
 
 When an unbootstrapped vault is initialized as a multi-operator vault, the setup proceeds as follows:
 
-1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using an Operator and the bootstrap token.
+1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using a User Agent and the bootstrap token.
 2. During bootstrap setup, that operator declares:
    - the total number of ordinary operators
    - the total number of Recovery Operators
 3. The vault enters **multi-bootstrap mode**.
 4. While in multi-bootstrap mode:
-   - every ordinary operator must connect with an Operator using the bootstrap token
+   - every ordinary operator must connect with a User Agent using the bootstrap token
    - every Recovery Operator must also connect using the bootstrap token
    - each participant is registered individually
    - each participant's share is created and protected with that participant's credentials
@@ -193,8 +191,8 @@ The server proves its identity using TLS with a self-signed certificate. The TLS
 
 Peers verify the server by its **public key fingerprint**:
 
-- **Operator (local):** Receives the fingerprint automatically through the bootstrap token.
+- **User Agent (local):** Receives the fingerprint automatically through the bootstrap token.
-- **Operator (remote) / SDK Client:** Must receive the fingerprint out-of-band.
+- **User Agent (remote) / SDK Client:** Must receive the fingerprint out-of-band.
 
 > A streamlined setup mechanism using a single connection string is planned but not yet implemented.
 
@@ -231,11 +229,11 @@ On boot, the root key is encrypted and the server cannot perform any signing ope
 
 ### 6.2 Unseal Flow
 
-To transition to the **Unsealed** state, an Operator must provide the password:
+To transition to the **Unsealed** state, a User Agent must provide the password:
 
-1. The Operator initiates an unseal request.
+1. The User Agent initiates an unseal request.
 2. The server generates a one-time key pair and returns the public key.
-3. The Operator encrypts the user's password with this one-time public key and sends the ciphertext to the server.
+3. The User Agent encrypts the user's password with this one-time public key and sends the ciphertext to the server.
 4. The server decrypts and verifies the password:
    - **Success:** The root key is decrypted and placed into a hardened memory cell. The server transitions to `Unsealed`. Any entries pending encryption scheme migration are re-encrypted.
    - **Failure:** The server returns an error indicating the password is incorrect.
@@ -257,7 +255,7 @@ See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the current and planned memory pr
 ### 7.1 Fundamental Rules
 
 - SDK clients have **no access by default**.
-- Access is granted **explicitly** by an Operator.
+- Access is granted **explicitly** by a User Agent.
 - Grants are scoped to **specific wallets** and governed by **policies**.
 
 Each blockchain requires its own policy system due to differences in static transaction analysis. Currently, only EVM is supported; Solana support is planned.
@@ -277,19 +275,19 @@ sequenceDiagram
     autonumber
     actor SDK as SDK Client
     participant Server
-    participant operator as Operator
+    participant UA as User Agent
 
     SDK->>Server: SignTransactionRequest
     Server->>Server: Resolve wallet and wallet visibility
     alt Visibility approval required
-        Server->>operator: Ask for wallet visibility approval
+        Server->>UA: Ask for wallet visibility approval
-        operator-->>Server: Vote result
+        UA-->>Server: Vote result
     end
     Server->>Server: Evaluate transaction
     Server->>Server: Load grant and limits context
     alt Grant approval required
-        Server->>operator: Ask for execution / grant approval
+        Server->>UA: Ask for execution / grant approval
-        operator-->>Server: Vote result
+        UA-->>Server: Vote result
         opt Create persistent grant
             Server->>Server: Create and store grant
         end

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1 +1,128 @@
-Refer to @AGENTS.md for instructions.
+# CLAUDE.md
+
+This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
+
+## Project Overview
+
+Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
+- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
+- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
+- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
+
+The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
+
+## Toolchain Setup
+
+Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
+```sh
+mise install
+```
+
+Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
+
+## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
+
+### Crates
+
+| Crate | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
+| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
+| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
+| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
+
+### Common Commands
+
+```sh
+cd server
+
+# Build
+cargo build
+
+# Run the server daemon
+cargo run -p arbiter-server
+
+# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
+cargo nextest run
+
+# Run a single test
+cargo nextest run <test_name>
+
+# Lint
+cargo clippy
+
+# Security audit
+cargo audit
+
+# Check unused dependencies
+cargo shear
+
+# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
+cargo insta review
+```
+
+### Architecture
+
+The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
+
+- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
+- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
+- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
+- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
+
+Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
+
+**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
+
+**Cryptography:**
+- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
+- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
+- Password KDF: Argon2
+- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
+- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
+
+**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
+
+### Proto Regeneration
+
+When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
+```sh
+cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
+```
+
+### Database Migrations
+
+```sh
+# Create a new migration
+diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
+
+# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
+diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
+```
+
+## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
+
+The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
+
+Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
+
+```sh
+cd useragent && rinf gen
+```
+
+### Common Commands
+
+```sh
+cd useragent
+
+# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
+flutter run
+
+# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
+rinf gen
+
+# Analyze Dart code
+flutter analyze
+```
+
+The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

IMPLEMENTATION.md

@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the archi
 
 ### Authentication Result Semantics
 
-Authentication no longer uses an implicit success-only response shape. Both `client` and `operator` return explicit auth status enums over the wire.
+Authentication no longer uses an implicit success-only response shape. Both `client` and `user-agent` return explicit auth status enums over the wire.
 
-- **Client:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `APPROVAL_DENIED`, `NO_OPERATORS_ONLINE`, or `INTERNAL`
+- **Client:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `APPROVAL_DENIED`, `NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE`, or `INTERNAL`
-- **Operator:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED`, `TOKEN_INVALID`, or `INTERNAL`
+- **User-agent:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED`, `TOKEN_INVALID`, or `INTERNAL`
 
 This makes transport-level failures and actor/domain-level auth failures distinct:
 
@@ -22,50 +22,63 @@ Clients are expected to handle these status codes directly and present the concr
 
 ### New Client Approval
 
-When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected operators are asked to approve the connection. The first operator to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel.
+When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected user agents are asked to approve the connection. The first agent to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel.
 
 ```mermaid
 flowchart TD
     A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest]
     B --> C{pubkey in DB?}
 
-    C -- yes --> G[Generate AuthChallenge]
+    C -- yes --> D[Read nonce\nIncrement nonce in DB]
+    D --> G
 
-    C -- no --> E[Ask all Operators:\nClientConnectionRequest]
+    C -- no --> E[Ask all UserAgents:\nClientConnectionRequest]
     E --> F{First response}
     F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection])
-    F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nOperator requests]
+    F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nUserAgent requests]
-    F2 --> F3[INSERT client]
+    F2 --> F3[INSERT client\nnonce = 1]
-    F3 --> G
+    F3 --> G[Send AuthChallenge\nwith nonce]
 
-    G --> H[Send AuthChallenge\ntimestamp + random bytes]
+    G --> H[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
-    H --> I[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
+    H --> I{Signature valid?}
-    I --> K{Signature valid?}
+    I -- no --> Z
-    K -- no --> Z
+    I -- yes --> J([Session started])
-    K -- yes --> J([Session started])
 ```
 
-Auth challenges are generated from fresh random bytes plus a nanosecond timestamp. The server keeps the issued challenge only in the in-flight authentication state for that connection, then verifies the signature against the same canonical challenge payload.
+### Known Issue: Concurrent Registration Race (TOCTOU)
 
-The authentication schema stores peer identity, not replay counters:
+Two connections presenting the same previously-unknown public key can race through the approval flow simultaneously:
 
-- `program_client` stores the SDK client's public key, metadata binding, and timestamps.
+1. Both check the DB → neither is registered.
-- `operator_client` stores the Operator public key and timestamps.
+2. Both request approval from user agents → both receive approval.
-- Neither table stores an authentication nonce, and challenge generation does not update either table.
+3. Both `INSERT` the client record → the second insert silently overwrites the first, resetting the nonce.
+
+This means the first connection's nonce is invalidated by the second, causing its challenge verification to fail. A fix requires either serialising new-client registration (e.g. an in-memory lock keyed on pubkey) or replacing the separate check + insert with an `INSERT OR IGNORE` / upsert guarded by a unique constraint on `public_key`.
+
+### Nonce Semantics
+
+The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it is always one ahead of the nonce last issued in a challenge.
+
+- **New client:** inserted with `nonce = 1`; the first challenge is issued with `nonce = 0`.
+- **Existing client:** the current DB value is read and used as the challenge nonce, then immediately incremented within the same exclusive transaction, preventing replay.
 
 ---
 
 ## Cryptography
 
 ### Authentication
-- **Client protocol:** ML-DSA
+- **Client protocol:** ed25519
 
 ### User-Agent Authentication
 
-Operator authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
+User-agent authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
 
-- **Supported schemes:** ML-DSA
+- **Supported schemes:** RSA, Ed25519, ECDSA (secp256k1)
-- **Why:** Secure Enclave (MacOS) support them natively, on other platforms we could emulate while they roll-out
+- **Why:** the user agent authenticates with keys backed by platform facilities, and those facilities differ by platform
+- **Apple Silicon Secure Enclave / Secure Element:** ECDSA-only in practice
+- **Windows Hello / TPM 2.0:** currently RSA-backed in our integration
+
+This is why the user-agent auth protocol carries an explicit `KeyType`, while the SDK client protocol remains fixed to ed25519.
 
 ### Encryption at Rest
 - **Scheme:** Symmetric AEAD — currently **XChaCha20-Poly1305**
@@ -86,7 +99,7 @@ Operator authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-pro
 
 ### Request Multiplexing
 
-Both `client` and `operator` connections support multiple in-flight requests over one gRPC bidi stream.
+Both `client` and `user-agent` connections support multiple in-flight requests over one gRPC bidi stream.
 
 - Every request carries a monotonically increasing request ID
 - Every normal response echoes the request ID it corresponds to
@@ -141,7 +154,7 @@ flowchart TD
     L -- Yes --> M[Check grant limits]
     L -- No --> N[Start execution or grant voting flow]
 
-    N --> O{Operator decision}
+    N --> O{User-agent decision}
     O -- Reject --> Z4[Return no matching grant error]
     O -- Allow once --> M
     O -- Create grant --> P[Create grant with user-selected limits]

README.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Security warning
 Arbiter can't meaningfully protect against host compromise. Potential attack flow:
 - Attacker steals TLS keys from database
-- Pretends to be server; just accepts operator challenge solutions
+- Pretends to be server; just accepts user agent challenge solutions
 - Pretend to be in sealed state and performing DH with client
 - Steals user password and derives seal key
 

app/.dart_tool/extension_discovery/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+Extension Discovery Cache
+=========================
+
+This folder is used by `package:extension_discovery` to cache lists of
+packages that contains extensions for other packages.
+
+DO NOT USE THIS FOLDER
+----------------------
+
+ * Do not read (or rely) the contents of this folder.
+ * Do write to this folder.
+
+If you're interested in the lists of extensions stored in this folder use the
+API offered by package `extension_discovery` to get this information.
+
+If this package doesn't work for your use-case, then don't try to read the
+contents of this folder. It may change, and will not remain stable.
+
+Use package `extension_discovery`
+---------------------------------
+
+If you want to access information from this folder.
+
+Feel free to delete this folder
+-------------------------------
+
+Files in this folder act as a cache, and the cache is discarded if the files
+are older than the modification time of `.dart_tool/package_config.json`.
+
+Hence, it should never be necessary to clear this cache manually, if you find a
+need to do please file a bug.

app/.dart_tool/extension_discovery/vs_code.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":2,"entries":[{"package":"app","rootUri":"../","packageUri":"lib/"}]}

app/.dart_tool/package_config.json

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+{
+  "configVersion": 2,
+  "packages": [
+    {
+      "name": "async",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/async-2.13.0",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "boolean_selector",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/boolean_selector-2.1.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "characters",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/characters-1.4.0",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "clock",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/clock-1.1.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "collection",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/collection-1.19.1",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "cupertino_icons",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/cupertino_icons-1.0.8",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "fake_async",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/fake_async-1.3.3",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.3"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "flutter",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "flutter_lints",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/flutter_lints-6.0.0",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "flutter_test",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/packages/flutter_test",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "leak_tracker",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker-11.0.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.2"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker_flutter_testing-3.0.10",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.2"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "leak_tracker_testing",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/leak_tracker_testing-3.0.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.2"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "lints",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/lints-6.1.0",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "matcher",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/matcher-0.12.17",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "material_color_utilities",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/material_color_utilities-0.11.1",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "2.17"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "meta",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/meta-1.17.0",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.5"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "path",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/path-1.9.1",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "sky_engine",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable/bin/cache/pkg/sky_engine",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.8"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "source_span",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/source_span-1.10.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "stack_trace",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stack_trace-1.12.1",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.4"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "stream_channel",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/stream_channel-2.1.4",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.3"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "string_scanner",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/string_scanner-1.4.1",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "term_glyph",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/term_glyph-1.2.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_api",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/test_api-0.7.7",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.5"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "vector_math",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vector_math-2.2.0",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.1"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "vm_service",
+      "rootUri": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache/hosted/pub.dev/vm_service-15.0.2",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.5"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "app",
+      "rootUri": "../",
+      "packageUri": "lib/",
+      "languageVersion": "3.10"
+    }
+  ],
+  "generator": "pub",
+  "generatorVersion": "3.10.8",
+  "flutterRoot": "file:///Users/kaska/.local/share/mise/installs/flutter/3.38.9-stable",
+  "flutterVersion": "3.38.9",
+  "pubCache": "file:///Users/kaska/.pub-cache"
+}

app/.dart_tool/package_graph.json

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+{
+  "roots": [
+    "app"
+  ],
+  "packages": [
+    {
+      "name": "app",
+      "version": "1.0.0+1",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "cupertino_icons",
+        "flutter"
+      ],
+      "devDependencies": [
+        "flutter_lints",
+        "flutter_test"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "flutter_lints",
+      "version": "6.0.0",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "lints"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "flutter_test",
+      "version": "0.0.0",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "clock",
+        "collection",
+        "fake_async",
+        "flutter",
+        "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
+        "matcher",
+        "meta",
+        "path",
+        "stack_trace",
+        "stream_channel",
+        "test_api",
+        "vector_math"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "cupertino_icons",
+      "version": "1.0.8",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "flutter",
+      "version": "0.0.0",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "characters",
+        "collection",
+        "material_color_utilities",
+        "meta",
+        "sky_engine",
+        "vector_math"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "lints",
+      "version": "6.1.0",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "stream_channel",
+      "version": "2.1.4",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "async"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "meta",
+      "version": "1.17.0",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "collection",
+      "version": "1.19.1",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "leak_tracker_flutter_testing",
+      "version": "3.0.10",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "flutter",
+        "leak_tracker",
+        "leak_tracker_testing",
+        "matcher",
+        "meta"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "vector_math",
+      "version": "2.2.0",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "stack_trace",
+      "version": "1.12.1",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "path"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "clock",
+      "version": "1.1.2",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "fake_async",
+      "version": "1.3.3",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "clock",
+        "collection"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "path",
+      "version": "1.9.1",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "matcher",
+      "version": "0.12.17",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "async",
+        "meta",
+        "stack_trace",
+        "term_glyph",
+        "test_api"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_api",
+      "version": "0.7.7",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "async",
+        "boolean_selector",
+        "collection",
+        "meta",
+        "source_span",
+        "stack_trace",
+        "stream_channel",
+        "string_scanner",
+        "term_glyph"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "sky_engine",
+      "version": "0.0.0",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "material_color_utilities",
+      "version": "0.11.1",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "collection"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "characters",
+      "version": "1.4.0",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "async",
+      "version": "2.13.0",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "collection",
+        "meta"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "leak_tracker_testing",
+      "version": "3.0.2",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "leak_tracker",
+        "matcher",
+        "meta"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "leak_tracker",
+      "version": "11.0.2",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "clock",
+        "collection",
+        "meta",
+        "path",
+        "vm_service"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "term_glyph",
+      "version": "1.2.2",
+      "dependencies": []
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "string_scanner",
+      "version": "1.4.1",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "source_span"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "source_span",
+      "version": "1.10.2",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "collection",
+        "path",
+        "term_glyph"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "boolean_selector",
+      "version": "2.1.2",
+      "dependencies": [
+        "source_span",
+        "string_scanner"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "vm_service",
+      "version": "15.0.2",
+      "dependencies": []
+    }
+  ],
+  "configVersion": 1
+}

app/.dart_tool/version

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+3.38.9

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-03-28-grant-grid-view.md

@@ -0,0 +1,821 @@
+# Grant Grid View Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Add an "EVM Grants" dashboard tab that displays all grants as enriched cards (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with per-card revoke support.
+
+**Architecture:** A new `walletAccessListProvider` fetches wallet accesses with their DB row IDs. The screen (`grants.dart`) watches only `evmGrantsProvider` for top-level state. Each `GrantCard` widget (its own file) watches enrichment providers (`walletAccessListProvider`, `evmProvider`, `sdkClientsProvider`) and the revoke mutation directly — keeping rebuilds scoped to the card. The screen is registered as a dashboard tab in `AdaptiveScaffold`.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Flutter, Riverpod (`riverpod_annotation` + `build_runner` codegen), `sizer` (adaptive sizing), `auto_route`, Protocol Buffers (Dart), `Palette` design tokens.
+
+---
+
+## File Map
+
+| File | Action | Responsibility |
+|---|---|---|
+| `useragent/lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify | Add `Palette.token` (indigo accent for token-transfer cards) |
+| `useragent/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart` | Modify | Add `listAllWalletAccesses()` function |
+| `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create | `WalletAccessListProvider` — fetches full wallet access list with IDs |
+| `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart` | Create | `GrantCard` widget — watches enrichment providers + revoke mutation; one card per grant |
+| `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create | `EvmGrantsScreen` — watches `evmGrantsProvider`; handles loading/error/empty/data states; renders `GrantCard` list |
+| `useragent/lib/router.dart` | Modify | Register `EvmGrantsRoute` in dashboard children |
+| `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify | Add Grants entry to `routes` list and `NavigationDestination` list |
+
+---
+
+## Task 1: Add `Palette.token`
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `useragent/lib/theme/palette.dart`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Add the color**
+
+Replace the contents of `useragent/lib/theme/palette.dart` with:
+
+```dart
+import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
+
+class Palette {
+  static const ink = Color(0xFF15263C);
+  static const coral = Color(0xFFE26254);
+  static const cream = Color(0xFFFFFAF4);
+  static const line = Color(0x1A15263C);
+  static const token = Color(0xFF5C6BC0);
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
+
+```sh
+cd useragent && flutter analyze lib/theme/palette.dart
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(theme): add Palette.token for token-transfer grant cards"
+jj new
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 2: Add `listAllWalletAccesses` feature function
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `useragent/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart`
+
+`readClientWalletAccess` (existing) filters the list to one client's wallet IDs and returns `Set<int>`. This new function returns the complete unfiltered list with row IDs so the grant cards can resolve wallet_access_id → wallet + client.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Append function**
+
+Add at the bottom of `useragent/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart`:
+
+```dart
+Future<List<SdkClientWalletAccess>> listAllWalletAccesses(
+  Connection connection,
+) async {
+  final response = await connection.ask(
+    UserAgentRequest(listWalletAccess: Empty()),
+  );
+  if (!response.hasListWalletAccessResponse()) {
+    throw Exception(
+      'Expected list wallet access response, got ${response.whichPayload()}',
+    );
+  }
+  return response.listWalletAccessResponse.accesses.toList(growable: false);
+}
+```
+
+Each returned `SdkClientWalletAccess` has:
+- `.id` — the `evm_wallet_access` row ID (same value as `wallet_access_id` in a `GrantEntry`)
+- `.access.walletId` — the EVM wallet DB ID
+- `.access.sdkClientId` — the SDK client DB ID
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
+
+```sh
+cd useragent && flutter analyze lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(evm): add listAllWalletAccesses feature function"
+jj new
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 3: Create `WalletAccessListProvider`
+
+**Files:**
+- Create: `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
+- Generated: `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.g.dart`
+
+Mirrors the structure of `EvmGrants` in `providers/evm/evm_grants.dart` — class-based `@riverpod` with a `refresh()` method.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the provider**
+
+Create `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`:
+
+```dart
+import 'package:arbiter/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/proto/user_agent.pb.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/connection/connection_manager.dart';
+import 'package:mtcore/markettakers.dart';
+import 'package:riverpod_annotation/riverpod_annotation.dart';
+
+part 'wallet_access_list.g.dart';
+
+@riverpod
+class WalletAccessList extends _$WalletAccessList {
+  @override
+  Future<List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?> build() async {
+    final connection = await ref.watch(connectionManagerProvider.future);
+    if (connection == null) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    try {
+      return await listAllWalletAccesses(connection);
+    } catch (e, st) {
+      talker.handle(e, st);
+      rethrow;
+    }
+  }
+
+  Future<void> refresh() async {
+    final connection = await ref.read(connectionManagerProvider.future);
+    if (connection == null) {
+      state = const AsyncData(null);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    state = const AsyncLoading();
+    state = await AsyncValue.guard(() => listAllWalletAccesses(connection));
+  }
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run code generation**
+
+```sh
+cd useragent && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
+```
+
+Expected: `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.g.dart` created. No errors.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Verify**
+
+```sh
+cd useragent && flutter analyze lib/providers/sdk_clients/
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(providers): add WalletAccessListProvider"
+jj new
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 4: Create `GrantCard` widget
+
+**Files:**
+- Create: `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart`
+
+This widget owns all per-card logic: enrichment lookups, revoke action, and rebuild scope. The screen only passes it a `GrantEntry` — the card fetches everything else itself.
+
+**Key types:**
+- `GrantEntry` (from `proto/evm.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.shared.walletAccessId`, `.shared.chainId`, `.specific.whichGrant()`
+- `SpecificGrant_Grant.etherTransfer` / `.tokenTransfer` — enum values for the oneof
+- `SdkClientWalletAccess` (from `proto/user_agent.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
+- `WalletEntry` (from `proto/evm.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.address` (List<int>)
+- `SdkClientEntry` (from `proto/user_agent.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.info.name`
+- `revokeEvmGrantMutation` — `Mutation<void>` (global; all revoke buttons disable together while any revoke is in flight)
+- `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: int)` — `Future<void>`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the widget**
+
+Create `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart`:
+
+```dart
+import 'package:arbiter/proto/evm.pb.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/proto/user_agent.pb.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm_grants.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/list.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/theme/palette.dart';
+import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
+import 'package:hooks_riverpod/experimental/mutation.dart';
+import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
+import 'package:sizer/sizer.dart';
+
+String _shortAddress(List<int> bytes) {
+  final hex = bytes.map((b) => b.toRadixString(16).padLeft(2, '0')).join();
+  return '0x${hex.substring(0, 6)}...${hex.substring(hex.length - 4)}';
+}
+
+String _formatError(Object error) {
+  final message = error.toString();
+  if (message.startsWith('Exception: ')) {
+    return message.substring('Exception: '.length);
+  }
+  return message;
+}
+
+class GrantCard extends ConsumerWidget {
+  const GrantCard({super.key, required this.grant});
+
+  final GrantEntry grant;
+
+  @override
+  Widget build(BuildContext context, WidgetRef ref) {
+    // Enrichment lookups — each watch scopes rebuilds to this card only
+    final walletAccesses =
+        ref.watch(walletAccessListProvider).asData?.value ?? const [];
+    final wallets = ref.watch(evmProvider).asData?.value ?? const [];
+    final clients = ref.watch(sdkClientsProvider).asData?.value ?? const [];
+    final revoking = ref.watch(revokeEvmGrantMutation) is MutationPending;
+
+    final isEther =
+        grant.specific.whichGrant() == SpecificGrant_Grant.etherTransfer;
+    final accent = isEther ? Palette.coral : Palette.token;
+    final typeLabel = isEther ? 'Ether' : 'Token';
+    final theme = Theme.of(context);
+    final muted = Palette.ink.withValues(alpha: 0.62);
+
+    // Resolve wallet_access_id → wallet address + client name
+    final accessById = <int, SdkClientWalletAccess>{
+      for (final a in walletAccesses) a.id: a,
+    };
+    final walletById = <int, WalletEntry>{
+      for (final w in wallets) w.id: w,
+    };
+    final clientNameById = <int, String>{
+      for (final c in clients) c.id: c.info.name,
+    };
+
+    final accessId = grant.shared.walletAccessId;
+    final access = accessById[accessId];
+    final wallet = access != null ? walletById[access.access.walletId] : null;
+
+    final walletLabel = wallet != null
+        ? _shortAddress(wallet.address)
+        : 'Access #$accessId';
+
+    final clientLabel = () {
+      if (access == null) return '';
+      final name = clientNameById[access.access.sdkClientId] ?? '';
+      return name.isEmpty ? 'Client #${access.access.sdkClientId}' : name;
+    }();
+
+    void showError(String message) {
+      if (!context.mounted) return;
+      ScaffoldMessenger.of(context).showSnackBar(
+        SnackBar(content: Text(message), behavior: SnackBarBehavior.floating),
+      );
+    }
+
+    Future<void> revoke() async {
+      try {
+        await executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: grant.id);
+      } catch (e) {
+        showError(_formatError(e));
+      }
+    }
+
+    return Container(
+      decoration: BoxDecoration(
+        borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(24),
+        color: Palette.cream.withValues(alpha: 0.92),
+        border: Border.all(color: Palette.line),
+      ),
+      child: IntrinsicHeight(
+        child: Row(
+          crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.stretch,
+          children: [
+            // Accent strip
+            Container(
+              width: 0.8.w,
+              decoration: BoxDecoration(
+                color: accent,
+                borderRadius: const BorderRadius.horizontal(
+                  left: Radius.circular(24),
+                ),
+              ),
+            ),
+            // Card body
+            Expanded(
+              child: Padding(
+                padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
+                  horizontal: 1.6.w,
+                  vertical: 1.4.h,
+                ),
+                child: Column(
+                  crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.start,
+                  children: [
+                    // Row 1: type badge · chain · spacer · revoke button
+                    Row(
+                      children: [
+                        Container(
+                          padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
+                            horizontal: 1.w,
+                            vertical: 0.4.h,
+                          ),
+                          decoration: BoxDecoration(
+                            color: accent.withValues(alpha: 0.15),
+                            borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(8),
+                          ),
+                          child: Text(
+                            typeLabel,
+                            style: theme.textTheme.labelSmall?.copyWith(
+                              color: accent,
+                              fontWeight: FontWeight.w800,
+                            ),
+                          ),
+                        ),
+                        SizedBox(width: 1.w),
+                        Container(
+                          padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
+                            horizontal: 1.w,
+                            vertical: 0.4.h,
+                          ),
+                          decoration: BoxDecoration(
+                            color: Palette.ink.withValues(alpha: 0.06),
+                            borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(8),
+                          ),
+                          child: Text(
+                            'Chain ${grant.shared.chainId}',
+                            style: theme.textTheme.labelSmall?.copyWith(
+                              color: muted,
+                              fontWeight: FontWeight.w700,
+                            ),
+                          ),
+                        ),
+                        const Spacer(),
+                        if (revoking)
+                          SizedBox(
+                            width: 1.8.h,
+                            height: 1.8.h,
+                            child: CircularProgressIndicator(
+                              strokeWidth: 2,
+                              color: Palette.coral,
+                            ),
+                          )
+                        else
+                          OutlinedButton.icon(
+                            onPressed: revoke,
+                            style: OutlinedButton.styleFrom(
+                              foregroundColor: Palette.coral,
+                              side: BorderSide(
+                                color: Palette.coral.withValues(alpha: 0.4),
+                              ),
+                              padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
+                                horizontal: 1.w,
+                                vertical: 0.6.h,
+                              ),
+                              shape: RoundedRectangleBorder(
+                                borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(10),
+                              ),
+                            ),
+                            icon: const Icon(Icons.block_rounded, size: 16),
+                            label: const Text('Revoke'),
+                          ),
+                      ],
+                    ),
+                    SizedBox(height: 0.8.h),
+                    // Row 2: wallet address · client name
+                    Row(
+                      children: [
+                        Text(
+                          walletLabel,
+                          style: theme.textTheme.bodySmall?.copyWith(
+                            color: Palette.ink,
+                            fontFamily: 'monospace',
+                          ),
+                        ),
+                        Padding(
+                          padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(horizontal: 0.8.w),
+                          child: Text(
+                            '·',
+                            style: theme.textTheme.bodySmall
+                                ?.copyWith(color: muted),
+                          ),
+                        ),
+                        Expanded(
+                          child: Text(
+                            clientLabel,
+                            maxLines: 1,
+                            overflow: TextOverflow.ellipsis,
+                            style: theme.textTheme.bodySmall
+                                ?.copyWith(color: muted),
+                          ),
+                        ),
+                      ],
+                    ),
+                  ],
+                ),
+              ),
+            ),
+          ],
+        ),
+      ),
+    );
+  }
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
+
+```sh
+cd useragent && flutter analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(grants): add GrantCard widget with self-contained enrichment"
+jj new
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 5: Create `EvmGrantsScreen`
+
+**Files:**
+- Create: `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
+
+The screen watches only `evmGrantsProvider` for top-level state (loading / error / no connection / empty / data). When there is data it renders a list of `GrantCard` widgets — each card manages its own enrichment subscriptions.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the screen**
+
+Create `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`:
+
+```dart
+import 'package:arbiter/proto/evm.pb.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm_grants.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/router.gr.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/theme/palette.dart';
+import 'package:arbiter/widgets/page_header.dart';
+import 'package:auto_route/auto_route.dart';
+import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
+import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
+import 'package:sizer/sizer.dart';
+
+String _formatError(Object error) {
+  final message = error.toString();
+  if (message.startsWith('Exception: ')) {
+    return message.substring('Exception: '.length);
+  }
+  return message;
+}
+
+// ─── State panel ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class _StatePanel extends StatelessWidget {
+  const _StatePanel({
+    required this.icon,
+    required this.title,
+    required this.body,
+    this.actionLabel,
+    this.onAction,
+    this.busy = false,
+  });
+
+  final IconData icon;
+  final String title;
+  final String body;
+  final String? actionLabel;
+  final Future<void> Function()? onAction;
+  final bool busy;
+
+  @override
+  Widget build(BuildContext context) {
+    final theme = Theme.of(context);
+
+    return Container(
+      decoration: BoxDecoration(
+        borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(24),
+        color: Palette.cream.withValues(alpha: 0.92),
+        border: Border.all(color: Palette.line),
+      ),
+      child: Padding(
+        padding: EdgeInsets.all(2.8.h),
+        child: Column(
+          crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.start,
+          children: [
+            if (busy)
+              SizedBox(
+                width: 2.8.h,
+                height: 2.8.h,
+                child: const CircularProgressIndicator(strokeWidth: 2.5),
+              )
+            else
+              Icon(icon, size: 34, color: Palette.coral),
+            SizedBox(height: 1.8.h),
+            Text(
+              title,
+              style: theme.textTheme.headlineSmall?.copyWith(
+                color: Palette.ink,
+                fontWeight: FontWeight.w800,
+              ),
+            ),
+            SizedBox(height: 1.h),
+            Text(
+              body,
+              style: theme.textTheme.bodyLarge?.copyWith(
+                color: Palette.ink.withValues(alpha: 0.72),
+                height: 1.5,
+              ),
+            ),
+            if (actionLabel != null && onAction != null) ...[
+              SizedBox(height: 2.h),
+              OutlinedButton.icon(
+                onPressed: () => onAction!(),
+                icon: const Icon(Icons.refresh),
+                label: Text(actionLabel!),
+              ),
+            ],
+          ],
+        ),
+      ),
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+// ─── Grant list ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class _GrantList extends StatelessWidget {
+  const _GrantList({required this.grants});
+
+  final List<GrantEntry> grants;
+
+  @override
+  Widget build(BuildContext context) {
+    return Column(
+      children: [
+        for (var i = 0; i < grants.length; i++)
+          Padding(
+            padding: EdgeInsets.only(
+              bottom: i == grants.length - 1 ? 0 : 1.8.h,
+            ),
+            child: GrantCard(grant: grants[i]),
+          ),
+      ],
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+// ─── Screen ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@RoutePage()
+class EvmGrantsScreen extends ConsumerWidget {
+  const EvmGrantsScreen({super.key});
+
+  @override
+  Widget build(BuildContext context, WidgetRef ref) {
+    // Screen watches only the grant list for top-level state decisions
+    final grantsAsync = ref.watch(evmGrantsProvider);
+
+    Future<void> refresh() async {
+      await Future.wait([
+        ref.read(evmGrantsProvider.notifier).refresh(),
+        ref.read(walletAccessListProvider.notifier).refresh(),
+      ]);
+    }
+
+    void showMessage(String message) {
+      if (!context.mounted) return;
+      ScaffoldMessenger.of(context).showSnackBar(
+        SnackBar(content: Text(message), behavior: SnackBarBehavior.floating),
+      );
+    }
+
+    Future<void> safeRefresh() async {
+      try {
+        await refresh();
+      } catch (e) {
+        showMessage(_formatError(e));
+      }
+    }
+
+    final grantsState = grantsAsync.asData?.value;
+    final grants = grantsState?.grants;
+
+    final content = switch (grantsAsync) {
+      AsyncLoading() when grantsState == null => const _StatePanel(
+        icon: Icons.hourglass_top,
+        title: 'Loading grants',
+        body: 'Pulling grant registry from Arbiter.',
+        busy: true,
+      ),
+      AsyncError(:final error) => _StatePanel(
+        icon: Icons.sync_problem,
+        title: 'Grant registry unavailable',
+        body: _formatError(error),
+        actionLabel: 'Retry',
+        onAction: safeRefresh,
+      ),
+      AsyncData(:final value) when value == null => _StatePanel(
+        icon: Icons.portable_wifi_off,
+        title: 'No active server connection',
+        body: 'Reconnect to Arbiter to list EVM grants.',
+        actionLabel: 'Refresh',
+        onAction: safeRefresh,
+      ),
+      _ when grants != null && grants.isEmpty => _StatePanel(
+        icon: Icons.policy_outlined,
+        title: 'No grants yet',
+        body: 'Create a grant to allow SDK clients to sign transactions.',
+        actionLabel: 'Create grant',
+        onAction: () => context.router.push(const CreateEvmGrantRoute()),
+      ),
+      _ => _GrantList(grants: grants ?? const []),
+    };
+
+    return Scaffold(
+      body: SafeArea(
+        child: RefreshIndicator.adaptive(
+          color: Palette.ink,
+          backgroundColor: Colors.white,
+          onRefresh: safeRefresh,
+          child: ListView(
+            physics: const BouncingScrollPhysics(
+              parent: AlwaysScrollableScrollPhysics(),
+            ),
+            padding: EdgeInsets.fromLTRB(2.4.w, 2.4.h, 2.4.w, 3.2.h),
+            children: [
+              PageHeader(
+                title: 'EVM Grants',
+                isBusy: grantsAsync.isLoading,
+                actions: [
+                  FilledButton.icon(
+                    onPressed: () =>
+                        context.router.push(const CreateEvmGrantRoute()),
+                    icon: const Icon(Icons.add_rounded),
+                    label: const Text('Create grant'),
+                  ),
+                  SizedBox(width: 1.w),
+                  OutlinedButton.icon(
+                    onPressed: safeRefresh,
+                    style: OutlinedButton.styleFrom(
+                      foregroundColor: Palette.ink,
+                      side: BorderSide(color: Palette.line),
+                      padding: EdgeInsets.symmetric(
+                        horizontal: 1.4.w,
+                        vertical: 1.2.h,
+                      ),
+                      shape: RoundedRectangleBorder(
+                        borderRadius: BorderRadius.circular(14),
+                      ),
+                    ),
+                    icon: const Icon(Icons.refresh, size: 18),
+                    label: const Text('Refresh'),
+                  ),
+                ],
+              ),
+              SizedBox(height: 1.8.h),
+              content,
+            ],
+          ),
+        ),
+      ),
+    );
+  }
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
+
+```sh
+cd useragent && flutter analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(grants): add EvmGrantsScreen"
+jj new
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 6: Wire router and dashboard tab
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `useragent/lib/router.dart`
+- Modify: `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard.dart`
+- Regenerated: `useragent/lib/router.gr.dart`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Add route to `router.dart`**
+
+Replace the contents of `useragent/lib/router.dart` with:
+
+```dart
+import 'package:auto_route/auto_route.dart';
+
+import 'router.gr.dart';
+
+@AutoRouterConfig(generateForDir: ['lib/screens'])
+class Router extends RootStackRouter {
+  @override
+  List<AutoRoute> get routes => [
+    AutoRoute(page: Bootstrap.page, path: '/bootstrap', initial: true),
+    AutoRoute(page: ServerInfoSetupRoute.page, path: '/server-info'),
+    AutoRoute(page: ServerConnectionRoute.page, path: '/server-connection'),
+    AutoRoute(page: VaultSetupRoute.page, path: '/vault'),
+    AutoRoute(page: ClientDetailsRoute.page, path: '/clients/:clientId'),
+    AutoRoute(page: CreateEvmGrantRoute.page, path: '/evm-grants/create'),
+
+    AutoRoute(
+      page: DashboardRouter.page,
+      path: '/dashboard',
+      children: [
+        AutoRoute(page: EvmRoute.page, path: 'evm'),
+        AutoRoute(page: ClientsRoute.page, path: 'clients'),
+        AutoRoute(page: EvmGrantsRoute.page, path: 'grants'),
+        AutoRoute(page: AboutRoute.page, path: 'about'),
+      ],
+    ),
+  ];
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Update `dashboard.dart`**
+
+In `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard.dart`, replace the `routes` constant:
+
+```dart
+final routes = [
+  const EvmRoute(),
+  const ClientsRoute(),
+  const EvmGrantsRoute(),
+  const AboutRoute(),
+];
+```
+
+And replace the `destinations` list inside `AdaptiveScaffold`:
+
+```dart
+destinations: const [
+  NavigationDestination(
+    icon: Icon(Icons.account_balance_wallet_outlined),
+    selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.account_balance_wallet),
+    label: 'Wallets',
+  ),
+  NavigationDestination(
+    icon: Icon(Icons.devices_other_outlined),
+    selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.devices_other),
+    label: 'Clients',
+  ),
+  NavigationDestination(
+    icon: Icon(Icons.policy_outlined),
+    selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.policy),
+    label: 'Grants',
+  ),
+  NavigationDestination(
+    icon: Icon(Icons.info_outline),
+    selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.info),
+    label: 'About',
+  ),
+],
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Regenerate router**
+
+```sh
+cd useragent && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
+```
+
+Expected: `lib/router.gr.dart` updated, `EvmGrantsRoute` now available, no errors.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Full project verify**
+
+```sh
+cd useragent && flutter analyze
+```
+
+Expected: no issues.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
+
+```sh
+jj describe -m "feat(nav): add Grants dashboard tab"
+jj new
+```

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-03-28-grant-grid-view-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+# Grant Grid View — Design Spec
+
+**Date:** 2026-03-28
+
+## Overview
+
+Add a "Grants" dashboard tab to the Flutter user-agent app that displays all EVM grants as a card-based grid. Each card shows a compact summary (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with a revoke action. The tab integrates into the existing `AdaptiveScaffold` navigation alongside Wallets, Clients, and About.
+
+## Scope
+
+- New `walletAccessListProvider` for fetching wallet access entries with their DB row IDs
+- New `EvmGrantsScreen` as a dashboard tab
+- Grant card widget with enriched display (type, chain, wallet, client)
+- Revoke action wired to existing `executeRevokeEvmGrant` mutation
+- Dashboard tab bar and router updated
+- New token-transfer accent color added to `Palette`
+
+**Out of scope:** Fixing grant creation (separate task).
+
+---
+
+## Data Layer
+
+### `walletAccessListProvider`
+
+**File:** `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
+
+- `@riverpod` class, watches `connectionManagerProvider.future`
+- Returns `List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?` (null when not connected)
+- Each entry: `.id` (wallet_access_id), `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
+- Exposes a `refresh()` method following the same pattern as `EvmGrants.refresh()`
+
+### Enrichment at render time (Approach A)
+
+The `EvmGrantsScreen` watches four providers:
+1. `evmGrantsProvider` — the grant list
+2. `walletAccessListProvider` — to resolve wallet_access_id → (wallet_id, sdk_client_id)
+3. `evmProvider` — to resolve wallet_id → wallet address
+4. `sdkClientsProvider` — to resolve sdk_client_id → client name
+
+All lookups are in-memory Maps built inside the build method; no extra model class needed.
+
+Fallbacks:
+- Wallet address not found → `"Access #N"` where N is the wallet_access_id
+- Client name not found → `"Client #N"` where N is the sdk_client_id
+
+---
+
+## Route Structure
+
+```
+/dashboard
+  /evm          ← existing (Wallets tab)
+  /clients      ← existing (Clients tab)
+  /grants       ← NEW (Grants tab)
+  /about        ← existing
+
+/evm-grants/create  ← existing push route (unchanged)
+```
+
+### Changes to `router.dart`
+
+Add inside dashboard children:
+```dart
+AutoRoute(page: EvmGrantsRoute.page, path: 'grants'),
+```
+
+### Changes to `dashboard.dart`
+
+Add to `routes` list:
+```dart
+const EvmGrantsRoute()
+```
+
+Add `NavigationDestination`:
+```dart
+NavigationDestination(
+  icon: Icon(Icons.policy_outlined),
+  selectedIcon: Icon(Icons.policy),
+  label: 'Grants',
+),
+```
+
+---
+
+## Screen: `EvmGrantsScreen`
+
+**File:** `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
+
+```
+Scaffold
+└─ SafeArea
+   └─ RefreshIndicator.adaptive (refreshes evmGrantsProvider + walletAccessListProvider)
+      └─ ListView (BouncingScrollPhysics + AlwaysScrollableScrollPhysics)
+         ├─ PageHeader
+         │    title: 'EVM Grants'
+         │    isBusy: evmGrantsProvider.isLoading
+         │    actions: [CreateGrantButton, RefreshButton]
+         ├─ SizedBox(height: 1.8.h)
+         └─ <content>
+```
+
+### State handling
+
+Matches the pattern from `EvmScreen` and `ClientsScreen`:
+
+| State | Display |
+|---|---|
+| Loading (no data yet) | `_StatePanel` with spinner, "Loading grants" |
+| Error | `_StatePanel` with coral icon, error message, Retry button |
+| No connection | `_StatePanel`, "No active server connection" |
+| Empty list | `_StatePanel`, "No grants yet", with Create Grant shortcut |
+| Data | Column of `_GrantCard` widgets |
+
+### Header actions
+
+**CreateGrantButton:** `FilledButton.icon` with `Icons.add_rounded`, pushes `CreateEvmGrantRoute()` via `context.router.push(...)`.
+
+**RefreshButton:** `OutlinedButton.icon` with `Icons.refresh`, calls `ref.read(evmGrantsProvider.notifier).refresh()`.
+
+---
+
+## Grant Card: `_GrantCard`
+
+**Layout:**
+
+```
+Container (rounded 24, Palette.cream bg, Palette.line border)
+└─ IntrinsicHeight > Row
+   ├─ Accent strip (0.8.w wide, full height, rounded left)
+   └─ Padding > Column
+        ├─ Row 1: TypeBadge + ChainChip + Spacer + RevokeButton
+        └─ Row 2: WalletText + "·" + ClientText
+```
+
+**Accent color by grant type:**
+- Ether transfer → `Palette.coral`
+- Token transfer → `Palette.token` (new entry in `Palette` — indigo, e.g. `Color(0xFF5C6BC0)`)
+
+**TypeBadge:** Small pill container with accent color background at 15% opacity, accent-colored text. Label: `'Ether'` or `'Token'`.
+
+**ChainChip:** Small container: `'Chain ${grant.shared.chainId}'`, muted ink color.
+
+**WalletText:** Short hex address (`0xabc...def`) from wallet lookup, `bodySmall`, monospace font family.
+
+**ClientText:** Client name from `sdkClientsProvider` lookup, or fallback string. `bodySmall`, muted ink.
+
+**RevokeButton:**
+- `OutlinedButton` with `Icons.block_rounded` icon, label `'Revoke'`
+- `foregroundColor: Palette.coral`, `side: BorderSide(color: Palette.coral.withValues(alpha: 0.4))`
+- Disabled (replaced with `CircularProgressIndicator`) while `revokeEvmGrantMutation` is pending — note: this is a single global mutation, so all revoke buttons disable while any revoke is in flight
+- On press: calls `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: grant.id)`; shows `SnackBar` on error
+
+---
+
+## Adaptive Sizing
+
+All sizing uses `sizer` units (`1.h`, `1.w`, etc.). No hardcoded pixel values.
+
+---
+
+## Files to Create / Modify
+
+| File | Action |
+|---|---|
+| `lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify — add `Palette.token` color |
+| `lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create |
+| `lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create |
+| `lib/router.dart` | Modify — add grants route to dashboard children |
+| `lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify — add tab to routes list and NavigationDestinations |

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-checksum = "sha256:a038965bfd7fe44257c771cdf8918dc3467dd8ec0eef673b8b14f639b144cdbd"
+checksum = "sha256:979ffe611327056f4730a1ae71b0209b3b830f58b22c6ed194cda34f55400db2"
-url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-apple-darwin.zip"
+url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-apple-darwin.zip"
 
 [tools.ast-grep."platforms.windows-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:fe34f631bb24c08ad146f92ca2a92971a53d179461b509fd8d32dc863bff9f83"
+checksum = "sha256:55836fa1b2c65dc7d61615a4d9368622a0d2371a76d28b9a165e5a3ab6ae32a4"
-url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip"
+url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-audit"]]
 version = "0.22.1"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-audit"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-edit"]]
-version = "0.13.10"
+version = "0.13.9"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-edit"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-features-manager"]]
-version = "0.12.0"
+version = "0.11.1"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-insta"]]
-version = "1.47.2"
+version = "1.46.3"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-mutants"]]
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ version = "27.0.0"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-mutants"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
-version = "0.9.133"
+version = "0.9.126"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
 
 [[tools."cargo:cargo-shear"]]
@@ -65,19 +65,15 @@ version = "0.10.2"
 backend = "cargo:cargo-vet"
 
 [[tools."cargo:diesel_cli"]]
-version = "2.3.7"
+version = "2.3.6"
 backend = "cargo:diesel_cli"
 
 [tools."cargo:diesel_cli".options]
 default-features = "false"
 features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled"
 
-[[tools."cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"]]
-version = "2.12.0"
-backend = "cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"
-
 [[tools.flutter]]
-version = "3.41.7-stable"
+version = "3.38.9-stable"
 backend = "asdf:flutter"
 
 [[tools.protoc]]
@@ -113,44 +109,44 @@ checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f
 url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"
 
 [[tools.python]]
-version = "3.14.4"
+version = "3.14.3"
 backend = "core:python"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64"]
-checksum = "sha256:b8b597fdb2f8dccdc502c11947b60a4b65eb6bce79cfa60c7ccf9b6e8352c60a"
+checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
-checksum = "sha256:b8b597fdb2f8dccdc502c11947b60a4b65eb6bce79cfa60c7ccf9b6e8352c60a"
+checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:fe9a9c32d13870af632cbac3dfc7528ae53597e94472aa4c7d6a42e8166136cd"
+checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
-checksum = "sha256:fe9a9c32d13870af632cbac3dfc7528ae53597e94472aa4c7d6a42e8166136cd"
+checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
-checksum = "blake3:0314ec66e0f33ec04959583b5900bc8edae371a396aa96b8874e750d1fe936e6"
+checksum = "sha256:c43aecde4a663aebff99b9b83da0efec506479f1c3f98331442f33d2c43501f9"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.macos-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:d51250a32fa5d9f0799c7bcb71720c27b10a3afd4a7de288120f96085d508a5a"
+checksum = "sha256:9ab41dbc2f100a2a45d1833b9c11165f51051c558b5213eda9a9731d5948a0c0"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [tools.python."platforms.windows-x64"]
-checksum = "sha256:a976991dcd085c1bb5d9a8084823a6bc8b7f9b079d8c432574a6ddd68c3a6fe1"
+checksum = "sha256:bbe19034b35b0267176a7442575ae7dc6343480fd4d35598cb7700173d431e09"
-url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
+url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
 provenance = "github-attestations"
 
 [[tools.rust]]
-version = "1.95.0"
+version = "1.93.0"
 backend = "core:rust"

mise.toml

@@ -1,19 +1,18 @@
 [tools]
-"cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.7", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = "false" }
+"cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.6", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = false }
 "cargo:cargo-audit" = "0.22.1"
 "cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
-flutter = "3.41.7-stable"
+flutter = "3.38.9-stable"
 protoc = "29.6"
-rust = { version = "1.95.0", components = "clippy,rust-analyzer" }
+"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy"}
-"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.12.0"
+"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.11.1"
-"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.133"
+"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
 "cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
-"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.47.2"
+"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.46.3"
-python = "3.14.4"
+python = "3.14.3"
-ast-grep = "0.42.1"
+ast-grep = "0.42.0"
-"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.10"
+"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.9"
 "cargo:cargo-mutants" = "27.0.0"
-"cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen" = "2.12.0"
 
 [tasks.codegen]
 sources = ['protobufs/*.proto', 'protobufs/**/*.proto']
@@ -22,5 +21,3 @@ run = '''
 dart pub global activate protoc_plugin && \
 protoc --dart_out=grpc:useragent/lib/proto --proto_path=protobufs/ $(find protobufs -name '*.proto' | sort)
 '''
-
-[tasks.generate_schema]

protobufs/arbiter.proto

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ syntax = "proto3";
 package arbiter;
 
 import "client.proto";
-import "operator.proto";
+import "user_agent.proto";
 
 message ServerInfo {
   string version = 1;
@@ -12,5 +12,5 @@ message ServerInfo {
 
 service ArbiterService {
   rpc Client(stream arbiter.client.ClientRequest) returns (stream arbiter.client.ClientResponse);
-  rpc Operator(stream arbiter.operator.OperatorRequest) returns (stream arbiter.operator.OperatorResponse);
+  rpc UserAgent(stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentRequest) returns (stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentResponse);
 }

protobufs/client/auth.proto

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ message AuthChallengeRequest {
 }
 
 message AuthChallenge {
-  uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
+  bytes pubkey = 1;
-  bytes random = 2;
+  int32 nonce = 2;
 }
 
 message AuthChallengeSolution {
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ enum AuthResult {
   AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
   AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
   AUTH_RESULT_APPROVAL_DENIED = 4;
-  AUTH_RESULT_NO_OPERATORS_ONLINE = 5;
+  AUTH_RESULT_NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE = 5;
   AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
 }
 

protobufs/evm.proto

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ message SpecificGrant {
   }
 }
 
-// --- Operator grant management ---
+// --- UserAgent grant management ---
 message EvmGrantCreateRequest {
   SharedSettings shared = 1;
   SpecificGrant specific = 2;

protobufs/operator.proto

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package arbiter.operator;
-
-import "operator/auth.proto";
-import "operator/evm.proto";
-import "operator/governance.proto";
-import "operator/sdk_client.proto";
-import "operator/vault/vault.proto";
-
-message OperatorRequest {
-  int32 id = 16;
-  oneof payload {
-    auth.Request            auth        = 1;
-    vault.Request           vault       = 2;
-    evm.Request             evm         = 3;
-    sdk_client.Request      sdk_client  = 4;
-    governance.Request      governance  = 5;
-  }
-}
-
-message OperatorResponse {
-  optional int32 id = 16;
-  oneof payload {
-    auth.Response           auth        = 1;
-    vault.Response          vault       = 2;
-    evm.Response            evm         = 3;
-    sdk_client.Response     sdk_client  = 4;
-    governance.Response     governance  = 5;
-  }
-}

protobufs/operator/governance.proto

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package arbiter.operator.governance;
-
-import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
-
-message Request {
-  oneof payload {
-    CreateProposalRequest create = 1;
-    CastVoteRequest       vote   = 2;
-    QueryPendingRequest   query  = 3;
-  }
-}
-
-message CreateProposalRequest {
-  oneof kind {
-    ApproveSdkClientPayload         approve_sdk_client          = 1;
-    GrantWalletAccessPayload        grant_wallet_access         = 2;
-    ReplaceOperatorPayload          replace_operator            = 3;
-    google.protobuf.Empty           trigger_rekey               = 4;
-    ApprovePersistentGrantPayload   approve_persistent_grant    = 5;
-    ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload approve_one_off_transaction = 6;
-  }
-  optional uint32 ttl_secs = 7;
-}
-
-message ReplaceOperatorPayload {
-  int32 old_operator_id = 1;
-  bytes new_pubkey      = 2;
-}
-
-message ApproveSdkClientPayload {
-  int32 client_id = 1;
-}
-
-message GrantWalletAccessPayload {
-  int32 wallet_id = 1;
-  int32 client_id = 2;
-}
-
-message CastVoteRequest {
-  int32 proposal_id = 1;
-  bool  approve     = 2;
-  bytes signature   = 3;
-}
-
-message QueryPendingRequest {}
-
-message Response {
-  oneof payload {
-    CreateProposalResponse created = 1;
-    VoteResponse           voted   = 2;
-    QueryPendingResponse   pending = 3;
-  }
-}
-
-message CreateProposalResponse {
-  int32 proposal_id = 1;
-}
-
-message VoteResponse {
-  VoteOutcome outcome = 1;
-}
-
-enum VoteOutcome {
-  VOTE_OUTCOME_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
-  VOTE_OUTCOME_PENDING     = 1;
-  VOTE_OUTCOME_APPROVED    = 2;
-  VOTE_OUTCOME_REJECTED    = 3;
-}
-
-message ProposalSummary {
-  int32  id            = 1;
-  string kind          = 2;
-  int32  initiator_id  = 3;
-  int64  expires_at    = 4;
-  int64  approve_count = 5;
-  int64  reject_count  = 6;
-}
-
-message QueryPendingResponse {
-  repeated ProposalSummary proposals = 1;
-}
-
-message TransactionRateLimitProto {
-  uint32 count       = 1;
-  int64  window_secs = 2;
-}
-
-message VolumeLimitProto {
-  bytes max_volume  = 1;
-  int64 window_secs = 2;
-}
-
-message EtherTransferSpecProto {
-  repeated bytes   targets = 1;
-  VolumeLimitProto limit   = 2;
-}
-
-message TokenTransferSpecProto {
-  bytes                     token_contract = 1;
-  optional bytes            target         = 2;
-  repeated VolumeLimitProto volume_limits  = 3;
-}
-
-message ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload {
-  int32  client_id                = 1;
-  bytes  wallet_address           = 2;
-  uint64 chain_id                 = 3;
-  uint64 nonce                    = 4;
-  uint64 gas_limit                = 5;
-  bytes  max_fee_per_gas          = 6;
-  bytes  max_priority_fee_per_gas = 7;
-  bytes  to                       = 8;
-  bytes  value                    = 9;
-  bytes  input                    = 10;
-}
-
-message ApprovePersistentGrantPayload {
-  int32                              wallet_access_id         = 1;
-  uint64                             chain_id                 = 2;
-  optional int64                     valid_from_secs          = 3;
-  optional int64                     valid_until_secs         = 4;
-  optional bytes                     max_gas_fee_per_gas      = 5;
-  optional bytes                     max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6;
-  optional TransactionRateLimitProto rate_limit               = 7;
-  oneof specific {
-    EtherTransferSpecProto ether_transfer = 8;
-    TokenTransferSpecProto token_transfer = 9;
-  }
-}

protobufs/operator/vault/bootstrap.proto

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap;
-
-message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
-  bytes nonce = 1;
-  bytes ciphertext = 2;
-  bytes associated_data = 3;
-}
-
-message DeclareCommittee {
-  uint32 count          = 1;
-  uint32 recovery_count = 2;
-}
-
-message ContributePassphrase {
-  bytes passphrase = 1;
-}
-
-message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
-  int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
-  bytes passphrase            = 2;
-}
-
-enum BootstrapResult {
-  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
-  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
-  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2;
-  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3;
-  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_AWAITING_CONTRIBUTIONS = 4;
-}
-
-message Request {
-  oneof payload {
-    BootstrapEncryptedKey        encrypted_key                    = 2;
-    DeclareCommittee             declare_committee                = 3;
-    ContributePassphrase         contribute_passphrase            = 4;
-    ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase   = 5;
-  }
-}
-
-message Response {
-  BootstrapResult result = 1;
-}

protobufs/operator/vault/rekey.proto

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package arbiter.operator.vault.rekey;
-
-message ContributePassphrase {
-  bytes passphrase = 1;
-}
-
-message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
-  int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
-  bytes passphrase           = 2;
-}
-
-enum RekeyResult {
-  REKEY_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED            = 0;
-  REKEY_RESULT_SUCCESS                = 1;
-  REKEY_RESULT_AWAITING_CONTRIBUTIONS = 2;
-  REKEY_RESULT_NOT_IN_PROGRESS        = 3;
-}
-
-message Request {
-  oneof payload {
-    ContributePassphrase         contribute_passphrase          = 1;
-    ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase = 2;
-  }
-}
-
-message Response {
-  RekeyResult result = 1;
-}

protobufs/operator/vault/vault.proto

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-syntax = "proto3";
-
-package arbiter.operator.vault;
-
-import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
-import "shared/vault.proto";
-import "operator/vault/bootstrap.proto";
-import "operator/vault/rekey.proto";
-import "operator/vault/unseal.proto";
-
-message Request {
-  oneof payload {
-    google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
-    unseal.Request        unseal      = 2;
-    bootstrap.Request     bootstrap   = 3;
-    rekey.Request         rekey       = 4;
-  }
-}
-
-message Response {
-  oneof payload {
-    arbiter.shared.VaultState state     = 1;
-    unseal.Response           unseal    = 2;
-    bootstrap.Response        bootstrap = 3;
-    rekey.Response            rekey     = 4;
-  }
-}

protobufs/shared/vault.proto

@@ -5,8 +5,7 @@ package arbiter.shared;
 enum VaultState {
   VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
   VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
-  VAULT_STATE_BOOSTRAPPING = 2;
+  VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
-  VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 3;
+  VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
-  VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 4;
+  VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
-  VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 5;
 }

protobufs/user_agent.proto

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+syntax = "proto3";
+
+package arbiter.user_agent;
+
+import "user_agent/auth.proto";
+import "user_agent/evm.proto";
+import "user_agent/sdk_client.proto";
+import "user_agent/vault/vault.proto";
+
+message UserAgentRequest {
+  int32 id = 16;
+  oneof payload {
+    auth.Request auth = 1;
+    vault.Request vault = 2;
+    evm.Request evm = 3;
+    sdk_client.Request sdk_client = 4;
+  }
+}
+
+message UserAgentResponse {
+  optional int32 id = 16;
+  oneof payload {
+    auth.Response auth = 1;
+    vault.Response vault = 2;
+    evm.Response evm = 3;
+    sdk_client.Response sdk_client = 4;
+  }
+}

protobufs/user_agent/auth.proto

@@ -1,15 +1,22 @@
 syntax = "proto3";
 
-package arbiter.operator.auth;
+package arbiter.user_agent.auth;
+
+enum KeyType {
+  KEY_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 1;
+  KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1 = 2;
+  KEY_TYPE_RSA = 3;
+}
 
 message AuthChallengeRequest {
   bytes pubkey = 1;
   optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
+  KeyType key_type = 3;
 }
 
 message AuthChallenge {
-  uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
+  int32 nonce = 1;
-  bytes random = 2;
 }
 
 message AuthChallengeSolution {

protobufs/user_agent/evm.proto

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 syntax = "proto3";
 
-package arbiter.operator.evm;
+package arbiter.user_agent.evm;
 
 import "evm.proto";
 import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";

protobufs/user_agent/sdk_client.proto

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 syntax = "proto3";
 
-package arbiter.operator.sdk_client;
+package arbiter.user_agent.sdk_client;
 
 import "shared/client.proto";
 import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";

protobufs/user_agent/vault/bootstrap.proto

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+syntax = "proto3";
+
+package arbiter.user_agent.vault.bootstrap;
+
+message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
+  bytes nonce = 1;
+  bytes ciphertext = 2;
+  bytes associated_data = 3;
+}
+
+enum BootstrapResult {
+  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
+  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
+  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2;
+  BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3;
+}
+
+message Request {
+  BootstrapEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
+}
+
+message Response {
+  BootstrapResult result = 1;
+}

protobufs/user_agent/vault/unseal.proto

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 syntax = "proto3";
 
-package arbiter.operator.vault.unseal;
+package arbiter.user_agent.vault.unseal;
 
 message UnsealStart {
   bytes client_pubkey = 1;
@@ -15,29 +15,17 @@ message UnsealEncryptedKey {
   bytes associated_data = 3;
 }
 
-message ContributePassphrase {
-  bytes passphrase = 1;
-}
-
-message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
-  int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
-  bytes passphrase            = 2;
-}
-
 enum UnsealResult {
   UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
   UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
   UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
   UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
-  UNSEAL_RESULT_AWAITING_CONTRIBUTIONS = 4;
 }
 
 message Request {
   oneof payload {
     UnsealStart start = 1;
     UnsealEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
-    ContributePassphrase         contribute_passphrase          = 3;
-    ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase = 4;
   }
 }
 

protobufs/user_agent/vault/vault.proto

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+syntax = "proto3";
+
+package arbiter.user_agent.vault;
+
+import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
+import "shared/vault.proto";
+import "user_agent/vault/bootstrap.proto";
+import "user_agent/vault/unseal.proto";
+
+message Request {
+  oneof payload {
+    google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
+    unseal.Request unseal = 2;
+    bootstrap.Request bootstrap = 3;
+  }
+}
+
+message Response {
+  oneof payload {
+    arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
+    unseal.Response unseal = 2;
+    bootstrap.Response bootstrap = 3;
+  }
+}

server/.cargo/config.toml

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-[env]
-MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = "26.3"

server/Cargo.toml

@@ -4,168 +4,44 @@ members = [
 ]
 resolver = "3"
 
+[workspace.lints.clippy]
+disallowed-methods = "deny"
+
 
 [workspace.dependencies]
-alloy = "2.0.4"
+tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [
-async-trait = "0.1.89"
+    "deflate",
-base64 = "0.22.1"
+    "gzip",
-chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
+    "tls-connect-info",
-futures = "0.3.32"
+    "zstd",
-k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
+] }
-kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "17af90e3"}
-kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "17af90e3"}
-hmac = "0.13.0"
-miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
-ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.9", features = ["zeroize"] }
-mutants = "0.0.4"
-prost = "0.14.3"
-prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
-rand = "0.10.1"
-rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs",  "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false }
-rstest = "0.26.1"
-rustls = { version = "0.23.40", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
-rustls-pki-types = "1.14.1"
-sha2 = "0.11"
-smlang = "0.8.0"
-strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
-thiserror = "2.0.18"
-tokio = { version = "1.52.1", features = ["full"] }
-tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
-tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [ "deflate", "gzip", "tls-connect-info", "zstd" ] }
 tracing = "0.1.44"
+tokio = { version = "1.50.0", features = ["full"] }
+ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
+chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
+rand = "0.10.0"
+rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
+smlang = "0.8.0"
+thiserror = "2.0.18"
+async-trait = "0.1.89"
+futures = "0.3.32"
+tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
+kameo = "0.19.2"
+prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
 x25519-dalek = { version = "2.0.1", features = ["getrandom"] }
-
+rstest = "0.26.1"
-[workspace.lints.rust]
+rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
-missing_unsafe_on_extern = "deny"
+alloy = "1.7.3"
-unsafe_attr_outside_unsafe = "deny"
+rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [
-unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn = "deny"
+    "aws_lc_rs",
-unstable_features = "deny"
+    "pem",
-
+    "x509-parser",
-deprecated_safe_2024 = "warn"
+    "zeroize",
-ffi_unwind_calls = "warn"
+], default-features = false }
-linker_messages = "warn"
+k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
-
+rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
-elided_lifetimes_in_paths = "warn"
+sha2 = "0.10"
-explicit_outlives_requirements = "warn"
+spki = "0.7"
-impl-trait-overcaptures = "warn"
+prost = "0.14.3"
-impl-trait-redundant-captures = "warn"
+miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
-redundant_lifetimes = "warn"
+mutants = "0.0.4"
-single_use_lifetimes = "warn"
-unused_lifetimes = "warn"
-
-macro_use_extern_crate = "warn"
-redundant_imports = "warn"
-unused_import_braces = "warn"
-unused_macro_rules = "warn"
-unused_qualifications = "warn"
-
-unit_bindings = "warn"
-
-# missing_docs = "warn" # ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
-unnameable_types = "warn"
-
-[workspace.lints.clippy]
-derive_partial_eq_without_eq = "allow" 
-future_not_send = "allow"
-inconsistent_struct_constructor = "allow"
-inline_always = "allow"
-missing_errors_doc = "allow"
-missing_fields_in_debug = "allow"
-missing_panics_doc = "allow"
-must_use_candidate = "allow"
-needless_pass_by_ref_mut = "allow"
-pub_underscore_fields = "allow"
-redundant_pub_crate = "allow" 
-uninhabited_references = "allow" # safe with unsafe_code = "forbid" and standard uninhabited pattern (match *self {})
-
-# restriction lints
-alloc_instead_of_core = "warn"
-allow_attributes_without_reason = "warn"
-as_conversions = "warn"
-assertions_on_result_states = "warn"
-cfg_not_test = "warn"
-clone_on_ref_ptr = "warn"
-cognitive_complexity = "warn"
-create_dir = "warn"
-dbg_macro = "warn"
-decimal_literal_representation = "warn"
-default_union_representation = "warn"
-deref_by_slicing = "warn"
-disallowed_script_idents = "warn"
-doc_include_without_cfg = "warn"
-empty_drop = "warn"
-empty_enum_variants_with_brackets = "warn"
-empty_structs_with_brackets = "warn"
-exit = "warn"
-filetype_is_file = "warn"
-float_arithmetic = "warn"
-float_cmp_const = "warn"
-fn_to_numeric_cast_any = "warn"
-get_unwrap = "warn"
-if_then_some_else_none = "warn"
-indexing_slicing = "warn"
-infinite_loop = "warn"
-inline_asm_x86_att_syntax = "warn"
-inline_asm_x86_intel_syntax = "warn"
-large_include_file = "warn"
-lossy_float_literal = "warn"
-map_with_unused_argument_over_ranges = "warn"
-mem_forget = "warn"
-missing_assert_message = "warn"
-mixed_read_write_in_expression = "warn"
-modulo_arithmetic = "warn"
-multiple_unsafe_ops_per_block = "warn"
-mutex_atomic = "warn"
-mutex_integer = "warn"
-needless_raw_strings = "warn"
-non_ascii_literal = "warn"
-non_zero_suggestions = "warn"
-pathbuf_init_then_push = "warn"
-pointer_format = "warn"
-precedence_bits = "warn"
-pub_without_shorthand = "warn"
-rc_buffer = "warn"
-rc_mutex = "warn"
-redundant_test_prefix = "warn"
-redundant_type_annotations = "warn"
-ref_patterns = "warn"
-renamed_function_params = "warn"
-rest_pat_in_fully_bound_structs = "warn"
-return_and_then = "warn"
-semicolon_inside_block = "warn"
-str_to_string = "warn"
-string_add = "warn"
-string_lit_chars_any = "warn"
-string_slice = "warn"
-suspicious_xor_used_as_pow = "warn"
-try_err = "warn"
-undocumented_unsafe_blocks = "warn"
-uninlined_format_args = "warn"
-unnecessary_safety_comment = "warn"
-unnecessary_safety_doc = "warn"
-unnecessary_self_imports = "warn"
-unneeded_field_pattern = "warn"
-unused_result_ok = "warn"
-verbose_file_reads = "warn"
-
-# cargo lints
-negative_feature_names = "warn"
-redundant_feature_names = "warn"
-wildcard_dependencies = "warn"
-
-# ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
-# todo = "warn"
-# unimplemented = "warn"
-# panic = "warn"
-# panic_in_result_fn = "warn"
-# 
-# cargo_common_metadata = "warn"
-# multiple_crate_versions = "warn" # a controversial option since it's really difficult to maintain
-
-disallowed_methods = "deny"
-
-nursery = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
-pedantic = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
-
-type_repetition_in_bounds = "allow"   # sometimes, it's better for readability this way
-unused_async_trait_impl = "allow"

server/clippy.toml

@@ -7,24 +7,3 @@ disallowed-methods = [
     { path = "rsa::traits::Decryptor::decrypt", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
     { path = "rsa::traits::RandomizedDecryptor::decrypt_with_rng", reason = "RSA decryption is forbidden (RUSTSEC-2023-0071 Marvin Attack). This blocks decrypt_with_rng() on rsa::{pkcs1v15,oaep}::DecryptingKey." },
 ]
-
-allow-indexing-slicing-in-tests = true
-allow-panic-in-tests = true
-check-inconsistent-struct-field-initializers = true
-suppress-restriction-lint-in-const = true
-allow-renamed-params-for = [
-    "core::convert::From",
-    "core::convert::TryFrom",
-    "core::str::FromStr",
-    "kameo::actor::Actor",
-]
-
-module-items-ordered-within-groupings = ["UPPER_SNAKE_CASE"]
-source-item-ordering = ["enum"]
-trait-assoc-item-kinds-order = [
-    "const",
-    "type",
-    "fn",
-] # community tested standard
-
-too-many-lines-threshold = 150

server/crates/arbiter-client/Cargo.toml

@@ -13,17 +13,14 @@ evm = ["dep:alloy"]
 
 [dependencies]
 arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
-arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
 alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 tonic.workspace = true
 tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
 tokio.workspace = true
 tokio-stream.workspace = true
+ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
 thiserror.workspace = true
 http = "1.4.0"
-rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.13", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
+rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.10", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
 async-trait.workspace = true
-chrono.workspace = true
+rand.workspace = true
-
-[lib]
-doctest = false

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/auth.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
-use crate::{
-    storage::StorageError,
-    transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
-};
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, SigningContext, SigningKey};
 use arbiter_proto::{
-    ClientMetadata,
+    ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
     proto::{
         client::{
             ClientRequest,
@@ -19,32 +14,35 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
         shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo,
     },
 };
+use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;
 
-use chrono::DateTime;
+use crate::{
+    storage::StorageError,
+    transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
+};
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum AuthError {
-    #[error("Server sent invalid auth challenge")]
-    InvalidChallenge,
-    #[error("Client approval denied by Operator")]
-    ApprovalDenied,
     #[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
     MissingAuthChallenge,
 
-    #[error("No Operators online to approve client")]
+    #[error("Client approval denied by User Agent")]
-    NoOperatorsOnline,
+    ApprovalDenied,
 
-    #[error("Signing key storage error")]
+    #[error("No User Agents online to approve client")]
-    Storage(#[from] StorageError),
+    NoUserAgentsOnline,
 
     #[error("Unexpected auth response payload")]
     UnexpectedAuthResponse,
+
+    #[error("Signing key storage error")]
+    Storage(#[from] StorageError),
 }
 
 fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
     match AuthResult::try_from(code).unwrap_or(AuthResult::Unspecified) {
         AuthResult::ApprovalDenied => AuthError::ApprovalDenied,
-        AuthResult::NoOperatorsOnline => AuthError::NoOperatorsOnline,
+        AuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline => AuthError::NoUserAgentsOnline,
         AuthResult::Unspecified
         | AuthResult::Success
         | AuthResult::InvalidKey
@@ -56,14 +54,14 @@ fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
 async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
     transport: &mut ClientTransport,
     metadata: ClientMetadata,
-    key: &SigningKey,
+    key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
-) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
+) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
     transport
         .send(ClientRequest {
             request_id: next_request_id(),
             payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
                 payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest {
-                    pubkey: key.public_key().to_bytes(),
+                    pubkey: key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
                     client_info: Some(ProtoClientInfo {
                         name: metadata.name,
                         description: metadata.description,
@@ -78,7 +76,7 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
 
 async fn receive_auth_challenge(
     transport: &mut ClientTransport,
-) -> Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
+) -> std::result::Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
     let response = transport
         .recv()
         .await
@@ -97,22 +95,11 @@ async fn receive_auth_challenge(
 
 async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
     transport: &mut ClientTransport,
-    key: &SigningKey,
+    key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
     challenge: AuthChallenge,
-) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
+) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
-    let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos as i64);
+    let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
-    let challenge = authn::AuthChallenge {
+    let signature = key.sign(&challenge_payload).to_bytes().to_vec();
-        nonce: *challenge
-            .random
-            .as_array()
-            .ok_or(AuthError::InvalidChallenge)?,
-        timestamp,
-    };
-    let challenge_payload: Vec<u8> = challenge.format();
-    let signature = key
-        .sign_message(&challenge_payload, SigningContext::Client)
-        .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?
-        .to_bytes();
 
     transport
         .send(ClientRequest {
@@ -127,7 +114,9 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
         .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)
 }
 
-async fn receive_auth_confirmation(transport: &mut ClientTransport) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
+async fn receive_auth_confirmation(
+    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
+) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
     let response = transport
         .recv()
         .await
@@ -148,11 +137,11 @@ async fn receive_auth_confirmation(transport: &mut ClientTransport) -> Result<()
     }
 }
 
-pub async fn authenticate(
+pub(crate) async fn authenticate(
     transport: &mut ClientTransport,
     metadata: ClientMetadata,
-    key: &SigningKey,
+    key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
-) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
+) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
     send_auth_challenge_request(transport, metadata, key).await?;
     let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?;
     send_auth_challenge_solution(transport, key, challenge).await?;

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/bin/test_connect.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
+use std::io::{self, Write};
+
 use arbiter_client::ArbiterClient;
 use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, url::ArbiterUrl};
 
-use std::io::{self, Write};
-
 #[tokio::main]
 async fn main() {
     println!("Testing connection to Arbiter server...");
@@ -29,16 +29,16 @@ async fn main() {
         }
     };
 
-    println!("{url:#?}");
+    println!("{:#?}", url);
 
     let metadata = ClientMetadata {
-        name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_owned(),
+        name: "arbiter-client test_connect".to_string(),
-        description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_owned()),
+        description: Some("Manual connection smoke test".to_string()),
-        version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_owned()),
+        version: Some(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string()),
     };
 
     match ArbiterClient::connect(url, metadata).await {
         Ok(_) => println!("Connected and authenticated successfully."),
-        Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {err:#?}"),
+        Err(err) => eprintln!("Failed to connect: {:#?}", err),
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/client.rs

@@ -1,55 +1,49 @@
-#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
+use arbiter_proto::{
-use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
+    ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
+};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
+use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
+use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
+
 use crate::{
     StorageError,
     auth::{AuthError, authenticate},
     storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage},
     transport::{BUFFER_LENGTH, ClientTransport},
 };
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
-use arbiter_proto::{
-    ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
-};
 
-use std::sync::Arc;
+#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
-use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
+use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
-use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
-use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum ArbiterClientError {
+pub enum Error {
-    #[error("Authentication error")]
+    #[error("gRPC error")]
-    Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
+    Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
 
     #[error("Could not establish connection")]
     Connection(#[from] tonic::transport::Error),
 
-    #[error("gRPC error")]
+    #[error("Invalid server URI")]
-    Grpc(#[from] tonic::Status),
+    InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
 
     #[error("Invalid CA certificate")]
     InvalidCaCert(#[from] webpki::Error),
 
-    #[error("Invalid server URI")]
+    #[error("Authentication error")]
-    InvalidUri(#[from] http::uri::InvalidUri),
+    Authentication(#[from] AuthError),
 
     #[error("Storage error")]
     Storage(#[from] StorageError),
 }
 
 pub struct ArbiterClient {
-    #[expect(
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
-        dead_code,
-        reason = "transport will be used in future methods for sending requests and receiving responses"
-    )]
     transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>,
 }
 
 impl ArbiterClient {
-    pub async fn connect(
+    pub async fn connect(url: ArbiterUrl, metadata: ClientMetadata) -> Result<Self, Error> {
-        url: ArbiterUrl,
-        metadata: ClientMetadata,
-    ) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
         let storage = FileSigningKeyStorage::from_default_location()?;
         Self::connect_with_storage(url, metadata, &storage).await
     }
@@ -58,7 +52,7 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
         url: ArbiterUrl,
         metadata: ClientMetadata,
         storage: &S,
-    ) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
+    ) -> Result<Self, Error> {
         let key = storage.load_or_create()?;
         Self::connect_with_key(url, metadata, key).await
     }
@@ -66,8 +60,8 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
     pub async fn connect_with_key(
         url: ArbiterUrl,
         metadata: ClientMetadata,
-        key: SigningKey,
+        key: ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
-    ) -> Result<Self, ArbiterClientError> {
+    ) -> Result<Self, Error> {
         let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned();
         let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);
 
@@ -94,8 +88,7 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
     }
 
     #[cfg(feature = "evm")]
-    #[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "false positive")]
+    pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, Error> {
-    pub async fn evm_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<ArbiterEvmWallet>, ArbiterClientError> {
         todo!("fetch EVM wallet list from server")
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/lib.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ mod transport;
 pub mod wallets;
 
 pub use auth::AuthError;
-pub use client::{ArbiterClient, ArbiterClientError};
+pub use client::{ArbiterClient, Error};
 pub use storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage, StorageError};
 
 #[cfg(feature = "evm")]

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/storage.rs

@@ -1,19 +1,17 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
 use arbiter_proto::home_path;
-
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum StorageError {
-    #[error("Invalid signing key length in storage: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
-    InvalidKeyLength { expected: usize, actual: usize },
-
     #[error("I/O error")]
     Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
+
+    #[error("Invalid signing key length in storage: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
+    InvalidKeyLength { expected: usize, actual: usize },
 }
 
 pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
-    fn load_or_create(&self) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError>;
+    fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError>;
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
@@ -22,17 +20,17 @@ pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage {
 }
 
 impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
-    pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ml_dsa.key";
+    pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ed25519.key";
 
     pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
         Self { path: path.into() }
     }
 
-    pub fn from_default_location() -> Result<Self, StorageError> {
+    pub fn from_default_location() -> std::result::Result<Self, StorageError> {
         Ok(Self::new(home_path()?.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME)))
     }
 
-    fn read_key(path: &Path) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
+    fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
         let bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
         let raw: [u8; 32] =
             bytes
@@ -41,12 +39,12 @@ impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
                     expected: 32,
                     actual: v.len(),
                 })?;
-        Ok(SigningKey::from_seed(raw))
+        Ok(ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&raw))
     }
 }
 
 impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
-    fn load_or_create(&self) -> Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
+    fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
         if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
             std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
         }
@@ -55,8 +53,8 @@ impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
             return Self::read_key(&self.path);
         }
 
-        let key = SigningKey::generate();
+        let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
-        let raw_key = key.to_seed();
+        let raw_key = key.to_bytes();
 
         // Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
         match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
@@ -105,7 +103,7 @@ mod tests {
             .load_or_create()
             .expect("second load_or_create should read same key");
 
-        assert_eq!(key_a.to_seed(), key_b.to_seed());
+        assert_eq!(key_a.to_bytes(), key_b.to_bytes());
         assert!(path.exists());
 
         std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
@@ -126,7 +124,7 @@ mod tests {
                 assert_eq!(expected, 32);
                 assert_eq!(actual, 31);
             }
-            other @ StorageError::Io(_) => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"),
+            other => panic!("unexpected error: {other:?}"),
         }
 
         std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/transport.rs

@@ -1,17 +1,16 @@
 use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse};
-
 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering};
 use tokio::sync::mpsc;
 
-pub const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
+pub(crate) const BUFFER_LENGTH: usize = 16;
 static NEXT_REQUEST_ID: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(1);
 
-pub fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
+pub(crate) fn next_request_id() -> i32 {
     NEXT_REQUEST_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum ClientSignError {
+pub(crate) enum ClientSignError {
     #[error("Transport channel closed")]
     ChannelClosed,
 
@@ -19,23 +18,27 @@ pub enum ClientSignError {
     ConnectionClosed,
 }
 
-pub struct ClientTransport {
+pub(crate) struct ClientTransport {
     pub(crate) sender: mpsc::Sender<ClientRequest>,
     pub(crate) receiver: tonic::Streaming<ClientResponse>,
 }
 
 impl ClientTransport {
-    pub(crate) async fn send(&mut self, request: ClientRequest) -> Result<(), ClientSignError> {
+    pub(crate) async fn send(
+        &mut self,
+        request: ClientRequest,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<(), ClientSignError> {
         self.sender
             .send(request)
             .await
             .map_err(|_| ClientSignError::ChannelClosed)
     }
 
-    pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
+    pub(crate) async fn recv(&mut self) -> std::result::Result<ClientResponse, ClientSignError> {
         match self.receiver.message().await {
             Ok(Some(resp)) => Ok(resp),
-            Ok(None) | Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
+            Ok(None) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
+            Err(_) => Err(ClientSignError::ConnectionClosed),
         }
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-client/src/wallets/evm.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,13 @@
-use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
+use alloy::{
+    consensus::SignableTransaction,
+    network::TxSigner,
+    primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
+    signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
+};
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+
 use arbiter_proto::proto::{
     client::{
         ClientRequest,
@@ -16,15 +25,7 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
     shared::evm::TransactionEvalError,
 };
 
-use alloy::{
+use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
-    consensus::SignableTransaction,
-    network::TxSigner,
-    primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
-    signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
-};
-use async_trait::async_trait;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use tokio::sync::Mutex;
 
 /// A typed error payload returned by [`ArbiterEvmWallet`] transaction signing.
 ///
@@ -60,9 +61,9 @@ pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet {
 impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
     #[expect(
         dead_code,
-        reason = "new will be used in future methods for creating wallets with different parameters"
+        reason = "constructor may be used in future extensions, e.g. to support wallet listing"
     )]
-    pub(crate) const fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
+    pub(crate) fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
         Self {
             transport,
             address,
@@ -70,12 +71,11 @@ impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
         }
     }
 
-    pub const fn address(&self) -> Address {
+    pub fn address(&self) -> Address {
         self.address
     }
 
-    #[must_use]
+    pub fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
-    pub const fn with_chain_id(mut self, chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
         self.chain_id = Some(chain_id);
         self
     }
@@ -150,7 +150,6 @@ impl TxSigner<Signature> for ArbiterEvmWallet {
             .recv()
             .await
             .map_err(|_| Error::other("failed to receive evm sign transaction response"))?;
-        drop(transport);
 
         if response.request_id != Some(request_id) {
             return Err(Error::other(

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/.gitignore

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-/target

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "arbiter-crypto"
-version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2024"
-
-[dependencies]
-ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true }
-rand = {workspace = true, optional = true}
-memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true}
-strum = { workspace = true, optional = true }
-hmac.workspace = true
-alloy.workspace = true
-x-wing = { version = "0.1.0-rc.0", features = ["zeroize"] }
-chrono.workspace = true
-thiserror.workspace = true
-
-[lints]
-workspace = true
-
-[features]
-default = ["authn", "safecell"]
-authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand", "dep:strum"]
-safecell = ["dep:memsafe"]
-
-[lib]
-doctest = false

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/authn/mod.rs

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-pub mod v1;
-pub use v1::*;

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/authn/v1.rs

@@ -1,288 +0,0 @@
-use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
-use hmac::digest::Digest;
-use ml_dsa::{
-    EncodedVerifyingKey, Error, KeyGen, MlDsa87, Seed, Signature as MlDsaSignature,
-    SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _,
-};
-use rand::RngExt;
-use strum::IntoStaticStr;
-
-/// Domain separation tag mixed into every ML-DSA signature.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, IntoStaticStr)]
-pub enum SigningContext {
-    #[strum(serialize = "arbiter_client")]
-    Client,
-    #[strum(serialize = "arbiter_operator")]
-    Operator,
-    #[strum(serialize = "arbiter_governance_vote")]
-    GovernanceVote,
-}
-
-impl SigningContext {
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn as_bytes(self) -> &'static [u8] {
-        <&'static str>::from(self).as_bytes()
-    }
-}
-
-const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 32;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
-#[error("invalid length: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
-pub struct InvalidLength {
-    pub expected: usize,
-    pub actual: usize,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct AuthChallenge {
-    pub nonce: [u8; NONCE_SIZE],
-    pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
-}
-
-impl AuthChallenge {
-    pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::CryptoRng) -> Self {
-        let timestamp = Utc::now();
-        let nonce = {
-            let mut array = [0; NONCE_SIZE];
-            rng.fill(&mut array);
-            array
-        };
-
-        Self { nonce, timestamp }
-    }
-
-    pub fn format(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        {
-            let mut buffer = Vec::from(self.nonce);
-
-            let stamp = self
-                .timestamp
-                .timestamp_nanos_opt()
-                .expect("We would be long dead by the time this triggers :)");
-            buffer.extend_from_slice(stamp.to_be_bytes().as_slice());
-
-            buffer
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_parts(nonce: &[u8], timestamp: i64) -> Result<Self, InvalidLength> {
-        let random_nonce = nonce.as_array().ok_or(InvalidLength {
-            expected: NONCE_SIZE,
-            actual: nonce.len(),
-        })?;
-        Ok(Self {
-            nonce: *random_nonce,
-            timestamp: DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(timestamp),
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-pub type KeyParams = MlDsa87;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct PublicKey(Box<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>>);
-
-impl crate::hashing::Hashable for PublicKey {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self.to_bytes());
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct Signature(Box<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>>);
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct SigningKey(Box<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>>);
-
-impl PublicKey {
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
-    }
-
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn verify(
-        &self,
-        challenge: &AuthChallenge,
-        context: SigningContext,
-        signature: &Signature,
-    ) -> bool {
-        let challenge = challenge.format();
-        self.0
-            .verify_with_context(&challenge, context.as_bytes(), &signature.0)
-    }
-
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn verify_message(
-        &self,
-        message: &[u8],
-        context: SigningContext,
-        signature: &Signature,
-    ) -> bool {
-        self.0
-            .verify_with_context(message, context.as_bytes(), &signature.0)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Signature {
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
-    }
-}
-
-impl SigningKey {
-    pub fn generate() -> Self {
-        Self(Box::new(KeyParams::key_gen(&mut rand::rng())))
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_seed(seed: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
-        Self(Box::new(KeyParams::from_seed(&Seed::from(seed))))
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_seed(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
-        self.0.to_seed().into()
-    }
-
-    pub fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
-        self.0.verifying_key().into()
-    }
-
-    pub fn sign_message(
-        &self,
-        message: &[u8],
-        context: SigningContext,
-    ) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
-        self.0
-            .signing_key()
-            .sign_deterministic(message, context.as_bytes())
-            .map(Into::into)
-    }
-
-    pub fn sign_challenge(
-        &self,
-        challenge: &AuthChallenge,
-        context: SigningContext,
-    ) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
-        let challenge = challenge.format();
-
-        self.sign_message(&challenge, context)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>> for PublicKey {
-    fn from(value: MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
-        Self(Box::new(value))
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>> for Signature {
-    fn from(value: MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>) -> Self {
-        Self(Box::new(value))
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>> for SigningKey {
-    fn from(value: MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
-        Self(Box::new(value))
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for PublicKey {
-    type Error = ();
-
-    fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for PublicKey {
-    type Error = ();
-
-    fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let encoded = EncodedVerifyingKey::<KeyParams>::try_from(value).map_err(|_| ())?;
-        Ok(Self(Box::new(MlDsaVerifyingKey::decode(&encoded))))
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for Signature {
-    type Error = ();
-
-    fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for Signature {
-    type Error = ();
-
-    fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        MlDsaSignature::try_from(value)
-            .map(|sig| Self(Box::new(sig)))
-            .map_err(|_| ())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, signature::Keypair as _};
-
-    use crate::authn::AuthChallenge;
-
-    use super::{PublicKey, Signature, SigningContext, SigningKey};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() {
-        let key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-        let encoded = PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()).to_bytes();
-
-        let decoded = PublicKey::try_from(encoded.as_slice()).expect("public key should decode");
-
-        assert_eq!(decoded, PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn signature_round_trip_decodes() {
-        let key = SigningKey::generate();
-        let signature = key
-            .sign_message(b"challenge", SigningContext::Client)
-            .expect("signature should be created");
-
-        let decoded =
-            Signature::try_from(signature.to_bytes().as_slice()).expect("signature should decode");
-
-        assert_eq!(decoded, signature);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn challenge_verification_uses_context_and_canonical_key_bytes() {
-        let key = SigningKey::generate();
-        let public_key = key.public_key();
-        let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
-        let signature = key
-            .sign_challenge(&challenge, SigningContext::Client)
-            .expect("signature should be created");
-
-        assert!(public_key.verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Client, &signature));
-        assert!(!public_key.verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Operator, &signature));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn signing_key_round_trip_seed_preserves_public_key_and_signing() {
-        let original = SigningKey::generate();
-        let restored = SigningKey::from_seed(original.to_seed());
-
-        assert_eq!(restored.public_key(), original.public_key());
-
-        let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
-
-        let signature = restored
-            .sign_challenge(&challenge, SigningContext::Client)
-            .expect("signature should be created");
-
-        assert!(
-            restored
-                .public_key()
-                .verify(&challenge, SigningContext::Client, &signature)
-        );
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-#[cfg(feature = "authn")]
-pub mod authn;
-pub mod hashing;
-#[cfg(feature = "safecell")]
-pub mod safecell;
-
-pub use x_wing;

server/crates/arbiter-macros/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "arbiter-macros"
-version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2024"
-
-[lib]
-proc-macro = true
-doctest = false
-
-[dependencies]
-proc-macro2 = "1.0"
-quote = "1.0"
-syn = { version = "2.0", features = ["derive", "fold", "full", "visit-mut"] }
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-arbiter-crypto = { path = "../arbiter-crypto" }
-
-[lints]
-workspace = true

server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/hashable.rs

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-use crate::utils::{HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH, HMAC_DIGEST_PATH};
-
-use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream, TokenTree};
-use quote::quote;
-use syn::{DataStruct, DeriveInput, Fields, Generics, Index, parse_quote, spanned::Spanned};
-
-pub(crate) fn derive(input: &DeriveInput) -> TokenStream {
-    match &input.data {
-        syn::Data::Struct(struct_data) => hashable_struct(input, struct_data),
-        syn::Data::Enum(_) => {
-            syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable can currently be derived only for structs")
-                .to_compile_error()
-        }
-        syn::Data::Union(_) => {
-            syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable cannot be derived for unions")
-                .to_compile_error()
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn hashable_struct(input: &DeriveInput, struct_data: &DataStruct) -> TokenStream {
-    let ident = &input.ident;
-    let hashable_trait = HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH.to_path();
-    let hmac_digest = HMAC_DIGEST_PATH.to_path();
-    let generics = add_hashable_bounds(input.generics.clone(), &hashable_trait);
-    let field_accesses = collect_field_accesses(struct_data);
-    let hash_calls = build_hash_calls(&field_accesses, &hashable_trait);
-
-    let (impl_generics, ty_generics, where_clause) = generics.split_for_impl();
-
-    quote! {
-        #[automatically_derived]
-        impl #impl_generics #hashable_trait for #ident #ty_generics #where_clause {
-            fn hash<H: #hmac_digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-                #(#hash_calls)*
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn add_hashable_bounds(mut generics: Generics, hashable_trait: &syn::Path) -> Generics {
-    for type_param in generics.type_params_mut() {
-        type_param.bounds.push(parse_quote!(#hashable_trait));
-    }
-
-    generics
-}
-
-struct FieldAccess {
-    access: TokenStream,
-    span: Span,
-}
-
-fn collect_field_accesses(struct_data: &DataStruct) -> Vec<FieldAccess> {
-    match &struct_data.fields {
-        Fields::Named(fields) => {
-            // Keep deterministic alphabetical order for named fields.
-            // Do not remove this sort, because it keeps hash output stable regardless of source order.
-            let mut named_fields = fields
-                .named
-                .iter()
-                .map(|field| {
-                    let name = field
-                        .ident
-                        .as_ref()
-                        .expect("Fields::Named(fields) must have names")
-                        .clone();
-                    (name.to_string(), name)
-                })
-                .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-            named_fields.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0));
-
-            named_fields
-                .into_iter()
-                .map(|(_, name)| FieldAccess {
-                    access: quote! { #name },
-                    span: name.span(),
-                })
-                .collect()
-        }
-        Fields::Unnamed(fields) => fields
-            .unnamed
-            .iter()
-            .enumerate()
-            .map(|(i, field)| FieldAccess {
-                access: {
-                    let index = Index::from(i);
-                    quote! { #index }
-                },
-                span: field.ty.span(),
-            })
-            .collect(),
-        Fields::Unit => Vec::new(),
-    }
-}
-
-fn build_hash_calls(
-    field_accesses: &[FieldAccess],
-    hashable_trait: &syn::Path,
-) -> Vec<TokenStream> {
-    field_accesses
-        .iter()
-        .map(|field| {
-            let access = &field.access;
-            let call = quote! {
-                #hashable_trait::hash(&self.#access, hasher);
-            };
-
-            respan(call, field.span)
-        })
-        .collect()
-}
-
-/// Recursively set span on all tokens, including interpolated ones.
-fn respan(tokens: TokenStream, span: Span) -> TokenStream {
-    tokens
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|tt| match tt {
-            TokenTree::Group(g) => {
-                let mut new = proc_macro2::Group::new(g.delimiter(), respan(g.stream(), span));
-                new.set_span(span);
-                TokenTree::Group(new)
-            }
-            mut other => {
-                other.set_span(span);
-                other
-            }
-        })
-        .collect()
-}

server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-use syn::{DeriveInput, parse_macro_input};
-
-mod hashable;
-mod utils;
-
-#[proc_macro_derive(Hashable)]
-pub fn derive_hashable(input: proc_macro::TokenStream) -> proc_macro::TokenStream {
-    let input = parse_macro_input!(input as DeriveInput);
-    hashable::derive(&input).into()
-}

server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/utils.rs

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-pub(crate) struct ToPath(pub &'static str);
-
-impl ToPath {
-    pub(crate) fn to_path(&self) -> syn::Path {
-        syn::parse_str(self.0).expect("Invalid path")
-    }
-}
-
-macro_rules! ensure_path {
-    ($path:path as $name:ident) => {
-        const _: () = {
-            #[cfg(test)]
-            #[expect(
-                unused_imports,
-                reason = "Ensures the path is valid and will cause a compile error if not"
-            )]
-            use $path as _;
-        };
-        pub(crate) const $name: ToPath = ToPath(stringify!($path));
-    };
-}
-
-ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable as HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH);
-ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Digest as HMAC_DIGEST_PATH);

server/crates/arbiter-proto/Cargo.toml

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ license = "Apache-2.0"
 tonic.workspace = true
 tokio.workspace = true
 futures.workspace = true
+hex = "0.4.3"
 tonic-prost = "0.14.5"
 prost.workspace = true
 kameo.workspace = true
@@ -16,20 +17,20 @@ url = "2.5.8"
 miette.workspace = true
 thiserror.workspace = true
 rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
-base64.workspace = true
+base64 = "0.22.1"
 prost-types.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
 async-trait.workspace = true
 tokio-stream.workspace = true
 
 [build-dependencies]
 tonic-prost-build = "0.14.5"
+protoc-bin-vendored = "3"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 rstest.workspace = true
+rand.workspace = true
 rcgen.workspace = true
 
-[lib]
-doctest = false
-
 [package.metadata.cargo-shear]
-ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost"]
+ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost", "kameo"]

server/crates/arbiter-proto/build.rs

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
         .compile_protos(
             &[
                 format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
-                format!("{}/operator.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
+                format!("{}/user_agent.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
                 format!("{}/client.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
                 format!("{}/evm.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
             ],

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 pub mod transport;
 pub mod url;
 
+use base64::{Engine, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
+
 pub mod proto {
     tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");
 
@@ -12,38 +14,30 @@ pub mod proto {
         }
     }
 
-    pub mod operator {
+    pub mod user_agent {
-        tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator");
+        tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent");
 
         pub mod auth {
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.auth");
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.auth");
         }
 
         pub mod evm {
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.evm");
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.evm");
-        }
-
-        pub mod governance {
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.governance");
         }
 
         pub mod sdk_client {
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.sdk_client");
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.sdk_client");
         }
 
         pub mod vault {
-            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault");
+            tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault");
 
             pub mod bootstrap {
-                tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap");
+                tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault.bootstrap");
-            }
-
-            pub mod rekey {
-                tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.rekey");
             }
 
             pub mod unseal {
-                tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.unseal");
+                tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault.unseal");
             }
         }
     }
@@ -90,3 +84,8 @@ pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {
 
     Ok(arbiter_home)
 }
+
+pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
+    concat_form.into_bytes()
+}

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/transport.rs

@@ -54,10 +54,11 @@
 //!   as a closed outbound channel.
 //! - [`Bi::recv`] returns `None` when the underlying transport closes.
 //! - Message translation is intentionally out of scope for this module.
-use async_trait::async_trait;
+
-use kameo::{error::Infallible, prelude::*};
 use std::marker::PhantomData;
 
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+
 /// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
 #[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
 pub enum Error {
@@ -105,36 +106,6 @@ pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync {
 /// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items.
 pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
 
-#[async_trait]
-impl<T, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for &mut T
-where
-    T: Sender<Outbound> + ?Sized,
-    Outbound: Send + 'static,
-{
-    async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        (**self).send(item).await
-    }
-}
-
-#[async_trait]
-impl<T, Inbound> Receiver<Inbound> for &mut T
-where
-    T: Receiver<Inbound> + ?Sized,
-    Inbound: Send + 'static,
-{
-    async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
-        (**self).recv().await
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T, Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for &mut T
-where
-    T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
-    Inbound: Send + 'static,
-    Outbound: Send + 'static,
-{
-}
-
 pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> {
     type Sender: Sender<Outbound>;
     type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>;
@@ -190,29 +161,3 @@ where
 }
 
 pub mod grpc;
-
-#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
-pub enum ForwardError<I> {
-    #[error("Transport error: {0}")]
-    Transport(#[from] Error),
-    #[error("Actor delivery error: {0}")]
-    Actor(SendError<I>),
-}
-
-pub async fn forward_to_actor<Transport, Inbound, Outbound, Handler>(
-    transport: &mut Transport,
-    actor: &ActorRef<Handler>,
-) -> Result<(), ForwardError<Inbound>>
-where
-    Transport: Bi<Inbound, <Outbound as Reply>::Ok>,
-    Handler: Actor + Message<Inbound, Reply = Outbound>,
-    Inbound: Send + 'static,
-    Outbound: Send + 'static + Reply<Error = Infallible>, // `Infallible` to enforce contract that `Outbound` carries handler-level error
-{
-    while let Some(request) = transport.recv().await {
-        let resp = actor.ask(request).await.map_err(ForwardError::Actor)?;
-        transport.send(resp).await?
-    }
-
-    Err(Error::ChannelClosed.into())
-}

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/transport/grpc.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
-
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use futures::StreamExt;
 use tokio::sync::mpsc;
 use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
 
+use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
+
 pub struct GrpcSender<Outbound> {
     tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
 }

server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/url.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
+use std::fmt::Display;
+
 use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_URL_SAFE};
 use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
-use std::fmt::Display;
 
 const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter";
 const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert";
@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[rstest]
 
-    fn parsing_correctness(
+    fn test_parsing_correctness(
         #[values("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "192.168.1.1", "some.domain.com")] host: &str,
 
         #[values(None, Some("token123".to_string()))] bootstrap_token: Option<String>,

server/crates/arbiter-server/Cargo.toml

@@ -9,16 +9,16 @@ license = "Apache-2.0"
 workspace = true
 
 [dependencies]
-diesel = { version = "2.3.9", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
+diesel = { version = "2.3.7", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
-diesel-async = { version = "0.9.0", features = [
+diesel-async = { version = "0.8.0", features = [
     "bb8",
     "migrations",
     "sqlite",
     "tokio",
 ] }
+ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
+ed25519-dalek.features = ["serde"]
 arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
-arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
-arbiter-macros.path = "../arbiter-macros"
 tracing.workspace = true
 tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
 tonic.workspace = true
@@ -27,39 +27,45 @@ tokio.workspace = true
 rustls.workspace = true
 smlang.workspace = true
 thiserror.workspace = true
-diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.2", features = ["sqlite"] }
+fatality = "0.1.1"
+diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.1", features = ["sqlite"] }
 async-trait.workspace = true
+secrecy = "0.10.3"
+futures.workspace = true
 tokio-stream.workspace = true
+dashmap = "6.1.0"
 rand.workspace = true
 rcgen.workspace = true
 chrono.workspace = true
+memsafe = "0.4.0"
+zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
 kameo.workspace = true
+x25519-dalek.workspace = true
 chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
 argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
 restructed = "0.2.2"
-strum.workspace = true
+strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
 pem = "3.0.6"
+k256.workspace = true
+k256.features = ["serde"]
+rsa.workspace = true
+rsa.features = ["serde"]
 sha2.workspace = true
-hmac.workspace = true
+hmac = "0.12"
+spki.workspace = true
 alloy.workspace = true
-prost.workspace = true
 prost-types.workspace = true
+prost.workspace = true
 arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
 anyhow = "1.0.102"
+serde_with = "3.18.0"
 mutants.workspace = true
 subtle = "2.6.1"
-x25519-dalek.workspace = true
+macro_rules_attribute = "0.2.2"
-k256.workspace = true
+paste = "1.0.15"
-kameo_actors.workspace = true
-vsss-rs = "5.4.0"
-rand_core = "0.6"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
+insta = "1.46.3"
 proptest = "1.11.0"
 rstest.workspace = true
 test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }
-ml-dsa.workspace = true
-mockall = "0.15.0"
-
-[lib]
-doctest = false

server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-14-171124-0000_init/up.sql

@@ -43,25 +43,15 @@ create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
 insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
 -- ensure singleton row exists
 
-create table if not exists operator_identity (
+create table if not exists useragent_client (
     id integer not null primary key,
+    nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
     public_key blob not null,
+    key_type integer not null default(1), -- 1=Ed25519, 2=ECDSA(secp256k1)
     created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
     updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
 ) STRICT;
-create unique index if not exists uniq_operator_identity_public_key on operator_identity (public_key);
+create unique index if not exists uniq_useragent_client_public_key on useragent_client (public_key, key_type);
-
-create table if not exists operator (
-    id integer primary key references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict, -- same id as operator_identity
-
-    share blob not null,
-    share_nonce blob not null,
-    share_salt blob not null,
-
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
-    updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
-
-) STRICT;
 
 create table if not exists client_metadata (
     id integer not null primary key,
@@ -83,6 +73,7 @@ create unique index if not exists uniq_metadata_binding_client on client_metadat
 
 create table if not exists program_client (
     id integer not null primary key,
+    nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
     public_key blob not null,
     metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
     created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
@@ -216,156 +207,3 @@ create table if not exists integrity_envelope (
 ) STRICT;
 
 create unique index if not exists uniq_integrity_envelope_entity on integrity_envelope (entity_kind, entity_id);
-
-create table if not exists proposal (
-    id           integer not null primary key,
-    kind         text    not null,
-    initiator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    created_at   integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    expires_at   integer not null,
-    status       text    not null default 'pending'
-        check (status in ('pending', 'approved', 'rejected'))
-) STRICT;
-
--- Parameters of an approved-or-pending proposal
-create table if not exists proposal_approve_sdk_client (
-    proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    client_id   integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists proposal_grant_wallet_access (
-    proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    wallet_id   integer not null references evm_wallet(id) on delete restrict,
-    client_id   integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists proposal_replace_operator (
-    proposal_id     integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    old_operator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    new_pubkey      blob    not null
-) STRICT;
-
--- The transaction an operator votes to sign.
-create table if not exists proposal_one_off_transaction (
-    proposal_id              integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    client_id                integer not null references program_client(id) on delete restrict,
-    wallet_address           blob    not null check (length(wallet_address) = 20),
-    chain_id                 integer not null,
-    nonce                    integer not null,
-    gas_limit                integer not null,
-    max_fee_per_gas          blob    not null check (length(max_fee_per_gas) = 16),
-    max_priority_fee_per_gas blob    not null check (length(max_priority_fee_per_gas) = 16),
-    to_address               blob    not null check (length(to_address) = 20),
-    value                    blob    not null check (length(value) = 32),
-    input                    blob    not null
-) STRICT;
-
--- The grant an operator votes to creat
-create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant (
-    proposal_id              integer not null primary key references proposal (id) on delete cascade,
-    wallet_access_id         integer not null references evm_wallet_access (id) on delete restrict,
-    chain_id                 integer not null, -- EIP-155 chain ID
-    valid_from               integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no lower bound
-    valid_until              integer, -- unix timestamp (seconds), null = no upper bound
-    max_gas_fee_per_gas      blob check (max_gas_fee_per_gas is null or length(max_gas_fee_per_gas) = 32),
-    max_priority_fee_per_gas blob check (max_priority_fee_per_gas is null or length(max_priority_fee_per_gas) = 32),
-    rate_limit_count         integer, -- max transactions in window, null = unlimited
-    rate_limit_window_secs   integer, -- window duration in seconds, null = unlimited
-    check ((rate_limit_count is null) = (rate_limit_window_secs is null))
-) STRICT;
-
--- `specific = ether_transfer`
-create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_ether (
-    proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
-    window_secs integer not null,
-    max_volume  blob    not null check (length(max_volume) = 32)
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target (
-    id          integer not null primary key,
-    proposal_id integer not null references proposal_persistent_grant_ether (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
-    address     blob    not null check (length(address) = 20)
-) STRICT;
-
-create unique index if not exists uniq_proposal_ether_target on proposal_persistent_grant_ether_target (proposal_id, address);
-
--- `specific = token_transfer`
-create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_token (
-    proposal_id    integer not null primary key references proposal_persistent_grant (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
-    token_contract blob    not null check (length(token_contract) = 20),
-    receiver       blob check (receiver is null or length(receiver) = 20)
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists proposal_persistent_grant_token_limit (
-    id          integer not null primary key,
-    proposal_id integer not null references proposal_persistent_grant_token (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
-    window_secs integer not null,
-    max_volume  blob    not null check (length(max_volume) = 32)
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists proposal_vote (
-    id          integer not null primary key,
-    proposal_id integer not null references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    operator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    approve     integer not null check (approve in (0, 1)),
-    signature   blob    not null,
-    voted_at    integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    unique (proposal_id, operator_id)
-) STRICT;
-
-
--- The signature the vault produced for an approved transaction, by component.
---
--- secp256k1 signatures have three common encodings (Electrum v=27/28, raw parity,
--- ERC-2098 compact); a single blob would not say which one it holds. `y_parity` is
--- the raw bit -- add 27 to rebuild the Electrum form `Signature::as_bytes` emits.
-create table if not exists proposal_one_off_transaction_result (
-    proposal_id integer not null primary key
-        references proposal_one_off_transaction (proposal_id) on delete cascade,
-    r           blob    not null check (length(r) = 32),
-    s           blob    not null check (length(s) = 32),
-    y_parity    integer not null check (y_parity in (0, 1)),
-    created_at  integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
-) STRICT;
-
--- ===============================
--- Recovery Operators (§3.4/§3.5/§3.6)
--- ===============================
-
--- Encrypted Shamir shares for recovery operators (mirrors the `operator` table).
-create table if not exists recovery_operator (
-    id          integer not null primary key references recovery_operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    share       blob    not null,
-    share_nonce blob    not null,
-    share_salt  blob    not null,
-    created_at  integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    updated_at  integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
-) STRICT;
-
-create table if not exists recovery_operator_identity (
-    id         integer not null primary key,
-    public_key blob    not null unique,
-    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
-) STRICT;
-
--- One active wakeup request at a time. A request is pending when cancelled_at IS NULL
--- and requested_at + 14 days > now. It becomes active (recovery live) after 14 days.
-create table if not exists recovery_wakeup_request (
-    id           integer not null primary key,
-    requested_by integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    requested_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    cancelled_by integer references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    cancelled_at integer
-) STRICT;
-
--- Votes cast by recovery operators; only allowed on replace_operator proposals.
-create table if not exists recovery_proposal_vote (
-    id                   integer not null primary key,
-    proposal_id          integer not null references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
-    recovery_operator_id integer not null references recovery_operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
-    approve              integer not null check (approve in (0, 1)),
-    signature            blob    not null,
-    voted_at             integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
-    unique (proposal_id, recovery_operator_id)
-) STRICT;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/bootstrap.rs

@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
-use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
 use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
-
 use diesel::QueryDsl;
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 use kameo::{Actor, messages};
+
 use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
 use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
 use thiserror::Error;
 
+use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
 const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
 
 pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
     let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
 
-    let token = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
+    let token: String = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
-        String::default(),
+        Default::default(),
         |mut accum, char| {
             accum += char.to_string().as_str();
             accum
@@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ pub enum Error {
     #[error("Database error: {0}")]
     Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
 
-    #[error("I/O error: {0}")]
-    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
-
     #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
     Query(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+
+    #[error("I/O error: {0}")]
+    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
 }
 
 #[derive(Actor)]
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
         let row_count: i64 = {
             let mut conn = db.get().await?;
 
-            schema::operator::table
+            schema::useragent_client::table
                 .count()
                 .get_result(&mut conn)
                 .await?
@@ -69,13 +69,16 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
 impl Bootstrapper {
     #[message]
     pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
-        self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| {
+        match &self.token {
+            Some(expected) => {
                 let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
                 let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
 
                 let choice = expected_bytes.ct_eq(token_bytes);
                 bool::from(choice)
-        })
+            }
+            None => false,
+        }
     }
 
     #[message]

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/auth.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
+use arbiter_proto::{
+    ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
+    transport::{Bi, expect_message},
+};
+use chrono::Utc;
+use diesel::{
+    ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
+    dsl::insert_into, update,
+};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
+use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
+use tracing::error;
+
+use crate::{
+    actors::{
+        client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, ClientProfile},
+        flow_coordinator::{self, RequestClientApproval},
+        keyholder::KeyHolder,
+    },
+    crypto::integrity::{self, Verified, verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor},
+    db::{
+        self,
+        models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
+        schema::program_client,
+    },
+};
+
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("Database pool unavailable")]
+    DatabasePoolUnavailable,
+    #[error("Database operation failed")]
+    DatabaseOperationFailed,
+    #[error("Integrity check failed")]
+    IntegrityCheckFailed,
+    #[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
+    InvalidChallengeSolution,
+    #[error("Client approval request failed")]
+    ApproveError(#[from] ApproveError),
+    #[error("Transport error")]
+    Transport,
+}
+
+impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
+    fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
+        error!(?e, "Database error");
+        Self::DatabaseOperationFailed
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ApproveError {
+    #[error("Internal error")]
+    Internal,
+    #[error("Client connection denied by user agents")]
+    Denied,
+    #[error("Upstream error: {0}")]
+    Upstream(flow_coordinator::ApprovalError),
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub enum Inbound {
+    AuthChallengeRequest {
+        pubkey: VerifyingKey,
+        metadata: ClientMetadata,
+    },
+    AuthChallengeSolution {
+        signature: Signature,
+    },
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub enum Outbound {
+    AuthChallenge { pubkey: VerifyingKey, nonce: i32 },
+    AuthSuccess,
+}
+
+/// Returns the current nonce and client ID for a registered client.
+/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
+async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
+    db: &db::DatabasePool,
+    pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
+) -> Result<Option<(i32, i32)>, Error> {
+    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
+        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
+        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
+    })?;
+    program_client::table
+        .filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
+        .select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
+        .first::<(i32, i32)>(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .optional()
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
+            Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
+        })
+}
+
+/// Atomically increments the nonce and re-signs the integrity envelope.
+/// Returns the new nonce, which is used as the challenge nonce.
+async fn create_nonce(
+    db: &db::DatabasePool,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
+) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
+        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
+        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
+    })?;
+
+    conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
+        let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
+        Box::pin(async move {
+            let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(program_client::table)
+                .filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
+                .set(program_client::nonce.eq(program_client::nonce + 1))
+                .returning((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
+                .get_result(conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            integrity::sign_entity(
+                conn,
+                &keyholder,
+                &ClientCredentials {
+                    pubkey: *pubkey,
+                    nonce: new_nonce,
+                },
+                id,
+            )
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                error!(?e, "Integrity sign failed after nonce update");
+                Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
+            })?
+            .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+            Ok(new_nonce)
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+}
+
+async fn approve_new_client(
+    actors: &crate::actors::GlobalActors,
+    profile: ClientProfile,
+) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    let result = actors
+        .flow_coordinator
+        .ask(RequestClientApproval { client: profile })
+        .await;
+
+    match result {
+        Ok(true) => Ok(()),
+        Ok(false) => Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Denied)),
+        Err(SendError::HandlerError(e)) => {
+            error!(error = ?e, "Approval upstream error");
+            Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Upstream(e)))
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            error!(error = ?e, "Approval request to flow coordinator failed");
+            Err(Error::ApproveError(ApproveError::Internal))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+async fn insert_client(
+    db: &db::DatabasePool,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
+    metadata: &ClientMetadata,
+) -> Result<Verified<i32>, Error> {
+    use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
+    let metadata = metadata.clone();
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
+        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
+        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
+    })?;
+
+    conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
+        let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
+        Box::pin(async move {
+            const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
+
+            let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
+                .values((
+                    client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
+                    client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
+                    client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
+                ))
+                .returning(client_metadata::id)
+                .get_result::<i32>(conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            let client_id = insert_into(program_client::table)
+                .values((
+                    program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
+                    program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
+                    program_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
+                ))
+                .on_conflict_do_nothing()
+                .returning(program_client::id)
+                .get_result::<i32>(conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            let verified_id = integrity::sign_entity(
+                conn,
+                &keyholder,
+                &ClientCredentials {
+                    pubkey: *pubkey,
+                    nonce: NONCE_START,
+                },
+                client_id,
+            )
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new client key");
+                Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
+            })?
+            .unqualify_origin();
+
+            Ok(verified_id)
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+}
+
+async fn sync_client_metadata(
+    db: &db::DatabasePool,
+    client_id: i32,
+    metadata: &ClientMetadata,
+) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history};
+
+    let now = SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now());
+
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
+        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
+        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
+    })?;
+
+    conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
+        let metadata = metadata.clone();
+        Box::pin(async move {
+            let (current_metadata_id, current): (i32, ProgramClientMetadata) =
+                program_client::table
+                    .find(client_id)
+                    .inner_join(client_metadata::table)
+                    .select((
+                        program_client::metadata_id,
+                        ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
+                    ))
+                    .first(conn)
+                    .await?;
+
+            let unchanged = current.name == metadata.name
+                && current.description == metadata.description
+                && current.version == metadata.version;
+            if unchanged {
+                return Ok(());
+            }
+
+            insert_into(client_metadata_history::table)
+                .values((
+                    client_metadata_history::metadata_id.eq(current_metadata_id),
+                    client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id),
+                ))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
+                .values((
+                    client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
+                    client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
+                    client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
+                ))
+                .returning(client_metadata::id)
+                .get_result::<i32>(conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            update(program_client::table.find(client_id))
+                .set((
+                    program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
+                    program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
+                ))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            Ok::<(), diesel::result::Error>(())
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
+        Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
+    })
+}
+
+async fn challenge_client<T>(
+    transport: &mut T,
+    pubkey: VerifyingKey,
+    nonce: i32,
+) -> Result<(), Error>
+where
+    T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + ?Sized,
+{
+    transport
+        .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce }))
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
+            Error::Transport
+        })?;
+
+    let signature = expect_message(transport, |req: Inbound| match req {
+        Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => Some(signature),
+        _ => None,
+    })
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        error!(error = ?e, "Failed to receive challenge solution");
+        Error::Transport
+    })?;
+
+    let formatted = format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes());
+
+    pubkey.verify_strict(&formatted, &signature).map_err(|_| {
+        error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
+        Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
+    })?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub async fn authenticate<T>(
+    props: &mut ClientConnection,
+    transport: &mut T,
+) -> Result<Verified<i32>, Error>
+where
+    T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
+{
+    let Some(Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { pubkey, metadata }) = transport.recv().await else {
+        return Err(Error::Transport);
+    };
+
+    // fixme! triage needed: probable regretion since in match->Some get_current_nonce_and_id called only once instead of twice
+    let client_id = match get_current_nonce_and_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
+        Some((nonce, id)) => {
+            let mut db_conn = props.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
+                error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
+                Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
+            })?;
+
+            integrity::verify_entity(
+                &mut db_conn,
+                &props.actors.key_holder,
+                ClientCredentials { pubkey, nonce },
+                id,
+            )
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
+                Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
+            })?
+            .inherit()
+            .entity_id
+            .unqualify_origin()
+        }
+        None => {
+            approve_new_client(
+                &props.actors,
+                ClientProfile {
+                    pubkey,
+                    metadata: metadata.clone(),
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+            insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
+        }
+    };
+
+    sync_client_metadata(&props.db, *client_id, &metadata).await?;
+    let challenge_nonce = create_nonce(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
+    challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge_nonce).await?;
+
+    transport
+        .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth success");
+            Error::Transport
+        })?;
+
+    Ok(client_id)
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/mod.rs

@@ -1,35 +1,42 @@
-use crate::{
-    actors::GlobalActors, crypto::integrity::Integrable, db, peers::client::session::ClientSession,
-};
-use arbiter_crypto::authn;
-use arbiter_macros::Hashable;
 use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, transport::Bi};
-
 use kameo::actor::Spawn;
 use tracing::{error, info};
 
+use crate::{
+    actors::{GlobalActors, client::session::ClientSession},
+    crypto::integrity::{Integrable, hashing::Hashable},
+    db,
+};
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct ClientProfile {
-    pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+    pub pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
     pub metadata: ClientMetadata,
 }
 
-#[derive(Hashable)]
 pub struct ClientCredentials {
-    pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+    pub pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
+    pub nonce: i32,
 }
 
 impl Integrable for ClientCredentials {
     const KIND: &'static str = "client_credentials";
 }
 
+impl Hashable for ClientCredentials {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self.pubkey.as_bytes());
+        self.nonce.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
+
 pub struct ClientConnection {
     pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
     pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
 }
 
 impl ClientConnection {
-    pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
         Self { db, actors }
     }
 }
@@ -41,9 +48,7 @@ pub async fn connect_client<T>(mut props: ClientConnection, transport: &mut T)
 where
     T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
 {
-    let fut = auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport);
+    match auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport).await {
-    println!("authenticate future size: {}", size_of_val(&fut));
-    match fut.await {
         Ok(client_id) => {
             ClientSession::spawn(ClientSession::new(props, client_id));
             info!("Client authenticated, session started");

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/session.rs

@@ -1,26 +1,29 @@
-use super::ClientConnection;
-use crate::{
-    actors::{
-        GlobalActors,
-        evm::{ClientSignTransaction, SignTransactionError},
-        flow_coordinator::RegisterClient,
-        vault::VaultState,
-    },
-    db,
-    evm::VetError,
-};
-
-use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
 use kameo::{Actor, messages};
 use tracing::error;
 
+use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
+
+use crate::{
+    actors::{
+        client::ClientConnection,
+        evm::{ClientSignTransaction, SignTransactionError},
+        flow_coordinator::RegisterClient,
+        keyholder::KeyHolderState,
+    },
+    crypto::integrity::Verified,
+    evm::VetError,
+};
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+use crate::{actors::GlobalActors, db};
+
 pub struct ClientSession {
     props: ClientConnection,
-    client_id: i32,
+    client_id: Verified<i32>,
 }
 
 impl ClientSession {
-    pub(crate) const fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: i32) -> Self {
+    pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: Verified<i32>) -> Self {
         Self { props, client_id }
     }
 }
@@ -28,13 +31,13 @@ impl ClientSession {
 #[messages]
 impl ClientSession {
     #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<VaultState, Error> {
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
-        use crate::actors::vault::GetState;
+        use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
 
-        let vault_state = match self.props.actors.vault.ask(GetState {}).await {
+        let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
             Ok(state) => state,
             Err(err) => {
-                error!(?err, actor = "client", "vault.query.failed");
+                error!(?err, actor = "client", "keyholder.query.failed");
                 return Err(Error::Internal);
             }
         };
@@ -53,7 +56,7 @@ impl ClientSession {
             .actors
             .evm
             .ask(ClientSignTransaction {
-                client_id: self.client_id,
+                client_id: *self.client_id,
                 wallet_address,
                 transaction,
             })
@@ -91,11 +94,12 @@ impl Actor for ClientSession {
 }
 
 impl ClientSession {
-    pub const fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
         let props = ClientConnection::new(db, actors);
         Self {
             props,
-            client_id: 0,
+            client_id: Verified::new_unchecked(0),
         }
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/evm/mod.rs

@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
+use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
+use diesel::{
+    ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
+};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
+use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
+
 use crate::{
-    actors::{
+    actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
-        proposal_manager::events::ProposalApproved,
+    crypto::integrity::{self, Integrable, Verified, hashing::Hashable},
-        vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
-    },
-    crypto::integrity,
     db::{
         DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
-        models::{self, EvmWalletId, ProposalId},
+        models::{self},
-        proposal::{ProposalKind, grant_wallet_access, one_off_transaction, persistent_grant},
         schema,
     },
     evm::{
@@ -17,77 +21,92 @@ use crate::{
             ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
         },
     },
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
 };
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-
-use alloy::{
-    consensus::TxEip1559, network::TxSignerSync as _, primitives::Address, signers::Signature,
-};
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
-};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages, prelude::Message};
-use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
-use tracing::error;
 
 pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
 
+/// Hashable structure for wallet integrity protection.
+/// Binds the encrypted private key to the wallet address using HMAC.
+pub struct EvmWalletIntegrity {
+    pub address: Vec<u8>,       // 20-byte Ethereum address
+    pub aead_encrypted_id: i32, // Reference to encrypted key material
+}
+
+impl Hashable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(&self.address);
+        hasher.update(self.aead_encrypted_id.to_be_bytes());
+    }
+}
+
+impl Integrable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
+    const KIND: &'static str = "evm_wallet";
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum SignTransactionError {
     #[error("Wallet not found")]
     WalletNotFound,
 
+    #[error("Wallet integrity check failed")]
+    WalletIntegrityCheckFailed,
+
+    #[error(
+        "Decrypted key does not correspond to wallet address (CRITICAL: possible key substitution attack)"
+    )]
+    KeyAddressMismatch,
+
     #[error("Database error: {0}")]
     Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
 
-    #[error("Vault error: {0}")]
+    #[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
-    Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
+    Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
 
-    #[error("Vault mailbox error")]
+    #[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
-    VaultSend,
+    KeyholderSend,
 
     #[error("Signing error: {0}")]
     Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
 
     #[error("Policy error: {0}")]
     Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
+
+    #[error("Integrity error: {0}")]
+    Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum Error {
-    #[error("Vault error: {0}")]
+    #[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
-    Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
+    Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::Error),
 
-    #[error("Vault mailbox error")]
+    #[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
-    VaultSend,
+    KeyholderSend,
 
     #[error("Database error: {0}")]
     Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
 
     #[error("Integrity violation: {0}")]
     Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
-
-    #[error("Signing error: {0}")]
-    Sign(#[from] SignTransactionError),
 }
 
 #[derive(Actor)]
 pub struct EvmActor {
-    pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
+    pub keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
     pub db: DatabasePool,
     pub rng: StdRng,
     pub engine: evm::Engine,
 }
 
 impl EvmActor {
-    pub fn new(vault: ActorRef<Vault>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
         // is it safe to seed rng from system once?
         // todo: audit
         let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
-        let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), vault.clone());
+        let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), keyholder.clone());
         Self {
-            vault,
+            keyholder,
             db,
             rng,
             engine,
@@ -98,19 +117,19 @@ impl EvmActor {
 #[messages]
 impl EvmActor {
     #[message]
-    pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
+    pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(Verified<i32>, Address), Error> {
         let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);
 
         let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
 
         let aead_id: i32 = self
-            .vault
+            .keyholder
             .ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
             .await
-            .map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
+            .map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?;
 
         let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
+        let wallet_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
             .values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
                 address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
                 aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
@@ -120,11 +139,21 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .await
             .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
 
-        Ok((wallet_id, address))
+        // Sign integrity envelope to bind encrypted key to wallet address
+        let wallet_integrity = EvmWalletIntegrity {
+            address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
+            aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
+        };
+        let verified_wallet_id =
+            integrity::sign_entity(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, &wallet_integrity, wallet_id)
+                .await?
+                .unqualify_origin();
+
+        Ok((verified_wallet_id, address))
     }
 
     #[message]
-    pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(EvmWalletId, Address)>, Error> {
+    pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
         let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
         let rows: Vec<models::EvmWallet> = schema::evm_wallet::table
             .select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
@@ -142,11 +171,11 @@ impl EvmActor {
 #[messages]
 impl EvmActor {
     #[message]
-    pub async fn operator_create_grant(
+    pub async fn useragent_create_grant(
         &mut self,
         basic: SharedGrantSettings,
         grant: SpecificGrant,
-    ) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+    ) -> Result<integrity::Verified<i32>, Error> {
         match grant {
             SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self
                 .engine
@@ -168,27 +197,32 @@ impl EvmActor {
     }
 
     #[message]
-    pub async fn operator_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+        // let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+        // let keyholder = self.keyholder.clone();
 
-        let affected = diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
+        // diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| {
-            .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
+        //     Box::pin(async move {
-            .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()))
+        //         diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
-            .execute(&mut conn)
+        //             .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
-            .await
+        //             .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+        //             .execute(conn)
+        //             .await?;
 
-        if affected == 0 {
+        //         let signed = integrity::evm::load_signed_grant_by_basic_id(conn, grant_id).await?;
-            return Err(Error::Database(DatabaseError::from(
-                diesel::result::Error::NotFound,
-            )));
-        }
 
-        Ok(())
+        //         diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(())
+        //     })
+        // })
+        // .await
+        // .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+
+        // Ok(())
+        todo!()
     }
 
     #[message]
-    pub async fn operator_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
+    pub async fn useragent_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
         match self.engine.list_all_grants().await {
             Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
             Err(ListError::Database(db_err)) => Err(Error::Database(db_err)),
@@ -212,9 +246,23 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .optional()
             .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
             .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
+
+        // Verify wallet integrity envelope
+        let wallet = integrity::verify_entity(
+            &mut conn,
+            &self.keyholder,
+            EvmWalletIntegrity {
+                address: wallet.address.clone(),
+                aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
+            },
+            wallet.id,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::WalletIntegrityCheckFailed)?;
+
         let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
             .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.entity_id))
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
             .first(&mut conn)
             .await
@@ -247,9 +295,23 @@ impl EvmActor {
             .optional()
             .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
             .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
+
+        // Verify wallet integrity envelope to ensure encrypted key is bound to address
+        let wallet = integrity::verify_entity(
+            &mut conn,
+            &self.keyholder,
+            EvmWalletIntegrity {
+                address: wallet.address.clone(),
+                aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
+            },
+            wallet.id,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::WalletIntegrityCheckFailed)?;
+
         let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
             .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.entity_id))
             .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
             .first(&mut conn)
             .await
@@ -259,158 +321,26 @@ impl EvmActor {
         drop(conn);
 
         let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
-            .vault
+            .keyholder
             .ask(Decrypt {
                 aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
             })
             .await
-            .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
+            .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::KeyholderSend)?;
 
         let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;
 
+        // Verify that the decrypted key's derived address matches the wallet address
+        // This prevents an attacker from substituting one wallet's key with another's even if they compromised the DB
+        if signer.address() != wallet_address {
+            return Err(SignTransactionError::KeyAddressMismatch);
+        }
+
         self.engine
             .evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
             .await?;
 
+        use alloy::network::TxSignerSync as _;
         Ok(signer.sign_transaction_sync(&mut transaction)?)
     }
 }
-
-impl Message<ProposalApproved> for EvmActor {
-    type Reply = ();
-
-    /// Every subscriber sees every approval and acts only on the kinds it owns.
-    async fn handle(
-        &mut self,
-        msg: ProposalApproved,
-        _ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
-    ) -> Self::Reply {
-        let result = match msg.kind {
-            ProposalKind::GrantWalletAccess(settings) => self.grant_wallet_access(&settings).await,
-            ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(settings) => {
-                self.create_persistent_grant(*settings).await
-            }
-            ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(settings) => {
-                self.sign_one_off_transaction(msg.id, *settings).await
-            }
-            _ => return,
-        };
-
-        if let Err(error) = result {
-            error!(
-                ?error,
-                proposal_id = msg.id.to_raw(),
-                "Failed to execute an approved proposal"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl EvmActor {
-    async fn grant_wallet_access(
-        &mut self,
-        settings: &grant_wallet_access::Settings,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-        insert_into(schema::evm_wallet_access::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(EvmWalletId::from_raw(settings.wallet_id)),
-                schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(settings.client_id),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn create_persistent_grant(
-        &mut self,
-        grant: persistent_grant::Settings,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        use crate::evm::policies::{
-            TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit, ether_transfer, token_transfers,
-        };
-        use alloy::primitives::U256;
-        use chrono::Duration;
-
-        let volume = |limit: persistent_grant::VolumeLimit| VolumeRateLimit {
-            max_volume: U256::from_be_bytes(limit.max_volume),
-            window: Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs),
-        };
-
-        let basic = SharedGrantSettings {
-            wallet_access_id: grant.wallet_access_id,
-            chain: grant.chain_id,
-            valid_from: grant
-                .valid_from_secs
-                .and_then(|s| chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(s, 0)),
-            valid_until: grant
-                .valid_until_secs
-                .and_then(|s| chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(s, 0)),
-            max_gas_fee_per_gas: grant.max_gas_fee_per_gas.map(U256::from_be_bytes),
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: grant.max_priority_fee_per_gas.map(U256::from_be_bytes),
-            rate_limit: grant.rate_limit.map(|r| TransactionRateLimit {
-                count: r.count,
-                window: Duration::seconds(r.window_secs),
-            }),
-        };
-
-        let specific = match grant.specific {
-            persistent_grant::Specific::EtherTransfer { targets, limit } => {
-                SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(ether_transfer::Settings {
-                    target: targets.into_iter().map(Address::from).collect(),
-                    limit: volume(limit),
-                })
-            }
-            persistent_grant::Specific::TokenTransfer {
-                token_contract,
-                receiver,
-                volume_limits,
-            } => SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings {
-                token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
-                target: receiver.map(Address::from),
-                volume_limits: volume_limits.into_iter().map(volume).collect(),
-            }),
-        };
-
-        self.operator_create_grant(basic, specific).await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn sign_one_off_transaction(
-        &mut self,
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        tx: one_off_transaction::Settings,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        use alloy::{
-            eips::eip2930::AccessList,
-            primitives::{Bytes, TxKind, U256},
-        };
-
-        let transaction = TxEip1559 {
-            chain_id: tx.chain_id,
-            nonce: tx.nonce,
-            gas_limit: tx.gas_limit,
-            max_fee_per_gas: tx.max_fee_per_gas,
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: tx.max_priority_fee_per_gas,
-            to: TxKind::Call(Address::from(tx.to)),
-            value: U256::from_be_bytes(tx.value),
-            input: Bytes::from(tx.input),
-            access_list: AccessList::default(),
-        };
-
-        let signature = self
-            .client_sign_transaction(tx.client_id, Address::from(tx.wallet_address), transaction)
-            .await?;
-
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        one_off_transaction::store_signature(proposal_id, &signature, &mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/flow_coordinator/client_connect_approval.rs

@@ -1,26 +1,25 @@
-use crate::{
+use std::ops::ControlFlow;
-    actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
-    peers::{
-        client::ClientProfile,
-        operator::{OperatorSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
-    },
-};
 
 use kameo::{
     Actor, messages,
     prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
     reply::ReplySender,
 };
-use std::ops::ControlFlow;
+
+use crate::actors::{
+    client::ClientProfile,
+    flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
+    user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
+};
 
 pub struct Args {
     pub client: ClientProfile,
-    pub operators: Vec<ActorRef<OperatorSession>>,
+    pub user_agents: Vec<ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
     pub reply: ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>,
 }
 
 pub struct ClientApprovalController {
-    /// Number of operators that have not yet responded (approval or denial) or died.
+    /// Number of UAs that have not yet responded (approval or denial) or died.
     pending: usize,
     /// Number of approvals received so far.
     approved: usize,
@@ -42,21 +41,20 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
     async fn on_start(
         Args {
             client,
-            operators,
+            mut user_agents,
             reply,
         }: Self::Args,
         actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>,
     ) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
         let this = Self {
-            pending: operators.len(),
+            pending: user_agents.len(),
             approved: 0,
             reply: Some(reply),
         };
 
-        for operator in operators {
+        for user_agent in user_agents.drain(..) {
-            actor_ref.link(&operator).await;
+            actor_ref.link(&user_agent).await;
-
+            let _ = user_agent
-            let _ = operator
                 .tell(BeginNewClientApproval {
                     client: client.clone(),
                     controller: actor_ref.clone(),
@@ -73,10 +71,10 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
         _: ActorId,
         _: ActorStopReason,
     ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
-        // A linked operator died before responding — counts as a non-approval.
+        // A linked UA died before responding — counts as a non-approval.
         self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
         if self.pending == 0 {
-            // At least one operator didn't approve: deny.
+            // At least one UA didn't approve: deny.
             self.send_reply(Ok(false));
             return Ok(ControlFlow::Break(ActorStopReason::Normal));
         }
@@ -87,7 +85,7 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
 #[messages]
 impl ClientApprovalController {
     #[message(ctx)]
-    pub fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
+    pub async fn client_approval_answer(&mut self, approved: bool, ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>) {
         if !approved {
             // Denial wins immediately regardless of other pending responses.
             self.send_reply(Ok(false));
@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ impl ClientApprovalController {
         self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
 
         if self.pending == 0 {
-            // Every connected operator approved.
+            // Every connected UA approved.
             self.send_reply(Ok(true));
             ctx.stop();
         }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/flow_coordinator/mod.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,4 @@
-use crate::{
+use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
-    actors::{
-        flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
-        operator_registry::{GetConnected, OperatorRegistry},
-    },
-    peers::client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
-};
 
 use kameo::{
     Actor,
@@ -13,23 +7,20 @@ use kameo::{
     prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
     reply::DelegatedReply,
 };
-use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
 use tracing::info;
 
+use crate::actors::{
+    client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
+    flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
+    user_agent::session::UserAgentSession,
+};
+
 pub mod client_connect_approval;
 
+#[derive(Default)]
 pub struct FlowCoordinator {
+    pub user_agents: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
     pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
-    operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
-}
-
-impl FlowCoordinator {
-    pub fn new(operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            clients: HashMap::default(),
-            operator_registry,
-        }
-    }
 }
 
 impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
@@ -47,7 +38,13 @@ impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
         id: ActorId,
         _: ActorStopReason,
     ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
-        if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
+        if self.user_agents.remove(&id).is_some() {
+            info!(
+                ?id,
+                actor = "FlowCoordinator",
+                event = "useragent.disconnected"
+            );
+        } else if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
             info!(
                 ?id,
                 actor = "FlowCoordinator",
@@ -66,12 +63,23 @@ impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
 pub enum ApprovalError {
-    #[error("No operators connected")]
+    #[error("No user agents connected")]
-    NoOperatorsConnected,
+    NoUserAgentsConnected,
 }
 
 #[messages]
 impl FlowCoordinator {
+    #[message(ctx)]
+    pub async fn register_user_agent(
+        &mut self,
+        actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
+        ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
+    ) {
+        info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "useragent.connected");
+        ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
+        self.user_agents.insert(actor.id(), actor);
+    }
+
     #[message(ctx)]
     pub async fn register_client(
         &mut self,
@@ -93,19 +101,15 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
             unreachable!("Expected `request_client_approval` to have callback channel");
         };
 
-        let Ok(refs) = self.operator_registry.ask(GetConnected).await else {
+        let refs: Vec<_> = self.user_agents.values().cloned().collect();
-            reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoOperatorsConnected));
-            return reply;
-        };
-
         if refs.is_empty() {
-            reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoOperatorsConnected));
+            reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected));
             return reply;
         }
 
         ClientApprovalController::spawn(client_connect_approval::Args {
             client,
-            operators: refs,
+            user_agents: refs,
             reply: reply_sender,
         });
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/keyholder/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+use chrono::Utc;
+use diesel::{
+    ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
+    dsl::{insert_into, update},
+};
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+use hmac::Mac as _;
+use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
+use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
+use tracing::{error, info};
+
+use crate::{
+    crypto::{
+        KeyCell, derive_key,
+        encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
+        integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
+    },
+    safe_cell::SafeCell,
+};
+use crate::{
+    db::{
+        self,
+        models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
+        schema::{self},
+    },
+    safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
+};
+
+#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
+#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(KeyHolderState))]
+enum State {
+    #[default]
+    Unbootstrapped,
+    Sealed {
+        root_key_history_id: i32,
+    },
+    Unsealed {
+        root_key_history_id: i32,
+        root_key: KeyCell,
+    },
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum Error {
+    #[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")]
+    AlreadyBootstrapped,
+    #[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")]
+    NotBootstrapped,
+    #[error("Invalid key provided")]
+    InvalidKey,
+
+    #[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
+    NotFound,
+
+    #[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
+    Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
+
+    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
+    DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
+
+    #[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
+    DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
+
+    #[error("Broken database")]
+    BrokenDatabase,
+}
+
+/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
+/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
+/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
+#[derive(Actor)]
+pub struct KeyHolder {
+    db: db::DatabasePool,
+    state: State,
+}
+
+#[messages]
+impl KeyHolder {
+    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
+        let state = {
+            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
+
+            let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
+                .left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                .select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
+                .get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
+                .await?;
+
+            match root_key_history {
+                Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
+                    root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id,
+                },
+                None => State::Unbootstrapped,
+            }
+        };
+
+        Ok(Self { db, state })
+    }
+
+    // Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple keyholders write
+    // additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
+    async fn get_new_nonce(pool: &db::DatabasePool, root_key_id: i32) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
+        let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
+
+        let nonce = conn
+            .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
+                Box::pin(async move {
+                    let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
+                        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
+                        .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
+                        .first(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+                        error!(
+                            "Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
+                            root_key_id
+                        );
+                        Error::BrokenDatabase
+                    })?;
+                    nonce.increment();
+
+                    update(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                        .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
+                        .set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    Result::<_, Error>::Ok(nonce)
+                })
+            })
+            .await?;
+
+        Ok(nonce)
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
+            return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
+        }
+        let salt = v1::generate_salt();
+        let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
+        let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
+
+        // Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
+        let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default();
+        let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
+
+        let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| {
+            let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice();
+            seal_key
+                .encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
+                .map_err(|err| {
+                    error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
+                    Error::Encryption(err)
+                })
+        })?;
+
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+
+        let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
+        let root_key_history_id = conn
+            .transaction(|conn| {
+                Box::pin(async move {
+                    let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
+                        .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
+                            ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext,
+                            tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
+                            root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
+                            data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes,
+                            schema_version: 1,
+                            salt: salt.to_vec(),
+                        })
+                        .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
+                        .get_result(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
+                        .set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                    Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id)
+                })
+            })
+            .await?;
+
+        self.state = State::Unsealed {
+            root_key,
+            root_key_history_id,
+        };
+
+        info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully");
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let State::Sealed {
+            root_key_history_id,
+        } = &self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        // We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
+        let current_key = {
+            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+            schema::root_key_history::table
+                .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
+                .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+                .first(&mut conn)
+                .await?
+        };
+
+        let salt = &current_key.salt;
+        let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+            error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
+            Error::BrokenDatabase
+        })?;
+        let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
+
+        let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
+
+        let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(
+            |_| {
+                error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
+                Error::BrokenDatabase
+            },
+        )?;
+
+        seal_key
+            .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
+            .map_err(|err| {
+                error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
+                Error::InvalidKey
+            })?;
+
+        self.state = State::Unsealed {
+            root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
+            root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
+                error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
+                Error::BrokenDatabase
+            })?,
+        };
+
+        info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully");
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
+            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+            schema::aead_encrypted::table
+                .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+                .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
+                .first(&mut conn)
+                .await
+                .optional()?
+                .ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
+        };
+
+        let nonce = v1::Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+            error!(
+                "Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
+                aead_id
+            );
+            Error::BrokenDatabase
+        })?;
+        let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
+        root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
+        Ok(output)
+    }
+
+    // Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed {
+            root_key,
+            root_key_history_id,
+            ..
+        } = &mut self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        // Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
+        // Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
+        let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
+
+        let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
+        let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
+        root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
+
+        let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
+
+        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
+        let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
+            .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
+                ciphertext,
+                tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
+                current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
+                schema_version: 1,
+                associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
+                created_at: Utc::now().into(),
+            })
+            .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
+            .get_result(&mut conn)
+            .await?;
+
+        Ok(aead_id)
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub fn get_state(&self) -> KeyHolderState {
+        self.state.discriminant()
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub fn sign_integrity(&mut self, mac_input: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(i32, Vec<u8>), Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed {
+            root_key,
+            root_key_history_id,
+        } = &mut self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        let mut hmac = root_key
+            .0
+            .read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) {
+                Ok(v) => v,
+                Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
+            });
+        hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes());
+        hmac.update(&mac_input);
+
+        let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
+        Ok((*root_key_history_id, mac))
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub fn verify_integrity(
+        &mut self,
+        mac_input: Vec<u8>,
+        expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
+        key_version: i32,
+    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed {
+            root_key,
+            root_key_history_id,
+        } = &mut self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+
+        if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
+            return Ok(false);
+        }
+
+        let mut hmac = root_key
+            .0
+            .read_inline(|k| match HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k) {
+                Ok(v) => v,
+                Err(_) => unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"),
+            });
+        hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes());
+        hmac.update(&mac_input);
+
+        Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let State::Unsealed {
+            root_key_history_id,
+            ..
+        } = &self.state
+        else {
+            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
+        };
+        self.state = State::Sealed {
+            root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
+        };
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use diesel::SelectableHelper;
+
+    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+
+    use crate::{
+        db::{self},
+        safe_cell::SafeCell,
+    };
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
+        let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
+        let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
+        actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
+        actor
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    #[test_log::test]
+    async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
+        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+        let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
+        let root_key_history_id = match actor.state {
+            State::Unsealed {
+                root_key_history_id,
+                ..
+            } => root_key_history_id,
+            _ => panic!("expected unsealed state"),
+        };
+
+        let n1 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let n2 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
+
+        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+        let root_row: models::RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
+            .select(models::RootKeyHistory::as_select())
+            .first(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
+
+        let id = actor
+            .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
+            .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id))
+            .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
+            .first(&mut conn)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(),
+            "next write must advance nonce"
+        );
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/mod.rs

@@ -1,87 +1,47 @@
+use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
+use thiserror::Error;
+
 use crate::{
     actors::{
-        bootstrap::Bootstrapper,
+        bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
-        evm::EvmActor,
+        keyholder::KeyHolder,
-        flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
-        operator_registry::OperatorRegistry,
-        proposal_manager::{ProposalManager, events::ProposalApproved},
-        vault::Vault,
-        vault_coordinator::VaultCoordinator,
     },
     db,
 };
 
-use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
-use kameo_actors::{
-    DeliveryStrategy,
-    message_bus::{MessageBus, Register},
-};
-use thiserror::Error;
-
 pub mod bootstrap;
-pub mod evm;
+pub mod client;
+mod evm;
 pub mod flow_coordinator;
-pub mod operator_registry;
+pub mod keyholder;
-pub mod proposal_manager;
+pub mod user_agent;
-pub mod vault;
-pub mod vault_coordinator;
 
 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
 pub enum SpawnError {
     #[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
     Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
 
-    #[error("Failed to spawn Vault actor")]
+    #[error("Failed to spawn KeyHolder actor")]
-    Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
+    KeyHolder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
 }
 
 /// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct GlobalActors {
-    pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
+    pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
     pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
-    pub vault_coordinator: ActorRef<VaultCoordinator>,
     pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
-    pub operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
     pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
-    pub proposal_manager: ActorRef<ProposalManager>,
-    pub events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
 }
 
 impl GlobalActors {
-    pub fn spawn_message_bus() -> ActorRef<MessageBus> {
-        MessageBus::spawn(MessageBus::new(DeliveryStrategy::Guaranteed))
-    }
-
     pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
-        let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
+        let key_holder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?);
-        let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
-        let operator_registry = OperatorRegistry::spawn(OperatorRegistry::default());
-        let evm = EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db.clone()));
-        let vault_coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(
-            db.clone(),
-            key_holder.clone(),
-        ));
-        // Approved proposals are executed by whoever owns the kind, not by ProposalManager.
-        for recipient in [
-            evm.clone().recipient::<ProposalApproved>(),
-            vault_coordinator.clone().recipient::<ProposalApproved>(),
-            key_holder.clone().recipient::<ProposalApproved>(),
-        ] {
-            let _ = message_bus.tell(Register(recipient)).await;
-        }
-
         Ok(Self {
             bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
-            proposal_manager: ProposalManager::spawn(ProposalManager::new(db, message_bus.clone())),
+            evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
-            vault: key_holder,
+            key_holder,
-            vault_coordinator,
+            flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::default()),
-            flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::new(
-                operator_registry.clone(),
-            )),
-            operator_registry,
-            events: message_bus,
-            evm,
         })
     }
 }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/operator_registry.rs

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-use crate::peers::operator::OperatorSession;
-
-use kameo::{
-    Actor,
-    actor::{ActorId, ActorRef},
-    error::Infallible,
-    messages,
-    prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
-};
-use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
-use tracing::info;
-
-#[derive(Default)]
-pub struct OperatorRegistry {
-    connected: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<OperatorSession>>,
-}
-
-impl Actor for OperatorRegistry {
-    type Args = Self;
-
-    type Error = Infallible;
-
-    async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Ok(args)
-    }
-
-    async fn on_link_died(
-        &mut self,
-        _: WeakActorRef<Self>,
-        id: ActorId,
-        _: ActorStopReason,
-    ) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
-        if self.connected.remove(&id).is_some() {
-            info!(
-                ?id,
-                actor = "OperatorRegistry",
-                event = "operator.disconnected"
-            );
-        }
-        Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl OperatorRegistry {
-    #[message(ctx)]
-    pub async fn connect_operator(
-        &mut self,
-        actor: ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
-        ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
-    ) {
-        info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "OperatorRegistry", event = "operator.connected");
-        ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
-        self.connected.insert(actor.id(), actor);
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub fn get_connected(&self) -> Vec<ActorRef<OperatorSession>> {
-        self.connected.values().cloned().collect()
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager.rs

@@ -1,333 +0,0 @@
-use crate::{
-    actors::proposal_manager::{
-        events::ProposalApproved,
-        store::{DieselProposalStore, ProposalStore, Tally},
-    },
-    crypto::governance,
-    db::{
-        self,
-        models::{
-            NewProposalVote, NewRecoveryProposalVote, OperatorIdentityId, Proposal, ProposalId,
-            ProposalStatus, RecoveryOperatorIdentityId, SqliteTimestamp,
-        },
-        proposal::{ProposalKind, ProposalKindTag},
-    },
-};
-use chrono::Utc;
-use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
-use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use tracing::warn;
-
-pub mod events;
-pub mod store;
-
-pub const DEFAULT_TTL_SECS: u32 = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 7 days
-pub const MAX_TTL_SECS: u32 = DEFAULT_TTL_SECS;
-
-/// Recovery operators stay asleep for this long after a wake-up is requested, so the other
-/// operators have time to dispute it (§3.6).
-const WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS: i32 = 14 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 14 days
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum VoteOutcome {
-    Pending,
-    Approved,
-    Rejected,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum Error {
-    #[error("Proposal not found")]
-    ProposalNotFound,
-    #[error("Proposal is not pending")]
-    ProposalNotPending,
-    #[error("Proposal has expired")]
-    ProposalExpired,
-    #[error("Requested TTL exceeds the maximum of {} seconds", MAX_TTL_SECS)]
-    TtlTooLong,
-    #[error("Operator already voted on this proposal")]
-    AlreadyVoted,
-    #[error("Invalid vote signature")]
-    InvalidSignature,
-    #[error("Operator not found")]
-    OperatorNotFound,
-    #[error("Database connection error: {0}")]
-    DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
-    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
-    DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-    #[error("Proposal manager is unavailable")]
-    Unavailable,
-    #[error("Recovery operators are sleeping")]
-    RecoveryNotActive,
-    #[error("Recovery operators may only vote on operator replacement")]
-    NotAllowedForRecoveryOperator,
-    #[error("A recovery wake-up is already pending or active")]
-    WakeupAlreadyPending,
-    #[error("No active recovery wake-up to cancel")]
-    NoActiveWakeup,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct ProposalSummary {
-    pub id: ProposalId,
-    pub kind: ProposalKindTag,
-    pub initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    pub approve_count: i64,
-    pub reject_count: i64,
-}
-
-#[derive(Actor)]
-pub struct ProposalManager {
-    pub(crate) store: Arc<dyn ProposalStore>,
-    pub(crate) events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
-}
-
-impl ProposalManager {
-    pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Self {
-        Self::with_store(Arc::new(DieselProposalStore::new(db)), events)
-    }
-
-    /// Builds the actor over an arbitrary store, so tests can supply a mock.
-    pub(crate) const fn with_store(
-        store: Arc<dyn ProposalStore>,
-        events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
-    ) -> Self {
-        Self { store, events }
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl ProposalManager {
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn create_proposal(
-        &mut self,
-        kind: ProposalKind,
-        initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-        ttl_secs: Option<u32>,
-    ) -> Result<ProposalId, Error> {
-        let ttl = ttl_secs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_TTL_SECS);
-        if ttl > MAX_TTL_SECS {
-            return Err(Error::TtlTooLong);
-        }
-        let expires_at =
-            SqliteTimestamp::from(Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::seconds(i64::from(ttl)));
-
-        self.store.create(kind, initiator_id, expires_at).await
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn query_pending(&mut self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Vec<ProposalSummary> {
-        self.store
-            .pending_for(operator_id)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
-                warn!(?e, "query_pending failed");
-                vec![]
-            })
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn cast_vote(
-        &mut self,
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-        approve: bool,
-        signature: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<VoteOutcome, Error> {
-        let proposal = self.store.load(proposal_id).await?;
-
-        // Checked before the status check so AlreadyVoted takes priority.
-        if self.store.has_voted(proposal_id, operator_id).await? {
-            return Err(Error::AlreadyVoted);
-        }
-
-        Self::check_votable(&proposal)?;
-
-        let public_key = self.store.operator_public_key(operator_id).await?;
-        governance::verify_vote(&public_key, proposal_id, approve, &signature)
-            .map_err(|_| Error::InvalidSignature)?;
-
-        self.store
-            .record_vote(NewProposalVote {
-                proposal_id,
-                operator_id,
-                approve,
-                signature,
-            })
-            .await?;
-
-        let mut tally = self.store.tally(proposal_id).await?;
-        // §3.5: recovery operators only join the electorate once they are awake.
-        if !self.store.is_recovery_active().await? {
-            tally.total_recovery = 0;
-        }
-
-        self.settle(&proposal, &tally).await
-    }
-
-    /// §3.6: Any ordinary operator may request recovery wake-up.
-    /// Fails if a wake-up is already pending or active.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn request_recovery_wakeup(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if self.store.has_uncancelled_wakeup().await? {
-            return Err(Error::WakeupAlreadyPending);
-        }
-        self.store.request_wakeup(operator_id).await
-    }
-
-    /// §3.6: Any ordinary operator may cancel a pending wake-up request.
-    /// Fails if there is no uncancelled request.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn cancel_recovery_wakeup(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if self.store.cancel_wakeup(operator_id).await? {
-            Ok(())
-        } else {
-            Err(Error::NoActiveWakeup)
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// §3.5: Recovery operators may only vote on operator replacement proposals.
-    /// §3.6: Voting is gated behind recovery being active (14-day window elapsed).
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn cast_recovery_vote(
-        &mut self,
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-        approve: bool,
-        signature: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<VoteOutcome, Error> {
-        let proposal = self.store.load(proposal_id).await?;
-
-        if proposal.kind != ProposalKindTag::ReplaceOperator {
-            return Err(Error::NotAllowedForRecoveryOperator);
-        }
-
-        if !self.store.is_recovery_active().await? {
-            return Err(Error::RecoveryNotActive);
-        }
-
-        if self
-            .store
-            .has_recovery_voted(proposal_id, recovery_operator_id)
-            .await?
-        {
-            return Err(Error::AlreadyVoted);
-        }
-
-        Self::check_votable(&proposal)?;
-
-        let public_key = self
-            .store
-            .recovery_operator_public_key(recovery_operator_id)
-            .await?;
-        governance::verify_vote(&public_key, proposal_id, approve, &signature)
-            .map_err(|_| Error::InvalidSignature)?;
-
-        self.store
-            .record_recovery_vote(NewRecoveryProposalVote {
-                proposal_id,
-                recovery_operator_id,
-                approve,
-                signature,
-            })
-            .await?;
-
-        let tally = self.store.tally(proposal_id).await?;
-        self.settle(&proposal, &tally).await
-    }
-}
-
-impl ProposalManager {
-    /// A vote only counts while the proposal is still open.
-    fn check_votable(proposal: &Proposal) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if proposal.status != ProposalStatus::Pending {
-            return Err(Error::ProposalNotPending);
-        }
-        if proposal.expires_at.0 <= Utc::now() {
-            return Err(Error::ProposalExpired);
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Pure quorum arithmetic — no I/O, so the rules can be tested directly (§3.3).
-    ///
-    /// A proposal is rejected once approval has become unreachable: even if every voter
-    /// who has not spoken yet approved, the threshold could not be met.
-    #[must_use]
-    pub(crate) const fn evaluate_quorum(tally: &Tally, requires_full_quorum: bool) -> VoteOutcome {
-        let total_eligible = tally.total_ordinary + tally.total_recovery;
-
-        #[expect(
-            clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
-            clippy::cast_sign_loss,
-            clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
-            clippy::as_conversions,
-            reason = "operator counts are always small positive integers"
-        )]
-        // §3.3: key-rotation proposals require every eligible voter to approve.
-        // §3.5: when recovery is active, recovery operators are eligible too.
-        let threshold: i64 = if requires_full_quorum {
-            total_eligible
-        } else {
-            crate::crypto::shamir::shamir_threshold(tally.total_ordinary as usize) as i64
-        };
-
-        if tally.approve >= threshold {
-            VoteOutcome::Approved
-        } else if tally.reject > total_eligible - threshold {
-            VoteOutcome::Rejected
-        } else {
-            VoteOutcome::Pending
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Applies the quorum rules to a fresh tally and records whatever they decide.
-    async fn settle(&self, proposal: &Proposal, tally: &Tally) -> Result<VoteOutcome, Error> {
-        let outcome = Self::evaluate_quorum(tally, proposal.kind.requires_full_quorum());
-
-        match outcome {
-            VoteOutcome::Approved => self.announce_approval(proposal).await?,
-            VoteOutcome::Rejected => {
-                self.store
-                    .set_status(proposal.id, ProposalStatus::Rejected)
-                    .await?;
-            }
-            VoteOutcome::Pending => {}
-        }
-
-        Ok(outcome)
-    }
-
-    /// Marks the proposal approved and hands the outcome to whoever owns that kind.
-    ///
-    /// The outcome is published, not executed: this actor coordinates voting and nothing
-    /// else. Executors subscribe on the bus, so a vote is answered once the quorum is
-    /// recorded rather than once the effect has landed.
-    async fn announce_approval(&self, proposal: &Proposal) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        self.store
-            .set_status(proposal.id, ProposalStatus::Approved)
-            .await?;
-
-        let kind = self.store.load_kind(proposal.id, proposal.kind).await?;
-        let _ = self
-            .events
-            .tell(Publish(ProposalApproved {
-                id: proposal.id,
-                kind,
-            }))
-            .await;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests;

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager/events.rs

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-use crate::db::{models::ProposalId, proposal::ProposalKind};
-
-/// Published once a proposal reaches its approval threshold.
-///
-/// Executors subscribe on the global `MessageBus` and act on the kinds they own;
-/// `ProposalManager` does not know who acts on an outcome, or whether anyone does.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct ProposalApproved {
-    pub id: ProposalId,
-    pub kind: ProposalKind,
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager/store.rs

@@ -1,409 +0,0 @@
-//! Database access for [`super::ProposalManager`], behind a trait.
-//!
-//! The actor holds a `dyn ProposalStore` rather than a connection pool, so the quorum
-//! rules can be exercised against a mock instead of a live SQLite file.
-
-use super::{Error, ProposalSummary, WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS};
-use crate::db::{
-    self,
-    functions::unixepoch,
-    models::{
-        NewProposal, NewProposalVote, NewRecoveryProposalVote, NewRecoveryWakeupRequest,
-        OperatorIdentityId, Proposal, ProposalId, ProposalStatus, RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-        SqliteTimestamp,
-    },
-    proposal::{ProposalKind, ProposalKindTag},
-    schema,
-};
-
-use async_trait::async_trait;
-use chrono::Utc;
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl,
-    dsl::{exists, select},
-};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection as _, RunQueryDsl};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use strum::IntoDiscriminant as _;
-
-/// Everything the quorum rules need to know about one proposal's votes.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct Tally {
-    pub approve: i64,
-    pub reject: i64,
-    pub total_ordinary: i64,
-    pub total_recovery: i64,
-}
-
-#[cfg_attr(test, mockall::automock)]
-#[async_trait]
-pub trait ProposalStore: Send + Sync + 'static {
-    /// Writes the proposal and its kind-specific rows in one transaction.
-    async fn create(
-        &self,
-        kind: ProposalKind,
-        initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-        expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    ) -> Result<ProposalId, Error>;
-
-    async fn load(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Proposal, Error>;
-
-    async fn load_kind(&self, id: ProposalId, tag: ProposalKindTag) -> Result<ProposalKind, Error>;
-
-    async fn has_voted(
-        &self,
-        id: ProposalId,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error>;
-
-    async fn has_recovery_voted(
-        &self,
-        id: ProposalId,
-        recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error>;
-
-    async fn operator_public_key(&self, id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error>;
-
-    async fn recovery_operator_public_key(
-        &self,
-        id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error>;
-
-    async fn record_vote(&self, vote: NewProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error>;
-
-    async fn record_recovery_vote(&self, vote: NewRecoveryProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error>;
-
-    /// Vote counts for one proposal, alongside the size of each electorate.
-    async fn tally(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Tally, Error>;
-
-    async fn set_status(&self, id: ProposalId, status: ProposalStatus) -> Result<(), Error>;
-
-    /// Pending, unexpired proposals this operator has not voted on yet.
-    async fn pending_for(
-        &self,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<ProposalSummary>, Error>;
-
-    /// True once an uncancelled wake-up request has outlived the dispute window.
-    async fn is_recovery_active(&self) -> Result<bool, Error>;
-
-    /// True while any wake-up request stands, whether or not the window has elapsed.
-    async fn has_uncancelled_wakeup(&self) -> Result<bool, Error>;
-
-    async fn request_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<(), Error>;
-
-    /// Returns false when there was no uncancelled request to cancel.
-    async fn cancel_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<bool, Error>;
-}
-
-pub struct DieselProposalStore {
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-}
-
-impl DieselProposalStore {
-    pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Self {
-        Self { db }
-    }
-}
-
-/// `NotFound` means the row is absent, which every caller reports as its own error.
-fn missing(absent: Error) -> impl FnOnce(diesel::result::Error) -> Error {
-    move |e| match e {
-        diesel::result::Error::NotFound => absent,
-        other => Error::DatabaseQuery(other),
-    }
-}
-
-#[async_trait]
-impl ProposalStore for DieselProposalStore {
-    async fn create(
-        &self,
-        kind: ProposalKind,
-        initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-        expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    ) -> Result<ProposalId, Error> {
-        let id = self
-            .db
-            .get()
-            .await?
-            .transaction(async |conn| {
-                let id: ProposalId = diesel::insert_into(schema::proposal::table)
-                    .values(&NewProposal {
-                        kind: kind.discriminant(),
-                        initiator_id,
-                        expires_at,
-                    })
-                    .returning(schema::proposal::id)
-                    .get_result(conn)
-                    .await?;
-                db::proposal::insert_kind(conn, id, &kind).await?;
-                Ok::<_, diesel::result::Error>(id)
-            })
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(id)
-    }
-
-    async fn load(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Proposal, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        schema::proposal::table
-            .find(id)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(missing(Error::ProposalNotFound))
-    }
-
-    async fn load_kind(&self, id: ProposalId, tag: ProposalKindTag) -> Result<ProposalKind, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        db::proposal::load_kind(&mut conn, id, tag)
-            .await
-            .map_err(Error::from)
-    }
-
-    async fn has_voted(
-        &self,
-        id: ProposalId,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        select(exists(
-            schema::proposal_vote::table
-                .filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-                .filter(schema::proposal_vote::operator_id.eq(operator_id)),
-        ))
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .map_err(Error::from)
-    }
-
-    async fn has_recovery_voted(
-        &self,
-        id: ProposalId,
-        recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        select(exists(
-            schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table
-                .filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-                .filter(
-                    schema::recovery_proposal_vote::recovery_operator_id.eq(recovery_operator_id),
-                ),
-        ))
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .map_err(Error::from)
-    }
-
-    async fn operator_public_key(&self, id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        schema::operator_identity::table
-            .find(id)
-            .select(schema::operator_identity::public_key)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(missing(Error::OperatorNotFound))
-    }
-
-    async fn recovery_operator_public_key(
-        &self,
-        id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
-            .find(id)
-            .select(schema::recovery_operator_identity::public_key)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .map_err(missing(Error::OperatorNotFound))
-    }
-
-    async fn record_vote(&self, vote: NewProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        diesel::insert_into(schema::proposal_vote::table)
-            .values(&vote)
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn record_recovery_vote(&self, vote: NewRecoveryProposalVote) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        diesel::insert_into(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table)
-            .values(&vote)
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn tally(&self, id: ProposalId) -> Result<Tally, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
-        let ordinary_approve: i64 = schema::proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::approve.eq(true))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        let recovery_approve: i64 = schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-            .filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::approve.eq(true))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let ordinary_reject: i64 = schema::proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::approve.eq(false))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        let recovery_reject: i64 = schema::recovery_proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq(id))
-            .filter(schema::recovery_proposal_vote::approve.eq(false))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let total_ordinary: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        let total_recovery: i64 = schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(Tally {
-            approve: ordinary_approve + recovery_approve,
-            reject: ordinary_reject + recovery_reject,
-            total_ordinary,
-            total_recovery,
-        })
-    }
-
-    async fn set_status(&self, id: ProposalId, status: ProposalStatus) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        diesel::update(schema::proposal::table.find(id))
-            .set(schema::proposal::status.eq(status))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn pending_for(
-        &self,
-        operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<ProposalSummary>, Error> {
-        #[expect(
-            clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
-            clippy::as_conversions,
-            reason = "fixme! #84; this will break in 2038"
-        )]
-        let now_ts = Utc::now().timestamp() as i32;
-
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
-        let voted_ids: Vec<ProposalId> = schema::proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::operator_id.eq(operator_id))
-            .select(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id)
-            .load(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let proposals: Vec<Proposal> = schema::proposal::table
-            .filter(schema::proposal::status.eq(ProposalStatus::Pending))
-            .filter(schema::proposal::expires_at.gt(now_ts))
-            .filter(diesel::dsl::not(schema::proposal::id.eq_any(&voted_ids)))
-            .load(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let ids: Vec<ProposalId> = proposals.iter().map(|p| p.id).collect();
-        let tallies: Vec<(ProposalId, bool, i64)> = schema::proposal_vote::table
-            .filter(schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id.eq_any(&ids))
-            .group_by((
-                schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id,
-                schema::proposal_vote::approve,
-            ))
-            .select((
-                schema::proposal_vote::proposal_id,
-                schema::proposal_vote::approve,
-                diesel::dsl::count_star(),
-            ))
-            .load(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let mut by_proposal: HashMap<ProposalId, (i64, i64)> = HashMap::new();
-        for (proposal_id, approve, count) in tallies {
-            let entry = by_proposal.entry(proposal_id).or_insert((0, 0));
-            if approve {
-                entry.0 += count;
-            } else {
-                entry.1 += count;
-            }
-        }
-
-        Ok(proposals
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|p| {
-                let (approve_count, reject_count) =
-                    by_proposal.get(&p.id).copied().unwrap_or((0, 0));
-                ProposalSummary {
-                    id: p.id,
-                    kind: p.kind,
-                    initiator_id: p.initiator_id,
-                    expires_at: p.expires_at,
-                    approve_count,
-                    reject_count,
-                }
-            })
-            .collect())
-    }
-
-    async fn is_recovery_active(&self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        select(exists(
-            schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table
-                .filter(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.is_null())
-                .filter(
-                    schema::recovery_wakeup_request::requested_at
-                        .le(unixepoch("now") - WAKEUP_DELAY_SECS),
-                ),
-        ))
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .map_err(Error::from)
-    }
-
-    async fn has_uncancelled_wakeup(&self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        select(exists(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table.filter(
-            schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.is_null(),
-        )))
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await
-        .map_err(Error::from)
-    }
-
-    async fn request_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        diesel::insert_into(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table)
-            .values(&NewRecoveryWakeupRequest {
-                requested_by: operator_id,
-            })
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    async fn cancel_wakeup(&self, operator_id: OperatorIdentityId) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        let rows = diesel::update(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::table)
-            .filter(schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.is_null())
-            .set((
-                schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_by.eq(Some(operator_id)),
-                schema::recovery_wakeup_request::cancelled_at.eq(Some(SqliteTimestamp::now())),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        Ok(rows > 0)
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/proposal_manager/tests.rs

@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
-//! The quorum rules, exercised without a database.
-//!
-//! These assertions are the point of [`super::store::ProposalStore`]: until the actor took
-//! its data through a trait, checking that two of three operators carry an ordinary
-//! proposal meant opening SQLite and registering operators first.
-
-use super::{
-    ProposalManager, VoteOutcome,
-    store::{MockProposalStore, Tally},
-};
-use crate::{
-    actors::GlobalActors,
-    crypto::governance::vote_message,
-    db::{
-        models::{OperatorIdentityId, Proposal, ProposalId, ProposalStatus, SqliteTimestamp},
-        proposal::ProposalKindTag,
-    },
-};
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{SigningContext, SigningKey};
-use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-const fn tally(approve: i64, reject: i64, ordinary: i64, recovery: i64) -> Tally {
-    Tally {
-        approve,
-        reject,
-        total_ordinary: ordinary,
-        total_recovery: recovery,
-    }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn simple_majority_approves_at_two_of_three() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(2, 0, 3, 0), false),
-        VoteOutcome::Approved
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn one_of_three_is_not_yet_a_majority() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(1, 0, 3, 0), false),
-        VoteOutcome::Pending
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn full_quorum_kind_needs_every_voter() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(2, 0, 3, 0), true),
-        VoteOutcome::Pending,
-        "two of three must not carry a key-rotation proposal"
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn recovery_voters_count_towards_full_quorum() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(3, 0, 2, 1), true),
-        VoteOutcome::Approved
-    );
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(2, 0, 2, 1), true),
-        VoteOutcome::Pending,
-        "the sleeping recovery operator still owes a vote"
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn rejection_is_decided_once_approval_is_unreachable() {
-    // Threshold is 2 of 3, so two rejections leave at most one approval available.
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(0, 2, 3, 0), false),
-        VoteOutcome::Rejected
-    );
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(0, 1, 3, 0), false),
-        VoteOutcome::Pending,
-        "one rejection still leaves two approvals reachable"
-    );
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn a_single_rejection_sinks_a_full_quorum_proposal() {
-    assert_eq!(
-        ProposalManager::evaluate_quorum(&tally(2, 1, 3, 0), true),
-        VoteOutcome::Rejected
-    );
-}
-
-fn pending_proposal(id: ProposalId, kind: ProposalKindTag) -> Proposal {
-    let now = Utc::now();
-    Proposal {
-        id,
-        kind,
-        initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(1),
-        created_at: SqliteTimestamp::from(now),
-        expires_at: SqliteTimestamp::from(now + Duration::days(1)),
-        status: ProposalStatus::Pending,
-    }
-}
-
-/// The mock earns its keep here: reaching quorum must flip the stored status to
-/// `Approved` exactly once. Signature verification stays real -- only the database is
-/// stubbed out.
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn reaching_quorum_marks_the_proposal_approved() {
-    let id = ProposalId::from_raw(1);
-    let voter = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(1);
-    let key = SigningKey::generate();
-    let signature = key
-        .sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
-        .expect("signing a vote must succeed");
-    let public_key = key.public_key().to_bytes();
-
-    let mut store = MockProposalStore::new();
-    store
-        .expect_load()
-        .returning(move |id| Ok(pending_proposal(id, ProposalKindTag::TriggerRekey)));
-    store.expect_has_voted().returning(|_, _| Ok(false));
-    store
-        .expect_operator_public_key()
-        .returning(move |_| Ok(public_key.clone()));
-    store.expect_record_vote().returning(|_| Ok(()));
-    store.expect_is_recovery_active().returning(|| Ok(false));
-    store.expect_tally().returning(|_| Ok(tally(1, 0, 1, 0)));
-    store
-        .expect_set_status()
-        .withf(move |got, status| *got == id && *status == ProposalStatus::Approved)
-        .times(1)
-        .returning(|_, _| Ok(()));
-    store
-        .expect_load_kind()
-        .returning(|_, _| Ok(crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind::TriggerRekey));
-
-    let mut manager =
-        ProposalManager::with_store(Arc::new(store), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus());
-
-    let outcome = manager
-        .cast_vote(id, voter, true, signature.to_bytes())
-        .await
-        .expect("a valid vote must be accepted");
-
-    assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Approved);
-}
-
-/// A vote that does not reach the threshold must leave the stored status alone.
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn a_vote_short_of_quorum_does_not_touch_the_status() {
-    let id = ProposalId::from_raw(7);
-    let voter = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(2);
-    let key = SigningKey::generate();
-    let signature = key
-        .sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
-        .expect("signing a vote must succeed");
-    let public_key = key.public_key().to_bytes();
-
-    let mut store = MockProposalStore::new();
-    store
-        .expect_load()
-        .returning(move |id| Ok(pending_proposal(id, ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient)));
-    store.expect_has_voted().returning(|_, _| Ok(false));
-    store
-        .expect_operator_public_key()
-        .returning(move |_| Ok(public_key.clone()));
-    store.expect_record_vote().returning(|_| Ok(()));
-    store.expect_is_recovery_active().returning(|| Ok(false));
-    store.expect_tally().returning(|_| Ok(tally(1, 0, 3, 0)));
-    store.expect_set_status().never();
-
-    let mut manager =
-        ProposalManager::with_store(Arc::new(store), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus());
-
-    let outcome = manager
-        .cast_vote(id, voter, true, signature.to_bytes())
-        .await
-        .expect("a valid vote must be accepted");
-
-    assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Pending);
-}
-
-/// A sleeping recovery electorate must not raise the bar for an ordinary proposal.
-#[tokio::test]
-async fn sleeping_recovery_operators_do_not_count_towards_quorum() {
-    let id = ProposalId::from_raw(9);
-    let voter = OperatorIdentityId::from_raw(3);
-    let key = SigningKey::generate();
-    let signature = key
-        .sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
-        .expect("signing a vote must succeed");
-    let public_key = key.public_key().to_bytes();
-
-    let mut store = MockProposalStore::new();
-    store
-        .expect_load()
-        .returning(move |id| Ok(pending_proposal(id, ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient)));
-    store.expect_has_voted().returning(|_, _| Ok(false));
-    store
-        .expect_operator_public_key()
-        .returning(move |_| Ok(public_key.clone()));
-    store.expect_record_vote().returning(|_| Ok(()));
-    store.expect_is_recovery_active().returning(|| Ok(false));
-    // Two recovery operators exist but are asleep, so the threshold stays at 1 of 1.
-    store.expect_tally().returning(|_| Ok(tally(1, 0, 1, 2)));
-    store.expect_set_status().times(1).returning(|_, _| Ok(()));
-    store.expect_load_kind().returning(|_, _| {
-        Ok(crate::db::proposal::ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(
-            crate::db::proposal::approve_sdk_client::Settings { client_id: 1 },
-        ))
-    });
-
-    let mut manager =
-        ProposalManager::with_store(Arc::new(store), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus());
-
-    let outcome = manager
-        .cast_vote(id, voter, true, signature.to_bytes())
-        .await
-        .expect("a valid vote must be accepted");
-
-    assert_eq!(outcome, VoteOutcome::Approved);
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/auth.rs

@@ -1,19 +1,18 @@
-use super::{Credentials, OperatorConnection};
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge};
 use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
-
-use state::{
-    AuthContext, AuthError, AuthEvents, AuthStateMachine, AuthStates, ChallengeRequest,
-    ChallengeSolution,
-};
 use tracing::error;
 
+use crate::actors::user_agent::{
+    AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection,
+    auth::state::{AuthContext, AuthStateMachine},
+};
+
 mod state;
+use state::*;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub enum Inbound {
     AuthChallengeRequest {
-        pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+        pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
         bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
     },
     AuthChallengeSolution {
@@ -31,23 +30,32 @@ pub enum Error {
 }
 
 impl Error {
-    fn internal(details: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+    #[track_caller]
-        Self::Internal {
+    pub(super) fn internal(details: impl Into<String>, err: &impl std::fmt::Debug) -> Self {
-            details: details.into(),
+        let details = details.into();
-        }
+        let caller = std::panic::Location::caller();
+        error!(
+            caller_file = %caller.file(),
+            caller_line = caller.line(),
+            caller_column = caller.column(),
+            details = %details,
+            error = ?err,
+            "Internal error"
+        );
+
+        Self::Internal { details }
     }
 }
 
 impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
     fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
-        error!(?e, "Database error");
+        Self::internal("Database error", &e)
-        Self::internal("Database error")
     }
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub enum Outbound {
-    AuthChallenge { challenge: AuthChallenge },
+    AuthChallenge { nonce: i32 },
     AuthSuccess,
 }
 
@@ -55,11 +63,12 @@ fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
     match payload {
         Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
             pubkey,
-            bootstrap_token,
+            bootstrap_token: None,
-        } => AuthEvents::AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest {
+        } => AuthEvents::AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest { pubkey }),
+        Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
             pubkey,
-            bootstrap_token,
+            bootstrap_token: Some(token),
-        }),
+        } => AuthEvents::BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }),
         Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => {
             AuthEvents::ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution {
                 solution: signature,
@@ -69,21 +78,22 @@ fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
 }
 
 pub async fn authenticate<T>(
-    props: &mut OperatorConnection,
+    props: &mut UserAgentConnection,
-    transport: &mut T,
+    transport: T,
-) -> Result<Credentials, Error>
+) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Error>
 where
-    T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
+    T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send,
 {
     let mut state = AuthStateMachine::new(AuthContext::new(props, transport));
 
     loop {
+        // `state` holds a mutable reference to `props` so we can't access it directly here
         let Some(payload) = state.context_mut().transport.recv().await else {
             return Err(Error::Transport);
         };
 
         match state.process_event(parse_auth_event(payload)).await {
-            Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(result)) => return Ok(result.clone()),
+            Ok(AuthStates::AuthOk(key)) => return Ok(key.clone()),
             Err(AuthError::ActionFailed(err)) => {
                 error!(?err, "State machine action failed");
                 return Err(err);

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/auth/state.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
+use tracing::error;
+
+use super::Error;
+use crate::{
+    actors::{
+        bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
+        keyholder::KeyHolder,
+        user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentCredentials, auth::Outbound},
+    },
+    crypto::integrity,
+    db::{DatabasePool, schema::useragent_client},
+};
+
+pub struct ChallengeRequest {
+    pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
+}
+
+pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
+    pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
+    pub token: String,
+}
+
+pub struct ChallengeContext {
+    pub challenge_nonce: i32,
+    pub key: AuthPublicKey,
+}
+
+pub struct ChallengeSolution {
+    pub solution: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+smlang::statemachine!(
+    name: Auth,
+    custom_error: true,
+    transitions: {
+        *Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
+        Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
+        SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
+    }
+);
+
+/// Returns the current nonce, ready to use for the challenge nonce.
+async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
+    db: &DatabasePool,
+    key: &AuthPublicKey,
+) -> Result<(i32, i32), Error> {
+    let mut db_conn = db
+        .get()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
+    db_conn
+        .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
+            Box::pin(async move {
+                useragent_client::table
+                    .filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(key.to_stored_bytes()))
+                    .filter(useragent_client::key_type.eq(key.key_type()))
+                    .select((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
+                    .first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
+                    .await
+            })
+        })
+        .await
+        .optional()
+        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?
+        .ok_or_else(|| {
+            error!(?key, "Public key not found in database");
+            Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
+        })
+}
+
+async fn verify_integrity(
+    db: &DatabasePool,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
+) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    let mut db_conn = db
+        .get()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
+
+    let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?;
+
+    let attestation_status = integrity::check_entity_attestation(
+        &mut db_conn,
+        keyholder,
+        &UserAgentCredentials {
+            pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
+            nonce,
+        },
+        id,
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Integrity verification failed", &e))?;
+
+    use integrity::AttestationStatus as AS;
+    // SAFETY (policy): challenge auth must work in both vault states.
+    // While sealed, integrity checks can only report `Unavailable` because key material is not
+    // accessible. While unsealed, the same check can report `Attested`.
+    // This path intentionally accepts both outcomes to keep challenge auth available across state
+    // transitions; stricter verification is enforced in sensitive post-auth flows.
+    match attestation_status {
+        AS::Attested | AS::Unavailable => Ok(()),
+    }
+}
+
+async fn create_nonce(
+    db: &DatabasePool,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
+) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+    let mut db_conn = db
+        .get()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
+    let new_nonce = db_conn
+        .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
+            Box::pin(async move {
+                let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(useragent_client::table)
+                    .filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_stored_bytes()))
+                    .filter(useragent_client::key_type.eq(pubkey.key_type()))
+                    .set(useragent_client::nonce.eq(useragent_client::nonce + 1))
+                    .returning((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
+                    .get_result(conn)
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?;
+
+                integrity::sign_entity(
+                    conn,
+                    keyholder,
+                    &UserAgentCredentials {
+                        pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
+                        nonce: new_nonce,
+                    },
+                    id,
+                )
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database error", &e))?
+                .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(new_nonce)
+            })
+        })
+        .await?;
+    Ok(new_nonce)
+}
+
+async fn register_key(
+    db: &DatabasePool,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
+) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
+    let key_type = pubkey.key_type();
+    let mut conn = db
+        .get()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
+
+    conn.transaction(|conn| {
+        Box::pin(async move {
+            const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
+
+            let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(useragent_client::table)
+                .values((
+                    useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
+                    useragent_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
+                    useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type),
+                ))
+                .returning(useragent_client::id)
+                .get_result(conn)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?;
+
+            if let Err(e) = integrity::sign_entity(
+                conn,
+                keyholder,
+                &UserAgentCredentials {
+                    pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
+                    nonce: NONCE_START,
+                },
+                id,
+            )
+            .await
+            {
+                match e {
+                    integrity::Error::Keyholder(
+                        crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped,
+                    ) => {
+                        // IMPORTANT: bootstrap-token auth must work before the vault has a root key.
+                        // We intentionally allow creating the DB row first and backfill envelopes
+                        // after bootstrap/unseal to keep the bootstrap flow possible.
+                    }
+                    other => {
+                        return Err(Error::internal("Failed to register public key", &other));
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
+        })
+    })
+    .await?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub struct AuthContext<'a, T> {
+    pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
+    pub(super) transport: T,
+}
+
+impl<'a, T> AuthContext<'a, T> {
+    pub fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: T) -> Self {
+        Self { conn, transport }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
+where
+    T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<super::Outbound, Error>> + Send,
+{
+    type Error = Error;
+
+    async fn prepare_challenge(
+        &mut self,
+        ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
+    ) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
+        verify_integrity(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
+
+        let nonce = create_nonce(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
+
+        self.transport
+            .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }))
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
+                Error::Transport
+            })?;
+
+        Ok(ChallengeContext {
+            challenge_nonce: nonce,
+            key: pubkey,
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[allow(missing_docs)]
+    #[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
+    async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
+        &mut self,
+        BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
+    ) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
+        let token_ok: bool = self
+            .conn
+            .actors
+            .bootstrapper
+            .ask(ConsumeToken {
+                token: token.clone(),
+            })
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token", &e))?;
+
+        if !token_ok {
+            error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
+            return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
+        }
+
+        match token_ok {
+            true => {
+                register_key(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
+                self.transport
+                    .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
+                Ok(pubkey)
+            }
+            false => {
+                error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
+                self.transport
+                    .send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
+                Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[allow(missing_docs)]
+    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
+    async fn verify_solution(
+        &mut self,
+        ChallengeContext {
+            challenge_nonce,
+            key,
+        }: &ChallengeContext,
+        ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
+    ) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
+        let formatted = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(*challenge_nonce, &key.to_stored_bytes());
+
+        let valid = match key {
+            AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(vk) => {
+                let sig = solution.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
+                    error!(?solution, "Invalid Ed25519 signature length");
+                    Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
+                })?;
+                vk.verify_strict(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
+            }
+            AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(vk) => {
+                use k256::ecdsa::signature::Verifier as _;
+                let sig = k256::ecdsa::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+                    error!(?solution, "Invalid ECDSA signature bytes");
+                    Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
+                })?;
+                vk.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
+            }
+            AuthPublicKey::Rsa(pk) => {
+                use rsa::signature::Verifier as _;
+                let verifying_key = rsa::pss::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha256>::new(pk.clone());
+                let sig = rsa::pss::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+                    error!(?solution, "Invalid RSA signature bytes");
+                    Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
+                })?;
+                verifying_key.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
+            }
+        };
+
+        match valid {
+            true => {
+                self.transport
+                    .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
+                Ok(key.clone())
+            }
+            false => {
+                self.transport
+                    .send(Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution))
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
+                Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+use crate::{
+    actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile},
+    crypto::integrity::Integrable,
+    db::{self, models::KeyType},
+};
+
+/// Abstraction over Ed25519 / ECDSA-secp256k1 / RSA public keys used during the auth handshake.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub enum AuthPublicKey {
+    Ed25519(ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey),
+    /// Compressed SEC1 public key; signature bytes are raw 64-byte (r||s).
+    EcdsaSecp256k1(k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey),
+    /// RSA-2048+ public key (Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager); signature bytes are PSS+SHA-256.
+    Rsa(rsa::RsaPublicKey),
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct UserAgentCredentials {
+    pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
+    pub nonce: i32,
+}
+
+impl Integrable for UserAgentCredentials {
+    const KIND: &'static str = "useragent_credentials";
+}
+
+impl AuthPublicKey {
+    /// Canonical bytes stored in DB and echoed back in the challenge.
+    /// Ed25519: raw 32 bytes. ECDSA: SEC1 compressed 33 bytes. RSA: DER-encoded SPKI.
+    pub fn to_stored_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        match self {
+            AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(k) => k.to_bytes().to_vec(),
+            // SEC1 compressed (33 bytes) is the natural compact format for secp256k1
+            AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(k) => k.to_encoded_point(true).as_bytes().to_vec(),
+            AuthPublicKey::Rsa(k) => {
+                use rsa::pkcs8::EncodePublicKey as _;
+                #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
+                k.to_public_key_der()
+                    .expect("rsa SPKI encoding is infallible")
+                    .to_vec()
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn key_type(&self) -> KeyType {
+        match self {
+            AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(_) => KeyType::Ed25519,
+            AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(_) => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
+            AuthPublicKey::Rsa(_) => KeyType::Rsa,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<(KeyType, Vec<u8>)> for AuthPublicKey {
+    type Error = &'static str;
+
+    fn try_from(value: (KeyType, Vec<u8>)) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        let (key_type, bytes) = value;
+        match key_type {
+            KeyType::Ed25519 => {
+                let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| "invalid Ed25519 key length")?;
+                let key = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&bytes)
+                    .map_err(|_e| "invalid Ed25519 key")?;
+                Ok(AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(key))
+            }
+            KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => {
+                let point =
+                    k256::EncodedPoint::from_bytes(&bytes).map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
+                let key = k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_encoded_point(&point)
+                    .map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
+                Ok(AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(key))
+            }
+            KeyType::Rsa => {
+                use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
+                let key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&bytes)
+                    .map_err(|_e| "invalid RSA key")?;
+                Ok(AuthPublicKey::Rsa(key))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum OutOfBand {
+    ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
+    ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey },
+}
+
+pub struct UserAgentConnection {
+    pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
+    pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
+}
+
+impl UserAgentConnection {
+    pub fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
+        Self { db, actors }
+    }
+}
+
+pub mod auth;
+pub mod session;
+
+pub use auth::authenticate;
+pub use session::UserAgentSession;
+
+use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
+
+impl Hashable for AuthPublicKey {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self.to_stored_bytes());
+    }
+}
+
+impl Hashable for UserAgentCredentials {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.pubkey.hash(hasher);
+        self.nonce.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/session.rs

@@ -1,19 +1,21 @@
-use super::{Credentials, OutOfBand, OperatorConnection};
-use crate::{
-    actors::{
-        flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
-        operator_registry::ConnectOperator,
-    },
-    peers::client::ClientProfile,
-};
-use arbiter_crypto::authn;
-use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
-
-use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
 use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};
+
+use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
+use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
 use thiserror::Error;
 use tracing::error;
 
+use crate::actors::{
+    client::ClientProfile,
+    flow_coordinator::{RegisterUserAgent, client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController},
+    user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection},
+};
+
+mod state;
+use state::{DummyContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine};
+
 #[derive(Debug, Error)]
 pub enum Error {
     #[error("State transition failed")]
@@ -45,33 +47,56 @@ impl Error {
 }
 
 pub struct PendingClientApproval {
-    pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
     controller: ActorRef<ClientApprovalController>,
 }
 
-pub struct OperatorSession {
+pub struct UserAgentSession {
-    props: OperatorConnection,
+    props: UserAgentConnection,
-    credentials: Credentials,
+    state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
     sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,
 
-    pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>,
+    pending_client_approvals: HashMap<VerifyingKey, PendingClientApproval>,
 }
 
-pub mod handlers;
+pub mod connection;
 
-impl OperatorSession {
+impl UserAgentSession {
-    pub(crate) fn new(props: OperatorConnection, credentials: Credentials, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
+    pub(crate) fn new(props: UserAgentConnection, sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>) -> Self {
         Self {
             props,
-            credentials,
+            state: UserAgentStateMachine::new(DummyContext),
             sender,
-            pending_client_approvals: HashMap::default(),
+            pending_client_approvals: Default::default(),
         }
     }
+
+    pub fn new_test(db: crate::db::DatabasePool, actors: crate::actors::GlobalActors) -> Self {
+        struct DummySender;
+
+        #[async_trait]
+        impl Sender<OutOfBand> for DummySender {
+            async fn send(
+                &mut self,
+                _item: OutOfBand,
+            ) -> Result<(), arbiter_proto::transport::Error> {
+                Ok(())
+            }
+        }
+
+        Self::new(UserAgentConnection::new(db, actors), Box::new(DummySender))
+    }
+
+    fn transition(&mut self, event: UserAgentEvents) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        self.state.process_event(event).map_err(|e| {
+            error!(?e, "State transition failed");
+            Error::State
+        })?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
 }
 
 #[messages]
-impl OperatorSession {
+impl UserAgentSession {
     #[message]
     pub async fn begin_new_client_approval(
         &mut self,
@@ -87,41 +112,39 @@ impl OperatorSession {
         {
             error!(
                 ?e,
-                actor = "operator",
+                actor = "user_agent",
                 event = "failed to announce new client connection"
             );
             return;
         }
 
-        self.pending_client_approvals.insert(
+        self.pending_client_approvals
-            client.pubkey.to_bytes(),
+            .insert(client.pubkey, PendingClientApproval { controller });
-            PendingClientApproval {
-                pubkey: client.pubkey,
-                controller,
-            },
-        );
     }
 }
 
-impl Actor for OperatorSession {
+impl Actor for UserAgentSession {
     type Args = Self;
 
     type Error = Error;
 
-    async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, this: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+    async fn on_start(
+        args: Self::Args,
+        this: kameo::prelude::ActorRef<Self>,
+    ) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
         args.props
             .actors
-            .operator_registry
+            .flow_coordinator
-            .ask(ConnectOperator {
+            .ask(RegisterUserAgent {
                 actor: this.clone(),
             })
             .await
             .map_err(|err| {
                 error!(
                     ?err,
-                    "Failed to register operator connection with operator registry"
+                    "Failed to register user agent connection with flow coordinator"
                 );
-                Error::internal("Failed to register operator connection with operator registry")
+                Error::internal("Failed to register user agent connection with flow coordinator")
             })?;
         Ok(args)
     }
@@ -135,23 +158,19 @@ impl Actor for OperatorSession {
         let cancelled_pubkey = self
             .pending_client_approvals
             .iter()
-            .find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(k.clone()));
+            .find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(*k));
 
-        if let Some(pubkey_bytes) = cancelled_pubkey {
+        if let Some(pubkey) = cancelled_pubkey {
-            let Some(approval) = self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey_bytes) else {
+            self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey);
-                return Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()));
-            };
 
             if let Err(e) = self
                 .sender
-                .send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel {
+                .send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey })
-                    pubkey: approval.pubkey,
-                })
                 .await
             {
                 error!(
                     ?e,
-                    actor = "operator",
+                    actor = "user_agent",
                     event = "failed to announce client connection cancellation"
                 );
             }

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/session/connection.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,592 @@
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+
+use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
+use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+use kameo::error::SendError;
+use kameo::messages;
+use kameo::prelude::Context;
+use tracing::{error, info};
+use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
+
+use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
+use crate::actors::user_agent::session::Error;
+use crate::db::models::{
+    EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
+};
+use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
+use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
+use crate::{
+    actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
+    crypto::integrity::{self, Verified},
+};
+use crate::{
+    actors::{
+        evm::{
+            ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
+            UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentDeleteGrant, UseragentListGrants,
+        },
+        keyholder::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
+        user_agent::session::{
+            UserAgentSession,
+            state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
+        },
+        user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentCredentials},
+    },
+    db::schema::useragent_client,
+    safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
+};
+
+fn is_vault_sealed_from_evm<M>(err: &SendError<M, crate::actors::evm::Error>) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        err,
+        SendError::HandlerError(crate::actors::evm::Error::Keyholder(
+            keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped
+        )) | SendError::HandlerError(crate::actors::evm::Error::Integrity(
+            crate::crypto::integrity::Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
+        ))
+    )
+}
+
+impl UserAgentSession {
+    async fn backfill_useragent_integrity(&self) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
+        let keyholder = self.props.actors.key_holder.clone();
+
+        conn.transaction(|conn| {
+            Box::pin(async move {
+                let rows: Vec<(i32, i32, Vec<u8>, crate::db::models::KeyType)> =
+                    useragent_client::table
+                        .select((
+                            useragent_client::id,
+                            useragent_client::nonce,
+                            useragent_client::public_key,
+                            useragent_client::key_type,
+                        ))
+                        .load(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                for (id, nonce, public_key, key_type) in rows {
+                    let pubkey = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, public_key)).map_err(|e| {
+                        Error::internal(format!("Invalid user-agent key in db: {e}"))
+                    })?;
+
+                    integrity::sign_entity(
+                        conn,
+                        &keyholder,
+                        &UserAgentCredentials { pubkey, nonce },
+                        id,
+                    )
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|e| {
+                        Error::internal(format!("Failed to backfill user-agent integrity: {e}"))
+                    })?
+                    .drop_verification_provenance();
+                }
+
+                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
+            })
+        })
+        .await?;
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn take_unseal_secret(&mut self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), Error> {
+        let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
+            error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
+            return Err(Error::internal("Invalid state for unseal encrypted key"));
+        };
+
+        let ephemeral_secret = {
+            #[allow(
+                clippy::unwrap_used,
+                reason = "Mutex poison is unrecoverable and should panic"
+            )]
+            let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
+            let secret = secret_lock.take();
+            match secret {
+                Some(secret) => secret,
+                None => {
+                    drop(secret_lock);
+                    error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
+                    return Err(Error::internal("Ephemeral secret already taken"));
+                }
+            }
+        };
+
+        Ok((ephemeral_secret, unseal_context.client_public_key))
+    }
+
+    fn decrypt_client_key_material(
+        ephemeral_secret: EphemeralSecret,
+        client_public_key: PublicKey,
+        nonce: &[u8],
+        ciphertext: &[u8],
+        associated_data: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
+        let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
+
+        let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_public_key);
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
+
+        let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
+
+        let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
+            cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
+        });
+
+        match decryption_result {
+            Ok(_) => Ok(key_buffer),
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
+                Err(())
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub struct UnsealStartResponse {
+    pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Error)]
+pub enum UnsealError {
+    #[error("Invalid key provided for unsealing")]
+    InvalidKey,
+    #[error("Internal error during unsealing process")]
+    General(#[from] super::Error),
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Error)]
+pub enum BootstrapError {
+    #[error("Invalid key provided for bootstrapping")]
+    InvalidKey,
+    #[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
+    AlreadyBootstrapped,
+
+    #[error("Internal error during bootstrapping process")]
+    General(#[from] super::Error),
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Error)]
+pub enum SignTransactionError {
+    #[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
+    Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
+
+    #[error("Internal signing error")]
+    Internal,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Error)]
+pub enum GrantMutationError {
+    #[error("Vault is sealed")]
+    VaultSealed,
+
+    #[error("Internal grant mutation error")]
+    Internal,
+}
+
+#[messages]
+impl UserAgentSession {
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn handle_unseal_request(
+        &mut self,
+        client_pubkey: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
+    ) -> Result<UnsealStartResponse, Error> {
+        let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
+        let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
+
+        self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
+            secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
+            client_public_key: client_pubkey,
+        }))?;
+
+        Ok(UnsealStartResponse {
+            server_pubkey: public_key,
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
+        &mut self,
+        nonce: Vec<u8>,
+        ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
+        associated_data: Vec<u8>,
+    ) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
+        let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
+            Ok(values) => values,
+            Err(Error::State) => {
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
+            }
+            Err(_err) => {
+                return Err(Error::internal("Failed to take unseal secret").into());
+            }
+        };
+
+        let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
+            ephemeral_secret,
+            client_public_key,
+            &nonce,
+            &ciphertext,
+            &associated_data,
+        ) {
+            Ok(buffer) => buffer,
+            Err(()) => {
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
+            }
+        };
+
+        match self
+            .props
+            .actors
+            .key_holder
+            .ask(TryUnseal {
+                seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(_) => {
+                self.backfill_useragent_integrity().await?;
+                info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
+                Ok(())
+            }
+            Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::InvalidKey)) => {
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
+            }
+            Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
+                error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                Err(Error::internal("Vault actor error").into())
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
+        &mut self,
+        nonce: Vec<u8>,
+        ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
+        associated_data: Vec<u8>,
+    ) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
+        let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
+            Ok(values) => values,
+            Err(Error::State) => {
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
+            }
+            Err(err) => return Err(err.into()),
+        };
+
+        let seal_key_buffer = match Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
+            ephemeral_secret,
+            client_public_key,
+            &nonce,
+            &ciphertext,
+            &associated_data,
+        ) {
+            Ok(buffer) => buffer,
+            Err(()) => {
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
+            }
+        };
+
+        match self
+            .props
+            .actors
+            .key_holder
+            .ask(Bootstrap {
+                seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(_) => {
+                self.backfill_useragent_integrity().await?;
+                info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
+                Ok(())
+            }
+            Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                Err(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)
+            }
+            Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
+                error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to bootstrap vault");
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to keyholder");
+                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
+                Err(BootstrapError::General(Error::internal(
+                    "Vault actor error",
+                )))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[messages]
+impl UserAgentSession {
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(&mut self) -> Result<KeyHolderState, Error> {
+        use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
+
+        let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
+            Ok(state) => state,
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "keyholder.query.failed");
+                return Err(Error::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
+            }
+        };
+
+        Ok(vault_state)
+    }
+}
+
+#[messages]
+impl UserAgentSession {
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<(Verified<i32>, Address), Error> {
+        match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
+            Ok(address) => Ok(address),
+            Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
+                "EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
+            ))),
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
+                Err(Error::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, Error> {
+        match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
+            Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
+                Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM wallets"))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[messages]
+impl UserAgentSession {
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, GrantMutationError> {
+        match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
+            Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
+            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
+                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
+        &mut self,
+        basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
+        grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
+    ) -> Result<Verified<i32>, GrantMutationError> {
+        match self
+            .props
+            .actors
+            .evm
+            .ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
+            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
+                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(
+        &mut self,
+        grant_id: i32,
+    ) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
+        match self
+            .props
+            .actors
+            .evm
+            .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant {
+                _grant_id: grant_id,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(()) => Ok(()),
+            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
+                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
+        &mut self,
+        client_id: i32,
+        wallet_address: Address,
+        transaction: TxEip1559,
+    ) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
+        match self
+            .props
+            .actors
+            .evm
+            .ask(ClientSignTransaction {
+                client_id,
+                wallet_address,
+                transaction,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
+            Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
+                Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
+                Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
+        &mut self,
+        entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
+        conn.transaction(|conn| {
+            Box::pin(async move {
+                use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
+
+                for entry in entries {
+                    diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
+                        .values(&entry)
+                        .on_conflict_do_nothing()
+                        .execute(conn)
+                        .await?;
+                }
+
+                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
+            })
+        })
+        .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
+        &mut self,
+        entries: Vec<i32>,
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
+        conn.transaction(|conn| {
+            Box::pin(async move {
+                use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
+                for entry in entries {
+                    diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
+                        .filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                        .await?;
+                }
+
+                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
+            })
+        })
+        .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, Error> {
+        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
+        use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
+        let access_entries = evm_wallet_access::table
+            .select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
+            .load::<_>(&mut conn)
+            .await?;
+        Ok(access_entries)
+    }
+}
+
+#[messages]
+impl UserAgentSession {
+    #[message(ctx)]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
+        &mut self,
+        approved: bool,
+        pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
+        ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
+    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let pending_approval = match self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey) {
+            Some(approval) => approval,
+            None => {
+                error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
+                return Err(Error::internal("Unknown client in connection response"));
+            }
+        };
+
+        pending_approval
+            .controller
+            .tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
+            .await
+            .map_err(|err| {
+                error!(
+                    ?err,
+                    "Failed to send client approval response to controller"
+                );
+                Error::internal("Failed to send client approval response to controller")
+            })?;
+
+        ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[message]
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, Error> {
+        use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
+        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
+
+        let clients = program_client::table
+            .inner_join(client_metadata::table)
+            .select((
+                ProgramClient::as_select(),
+                ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
+            ))
+            .load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
+            .await?;
+
+        Ok(clients)
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/session/state.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+
+use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
+
+pub struct UnsealContext {
+    pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
+    pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
+}
+
+smlang::statemachine!(
+    name: UserAgent,
+    custom_error: false,
+    transitions: {
+        *Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
+        WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
+        WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
+    }
+);
+
+pub struct DummyContext;
+impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
+    #[allow(missing_docs)]
+    #[allow(clippy::unused_unit)]
+    fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
+        Ok(event_data)
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/vault/mod.rs

@@ -1,581 +0,0 @@
-use crate::{
-    actors::proposal_manager::events::ProposalApproved,
-    crypto::{
-        KeyCell,
-        encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
-        integrity::{self, v1::HmacSha256},
-    },
-    db::{
-        self,
-        models::{self, RootKeyHistory, RootKeyHistoryId},
-        proposal::ProposalKind,
-        schema,
-    },
-};
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-
-use chrono::Utc;
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
-    dsl::{insert_into, update},
-};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
-use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages, prelude::Message};
-use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
-use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
-use tracing::{error, info};
-
-pub mod events {
-    #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-    pub struct Bootstrapped;
-
-    #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-    pub struct Unsealed;
-
-    #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-    pub struct VaultResealed;
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum Error {
-    #[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
-    AlreadyBootstrapped,
-    #[error("Vault is not bootstrapped")]
-    NotBootstrapped,
-    #[error("Vault is sealed")]
-    Sealed,
-    #[error("Invalid key provided")]
-    InvalidKey,
-
-    #[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
-    NotFound,
-
-    #[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
-    Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
-
-    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
-    DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
-
-    #[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
-    DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-
-    #[error("Broken database")]
-    BrokenDatabase,
-}
-
-struct Unsealed {
-    root_key_history_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
-    root_key: KeyCell,
-}
-
-#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
-#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(VaultState))]
-enum State {
-    #[default]
-    Unbootstrapped,
-
-    Sealed {
-        root_key_history_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
-    },
-    Unsealed(Unsealed),
-}
-
-/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
-///
-/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
-/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
-#[derive(Actor)]
-pub struct Vault {
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-    state: State,
-    events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
-}
-
-impl Vault {
-    pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
-        let state = {
-            let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-
-            let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
-                .left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
-                .select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
-                .get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
-                .await?;
-
-            match root_key_history {
-                Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
-                    root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id,
-                },
-                None => State::Unbootstrapped,
-            }
-        };
-
-        Ok(Self { db, state, events })
-    }
-
-    // Exclusive transaction to avoid race conditions if multiple vaults write
-    // additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
-    async fn get_new_nonce(
-        pool: &db::DatabasePool,
-        root_key_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
-    ) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
-        let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
-
-        let nonce = conn
-            .exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
-                let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
-                    .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
-                    .select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
-                    .first(&mut *conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-                let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
-                    error!(
-                        "Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={:#?}",
-                        root_key_id
-                    );
-                    Error::BrokenDatabase
-                })?;
-                nonce.increment();
-
-                update(schema::root_key_history::table)
-                    .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
-                    .set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
-                    .execute(&mut *conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(nonce)
-            })
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(nonce)
-    }
-
-    const fn expect_unsealed(state: &mut State) -> Result<&mut Unsealed, Error> {
-        match state {
-            State::Unsealed(unsealed) => Ok(unsealed),
-            State::Unbootstrapped => Err(Error::NotBootstrapped),
-            State::Sealed { .. } => Err(Error::Sealed),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl Vault {
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, mut seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if !matches!(&self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
-            return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
-        }
-
-        let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
-
-        // Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
-        let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default();
-        let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
-
-        // Generate salt (kept for schema compat)
-        let root_key_salt = v1::generate_salt();
-
-        let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|rk| {
-            seal_key
-                .encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, rk.as_slice())
-                .map_err(|err| {
-                    error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
-                    Error::Encryption(err)
-                })
-        })?;
-
-        let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
-        let root_key_history_id = conn
-            .transaction(async |conn| {
-                let root_key_history_id = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
-                    .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
-                        ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext.clone(),
-                        tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
-                        root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
-                        data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes.clone(),
-                        schema_version: 1,
-                        salt: root_key_salt.to_vec(),
-                    })
-                    .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
-                    .get_result(&mut *conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-                update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
-                    .set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
-                    .execute(&mut *conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-                Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(RootKeyHistoryId::from_raw(
-                    root_key_history_id,
-                ))
-            })
-            .await?;
-
-        self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
-            root_key,
-            root_key_history_id,
-        });
-
-        info!("Vault bootstrapped successfully");
-        let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, mut seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let State::Sealed {
-            root_key_history_id,
-        } = &self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
-        };
-        let root_key_history_id = *root_key_history_id;
-
-        // We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive work
-        let current_key = {
-            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-            schema::root_key_history::table
-                .filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
-                .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
-                .first(&mut conn)
-                .await?
-        };
-
-        let nonce =
-            Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
-                error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
-                Error::BrokenDatabase
-            })?;
-
-        let mut root_key_bytes = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
-        seal_key
-            .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key_bytes)
-            .map_err(|err| {
-                error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
-                Error::InvalidKey
-            })?;
-
-        let root_key = KeyCell::try_from(root_key_bytes).map_err(|()| {
-            error!("Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
-            Error::BrokenDatabase
-        })?;
-
-        self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
-            root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
-            root_key,
-        });
-
-        info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
-        let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Unsealed)).await;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Re-encrypts the root key with `new_seal_key` and records a new root_key_history row.
-    /// Called after a Shamir re-key so the old seal key is no longer sufficient to unseal.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn rekey_root_key(&mut self, mut new_seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let Unsealed {
-            root_key,
-            root_key_history_id,
-        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-
-        let new_nonce = Nonce::default();
-        let new_salt = v1::generate_salt();
-
-        let new_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|rk| {
-            new_seal_key
-                .encrypt(&new_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, rk.as_slice())
-                .map_err(|err| {
-                    error!(?err, "Fatal rekey error");
-                    Error::Encryption(err)
-                })
-        })?;
-
-        let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
-
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        let new_root_key_history_id: i32 = conn
-            .transaction(async |conn| {
-                let new_id = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
-                    .values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
-                        ciphertext: new_ciphertext,
-                        tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
-                        root_key_encryption_nonce: new_nonce.to_vec(),
-                        data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce.to_vec(),
-                        schema_version: 1,
-                        salt: new_salt.to_vec(),
-                    })
-                    .returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
-                    .get_result::<i32>(&mut *conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-                update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
-                    .set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(new_id))
-                    .execute(&mut *conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-                Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(new_id)
-            })
-            .await?;
-
-        *root_key_history_id = RootKeyHistoryId::from_raw(new_root_key_history_id);
-        info!("Vault root key rekeyed successfully");
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let Unsealed {
-            root_key_history_id,
-            ..
-        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-
-        self.state = State::Sealed {
-            root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
-        };
-        let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-// Server-side cryptographic operations
-#[messages]
-impl Vault {
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
-        let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-
-        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
-            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-            schema::aead_encrypted::table
-                .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
-                .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
-                .first(&mut conn)
-                .await
-                .optional()?
-                .ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
-        };
-
-        let nonce = Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
-            error!(
-                "Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
-                aead_id
-            );
-            Error::BrokenDatabase
-        })?;
-        let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
-        root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
-        Ok(output)
-    }
-
-    // Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-        let Unsealed {
-            root_key,
-            root_key_history_id,
-        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-
-        // Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
-        // Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
-        let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
-
-        let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
-        let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
-        root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
-
-        let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
-
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
-            .values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
-                ciphertext,
-                tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
-                current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
-                schema_version: 1,
-                associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
-                created_at: Utc::now().into(),
-            })
-            .returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(aead_id)
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub fn get_state(&self) -> VaultState {
-        self.state.discriminant()
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub fn sign_integrity(
-        &mut self,
-        mac_input: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<(RootKeyHistoryId, Vec<u8>), Error> {
-        let Unsealed {
-            root_key,
-            root_key_history_id,
-        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-
-        let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
-            HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
-                .unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
-        });
-        hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_raw().to_be_bytes());
-        hmac.update(&mac_input);
-
-        let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
-        Ok((*root_key_history_id, mac))
-    }
-
-    #[message]
-    pub fn verify_integrity(
-        &mut self,
-        mac_input: Vec<u8>,
-        expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
-        key_version: RootKeyHistoryId,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let Unsealed {
-            root_key,
-            root_key_history_id,
-        } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
-
-        if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
-            HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
-                .unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
-        });
-        hmac.update(&key_version.to_raw().to_be_bytes());
-        hmac.update(&mac_input);
-
-        Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
-    }
-}
-
-impl Message<ProposalApproved> for Vault {
-    type Reply = ();
-
-    /// Every subscriber sees every approval and acts only on the kinds it owns.
-    async fn handle(
-        &mut self,
-        msg: ProposalApproved,
-        _ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
-    ) -> Self::Reply {
-        let ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient(settings) = msg.kind else {
-            return;
-        };
-
-        if let Err(error) = self.approve_sdk_client(settings.client_id).await {
-            error!(
-                ?error,
-                proposal_id = msg.id.to_raw(),
-                "Failed to execute an approved proposal"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl Vault {
-    /// Attests an approved SDK client with the root key.
-    ///
-    /// Builds the envelope from its parts rather than calling `integrity::sign_entity`,
-    /// which would have this actor ask itself for a signature and deadlock.
-    async fn approve_sdk_client(&mut self, client_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        use crate::peers::client::ClientCredentials;
-        use arbiter_crypto::authn;
-
-        // Cloned so the connection does not hold a borrow of `self` across `sign_integrity`.
-        let db = self.db.clone();
-        let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-
-        let pubkey_bytes: Vec<u8> = schema::program_client::table
-            .find(client_id)
-            .select(schema::program_client::public_key)
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        let pubkey =
-            authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey_bytes.as_slice()).map_err(|()| Error::InvalidKey)?;
-        let credentials = ClientCredentials { pubkey };
-
-        let (entity_id, mac_input) = integrity::envelope_input(&credentials, client_id);
-        let (key_version, mac) = self.sign_integrity(mac_input)?;
-
-        integrity::store_envelope::<ClientCredentials>(&mut conn, entity_id, key_version, mac)
-            .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::actors::GlobalActors;
-    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::SafeCellHandle as _;
-
-    use super::*;
-
-    async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
-        let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        actor.bootstrap(KeyCell::from([0u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
-        actor
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    #[test_log::test]
-    async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
-        let State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
-            root_key_history_id,
-            ..
-        }) = actor.state
-        else {
-            panic!("expected unsealed state");
-        };
-
-        let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let n2 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
-
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        let root_row: RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
-            .select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
-
-        let id = actor
-            .create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
-            .filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id))
-            .select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
-            .first(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(),
-            "next write must advance nonce"
-        );
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/vault_coordinator/mod.rs

@@ -1,780 +0,0 @@
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages, prelude::Message};
-use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore as _};
-use tracing::error;
-
-use crate::{
-    actors::{
-        proposal_manager::events::ProposalApproved,
-        vault::{Bootstrap, RekeyRootKey, TryUnseal, Vault},
-    },
-    crypto::{KeyCell, derive_key, encryption::v1::Nonce, shamir, shamir::shamir_threshold},
-    db::{
-        self, models,
-        proposal::{ProposalKind, replace_operator},
-        schema,
-    },
-};
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum Error {
-    #[error("Already coordinating a bootstrap")]
-    AlreadyBootstrapping,
-    #[error("Already coordinating an unseal")]
-    AlreadyUnsealing,
-    #[error("Rekey not in progress")]
-    NotRekeying,
-    #[error("Bootstrap not in progress")]
-    NotBootstrapping,
-    #[error("Unseal not in progress")]
-    NotUnsealing,
-    #[error("Operator already contributed")]
-    DuplicateContribution,
-    #[error("Operator not found in database")]
-    OperatorNotFound,
-    #[error("Invalid passphrase (decryption failed)")]
-    InvalidPassphrase,
-    #[error("Shamir error: {0}")]
-    Shamir(String),
-    #[error("Database connection error: {0}")]
-    DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
-    #[error("Database query error: {0}")]
-    DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-    #[error("Encryption error")]
-    Encryption,
-    #[error("Vault error")]
-    VaultError,
-    #[error("Two-operator vaults require at least one recovery share")]
-    TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery,
-    #[error("Broken database")]
-    BrokenDatabase,
-}
-
-// Passphrases stored as plain Vec<u8> (not SafeCell) so CoordinatorState is Sync.
-// They are ephemeral and dropped immediately after use.
-enum CoordinatorState {
-    Idle,
-    Bootstrapping {
-        declared_count: usize,
-        recovery_count: usize,
-        passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-        recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    },
-    Unsealing {
-        threshold: usize,
-        ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-        recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    },
-    /// Shamir re-key after `replace_operator` or `trigger_rekey` is approved (§3.3).
-    /// Collects new passphrases from all current operators, then generates a fresh seal key,
-    /// re-splits it, and re-encrypts the vault root key.
-    Rekeying {
-        ordinary_count: usize,
-        recovery_count: usize,
-        passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-        recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    },
-}
-
-#[derive(Actor)]
-pub struct VaultCoordinator {
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-    vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
-    state: CoordinatorState,
-}
-
-impl VaultCoordinator {
-    pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, vault: ActorRef<Vault>) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            db,
-            vault,
-            state: CoordinatorState::Idle,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-const SHARE_AAD: &[u8] = b"arbiter/shamir-share/v1";
-
-fn encrypt_share(
-    passphrase_bytes: Vec<u8>,
-    share: &[u8],
-) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>), Error> {
-    let mut share_salt = vec![0u8; 32];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut share_salt);
-
-    let mut passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase_bytes);
-    let mut share_seal_key = derive_key(&mut passphrase_cell, &share_salt);
-
-    let nonce = Nonce::default();
-    let encrypted_share = share_seal_key
-        .encrypt(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, share)
-        .map_err(|_| Error::Encryption)?;
-
-    Ok((encrypted_share, nonce.to_vec(), share_salt))
-}
-
-fn decrypt_share(
-    passphrase_bytes: Vec<u8>,
-    encrypted_share: Vec<u8>,
-    share_nonce_bytes: &[u8],
-    share_salt: &[u8],
-    operator_id: i32,
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
-    let nonce = Nonce::try_from(share_nonce_bytes).map_err(|()| {
-        error!(operator_id, "Invalid nonce in DB");
-        Error::BrokenDatabase
-    })?;
-
-    let mut passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase_bytes);
-    let mut share_seal_key = derive_key(&mut passphrase_cell, share_salt);
-
-    let mut share_buffer = SafeCell::new(encrypted_share);
-    share_seal_key
-        .decrypt_in_place(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, &mut share_buffer)
-        .map_err(|_| Error::InvalidPassphrase)?;
-
-    Ok(share_buffer.read().clone())
-}
-
-/// §3.4: Split the seal key across ordinary + recovery operators.
-/// Threshold = `shamir_threshold(ordinary_count)`; total shares = ordinary + recovery.
-/// When `ordinary_count` == 1 (threshold = 1), vsss-rs does not support a proper split,
-/// so each share is the seal key itself — any single participant can reconstruct.
-async fn finalize_bootstrap(
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-    vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
-    ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let ordinary_count = ordinary_passphrases.len();
-    let recovery_count = recovery_passphrases.len();
-    let total = ordinary_count + recovery_count;
-    let threshold = shamir_threshold(ordinary_count);
-
-    let mut seal_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut seal_key_bytes);
-
-    // threshold == 1 means any single share reconstructs the key (degenerate split).
-    // vsss-rs requires threshold >= 2, so we store the key directly in this case.
-    let shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = if threshold >= 2 {
-        shamir::split_key(threshold, total, &seal_key_bytes, OsRng)
-            .map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
-    } else {
-        std::iter::repeat_with(|| seal_key_bytes.to_vec()).take(total).collect()
-    };
-
-    let seal_key = KeyCell::from(seal_key_bytes);
-
-    let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-    let mut shares_iter = shares.into_iter();
-
-    for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
-        let share = shares_iter
-            .next()
-            .expect("split_key returned enough shares");
-        let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
-
-        diesel::replace_into(schema::operator::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)),
-                schema::operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
-                schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
-                schema::operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
-                schema::operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-                schema::operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-    }
-
-    for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
-        let share = shares_iter
-            .next()
-            .expect("split_key returned enough shares");
-        let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
-
-        diesel::replace_into(schema::recovery_operator::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::recovery_operator::id.eq(recovery_id_raw),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
-                schema::recovery_operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-                schema::recovery_operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-    }
-
-    vault.ask(Bootstrap { seal_key }).await.map_err(|err| {
-        error!(?err, "Vault bootstrap failed");
-        Error::VaultError
-    })?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// §3.5: Unseal using any threshold-sized mix of ordinary + recovery shares.
-async fn finalize_unseal(
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-    vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
-    ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-
-    // Determine whether shares were stored as raw keys (threshold=1) or vsss-rs splits (threshold>=2).
-    let ordinary_operator_count: i64 = schema::operator::table
-        .count()
-        .get_result(&mut conn)
-        .await?;
-    let threshold = shamir_threshold(ordinary_operator_count as usize);
-
-    let mut shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
-
-    for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
-        let (encrypted_share, share_nonce_bytes, share_salt): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) =
-            schema::operator::table
-                .filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)))
-                .select((
-                    schema::operator::share,
-                    schema::operator::share_nonce,
-                    schema::operator::share_salt,
-                ))
-                .first(&mut conn)
-                .await
-                .map_err(|_| Error::OperatorNotFound)?;
-
-        shares.push(decrypt_share(
-            passphrase_bytes,
-            encrypted_share,
-            &share_nonce_bytes,
-            &share_salt,
-            operator_id_raw,
-        )?);
-    }
-
-    for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
-        let (encrypted_share, share_nonce_bytes, share_salt): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) =
-            schema::recovery_operator::table
-                .find(recovery_id_raw)
-                .select((
-                    schema::recovery_operator::share,
-                    schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce,
-                    schema::recovery_operator::share_salt,
-                ))
-                .first(&mut conn)
-                .await
-                .map_err(|_| Error::OperatorNotFound)?;
-
-        shares.push(decrypt_share(
-            passphrase_bytes,
-            encrypted_share,
-            &share_nonce_bytes,
-            &share_salt,
-            recovery_id_raw,
-        )?);
-    }
-
-    // When threshold==1, shares are raw 32-byte seal keys (vsss-rs cannot split 1-of-N).
-    // Any single decrypted share is the key itself.
-    let seal_key_bytes: [u8; 32] = if threshold <= 1 {
-        let raw = shares
-            .into_iter()
-            .next()
-            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Shamir("No shares available".into()))?;
-        raw.try_into()
-            .map_err(|_| Error::Shamir("Invalid share length".into()))?
-    } else {
-        shamir::combine_shares(&shares).map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
-    };
-
-    let seal_key = KeyCell::from(seal_key_bytes);
-
-    vault.ask(TryUnseal { seal_key }).await.map_err(|err| {
-        error!(?err, "Vault unseal failed");
-        Error::VaultError
-    })?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// §3.3: Generate a fresh seal key, split across current operators, re-encrypt the vault root key.
-/// Called after `replace_operator` or `trigger_rekey` is approved and all contributors submit.
-async fn finalize_rekey(
-    db: db::DatabasePool,
-    vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
-    ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-    recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let ordinary_count = ordinary_passphrases.len();
-    let recovery_count = recovery_passphrases.len();
-    let total = ordinary_count + recovery_count;
-    let threshold = shamir_threshold(ordinary_count);
-
-    let mut new_seal_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
-    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut new_seal_key_bytes);
-
-    let shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = if threshold >= 2 {
-        shamir::split_key(threshold, total, &new_seal_key_bytes, OsRng)
-            .map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
-    } else {
-        std::iter::repeat_with(|| new_seal_key_bytes.to_vec())
-            .take(total)
-            .collect()
-    };
-
-    let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-    let mut shares_iter = shares.into_iter();
-
-    for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
-        let share = shares_iter
-            .next()
-            .expect("split_key returned enough shares");
-        let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
-
-        diesel::replace_into(schema::operator::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)),
-                schema::operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
-                schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
-                schema::operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
-                schema::operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-                schema::operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-    }
-
-    for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
-        let share = shares_iter
-            .next()
-            .expect("split_key returned enough shares");
-        let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
-
-        diesel::replace_into(schema::recovery_operator::table)
-            .values((
-                schema::recovery_operator::id.eq(recovery_id_raw),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
-                schema::recovery_operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
-                schema::recovery_operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-                schema::recovery_operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
-            ))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-    }
-
-    drop(conn);
-
-    let new_seal_key = KeyCell::from(new_seal_key_bytes);
-    vault
-        .ask(RekeyRootKey { new_seal_key })
-        .await
-        .map_err(|err| {
-            error!(?err, "Vault rekey failed");
-            Error::VaultError
-        })?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl VaultCoordinator {
-    /// Phase 1 of multi-operator bootstrap: declare the committee size.
-    #[message]
-    #[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "kameo requires messages to be async")]
-    pub async fn start_bootstrap(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: i32,
-        declared_count: usize,
-        recovery_count: usize,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let _ = operator_id; // fixme!: any authenticated operator may announce the committee size. the first call wins
-        if !matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
-            return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping);
-        }
-        if declared_count == 2 && recovery_count == 0 {
-            return Err(Error::TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery);
-        }
-        self.state = CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
-            declared_count,
-            recovery_count,
-            passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-            recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-        };
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Phase 2 of multi-operator bootstrap: ordinary operator contributes a passphrase.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when all ordinary + recovery operators contributed and bootstrap finalized.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_bootstrap(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
-            declared_count,
-            recovery_count,
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapping);
-        };
-
-        if passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
-        passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
-
-        if passphrases.len() < *declared_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-            ..
-        } = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
-        else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-
-        finalize_bootstrap(
-            self.db.clone(),
-            self.vault.clone(),
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(true)
-    }
-
-    /// Phase 2 of multi-operator bootstrap: recovery operator contributes a passphrase.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors are in and bootstrap finalized.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_recovery_bootstrap(
-        &mut self,
-        recovery_operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
-            declared_count,
-            recovery_count,
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotBootstrapping);
-        };
-
-        if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
-        recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
-
-        if passphrases.len() < *declared_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-            ..
-        } = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
-        else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-
-        finalize_bootstrap(
-            self.db.clone(),
-            self.vault.clone(),
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(true)
-    }
-
-    /// Contribute a passphrase for vault unseal (ordinary operator).
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when threshold reached and vault is unsealed.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_unseal(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        self.ensure_unsealing_state().await?;
-
-        let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
-            threshold,
-            ordinary_passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotUnsealing);
-        };
-
-        if ordinary_passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
-        ordinary_passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
-
-        if ordinary_passphrases.len() + recovery_passphrases.len() < *threshold {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        self.do_finalize_unseal().await
-    }
-
-    /// Contribute a passphrase for vault unseal (recovery operator, §3.5).
-    /// Recovery operators may contribute during unseal when recovery is active.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when threshold reached and vault is unsealed.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_recovery_unseal(
-        &mut self,
-        recovery_operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        self.ensure_unsealing_state().await?;
-
-        let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
-            threshold,
-            ordinary_passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotUnsealing);
-        };
-
-        if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
-        recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
-
-        if ordinary_passphrases.len() + recovery_passphrases.len() < *threshold {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        self.do_finalize_unseal().await
-    }
-}
-
-impl VaultCoordinator {
-    /// Initializes `CoordinatorState::Unsealing` on first call if still `Idle`.
-    /// Threshold is based on ordinary operator count only (§3.4).
-    async fn ensure_unsealing_state(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
-            let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-            let ordinary_count: i64 = schema::operator::table
-                .count()
-                .get_result(&mut conn)
-                .await?;
-            let threshold = shamir_threshold(usize::try_from(ordinary_count).unwrap_or_default());
-            self.state = CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
-                threshold,
-                ordinary_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-                recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-            };
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Moves state back to Idle and calls finalize_unseal.
-    async fn do_finalize_unseal(&mut self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
-            ordinary_passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-            ..
-        } = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
-        else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-
-        finalize_unseal(
-            self.db.clone(),
-            self.vault.clone(),
-            ordinary_passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(true)
-    }
-
-    async fn do_finalize_rekey(&mut self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-            ..
-        } = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
-        else {
-            unreachable!()
-        };
-
-        finalize_rekey(
-            self.db.clone(),
-            self.vault.clone(),
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        )
-        .await?;
-        Ok(true)
-    }
-}
-
-#[messages]
-impl VaultCoordinator {
-    /// Begin Shamir re-key after a key-rotation proposal is approved (§3.3).
-    /// Queries the current operator and recovery operator counts from the DB,
-    /// then transitions to Rekeying state awaiting contributions from all of them.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn start_rekey(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        if !matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
-            return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping);
-        }
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-        let ordinary_count: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        let recovery_count: i64 = schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-        self.state = CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
-            ordinary_count: ordinary_count as usize,
-            recovery_count: recovery_count as usize,
-            passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-            recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
-        };
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Contribute an ordinary operator passphrase for the re-key.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors have submitted and the re-key is complete.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_rekey(
-        &mut self,
-        operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
-            ordinary_count,
-            recovery_count,
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotRekeying);
-        };
-
-        if passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase.read().to_vec());
-
-        if passphrases.len() < *ordinary_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        self.do_finalize_rekey().await
-    }
-
-    /// Contribute a recovery operator passphrase for the re-key.
-    /// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors have submitted and the re-key is complete.
-    #[message]
-    pub async fn contribute_recovery_rekey(
-        &mut self,
-        recovery_operator_id: i32,
-        mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
-            ordinary_count,
-            recovery_count,
-            passphrases,
-            recovery_passphrases,
-        } = &mut self.state
-        else {
-            return Err(Error::NotRekeying);
-        };
-
-        if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
-            return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
-        }
-
-        recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase.read().to_vec());
-
-        if passphrases.len() < *ordinary_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
-
-        self.do_finalize_rekey().await
-    }
-}
-
-impl Message<ProposalApproved> for VaultCoordinator {
-    type Reply = ();
-
-    /// Every subscriber sees every approval and acts only on the kinds it owns.
-    async fn handle(
-        &mut self,
-        msg: ProposalApproved,
-        _ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
-    ) -> Self::Reply {
-        let result = match msg.kind {
-            ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator(settings) => self.replace_operator(&settings).await,
-            ProposalKind::TriggerRekey => self.start_rekey().await,
-            _ => return,
-        };
-
-        if let Err(error) = result {
-            error!(
-                ?error,
-                proposal_id = msg.id.to_raw(),
-                "Failed to execute an approved proposal"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl VaultCoordinator {
-    /// Replaces the operator's public key in place, keeping their id and history, drops the
-    /// share that key no longer matches, then begins a coordinated re-key (§3.3).
-    async fn replace_operator(
-        &mut self,
-        settings: &replace_operator::Settings,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
-
-        diesel::update(schema::operator_identity::table)
-            .filter(schema::operator_identity::id.eq(settings.old_operator_id))
-            .set(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(&settings.new_pubkey))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        // Drop the stale Shamir share; finalize_rekey stores a fresh one.
-        diesel::delete(schema::operator::table)
-            .filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(settings.old_operator_id)))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await?;
-
-        drop(conn);
-
-        self.start_rekey().await
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/mod.rs

@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use thiserror::Error;
+
 use crate::{
     actors::GlobalActors,
     context::tls::TlsManager,
     db::{self},
 };
 
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use thiserror::Error;
-
 pub mod tls;
 
 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
@@ -30,16 +31,16 @@ pub enum InitError {
     Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
 }
 
-pub struct __ServerContextInner {
+pub struct _ServerContextInner {
     pub db: db::DatabasePool,
     pub tls: TlsManager,
     pub actors: GlobalActors,
 }
 #[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct ServerContext(Arc<__ServerContextInner>);
+pub struct ServerContext(Arc<_ServerContextInner>);
 
 impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
-    type Target = __ServerContextInner;
+    type Target = _ServerContextInner;
 
     fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
         &self.0
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ impl std::ops::Deref for ServerContext {
 
 impl ServerContext {
     pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
-        Ok(Self(Arc::new(__ServerContextInner {
+        Ok(Self(Arc::new(_ServerContextInner {
             actors: GlobalActors::spawn(db.clone()).await?,
             tls: TlsManager::new(db.clone()).await?,
             db,

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/context/tls.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
+use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
+
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
+use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
+
+use pem::Pem;
+use rcgen::{
+    BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
+    IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
+};
+use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
+use thiserror::Error;
+use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
+
 use crate::db::{
     self,
     models::{NewTlsHistory, TlsHistory},
@@ -7,23 +21,10 @@ use crate::db::{
     },
 };
 
-use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
-use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-use pem::Pem;
-use rcgen::{
-    BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
-    IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
-};
-use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
-use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
-use thiserror::Error;
-use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
-
 const ENCODE_CONFIG: pem::EncodeConfig = {
-    let line_ending = if cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
+    let line_ending = match cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
-        pem::LineEnding::CRLF
+        true => pem::LineEnding::CRLF,
-    } else {
+        false => pem::LineEnding::LF,
-        pem::LineEnding::LF
     };
     pem::EncodeConfig::new().set_line_ending(line_ending)
 };
@@ -51,14 +52,11 @@ pub enum InitError {
 
 pub type PemCert = String;
 
-pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer<'_>) -> PemCert {
+pub fn encode_cert_to_pem(cert: &CertificateDer) -> PemCert {
     pem::encode_config(&Pem::new("CERTIFICATE", cert.to_vec()), ENCODE_CONFIG)
 }
 
-#[expect(
+#[allow(unused)]
-    unused,
-    reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
-)]
 struct SerializedTls {
     cert_pem: PemCert,
     cert_key_pem: String,
@@ -87,7 +85,7 @@ impl TlsCa {
 
         let cert_key_pem = certified_issuer.key().serialize_pem();
 
-        #[expect(
+        #[allow(
             clippy::unwrap_used,
             reason = "Broken cert couldn't bootstrap server anyway"
         )]
@@ -126,11 +124,7 @@ impl TlsCa {
         })
     }
 
-    #[expect(
+    #[allow(unused)]
-        unused,
-        clippy::unnecessary_wraps,
-        reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
-    )]
     fn serialize(&self) -> Result<SerializedTls, InitError> {
         let cert_key_pem = self.issuer.key().serialize_pem();
         Ok(SerializedTls {
@@ -139,10 +133,7 @@ impl TlsCa {
         })
     }
 
-    #[expect(
+    #[allow(unused)]
-        unused,
-        reason = "may be needed for future cert rotation implementation"
-    )]
     fn try_deserialize(cert_pem: &str, cert_key_pem: &str) -> Result<Self, InitError> {
         let keypair =
             KeyPair::from_pem(cert_key_pem).map_err(InitError::KeyDeserializationError)?;
@@ -174,7 +165,8 @@ impl TlsManager {
 
         {
             let mut conn = db.get().await?;
-            conn.transaction(async |conn| {
+            conn.transaction(|conn| {
+                Box::pin(async {
                     let new_tls_history = NewTlsHistory {
                         cert: new_cert.cert.pem(),
                         cert_key: new_cert.cert_key.serialize_pem(),
@@ -185,16 +177,17 @@ impl TlsManager {
                     let inserted_tls_history: i32 = diesel::insert_into(tls_history::table)
                         .values(&new_tls_history)
                         .returning(tls_history::id)
-                    .get_result(&mut *conn)
+                        .get_result(conn)
                         .await?;
 
                     diesel::update(arbiter_settings::table)
                         .set(arbiter_settings::tls_id.eq(inserted_tls_history))
-                    .execute(&mut *conn)
+                        .execute(conn)
                         .await?;
 
                     Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(())
                 })
+            })
             .await?;
         }
 
@@ -241,10 +234,10 @@ impl TlsManager {
         }
     }
 
-    pub const fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
+    pub fn cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
         &self.cert
     }
-    pub const fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
+    pub fn ca_cert(&self) -> &CertificateDer<'static> {
         &self.ca_cert
     }
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/encryption/v1.rs

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 use argon2::password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt;
+
 use rand::{
     Rng as _, SeedableRng,
     rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
 };
 
-pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/seal/v1";
+pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
-pub const TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/private-key/v1";
+pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
 
 pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
 
@@ -14,16 +15,14 @@ pub struct Nonce(pub [u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
 impl Nonce {
     pub fn increment(&mut self) {
         for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
-            if let Some(byte) = self.0.get_mut(i) {
+            if self.0[i] == 0xFF {
-                if *byte == 0xFF {
+                self.0[i] = 0;
-                    *byte = 0;
             } else {
-                    *byte += 1;
+                self.0[i] += 1;
                 break;
             }
         }
     }
-    }
 
     pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
         self.0.to_vec()
@@ -46,49 +45,57 @@ pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
 
 pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
     let mut salt = Salt::default();
-    let mut rng =
+    #[allow(
-        StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
+        clippy::unwrap_used,
+        reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
+    )]
+    let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
     rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
     salt
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
+    use std::ops::Deref as _;
+
     use super::*;
-    use crate::crypto::derive_key;
+    use crate::{
-    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+        crypto::derive_key,
+        safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+    };
 
     #[test]
-    fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
+    pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
         static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
-        let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
-        let mut password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
         let salt = generate_salt();
 
-        let mut key1 = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
+        let mut key1 = derive_key(password, &salt);
-        let mut key2 = derive_key(&mut password2, &salt);
+        let mut key2 = derive_key(password2, &salt);
 
         let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
         let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
 
-        assert_eq!(&*key1_reader, &*key2_reader);
+        assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn successful_derive() {
+    pub fn successful_derive() {
         static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
-        let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
         let salt = generate_salt();
 
-        let mut key = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
+        let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
         let key_reader = key.0.read();
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
 
-        assert_ne!(key_reader.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
+        assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
     }
 
     #[test]
     // We should fuzz this
-    pub fn nonce_increment() {
+    pub fn test_nonce_increment() {
         let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
         nonce.increment();
 

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/governance.rs

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-//! Canonical encoding and verification of governance vote signatures (§3.3).
-
-use crate::db::models::ProposalId;
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, SigningContext};
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum VerifyError {
-    #[error("Malformed operator public key")]
-    PublicKey,
-    #[error("Malformed vote signature")]
-    Signature,
-    #[error("Signature does not match this vote")]
-    Mismatch,
-}
-
-/// Canonical bytes an operator signs when voting: `proposal_id` as i64 big-endian,
-/// followed by the approve flag as one byte.
-///
-/// The flag is part of the message on purpose: without it an approval could be
-/// replayed as a rejection of the same proposal.
-#[must_use]
-pub fn vote_message(proposal_id: ProposalId, approve: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut message = Vec::with_capacity(9);
-    message.extend_from_slice(&i64::from(proposal_id.to_raw()).to_be_bytes());
-    message.push(u8::from(approve));
-    message
-}
-
-/// Verifies a vote signature against an operator's stored public key.
-pub fn verify_vote(
-    public_key: &[u8],
-    proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    approve: bool,
-    signature: &[u8],
-) -> Result<(), VerifyError> {
-    let public_key = authn::PublicKey::try_from(public_key).map_err(|()| VerifyError::PublicKey)?;
-    let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(signature).map_err(|()| VerifyError::Signature)?;
-
-    if public_key.verify_message(
-        &vote_message(proposal_id, approve),
-        SigningContext::GovernanceVote,
-        &signature,
-    ) {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(VerifyError::Mismatch)
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::{VerifyError, verify_vote, vote_message};
-    use crate::db::models::ProposalId;
-    use arbiter_crypto::authn::{SigningContext, SigningKey};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn vote_message_is_the_id_then_the_approve_flag() {
-        let message = vote_message(ProposalId::from_raw(0x0102), true);
-        assert_eq!(message, vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 1]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_vote_accepts_a_matching_signature() {
-        let key = SigningKey::generate();
-        let id = ProposalId::from_raw(42);
-        let signature = key
-            .sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        verify_vote(
-            &key.public_key().to_bytes(),
-            id,
-            true,
-            &signature.to_bytes(),
-        )
-        .expect("a signature over this exact vote must verify");
-    }
-
-    /// The decisive one: an approval must not verify as a rejection of the same
-    /// proposal, or a captured vote could be replayed with its meaning flipped.
-    #[test]
-    fn verify_vote_rejects_a_flipped_approve_flag() {
-        let key = SigningKey::generate();
-        let id = ProposalId::from_raw(42);
-        let signature = key
-            .sign_message(&vote_message(id, true), SigningContext::GovernanceVote)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(matches!(
-            verify_vote(
-                &key.public_key().to_bytes(),
-                id,
-                false,
-                &signature.to_bytes()
-            ),
-            Err(VerifyError::Mismatch)
-        ));
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs

@@ -1,29 +1,44 @@
-use crate::{
+use crate::actors::keyholder;
-    actors::vault::{self, GetState, SignIntegrity, Vault, VerifyIntegrity},
+use hmac::Hmac;
-    db::{
+use sha2::Sha256;
-        self,
+use std::future::Future;
-        models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope, RootKeyHistoryId},
+use std::ops::Deref;
-        schema::integrity_envelope,
+use std::pin::Pin;
-    },
-};
-use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
 
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
 use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
-use hmac::Hmac;
 use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
-use sha2::{Digest as _, Sha256};
+use sha2::Digest as _;
+
+pub mod hashing;
+pub mod verified;
+use self::hashing::Hashable;
+
+use crate::{
+    actors::keyholder::{KeyHolder, SignIntegrity, VerifyIntegrity},
+    db::{
+        self,
+        models::{IntegrityEnvelope as IntegrityEnvelopeRow, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
+        schema::integrity_envelope,
+    },
+};
+
+pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
+pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
+
+pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
+pub use self::verified::{Nested, Root, VerificationOrigin, Verified};
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum Error {
     #[error("Database error: {0}")]
     Database(#[from] db::DatabaseError),
 
-    #[error("Vault error: {0}")]
+    #[error("KeyHolder error: {0}")]
-    Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
+    Keyholder(#[from] keyholder::Error),
 
-    #[error("Vault mailbox error")]
+    #[error("KeyHolder mailbox error")]
-    VaultSend,
+    KeyholderSend,
 
     #[error("Integrity envelope is missing for entity {entity_kind}")]
     MissingEnvelope { entity_kind: &'static str },
@@ -42,116 +57,108 @@ pub enum Error {
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[must_use]
 pub enum AttestationStatus {
     Attested,
     Unavailable,
 }
 
-pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
-pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
-
-pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
-
 pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
     const KIND: &'static str;
     const VERSION: i32 = 1;
 }
 
-fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
+impl<T: Integrable> Integrable for &T {
-    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    const KIND: &'static str = T::KIND;
-    payload.hash(&mut hasher);
+    const VERSION: i32 = T::VERSION;
-    hasher.finalize().into()
 }
 
-fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-    #[expect(
+pub struct EntityId(Vec<u8>);
-        clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
-        clippy::as_conversions,
-        reason = "fixme! #85"
-    )]
-    out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
-    out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
-}
 
-fn build_mac_input(
+impl Deref for EntityId {
-    entity_kind: &str,
+    type Target = [u8];
-    entity_id: &[u8],
-    payload_version: i32,
-    payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
-) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
-    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
-    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
-    out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
-    out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
-    out
-}
 
-pub trait IntoId {
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8>;
+        &self.0
-}
-
-impl IntoId for i32 {
-    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
     }
 }
 
-impl IntoId for &'_ [u8] {
+impl From<i32> for EntityId {
-    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
+    fn from(value: i32) -> Self {
-        self.to_vec()
+        Self(value.to_be_bytes().to_vec())
     }
 }
 
-pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
+impl From<&'_ [u8]> for EntityId {
+    fn from(bytes: &'_ [u8]) -> Self {
+        Self(bytes.to_vec())
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn lookup_verified<E, Id, C, F, Fut>(
+    conn: &mut C,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    entity_id: Id,
+    load: F,
+) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error>
+where
+    C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+    E: Integrable,
+    Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
+    F: FnOnce(&mut C) -> Fut,
+    Fut: Future<Output = Result<E, db::DatabaseError>>,
+{
+    let entity = load(conn).await?;
+    verify_entity(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id).await
+}
+
+pub async fn lookup_verified_from_query<E, Id, C, F>(
+    conn: &mut C,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    load: F,
+) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error>
+where
+    C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite> + Send,
+    E: Integrable,
+    Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
+    F: for<'a> FnOnce(
+        &'a mut C,
+    ) -> Pin<
+        Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<(Id, E), db::DatabaseError>> + Send + 'a>,
+    >,
+{
+    let (entity_id, entity) = load(conn).await?;
+    verify_entity(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id).await
+}
+
+pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
     conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
     entity: &E,
-    entity_id: impl IntoId,
+    as_entity_id: Id,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
+) -> Result<Verified<Id, Nested<E>>, Error> {
-    let (entity_id, mac_input) = envelope_input::<E>(entity, entity_id);
+    let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
 
-    let (key_version, mac) =
+    let entity_id = as_entity_id.clone().into();
-        vault
+
+    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
+
+    let (key_version, mac) = keyholder
         .ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
         .await
         .map_err(|err| match err {
-                SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Vault(inner),
+            kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Keyholder(inner),
-                _ => Error::VaultSend,
+            _ => Error::KeyholderSend,
         })?;
 
-    store_envelope::<E>(conn, entity_id, key_version, mac)
-        .await
-        .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// The entity id and the bytes the root key covers, as a pair.
-///
-/// Split out of [`sign_entity`] so the `Vault` actor can build an envelope from inside a
-/// message handler, where asking itself for a signature would deadlock.
-pub fn envelope_input<E: Integrable>(entity: &E, entity_id: impl IntoId) -> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) {
-    let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
-    let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
-    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
-    (entity_id, mac_input)
-}
-
-/// Stores the integrity envelope for one entity, replacing any envelope it already has.
-pub async fn store_envelope<E: Integrable>(
-    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    entity_id: Vec<u8>,
-    key_version: RootKeyHistoryId,
-    mac: Vec<u8>,
-) -> Result<(), diesel::result::Error> {
     insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
         .values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
             entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
-            entity_id,
+            entity_id: entity_id.to_vec(),
             payload_version: E::VERSION,
             key_version,
-            mac: mac.clone(),
+            mac: mac.to_vec(),
         })
         .on_conflict((
             integrity_envelope::entity_id,
@@ -164,21 +171,22 @@ pub async fn store_envelope<E: Integrable>(
             integrity_envelope::mac.eq(mac),
         ))
         .execute(conn)
-        .await?;
+        .await
+        .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
 
-    Ok(())
+    Ok(Verified::<Id, Nested<E>>::new(as_entity_id))
 }
 
-pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
+pub async fn check_entity_attestation<E: Integrable>(
     conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
     entity: &E,
-    entity_id: impl IntoId,
+    entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
 ) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
-    let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
+    let entity_id = entity_id.into();
-    let envelope: IntegrityEnvelope = integrity_envelope::table
+    let envelope: IntegrityEnvelopeRow = integrity_envelope::table
         .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
-        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&entity_id))
+        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id))
         .first(conn)
         .await
         .map_err(|err| match err {
@@ -196,10 +204,10 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
         });
     }
 
-    let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
+    let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
     let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash);
 
-    let result = vault
+    let result = keyholder
         .ask(VerifyIntegrity {
             mac_input,
             expected_mac: envelope.mac,
@@ -212,141 +220,100 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
         Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
             entity_kind: E::KIND,
         }),
-        Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
+        Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)) => {
-        Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
+            Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable)
+        }
+        Err(_) => Err(Error::KeyholderSend),
     }
 }
 
-pub async fn is_signing_available(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, crate::VerifiedFields!)]
-    let state = vault.ask(GetState).await.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
+#[repr(C)]
-    Ok(matches!(state, vault::VaultState::Unsealed))
+pub struct Entity<E, Id> {
+    pub entity: E,
+    pub entity_id: Id,
+}
+
+impl<E, Id> Deref for Entity<E, Id> {
+    type Target = E;
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        &self.entity
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
+    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    entity: E,
+    entity_id: Id,
+) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
+    match check_entity_attestation(conn, keyholder, &entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
+        AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(Entity {
+            entity,
+            entity_id,
+        })),
+        AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)),
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn verify_entity_ref<'e, E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
+    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    entity: &'e E,
+    entity_id: Id,
+) -> Result<Verified<Entity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
+    match check_entity_attestation(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
+        AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<Entity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(Entity {
+            entity,
+            entity_id,
+        })),
+        AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)),
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn delete_envelope<E: Integrable>(
+    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+    entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
+) -> Result<usize, Error> {
+    let entity_id = entity_id.into();
+
+    let affected = diesel::delete(
+        integrity_envelope::table
+            .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
+            .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id)),
+    )
+    .execute(conn)
+    .await
+    .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
+
+    Ok(affected)
+}
+
+fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    payload.hash(&mut hasher);
+    hasher.finalize().into()
+}
+
+fn build_mac_input(
+    entity_kind: &str,
+    entity_id: &[u8],
+    payload_version: i32,
+    payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
+) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
+    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
+    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
+    out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
+    out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
+    out
+}
+
+fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
+    out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+    out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
+mod tests;
-    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
-    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-    use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
-
-    use crate::{
-        actors::{
-            GlobalActors,
-            vault::{Bootstrap, Vault},
-        },
-        db::{self, schema},
-    };
-    use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
-    #[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
-    struct DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: i32,
-        payload: Vec<u8>,
-    }
-    impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
-        const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
-    }
-
-    async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
-        let actor = Vault::spawn(
-            Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
-                .await
-                .unwrap(),
-        );
-        actor
-            .ask(Bootstrap {
-                seal_key: crate::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
-            })
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        actor
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
-        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
-
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let entity = DummyEntity {
-            payload_version: 1,
-            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        };
-
-        sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
-            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
-            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
-        verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
-        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
-
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let entity = DummyEntity {
-            payload_version: 1,
-            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        };
-
-        sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
-            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
-            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
-            .set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_err();
-        assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
-        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
-
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        let entity = DummyEntity {
-            payload_version: 1,
-            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        };
-
-        sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let tampered = DummyEntity {
-            payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
-            ..entity
-        };
-
-        let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_err();
-        assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/hashing.rs

@@ -1,12 +1,7 @@
+use hmac::digest::Digest;
 use std::collections::HashSet;
 
-pub use hmac::digest::Digest;
-
 /// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
-#[diagnostic::on_unimplemented(
-    note = "for local types consider adding `#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]` to your `{Self}` type",
-    note = "for types from other crates check whether the crate offers a `Hashable` implementation"
-)]
 pub trait Hashable {
     fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H);
 }
@@ -50,7 +45,7 @@ impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for Vec<T> {
     }
 }
 
-impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd, S: std::hash::BuildHasher> Hashable for HashSet<T, S> {
+impl<T: Hashable + PartialOrd> Hashable for HashSet<T> {
     fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
         let ref_sorted = {
             let mut sorted = self.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
+use sha2::Digest;
+
+use crate::{
+    actors::keyholder::{Bootstrap, KeyHolder},
+    db::{self, schema},
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+};
+
+use super::hashing::Hashable;
+use super::{
+    Error, Integrable, check_entity_attestation, lookup_verified, lookup_verified_from_query,
+    sign_entity, verify_entity,
+};
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+struct DummyEntity {
+    payload_version: i32,
+    payload: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl Hashable for DummyEntity {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.payload_version.hash(hasher);
+        self.payload.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
+impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
+    const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
+}
+
+async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<KeyHolder> {
+    let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
+    actor
+        .ask(Bootstrap {
+            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    actor
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
+        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
+        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
+    let _ = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
+        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
+        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
+        .set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    let tampered = DummyEntity {
+        payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
+        ..entity
+    };
+
+    let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn strict_verify_fails_closed_while_sealed() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-41";
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+    drop(keyholder);
+
+    let sealed_keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
+
+    let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(
+        err,
+        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
+    ));
+
+    let err = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| async {
+        Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
+            payload_version: 1,
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(
+        err,
+        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
+    ));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn lookup_verified_supports_loaded_aggregate() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 77;
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    let verified = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| async {
+        Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
+            payload_version: 1,
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn extension_trait_lookup_verified_required_works() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 79;
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    let verified = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| {
+        Box::pin(async {
+            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
+                payload_version: 1,
+                payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+            })
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn lookup_verified_from_query_helpers_work() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 80;
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    let verified = lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &keyholder, |_| {
+        Box::pin(async {
+            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>((
+                ENTITY_ID,
+                DummyEntity {
+                    payload_version: 1,
+                    payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+                },
+            ))
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
+
+    drop(keyholder);
+    let sealed_keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
+
+    let err = lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, |_| {
+        Box::pin(async {
+            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>((
+                ENTITY_ID,
+                DummyEntity {
+                    payload_version: 1,
+                    payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+                },
+            ))
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap_err();
+
+    assert!(matches!(
+        err,
+        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
+    ));
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/verified.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+use std::ops::Deref;
+
+use super::Integrable;
+
+mod private {
+    pub trait Sealed {}
+}
+
+/// Marker trait for type-level verification provenance.
+///
+/// This trait is intentionally sealed so external code cannot invent arbitrary
+/// provenance tags and bypass the intended type-level guarantees.
+pub trait VerificationOrigin: private::Sealed {
+    type Origin: VerificationOrigin;
+}
+
+/// Root provenance marker for values directly produced by integrity APIs.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Default)]
+pub struct Root;
+
+/// Nested provenance marker carrying the source integrable type and previous
+/// provenance marker in the chain.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+pub struct Nested<From, P: VerificationOrigin = Root>(core::marker::PhantomData<(From, P)>);
+
+impl private::Sealed for Root {}
+impl VerificationOrigin for Root {
+    type Origin = Self;
+}
+
+impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> private::Sealed for Nested<T, P> {}
+impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> VerificationOrigin for Nested<T, P> {
+    type Origin = P;
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[repr(transparent)]
+#[must_use = "Verified<T> is a proof-bearing wrapper; use self.drop_verification_provenance() to explicitly discard integrity provenance when needed"]
+pub struct Verified<T, O: VerificationOrigin = Root> {
+    inner: T,
+    origin: core::marker::PhantomData<O>,
+}
+
+impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> AsRef<Verified<T, O>> for Verified<&T, O> {
+    fn as_ref(&self) -> &Verified<T, O> {
+        // SAFETY: `Verified<T>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so `&T`
+        // and `&Verified<T>` have identical layout.
+        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<T, Verified<T, O>>(self.inner) }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T, U: Integrable, O: VerificationOrigin> Deref for Verified<T, Nested<U, O>> {
+    type Target = Verified<T, O::Origin>;
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        // SAFETY: `Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so `&Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>`
+        // and `&Nested<U, O>` have identical layout.
+        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<Self, Verified<T, O::Origin>>(self) }
+    }
+}
+impl<T> Deref for Verified<T, Root> {
+    type Target = T;
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        &self.inner
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> Verified<T, O> {
+    /// Unwraps the verified value, discarding the integrity provenance.
+    ///
+    /// The name is intentionally verbose — call sites where provenance is
+    /// dropped should be easy to find and audit.
+    pub fn drop_verification_provenance(self) -> T {
+        self.inner
+    }
+
+    /// Downgrades the origin provenance to any lower nestedness level,
+    /// e.g. `Verified<T, Nested<Other>>` to `Verified<T, Root>`.
+    pub fn unqualify_origin<Target: VerificationOrigin>(self) -> Verified<T, Target>
+    where
+        O: VerificationOrigin<Origin = Target>,
+    {
+        Verified {
+            inner: self.inner,
+            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Constructs a `Verified<T>` by wrapping a `T`.
+    pub(super) fn new(value: T) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            inner: value,
+            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Constructs a `Verified<T>` from a raw value without performing any
+    /// integrity check. Only available in test builds; use the integrity
+    /// module's functions to obtain a `Verified<T>` in production code.
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) fn new_unchecked(value: T) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            inner: value,
+            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Reinterprets `&T` as `&Verified<T>`.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub(super) fn from_ref(from: &T) -> &Self {
+        // SAFETY: `Self` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`.
+        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<T, Self>(from) }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Bit-copies `value: From` into a `To`, suppressing the source destructor so
+/// the destination owns the bytes.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// The caller must guarantee that `From` and `To` have identical in-memory
+/// layout — the raw bytes that encode a valid `From` must also encode a valid
+/// `To`.
+///
+/// A `union` is used instead of [`std::mem::transmute`] because `transmute`
+/// rejects generic source/destination types at the call site even when their
+/// sizes are provably equal at monomorphization time.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+#[inline]
+pub const unsafe fn reinterpret_layout<From, To>(value: From) -> To {
+    const {
+        assert!(
+            ::std::mem::size_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::size_of::<To>(),
+            "reinterpret_layout: source and destination must have identical size"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            ::std::mem::align_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::align_of::<To>(),
+            "reinterpret_layout: source and destination must have identical alignment"
+        );
+    }
+    union Reinterpret<A, B> {
+        from: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop<A>,
+        to: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop<B>,
+    }
+    // SAFETY: caller guarantees layout equivalence (see fn docs). The union
+    // write-read copies the raw bytes of `value` into a `To` slot, and
+    // `ManuallyDrop` on the source side suppresses its destructor so the
+    // destination owns the bytes unambiguously — no double-drop is possible.
+    unsafe {
+        ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop::into_inner(
+            Reinterpret {
+                from: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop::new(value),
+            }
+            .to,
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+/// Reinterprets `&From` as `&To` via a layout-preserving pointer cast.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Same invariants as [`reinterpret_layout`].
+#[inline]
+pub const unsafe fn reinterpret_layout_ref<From, To>(value: &From) -> &To {
+    const {
+        assert!(
+            ::std::mem::size_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::size_of::<To>(),
+            "reinterpret_layout_ref: source and destination must have identical size"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            ::std::mem::align_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::align_of::<To>(),
+            "reinterpret_layout_ref: source and destination must have identical alignment"
+        );
+    }
+    // SAFETY: caller guarantees layout equivalence (see fn docs). A reference
+    // cast between identically-laid-out types produces a reference with the
+    // same address and lifetime, which is sound.
+    unsafe { &*(value as *const From as *const To) }
+}
+
+/// Implemented on `Verified<T>` by [`VerifiedFields!`], exposing the field-wise counterpart.
+///
+/// ## Disclaimer
+/// Do not implement this trait manually. It is intended to be implemented only
+/// by the `VerifiedFields!` macro, which generates the necessary layout
+/// guarantees for sound pointer casts.
+///
+/// ## Soundness
+/// When [`verify_entity`][crate::crypto::integrity::verify_entity] attests an
+/// entity, it returns `Verified<T>` — an aggregate proof over the whole value.
+/// This trait converts that wrapper into `Counterpart` (e.g.
+/// `VerifiedMyStruct`), where every field is individually wrapped in
+/// [`Verified`], allowing verified data to flow into functions that require
+/// `Verified<FieldType>` without re-verifying.
+///
+/// ## Safety
+/// The conversion is a zero-cost reinterpretation — no copying (beyond a
+/// bitwise move in the owned variant) or HMAC work occurs. Soundness rests on
+/// identical memory layout between `Verified<T>` and `Counterpart`:
+///
+/// - `T` carries `#[repr(C)]` (enforced by `@require_repr` in the macro).
+/// - `T` does **not** carry `packed` (enforced by `@reject_packed`).
+/// - `Counterpart` also carries `#[repr(C)]`, with the same fields in the same
+///   order.
+/// - Each `Verified<F>` field is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, so its size
+///   and alignment match `F` exactly.
+/// - `Verified<T>` itself is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`.
+///
+/// As an additional machine-checked guard, [`reinterpret_layout`] and
+/// [`reinterpret_layout_ref`] assert size/align equality of the two types at
+/// monomorphization time.
+///
+/// The trait is implemented directly on `Verified<T>` (not on `T`), so no
+/// `Deref`-coercion or auto-ref stripping is needed at call sites — the impl
+/// is unambiguous.
+pub trait VerifiedFieldsAccessor {
+    /// The field-wise verified counterpart, e.g. `VerifiedMyStruct`.
+    type Counterpart;
+
+    /// Reinterprets `&self` as `&Counterpart` via a layout-preserving pointer cast.
+    ///
+    /// No data is copied and no re-verification occurs. The returned reference
+    /// borrows from `self` and has the same lifetime.
+    fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart;
+
+    /// Consumes `self` and returns `Counterpart` via a layout-preserving
+    /// bitwise move.
+    ///
+    /// The original `Verified<T>` is moved without running its destructor
+    /// (there is none — `Verified` is a transparent wrapper with no heap
+    /// allocation), and the returned counterpart owns the original bytes. No
+    /// re-verification occurs.
+    fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart;
+}
+
+// todo! rewrite macro_rules to derive crate
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! VerifiedFields {
+    // --- Entry point (no source generics) ---
+    (
+        $(#$attr:tt)*
+        $vis:vis struct $name:ident
+        {
+            $(
+                $field_vis:vis $field_name:ident : $field_ty:ty
+            ),* $(,)?
+        }
+    ) => {
+        // Attribute-list checks run in isolation — they only receive the attrs,
+        // not the struct body.
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$(#$attr)*]);
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$(#$attr)*]);
+
+        paste::paste! {
+            #[doc = concat!(
+                "Field-wise verified counterpart of [`", stringify!($name), "`]."
+            )]
+            //
+            // `#[repr(C)]` is required for the pointer casts in `inherit_ref`
+            // and `inherit` to be sound. Both the source struct (enforced by
+            // `@require_repr`) and this counterpart carry `#[repr(C)]`, which
+            // guarantees matching field offsets. Combined with each
+            // `Verified<F>` being `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, the two
+            // structs have identical memory layout.
+            //
+            // `#[repr(transparent)]` is not usable here because it only permits
+            // a single non-ZST field; multi-field structs would fail to compile.
+            #[repr(C)]
+            $vis struct [<Verified $name>]<P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
+            {
+                $(
+                    $field_vis $field_name : $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$field_ty, P>
+                ),*
+            }
+
+            impl<P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
+                $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor
+                for $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$name, P>
+            {
+                type Counterpart = [<Verified $name>]<P>;
+
+                fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart {
+                    // SAFETY: `Self` is `Verified<T>` (transparent over
+                    // `T #[repr(C)]`) and `Self::Counterpart` is `#[repr(C)]`
+                    // with the same fields in the same order, each wrapped in
+                    // a `#[repr(transparent)]` `Verified<F>`. The two types
+                    // therefore have identical memory layout, which
+                    // `reinterpret_layout_ref` re-checks as size/align
+                    // equality at monomorphization.
+                    unsafe {
+                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout_ref::<
+                            Self,
+                            Self::Counterpart,
+                        >(self)
+                    }
+                }
+
+                fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart {
+                    // SAFETY: identical layout — see `inherit_ref`. The owned
+                    // helper additionally suppresses the source destructor so
+                    // the returned counterpart owns the original bytes (no
+                    // double-drop is possible).
+                    unsafe {
+                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout::<
+                            Self,
+                            Self::Counterpart,
+                        >(self)
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    };
+
+    // --- Entry point (source has generics) ---
+    (
+        $(#$attr:tt)*
+        $vis:vis struct $name:ident <$($gen:tt),*>
+        {
+            $(
+                $field_vis:vis $field_name:ident : $field_ty:ty
+            ),* $(,)?
+        }
+    ) => {
+        // Attribute-list checks run in isolation — they only receive the attrs,
+        // not the struct body.
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$(#$attr)*]);
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$(#$attr)*]);
+
+        paste::paste! {
+            #[doc = concat!(
+                "Field-wise verified counterpart of [`", stringify!($name), "`]."
+            )]
+            //
+            // `#[repr(C)]` is required for the pointer casts in `inherit_ref`
+            // and `inherit` to be sound. Both the source struct (enforced by
+            // `@require_repr`) and this counterpart carry `#[repr(C)]`, which
+            // guarantees matching field offsets. Combined with each
+            // `Verified<F>` being `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, the two
+            // structs have identical memory layout.
+            //
+            // `#[repr(transparent)]` is not usable here because it only permits
+            // a single non-ZST field; multi-field structs would fail to compile.
+            #[repr(C)]
+            $vis struct [<Verified $name>]<$($gen),*, P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
+            {
+                $(
+                    $field_vis $field_name : $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$field_ty, P>
+                ),*
+            }
+
+            impl<$($gen),*, P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
+                $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor
+                for $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$name<$($gen),*>, P>
+            {
+                type Counterpart = [<Verified $name>]<$($gen),*, P>;
+
+                fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart {
+                    // SAFETY: `Self` is `Verified<T>` (transparent over
+                    // `T #[repr(C)]`) and `Self::Counterpart` is `#[repr(C)]`
+                    // with the same fields in the same order, each wrapped in
+                    // a `#[repr(transparent)]` `Verified<F>`. The two types
+                    // therefore have identical memory layout, which
+                    // `reinterpret_layout_ref` re-checks as size/align
+                    // equality at monomorphization.
+                    unsafe {
+                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout_ref::<
+                            Self,
+                            Self::Counterpart,
+                        >(self)
+                    }
+                }
+
+                fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart {
+                    // SAFETY: identical layout — see `inherit_ref`. The owned
+                    // helper additionally suppresses the source destructor so
+                    // the returned counterpart owns the original bytes (no
+                    // double-drop is possible).
+                    unsafe {
+                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout::<
+                            Self,
+                            Self::Counterpart,
+                        >(self)
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    };
+
+    // --- @require_repr: ensure `#[repr(C)]` appears in the attribute list ---
+    (@require_repr [#[repr(C)] $($rest:tt)*]) => {};
+    (@require_repr [#$other:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$($rest)*]);
+    };
+    (@require_repr []) => {
+        ::std::compile_error!(
+            "VerifiedFields requires `#[repr(C)]` on the struct to guarantee field layout"
+        );
+    };
+
+    // --- @reject_packed: walk attrs and reject any `#[repr(..., packed, ...)]`.
+    //
+    // Without this, a packed struct would still fail at monomorphization via
+    // the const assertions inside the `reinterpret_layout*` helpers, but the
+    // diagnostic would be much harder to read. `align(N)` is *not* rejected
+    // here because const assertions catch alignment mismatches cleanly, and
+    // forbidding it would be unnecessarily restrictive.
+    (@reject_packed [#[repr($($inner:tt)*)] $($rest:tt)*]) => {
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed_inner [$($inner)*]);
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$($rest)*]);
+    };
+    (@reject_packed [#$other:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$($rest)*]);
+    };
+    (@reject_packed []) => {};
+
+    (@reject_packed_inner [packed $($rest:tt)*]) => {
+        ::std::compile_error!(
+            "VerifiedFields does not support packed layouts; the generated \
+             counterpart would not share layout with the source struct"
+        );
+    };
+    (@reject_packed_inner [$first:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed_inner [$($rest)*]);
+    };
+    (@reject_packed_inner []) => {};
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
+    #[repr(C)]
+    #[derive(Default, Clone)]
+    pub struct MyStruct<T> {
+        pub field1: String,
+        pub field2: T,
+    }
+
+    fn verify<T>(t: T) -> Verified<T> {
+        Verified {
+            inner: t,
+            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
+        }
+    }
+
+    // --- inherit_ref ---
+
+    // Verifies that `inherit_ref` returns a reference to the same memory
+    // address, confirming that no copy is made and the cast is purely a
+    // reinterpretation.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_ref_is_same_address() {
+        let v = verify(MyStruct {
+            field1: "hello".into(),
+            field2: 42u32,
+        });
+        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
+        assert_eq!(
+            &v as *const _ as *const u8, fields as *const _ as *const u8,
+            "inherit_ref must return a pointer to the same memory, not a copy"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Verifies that field values are correctly accessible after `inherit_ref`.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_ref_field_values() {
+        let v = verify(MyStruct {
+            field1: "hello".into(),
+            field2: 99u32,
+        });
+        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
+        assert_eq!(*fields.field1, "hello");
+        assert_eq!(*fields.field2, 99u32);
+    }
+
+    // Verifies that casting the counterpart back to `Verified<T>` via a raw
+    // pointer lands on the original address — confirms the round-trip is a
+    // pure reinterpretation.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_ref_cast_roundtrip() {
+        let v = verify(MyStruct {
+            field1: "x".into(),
+            field2: 7u32,
+        });
+        let fields: &VerifiedMyStruct<u32, Root> = v.inherit_ref();
+        let back_ptr =
+            fields as *const VerifiedMyStruct<u32, Root> as *const Verified<MyStruct<u32>>;
+        assert_eq!(
+            back_ptr as *const u8, &v as *const _ as *const u8,
+            "cast of counterpart must point back to the same Verified<T>"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // ZST fields must still produce a counterpart with identical layout — the
+    // const asserts in `reinterpret_layout_ref` guard this at monomorphization.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_ref_with_zst_field() {
+        #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
+        #[repr(C)]
+        struct WithZst {
+            pub unit: (),
+            pub val: u64,
+        }
+
+        let v = Verified::<WithZst>::new_unchecked(WithZst { unit: (), val: 777 });
+        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
+        assert_eq!(*fields.val, 777);
+        assert_eq!(*fields.unit, ());
+    }
+
+    // --- inherit ---
+
+    // Verifies that `inherit` preserves field values in the owned counterpart.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_field_values() {
+        let v = verify(MyStruct {
+            field1: "world".into(),
+            field2: 1234u64,
+        });
+        let VerifiedMyStruct { field1, field2 } = v.inherit();
+        assert_eq!(*field1, "world");
+        assert_eq!(*field2, 1234u64);
+    }
+
+    // Verifies that `inherit` does not double-drop the inner value.
+    // If `ManuallyDrop` handling is wrong, running under Miri or with a drop
+    // counter catches a double-free.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_no_double_drop() {
+        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+
+        static DROP_COUNT: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
+
+        struct DropCounter;
+        impl Drop for DropCounter {
+            fn drop(&mut self) {
+                DROP_COUNT.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+            }
+        }
+
+        #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
+        #[repr(C)]
+        struct WithDrop {
+            pub val: DropCounter,
+        }
+
+        DROP_COUNT.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
+        {
+            let v = Verified::<WithDrop>::new_unchecked(WithDrop { val: DropCounter });
+            let _ = v.inherit();
+        }
+        assert_eq!(
+            DROP_COUNT.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
+            1,
+            "DropCounter must be dropped exactly once"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // --- Verified::from_ref ---
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_ref_is_same_address() {
+        let val = 42u32;
+        let verified: &Verified<u32> = Verified::from_ref(&val);
+        assert_eq!(
+            &val as *const u32 as *const u8, verified as *const _ as *const u8,
+            "from_ref must alias the original reference, not copy the value"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_ref_value_preserved() {
+        let val = String::from("test");
+        let verified: &Verified<String> = Verified::from_ref(&val);
+        assert_eq!(**verified, "test");
+    }
+
+    // --- AsRef<Verified<T>> for Verified<&T> ---
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verified_ref_as_ref_is_same_address() {
+        let val = 99u32;
+        let vref: Verified<&u32> = Verified::new_unchecked(&val);
+        let v: &Verified<u32> = vref.as_ref();
+        assert_eq!(
+            &val as *const u32 as *const u8, v as *const _ as *const u8,
+            "AsRef<Verified<T>> for Verified<&T> must alias the referent, not copy it"
+        );
+    }
+}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+use std::ops::Deref as _;
-use encryption::v1::Nonce;
 
 use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
 use chacha20poly1305::{
@@ -11,10 +10,12 @@ use rand::{
     rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
 };
 
+use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+
 pub mod encryption;
-pub mod governance;
 pub mod integrity;
-pub mod shamir;
+
+use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
 
 pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
 impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
@@ -22,15 +23,6 @@ impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
         Self(value)
     }
 }
-impl From<[u8; 32]> for KeyCell {
-    fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
-        let cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|key: &mut Key| {
-            key.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
-        });
-        Self(cell)
-    }
-}
-
 impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
     type Error = ();
 
@@ -39,7 +31,7 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
         if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
             return Err(());
         }
-        let cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
+        let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
             cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
         });
         Ok(Self(cell))
@@ -48,9 +40,12 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
 
 impl KeyCell {
     pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
-        let key = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
+        let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
-            let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng)
+            #[allow(
-                .expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
+                clippy::unwrap_used,
+                reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
+            )]
+            let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
             rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
         });
 
@@ -64,7 +59,8 @@ impl KeyCell {
         mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
     ) -> Result<(), Error> {
         let key_reader = self.0.read();
-        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
         let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
         let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
         cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
@@ -76,7 +72,8 @@ impl KeyCell {
         buffer: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
     ) -> Result<(), Error> {
         let key_reader = self.0.read();
-        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+        let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
         let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
         let mut buffer = buffer.write();
         let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
@@ -90,7 +87,8 @@ impl KeyCell {
         plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
     ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
         let key_reader = self.0.read();
-        let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key_reader);
+        let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
+        let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
         let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
 
         let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
@@ -105,7 +103,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
 }
 
 /// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
-pub fn derive_key(password: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &[u8]) -> KeyCell {
+pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
     let params = {
         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
         {
@@ -118,15 +116,20 @@ pub fn derive_key(password: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &[u8]) -> KeyCell {
         }
     };
 
+    #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
     let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
     let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
     password.read_inline(|password_source| {
         let mut key_buffer = key.write();
         let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
 
+        #[allow(
+            clippy::unwrap_used,
+            reason = "Better fail completely than return a weak key"
+        )]
         hasher
-            .hash_password_into(password_source, salt, key_buffer)
+            .hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
-            .expect("Better fail completely than return a weak key");
+            .unwrap();
     });
 
     key.into()
@@ -138,15 +141,15 @@ mod tests {
         derive_key,
         encryption::v1::{Nonce, generate_salt},
     };
-    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+    use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 
     #[test]
-    fn encrypt_decrypt() {
+    pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
         static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
-        let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
+        let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
         let salt = generate_salt();
 
-        let mut key = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
+        let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
         let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
         let associated_data = b"associated data";
         let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/shamir.rs

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-use vsss_rs::Gf256;
-
-#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
-pub enum ShamirError {
-    #[error("Failed to split key: {0}")]
-    Split(String),
-    #[error("Failed to combine shares: {0}")]
-    Combine(String),
-}
-
-/// Split `key` into `total` shares where any `threshold` shares can reconstruct it.
-/// Each returned Vec<u8> is a share with format [`identifier_byte`, `value_bytes`...].
-pub fn split_key(
-    threshold: usize,
-    total: usize,
-    key: &[u8; 32],
-    rng: impl rand_core::RngCore + rand_core::CryptoRng,
-) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, ShamirError> {
-    Gf256::split_array(threshold, total, key.as_slice(), rng)
-        .map_err(|e| ShamirError::Split(format!("{e:?}")))
-}
-
-/// Returns the minimum number of shares required to reconstruct the secret
-/// for a committee of `n` operators.
-#[must_use]
-pub const fn shamir_threshold(n: usize) -> usize {
-    match n {
-        0 => panic!("No operators"),
-        1 => 1,
-        2 => 2,
-        n => n / 2 + 1,
-    }
-}
-
-/// Reconstruct the secret from `threshold` or more shares.
-pub fn combine_shares(shares: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ShamirError> {
-    let bytes = Gf256::combine_array(shares)
-        .map_err(|e| ShamirError::Combine(format!("{e:?}")))?;
-    <[u8; 32]>::try_from(bytes.as_slice())
-        .map_err(|_| ShamirError::Combine("unexpected reconstructed key length".to_owned()))
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/functions.rs

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-//! Typed bindings for the SQLite scalar functions used in Diesel expressions.
-
-use diesel::sql_types::{Integer, Text};
-
-diesel::define_sql_function! {
-    /// SQLite `unixepoch(modifier)` -- seconds since the Unix epoch.
-    ///
-    /// Declared so timestamp comparisons are built by the query DSL instead of by
-    /// `format!`-ing a SQL fragment: the argument becomes a bind parameter and the
-    /// result type is checked against the column it is compared with.
-    fn unixepoch(modifier: Text) -> Integer;
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/mod.rs

@@ -5,12 +5,11 @@ use diesel_async::{
     sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
 };
 use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
+
 use thiserror::Error;
 use tracing::info;
 
-pub mod functions;
 pub mod models;
-pub mod proposal;
 pub mod schema;
 
 pub type DatabaseConnection = SyncConnectionWrapper<SqliteConnection>;
@@ -24,14 +23,14 @@ const MIGRATIONS: EmbeddedMigrations = embed_migrations!("migrations");
 
 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
 pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
-    #[error(transparent)]
+    #[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
-    ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
+    HomeDir(std::io::Error),
 
     #[error(transparent)]
     Connection(diesel::ConnectionError),
 
-    #[error("Failed to determine home directory")]
+    #[error(transparent)]
-    HomeDir(std::io::Error),
+    ConcurrencySetup(diesel::result::Error),
 
     #[error(transparent)]
     Migration(Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>),
@@ -42,11 +41,10 @@ pub enum DatabaseSetupError {
 
 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
 pub enum DatabaseError {
-    #[error("Database query error")]
-    Connection(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
-
     #[error("Database connection error")]
     Pool(#[from] PoolError),
+    #[error("Database query error")]
+    Connection(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
 }
 
 #[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
@@ -95,16 +93,13 @@ fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
 }
 
 #[tracing::instrument(level = "info")]
-/// Creates a connection pool for the `SQLite` database.
-///
-/// # Panics
-/// Panics if the database path is not valid UTF-8.
 pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
     let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
+        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
         database_path()?
             .to_str()
             .expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
-            .to_owned(),
+            .to_string(),
     );
 
     initialize_database(&database_url)?;
@@ -139,19 +134,19 @@ pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetu
 }
 
 #[mutants::skip]
-#[expect(clippy::missing_panics_doc, reason = "Tests oriented function")]
-/// Creates a test database pool with a temporary `SQLite` database file.
 pub async fn create_test_pool() -> DatabasePool {
     use rand::distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _};
 
     let tempfile_name = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rand::rng(), 16);
 
     let file = std::env::temp_dir().join(tempfile_name);
+    #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
     let url = file
         .to_str()
         .expect("temp file path is not valid UTF-8")
-        .to_owned();
+        .to_string();
 
+    #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
     create_pool(Some(&url))
         .await
         .expect("Failed to create test database pool")

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/models.rs

@@ -1,26 +1,23 @@
-#![allow(
+#![allow(unused)]
-    clippy::duplicated_attributes,
+#![allow(clippy::all)]
-    reason = "restructed's #[view] causes false positives"
+
-)]
 use crate::db::schema::{
     self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant,
     evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
     evm_token_transfer_log, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_transaction_log, evm_wallet,
     integrity_envelope, root_key_history, tls_history,
 };
-
+use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
-use crate::db::proposal::ProposalKindTag;
 use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
 use restructed::Models;
 
 pub mod types {
     use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
     use diesel::{
-        backend::Backend,
         deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow},
         expression::AsExpression,
         serialize::{IsNull, ToSql},
-        sql_types::{Integer, Text},
+        sql_types::Integer,
         sqlite::{Sqlite, SqliteType},
     };
 
@@ -30,16 +27,16 @@ pub mod types {
     pub struct SqliteTimestamp(pub DateTime<Utc>);
     impl SqliteTimestamp {
         pub fn now() -> Self {
-            Self(Utc::now())
+            SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())
         }
     }
 
-    impl From<DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
+    impl From<chrono::DateTime<Utc>> for SqliteTimestamp {
-        fn from(dt: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
+        fn from(dt: chrono::DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
-            Self(dt)
+            SqliteTimestamp(dt)
         }
     }
-    impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for DateTime<Utc> {
+    impl From<SqliteTimestamp> for chrono::DateTime<Utc> {
         fn from(ts: SqliteTimestamp) -> Self {
             ts.0
         }
@@ -50,11 +47,6 @@ pub mod types {
             &'b self,
             out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
         ) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
-            #[expect(
-                clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
-                clippy::as_conversions,
-                reason = "fixme! #84; this will break up in 2038 :3"
-            )]
             let unix_timestamp = self.0.timestamp() as i32;
             out.set_value(unix_timestamp);
             Ok(IsNull::No)
@@ -63,7 +55,7 @@ pub mod types {
 
     impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
         fn from_sql(
-            mut bytes: <Sqlite as Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
+            mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
         ) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
             let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
                 return Err(format!(
@@ -77,106 +69,41 @@ pub mod types {
             let datetime =
                 DateTime::from_timestamp(unix_timestamp, 0).ok_or("Timestamp is out of bounds")?;
 
-            Ok(Self(datetime))
+            Ok(SqliteTimestamp(datetime))
         }
     }
 
-    macro_rules! declare_id {
+    /// Key algorithm stored in the `useragent_client.key_type` column.
-        ($name:ident) => {
+    /// Values must stay stable — they are persisted in the database.
-            #[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone, Hash, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+    #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, strum::FromRepr)]
     #[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
-            #[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
+    #[repr(i32)]
-            pub struct $name(i32);
+    pub enum KeyType {
-
+        Ed25519 = 1,
-            impl $name {
+        EcdsaSecp256k1 = 2,
-                pub const fn to_raw(self) -> i32 {
+        Rsa = 3,
-                    self.0
     }
-                pub const fn from_raw(raw: i32) -> Self {
+
-                    Self(raw)
+    impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
+        fn to_sql<'b>(
+            &'b self,
+            out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
+        ) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
+            out.set_value(*self as i32);
+            Ok(IsNull::No)
         }
     }
 
-            impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for $name {
+    impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
         fn from_sql(
-                    bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
+            mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
         ) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
-                    FromSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::from_sql(bytes).map(Self)
+            let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
-                }
+                return Err("Expected Integer for KeyType".into());
-            }
-            impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for $name {
-                fn to_sql<'b>(
-                    &'b self,
-                    out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
-                ) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
-                    ToSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::to_sql(&self.0, out)
-                }
-            }
             };
-    }
+            let discriminant = bytes.read_long();
-
+            KeyType::from_repr(discriminant as i32)
-    declare_id!(ChainId);
+                .ok_or_else(|| format!("Unknown KeyType discriminant: {discriminant}").into())
-
-    #[expect(
-        clippy::cast_sign_loss,
-        clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
-        clippy::as_conversions,
-        reason = "safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants"
-    )]
-    const _: () = {
-        impl From<ChainId> for alloy::primitives::ChainId {
-            fn from(chain_id: ChainId) -> Self {
-                chain_id.0 as Self
-            }
-        }
-        impl From<alloy::primitives::ChainId> for ChainId {
-            fn from(chain_id: alloy::primitives::ChainId) -> Self {
-                Self(chain_id as _)
-            }
-        }
-    };
-
-    declare_id!(OperatorId);
-    declare_id!(OperatorIdentityId);
-    declare_id!(AeadEncryptedId);
-    declare_id!(RootKeyHistoryId);
-    declare_id!(TlsHistoryId);
-    declare_id!(EvmWalletId);
-    declare_id!(ClientId);
-    declare_id!(ProposalId);
-    declare_id!(RecoveryOperatorIdentityId);
-
-    #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, AsExpression, FromSqlRow)]
-    #[diesel(sql_type = Text)]
-    pub enum ProposalStatus {
-        Pending,
-        Approved,
-        Rejected,
-    }
-
-    impl ToSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalStatus {
-        fn to_sql<'b>(
-            &'b self,
-            out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
-        ) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
-            let s: &str = match self {
-                Self::Pending => "pending",
-                Self::Approved => "approved",
-                Self::Rejected => "rejected",
-            };
-            <str as ToSql<Text, Sqlite>>::to_sql(s, out)
-        }
-    }
-
-    impl FromSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalStatus {
-        fn from_sql(bytes: <Sqlite as Backend>::RawValue<'_>) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
-            let s = <String as FromSql<Text, Sqlite>>::from_sql(bytes)?;
-            match s.as_str() {
-                "pending" => Ok(Self::Pending),
-                "approved" => Ok(Self::Approved),
-                "rejected" => Ok(Self::Rejected),
-                other => Err(format!("Unknown proposal status: {other}").into()),
-            }
         }
     }
 }
@@ -191,12 +118,12 @@ pub use types::*;
 )]
 #[diesel(table_name = aead_encrypted, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
 pub struct AeadEncrypted {
-    pub id: AeadEncryptedId,
+    pub id: i32,
     pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
     pub tag: Vec<u8>,
     pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>,
     pub schema_version: i32,
-    pub associated_root_key_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
+    pub associated_root_key_id: i32, // references root_key_history.id
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
 }
 
@@ -209,7 +136,7 @@ pub struct AeadEncrypted {
     attributes_with = "deriveless"
 )]
 pub struct RootKeyHistory {
-    pub id: RootKeyHistoryId,
+    pub id: i32,
     pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
     pub tag: Vec<u8>,
     pub root_key_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
@@ -227,7 +154,7 @@ pub struct RootKeyHistory {
     attributes_with = "deriveless"
 )]
 pub struct TlsHistory {
-    pub id: TlsHistoryId,
+    pub id: i32,
     pub cert: String,
     pub cert_key: String, // PEM Encoded private key
     pub ca_cert: String,  // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing
@@ -252,7 +179,7 @@ pub struct ArbiterSettings {
     attributes_with = "deriveless"
 )]
 pub struct EvmWallet {
-    pub id: EvmWalletId,
+    pub id: i32,
     pub address: Vec<u8>,
     pub aead_encrypted_id: i32,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
@@ -274,7 +201,7 @@ pub struct EvmWallet {
 )]
 pub struct EvmWalletAccess {
     pub id: i32,
-    pub wallet_id: EvmWalletId,
+    pub wallet_id: i32,
     pub client_id: i32,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
 }
@@ -301,7 +228,8 @@ pub struct ProgramClientMetadataHistory {
 #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
 #[diesel(table_name = schema::program_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
 pub struct ProgramClient {
-    pub id: ClientId,
+    pub id: i32,
+    pub nonce: i32,
     pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
     pub metadata_id: i32,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
@@ -309,23 +237,14 @@ pub struct ProgramClient {
 }
 
 #[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::operator_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
+#[diesel(table_name = schema::useragent_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct OperatorClient {
+pub struct UseragentClient {
-    pub id: OperatorIdentityId,
+    pub id: i32,
+    pub nonce: i32,
     pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
     pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-}
+    pub key_type: KeyType,
-
-#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::operator, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct Operator {
-    pub id: OperatorId,
-    pub share: Vec<u8>,
-    pub share_nonce: Vec<u8>,
-    pub share_salt: Vec<u8>,
-    pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
 }
 
 #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
@@ -353,7 +272,7 @@ pub struct EvmEtherTransferLimit {
 pub struct EvmBasicGrant {
     pub id: i32,
     pub wallet_access_id: i32, // references evm_wallet_access.id
-    pub chain_id: ChainId,
+    pub chain_id: i32,
     pub valid_from: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
     pub valid_until: Option<SqliteTimestamp>,
     pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<Vec<u8>>,
@@ -376,7 +295,7 @@ pub struct EvmTransactionLog {
     pub id: i32,
     pub grant_id: i32,
     pub wallet_access_id: i32,
-    pub chain_id: ChainId,
+    pub chain_id: i32,
     pub eth_value: Vec<u8>,
     pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
 }
@@ -451,7 +370,7 @@ pub struct EvmTokenTransferLog {
     pub id: i32,
     pub grant_id: i32,
     pub log_id: i32,
-    pub chain_id: ChainId,
+    pub chain_id: i32,
     pub token_contract: Vec<u8>,
     pub recipient_address: Vec<u8>,
     pub value: Vec<u8>,
@@ -471,63 +390,8 @@ pub struct IntegrityEnvelope {
     pub entity_kind: String,
     pub entity_id: Vec<u8>,
     pub payload_version: i32,
-    pub key_version: RootKeyHistoryId,
+    pub key_version: i32,
     pub mac: Vec<u8>,
     pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
     pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
 }
-
-#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Identifiable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct Proposal {
-    pub id: ProposalId,
-    pub kind: ProposalKindTag,
-    pub initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-    pub status: ProposalStatus,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct NewProposal {
-    pub kind: ProposalKindTag,
-    pub initiator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    // status defaults to 'pending' at the DB layer
-    pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Identifiable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct ProposalVote {
-    pub id: i32,
-    pub proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    pub operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    pub approve: bool,
-    pub signature: Vec<u8>,
-    pub voted_at: SqliteTimestamp,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct NewProposalVote {
-    pub proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    pub operator_id: OperatorIdentityId,
-    pub approve: bool,
-    pub signature: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::recovery_proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct NewRecoveryProposalVote {
-    pub proposal_id: ProposalId,
-    pub recovery_operator_id: RecoveryOperatorIdentityId,
-    pub approve: bool,
-    pub signature: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = schema::recovery_wakeup_request, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct NewRecoveryWakeupRequest {
-    pub requested_by: OperatorIdentityId,
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/approve_sdk_client.rs

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-//! Approving an SDK client so it may authenticate against the vault.
-
-use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag};
-use crate::db::{
-    DatabaseConnection, models::ProposalId, schema::proposal_approve_sdk_client as table,
-};
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, Insertable, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, Queryable, Selectable,
-    SelectableHelper as _, sqlite::Sqlite,
-};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = table, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct Settings {
-    pub client_id: i32,
-}
-
-pub struct ApproveSdkClient;
-
-impl Proposal for ApproveSdkClient {
-    const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::ApproveSdkClient;
-
-    type Settings = Settings;
-
-    async fn insert(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        settings: &Self::Settings,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<()> {
-        diesel::insert_into(table::table)
-            .values((table::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id), settings))
-            .execute(conn)
-            .await
-            .map(drop)
-    }
-
-    async fn load(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
-        table::table
-            .find(proposal_id)
-            .select(Settings::as_select())
-            .first(conn)
-            .await
-    }
-}

server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/proposal/grant_wallet_access.rs

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-//! Granting an SDK client visibility of a wallet.
-
-use super::{Proposal, ProposalKindTag};
-use crate::db::{
-    DatabaseConnection, models::ProposalId, schema::proposal_grant_wallet_access as table,
-};
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, Insertable, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, Queryable, Selectable,
-    SelectableHelper as _, sqlite::Sqlite,
-};
-use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Queryable, Selectable, Insertable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = table, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
-pub struct Settings {
-    pub wallet_id: i32,
-    pub client_id: i32,
-}
-
-pub struct GrantWalletAccess;
-
-impl Proposal for GrantWalletAccess {
-    const KIND: ProposalKindTag = ProposalKindTag::GrantWalletAccess;
-
-    type Settings = Settings;
-
-    async fn insert(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        settings: &Self::Settings,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<()> {
-        diesel::insert_into(table::table)
-            .values((table::proposal_id.eq(proposal_id), settings))
-            .execute(conn)
-            .await
-            .map(drop)
-    }
-
-    async fn load(
-        proposal_id: ProposalId,
-        conn: &mut DatabaseConnection,
-    ) -> QueryResult<Self::Settings> {
-        table::table
-            .find(proposal_id)
-            .select(Settings::as_select())
-            .first(conn)
-            .await
-    }
-}