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Author SHA1 Message Date
CleverWild
7ab47ec563 feat(vault)!: implement full Shamir re-key flow and governance execution (§3.3–§3.5)
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- Add `rekey.proto` with `ContributePassphrase` / `ContributeRecoveryPassphrase` / `RekeyResult`
- Wire `rekey` as a 4th vault stream payload in `vault.proto` and gRPC dispatch
- Add `RekeyRootKey` message to `Vault` actor: generates new random seal key, re-encrypts root key, writes new `root_key_history` row
- Add `StartRekey`, `ContributeRekey`, `ContributeRecoveryRekey` messages to `VaultCoordinator`; `finalize_rekey` uses threshold-1 fast path identical to bootstrap
- `execute_replace_operator` now UPDATEs `operator_identity.public_key` in-place (avoids FK constraint violation), deletes stale `operator` share row, then triggers `StartRekey`
- `execute_update_shamir_parameters` triggers `StartRekey` instead of warning stub
- `ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator` carries `old_operator_id`; encode/decode updated accordingly
- `GlobalActors::spawn` extracts `vault_coordinator` before `Ok(Self { … })` so it can be cloned into `ProposalManager::new`
- Add `handle_rekey` in session handlers forwarding passphrase contributions to `VaultCoordinator`
- Fix test: rename `replace_operator_inserts_identity_row` → `replace_operator_updates_pubkey_and_starts_rekey`, assert count stays 1 and pubkey is updated
2026-06-14 15:11:11 +02:00
CleverWild
aff87c13ca refactor(proposal): replace string kind dispatch with ProposalKindTag enum (strum) 2026-06-14 15:02:25 +02:00
CleverWild
9f9b6820c2 feat(vault): add recovery passphrase handling for bootstrap and unseal processes
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2026-06-13 23:09:49 +02:00
CleverWild
6017ef29ca fix(crypto): handle 1-of-N Shamir split when ordinary_count=1 2026-06-13 23:08:53 +02:00
CleverWild
eb16da3a20 feat(server): recovery operators with sleeping/wakeup mechanism (§3.5/§3.6)
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2026-06-13 22:31:10 +02:00
CleverWild
2fda0484fc feat(server): key-rotation proposals require full quorum (§3.3)
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2026-06-13 22:20:48 +02:00
CleverWild
f8c621b20e feat(server): two-operator vault requires at least one recovery share
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2026-06-13 22:13:07 +02:00
CleverWild
3b090cd3ce refactor(server): typed pubkey len via u32::try_from in ReplaceOperator
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2026-06-13 21:53:46 +02:00
CleverWild
99e2b841e9 feat(server): ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction 2026-06-13 21:32:23 +02:00
CleverWild
b2b159b16f feat(server): ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant 2026-06-13 21:27:41 +02:00
CleverWild
ab767fe158 feat(server): ProposalKind::UpdateShamirParameters 2026-06-13 21:20:06 +02:00
CleverWild
f080a8615f feat(server): ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator 2026-06-13 16:46:04 +02:00
CleverWild
514a4cb2d1 feat(server): ProposalKind ::GrantWalletAccess and ::ApproveServerUpdate
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2026-06-13 15:51:22 +02:00
CleverWild
0b331d90bf test(server): governance integration tests
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2026-06-13 15:23:10 +02:00
CleverWild
f981ddeb79 feat(server::grpc): wire governance RPCs through operator session 2026-06-13 15:23:10 +02:00
CleverWild
8517b981f2 feat(server): introduce ProposalManager actor with quorum voting logic 2026-06-13 15:11:00 +02:00
CleverWild
af13465c03 feat(crypto): expose governance signing context and make shamir_threshold pub const 2026-06-13 15:11:00 +02:00
CleverWild
d7950beb09 feat(db): add proposal and proposal_vote tables 2026-06-13 15:11:00 +02:00
CleverWild
0cb0de759b feat(proto): add governance proposal/vote RPC definitions 2026-06-13 15:11:00 +02:00
CleverWild
6f270ef0c4 housekepping: add fixme for start_bootstrap's operator_id
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2026-06-12 22:01:17 +02:00
CleverWild
0098c3c08a refactor(server::crypto): use fixed-size [u8; 32] and KeyCell throughout seal key API
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2026-06-12 21:15:07 +02:00
CleverWild
a3b98ca024 fix(server::tests): tighten unseal test seal_key params to &[u8; 32] 2026-06-12 21:11:48 +02:00
CleverWild
0d364d1951 feat(server::grpc): wire Shamir committee bootstrap and unseal proto messages
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Adds DeclareCommittee and ContributePassphrase variants to bootstrap.proto,
ContributePassphrase to unseal.proto, and AwaitingContributions result codes
to both. Implements corresponding inbound converters and outbound reply
mappings. VaultGate handlers delegate to VaultCoordinator.
2026-06-12 19:43:17 +02:00
CleverWild
6f65c907a3 feat(server): introduce VaultCoordinator for multi-operator Shamir bootstrap/unseal
VaultCoordinator collects operator passphrases, splits the seal key into
Shamir shares on bootstrap (encrypting each share with the operator's
passphrase via Argon2 + XChaCha20-Poly1305), and reconstructs the seal
key from threshold shares on unseal. Adds vsss-rs 5.4.0 and rand_core 0.6
dependencies.
2026-06-12 19:43:09 +02:00
CleverWild
9764b0d5ce refactor(server::actors::vault): clean up Bootstrap/TryUnseal, remove Bootstrapping state
Bootstrap and TryUnseal now accept a SafeCell<Vec<u8>> seal key directly.
The Bootstrapping intermediate state is removed — multi-operator coordination
is the responsibility of VaultCoordinator, which calls Bootstrap atomically
once all shares are collected.
2026-06-12 19:43:02 +02:00
CleverWild
50fe18d6ce feat(server::crypto): add Shamir secret sharing utilities
Wraps vsss_rs Gf256::split_array / combine_array into thin split_key /
combine_shares helpers. Also widens derive_key salt parameter from &[u8;16]
to &[u8] to accommodate the 32-byte share salts.
2026-06-12 19:42:56 +02:00
CleverWild
3e5f0cb3df feat(server::db): add share_salt column to operator table
Each operator row now stores a 32-byte random salt used to derive the
per-operator share encryption key from their passphrase (Argon2 KDF).
2026-06-12 19:42:49 +02:00
CleverWild
34850137df feat(server::actors::evm): implement operator_delete_grant
Sets revoked_at on the evm_basic_grant row; returns NotFound if the grant
does not exist. Wires the handler in OperatorSession replacing the todo!().
2026-06-12 19:42:43 +02:00
CleverWild
d1b96c8409 fix(server::peers::operator::auth): make ChallengeContext pub for smlang state machine
smlang generates a public state enum whose variants contain ChallengeContext,
requiring the type itself to be fully public. Also tightens the wildcard arm
in client auth to an exhaustive match.
2026-06-12 19:42:37 +02:00
Skipper
9dbb18ae82 WIP: some things
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2026-05-20 21:04:16 +02:00
Skipper
a773255935 refactor(server::db): introduced newtype wrappers for entity id's in database 2026-05-04 19:35:27 +02:00
Skipper
3f801abdff housekeeping(server): deps upgrade + diesel migration to AsyncFnOnce
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2026-05-01 11:22:40 +02:00
Skipper
2b44570ab4 fix(server): MacOS build version
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2026-04-19 13:47:47 +02:00
Skipper
1f9b253433 housekeeping(server): removed unused deps 2026-04-19 13:46:49 +02:00
Skipper
a1c3ffd2d1 refactor: rename to to better reflect meaning
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2026-04-19 13:41:50 +02:00
Skipper
fd25de32a1 docs: move to folder and update to new challenge payload 2026-04-18 15:17:18 +02:00
Skipper
9ab074170b merge: feat-lints into main
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2026-04-18 15:04:33 +02:00
18b8a3bbf5 Merge pull request 'refactor-integrity-check' (#90) from refactor-integrity-check into main
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Reviewed-on: #90
2026-04-18 11:54:30 +00:00
Skipper
38cf1b98b9 housekeeping(server): clippy warns fix
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2026-04-18 13:53:11 +02:00
Skipper
9cf87b2058 merge: refactor-integrity-check into main
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2026-04-18 13:46:28 +02:00
Skipper
929d50b589 housekeeping(server): clean too-broad visibility markers and organize imports
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2026-04-18 13:30:09 +02:00
Skipper
70acfc99b5 merge: refactor-integrity-check into main 2026-04-18 13:19:13 +02:00
28f84d03ab Merge pull request 'housekeeping(server): dependencies upgrade' (#89) from push-zmvtzuwrnyyv into main
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Reviewed-on: #89
2026-04-17 19:20:50 +00:00
Skipper
4a8e51ef32 docs: updated to new auth challenge format and removed stale TOCTOU race condition note
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2026-04-17 18:25:55 +02:00
Skipper
9ee86afc19 fix(useragent): now using new challenge format 2026-04-17 18:19:51 +02:00
Skipper
790026e93b fix(server::tests): api surface of auth challenge changed 2026-04-17 17:58:22 +02:00
Skipper
0e09afda5d refactor(server::{useragent::auth, client::auth}): use random based + timestamp nonce instead of monotonic counter in database 2026-04-17 17:44:42 +02:00
Skipper
51e6571d80 refactor(server): now keeps track of useragents, instead of 2026-04-17 00:00:43 +02:00
Skipper
3b828d5874 refactor(server::grpc::vault_gate): standard approach using / traits 2026-04-16 22:15:18 +02:00
Skipper
a6f94e3115 fix(server): sending fixed vault state when on stage 2026-04-16 19:36:41 +02:00
hdbg
f49e995c2f WIP: kameo::messages wiring for transport generalization
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2026-04-16 17:18:46 +02:00
Skipper
e88df432fb housekeeping(server): dependencies upgrade
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2026-04-14 19:10:07 +02:00
hdbg
87ee0fe87b feat(user-agent): add VaultGate for sealed vault authentication 2026-04-12 11:53:05 +02:00
hdbg
205227a3df fix(server::integrity): vault now differentias between expected/unexpected states for commands more granularly 2026-04-08 18:21:48 +02:00
hdbg
a4070e7df7 fix(useragent): unsafe, but working implementation of ml-dsa 2026-04-08 17:43:51 +02:00
hdbg
6b8da567dd fix(server::user_agent): useragents now self-sign themselves on bootstrap 2026-04-08 17:40:45 +02:00
hdbg
1585f90cae refactor(server): reorganized client/user_agent actors into separate module peers and added event MessageBus 2026-04-08 12:34:16 +02:00
243 changed files with 20670 additions and 5099 deletions

2
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ scripts/__pycache__/
.DS_Store
.cargo/config.toml
.vscode/
docs/
docs/superpowers

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ This file provides guidance to Codex (Codex.ai/code) when working with code in t
Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
- **`operator/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, die
|---|---|
| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
| `arbiter-operator` | Rust client library for the operator side of the gRPC protocol |
| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
### Common Commands
@@ -66,11 +66,11 @@ cargo insta review
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`Vault`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between operators and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
Per-connection actors live under `actors/operator/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
@@ -121,20 +121,20 @@ pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool
This forces callers to either use the return value or explicitly ignore it with `let _ = ...;`, preventing silent failures.
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
## Operator (Flutter + Rinf at `operator/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `operator/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-operator` for the gRPC client.
Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `operator/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
```sh
cd useragent && rinf gen
cd operator && rinf gen
```
### Common Commands
```sh
cd useragent
cd operator
# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
flutter run
@@ -146,4 +146,4 @@ rinf gen
flutter analyze
```
The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.
The Rinf Rust entry point is `operator/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `operator/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.

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CLAUDE.md
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@@ -1,149 +1 @@
# CLAUDE.md
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Project Overview
Arbiter is a **permissioned signing service** for cryptocurrency wallets. It consists of:
- **`server/`** — Rust gRPC daemon that holds encrypted keys and enforces policies
- **`useragent/`** — Flutter desktop app (macOS/Windows) with a Rust backend via Rinf
- **`protobufs/`** — Protocol Buffer definitions shared between server and client
The vault never exposes key material; it only produces signatures when requests satisfy configured policies.
## Toolchain Setup
Tools are managed via [mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/). Install all required tools:
```sh
mise install
```
Key versions: Rust 1.93.0 (with clippy), Flutter 3.38.9-stable, protoc 29.6, diesel_cli 2.3.6 (sqlite).
## Server (Rust workspace at `server/`)
### Crates
| Crate | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `arbiter-proto` | Generated gRPC stubs + protobuf types; compiled from `protobufs/*.proto` via `tonic-prost-build` |
| `arbiter-server` | Main daemon — actors, DB, EVM policy engine, gRPC service implementation |
| `arbiter-useragent` | Rust client library for the user agent side of the gRPC protocol |
| `arbiter-client` | Rust client library for SDK clients |
### Common Commands
```sh
cd server
# Build
cargo build
# Run the server daemon
cargo run -p arbiter-server
# Run all tests (preferred over cargo test)
cargo nextest run
# Run a single test
cargo nextest run <test_name>
# Lint
cargo clippy
# Security audit
cargo audit
# Check unused dependencies
cargo shear
# Run snapshot tests and update snapshots
cargo insta review
```
### Architecture
The server is actor-based using the **kameo** crate. All long-lived state lives in `GlobalActors`:
- **`Bootstrapper`** — Manages the one-time bootstrap token written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` on first run.
- **`KeyHolder`** — Holds the encrypted root key and manages the Sealed/Unsealed vault state machine. On unseal, decrypts the root key into a `memsafe` hardened memory cell.
- **`FlowCoordinator`** — Coordinates cross-connection flow between user agents and SDK clients.
- **`EvmActor`** — Handles EVM transaction policy enforcement and signing.
Per-connection actors live under `actors/user_agent/` and `actors/client/`, each with `auth` (challenge-response authentication) and `session` (post-auth operations) sub-modules.
**Database:** SQLite via `diesel-async` + `bb8` connection pool. Schema managed by embedded Diesel migrations in `crates/arbiter-server/migrations/`. DB file lives at `~/.arbiter/arbiter.sqlite`. Tests use a temp-file DB via `db::create_test_pool()`.
**Cryptography:**
- Authentication: ed25519 (challenge-response, nonce-tracked per peer)
- Encryption at rest: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (versioned via `scheme` field for transparent migration on unseal)
- Password KDF: Argon2
- Unseal transport: X25519 ephemeral key exchange
- TLS: self-signed certificate (aws-lc-rs backend), fingerprint distributed via `ArbiterUrl`
**Protocol:** gRPC with Protocol Buffers. The `ArbiterUrl` type encodes host, port, CA cert, and bootstrap token into a single shareable string (printed to console on first run).
### Proto Regeneration
When `.proto` files in `protobufs/` change, rebuild to regenerate:
```sh
cd server && cargo build -p arbiter-proto
```
### Database Migrations
```sh
# Create a new migration
diesel migration generate <name> --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
# Run migrations manually (server also runs them on startup)
diesel migration run --migration-dir crates/arbiter-server/migrations
```
### Code Conventions
**`#[must_use]` Attribute:**
Apply the `#[must_use]` attribute to return types of functions where the return value is critical and should not be accidentally ignored. This is commonly used for:
- Methods that return `bool` indicating success/failure or validation state
- Any function where ignoring the return value indicates a logic error
Do not apply `#[must_use]` redundantly to items (types or functions) that are already annotated with `#[must_use]`.
Example:
```rust
#[must_use]
pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
// verification logic
}
```
This forces callers to either use the return value or explicitly ignore it with `let _ = ...;`, preventing silent failures.
## User Agent (Flutter + Rinf at `useragent/`)
The Flutter app uses [Rinf](https://rinf.cunarist.org) to call Rust code. The Rust logic lives in `useragent/native/hub/` as a separate crate that uses `arbiter-useragent` for the gRPC client.
Communication between Dart and Rust uses typed **signals** defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/signals/`. After modifying signal structs, regenerate Dart bindings:
```sh
cd useragent && rinf gen
```
### Common Commands
```sh
cd useragent
# Run the app (macOS or Windows)
flutter run
# Regenerate Rust↔Dart signal bindings
rinf gen
# Analyze Dart code
flutter analyze
```
The Rinf Rust entry point is `useragent/native/hub/src/lib.rs`. It spawns actors defined in `useragent/native/hub/src/actors/` which handle Dart↔server communication via signals.
Refer to @AGENTS.md for instructions.

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Security warning
Arbiter can't meaningfully protect against host compromise. Potential attack flow:
- Attacker steals TLS keys from database
- Pretends to be server; just accepts user agent challenge solutions
- Pretends to be server; just accepts operator challenge solutions
- Pretend to be in sealed state and performing DH with client
- Steals user password and derives seal key

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Arbiter is a permissioned signing service for cryptocurrency wallets. It runs as
Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers:
- **User Agent** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies).
- **Operator** — A client application used by the owner to manage the vault (create wallets, approve SDK clients, configure policies).
- **SDK Client** — A consumer of signing capabilities, typically an automation tool. In the future, this could include a browser-based wallet.
- **Recovery Operator** — A dormant recovery participant with narrowly scoped authority used only for custody recovery and operator replacement.
@@ -22,30 +22,32 @@ Arbiter distinguishes two kinds of peers:
All peers authenticate via public-key cryptography using a challenge-response protocol:
1. The peer sends its public key and requests a challenge.
2. The server looks up the key in its database. If found, it increments the nonce and returns a challenge (replay-attack protection).
3. The peer signs the challenge with its private key and sends the signature back.
2. The server looks up the key in its database. If found, it generates a fresh challenge from random bytes plus the current timestamp.
3. The peer signs the canonical challenge payload with its private key and sends the signature back.
4. The server verifies the signature:
- **Pass:** The connection is considered authenticated.
- **Fail:** The server closes the connection.
### 2.2 User Agent Bootstrap
Authentication challenges are per-connection, ephemeral values. They are not persisted in the peer tables, and peer records store no challenge state.
On first run — when no User Agents are registered — the server generates a one-time bootstrap token. It is made available in two ways:
### 2.2 Operator Bootstrap
- **Local setup:** Written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` for automatic discovery by a co-located User Agent.
On first run — when no Operators are registered — the server generates a one-time bootstrap token. It is made available in two ways:
- **Local setup:** Written to `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token` for automatic discovery by a co-located Operator.
- **Remote setup:** Printed to the server's console output.
The first User Agent must present this token alongside the standard challenge-response to complete registration.
The first Operator must present this token alongside the standard challenge-response to complete registration.
### 2.3 SDK Client Registration
There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approved by an already-registered User Agent.
There is no bootstrap mechanism for SDK clients. They must be explicitly approved by an already-registered Operator.
---
## 3. Multi-Operator Governance
When more than one User Agent is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision.
When more than one Operator is registered, the vault is treated as having multiple operators. In that mode, sensitive actions are governed by voting rather than by a single operator decision.
### 3.1 Voting Rules
@@ -163,13 +165,13 @@ In both cases, committee formation is a coordinated process. Arbiter does not al
When an unbootstrapped vault is initialized as a multi-operator vault, the setup proceeds as follows:
1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using a User Agent and the bootstrap token.
1. An operator connects to the unbootstrapped vault using an Operator and the bootstrap token.
2. During bootstrap setup, that operator declares:
- the total number of ordinary operators
- the total number of Recovery Operators
3. The vault enters **multi-bootstrap mode**.
4. While in multi-bootstrap mode:
- every ordinary operator must connect with a User Agent using the bootstrap token
- every ordinary operator must connect with an Operator using the bootstrap token
- every Recovery Operator must also connect using the bootstrap token
- each participant is registered individually
- each participant's share is created and protected with that participant's credentials
@@ -191,8 +193,8 @@ The server proves its identity using TLS with a self-signed certificate. The TLS
Peers verify the server by its **public key fingerprint**:
- **User Agent (local):** Receives the fingerprint automatically through the bootstrap token.
- **User Agent (remote) / SDK Client:** Must receive the fingerprint out-of-band.
- **Operator (local):** Receives the fingerprint automatically through the bootstrap token.
- **Operator (remote) / SDK Client:** Must receive the fingerprint out-of-band.
> A streamlined setup mechanism using a single connection string is planned but not yet implemented.
@@ -229,11 +231,11 @@ On boot, the root key is encrypted and the server cannot perform any signing ope
### 6.2 Unseal Flow
To transition to the **Unsealed** state, a User Agent must provide the password:
To transition to the **Unsealed** state, an Operator must provide the password:
1. The User Agent initiates an unseal request.
1. The Operator initiates an unseal request.
2. The server generates a one-time key pair and returns the public key.
3. The User Agent encrypts the user's password with this one-time public key and sends the ciphertext to the server.
3. The Operator encrypts the user's password with this one-time public key and sends the ciphertext to the server.
4. The server decrypts and verifies the password:
- **Success:** The root key is decrypted and placed into a hardened memory cell. The server transitions to `Unsealed`. Any entries pending encryption scheme migration are re-encrypted.
- **Failure:** The server returns an error indicating the password is incorrect.
@@ -255,7 +257,7 @@ See [IMPLEMENTATION.md](IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the current and planned memory pr
### 7.1 Fundamental Rules
- SDK clients have **no access by default**.
- Access is granted **explicitly** by a User Agent.
- Access is granted **explicitly** by an Operator.
- Grants are scoped to **specific wallets** and governed by **policies**.
Each blockchain requires its own policy system due to differences in static transaction analysis. Currently, only EVM is supported; Solana support is planned.
@@ -275,19 +277,19 @@ sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor SDK as SDK Client
participant Server
participant UA as User Agent
participant operator as Operator
SDK->>Server: SignTransactionRequest
Server->>Server: Resolve wallet and wallet visibility
alt Visibility approval required
Server->>UA: Ask for wallet visibility approval
UA-->>Server: Vote result
Server->>operator: Ask for wallet visibility approval
operator-->>Server: Vote result
end
Server->>Server: Evaluate transaction
Server->>Server: Load grant and limits context
alt Grant approval required
Server->>UA: Ask for execution / grant approval
UA-->>Server: Vote result
Server->>operator: Ask for execution / grant approval
operator-->>Server: Vote result
opt Create persistent grant
Server->>Server: Create and store grant
end

View File

@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ This document covers concrete technology choices and dependencies. For the archi
### Authentication Result Semantics
Authentication no longer uses an implicit success-only response shape. Both `client` and `user-agent` return explicit auth status enums over the wire.
Authentication no longer uses an implicit success-only response shape. Both `client` and `operator` return explicit auth status enums over the wire.
- **Client:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `APPROVAL_DENIED`, `NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE`, or `INTERNAL`
- **User-agent:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED`, `TOKEN_INVALID`, or `INTERNAL`
- **Client:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `APPROVAL_DENIED`, `NO_OPERATORS_ONLINE`, or `INTERNAL`
- **Operator:** `AuthResult` may return `SUCCESS`, `INVALID_KEY`, `INVALID_SIGNATURE`, `BOOTSTRAP_REQUIRED`, `TOKEN_INVALID`, or `INTERNAL`
This makes transport-level failures and actor/domain-level auth failures distinct:
@@ -22,45 +22,36 @@ Clients are expected to handle these status codes directly and present the concr
### New Client Approval
When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected user agents are asked to approve the connection. The first agent to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel.
When a client whose public key is not yet in the database connects, all connected operators are asked to approve the connection. The first operator to respond determines the outcome; remaining requests are cancelled via a watch channel.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A([Client connects]) --> B[Receive AuthChallengeRequest]
B --> C{pubkey in DB?}
C -- yes --> D[Read nonce\nIncrement nonce in DB]
D --> G
C -- yes --> G[Generate AuthChallenge]
C -- no --> E[Ask all UserAgents:\nClientConnectionRequest]
C -- no --> E[Ask all Operators:\nClientConnectionRequest]
E --> F{First response}
F -- denied --> Z([Reject connection])
F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nUserAgent requests]
F2 --> F3[INSERT client\nnonce = 1]
F3 --> G[Send AuthChallenge\nwith nonce]
F -- approved --> F2[Cancel remaining\nOperator requests]
F2 --> F3[INSERT client]
F3 --> G
G --> H[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
H --> I{Signature valid?}
I -- no --> Z
I -- yes --> J([Session started])
G --> H[Send AuthChallenge\ntimestamp + random bytes]
H --> I[Receive AuthChallengeSolution]
I --> K{Signature valid?}
K -- no --> Z
K -- yes --> J([Session started])
```
### Known Issue: Concurrent Registration Race (TOCTOU)
Auth challenges are generated from fresh random bytes plus a nanosecond timestamp. The server keeps the issued challenge only in the in-flight authentication state for that connection, then verifies the signature against the same canonical challenge payload.
Two connections presenting the same previously-unknown public key can race through the approval flow simultaneously:
The authentication schema stores peer identity, not replay counters:
1. Both check the DB → neither is registered.
2. Both request approval from user agents → both receive approval.
3. Both `INSERT` the client record → the second insert silently overwrites the first, resetting the nonce.
This means the first connection's nonce is invalidated by the second, causing its challenge verification to fail. A fix requires either serialising new-client registration (e.g. an in-memory lock keyed on pubkey) or replacing the separate check + insert with an `INSERT OR IGNORE` / upsert guarded by a unique constraint on `public_key`.
### Nonce Semantics
The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it is always one ahead of the nonce last issued in a challenge.
- **New client:** inserted with `nonce = 1`; the first challenge is issued with `nonce = 0`.
- **Existing client:** the current DB value is read and used as the challenge nonce, then immediately incremented within the same exclusive transaction, preventing replay.
- `program_client` stores the SDK client's public key, metadata binding, and timestamps.
- `operator_client` stores the Operator public key and timestamps.
- Neither table stores an authentication nonce, and challenge generation does not update either table.
---
@@ -71,7 +62,7 @@ The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it i
### User-Agent Authentication
User-agent authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
Operator authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.
- **Supported schemes:** ML-DSA
- **Why:** Secure Enclave (MacOS) support them natively, on other platforms we could emulate while they roll-out
@@ -95,7 +86,7 @@ User-agent authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-p
### Request Multiplexing
Both `client` and `user-agent` connections support multiple in-flight requests over one gRPC bidi stream.
Both `client` and `operator` connections support multiple in-flight requests over one gRPC bidi stream.
- Every request carries a monotonically increasing request ID
- Every normal response echoes the request ID it corresponds to
@@ -150,7 +141,7 @@ flowchart TD
L -- Yes --> M[Check grant limits]
L -- No --> N[Start execution or grant voting flow]
N --> O{User-agent decision}
N --> O{Operator decision}
O -- Reject --> Z4[Return no matching grant error]
O -- Allow once --> M
O -- Create grant --> P[Create grant with user-selected limits]

View File

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ String shortAddress(List<int> bytes) {
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
```sh
cd useragent && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/utils.dart
cd operator && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/utils.dart
```
Expected: no errors.
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ class GrantCreation extends _$GrantCreation {
- [ ] **Step 2: Run code generator**
```sh
cd useragent && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
cd operator && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
```
Expected: generates `provider.freezed.dart` and `provider.g.dart`, no errors.
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ Expected: generates `provider.freezed.dart` and `provider.g.dart`, no errors.
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify**
```sh
cd useragent && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/provider.dart
cd operator && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/provider.dart
```
Expected: no errors.
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ jj describe -m "feat(grants): add GrantCreation provider (client selection + gra
```dart
// lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/fields/client_picker_field.dart
import 'package:arbiter/proto/user_agent.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/proto/operator.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/list.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/provider.dart';
import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ class ClientPickerField extends ConsumerWidget {
```dart
// lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/fields/wallet_access_picker_field.dart
import 'package:arbiter/proto/evm.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/proto/user_agent.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/proto/operator.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/provider.dart';
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ class TransactionRateLimitField extends StatelessWidget {
- [ ] **Step 8: Verify all field widgets**
```sh
cd useragent && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/fields/
cd operator && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/fields/
```
Expected: no errors.
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ class SharedGrantFields extends StatelessWidget {
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
```sh
cd useragent && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/shared_grant_fields.dart
cd operator && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/shared_grant_fields.dart
```
Expected: no errors.
@@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ class _TokenVolumeLimitRow extends HookWidget {
- [ ] **Step 4: Run code generator for token_transfer_grant.g.dart**
```sh
cd useragent && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
cd operator && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
```
Expected: generates `token_transfer_grant.g.dart`, no errors.
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ Expected: generates `token_transfer_grant.g.dart`, no errors.
- [ ] **Step 5: Verify**
```sh
cd useragent && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/grants/
cd operator && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/grants/
```
Expected: no errors.
@@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ String _formatError(Object error) {
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify the full create/ directory**
```sh
cd useragent && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/
cd operator && dart analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/create/
```
Expected: no errors.

View File

@@ -14,24 +14,24 @@
| File | Action | Responsibility |
|---|---|---|
| `useragent/lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify | Add `Palette.token` (indigo accent for token-transfer cards) |
| `useragent/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart` | Modify | Add `listAllWalletAccesses()` function |
| `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create | `WalletAccessListProvider` — fetches full wallet access list with IDs |
| `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart` | Create | `GrantCard` widget — watches enrichment providers + revoke mutation; one card per grant |
| `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create | `EvmGrantsScreen` — watches `evmGrantsProvider`; handles loading/error/empty/data states; renders `GrantCard` list |
| `useragent/lib/router.dart` | Modify | Register `EvmGrantsRoute` in dashboard children |
| `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify | Add Grants entry to `routes` list and `NavigationDestination` list |
| `operator/lib/theme/palette.dart` | Modify | Add `Palette.token` (indigo accent for token-transfer cards) |
| `operator/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart` | Modify | Add `listAllWalletAccesses()` function |
| `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart` | Create | `WalletAccessListProvider` — fetches full wallet access list with IDs |
| `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart` | Create | `GrantCard` widget — watches enrichment providers + revoke mutation; one card per grant |
| `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart` | Create | `EvmGrantsScreen` — watches `evmGrantsProvider`; handles loading/error/empty/data states; renders `GrantCard` list |
| `operator/lib/router.dart` | Modify | Register `EvmGrantsRoute` in dashboard children |
| `operator/lib/screens/dashboard.dart` | Modify | Add Grants entry to `routes` list and `NavigationDestination` list |
---
## Task 1: Add `Palette.token`
**Files:**
- Modify: `useragent/lib/theme/palette.dart`
- Modify: `operator/lib/theme/palette.dart`
- [ ] **Step 1: Add the color**
Replace the contents of `useragent/lib/theme/palette.dart` with:
Replace the contents of `operator/lib/theme/palette.dart` with:
```dart
import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ class Palette {
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
```sh
cd useragent && flutter analyze lib/theme/palette.dart
cd operator && flutter analyze lib/theme/palette.dart
```
Expected: no issues.
@@ -65,20 +65,20 @@ jj new
## Task 2: Add `listAllWalletAccesses` feature function
**Files:**
- Modify: `useragent/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart`
- Modify: `operator/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart`
`readClientWalletAccess` (existing) filters the list to one client's wallet IDs and returns `Set<int>`. This new function returns the complete unfiltered list with row IDs so the grant cards can resolve wallet_access_id → wallet + client.
- [ ] **Step 1: Append function**
Add at the bottom of `useragent/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart`:
Add at the bottom of `operator/lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart`:
```dart
Future<List<SdkClientWalletAccess>> listAllWalletAccesses(
Connection connection,
) async {
final response = await connection.ask(
UserAgentRequest(listWalletAccess: Empty()),
OperatorRequest(listWalletAccess: Empty()),
);
if (!response.hasListWalletAccessResponse()) {
throw Exception(
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Each returned `SdkClientWalletAccess` has:
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
```sh
cd useragent && flutter analyze lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart
cd operator && flutter analyze lib/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart
```
Expected: no issues.
@@ -114,18 +114,18 @@ jj new
## Task 3: Create `WalletAccessListProvider`
**Files:**
- Create: `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
- Generated: `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.g.dart`
- Create: `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
- Generated: `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.g.dart`
Mirrors the structure of `EvmGrants` in `providers/evm/evm_grants.dart` — class-based `@riverpod` with a `refresh()` method.
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the provider**
Create `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`:
Create `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`:
```dart
import 'package:arbiter/features/connection/evm/wallet_access.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/proto/user_agent.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/proto/operator.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/connection/connection_manager.dart';
import 'package:mtcore/markettakers.dart';
import 'package:riverpod_annotation/riverpod_annotation.dart';
@@ -165,15 +165,15 @@ class WalletAccessList extends _$WalletAccessList {
- [ ] **Step 2: Run code generation**
```sh
cd useragent && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
cd operator && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
```
Expected: `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.g.dart` created. No errors.
Expected: `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.g.dart` created. No errors.
- [ ] **Step 3: Verify**
```sh
cd useragent && flutter analyze lib/providers/sdk_clients/
cd operator && flutter analyze lib/providers/sdk_clients/
```
Expected: no issues.
@@ -190,26 +190,26 @@ jj new
## Task 4: Create `GrantCard` widget
**Files:**
- Create: `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart`
- Create: `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart`
This widget owns all per-card logic: enrichment lookups, revoke action, and rebuild scope. The screen only passes it a `GrantEntry` — the card fetches everything else itself.
**Key types:**
- `GrantEntry` (from `proto/evm.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.shared.walletAccessId`, `.shared.chainId`, `.specific.whichGrant()`
- `SpecificGrant_Grant.etherTransfer` / `.tokenTransfer` — enum values for the oneof
- `SdkClientWalletAccess` (from `proto/user_agent.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
- `SdkClientWalletAccess` (from `proto/operator.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.access.walletId`, `.access.sdkClientId`
- `WalletEntry` (from `proto/evm.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.address` (List<int>)
- `SdkClientEntry` (from `proto/user_agent.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.info.name`
- `SdkClientEntry` (from `proto/operator.pb.dart`): `.id`, `.info.name`
- `revokeEvmGrantMutation``Mutation<void>` (global; all revoke buttons disable together while any revoke is in flight)
- `executeRevokeEvmGrant(ref, grantId: int)``Future<void>`
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the widget**
Create `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart`:
Create `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart`:
```dart
import 'package:arbiter/proto/evm.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/proto/user_agent.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/proto/operator.pb.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/evm/evm_grants.dart';
import 'package:arbiter/providers/sdk_clients/list.dart';
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ class GrantCard extends ConsumerWidget {
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
```sh
cd useragent && flutter analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart
cd operator && flutter analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/widgets/grant_card.dart
```
Expected: no issues.
@@ -455,13 +455,13 @@ jj new
## Task 5: Create `EvmGrantsScreen`
**Files:**
- Create: `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
- Create: `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
The screen watches only `evmGrantsProvider` for top-level state (loading / error / no connection / empty / data). When there is data it renders a list of `GrantCard` widgets — each card manages its own enrichment subscriptions.
- [ ] **Step 1: Write the screen**
Create `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`:
Create `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`:
```dart
import 'package:arbiter/proto/evm.pb.dart';
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ class EvmGrantsScreen extends ConsumerWidget {
- [ ] **Step 2: Verify**
```sh
cd useragent && flutter analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/
cd operator && flutter analyze lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/
```
Expected: no issues.
@@ -719,13 +719,13 @@ jj new
## Task 6: Wire router and dashboard tab
**Files:**
- Modify: `useragent/lib/router.dart`
- Modify: `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard.dart`
- Regenerated: `useragent/lib/router.gr.dart`
- Modify: `operator/lib/router.dart`
- Modify: `operator/lib/screens/dashboard.dart`
- Regenerated: `operator/lib/router.gr.dart`
- [ ] **Step 1: Add route to `router.dart`**
Replace the contents of `useragent/lib/router.dart` with:
Replace the contents of `operator/lib/router.dart` with:
```dart
import 'package:auto_route/auto_route.dart';
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ class Router extends RootStackRouter {
- [ ] **Step 2: Update `dashboard.dart`**
In `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard.dart`, replace the `routes` constant:
In `operator/lib/screens/dashboard.dart`, replace the `routes` constant:
```dart
final routes = [
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ destinations: const [
- [ ] **Step 3: Regenerate router**
```sh
cd useragent && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
cd operator && dart run build_runner build --delete-conflicting-outputs
```
Expected: `lib/router.gr.dart` updated, `EvmGrantsRoute` now available, no errors.
@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ Expected: `lib/router.gr.dart` updated, `EvmGrantsRoute` now available, no error
- [ ] **Step 4: Full project verify**
```sh
cd useragent && flutter analyze
cd operator && flutter analyze
```
Expected: no issues.

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Overview
Add a "Grants" dashboard tab to the Flutter user-agent app that displays all EVM grants as a card-based grid. Each card shows a compact summary (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with a revoke action. The tab integrates into the existing `AdaptiveScaffold` navigation alongside Wallets, Clients, and About.
Add a "Grants" dashboard tab to the Flutter operator app that displays all EVM grants as a card-based grid. Each card shows a compact summary (type, chain, wallet address, client name) with a revoke action. The tab integrates into the existing `AdaptiveScaffold` navigation alongside Wallets, Clients, and About.
## Scope
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Add a "Grants" dashboard tab to the Flutter user-agent app that displays all EVM
### `walletAccessListProvider`
**File:** `useragent/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
**File:** `operator/lib/providers/sdk_clients/wallet_access_list.dart`
- `@riverpod` class, watches `connectionManagerProvider.future`
- Returns `List<SdkClientWalletAccess>?` (null when not connected)
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ NavigationDestination(
## Screen: `EvmGrantsScreen`
**File:** `useragent/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
**File:** `operator/lib/screens/dashboard/evm/grants/grants.dart`
```
Scaffold

View File

@@ -1,51 +1,51 @@
# @generated - this file is auto-generated by `mise lock` https://mise.jdx.dev/dev-tools/mise-lock.html
[[tools.ast-grep]]
version = "0.42.0"
version = "0.42.1"
backend = "aqua:ast-grep/ast-grep"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64"]
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[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:5c830eae8456569e2f7212434ed9c238f58dca412d76045418ed6d394a755836"
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checksum = "sha256:3ba383839044cf9817929435f5ce0027f91d06931e8efb32d942e58d73d92be5"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64"]
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url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
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checksum = "sha256:5de8b87cba67fc8dc3e239d54b6484802ad745a7ae3de76be4fe89661dc52657"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:fc300d5293b1c770a5aece03a8a193b92e71e87cec726c28096990691a582620"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-aarch64-apple-darwin.zip"
checksum = "sha256:c3961d8e8a4ee0ce2d0d98c7beeb168bb331cdc766b53630118a7b6c4fd39015"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-aarch64-apple-darwin.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:979ffe611327056f4730a1ae71b0209b3b830f58b22c6ed194cda34f55400db2"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-apple-darwin.zip"
checksum = "sha256:a038965bfd7fe44257c771cdf8918dc3467dd8ec0eef673b8b14f639b144cdbd"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-apple-darwin.zip"
[tools.ast-grep."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:55836fa1b2c65dc7d61615a4d9368622a0d2371a76d28b9a165e5a3ab6ae32a4"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.0/app-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip"
checksum = "sha256:fe34f631bb24c08ad146f92ca2a92971a53d179461b509fd8d32dc863bff9f83"
url = "https://github.com/ast-grep/ast-grep/releases/download/0.42.1/app-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-audit"]]
version = "0.22.1"
backend = "cargo:cargo-audit"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-edit"]]
version = "0.13.9"
version = "0.13.10"
backend = "cargo:cargo-edit"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-features-manager"]]
version = "0.11.1"
version = "0.12.0"
backend = "cargo:cargo-features-manager"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-insta"]]
version = "1.46.3"
version = "1.47.2"
backend = "cargo:cargo-insta"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-mutants"]]
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ version = "27.0.0"
backend = "cargo:cargo-mutants"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-nextest"]]
version = "0.9.126"
version = "0.9.133"
backend = "cargo:cargo-nextest"
[[tools."cargo:cargo-shear"]]
@@ -65,15 +65,19 @@ version = "0.10.2"
backend = "cargo:cargo-vet"
[[tools."cargo:diesel_cli"]]
version = "2.3.6"
version = "2.3.7"
backend = "cargo:diesel_cli"
[tools."cargo:diesel_cli".options]
default-features = "false"
features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled"
[[tools."cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"]]
version = "2.12.0"
backend = "cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen"
[[tools.flutter]]
version = "3.38.9-stable"
version = "3.41.7-stable"
backend = "asdf:flutter"
[[tools.protoc]]
@@ -109,44 +113,44 @@ checksum = "sha256:1ebd7c87baffb9f1c47169b640872bf5fb1e4408079c691af527be9561d8f
url = "https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/releases/download/v29.6/protoc-29.6-win64.zip"
[[tools.python]]
version = "3.14.3"
version = "3.14.4"
backend = "core:python"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
checksum = "sha256:b8b597fdb2f8dccdc502c11947b60a4b65eb6bce79cfa60c7ccf9b6e8352c60a"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-arm64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:53700338695e402a1a1fe22be4a41fbdacc70e22bb308a48eca8ed67cb7992be"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
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url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
checksum = "sha256:fe9a9c32d13870af632cbac3dfc7528ae53597e94472aa4c7d6a42e8166136cd"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.linux-x64-musl"]
checksum = "sha256:d7a9f970914bb4c88756fe3bdcc186d4feb90e9500e54f1db47dae4dc9687e39"
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checksum = "sha256:fe9a9c32d13870af632cbac3dfc7528ae53597e94472aa4c7d6a42e8166136cd"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-arm64"]
checksum = "sha256:c43aecde4a663aebff99b9b83da0efec506479f1c3f98331442f33d2c43501f9"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-aarch64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
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provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.macos-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:9ab41dbc2f100a2a45d1833b9c11165f51051c558b5213eda9a9731d5948a0c0"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
checksum = "sha256:d51250a32fa5d9f0799c7bcb71720c27b10a3afd4a7de288120f96085d508a5a"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-apple-darwin-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[tools.python."platforms.windows-x64"]
checksum = "sha256:bbe19034b35b0267176a7442575ae7dc6343480fd4d35598cb7700173d431e09"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260324/cpython-3.14.3+20260324-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
checksum = "sha256:a976991dcd085c1bb5d9a8084823a6bc8b7f9b079d8c432574a6ddd68c3a6fe1"
url = "https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone/releases/download/20260414/cpython-3.14.4+20260414-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-install_only_stripped.tar.gz"
provenance = "github-attestations"
[[tools.rust]]
version = "1.93.0"
version = "1.95.0"
backend = "core:rust"

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
[tools]
"cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.6", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = false }
"cargo:diesel_cli" = { version = "2.3.7", features = "sqlite,sqlite-bundled", default-features = "false" }
"cargo:cargo-audit" = "0.22.1"
"cargo:cargo-vet" = "0.10.2"
flutter = "3.38.9-stable"
flutter = "3.41.7-stable"
protoc = "29.6"
"rust" = {version = "1.93.0", components = "clippy"}
"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.11.1"
"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.126"
rust = { version = "1.95.0", components = "clippy,rust-analyzer" }
"cargo:cargo-features-manager" = "0.12.0"
"cargo:cargo-nextest" = "0.9.133"
"cargo:cargo-shear" = "latest"
"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.46.3"
python = "3.14.3"
ast-grep = "0.42.0"
"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.9"
"cargo:cargo-insta" = "1.47.2"
python = "3.14.4"
ast-grep = "0.42.1"
"cargo:cargo-edit" = "0.13.10"
"cargo:cargo-mutants" = "27.0.0"
"cargo:flutter_rust_bridge_codegen" = "2.12.0"
[tasks.codegen]
sources = ['protobufs/*.proto', 'protobufs/**/*.proto']
@@ -21,3 +22,5 @@ run = '''
dart pub global activate protoc_plugin && \
protoc --dart_out=grpc:useragent/lib/proto --proto_path=protobufs/ $(find protobufs -name '*.proto' | sort)
'''
[tasks.generate_schema]

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter;
import "client.proto";
import "user_agent.proto";
import "operator.proto";
message ServerInfo {
string version = 1;
@@ -12,5 +12,5 @@ message ServerInfo {
service ArbiterService {
rpc Client(stream arbiter.client.ClientRequest) returns (stream arbiter.client.ClientResponse);
rpc UserAgent(stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentRequest) returns (stream arbiter.user_agent.UserAgentResponse);
rpc Operator(stream arbiter.operator.OperatorRequest) returns (stream arbiter.operator.OperatorResponse);
}

View File

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ message AuthChallengeRequest {
}
message AuthChallenge {
bytes pubkey = 1;
int32 nonce = 2;
uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
bytes random = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ enum AuthResult {
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
AUTH_RESULT_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 3;
AUTH_RESULT_APPROVAL_DENIED = 4;
AUTH_RESULT_NO_USER_AGENTS_ONLINE = 5;
AUTH_RESULT_NO_OPERATORS_ONLINE = 5;
AUTH_RESULT_INTERNAL = 6;
}

View File

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ message SpecificGrant {
}
}
// --- UserAgent grant management ---
// --- Operator grant management ---
message EvmGrantCreateRequest {
SharedSettings shared = 1;
SpecificGrant specific = 2;

31
protobufs/operator.proto Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.operator;
import "operator/auth.proto";
import "operator/evm.proto";
import "operator/governance.proto";
import "operator/sdk_client.proto";
import "operator/vault/vault.proto";
message OperatorRequest {
int32 id = 16;
oneof payload {
auth.Request auth = 1;
vault.Request vault = 2;
evm.Request evm = 3;
sdk_client.Request sdk_client = 4;
governance.Request governance = 5;
}
}
message OperatorResponse {
optional int32 id = 16;
oneof payload {
auth.Response auth = 1;
vault.Response vault = 2;
evm.Response evm = 3;
sdk_client.Response sdk_client = 4;
governance.Response governance = 5;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,22 +1,15 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.auth;
enum KeyType {
KEY_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 1;
KEY_TYPE_ECDSA_SECP256K1 = 2;
KEY_TYPE_RSA = 3;
}
package arbiter.operator.auth;
message AuthChallengeRequest {
bytes pubkey = 1;
optional string bootstrap_token = 2;
KeyType key_type = 3;
}
message AuthChallenge {
int32 nonce = 1;
uint64 timestamp_nanos = 1;
bytes random = 2;
}
message AuthChallengeSolution {

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.evm;
package arbiter.operator.evm;
import "evm.proto";
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.operator.governance;
message Request {
oneof payload {
CreateProposalRequest create = 1;
CastVoteRequest vote = 2;
QueryPendingRequest query = 3;
}
}
message CreateProposalRequest {
oneof kind {
ApproveSdkClientPayload approve_sdk_client = 1;
GrantWalletAccessPayload grant_wallet_access = 3;
ApproveServerUpdatePayload approve_server_update = 4;
ReplaceOperatorPayload replace_operator = 5;
UpdateShamirParametersPayload update_shamir_parameters = 6;
ApprovePersistentGrantPayload approve_persistent_grant = 7;
ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload approve_one_off_transaction = 8;
}
optional uint32 ttl_secs = 2;
}
message ReplaceOperatorPayload {
int32 old_operator_id = 1;
bytes new_pubkey = 2;
}
message UpdateShamirParametersPayload {
uint32 new_n = 1;
}
message ApproveServerUpdatePayload {}
message ApproveSdkClientPayload {
int32 client_id = 1;
}
message GrantWalletAccessPayload {
int32 wallet_id = 1;
int32 client_id = 2;
}
message CastVoteRequest {
int32 proposal_id = 1;
bool approve = 2;
bytes signature = 3;
}
message QueryPendingRequest {}
message Response {
oneof payload {
CreateProposalResponse created = 1;
VoteResponse voted = 2;
QueryPendingResponse pending = 3;
}
}
message CreateProposalResponse {
int32 proposal_id = 1;
}
message VoteResponse {
VoteOutcome outcome = 1;
}
enum VoteOutcome {
VOTE_OUTCOME_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
VOTE_OUTCOME_PENDING = 1;
VOTE_OUTCOME_APPROVED = 2;
VOTE_OUTCOME_REJECTED = 3;
}
message ProposalSummary {
int32 id = 1;
string kind = 2;
int32 initiator_id = 3;
int64 expires_at = 4;
int64 approve_count = 5;
int64 reject_count = 6;
}
message QueryPendingResponse {
repeated ProposalSummary proposals = 1;
}
message TransactionRateLimitProto {
uint32 count = 1;
int64 window_secs = 2;
}
message VolumeLimitProto {
bytes max_volume = 1;
int64 window_secs = 2;
}
message EtherTransferSpecProto {
repeated bytes targets = 1;
VolumeLimitProto limit = 2;
}
message TokenTransferSpecProto {
bytes token_contract = 1;
optional bytes target = 2;
repeated VolumeLimitProto volume_limits = 3;
}
message ApproveOneOffTransactionPayload {
int32 client_id = 1;
bytes wallet_address = 2;
uint64 chain_id = 3;
uint64 nonce = 4;
uint64 gas_limit = 5;
bytes max_fee_per_gas = 6;
bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 7;
bytes to = 8;
bytes value = 9;
bytes input = 10;
}
message ApprovePersistentGrantPayload {
int32 wallet_access_id = 1;
uint64 chain_id = 2;
optional int64 valid_from_secs = 3;
optional int64 valid_until_secs = 4;
optional bytes max_gas_fee_per_gas = 5;
optional bytes max_priority_fee_per_gas = 6;
optional TransactionRateLimitProto rate_limit = 7;
oneof specific {
EtherTransferSpecProto ether_transfer = 8;
TokenTransferSpecProto token_transfer = 9;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.sdk_client;
package arbiter.operator.sdk_client;
import "shared/client.proto";
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap;
message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
bytes nonce = 1;
bytes ciphertext = 2;
bytes associated_data = 3;
}
message DeclareCommittee {
uint32 count = 1;
uint32 recovery_count = 2;
}
message ContributePassphrase {
bytes passphrase = 1;
}
message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
bytes passphrase = 2;
}
enum BootstrapResult {
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_AWAITING_CONTRIBUTIONS = 4;
}
message Request {
oneof payload {
BootstrapEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
DeclareCommittee declare_committee = 3;
ContributePassphrase contribute_passphrase = 4;
ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase = 5;
}
}
message Response {
BootstrapResult result = 1;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.operator.vault.rekey;
message ContributePassphrase {
bytes passphrase = 1;
}
message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
bytes passphrase = 2;
}
enum RekeyResult {
REKEY_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
REKEY_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
REKEY_RESULT_AWAITING_CONTRIBUTIONS = 2;
REKEY_RESULT_NOT_IN_PROGRESS = 3;
}
message Request {
oneof payload {
ContributePassphrase contribute_passphrase = 1;
ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase = 2;
}
}
message Response {
RekeyResult result = 1;
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.vault.unseal;
package arbiter.operator.vault.unseal;
message UnsealStart {
bytes client_pubkey = 1;
@@ -15,17 +15,29 @@ message UnsealEncryptedKey {
bytes associated_data = 3;
}
message ContributePassphrase {
bytes passphrase = 1;
}
message ContributeRecoveryPassphrase {
int32 recovery_operator_id = 1;
bytes passphrase = 2;
}
enum UnsealResult {
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
UNSEAL_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
UNSEAL_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 2;
UNSEAL_RESULT_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 3;
UNSEAL_RESULT_AWAITING_CONTRIBUTIONS = 4;
}
message Request {
oneof payload {
UnsealStart start = 1;
UnsealEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
UnsealStart start = 1;
UnsealEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
ContributePassphrase contribute_passphrase = 3;
ContributeRecoveryPassphrase contribute_recovery_passphrase = 4;
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.operator.vault;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
import "shared/vault.proto";
import "operator/vault/bootstrap.proto";
import "operator/vault/rekey.proto";
import "operator/vault/unseal.proto";
message Request {
oneof payload {
google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
unseal.Request unseal = 2;
bootstrap.Request bootstrap = 3;
rekey.Request rekey = 4;
}
}
message Response {
oneof payload {
arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
unseal.Response unseal = 2;
bootstrap.Response bootstrap = 3;
rekey.Response rekey = 4;
}
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ package arbiter.shared;
enum VaultState {
VAULT_STATE_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
VAULT_STATE_UNBOOTSTRAPPED = 1;
VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 2;
VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 3;
VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 4;
VAULT_STATE_BOOSTRAPPING = 2;
VAULT_STATE_SEALED = 3;
VAULT_STATE_UNSEALED = 4;
VAULT_STATE_ERROR = 5;
}

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent;
import "user_agent/auth.proto";
import "user_agent/evm.proto";
import "user_agent/sdk_client.proto";
import "user_agent/vault/vault.proto";
message UserAgentRequest {
int32 id = 16;
oneof payload {
auth.Request auth = 1;
vault.Request vault = 2;
evm.Request evm = 3;
sdk_client.Request sdk_client = 4;
}
}
message UserAgentResponse {
optional int32 id = 16;
oneof payload {
auth.Response auth = 1;
vault.Response vault = 2;
evm.Response evm = 3;
sdk_client.Response sdk_client = 4;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.vault.bootstrap;
message BootstrapEncryptedKey {
bytes nonce = 1;
bytes ciphertext = 2;
bytes associated_data = 3;
}
enum BootstrapResult {
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_SUCCESS = 1;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_ALREADY_BOOTSTRAPPED = 2;
BOOTSTRAP_RESULT_INVALID_KEY = 3;
}
message Request {
BootstrapEncryptedKey encrypted_key = 2;
}
message Response {
BootstrapResult result = 1;
}

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package arbiter.user_agent.vault;
import "google/protobuf/empty.proto";
import "shared/vault.proto";
import "user_agent/vault/bootstrap.proto";
import "user_agent/vault/unseal.proto";
message Request {
oneof payload {
google.protobuf.Empty query_state = 1;
unseal.Request unseal = 2;
bootstrap.Request bootstrap = 3;
}
}
message Response {
oneof payload {
arbiter.shared.VaultState state = 1;
unseal.Response unseal = 2;
bootstrap.Response bootstrap = 3;
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
[env]
MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = "26.3"

1096
server/Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -6,31 +6,29 @@ resolver = "3"
[workspace.dependencies]
alloy = "1.7.3"
alloy = "2.0.4"
async-trait = "0.1.89"
base64 = "0.22.1"
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
futures = "0.3.32"
hmac = "0.12.1"
k256 = { version = "0.13.4", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
kameo = { version = "0.20.0", git = "https://github.com/tqwewe/kameo" } # hold this until new patch version is released
kameo = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "3e18ba2"}
kameo_actors = {git = "https://github.com/hdbg/kameo.git", rev = "3e18ba2"}
hmac = "0.13.0"
miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.8", features = ["zeroize"] }
ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.9", features = ["zeroize"] }
mutants = "0.0.4"
prost = "0.14.3"
prost-types = { version = "0.14.3", features = ["chrono"] }
rand = "0.10.0"
rand = "0.10.1"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.7", features = [ "aws_lc_rs", "pem", "x509-parser", "zeroize" ], default-features = false }
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
rstest = "0.26.1"
rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
sha2 = "0.10"
rustls = { version = "0.23.40", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.1"
sha2 = "0.11"
smlang = "0.8.0"
spki = "0.7"
thiserror = "2.0.18"
tokio = { version = "1.50.0", features = ["full"] }
tokio = { version = "1.52.1", features = ["full"] }
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18", features = ["full"] }
tonic = { version = "0.14.5", features = [ "deflate", "gzip", "tls-connect-info", "zstd" ] }
tracing = "0.1.44"
@@ -64,7 +62,6 @@ unit_bindings = "warn"
# missing_docs = "warn" # ENABLE BY THE FIRST MAJOR VERSION!!
unnameable_types = "warn"
variant_size_differences = "warn"
[workspace.lints.clippy]
derive_partial_eq_without_eq = "allow"
@@ -98,7 +95,6 @@ doc_include_without_cfg = "warn"
empty_drop = "warn"
empty_enum_variants_with_brackets = "warn"
empty_structs_with_brackets = "warn"
error_impl_error = "warn"
exit = "warn"
filetype_is_file = "warn"
float_arithmetic = "warn"
@@ -110,7 +106,6 @@ indexing_slicing = "warn"
infinite_loop = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_att_syntax = "warn"
inline_asm_x86_intel_syntax = "warn"
integer_division = "warn"
large_include_file = "warn"
lossy_float_literal = "warn"
map_with_unused_argument_over_ranges = "warn"
@@ -170,3 +165,5 @@ disallowed_methods = "deny"
nursery = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
pedantic = { level = "warn", priority = -1 }
type_repetition_in_bounds = "allow" # sometimes, it's better for readability this way

View File

@@ -26,3 +26,5 @@ trait-assoc-item-kinds-order = [
"type",
"fn",
] # community tested standard
too-many-lines-threshold = 150

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ tokio.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
http = "1.4.0"
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.10", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.13", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
async-trait.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
[lib]
doctest = false

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey, format_challenge};
use crate::{
storage::StorageError,
transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
proto::{
@@ -16,21 +20,19 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
};
use crate::{
storage::StorageError,
transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id},
};
use chrono::DateTime;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AuthError {
#[error("Client approval denied by User Agent")]
#[error("Server sent invalid auth challenge")]
InvalidChallenge,
#[error("Client approval denied by Operator")]
ApprovalDenied,
#[error("Auth challenge was not returned by server")]
MissingAuthChallenge,
#[error("No User Agents online to approve client")]
NoUserAgentsOnline,
#[error("No Operators online to approve client")]
NoOperatorsOnline,
#[error("Signing key storage error")]
Storage(#[from] StorageError),
@@ -42,7 +44,7 @@ pub enum AuthError {
fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
match AuthResult::try_from(code).unwrap_or(AuthResult::Unspecified) {
AuthResult::ApprovalDenied => AuthError::ApprovalDenied,
AuthResult::NoUserAgentsOnline => AuthError::NoUserAgentsOnline,
AuthResult::NoOperatorsOnline => AuthError::NoOperatorsOnline,
AuthResult::Unspecified
| AuthResult::Success
| AuthResult::InvalidKey
@@ -98,7 +100,15 @@ async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
key: &SigningKey,
challenge: AuthChallenge,
) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
let timestamp = DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(challenge.timestamp_nanos as i64);
let challenge = authn::AuthChallenge {
nonce: *challenge
.random
.as_array()
.ok_or(AuthError::InvalidChallenge)?,
timestamp,
};
let challenge_payload: Vec<u8> = challenge.format();
let signature = key
.sign_message(&challenge_payload, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
use std::io::{self, Write};
use arbiter_client::ArbiterClient;
use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, url::ArbiterUrl};
use std::io::{self, Write};
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
println!("Testing connection to Arbiter server...");

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,20 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
use crate::{
StorageError,
auth::{AuthError, authenticate},
storage::{FileSigningKeyStorage, SigningKeyStorage},
transport::{BUFFER_LENGTH, ClientTransport},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
};
#[cfg(feature = "evm")]
use crate::wallets::evm::ArbiterEvmWallet;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ArbiterClientError {

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
use arbiter_proto::home_path;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
use arbiter_proto::proto::client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI32, Ordering};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
@@ -24,10 +25,7 @@ pub struct ClientTransport {
}
impl ClientTransport {
pub(crate) async fn send(
&mut self,
request: ClientRequest,
) -> Result<(), ClientSignError> {
pub(crate) async fn send(&mut self, request: ClientRequest) -> Result<(), ClientSignError> {
self.sender
.send(request)
.await

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,4 @@
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::TxSigner,
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
ClientRequest,
@@ -25,7 +16,15 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
shared::evm::TransactionEvalError,
};
use crate::transport::{ClientTransport, next_request_id};
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
network::TxSigner,
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
/// A typed error payload returned by [`ArbiterEvmWallet`] transaction signing.
///

View File

@@ -6,16 +6,20 @@ edition = "2024"
[dependencies]
ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true }
rand = {workspace = true, optional = true}
base64 = {workspace = true, optional = true }
memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true}
hmac.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
x-wing = { version = "0.1.0-rc.0", features = ["zeroize"] }
chrono.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = ["authn", "safecell"]
authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand", "dep:base64"]
authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand"]
safecell = ["dep:memsafe"]
[lib]
doctest = false

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,66 @@
use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use hmac::digest::Digest;
use ml_dsa::{
EncodedVerifyingKey, Error, KeyGen, MlDsa87, Seed, Signature as MlDsaSignature,
SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _,
};
use rand::RngExt;
pub static CLIENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_client";
pub static USERAGENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_user_agent";
pub static OPERATOR_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_operator";
pub static GOVERNANCE_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_governance_vote";
pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
concat_form.into_bytes()
const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 32;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("invalid length: expected {expected} bytes, got {actual} bytes")]
pub struct InvalidLength {
pub expected: usize,
pub actual: usize,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AuthChallenge {
pub nonce: [u8; NONCE_SIZE],
pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
}
impl AuthChallenge {
pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::CryptoRng) -> Self {
let timestamp = Utc::now();
let nonce = {
let mut array = [0; NONCE_SIZE];
rng.fill(&mut array);
array
};
Self { nonce, timestamp }
}
pub fn format(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
{
let mut buffer = Vec::from(self.nonce);
let stamp = self
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("We would be long dead by the time this triggers :)");
buffer.extend_from_slice(stamp.to_be_bytes().as_slice());
buffer
}
}
pub fn from_parts(nonce: &[u8], timestamp: i64) -> Result<Self, InvalidLength> {
let random_nonce = nonce.as_array().ok_or(InvalidLength {
expected: NONCE_SIZE,
actual: nonce.len(),
})?;
Ok(Self {
nonce: *random_nonce,
timestamp: DateTime::from_timestamp_nanos(timestamp),
})
}
}
pub type KeyParams = MlDsa87;
@@ -36,12 +86,15 @@ impl PublicKey {
}
#[must_use]
pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
self.0.verify_with_context(
&format_challenge(nonce, &self.to_bytes()),
context,
&signature.0,
)
pub fn verify(&self, challenge: &AuthChallenge, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
let challenge = challenge.format();
self.0
.verify_with_context(&challenge, context, &signature.0)
}
#[must_use]
pub fn verify_message(&self, message: &[u8], context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
self.0.verify_with_context(message, context, &signature.0)
}
}
@@ -75,11 +128,14 @@ impl SigningKey {
.map(Into::into)
}
pub fn sign_challenge(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
self.sign_message(
&format_challenge(nonce, &self.public_key().to_bytes()),
context,
)
pub fn sign_challenge(
&self,
challenge: &AuthChallenge,
context: &[u8],
) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
let challenge = challenge.format();
self.sign_message(&challenge, context)
}
}
@@ -140,7 +196,9 @@ impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for Signature {
mod tests {
use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, signature::Keypair as _};
use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
use crate::authn::AuthChallenge;
use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, OPERATOR_CONTEXT};
#[test]
fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() {
@@ -169,13 +227,13 @@ mod tests {
fn challenge_verification_uses_context_and_canonical_key_bytes() {
let key = SigningKey::generate();
let public_key = key.public_key();
let nonce = 17;
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let signature = key
.sign_challenge(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(public_key.verify(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
assert!(!public_key.verify(nonce, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
assert!(public_key.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
assert!(!public_key.verify(&challenge, OPERATOR_CONTEXT, &signature));
}
#[test]
@@ -185,10 +243,16 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(restored.public_key(), original.public_key());
let challenge = AuthChallenge::generate(&mut rand::rng());
let signature = restored
.sign_challenge(9, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.sign_challenge(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
.expect("signature should be created");
assert!(restored.public_key().verify(9, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
assert!(
restored
.public_key()
.verify(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature)
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
pub use hmac::digest::Digest;
use std::collections::HashSet;
pub use hmac::digest::Digest;
/// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
#[diagnostic::on_unimplemented(
note = "for local types consider adding `#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]` to your `{Self}` type",

View File

@@ -3,3 +3,5 @@ pub mod authn;
pub mod hashing;
#[cfg(feature = "safecell")]
pub mod safecell;
pub use x_wing;

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
use std::{any::type_name, fmt};
use memsafe::MemSafe;
use std::{
any::type_name,
fmt,
ops::{Deref, DerefMut},
};
pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
type CellRead<'a>: Deref<Target = T>
@@ -20,7 +22,7 @@ pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
fn read(&mut self) -> Self::CellRead<'_>;
fn write(&mut self) -> Self::CellWrite<'_>;
fn new_inline<F>(f: F) -> Self
fn new_inline_default<F>(f: F) -> Self
where
Self: Sized,
T: Default,
@@ -34,6 +36,14 @@ pub trait SafeCellHandle<T> {
cell
}
fn new_inline<F>(f: Box<F>) -> Self
where
Self: Sized,
F: for<'a> FnOnce() -> T,
{
Self::new(f())
}
#[inline(always)]
fn read_inline<F, R>(&mut self, f: F) -> R
where

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ edition = "2024"
[lib]
proc-macro = true
doctest = false
[dependencies]
proc-macro2 = "1.0"

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
use crate::utils::{HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH, HMAC_DIGEST_PATH};
use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream, TokenTree};
use quote::quote;
use syn::parse_quote;
use syn::spanned::Spanned;
use syn::{DataStruct, DeriveInput, Fields, Generics, Index};
use crate::utils::{HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH, HMAC_DIGEST_PATH};
use syn::{DataStruct, DeriveInput, Fields, Generics, Index, parse_quote, spanned::Spanned};
pub(crate) fn derive(input: &DeriveInput) -> TokenStream {
match &input.data {

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ license = "Apache-2.0"
tonic.workspace = true
tokio.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true
hex = "0.4.3"
tonic-prost = "0.14.5"
prost.workspace = true
kameo.workspace = true
@@ -19,18 +18,18 @@ thiserror.workspace = true
rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
base64.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
[build-dependencies]
tonic-prost-build = "0.14.5"
protoc-bin-vendored = "3"
[dev-dependencies]
rstest.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
rcgen.workspace = true
[lib]
doctest = false
[package.metadata.cargo-shear]
ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost", "kameo"]
ignored = ["tonic-prost", "prost"]

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
.compile_protos(
&[
format!("{}/arbiter.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/user_agent.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/operator.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/client.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
format!("{}/evm.proto", PROTOBUF_DIR),
],

View File

@@ -12,30 +12,38 @@ pub mod proto {
}
}
pub mod user_agent {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent");
pub mod operator {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator");
pub mod auth {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.auth");
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.auth");
}
pub mod evm {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.evm");
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.evm");
}
pub mod governance {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.governance");
}
pub mod sdk_client {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.sdk_client");
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.sdk_client");
}
pub mod vault {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault");
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault");
pub mod bootstrap {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault.bootstrap");
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.bootstrap");
}
pub mod rekey {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.rekey");
}
pub mod unseal {
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.user_agent.vault.unseal");
tonic::include_proto!("arbiter.operator.vault.unseal");
}
}
}

View File

@@ -54,10 +54,9 @@
//! as a closed outbound channel.
//! - [`Bi::recv`] returns `None` when the underlying transport closes.
//! - Message translation is intentionally out of scope for this module.
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::{error::Infallible, prelude::*};
use std::marker::PhantomData;
/// Errors returned by transport adapters implementing [`Bi`].
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
@@ -106,6 +105,36 @@ pub trait Receiver<Inbound>: Send + Sync {
/// any built-in correlation mechanism between inbound and outbound items.
pub trait Bi<Inbound, Outbound>: Sender<Outbound> + Receiver<Inbound> + Send + Sync {}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Outbound> Sender<Outbound> for &mut T
where
T: Sender<Outbound> + ?Sized,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
{
async fn send(&mut self, item: Outbound) -> Result<(), Error> {
(**self).send(item).await
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl<T, Inbound> Receiver<Inbound> for &mut T
where
T: Receiver<Inbound> + ?Sized,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
{
async fn recv(&mut self) -> Option<Inbound> {
(**self).recv().await
}
}
impl<T, Inbound, Outbound> Bi<Inbound, Outbound> for &mut T
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> + ?Sized,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static,
{
}
pub trait SplittableBi<Inbound, Outbound>: Bi<Inbound, Outbound> {
type Sender: Sender<Outbound>;
type Receiver: Receiver<Inbound>;
@@ -161,3 +190,29 @@ where
}
pub mod grpc;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
pub enum ForwardError<I> {
#[error("Transport error: {0}")]
Transport(#[from] Error),
#[error("Actor delivery error: {0}")]
Actor(SendError<I>),
}
pub async fn forward_to_actor<Transport, Inbound, Outbound, Handler>(
transport: &mut Transport,
actor: &ActorRef<Handler>,
) -> Result<(), ForwardError<Inbound>>
where
Transport: Bi<Inbound, <Outbound as Reply>::Ok>,
Handler: Actor + Message<Inbound, Reply = Outbound>,
Inbound: Send + 'static,
Outbound: Send + 'static + Reply<Error = Infallible>, // `Infallible` to enforce contract that `Outbound` carries handler-level error
{
while let Some(request) = transport.recv().await {
let resp = actor.ask(request).await.map_err(ForwardError::Actor)?;
transport.send(resp).await?
}
Err(Error::ChannelClosed.into())
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use futures::StreamExt;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use super::{Bi, Receiver, Sender};
pub struct GrpcSender<Outbound> {
tx: mpsc::Sender<Result<Outbound, tonic::Status>>,
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
use std::fmt::Display;
use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_URL_SAFE};
use rustls_pki_types::CertificateDer;
use std::fmt::Display;
const ARBITER_URL_SCHEME: &str = "arbiter";
const CERT_QUERY_KEY: &str = "cert";

View File

@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ license = "Apache-2.0"
workspace = true
[dependencies]
diesel = { version = "2.3.7", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
diesel-async = { version = "0.8.0", features = [
diesel = { version = "2.3.9", features = ["chrono", "returning_clauses_for_sqlite_3_35", "serde_json", "time", "uuid"] }
diesel-async = { version = "0.9.0", features = [
"bb8",
"migrations",
"sqlite",
@@ -27,17 +27,12 @@ tokio.workspace = true
rustls.workspace = true
smlang.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
fatality = "0.1.1"
diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.1", features = ["sqlite"] }
diesel_migrations = { version = "2.3.2", features = ["sqlite"] }
async-trait.workspace = true
secrecy = "0.10.3"
futures.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
dashmap = "6.1.0"
rand.workspace = true
rcgen.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
kameo.workspace = true
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
@@ -46,22 +41,24 @@ strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
pem = "3.0.6"
sha2.workspace = true
hmac.workspace = true
spki.workspace = true
alloy.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
prost.workspace = true
prost-types.workspace = true
arbiter-tokens-registry.path = "../arbiter-tokens-registry"
anyhow = "1.0.102"
serde_with = "3.18.0"
mutants.workspace = true
subtle = "2.6.1"
ml-dsa.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
k256.workspace = true
kameo_actors.workspace = true
vsss-rs = "5.4.0"
rand_core = "0.6"
[dev-dependencies]
insta = "1.46.3"
proptest = "1.11.0"
rstest.workspace = true
test-log = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }
ml-dsa.workspace = true
[lib]
doctest = false

View File

@@ -43,15 +43,25 @@ create table if not exists arbiter_settings (
insert into arbiter_settings (id) values (1) on conflict do nothing;
-- ensure singleton row exists
create table if not exists useragent_client (
create table if not exists operator_identity (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
key_type integer not null default(1),
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_useragent_client_public_key on useragent_client (public_key, key_type);
create unique index if not exists uniq_operator_identity_public_key on operator_identity (public_key);
create table if not exists operator (
id integer primary key references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict, -- same id as operator_identity
share blob not null,
share_nonce blob not null,
share_salt blob not null default (randomblob(32)),
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
) STRICT;
create table if not exists client_metadata (
id integer not null primary key,
@@ -73,7 +83,6 @@ create unique index if not exists uniq_metadata_binding_client on client_metadat
create table if not exists program_client (
id integer not null primary key,
nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
public_key blob not null,
metadata_id integer not null references client_metadata (id) on delete cascade,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
@@ -207,3 +216,73 @@ create table if not exists integrity_envelope (
) STRICT;
create unique index if not exists uniq_integrity_envelope_entity on integrity_envelope (entity_kind, entity_id);
create table if not exists proposal (
id integer not null primary key,
kind text not null,
payload blob not null,
initiator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
expires_at integer not null,
status text not null default 'pending'
check (status in ('pending', 'approved', 'rejected', 'expired'))
) STRICT;
create table if not exists proposal_vote (
id integer not null primary key,
proposal_id integer not null references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
operator_id integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
approve integer not null check (approve in (0, 1)),
signature blob not null,
voted_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
unique (proposal_id, operator_id)
) STRICT;
create table if not exists proposal_result (
proposal_id integer not null primary key references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
data blob not null,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
-- ===============================
-- Recovery Operators (§3.4/§3.5/§3.6)
-- ===============================
-- Encrypted Shamir shares for recovery operators (mirrors the `operator` table).
create table if not exists recovery_operator (
id integer not null primary key references recovery_operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
share blob not null,
share_nonce blob not null,
share_salt blob not null,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
create table if not exists recovery_operator_identity (
id integer not null primary key,
public_key blob not null unique,
created_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now'))
) STRICT;
-- One active wakeup request at a time. A request is pending when cancelled_at IS NULL
-- and requested_at + 14 days > now. It becomes active (recovery live) after 14 days.
create table if not exists recovery_wakeup_request (
id integer not null primary key,
requested_by integer not null references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
requested_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
cancelled_by integer references operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
cancelled_at integer
) STRICT;
-- Votes cast by recovery operators; only allowed on replace_operator proposals.
create table if not exists recovery_proposal_vote (
id integer not null primary key,
proposal_id integer not null references proposal(id) on delete cascade,
recovery_operator_id integer not null references recovery_operator_identity(id) on delete restrict,
approve integer not null check (approve in (0, 1)),
signature blob not null,
voted_at integer not null default(unixepoch('now')),
unique (proposal_id, recovery_operator_id)
) STRICT;

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::db::{self, DatabasePool, schema};
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
}
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum BootstrappError {
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] db::PoolError),
@@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ pub struct Bootstrapper {
}
impl Bootstrapper {
pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, BootstrappError> {
pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let row_count: i64 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
schema::useragent_client::table
schema::operator::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?

View File

@@ -1,462 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
proto::client::auth::{AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult},
transport::{Bi, expect_message},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper as _,
dsl::insert_into, update,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::{
client::{ClientConnection, ClientCredentials, ClientProfile},
flow_coordinator::{self, RequestClientApproval},
keyholder::KeyHolder,
},
crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
db::{
self,
models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::program_client,
},
};
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ClientAuthError {
#[error("Client approval request failed")]
ApproveError(#[from] ApproveError),
#[error("Database operation failed")]
DatabaseOperationFailed,
#[error("Database pool unavailable")]
DatabasePoolUnavailable,
#[error("Integrity check failed")]
IntegrityCheckFailed,
#[error("Invalid challenge solution")]
InvalidChallengeSolution,
#[error("Transport error")]
Transport,
}
impl From<diesel::result::Error> for ClientAuthError {
fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
error!(?e, "Database error");
Self::DatabaseOperationFailed
}
}
impl From<ClientAuthError> for arbiter_proto::proto::client::auth::AuthResult {
fn from(value: ClientAuthError) -> Self {
match value {
ClientAuthError::ApproveError(e) => match e {
ApproveError::Denied => Self::ApprovalDenied,
ApproveError::Internal => Self::Internal,
ApproveError::Upstream(flow_coordinator::ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected) => {
Self::NoUserAgentsOnline
} // ApproveError::Upstream(_) => Self::Internal,
},
ClientAuthError::DatabaseOperationFailed
| ClientAuthError::DatabasePoolUnavailable
| ClientAuthError::IntegrityCheckFailed
| ClientAuthError::Transport => Self::Internal,
ClientAuthError::InvalidChallengeSolution => Self::InvalidSignature,
}
}
}
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ApproveError {
#[error("Client connection denied by user agents")]
Denied,
#[error("Internal error")]
Internal,
#[error("Upstream error: {0}")]
Upstream(flow_coordinator::ApprovalError),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Inbound {
AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
metadata: ClientMetadata,
},
AuthChallengeSolution {
signature: authn::Signature,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Outbound {
AuthChallenge {
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
nonce: i32,
},
AuthSuccess,
}
impl From<Outbound> for arbiter_proto::proto::client::auth::response::Payload {
fn from(value: Outbound) -> Self {
match value {
Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => Self::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes(),
nonce,
}),
Outbound::AuthSuccess => Self::Result(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into()),
}
}
}
/// Returns the current nonce and client ID for a registered client.
/// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<Option<(i32, i32)>, ClientAuthError> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
ClientAuthError::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
program_client::table
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.select((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
ClientAuthError::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn verify_integrity(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(), ClientAuthError> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
ClientAuthError::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?.ok_or_else(|| {
error!("Client not found during integrity verification");
ClientAuthError::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
let attestation = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut db_conn,
keyholder,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
ClientAuthError::IntegrityCheckFailed
})?;
if attestation != AttestationStatus::Attested {
error!("Integrity attestation unavailable for client {id}");
return Err(ClientAuthError::IntegrityCheckFailed);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Atomically increments the nonce and re-signs the integrity envelope.
/// Returns the new nonce, which is used as the challenge nonce.
async fn create_nonce(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<i32, ClientAuthError> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
ClientAuthError::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(program_client::table)
.filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
.set(program_client::nonce.eq(program_client::nonce + 1))
.returning((program_client::id, program_client::nonce))
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&keyholder,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: new_nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity sign failed after nonce update");
ClientAuthError::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
Ok(new_nonce)
})
})
.await
}
async fn approve_new_client(
actors: &crate::actors::GlobalActors,
profile: ClientProfile,
) -> Result<(), ClientAuthError> {
let result = actors
.flow_coordinator
.ask(RequestClientApproval { client: profile })
.await;
match result {
Ok(true) => Ok(()),
Ok(false) => Err(ClientAuthError::ApproveError(ApproveError::Denied)),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(e)) => {
error!(error = ?e, "Approval upstream error");
Err(ClientAuthError::ApproveError(ApproveError::Upstream(e)))
}
Err(e) => {
error!(error = ?e, "Approval request to flow coordinator failed");
Err(ClientAuthError::ApproveError(ApproveError::Internal))
}
}
}
async fn insert_client(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<i32, ClientAuthError> {
use crate::db::schema::client_metadata;
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
let metadata = metadata.clone();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
ClientAuthError::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
let client_id = insert_into(program_client::table)
.values((
program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()),
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
))
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.returning(program_client::id)
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
&keyholder,
&ClientCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: NONCE_START,
},
client_id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new client key");
ClientAuthError::DatabaseOperationFailed
})?;
Ok(client_id)
})
})
.await
}
async fn sync_client_metadata(
db: &db::DatabasePool,
client_id: i32,
metadata: &ClientMetadata,
) -> Result<(), ClientAuthError> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, client_metadata_history};
let now = SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now());
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
ClientAuthError::DatabasePoolUnavailable
})?;
conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
let metadata = metadata.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let (current_metadata_id, current): (i32, ProgramClientMetadata) =
program_client::table
.find(client_id)
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
program_client::metadata_id,
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.first(conn)
.await?;
let unchanged = current.name == metadata.name
&& current.description == metadata.description
&& current.version == metadata.version;
if unchanged {
return Ok(());
}
insert_into(client_metadata_history::table)
.values((
client_metadata_history::metadata_id.eq(current_metadata_id),
client_metadata_history::client_id.eq(client_id),
))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
let metadata_id = insert_into(client_metadata::table)
.values((
client_metadata::name.eq(&metadata.name),
client_metadata::description.eq(&metadata.description),
client_metadata::version.eq(&metadata.version),
))
.returning(client_metadata::id)
.get_result::<i32>(conn)
.await?;
update(program_client::table.find(client_id))
.set((
program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
program_client::updated_at.eq(now),
))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Ok::<(), diesel::result::Error>(())
})
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
ClientAuthError::DatabaseOperationFailed
})
}
async fn challenge_client<T>(
transport: &mut T,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
nonce: i32,
) -> Result<(), ClientAuthError>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, ClientAuthError>> + ?Sized,
{
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce,
}))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
ClientAuthError::Transport
})?;
let signature = expect_message(transport, |req: Inbound| match req {
Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature } => Some(signature),
Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { .. } => None,
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to receive challenge solution");
ClientAuthError::Transport
})?;
if !pubkey.verify(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature) {
error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
return Err(ClientAuthError::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn authenticate<T>(
props: &mut ClientConnection,
transport: &mut T,
) -> Result<i32, ClientAuthError>
where
T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, ClientAuthError>> + Send + ?Sized,
{
let Some(Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest { pubkey, metadata }) = transport.recv().await else {
return Err(ClientAuthError::Transport);
};
let client_id = if let Some((id, _)) = get_current_nonce_and_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
id
} else {
approve_new_client(
&props.actors,
ClientProfile {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
metadata: metadata.clone(),
},
)
.await?;
insert_client(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey, &metadata).await?
};
sync_client_metadata(&props.db, client_id, &metadata).await?;
let challenge_nonce = create_nonce(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge_nonce).await?;
transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth success");
ClientAuthError::Transport
})?;
Ok(client_id)
}

View File

@@ -1,19 +1,9 @@
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559, network::TxSignerSync as _, primitives::Address, signers::Signature,
};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
actors::vault::{CreateNew, Decrypt, Vault},
crypto::integrity,
db::{
DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
models::{self},
models::{self, EvmWalletId},
schema,
},
evm::{
@@ -26,6 +16,16 @@ use crate::{
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559, network::TxSignerSync as _, primitives::Address, signers::Signature,
};
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _, dsl::insert_into,
};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};
pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderError),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Signing error: {0}")]
Signing(#[from] alloy::signers::Error),
@@ -50,36 +50,36 @@ pub enum SignTransactionError {
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum EvmActorError {
#[error("Keyholder error: {0}")]
Keyholder(#[from] crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderError),
pub enum Error {
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] crate::actors::vault::Error),
#[error("Keyholder mailbox error")]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Integrity violation: {0}")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::IntegrityError),
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct EvmActor {
pub keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub db: DatabasePool,
pub rng: StdRng,
pub engine: evm::Engine,
}
impl EvmActor {
pub fn new(keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
pub fn new(vault: ActorRef<Vault>, db: DatabasePool) -> Self {
// is it safe to seed rng from system once?
// todo: audit
let rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rng());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), keyholder.clone());
let engine = evm::Engine::new(db.clone(), vault.clone());
Self {
keyholder,
vault,
db,
rng,
engine,
@@ -90,16 +90,16 @@ impl EvmActor {
#[messages]
impl EvmActor {
#[message]
pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), EvmActorError> {
pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);
let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
let aead_id: i32 = self
.keyholder
.vault
.ask(CreateNew { plaintext })
.await
.map_err(|_| EvmActorError::KeyholderSend)?;
.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
}
#[message]
pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, EvmActorError> {
pub async fn list_wallets(&self) -> Result<Vec<(EvmWalletId, Address)>, Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
let rows: Vec<models::EvmWallet> = schema::evm_wallet::table
.select(models::EvmWallet::as_select())
@@ -134,11 +134,11 @@ impl EvmActor {
#[messages]
impl EvmActor {
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_create_grant(
pub async fn operator_create_grant(
&mut self,
basic: SharedGrantSettings,
grant: SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, EvmActorError> {
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
match grant {
SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self
.engine
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
specific: settings,
})
.await
.map_err(EvmActorError::from),
.map_err(Error::from),
SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(settings) => self
.engine
.create_grant::<TokenTransfer>(CombinedSettings {
@@ -155,46 +155,36 @@ impl EvmActor {
specific: settings,
})
.await
.map_err(EvmActorError::from),
.map_err(Error::from),
}
}
#[message]
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "reserved for impl")]
pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), EvmActorError> {
// let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// let keyholder = self.keyholder.clone();
pub async fn operator_delete_grant(&mut self, grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| {
// Box::pin(async move {
// diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
// .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
// .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
// .execute(conn)
// .await?;
let affected = diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
.filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
.set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// let signed = integrity::evm::load_signed_grant_by_basic_id(conn, grant_id).await?;
if affected == 0 {
return Err(Error::Database(DatabaseError::from(
diesel::result::Error::NotFound,
)));
}
// diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(())
// })
// })
// .await
// .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
// Ok(())
todo!()
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn useragent_list_grants(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, EvmActorError> {
pub async fn operator_list_grants(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
match self.engine.list_all_grants().await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(ListError::Database(db_err)) => Err(EvmActorError::Database(db_err)),
Err(ListError::Integrity(integrity_err)) => {
Err(EvmActorError::Integrity(integrity_err))
}
Err(ListError::Database(db_err)) => Err(Error::Database(db_err)),
Err(ListError::Integrity(integrity_err)) => Err(Error::Integrity(integrity_err)),
}
}
@@ -261,12 +251,12 @@ impl EvmActor {
drop(conn);
let raw_key: SafeCell<Vec<u8>> = self
.keyholder
.vault
.ask(Decrypt {
aead_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
})
.await
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::KeyholderSend)?;
.map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::VaultSend)?;
let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;

View File

@@ -1,25 +1,26 @@
use std::ops::ControlFlow;
use crate::{
actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
peers::{
client::ClientProfile,
operator::{OperatorSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
},
};
use kameo::{
Actor, messages,
prelude::{ActorId, ActorRef, ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::ReplySender,
};
use crate::actors::{
client::ClientProfile,
flow_coordinator::ApprovalError,
user_agent::{UserAgentSession, session::BeginNewClientApproval},
};
use std::ops::ControlFlow;
pub struct Args {
pub client: ClientProfile,
pub user_agents: Vec<ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
pub operators: Vec<ActorRef<OperatorSession>>,
pub reply: ReplySender<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>,
}
pub struct ClientApprovalController {
/// Number of UAs that have not yet responded (approval or denial) or died.
/// Number of operators that have not yet responded (approval or denial) or died.
pending: usize,
/// Number of approvals received so far.
approved: usize,
@@ -41,21 +42,21 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
async fn on_start(
Args {
client,
user_agents,
operators,
reply,
}: Self::Args,
actor_ref: ActorRef<Self>,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let this = Self {
pending: user_agents.len(),
pending: operators.len(),
approved: 0,
reply: Some(reply),
};
for user_agent in user_agents {
actor_ref.link(&user_agent).await;
for operator in operators {
actor_ref.link(&operator).await;
let _ = user_agent
let _ = operator
.tell(BeginNewClientApproval {
client: client.clone(),
controller: actor_ref.clone(),
@@ -72,10 +73,10 @@ impl Actor for ClientApprovalController {
_: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
// A linked UA died before responding — counts as a non-approval.
// A linked operator died before responding — counts as a non-approval.
self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
if self.pending == 0 {
// At least one UA didn't approve: deny.
// At least one operator didn't approve: deny.
self.send_reply(Ok(false));
return Ok(ControlFlow::Break(ActorStopReason::Normal));
}
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ impl ClientApprovalController {
self.pending = self.pending.saturating_sub(1);
if self.pending == 0 {
// Every connected UA approved.
// Every connected operator approved.
self.send_reply(Ok(true));
ctx.stop();
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use crate::{
actors::{
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
operator_registry::{GetConnected, OperatorRegistry},
},
peers::client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
};
use kameo::{
Actor,
@@ -7,20 +13,23 @@ use kameo::{
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
reply::DelegatedReply,
};
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use tracing::info;
use crate::actors::{
client::{ClientProfile, session::ClientSession},
flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController,
user_agent::session::UserAgentSession,
};
pub mod client_connect_approval;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct FlowCoordinator {
pub user_agents: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<UserAgentSession>>,
pub clients: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<ClientSession>>,
operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
}
impl FlowCoordinator {
pub fn new(operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>) -> Self {
Self {
clients: HashMap::default(),
operator_registry,
}
}
}
impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
@@ -38,13 +47,7 @@ impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
id: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.user_agents.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
event = "useragent.disconnected"
);
} else if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
if self.clients.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "FlowCoordinator",
@@ -63,23 +66,12 @@ impl Actor for FlowCoordinator {
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum ApprovalError {
#[error("No user agents connected")]
NoUserAgentsConnected,
#[error("No operators connected")]
NoOperatorsConnected,
}
#[messages]
impl FlowCoordinator {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_user_agent(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "FlowCoordinator", event = "useragent.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.user_agents.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn register_client(
&mut self,
@@ -92,7 +84,7 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
}
#[message(ctx)]
pub fn request_client_approval(
pub async fn request_client_approval(
&mut self,
client: ClientProfile,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, DelegatedReply<Result<bool, ApprovalError>>>,
@@ -101,15 +93,19 @@ impl FlowCoordinator {
unreachable!("Expected `request_client_approval` to have callback channel");
};
let refs: Vec<_> = self.user_agents.values().cloned().collect();
let Ok(refs) = self.operator_registry.ask(GetConnected).await else {
reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoOperatorsConnected));
return reply;
};
if refs.is_empty() {
reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoUserAgentsConnected));
reply_sender.send(Err(ApprovalError::NoOperatorsConnected));
return reply;
}
ClientApprovalController::spawn(client_connect_approval::Args {
client,
user_agents: refs,
operators: refs,
reply: reply_sender,
});

View File

@@ -1,460 +0,0 @@
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
dsl::{insert_into, update},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use hmac::Mac as _;
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
use crate::crypto::{
KeyCell, derive_key,
encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
};
use crate::db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
schema::{self},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(KeyHolderState))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
},
Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: i32,
root_key: KeyCell,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum KeyHolderError {
#[error("Keyholder is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Broken database")]
BrokenDatabase,
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Keyholder is not bootstrapped")]
NotBootstrapped,
#[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
NotFound,
}
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
///
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct KeyHolder {
db: db::DatabasePool,
state: State,
}
#[messages]
impl KeyHolder {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, KeyHolderError> {
let state = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
.select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
.get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
match root_key_history {
Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id,
},
None => State::Unbootstrapped,
}
};
Ok(Self { db, state })
}
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race condtions if multiple keyholders write
// additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
async fn get_new_nonce(
pool: &db::DatabasePool,
root_key_id: i32,
) -> Result<Nonce, KeyHolderError> {
let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
let nonce = conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
.select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
.first(conn)
.await?;
let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={}",
root_key_id
);
KeyHolderError::BrokenDatabase
})?;
nonce.increment();
update(schema::root_key_history::table)
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
.set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, KeyHolderError>::Ok(nonce)
})
})
.await?;
Ok(nonce)
}
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(
&mut self,
seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), KeyHolderError> {
if !matches!(self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
return Err(KeyHolderError::AlreadyBootstrapped);
}
let salt = v1::generate_salt();
let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
// Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default();
let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|reader| {
let root_key_reader = reader.as_slice();
seal_key
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, root_key_reader)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
KeyHolderError::Encryption(err)
})
})?;
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
let root_key_history_id = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext,
tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes,
schema_version: 1,
salt: salt.to_vec(),
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
.set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(root_key_history_id)
})
})
.await?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
};
info!("Keyholder bootstrapped successfully");
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(
&mut self,
seal_key_raw: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), KeyHolderError> {
let State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id,
} = &self.state
else {
return Err(KeyHolderError::NotBootstrapped);
};
// We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive KDF work
let current_key = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(*root_key_history_id))
.select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await?
};
let salt = &current_key.salt;
let salt = v1::Salt::try_from(salt.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
error!("Broken database: invalid salt for root key");
KeyHolderError::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut seal_key = derive_key(seal_key_raw, &salt);
let mut root_key = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(
|()| {
error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
KeyHolderError::BrokenDatabase
},
)?;
seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
KeyHolderError::InvalidKey
})?;
self.state = State::Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
root_key: KeyCell::try_from(root_key).map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
KeyHolderError::BrokenDatabase
})?,
};
info!("Keyholder unsealed successfully");
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, KeyHolderError> {
let State::Unsealed { root_key, .. } = &mut self.state else {
return Err(KeyHolderError::NotBootstrapped);
};
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::aead_encrypted::table
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()?
.ok_or(KeyHolderError::NotFound)?
};
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
aead_id
);
KeyHolderError::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
Ok(output)
}
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(
&mut self,
mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<i32, KeyHolderError> {
let State::Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
..
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(KeyHolderError::NotBootstrapped);
};
// Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
// Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
.values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
ciphertext,
tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
schema_version: 1,
associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
created_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(aead_id)
}
#[message]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> KeyHolderState {
self.state.discriminant()
}
#[message]
pub fn sign_integrity(&mut self, mac_input: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(i32, Vec<u8>), KeyHolderError> {
let State::Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(KeyHolderError::NotBootstrapped);
};
let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
});
hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input);
let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
Ok((*root_key_history_id, mac))
}
#[message]
pub fn verify_integrity(
&mut self,
mac_input: Vec<u8>,
expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
key_version: i32,
) -> Result<bool, KeyHolderError> {
let State::Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(KeyHolderError::NotBootstrapped);
};
if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
return Ok(false);
}
let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
});
hmac.update(&key_version.to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input);
Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
}
#[message]
pub fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), KeyHolderError> {
let State::Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = &self.state
else {
return Err(KeyHolderError::NotBootstrapped);
};
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
};
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::SafeCellHandle as _;
use super::*;
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> KeyHolder {
let mut actor = KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap();
let seal_key = SafeCell::new(b"test-seal-key".to_vec());
actor.bootstrap(seal_key).await.unwrap();
actor
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let State::Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = actor.state
else {
panic!("expected unsealed state");
};
let n1 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
let n2 = KeyHolder::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let root_row = schema::root_key_history::table
.select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id))
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(),
"next write must advance nonce"
);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,47 +1,76 @@
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::Bootstrapper, evm::EvmActor, flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
keyholder::KeyHolder,
operator_registry::OperatorRegistry, proposal_manager::ProposalManager, vault::Vault,
vault_coordinator::VaultCoordinator,
},
db,
};
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn};
use kameo_actors::{DeliveryStrategy, message_bus::MessageBus};
use thiserror::Error;
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod client;
pub mod evm;
pub mod flow_coordinator;
pub mod keyholder;
pub mod user_agent;
pub mod operator_registry;
pub mod proposal_manager;
pub mod vault;
pub mod vault_coordinator;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum GlobalActorsSpawnError {
pub enum SpawnError {
#[error("Failed to spawn Bootstrapper actor")]
Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::BootstrappError),
Bootstrapper(#[from] bootstrap::Error),
#[error("Failed to spawn KeyHolder actor")]
KeyHolder(#[from] keyholder::KeyHolderError),
#[error("Failed to spawn Vault actor")]
Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
}
/// Long-lived actors that are shared across all connections and handle global state and operations
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct GlobalActors {
pub key_holder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pub vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
pub bootstrapper: ActorRef<Bootstrapper>,
pub vault_coordinator: ActorRef<VaultCoordinator>,
pub flow_coordinator: ActorRef<FlowCoordinator>,
pub operator_registry: ActorRef<OperatorRegistry>,
pub evm: ActorRef<EvmActor>,
pub proposal_manager: ActorRef<ProposalManager>,
pub events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
impl GlobalActors {
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, GlobalActorsSpawnError> {
let key_holder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await?);
pub fn spawn_message_bus() -> ActorRef<MessageBus> {
MessageBus::spawn(MessageBus::new(DeliveryStrategy::Guaranteed))
}
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
let operator_registry = OperatorRegistry::spawn(OperatorRegistry::default());
let evm = EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db.clone()));
let vault_coordinator = VaultCoordinator::spawn(VaultCoordinator::new(
db.clone(),
key_holder.clone(),
));
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
evm: EvmActor::spawn(EvmActor::new(key_holder.clone(), db)),
key_holder,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::default()),
proposal_manager: ProposalManager::spawn(ProposalManager::new(
db,
key_holder.clone(),
evm.clone(),
vault_coordinator.clone(),
)),
vault: key_holder,
vault_coordinator,
flow_coordinator: FlowCoordinator::spawn(FlowCoordinator::new(
operator_registry.clone(),
)),
operator_registry,
events: message_bus,
evm,
})
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
use crate::peers::operator::OperatorSession;
use kameo::{
Actor,
actor::{ActorId, ActorRef},
error::Infallible,
messages,
prelude::{ActorStopReason, Context, WeakActorRef},
};
use std::{collections::HashMap, ops::ControlFlow};
use tracing::info;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct OperatorRegistry {
connected: HashMap<ActorId, ActorRef<OperatorSession>>,
}
impl Actor for OperatorRegistry {
type Args = Self;
type Error = Infallible;
async fn on_start(args: Self::Args, _: ActorRef<Self>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
Ok(args)
}
async fn on_link_died(
&mut self,
_: WeakActorRef<Self>,
id: ActorId,
_: ActorStopReason,
) -> Result<ControlFlow<ActorStopReason>, Self::Error> {
if self.connected.remove(&id).is_some() {
info!(
?id,
actor = "OperatorRegistry",
event = "operator.disconnected"
);
}
Ok(ControlFlow::Continue(()))
}
}
#[messages]
impl OperatorRegistry {
#[message(ctx)]
pub async fn connect_operator(
&mut self,
actor: ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
ctx: &mut Context<Self, ()>,
) {
info!(id = %actor.id(), actor = "OperatorRegistry", event = "operator.connected");
ctx.actor_ref().link(&actor).await;
self.connected.insert(actor.id(), actor);
}
#[message]
pub fn get_connected(&self) -> Vec<ActorRef<OperatorSession>> {
self.connected.values().cloned().collect()
}
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,308 +0,0 @@
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tracing::error;
use super::Error;
use crate::{
actors::{
bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
keyholder::KeyHolder,
user_agent::{UserAgentConnection, UserAgentCredentials, auth::Outbound},
},
crypto::integrity,
db::{DatabasePool, schema::useragent_client},
};
pub struct ChallengeRequest {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
}
pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub token: String,
}
pub struct ChallengeContext {
pub challenge_nonce: i32,
pub key: authn::PublicKey,
}
pub struct ChallengeSolution {
pub solution: Vec<u8>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: Auth,
custom_error: true,
transitions: {
*Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(authn::PublicKey),
SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(authn::PublicKey),
}
);
/// Returns the current nonce, ready to use for the challenge nonce.
async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
db: &DatabasePool,
key: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(i32, i32), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
useragent_client::table
.filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(key.to_bytes()))
.select((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
.first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
.await
})
})
.await
.optional()
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?
.ok_or_else(|| {
error!(?key, "Public key not found in database");
Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
})
}
async fn verify_integrity(
db: &DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?;
let _result = integrity::verify_entity(
&mut db_conn,
keyholder,
&UserAgentCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
Error::internal("Integrity verification failed")
})?;
Ok(())
}
async fn create_nonce(
db: &DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let new_nonce = db_conn
.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(useragent_client::table)
.filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
.set(useragent_client::nonce.eq(useragent_client::nonce + 1))
.returning((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
integrity::sign_entity(
conn,
keyholder,
&UserAgentCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: new_nonce,
},
id,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Integrity signature update failed");
Error::internal("Database error")
})?;
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(new_nonce)
})
})
.await?;
Ok(new_nonce)
}
async fn register_key(
db: &DatabasePool,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(useragent_client::table)
.values((
useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
useragent_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
))
.returning(useragent_client::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
let entity = UserAgentCredentials {
pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
nonce: NONCE_START,
};
integrity::sign_entity(conn, keyholder, &entity, id)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new user-agent key");
Error::internal("Failed to register public key")
})?;
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
pub struct AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub(super) conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection,
pub(super) transport: T,
}
impl<'a, T> AuthContext<'a, T> {
pub const fn new(conn: &'a mut UserAgentConnection, transport: T) -> Self {
Self { conn, transport }
}
}
impl<T> AuthStateMachineContext for AuthContext<'_, T>
where
T: Bi<super::Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send,
{
type Error = Error;
async fn prepare_challenge(
&mut self,
ChallengeRequest { pubkey }: ChallengeRequest,
) -> Result<ChallengeContext, Self::Error> {
verify_integrity(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
let nonce = create_nonce(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
Error::Transport
})?;
Ok(ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce: nonce,
key: pubkey,
})
}
async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
&mut self,
BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
) -> Result<authn::PublicKey, Self::Error> {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
if token_ok {
register_key(&self.conn.db, &self.conn.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(pubkey)
} else {
error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken)
}
}
async fn verify_solution(
&mut self,
ChallengeContext {
challenge_nonce,
key,
}: &ChallengeContext,
ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
) -> Result<authn::PublicKey, Self::Error> {
let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!("Failed to decode signature in challenge solution");
Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
})?;
let valid = key.verify(*challenge_nonce, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature);
if valid {
self.transport
.send(Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Ok(key.clone())
} else {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
use crate::{
actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile},
crypto::integrity::Integrable,
db,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
#[derive(Debug, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
pub struct UserAgentCredentials {
pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
pub nonce: i32,
}
impl Integrable for UserAgentCredentials {
const KIND: &'static str = "useragent_credentials";
}
// Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum OutOfBand {
ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: authn::PublicKey },
}
pub struct UserAgentConnection {
pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
}
impl UserAgentConnection {
pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
Self { db, actors }
}
}
pub mod auth;
pub mod session;
pub use auth::authenticate;
pub use session::UserAgentSession;

View File

@@ -1,534 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
use arbiter_crypto::{
authn,
safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
};
use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::error::SendError;
use kameo::messages;
use kameo::prelude::Context;
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::{error, info};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
use crate::{actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer, evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings};
use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
use crate::actors::user_agent::session::UserAgentSessionError;
use crate::actors::{
evm::{
ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentListGrants,
},
keyholder::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
user_agent::session::{
UserAgentSession,
state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
},
};
use crate::db::models::{
EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
};
use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
impl UserAgentSession {
fn take_unseal_secret(&self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), UserAgentSessionError> {
let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
return Err(UserAgentSessionError::internal(
"Invalid state for unseal encrypted key",
));
};
let ephemeral_secret = {
#[allow(
clippy::unwrap_used,
reason = "Mutex poison is unrecoverable and should panic"
)]
let mut secret_lock = unseal_context.secret.lock().unwrap();
let secret = secret_lock.take();
if let Some(secret) = secret {
secret
} else {
drop(secret_lock);
error!("Ephemeral secret already taken");
return Err(UserAgentSessionError::internal(
"Ephemeral secret already taken",
));
}
};
Ok((ephemeral_secret, unseal_context.client_public_key))
}
fn decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret: EphemeralSecret,
client_public_key: PublicKey,
nonce: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
associated_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce);
let shared_secret = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&client_public_key);
let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(shared_secret.as_bytes().into());
let mut key_buffer = SafeCell::new(ciphertext.to_vec());
let decryption_result = key_buffer.write_inline(|write_handle| {
cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, write_handle)
});
match decryption_result {
Ok(()) => Ok(key_buffer),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to decrypt encrypted key material");
Err(())
}
}
}
}
pub struct UnsealStartResponse {
pub server_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum UnsealError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for unsealing")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Internal error during unsealing process")]
General(#[from] UserAgentSessionError),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum BootstrapError {
#[error("Invalid key provided for bootstrapping")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Internal error during bootstrapping process")]
General(#[from] UserAgentSessionError),
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum SignTransactionError {
#[error("Policy evaluation failed")]
Vet(#[from] crate::evm::VetError),
#[error("Internal signing error")]
Internal,
}
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum GrantMutationError {
#[error("Vault is sealed")]
VaultSealed,
#[error("Internal grant mutation error")]
Internal,
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub fn handle_unseal_request(
&mut self,
client_pubkey: PublicKey,
) -> Result<UnsealStartResponse, UserAgentSessionError> {
let secret = EphemeralSecret::random();
let public_key = PublicKey::from(&secret);
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::UnsealRequest(UnsealContext {
client_public_key: client_pubkey,
secret: Mutex::new(Some(secret)),
}))?;
Ok(UnsealStartResponse {
server_pubkey: public_key,
})
}
#[message]
pub async fn handle_unseal_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), UnsealError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(UserAgentSessionError::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(_err) => {
return Err(UserAgentSessionError::internal("Failed to take unseal secret").into());
}
};
let Ok(seal_key_buffer) = Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) else {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey);
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(TryUnseal {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => {
info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::KeyHolderError::InvalidKey)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to unseal key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UnsealError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send unseal request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(UserAgentSessionError::internal("Vault actor error").into())
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_bootstrap_encrypted_key(
&mut self,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
associated_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), BootstrapError> {
let (ephemeral_secret, client_public_key) = match self.take_unseal_secret() {
Ok(values) => values,
Err(UserAgentSessionError::State) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
}
Err(err) => return Err(err.into()),
};
let Ok(seal_key_buffer) = Self::decrypt_client_key_material(
ephemeral_secret,
client_public_key,
&nonce,
&ciphertext,
&associated_data,
) else {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
return Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey);
};
match self
.props
.actors
.key_holder
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: seal_key_buffer,
})
.await
{
Ok(()) => {
info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
Ok(())
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::KeyHolderError::AlreadyBootstrapped)) => {
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::AlreadyBootstrapped)
}
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => {
error!(?err, "Keyholder failed to bootstrap vault");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::InvalidKey)
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "Failed to send bootstrap request to keyholder");
self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedInvalidKey)?;
Err(BootstrapError::General(UserAgentSessionError::internal(
"Vault actor error",
)))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_query_vault_state(
&mut self,
) -> Result<KeyHolderState, UserAgentSessionError> {
use crate::actors::keyholder::GetState;
let vault_state = match self.props.actors.key_holder.ask(GetState {}).await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, actor = "useragent", "keyholder.query.failed");
return Err(UserAgentSessionError::internal("Vault is in broken state"));
}
};
Ok(vault_state)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(
&mut self,
) -> Result<(i32, Address), UserAgentSessionError> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
Ok(address) => Ok(address),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(UserAgentSessionError::internal(format!(
"EVM wallet generation failed: {err}"
))),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM actor unreachable during wallet create");
Err(UserAgentSessionError::internal("EVM actor unreachable"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<(i32, Address)>, UserAgentSessionError> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(ListWallets {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => Ok(wallets),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM wallet list failed");
Err(UserAgentSessionError::internal(
"Failed to list EVM wallets",
))
}
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, UserAgentSessionError> {
match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
Err(UserAgentSessionError::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_create(
&mut self,
basic: SharedGrantSettings,
grant: SpecificGrant,
) -> Result<i32, GrantMutationError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(UseragentCreateGrant { basic, grant })
.await
{
Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "false positive")]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_delete(
&mut self,
grant_id: i32,
) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
// match self
// .props
// .actors
// .evm
// .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
// .await
// {
// Ok(()) => Ok(()),
// Err(err) => {
// error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
// Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
// }
// }
let _ = grant_id;
todo!()
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sign_transaction(
&mut self,
client_id: i32,
wallet_address: Address,
transaction: TxEip1559,
) -> Result<Signature, SignTransactionError> {
match self
.props
.actors
.evm
.ask(ClientSignTransaction {
client_id,
wallet_address,
transaction,
})
.await
{
Ok(signature) => Ok(signature),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(EvmSignError::Vet(vet_error))) => {
Err(SignTransactionError::Vet(vet_error))
}
Err(err) => {
error!(?err, "EVM sign transaction failed in user-agent session");
Err(SignTransactionError::Internal)
}
}
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess>,
) -> Result<(), UserAgentSessionError> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::insert_into(evm_wallet_access::table)
.values(&entry)
.on_conflict_do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, UserAgentSessionError>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_revoke_evm_wallet_access(
&mut self,
entries: Vec<i32>,
) -> Result<(), UserAgentSessionError> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access;
for entry in entries {
diesel::delete(evm_wallet_access::table)
.filter(evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(entry))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
}
Result::<_, UserAgentSessionError>::Ok(())
})
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<EvmWalletAccess>, UserAgentSessionError> {
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let access_entries = crate::db::schema::evm_wallet_access::table
.select(EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
.load::<_>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(access_entries)
}
}
#[messages]
impl UserAgentSession {
#[message(ctx)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
&mut self,
approved: bool,
pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
ctx: &Context<Self, Result<(), UserAgentSessionError>>,
) -> Result<(), UserAgentSessionError> {
let Some(pending_approval) = self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey.to_bytes())
else {
error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
return Err(UserAgentSessionError::internal(
"Unknown client in connection response",
));
};
pending_approval
.controller
.tell(ClientApprovalAnswer { approved })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(
?err,
"Failed to send client approval response to controller"
);
UserAgentSessionError::internal(
"Failed to send client approval response to controller",
)
})?;
ctx.actor_ref().unlink(&pending_approval.controller).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub(crate) async fn handle_sdk_client_list(
&mut self,
) -> Result<Vec<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>, UserAgentSessionError> {
use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
let clients = program_client::table
.inner_join(client_metadata::table)
.select((
ProgramClient::as_select(),
ProgramClientMetadata::as_select(),
))
.load::<(ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(clients)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
pub struct UnsealContext {
pub client_public_key: PublicKey,
pub secret: Mutex<Option<EphemeralSecret>>,
}
smlang::statemachine!(
name: UserAgent,
custom_error: false,
transitions: {
*Idle + UnsealRequest(UnsealContext) / generate_temp_keypair = WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext),
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedValidKey = Unsealed,
WaitingForUnsealKey(UnsealContext) + ReceivedInvalidKey = Idle,
}
);
pub struct DummyContext;
impl UserAgentStateMachineContext for DummyContext {
fn generate_temp_keypair(&mut self, event_data: UnsealContext) -> Result<UnsealContext, ()> {
Ok(event_data)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,523 @@
use crate::{
crypto::{
KeyCell,
encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
},
db::{
self,
models::{self, RootKeyHistory, RootKeyHistoryId},
schema,
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper,
dsl::{insert_into, update},
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use hmac::{KeyInit as _, Mac as _};
use kameo::{Actor, Reply, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use kameo_actors::message_bus::{MessageBus, Publish};
use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
use tracing::{error, info};
pub mod events {
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Bootstrapped;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Unsealed;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct VaultResealed;
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Vault is already bootstrapped")]
AlreadyBootstrapped,
#[error("Vault is not bootstrapped")]
NotBootstrapped,
#[error("Vault is sealed")]
Sealed,
#[error("Invalid key provided")]
InvalidKey,
#[error("Requested aead entry not found")]
NotFound,
#[error("Encryption error: {0}")]
Encryption(#[from] chacha20poly1305::aead::Error),
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database transaction error: {0}")]
DatabaseTransaction(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Broken database")]
BrokenDatabase,
}
struct Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
root_key: KeyCell,
}
#[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
#[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(VaultState))]
enum State {
#[default]
Unbootstrapped,
Sealed {
root_key_history_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
},
Unsealed(Unsealed),
}
/// Manages vault root key and tracks current state of the vault (bootstrapped/unbootstrapped, sealed/unsealed).
///
/// Provides API for encrypting and decrypting data using the vault root key.
/// Abstraction over database to make sure nonces are never reused and encryption keys are never exposed in plaintext outside of this actor.
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct Vault {
db: db::DatabasePool,
state: State,
events: ActorRef<MessageBus>,
}
impl Vault {
pub async fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, events: ActorRef<MessageBus>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let state = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let (root_key_history,) = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.left_join(schema::root_key_history::table)
.select((Option::<RootKeyHistory>::as_select(),))
.get_result::<(Option<RootKeyHistory>,)>(&mut conn)
.await?;
match root_key_history {
Some(root_key_history) => State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: root_key_history.id,
},
None => State::Unbootstrapped,
}
};
Ok(Self { db, state, events })
}
// Exclusive transaction to avoid race conditions if multiple vaults write
// additional layer of protection against nonce-reuse
async fn get_new_nonce(
pool: &db::DatabasePool,
root_key_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
) -> Result<Nonce, Error> {
let mut conn = pool.get().await?;
let nonce = conn
.exclusive_transaction(async |conn| {
let current_nonce: Vec<u8> = schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
.select(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce)
.first(&mut *conn)
.await?;
let mut nonce = Nonce::try_from(current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for root key history id={:#?}",
root_key_id
);
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
nonce.increment();
update(schema::root_key_history::table)
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_id))
.set(schema::root_key_history::data_encryption_nonce.eq(nonce.to_vec()))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, Error>::Ok(nonce)
})
.await?;
Ok(nonce)
}
const fn expect_unsealed(state: &mut State) -> Result<&mut Unsealed, Error> {
match state {
State::Unsealed(unsealed) => Ok(unsealed),
State::Unbootstrapped => Err(Error::NotBootstrapped),
State::Sealed { .. } => Err(Error::Sealed),
}
}
}
#[messages]
impl Vault {
#[message]
pub async fn bootstrap(&mut self, mut seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(&self.state, State::Unbootstrapped) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapped);
}
let mut root_key = KeyCell::new_secure_random();
// Zero nonces are fine because they are one-time
let root_key_nonce = Nonce::default();
let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
// Generate salt (kept for schema compat)
let root_key_salt = v1::generate_salt();
let root_key_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|rk| {
seal_key
.encrypt(&root_key_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, rk.as_slice())
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Fatal bootstrap error");
Error::Encryption(err)
})
})?;
let data_encryption_nonce_bytes = data_encryption_nonce.to_vec();
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let root_key_history_id = conn
.transaction(async |conn| {
let root_key_history_id = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: root_key_ciphertext.clone(),
tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
root_key_encryption_nonce: root_key_nonce.to_vec(),
data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce_bytes.clone(),
schema_version: 1,
salt: root_key_salt.to_vec(),
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await?;
update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
.set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(RootKeyHistoryId::from_raw(
root_key_history_id,
))
})
.await?;
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
});
info!("Vault bootstrapped successfully");
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await;
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn try_unseal(&mut self, mut seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
let State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id,
} = &self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapped);
};
let root_key_history_id = *root_key_history_id;
// We don't want to hold connection while doing expensive work
let current_key = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::root_key_history::table
.filter(schema::root_key_history::id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await?
};
let nonce =
Nonce::try_from(current_key.root_key_encryption_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!("Broken database: invalid nonce for root key");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut root_key_bytes = SafeCell::new(current_key.ciphertext.clone());
seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, &mut root_key_bytes)
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Failed to unseal root key: invalid seal key");
Error::InvalidKey
})?;
let root_key = KeyCell::try_from(root_key_bytes).map_err(|()| {
error!("Broken database: invalid encryption key size");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
self.state = State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id: current_key.id,
root_key,
});
info!("Vault unsealed successfully");
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Unsealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
/// Re-encrypts the root key with `new_seal_key` and records a new root_key_history row.
/// Called after a Shamir re-key so the old seal key is no longer sufficient to unseal.
#[message]
pub async fn rekey_root_key(&mut self, mut new_seal_key: KeyCell) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let new_nonce = Nonce::default();
let new_salt = v1::generate_salt();
let new_ciphertext: Vec<u8> = root_key.0.read_inline(|rk| {
new_seal_key
.encrypt(&new_nonce, v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG, rk.as_slice())
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Fatal rekey error");
Error::Encryption(err)
})
})?;
let data_encryption_nonce = Nonce::default();
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let new_root_key_history_id: i32 = conn
.transaction(async |conn| {
let new_id = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: new_ciphertext,
tag: v1::ROOT_KEY_TAG.to_vec(),
root_key_encryption_nonce: new_nonce.to_vec(),
data_encryption_nonce: data_encryption_nonce.to_vec(),
schema_version: 1,
salt: new_salt.to_vec(),
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result::<i32>(&mut *conn)
.await?;
update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
.set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(new_id))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(new_id)
})
.await?;
*root_key_history_id = RootKeyHistoryId::from_raw(new_root_key_history_id);
info!("Vault root key rekeyed successfully");
Ok(())
}
#[message]
pub async fn seal(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
self.state = State::Sealed {
root_key_history_id: *root_key_history_id,
};
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::VaultResealed)).await;
Ok(())
}
}
// Server-side cryptographic operations
#[messages]
impl Vault {
#[message]
pub async fn decrypt(&mut self, aead_id: i32) -> Result<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, Error> {
let Unsealed { root_key, .. } = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
schema::aead_encrypted::table
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(aead_id))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.optional()?
.ok_or(Error::NotFound)?
};
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(row.current_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|()| {
error!(
"Broken database: invalid nonce for aead_encrypted id={}",
aead_id
);
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut output = SafeCell::new(row.ciphertext);
root_key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut output)?;
Ok(output)
}
// Creates new `aead_encrypted` entry in the database and returns it's ID
#[message]
pub async fn create_new(&mut self, mut plaintext: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<i32, Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
// Order matters here - `get_new_nonce` acquires connection, so we need to call it before next acquire
// Borrow checker note: &mut borrow a few lines above is disjoint from this field
let nonce = Self::get_new_nonce(&self.db, *root_key_history_id).await?;
let mut ciphertext_buffer = plaintext.write();
let ciphertext_buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = ciphertext_buffer.as_mut();
root_key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, v1::TAG, &mut *ciphertext_buffer)?;
let ciphertext = std::mem::take(ciphertext_buffer);
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let aead_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::aead_encrypted::table)
.values(&models::NewAeadEncrypted {
ciphertext,
tag: v1::TAG.to_vec(),
current_nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
schema_version: 1,
associated_root_key_id: *root_key_history_id,
created_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(schema::aead_encrypted::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
Ok(aead_id)
}
#[message]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> VaultState {
self.state.discriminant()
}
#[message]
pub fn sign_integrity(
&mut self,
mac_input: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(RootKeyHistoryId, Vec<u8>), Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
});
hmac.update(&root_key_history_id.to_raw().to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input);
let mac = hmac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec();
Ok((*root_key_history_id, mac))
}
#[message]
pub fn verify_integrity(
&mut self,
mac_input: Vec<u8>,
expected_mac: Vec<u8>,
key_version: RootKeyHistoryId,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let Unsealed {
root_key,
root_key_history_id,
} = Self::expect_unsealed(&mut self.state)?;
if *root_key_history_id != key_version {
return Ok(false);
}
let mut hmac = root_key.0.read_inline(|k| {
HmacSha256::new_from_slice(k)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!("HMAC accepts keys of any size"))
});
hmac.update(&key_version.to_raw().to_be_bytes());
hmac.update(&mac_input);
Ok(hmac.verify_slice(&expected_mac).is_ok())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::actors::GlobalActors;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::SafeCellHandle as _;
use super::*;
async fn bootstrapped_actor(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> Vault {
let mut actor = Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap();
actor.bootstrap(KeyCell::from([0u8; 32])).await.unwrap();
actor
}
#[tokio::test]
#[test_log::test]
async fn nonce_monotonic_even_when_nonce_allocation_interleaves() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut actor = bootstrapped_actor(&db).await;
let State::Unsealed(Unsealed {
root_key_history_id,
..
}) = actor.state
else {
panic!("expected unsealed state");
};
let n1 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
let n2 = Vault::get_new_nonce(&db, root_key_history_id)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(n2.to_vec() > n1.to_vec(), "nonce must increase");
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let root_row: RootKeyHistory = schema::root_key_history::table
.select(RootKeyHistory::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(root_row.data_encryption_nonce, n2.to_vec());
let id = actor
.create_new(SafeCell::new(b"post-interleave".to_vec()))
.await
.unwrap();
let row: models::AeadEncrypted = schema::aead_encrypted::table
.filter(schema::aead_encrypted::id.eq(id))
.select(models::AeadEncrypted::as_select())
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
row.current_nonce > n2.to_vec(),
"next write must advance nonce"
);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,721 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore as _};
use tracing::error;
use crate::{
actors::vault::{Bootstrap, RekeyRootKey, TryUnseal, Vault},
crypto::{KeyCell, derive_key, encryption::v1::Nonce, shamir, shamir::shamir_threshold},
db::{self, models, schema},
};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Already coordinating a bootstrap")]
AlreadyBootstrapping,
#[error("Already coordinating an unseal")]
AlreadyUnsealing,
#[error("Rekey not in progress")]
NotRekeying,
#[error("Bootstrap not in progress")]
NotBootstrapping,
#[error("Unseal not in progress")]
NotUnsealing,
#[error("Operator already contributed")]
DuplicateContribution,
#[error("Operator not found in database")]
OperatorNotFound,
#[error("Invalid passphrase (decryption failed)")]
InvalidPassphrase,
#[error("Shamir error: {0}")]
Shamir(String),
#[error("Database connection error: {0}")]
DatabaseConnection(#[from] db::PoolError),
#[error("Database query error: {0}")]
DatabaseQuery(#[from] diesel::result::Error),
#[error("Encryption error")]
Encryption,
#[error("Vault error")]
VaultError,
#[error("Two-operator vaults require at least one recovery share")]
TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery,
#[error("Broken database")]
BrokenDatabase,
}
// Passphrases stored as plain Vec<u8> (not SafeCell) so CoordinatorState is Sync.
// They are ephemeral and dropped immediately after use.
enum CoordinatorState {
Idle,
Bootstrapping {
declared_count: usize,
recovery_count: usize,
passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
},
Unsealing {
threshold: usize,
ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
},
/// Shamir re-key after `replace_operator` or `update_shamir_parameters` is approved (§3.3).
/// Collects new passphrases from all current operators, then generates a fresh seal key,
/// re-splits it, and re-encrypts the vault root key.
Rekeying {
ordinary_count: usize,
recovery_count: usize,
passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
},
}
#[derive(Actor)]
pub struct VaultCoordinator {
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
state: CoordinatorState,
}
impl VaultCoordinator {
pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, vault: ActorRef<Vault>) -> Self {
Self {
db,
vault,
state: CoordinatorState::Idle,
}
}
}
const SHARE_AAD: &[u8] = b"arbiter/shamir-share/v1";
fn encrypt_share(
passphrase_bytes: Vec<u8>,
share: &[u8],
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>), Error> {
let mut share_salt = vec![0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut share_salt);
let mut passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase_bytes);
let mut share_seal_key = derive_key(&mut passphrase_cell, &share_salt);
let nonce = Nonce::default();
let encrypted_share = share_seal_key
.encrypt(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, share)
.map_err(|_| Error::Encryption)?;
Ok((encrypted_share, nonce.to_vec(), share_salt))
}
fn decrypt_share(
passphrase_bytes: Vec<u8>,
encrypted_share: Vec<u8>,
share_nonce_bytes: &[u8],
share_salt: &[u8],
operator_id: i32,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(share_nonce_bytes).map_err(|()| {
error!(operator_id, "Invalid nonce in DB");
Error::BrokenDatabase
})?;
let mut passphrase_cell = SafeCell::new(passphrase_bytes);
let mut share_seal_key = derive_key(&mut passphrase_cell, share_salt);
let mut share_buffer = SafeCell::new(encrypted_share);
share_seal_key
.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, SHARE_AAD, &mut share_buffer)
.map_err(|_| Error::InvalidPassphrase)?;
Ok(share_buffer.read().clone())
}
/// §3.4: Split the seal key across ordinary + recovery operators.
/// Threshold = `shamir_threshold(ordinary_count)`; total shares = ordinary + recovery.
/// When `ordinary_count` == 1 (threshold = 1), vsss-rs does not support a proper split,
/// so each share is the seal key itself — any single participant can reconstruct.
async fn finalize_bootstrap(
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let ordinary_count = ordinary_passphrases.len();
let recovery_count = recovery_passphrases.len();
let total = ordinary_count + recovery_count;
let threshold = shamir_threshold(ordinary_count);
let mut seal_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut seal_key_bytes);
// threshold == 1 means any single share reconstructs the key (degenerate split).
// vsss-rs requires threshold >= 2, so we store the key directly in this case.
let shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = if threshold >= 2 {
shamir::split_key(threshold, total, &seal_key_bytes, OsRng)
.map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
} else {
std::iter::repeat_with(|| seal_key_bytes.to_vec()).take(total).collect()
};
let seal_key = KeyCell::from(seal_key_bytes);
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let mut shares_iter = shares.into_iter();
for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
let share = shares_iter
.next()
.expect("split_key returned enough shares");
let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
diesel::replace_into(schema::operator::table)
.values((
schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)),
schema::operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
schema::operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
schema::operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
schema::operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
let share = shares_iter
.next()
.expect("split_key returned enough shares");
let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
diesel::replace_into(schema::recovery_operator::table)
.values((
schema::recovery_operator::id.eq(recovery_id_raw),
schema::recovery_operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
schema::recovery_operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
schema::recovery_operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
schema::recovery_operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
vault.ask(Bootstrap { seal_key }).await.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Vault bootstrap failed");
Error::VaultError
})?;
Ok(())
}
/// §3.5: Unseal using any threshold-sized mix of ordinary + recovery shares.
async fn finalize_unseal(
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
// Determine whether shares were stored as raw keys (threshold=1) or vsss-rs splits (threshold>=2).
let ordinary_operator_count: i64 = schema::operator::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
let threshold = shamir_threshold(ordinary_operator_count as usize);
let mut shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
let (encrypted_share, share_nonce_bytes, share_salt): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) =
schema::operator::table
.filter(schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)))
.select((
schema::operator::share,
schema::operator::share_nonce,
schema::operator::share_salt,
))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::OperatorNotFound)?;
shares.push(decrypt_share(
passphrase_bytes,
encrypted_share,
&share_nonce_bytes,
&share_salt,
operator_id_raw,
)?);
}
for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
let (encrypted_share, share_nonce_bytes, share_salt): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) =
schema::recovery_operator::table
.find(recovery_id_raw)
.select((
schema::recovery_operator::share,
schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce,
schema::recovery_operator::share_salt,
))
.first(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::OperatorNotFound)?;
shares.push(decrypt_share(
passphrase_bytes,
encrypted_share,
&share_nonce_bytes,
&share_salt,
recovery_id_raw,
)?);
}
// When threshold==1, shares are raw 32-byte seal keys (vsss-rs cannot split 1-of-N).
// Any single decrypted share is the key itself.
let seal_key_bytes: [u8; 32] = if threshold <= 1 {
let raw = shares
.into_iter()
.next()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Shamir("No shares available".into()))?;
raw.try_into()
.map_err(|_| Error::Shamir("Invalid share length".into()))?
} else {
shamir::combine_shares(&shares).map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
};
let seal_key = KeyCell::from(seal_key_bytes);
vault.ask(TryUnseal { seal_key }).await.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Vault unseal failed");
Error::VaultError
})?;
Ok(())
}
/// §3.3: Generate a fresh seal key, split across current operators, re-encrypt the vault root key.
/// Called after `replace_operator` or `update_shamir_parameters` is approved and all contributors submit.
async fn finalize_rekey(
db: db::DatabasePool,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
ordinary_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
recovery_passphrases: HashMap<i32, Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let ordinary_count = ordinary_passphrases.len();
let recovery_count = recovery_passphrases.len();
let total = ordinary_count + recovery_count;
let threshold = shamir_threshold(ordinary_count);
let mut new_seal_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut new_seal_key_bytes);
let shares: Vec<Vec<u8>> = if threshold >= 2 {
shamir::split_key(threshold, total, &new_seal_key_bytes, OsRng)
.map_err(|e| Error::Shamir(e.to_string()))?
} else {
std::iter::repeat_with(|| new_seal_key_bytes.to_vec())
.take(total)
.collect()
};
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let mut shares_iter = shares.into_iter();
for (operator_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in ordinary_passphrases {
let share = shares_iter
.next()
.expect("split_key returned enough shares");
let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
diesel::replace_into(schema::operator::table)
.values((
schema::operator::id.eq(Some(operator_id_raw)),
schema::operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
schema::operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
schema::operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
schema::operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
schema::operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
for (recovery_id_raw, passphrase_bytes) in recovery_passphrases {
let share = shares_iter
.next()
.expect("split_key returned enough shares");
let (encrypted_share, nonce_bytes, share_salt) = encrypt_share(passphrase_bytes, &share)?;
diesel::replace_into(schema::recovery_operator::table)
.values((
schema::recovery_operator::id.eq(recovery_id_raw),
schema::recovery_operator::share.eq(&encrypted_share),
schema::recovery_operator::share_nonce.eq(&nonce_bytes),
schema::recovery_operator::share_salt.eq(&share_salt),
schema::recovery_operator::created_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
schema::recovery_operator::updated_at.eq(models::SqliteTimestamp::now()),
))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await?;
}
drop(conn);
let new_seal_key = KeyCell::from(new_seal_key_bytes);
vault
.ask(RekeyRootKey { new_seal_key })
.await
.map_err(|err| {
error!(?err, "Vault rekey failed");
Error::VaultError
})?;
Ok(())
}
#[messages]
impl VaultCoordinator {
/// Phase 1 of multi-operator bootstrap: declare the committee size.
#[message]
#[expect(clippy::unused_async, reason = "kameo requires messages to be async")]
pub async fn start_bootstrap(
&mut self,
operator_id: i32,
declared_count: usize,
recovery_count: usize,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let _ = operator_id; // fixme!: any authenticated operator may announce the committee size. the first call wins
if !matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping);
}
if declared_count == 2 && recovery_count == 0 {
return Err(Error::TwoOperatorsRequireRecovery);
}
self.state = CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
declared_count,
recovery_count,
passphrases: HashMap::new(),
recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
};
Ok(())
}
/// Phase 2 of multi-operator bootstrap: ordinary operator contributes a passphrase.
/// Returns Ok(true) when all ordinary + recovery operators contributed and bootstrap finalized.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_bootstrap(
&mut self,
operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
declared_count,
recovery_count,
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapping);
};
if passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
if passphrases.len() < *declared_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
return Ok(false);
}
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
..
} = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
else {
unreachable!()
};
finalize_bootstrap(
self.db.clone(),
self.vault.clone(),
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
)
.await?;
Ok(true)
}
/// Phase 2 of multi-operator bootstrap: recovery operator contributes a passphrase.
/// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors are in and bootstrap finalized.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_recovery_bootstrap(
&mut self,
recovery_operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
declared_count,
recovery_count,
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotBootstrapping);
};
if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
if passphrases.len() < *declared_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
return Ok(false);
}
let CoordinatorState::Bootstrapping {
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
..
} = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
else {
unreachable!()
};
finalize_bootstrap(
self.db.clone(),
self.vault.clone(),
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
)
.await?;
Ok(true)
}
/// Contribute a passphrase for vault unseal (ordinary operator).
/// Returns Ok(true) when threshold reached and vault is unsealed.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_unseal(
&mut self,
operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
self.ensure_unsealing_state().await?;
let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
threshold,
ordinary_passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotUnsealing);
};
if ordinary_passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
ordinary_passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
if ordinary_passphrases.len() + recovery_passphrases.len() < *threshold {
return Ok(false);
}
self.do_finalize_unseal().await
}
/// Contribute a passphrase for vault unseal (recovery operator, §3.5).
/// Recovery operators may contribute during unseal when recovery is active.
/// Returns Ok(true) when threshold reached and vault is unsealed.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_recovery_unseal(
&mut self,
recovery_operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
self.ensure_unsealing_state().await?;
let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
threshold,
ordinary_passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotUnsealing);
};
if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
let passphrase_bytes = passphrase.read().to_vec();
recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase_bytes);
if ordinary_passphrases.len() + recovery_passphrases.len() < *threshold {
return Ok(false);
}
self.do_finalize_unseal().await
}
}
impl VaultCoordinator {
/// Initializes `CoordinatorState::Unsealing` on first call if still `Idle`.
/// Threshold is based on ordinary operator count only (§3.4).
async fn ensure_unsealing_state(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
if matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let ordinary_count: i64 = schema::operator::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
let threshold = shamir_threshold(usize::try_from(ordinary_count).unwrap_or_default());
self.state = CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
threshold,
ordinary_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
};
}
Ok(())
}
/// Moves state back to Idle and calls finalize_unseal.
async fn do_finalize_unseal(&mut self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Unsealing {
ordinary_passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
..
} = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
else {
unreachable!()
};
finalize_unseal(
self.db.clone(),
self.vault.clone(),
ordinary_passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
)
.await?;
Ok(true)
}
async fn do_finalize_rekey(&mut self) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
..
} = std::mem::replace(&mut self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle)
else {
unreachable!()
};
finalize_rekey(
self.db.clone(),
self.vault.clone(),
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
)
.await?;
Ok(true)
}
}
#[messages]
impl VaultCoordinator {
/// Begin Shamir re-key after a key-rotation proposal is approved (§3.3).
/// Queries the current operator and recovery operator counts from the DB,
/// then transitions to Rekeying state awaiting contributions from all of them.
#[message]
pub async fn start_rekey(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !matches!(self.state, CoordinatorState::Idle) {
return Err(Error::AlreadyBootstrapping);
}
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let ordinary_count: i64 = schema::operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
let recovery_count: i64 = schema::recovery_operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?;
self.state = CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
ordinary_count: ordinary_count as usize,
recovery_count: recovery_count as usize,
passphrases: HashMap::new(),
recovery_passphrases: HashMap::new(),
};
Ok(())
}
/// Contribute an ordinary operator passphrase for the re-key.
/// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors have submitted and the re-key is complete.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_rekey(
&mut self,
operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
ordinary_count,
recovery_count,
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotRekeying);
};
if passphrases.contains_key(&operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
passphrases.insert(operator_id, passphrase.read().to_vec());
if passphrases.len() < *ordinary_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
return Ok(false);
}
self.do_finalize_rekey().await
}
/// Contribute a recovery operator passphrase for the re-key.
/// Returns Ok(true) when all contributors have submitted and the re-key is complete.
#[message]
pub async fn contribute_recovery_rekey(
&mut self,
recovery_operator_id: i32,
mut passphrase: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let CoordinatorState::Rekeying {
ordinary_count,
recovery_count,
passphrases,
recovery_passphrases,
} = &mut self.state
else {
return Err(Error::NotRekeying);
};
if recovery_passphrases.contains_key(&recovery_operator_id) {
return Err(Error::DuplicateContribution);
}
recovery_passphrases.insert(recovery_operator_id, passphrase.read().to_vec());
if passphrases.len() < *ordinary_count || recovery_passphrases.len() < *recovery_count {
return Ok(false);
}
self.do_finalize_rekey().await
}
}

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
actors::GlobalActors,
context::tls::TlsManager,
db::{self},
};
use std::sync::Arc;
use thiserror::Error;
pub mod tls;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
@@ -25,7 +24,7 @@ pub enum InitError {
Tls(#[from] tls::InitError),
#[error("Actor spawn failed: {0}")]
ActorSpawn(#[from] crate::actors::GlobalActorsSpawnError),
ActorSpawn(#[from] crate::actors::SpawnError),
#[error("I/O Error: {0}")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,3 @@
use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use pem::Pem;
use rcgen::{
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
};
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
use thiserror::Error;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
use crate::db::{
self,
models::{NewTlsHistory, TlsHistory},
@@ -21,6 +7,18 @@ use crate::db::{
},
};
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper as _};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use pem::Pem;
use rcgen::{
BasicConstraints, Certificate, CertificateParams, CertifiedIssuer, DistinguishedName, DnType,
IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
};
use rustls::pki_types::pem::PemObject;
use std::{net::Ipv4Addr, string::FromUtf8Error};
use thiserror::Error;
use tonic::transport::CertificateDer;
const ENCODE_CONFIG: pem::EncodeConfig = {
let line_ending = if cfg!(target_family = "windows") {
pem::LineEnding::CRLF
@@ -176,28 +174,26 @@ impl TlsManager {
{
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async {
let new_tls_history = NewTlsHistory {
cert: new_cert.cert.pem(),
cert_key: new_cert.cert_key.serialize_pem(),
ca_cert: encode_cert_to_pem(&ca.cert),
ca_key: ca.issuer.key().serialize_pem(),
};
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
let new_tls_history = NewTlsHistory {
cert: new_cert.cert.pem(),
cert_key: new_cert.cert_key.serialize_pem(),
ca_cert: encode_cert_to_pem(&ca.cert),
ca_key: ca.issuer.key().serialize_pem(),
};
let inserted_tls_history: i32 = diesel::insert_into(tls_history::table)
.values(&new_tls_history)
.returning(tls_history::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
let inserted_tls_history: i32 = diesel::insert_into(tls_history::table)
.values(&new_tls_history)
.returning(tls_history::id)
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await?;
diesel::update(arbiter_settings::table)
.set(arbiter_settings::tls_id.eq(inserted_tls_history))
.execute(conn)
.await?;
diesel::update(arbiter_settings::table)
.set(arbiter_settings::tls_id.eq(inserted_tls_history))
.execute(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(())
})
Result::<_, diesel::result::Error>::Ok(())
})
.await?;
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
use argon2::password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt;
use rand::{
Rng as _, SeedableRng,
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
@@ -60,14 +59,14 @@ mod tests {
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[test]
pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let mut password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key1 = derive_key(password, &salt);
let mut key2 = derive_key(password2, &salt);
let mut key1 = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
let mut key2 = derive_key(&mut password2, &salt);
let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
@@ -76,12 +75,12 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
pub fn successful_derive() {
fn successful_derive() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
let mut key = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
let key_reader = key.0.read();
assert_ne!(key_reader.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);

View File

@@ -1,32 +1,29 @@
use crate::actors::keyholder;
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
use hmac::Hmac;
use sha2::Sha256;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use sha2::Digest as _;
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{KeyHolder, SignIntegrity, VerifyIntegrity},
actors::vault::{self, GetState, SignIntegrity, Vault, VerifyIntegrity},
db::{
self,
models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
schema::integrity_envelope,
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use hmac::Hmac;
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use sha2::{Digest as _, Sha256};
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum IntegrityError {
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
Database(#[from] db::DatabaseError),
#[error("KeyHolder error: {0}")]
Keyholder(#[from] keyholder::KeyHolderError),
#[error("Vault error: {0}")]
Vault(#[from] vault::Error),
#[error("KeyHolder mailbox error")]
KeyholderSend,
#[error("Vault mailbox error")]
VaultSend,
#[error("Integrity envelope is missing for entity {entity_kind}")]
MissingEnvelope { entity_kind: &'static str },
@@ -108,23 +105,24 @@ impl IntoId for &'_ [u8] {
pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity: &E,
entity_id: impl IntoId,
) -> Result<(), IntegrityError> {
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);
let (key_version, mac) = keyholder
.ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
SendError::HandlerError(inner) => IntegrityError::Keyholder(inner),
_ => IntegrityError::KeyholderSend,
})?;
let (key_version, mac) =
vault
.ask(SignIntegrity { mac_input })
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
SendError::HandlerError(inner) => Error::Vault(inner),
_ => Error::VaultSend,
})?;
insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
.values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
@@ -153,10 +151,10 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
vault: &ActorRef<Vault>,
entity: &E,
entity_id: impl IntoId,
) -> Result<AttestationStatus, IntegrityError> {
) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
let envelope: IntegrityEnvelope = integrity_envelope::table
.filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
@@ -164,14 +162,14 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
.first(conn)
.await
.map_err(|err| match err {
diesel::result::Error::NotFound => IntegrityError::MissingEnvelope {
diesel::result::Error::NotFound => Error::MissingEnvelope {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
},
other => IntegrityError::Database(db::DatabaseError::from(other)),
other => Error::Database(db::DatabaseError::from(other)),
})?;
if envelope.payload_version != E::VERSION {
return Err(IntegrityError::PayloadVersionMismatch {
return Err(Error::PayloadVersionMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
expected: E::VERSION,
found: envelope.payload_version,
@@ -181,7 +179,7 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash);
let result = keyholder
let result = vault
.ask(VerifyIntegrity {
mac_input,
expected_mac: envelope.mac,
@@ -191,16 +189,19 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
match result {
Ok(true) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Attested),
Ok(false) => Err(IntegrityError::MacMismatch {
Ok(false) => Err(Error::MacMismatch {
entity_kind: E::KIND,
}),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(keyholder::KeyHolderError::NotBootstrapped)) => {
Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable)
}
Err(_) => Err(IntegrityError::KeyholderSend),
Err(SendError::HandlerError(vault::Error::Sealed)) => Ok(AttestationStatus::Unavailable),
Err(_) => Err(Error::VaultSend),
}
}
pub async fn is_signing_available(vault: &ActorRef<Vault>) -> Result<bool, Error> {
let state = vault.ask(GetState).await.map_err(|_| Error::VaultSend)?;
Ok(matches!(state, vault::VaultState::Unsealed))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
@@ -208,12 +209,13 @@ mod tests {
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::{Bootstrap, KeyHolder},
actors::{
GlobalActors,
vault::{Bootstrap, Vault},
},
db::{self, schema},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use super::{Integrable, IntegrityError, sign_entity, verify_entity};
use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
#[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
struct DummyEntity {
payload_version: i32,
@@ -223,11 +225,15 @@ mod tests {
const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
}
async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<KeyHolder> {
let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
async fn bootstrapped_vault(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<Vault> {
let actor = Vault::spawn(
Vault::new(db.clone(), GlobalActors::spawn_message_bus())
.await
.unwrap(),
);
actor
.ask(Bootstrap {
seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
seal_key: crate::crypto::KeyCell::from([0u8; 32]),
})
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -239,7 +245,7 @@ mod tests {
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
@@ -247,7 +253,7 @@ mod tests {
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -260,7 +266,7 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
}
@@ -270,7 +276,7 @@ mod tests {
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
@@ -278,7 +284,7 @@ mod tests {
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -290,10 +296,10 @@ mod tests {
.await
.unwrap();
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, IntegrityError::MacMismatch { .. }));
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -301,7 +307,7 @@ mod tests {
const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
let vault = bootstrapped_vault(&db).await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let entity = DummyEntity {
@@ -309,7 +315,7 @@ mod tests {
payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
};
sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
sign_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -318,9 +324,9 @@ mod tests {
..entity
};
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &vault, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
.await
.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, IntegrityError::MacMismatch { .. }));
assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
}
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use encryption::v1::Nonce;
use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
use chacha20poly1305::{
AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
@@ -8,12 +11,9 @@ use rand::{
rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
pub mod encryption;
pub mod integrity;
use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
pub mod shamir;
pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
@@ -21,6 +21,15 @@ impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
Self(value)
}
}
impl From<[u8; 32]> for KeyCell {
fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|key: &mut Key| {
key.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
});
Self(cell)
}
}
impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
type Error = ();
@@ -29,7 +38,7 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
return Err(());
}
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
let cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
});
Ok(Self(cell))
@@ -38,7 +47,7 @@ impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
impl KeyCell {
pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
let key = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng)
.expect("Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic");
rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
@@ -95,7 +104,7 @@ impl KeyCell {
}
/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
pub fn derive_key(password: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &[u8]) -> KeyCell {
let params = {
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
@@ -131,12 +140,12 @@ mod tests {
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
#[test]
pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
fn encrypt_decrypt() {
static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let mut password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
let salt = generate_salt();
let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
let mut key = derive_key(&mut password, &salt);
let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
let associated_data = b"associated data";
let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
use vsss_rs::Gf256;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ShamirError {
#[error("Failed to split key: {0}")]
Split(String),
#[error("Failed to combine shares: {0}")]
Combine(String),
}
/// Split `key` into `total` shares where any `threshold` shares can reconstruct it.
/// Each returned Vec<u8> is a share with format [`identifier_byte`, `value_bytes`...].
pub fn split_key(
threshold: usize,
total: usize,
key: &[u8; 32],
rng: impl rand_core::RngCore + rand_core::CryptoRng,
) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, ShamirError> {
Gf256::split_array(threshold, total, key.as_slice(), rng)
.map_err(|e| ShamirError::Split(format!("{e:?}")))
}
/// Returns the minimum number of shares required to reconstruct the secret
/// for a committee of `n` operators.
#[must_use]
pub const fn shamir_threshold(n: usize) -> usize {
match n {
0 => panic!("No operators"),
1 => 1,
2 => 2,
n => n / 2 + 1,
}
}
/// Reconstruct the secret from `threshold` or more shares.
pub fn combine_shares(shares: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ShamirError> {
let bytes = Gf256::combine_array(shares)
.map_err(|e| ShamirError::Combine(format!("{e:?}")))?;
<[u8; 32]>::try_from(bytes.as_slice())
.map_err(|_| ShamirError::Combine("unexpected reconstructed key length".to_owned()))
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ use diesel_async::{
sync_connection_wrapper::SyncConnectionWrapper,
};
use diesel_migrations::{EmbeddedMigrations, MigrationHarness, embed_migrations};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::info;

View File

@@ -2,23 +2,24 @@
clippy::duplicated_attributes,
reason = "restructed's #[view] causes false positives"
)]
use crate::db::schema::{
self, aead_encrypted, arbiter_settings, evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant,
evm_ether_transfer_grant_target, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
evm_token_transfer_log, evm_token_transfer_volume_limit, evm_transaction_log, evm_wallet,
integrity_envelope, root_key_history, tls_history,
};
use diesel::{prelude::*, sqlite::Sqlite};
use restructed::Models;
pub mod types {
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use diesel::{
backend::Backend,
deserialize::{FromSql, FromSqlRow},
expression::AsExpression,
serialize::{IsNull, ToSql},
sql_types::Integer,
sql_types::{Integer, Text},
sqlite::{Sqlite, SqliteType},
};
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ pub mod types {
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for SqliteTimestamp {
fn from_sql(
mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
mut bytes: <Sqlite as Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
return Err(format!(
@@ -79,10 +80,41 @@ pub mod types {
}
}
#[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
pub struct ChainId(pub i32);
macro_rules! declare_id {
($name:ident) => {
#[derive(Debug, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, Clone, Hash, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
#[repr(transparent)] // hint compiler to optimize the wrapper struct away
pub struct $name(i32);
impl $name {
pub const fn to_raw(self) -> i32 {
self.0
}
pub const fn from_raw(raw: i32) -> Self {
Self(raw)
}
}
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for $name {
fn from_sql(
bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
FromSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::from_sql(bytes).map(Self)
}
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for $name {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
ToSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::to_sql(&self.0, out)
}
}
};
}
declare_id!(ChainId);
#[expect(
clippy::cast_sign_loss,
@@ -103,19 +135,50 @@ pub mod types {
}
};
impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for ChainId {
fn from_sql(
bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
FromSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::from_sql(bytes).map(Self)
}
declare_id!(OperatorId);
declare_id!(OperatorIdentityId);
declare_id!(AeadEncryptedId);
declare_id!(RootKeyHistoryId);
declare_id!(TlsHistoryId);
declare_id!(EvmWalletId);
declare_id!(ClientId);
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, AsExpression, FromSqlRow)]
#[diesel(sql_type = Text)]
pub enum ProposalStatus {
Pending,
Approved,
Rejected,
Expired,
}
impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for ChainId {
impl ToSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalStatus {
fn to_sql<'b>(
&'b self,
out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
ToSql::<Integer, Sqlite>::to_sql(&self.0, out)
let s: &str = match self {
Self::Pending => "pending",
Self::Approved => "approved",
Self::Rejected => "rejected",
Self::Expired => "expired",
};
<str as ToSql<Text, Sqlite>>::to_sql(s, out)
}
}
impl FromSql<Text, Sqlite> for ProposalStatus {
fn from_sql(
bytes: <Sqlite as Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
let s = <String as FromSql<Text, Sqlite>>::from_sql(bytes)?;
match s.as_str() {
"pending" => Ok(Self::Pending),
"approved" => Ok(Self::Approved),
"rejected" => Ok(Self::Rejected),
"expired" => Ok(Self::Expired),
other => Err(format!("Unknown proposal status: {other}").into()),
}
}
}
}
@@ -130,12 +193,12 @@ pub use types::*;
)]
#[diesel(table_name = aead_encrypted, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct AeadEncrypted {
pub id: i32,
pub id: AeadEncryptedId,
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
pub tag: Vec<u8>,
pub current_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub schema_version: i32,
pub associated_root_key_id: i32, // references root_key_history.id
pub associated_root_key_id: RootKeyHistoryId,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
@@ -148,7 +211,7 @@ pub struct AeadEncrypted {
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct RootKeyHistory {
pub id: i32,
pub id: RootKeyHistoryId,
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
pub tag: Vec<u8>,
pub root_key_encryption_nonce: Vec<u8>,
@@ -166,7 +229,7 @@ pub struct RootKeyHistory {
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct TlsHistory {
pub id: i32,
pub id: TlsHistoryId,
pub cert: String,
pub cert_key: String, // PEM Encoded private key
pub ca_cert: String, // PEM Encoded certificate for cert signing
@@ -191,7 +254,7 @@ pub struct ArbiterSettings {
attributes_with = "deriveless"
)]
pub struct EvmWallet {
pub id: i32,
pub id: EvmWalletId,
pub address: Vec<u8>,
pub aead_encrypted_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
@@ -213,7 +276,7 @@ pub struct EvmWallet {
)]
pub struct EvmWalletAccess {
pub id: i32,
pub wallet_id: i32,
pub wallet_id: EvmWalletId,
pub client_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
@@ -240,8 +303,7 @@ pub struct ProgramClientMetadataHistory {
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::program_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProgramClient {
pub id: i32,
pub nonce: i32,
pub id: ClientId,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub metadata_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
@@ -249,15 +311,25 @@ pub struct ProgramClient {
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::useragent_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct UseragentClient {
pub id: i32,
pub nonce: i32,
#[diesel(table_name = schema::operator_client, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct OperatorClient {
pub id: OperatorIdentityId,
pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Queryable, Debug)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::operator, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct Operator {
pub id: OperatorId,
pub share: Vec<u8>,
pub share_nonce: Vec<u8>,
pub share_salt: Vec<u8>,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = evm_ether_transfer_limit, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
#[view(
@@ -401,8 +473,73 @@ pub struct IntegrityEnvelope {
pub entity_kind: String,
pub entity_id: Vec<u8>,
pub payload_version: i32,
pub key_version: i32,
pub key_version: RootKeyHistoryId,
pub mac: Vec<u8>,
pub signed_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Identifiable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct Proposal {
pub id: i32,
pub kind: String,
pub payload: Vec<u8>,
pub initiator_id: i32,
pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
pub status: ProposalStatus,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct NewProposal {
pub kind: String,
pub payload: Vec<u8>,
pub initiator_id: i32,
// status defaults to 'pending' at the DB layer
pub expires_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Debug, Queryable, Selectable, Identifiable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct ProposalVote {
pub id: i32,
pub proposal_id: i32,
pub operator_id: i32,
pub approve: bool,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
pub voted_at: SqliteTimestamp,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct NewProposalVote {
pub proposal_id: i32,
pub operator_id: i32,
pub approve: bool,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::proposal_result, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct NewProposalResult {
pub proposal_id: i32,
pub data: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::recovery_proposal_vote, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct NewRecoveryProposalVote {
pub proposal_id: i32,
pub recovery_operator_id: i32,
pub approve: bool,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = schema::recovery_wakeup_request, check_for_backend(Sqlite))]
pub struct NewRecoveryWakeupRequest {
pub requested_by: i32,
}

View File

@@ -152,10 +152,101 @@ diesel::table! {
}
}
diesel::table! {
operator (id) {
id -> Nullable<Integer>,
share -> Binary,
share_nonce -> Binary,
share_salt -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
operator_identity (id) {
id -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal (id) {
id -> Integer,
kind -> Text,
payload -> Binary,
initiator_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
expires_at -> Integer,
status -> Text,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_result (proposal_id) {
proposal_id -> Integer,
data -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
recovery_operator (id) {
id -> Integer,
share -> Binary,
share_nonce -> Binary,
share_salt -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
recovery_operator_identity (id) {
id -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
recovery_wakeup_request (id) {
id -> Integer,
requested_by -> Integer,
requested_at -> Integer,
cancelled_by -> Nullable<Integer>,
cancelled_at -> Nullable<Integer>,
}
}
diesel::table! {
recovery_proposal_vote (id) {
id -> Integer,
proposal_id -> Integer,
recovery_operator_id -> Integer,
approve -> Bool,
signature -> Binary,
voted_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
proposal_vote (id) {
id -> Integer,
proposal_id -> Integer,
operator_id -> Integer,
approve -> Bool,
signature -> Binary,
voted_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::table! {
program_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
nonce -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
metadata_id -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
@@ -186,17 +277,6 @@ diesel::table! {
}
}
diesel::table! {
useragent_client (id) {
id -> Integer,
nonce -> Integer,
public_key -> Binary,
key_type -> Integer,
created_at -> Integer,
updated_at -> Integer,
}
}
diesel::joinable!(aead_encrypted -> root_key_history (associated_root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> root_key_history (root_key_id));
diesel::joinable!(arbiter_settings -> tls_history (tls_id));
@@ -215,10 +295,24 @@ diesel::joinable!(evm_transaction_log -> evm_wallet_access (wallet_access_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet -> aead_encrypted (aead_encrypted_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> evm_wallet (wallet_id));
diesel::joinable!(evm_wallet_access -> program_client (client_id));
diesel::joinable!(operator -> operator_identity (id));
diesel::joinable!(program_client -> client_metadata (metadata_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal -> operator_identity (initiator_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_result -> proposal (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_vote -> proposal (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(proposal_vote -> operator_identity (operator_id));
diesel::joinable!(recovery_operator -> recovery_operator_identity (id));
diesel::joinable!(recovery_proposal_vote -> proposal (proposal_id));
diesel::joinable!(recovery_proposal_vote -> recovery_operator_identity (recovery_operator_id));
diesel::joinable!(recovery_wakeup_request -> operator_identity (requested_by));
diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
aead_encrypted,
proposal_result,
recovery_operator,
recovery_operator_identity,
recovery_wakeup_request,
recovery_proposal_vote,
arbiter_settings,
client_metadata,
client_metadata_history,
@@ -233,8 +327,11 @@ diesel::allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
evm_wallet,
evm_wallet_access,
integrity_envelope,
operator,
operator_identity,
program_client,
proposal,
proposal_vote,
root_key_history,
tls_history,
useragent_client,
);

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,5 @@
pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer;
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{TxKind, U256},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use crate::{
actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
actors::vault::Vault,
crypto::integrity,
db::{
self, DatabaseError,
@@ -27,6 +15,18 @@ use crate::{
},
};
use alloy::{
consensus::TxEip1559,
primitives::{TxKind, U256},
};
use chrono::Utc;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
pub mod abi;
pub mod safe_signer;
pub mod policies;
mod utils;
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ pub enum PolicyError {
NoMatchingGrant,
#[error("Integrity error: {0}")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::IntegrityError),
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ pub enum ListError {
Database(#[from] DatabaseError),
#[error("Integrity verification failed for grant")]
Integrity(#[from] integrity::IntegrityError),
Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
}
/// Controls whether a transaction should be executed or only validated
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ async fn check_shared_constraints(
// Supporting only EIP-1559 transactions for now, but we can easily extend this to support legacy transactions if needed
pub struct Engine {
db: db::DatabasePool,
keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
vault: ActorRef<Vault>,
}
impl Engine {
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ impl Engine {
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
.ok_or(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant)?;
integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &self.vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
let mut violations = check_shared_constraints(
&context,
@@ -179,24 +179,22 @@ impl Engine {
}
if run_kind == RunKind::Execution {
conn.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
let log_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(&NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: grant.common_settings_id,
wallet_access_id: context.target.id,
chain_id: context.chain.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(context.value).to_vec(),
signed_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(evm_transaction_log::id)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
conn.transaction(async |conn| {
let log_id: i32 = insert_into(evm_transaction_log::table)
.values(&NewEvmTransactionLog {
grant_id: grant.common_settings_id,
wallet_access_id: context.target.id,
chain_id: context.chain.into(),
eth_value: utils::u256_to_bytes(context.value).to_vec(),
signed_at: Utc::now().into(),
})
.returning(evm_transaction_log::id)
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await?;
P::record_transaction(&context, meaning, log_id, &grant, conn).await?;
P::record_transaction(&context, meaning, log_id, &grant, &mut *conn).await?;
QueryResult::Ok(())
})
QueryResult::Ok(())
})
.await
.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
@@ -207,8 +205,8 @@ impl Engine {
}
impl Engine {
pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, keyholder: ActorRef<KeyHolder>) -> Self {
Self { db, keyholder }
pub const fn new(db: db::DatabasePool, vault: ActorRef<Vault>) -> Self {
Self { db, vault }
}
pub async fn create_grant<P: Policy>(
@@ -219,57 +217,55 @@ impl Engine {
P::Settings: Clone,
{
let mut conn = self.db.get().await?;
let keyholder = self.keyholder.clone();
let vault = self.vault.clone();
let id = conn
.transaction(|conn| {
Box::pin(async move {
use schema::evm_basic_grant;
.transaction(async |conn| {
use schema::evm_basic_grant;
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #86"
)]
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmBasicGrant {
chain_id: full_grant.shared.chain.into(),
wallet_access_id: full_grant.shared.wallet_access_id,
valid_from: full_grant.shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: full_grant.shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.shared
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
rate_limit_count: full_grant
.shared
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.count as i32),
rate_limit_window_secs: full_grant
.shared
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.window.num_seconds() as i32),
revoked_at: None,
})
.returning(evm_basic_grant::all_columns)
.get_result(conn)
.await?;
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "fixme! #86"
)]
let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = insert_into(evm_basic_grant::table)
.values(&NewEvmBasicGrant {
chain_id: full_grant.shared.chain.into(),
wallet_access_id: full_grant.shared.wallet_access_id,
valid_from: full_grant.shared.valid_from.map(SqliteTimestamp),
valid_until: full_grant.shared.valid_until.map(SqliteTimestamp),
max_gas_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.shared
.max_gas_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
max_priority_fee_per_gas: full_grant
.shared
.max_priority_fee_per_gas
.map(|fee| utils::u256_to_bytes(fee).to_vec()),
rate_limit_count: full_grant
.shared
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.count as i32),
rate_limit_window_secs: full_grant
.shared
.rate_limit
.as_ref()
.map(|rl| rl.window.num_seconds() as i32),
revoked_at: None,
})
.returning(evm_basic_grant::all_columns)
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await?;
P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await?;
P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, &mut *conn).await?;
integrity::sign_entity(conn, &keyholder, &full_grant, basic_grant.id)
.await
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
integrity::sign_entity(&mut *conn, &vault, &full_grant, basic_grant.id)
.await
.map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
QueryResult::Ok(basic_grant.id)
})
QueryResult::Ok(basic_grant.id)
})
.await?;
@@ -289,7 +285,7 @@ impl Engine {
// Verify integrity of all grants before returning any results
for grant in &all_grants {
integrity::verify_entity(conn, &self.keyholder, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
integrity::verify_entity(conn, &self.vault, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
}
Ok(all_grants.into_iter().map(|g| Grant {
@@ -363,7 +359,8 @@ mod tests {
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog,
SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
@@ -381,7 +378,7 @@ mod tests {
EvalContext {
target: EvmWalletAccess {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: 10,
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(5),
client_id: 20,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
},

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
use std::fmt::Display;
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
db::models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess},
evm::utils,
};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, ChainId, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
@@ -6,15 +10,9 @@ use diesel::{
ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, result::QueryResult, sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use std::fmt::Display;
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
db::models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess},
evm::utils,
};
pub mod ether_transfer;
pub mod token_transfers;

View File

@@ -1,30 +1,32 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fmt::Display;
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::prelude::*;
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use crate::crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable;
use crate::db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, EvmEtherTransferLimit,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
};
use crate::db::schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_transaction_log};
use crate::evm::policies::{
CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::v1::Integrable,
db::models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget, EvmEtherTransferLimit,
NewEvmEtherTransferLimit, SqliteTimestamp,
},
db::schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_transaction_log},
db::{
models::{NewEvmEtherTransferGrant, NewEvmEtherTransferGrantTarget},
schema::{evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target},
},
evm::policies::{
CombinedSettings, Grant, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
evm::{policies::Policy, utils},
};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{
dsl::{auto_type, insert_into},
prelude::*,
sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use std::{collections::HashMap, fmt::Display};
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {
evm_ether_transfer_grant::table.inner_join(
@@ -32,8 +34,6 @@ fn grant_join() -> _ {
)
}
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
// Plain ether transfer
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct Meaning {

View File

@@ -1,25 +1,27 @@
use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
use crate::{
db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog,
SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
},
evm::{
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
},
};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{
EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
},
schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
};
use crate::evm::{
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
use super::{EtherTransfer, Settings};
const WALLET_ACCESS_ID: i32 = 1;
const CHAIN_ID: alloy::primitives::ChainId = 1;
@@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, value: U256) -> EvalContext {
EvalContext {
target: EvmWalletAccess {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: 10,
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(10),
client_id: 20,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
},

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,4 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use crate::db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use crate::{
crypto::integrity::Integrable,
db::models::{
@@ -18,20 +6,33 @@ use crate::{
NewEvmTokenTransferGrant, NewEvmTokenTransferLog, NewEvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
SqliteTimestamp,
},
db::schema::{
evm_basic_grant, evm_token_transfer_grant, evm_token_transfer_log,
evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
},
evm::policies::CombinedSettings,
evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
},
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, U256},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use arbiter_tokens_registry::evm::nonfungible::{self, TokenInfo};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use diesel::dsl::{auto_type, insert_into};
use diesel::prelude::*;
use diesel::sqlite::Sqlite;
use diesel::{
dsl::{auto_type, insert_into},
prelude::*,
sqlite::Sqlite,
};
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
use super::{DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation};
use std::collections::HashMap;
#[auto_type]
fn grant_join() -> _ {

View File

@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
use alloy::sol_types::SolCall;
use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
use crate::{
db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::evm_basic_grant,
},
evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
},
};
use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address},
sol_types::SolCall,
};
use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use crate::db::{
self, DatabaseConnection,
models::{EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, SqliteTimestamp},
schema::evm_basic_grant,
};
use crate::evm::{
abi::IERC20::transferCall,
policies::{
CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
VolumeRateLimit,
},
utils,
};
use super::{Settings, TokenTransfer};
// DAI on Ethereum mainnet — present in the static token registry
const CHAIN_ID: u64 = 1;
const DAI: Address = address!("6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F");
@@ -42,7 +45,7 @@ fn ctx(to: Address, calldata: Bytes) -> EvalContext {
EvalContext {
target: EvmWalletAccess {
id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
wallet_id: 10,
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(10),
client_id: 20,
created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
},

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use alloy::{
consensus::SignableTransaction,
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ use alloy::{
primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
signers::{Error, Result, Signer, SignerSync, utils::secret_key_to_address},
};
use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use k256::ecdsa::{self, RecoveryId, SigningKey, signature::hazmat::PrehashSigner};
use std::sync::Mutex;
/// An Ethereum signer that stores its secp256k1 secret key inside a
/// hardware-protected [`MemSafe`] cell.
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for SafeSigner {
/// Returns the protected key bytes and the derived Ethereum address.
pub fn generate(rng: &mut impl rand::Rng) -> (SafeCell<[u8; 32]>, Address) {
loop {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|w: &mut [u8; 32]| {
let mut cell = SafeCell::new_inline_default(|w: &mut [u8; 32]| {
rng.fill_bytes(w);
});

View File

@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@ use alloy::primitives::U256;
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
#[error("Expected {expected} bytes but got {actual} bytes")]
pub struct LengthError {
pub expected: usize,
pub actual: usize,
pub(super) struct LengthError {
pub(super) expected: usize,
pub(super) actual: usize,
}
pub const fn u256_to_bytes(value: U256) -> [u8; 32] {
value.to_le_bytes()
}
pub fn bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<U256> {
pub(super) fn bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().ok()?;
Some(U256::from_le_bytes(bytes))
}
pub fn try_bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<U256> {
pub(super) fn try_bytes_to_u256(bytes: &[u8]) -> diesel::result::QueryResult<U256> {
let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(LengthError {
expected: 32,

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
use crate::{
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::client::{ClientConnection, session::ClientSession},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::client::{
ClientRequest, ClientResponse, client_request::Payload as ClientRequestPayload,
@@ -5,15 +9,11 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
transport::{Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::client::{ClientConnection, session::ClientSession},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
mod auth;
mod evm;
mod inbound;

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{Convert, request_tracker::RequestTracker},
peers::client::{ClientConnection, auth},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::{
ClientMetadata,
@@ -5,7 +9,8 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
client::{
ClientRequest, ClientResponse,
auth::{
self as proto_auth, AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
self as proto_auth, AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge,
AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
AuthChallengeSolution as ProtoAuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult,
request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload, response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
},
@@ -16,22 +21,18 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::client::{ClientConnection, auth},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub(super) struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub const fn new(
pub(super) const fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
) -> Self {
@@ -62,14 +63,14 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
}
#[async_trait]
impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::ClientAuthError>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
async fn send(
&mut self,
item: Result<auth::Outbound, auth::ClientAuthError>,
item: Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
let payload = match item {
Ok(message) => message.into(),
Err(err) => AuthResponsePayload::Result(ProtoAuthResult::from(err).into()),
Ok(message) => message.convert(),
Err(err) => err.convert(),
};
self.send_client_response(payload).await
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
};
Some(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
metadata: client_metadata_from_proto(client_info),
metadata: client_info.convert(),
})
}
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => {
@@ -148,21 +149,71 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
}
}
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::ClientAuthError>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
fn client_metadata_from_proto(metadata: ProtoClientInfo) -> ClientMetadata {
ClientMetadata {
name: metadata.name,
description: metadata.description,
version: metadata.version,
impl Convert for ProtoClientInfo {
type Output = ClientMetadata;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
ClientMetadata {
name: self.name,
description: self.description,
version: self.version,
}
}
}
pub async fn start(
impl Convert for auth::Error {
type Output = AuthResponsePayload;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
use auth::Error::{
ApproveError, DatabaseOperationFailed, DatabasePoolUnavailable, IntegrityCheckFailed,
InvalidChallengeSolution, Transport,
};
AuthResponsePayload::Result(
match self {
InvalidChallengeSolution => ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature,
ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Denied) => ProtoAuthResult::ApprovalDenied,
ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Upstream(
crate::actors::flow_coordinator::ApprovalError::NoOperatorsConnected,
)) => ProtoAuthResult::NoOperatorsOnline,
ApproveError(auth::ApproveError::Internal)
| DatabasePoolUnavailable
| DatabaseOperationFailed
| IntegrityCheckFailed
| Transport => ProtoAuthResult::Internal,
}
.into(),
)
}
}
impl Convert for auth::Outbound {
type Output = AuthResponsePayload;
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
match self {
Self::AuthChallenge { challenge } => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
timestamp_nanos: challenge
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("timestamp within range")
as u64,
random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
})
}
Self::AuthSuccess => AuthResponsePayload::Result(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into()),
}
}
}
pub(super) async fn start(
conn: &mut ClientConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
) -> Result<i32, auth::ClientAuthError> {
) -> Result<i32, auth::Error> {
let mut transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
peers::client::session::{ClientSession, HandleSignTransaction, SignTransactionRpcError},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
@@ -11,18 +18,11 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm_sign_transaction_response::Result as EvmSignTransactionResult,
},
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::client::session::{ClientSession, HandleSignTransaction, SignTransactionRpcError},
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
};
const fn wrap_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> ClientResponsePayload {
ClientResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
payload: Some(payload),

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
use crate::{
actors::vault::VaultState,
peers::client::session::{ClientSession, Error, HandleQueryVaultState},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
client::{
client_response::Payload as ClientResponsePayload,
@@ -8,15 +12,11 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
},
shared::VaultState as ProtoVaultState,
};
use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::actors::{
client::session::{ClientSession, ClientSessionError, HandleQueryVaultState},
keyholder::KeyHolderState,
};
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
actor: &ActorRef<ClientSession>,
req: proto_vault::Request,
@@ -30,12 +30,10 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
match payload {
VaultRequestPayload::QueryState(()) => {
let state = match actor.ask(HandleQueryVaultState {}).await {
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(KeyHolderState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(ClientSessionError::Internal)) => {
ProtoVaultState::Error
}
Ok(VaultState::Unbootstrapped) => ProtoVaultState::Unbootstrapped,
Ok(VaultState::Sealed) => ProtoVaultState::Sealed,
Ok(VaultState::Unsealed) => ProtoVaultState::Unsealed,
Err(SendError::HandlerError(Error::Internal)) => ProtoVaultState::Error,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to query vault state");
ProtoVaultState::Error

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
pub mod inbound;
pub mod outbound;
pub(super) mod inbound;
pub(super) mod outbound;

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, rlp::Decodable as _};
use crate::grpc::TryConvert;
pub struct RawEvmAddress(pub Vec<u8>);
use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, rlp::Decodable as _};
pub(in crate::grpc) struct RawEvmAddress(pub(in crate::grpc) Vec<u8>);
impl TryConvert for RawEvmAddress {
type Output = Address;
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ impl TryConvert for RawEvmAddress {
}
}
pub struct RawEvmTransaction(pub Vec<u8>);
pub(in crate::grpc) struct RawEvmTransaction(pub(in crate::grpc) Vec<u8>);
impl TryConvert for RawEvmTransaction {
type Output = TxEip1559;

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
use alloy::primitives::U256;
use crate::{
evm::{
PolicyError, VetError,
policies::{EvalViolation, SpecificMeaning},
},
grpc::Convert,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm::{
EvmError as ProtoEvmError,
@@ -14,13 +20,7 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
},
};
use crate::{
evm::{
PolicyError, VetError,
policies::{EvalViolation, SpecificMeaning},
},
grpc::Convert,
};
use alloy::primitives::U256;
fn u256_to_proto_bytes(value: U256) -> Vec<u8> {
value.to_be_bytes::<32>().to_vec()

View File

@@ -1,23 +1,20 @@
use crate::peers::{client::ClientConnection, operator::OperatorConnection};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::{
client::{ClientRequest, ClientResponse},
user_agent::{UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse},
operator::{OperatorRequest, OperatorResponse},
},
transport::grpc::GrpcBi,
};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
use tonic::{Request, Response, Status, async_trait};
use tracing::info;
use crate::{
actors::{client::ClientConnection, user_agent::UserAgentConnection},
grpc::user_agent::start,
};
mod request_tracker;
pub mod client;
pub mod user_agent;
pub mod operator;
mod common;
@@ -36,7 +33,7 @@ pub trait TryConvert {
#[async_trait]
impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for super::Server {
type UserAgentStream = ReceiverStream<Result<UserAgentResponse, Status>>;
type OperatorStream = ReceiverStream<Result<OperatorResponse, Status>>;
type ClientStream = ReceiverStream<Result<ClientResponse, Status>>;
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
@@ -55,23 +52,23 @@ impl arbiter_proto::proto::arbiter_service_server::ArbiterService for super::Ser
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
async fn user_agent(
async fn operator(
&self,
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<UserAgentRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::UserAgentStream>, Status> {
request: Request<tonic::Streaming<OperatorRequest>>,
) -> Result<Response<Self::OperatorStream>, Status> {
let req_stream = request.into_inner();
let (bi, rx) = GrpcBi::from_bi_stream(req_stream);
tokio::spawn(start(
UserAgentConnection {
tokio::spawn(operator::start(
OperatorConnection {
db: self.context.db.clone(),
actors: self.context.actors.clone(),
},
bi,
));
info!(event = "connection established", "grpc.user_agent");
info!(event = "connection established", "grpc.operator");
Ok(Response::new(rx))
}

View File

@@ -1,29 +1,30 @@
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use crate::{
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
peers::operator::{OutOfBand, OperatorConnection, OperatorSession},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
proto::operator::{
OperatorRequest, OperatorResponse,
operator_request::Payload as OperatorRequestPayload,
operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
},
transport::{Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentSession},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
mod auth;
mod evm;
mod governance;
mod inbound;
mod outbound;
mod sdk_client;
mod vault;
mod vault_gate;
pub struct OutOfBandAdapter(mpsc::Sender<OutOfBand>);
@@ -38,8 +39,8 @@ impl Sender<OutOfBand> for OutOfBandAdapter {
}
async fn dispatch_loop(
mut bi: GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
actor: ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
mut bi: GrpcBi<OperatorRequest, OperatorResponse>,
actor: ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
mut receiver: mpsc::Receiver<OutOfBand>,
mut request_tracker: RequestTracker,
) {
@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ async fn dispatch_loop(
let payload = sdk_client::out_of_band_payload(oob);
if bi.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse { id: None, payload: Some(payload) })).await.is_err() {
if bi.send(Ok(OperatorResponse { id: None, payload: Some(payload) })).await.is_err() {
return;
}
}
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ async fn dispatch_loop(
let conn = match message {
Ok(conn) => conn,
Err(err) => {
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to receive user agent request");
warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to receive operator request");
return;
}
};
@@ -78,13 +79,13 @@ async fn dispatch_loop(
};
let Some(payload) = conn.payload else {
let _ = bi.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing user-agent request payload"))).await;
let _ = bi.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing operator request payload"))).await;
return;
};
match dispatch_inner(&actor, payload).await {
Ok(Some(response)) => {
if bi.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
if bi.send(Ok(OperatorResponse {
id: Some(request_id),
payload: Some(response),
})).await.is_err() {
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ async fn dispatch_loop(
}
Ok(None) => {}
Err(status) => {
error!(?status, "Failed to process user agent request");
error!(?status, "Failed to process operator request");
let _ = bi.send(Err(status)).await;
return;
}
@@ -104,41 +105,43 @@ async fn dispatch_loop(
}
async fn dispatch_inner(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
payload: UserAgentRequestPayload,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
payload: OperatorRequestPayload,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
match payload {
UserAgentRequestPayload::Vault(req) => vault::dispatch(actor, req).await,
UserAgentRequestPayload::Evm(req) => evm::dispatch(actor, req).await,
UserAgentRequestPayload::SdkClient(req) => sdk_client::dispatch(actor, req).await,
UserAgentRequestPayload::Auth(..) => {
warn!("Unsupported post-auth user agent auth request");
Err(Status::invalid_argument("Unsupported user-agent request"))
OperatorRequestPayload::Vault(req) => vault::dispatch(actor, req).await,
OperatorRequestPayload::Evm(req) => evm::dispatch(actor, req).await,
OperatorRequestPayload::SdkClient(req) => sdk_client::dispatch(actor, req).await,
OperatorRequestPayload::Auth(..) => {
warn!("Unsupported post-auth operator auth request");
Err(Status::invalid_argument("Unsupported operator request"))
}
OperatorRequestPayload::Governance(req) => governance::dispatch(actor, req).await,
}
}
pub async fn start(
mut conn: UserAgentConnection,
mut bi: GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
mut conn: OperatorConnection,
mut bi: GrpcBi<OperatorRequest, OperatorResponse>,
) {
let mut request_tracker = RequestTracker::default();
let pubkey = match auth::start(&mut conn, &mut bi, &mut request_tracker).await {
Ok(pubkey) => pubkey,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "Authentication failed");
return;
}
};
let (oob_sender, oob_receiver) = mpsc::channel(16);
let oob_adapter = OutOfBandAdapter(oob_sender);
let actor = UserAgentSession::spawn(UserAgentSession::new(conn, Box::new(oob_adapter)));
let actor_for_cleanup = actor.clone();
let actor = {
let transport = auth::AuthTransportAdapter::new(&mut bi, &mut request_tracker);
match crate::peers::operator::start(&mut conn, transport, Box::new(oob_adapter)).await {
Ok(actor) => actor,
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "Operator connection failed");
return;
}
}
};
info!(?pubkey, "User authenticated successfully");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor, oob_receiver, request_tracker).await;
actor_for_cleanup.kill();
info!("Operator session established");
dispatch_loop(bi, actor.clone(), oob_receiver, request_tracker).await;
actor.kill();
}

View File

@@ -1,35 +1,32 @@
use crate::{grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker, peers::operator::auth};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::user_agent::{
UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
proto::operator::{
OperatorRequest, OperatorResponse,
auth::{
self as proto_auth, AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge,
AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
AuthChallengeSolution as ProtoAuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult,
request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload, response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
},
user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
operator_request::Payload as OperatorRequestPayload,
operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
},
transport::{Bi, Error as TransportError, Receiver, Sender, grpc::GrpcBi},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{UserAgentConnection, auth},
grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
};
pub struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
pub(super) struct AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub(super) bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<OperatorRequest, OperatorResponse>,
pub(super) request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
}
impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
pub const fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
pub(super) const fn new(
bi: &'a mut GrpcBi<OperatorRequest, OperatorResponse>,
request_tracker: &'a mut RequestTracker,
) -> Self {
Self {
@@ -38,18 +35,34 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
}
}
async fn send_user_agent_response(
pub(super) const fn bi_mut(&mut self) -> &mut GrpcBi<OperatorRequest, OperatorResponse> {
self.bi
}
pub(super) const fn tracker_mut(&mut self) -> &mut RequestTracker {
self.request_tracker
}
pub(super) async fn send_response_payload(
&mut self,
payload: OperatorResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.bi
.send(Ok(OperatorResponse {
id: Some(self.request_tracker.current_request_id()),
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
}
async fn send_operator_response(
&mut self,
payload: AuthResponsePayload,
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
self.bi
.send(Ok(UserAgentResponse {
id: Some(self.request_tracker.current_request_id()),
payload: Some(UserAgentResponsePayload::Auth(proto_auth::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})),
}))
.await
self.send_response_payload(OperatorResponsePayload::Auth(proto_auth::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
}))
.await
}
}
@@ -61,8 +74,15 @@ impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
) -> Result<(), TransportError> {
use auth::{Error, Outbound};
let payload = match item {
Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { nonce }) => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge { nonce })
Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { challenge }) => {
AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
timestamp_nanos: challenge
.timestamp
.timestamp_nanos_opt()
.expect("timestamp within range")
as u64,
random: challenge.nonce.to_vec(),
})
}
Ok(Outbound::AuthSuccess) => {
AuthResponsePayload::Result(ProtoAuthResult::Success.into())
@@ -87,7 +107,7 @@ impl Sender<Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
}
};
self.send_user_agent_response(payload).await
self.send_operator_response(payload).await
}
}
@@ -97,7 +117,7 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
let request = match self.bi.recv().await? {
Ok(request) => request,
Err(error) => {
warn!(error = ?error, "Failed to receive user agent auth request");
warn!(error = ?error, "Failed to receive operator auth request");
return None;
}
};
@@ -113,16 +133,16 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
let Some(payload) = request.payload else {
warn!(
event = "received request with empty payload",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
"grpc.operator.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
let UserAgentRequestPayload::Auth(auth_request) = payload else {
let OperatorRequestPayload::Auth(auth_request) = payload else {
let _ = self
.bi
.send(Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Unsupported user-agent auth request",
"Unsupported operator auth request",
)))
.await;
return None;
@@ -131,7 +151,7 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
let Some(payload) = auth_request.payload else {
warn!(
event = "received auth request with empty payload",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
"grpc.operator.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
@@ -140,12 +160,11 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(ProtoAuthChallengeRequest {
pubkey,
bootstrap_token,
..
}) => {
let Ok(pubkey) = authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey.as_slice()) else {
warn!(
event = "received request with invalid public key",
"grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
"grpc.operator.auth_adapter"
);
return None;
};
@@ -163,12 +182,3 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
}
impl Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {}
pub async fn start(
conn: &mut UserAgentConnection,
bi: &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
) -> Result<authn::PublicKey, auth::Error> {
let transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
auth::authenticate(conn, transport).await
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
use crate::{
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
peers::operator::{
OperatorSession,
session::handlers::{
GrantMutationError, HandleEvmWalletCreate, HandleEvmWalletList, HandleGrantCreate,
HandleGrantDelete, HandleGrantList, HandleSignTransaction,
SignTransactionError as SessionSignTransactionError,
},
},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm::{
EvmError as ProtoEvmError, EvmGrantCreateRequest, EvmGrantCreateResponse,
@@ -10,43 +24,29 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
wallet_create_response::Result as WalletCreateResult,
wallet_list_response::Result as WalletListResult,
},
user_agent::{
operator::{
evm::{
self as proto_evm, SignTransactionRequest as ProtoSignTransactionRequest,
request::Payload as EvmRequestPayload, response::Payload as EvmResponsePayload,
},
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
},
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{
UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
GrantMutationError, HandleEvmWalletCreate, HandleEvmWalletList, HandleGrantCreate,
HandleGrantDelete, HandleGrantList, HandleSignTransaction,
SignTransactionError as SessionSignTransactionError,
},
},
grpc::{
Convert, TryConvert,
common::inbound::{RawEvmAddress, RawEvmTransaction},
},
};
const fn wrap_evm_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
const fn wrap_evm_response(payload: EvmResponsePayload) -> OperatorResponsePayload {
OperatorResponsePayload::Evm(proto_evm::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
}
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: proto_evm::Request,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let Some(payload) = req.payload else {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing EVM request payload"));
};
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
}
async fn handle_wallet_create(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleEvmWalletCreate {}).await {
Ok((wallet_id, address)) => WalletCreateResult::Wallet(WalletEntry {
id: wallet_id,
@@ -82,15 +82,15 @@ async fn handle_wallet_create(
}
async fn handle_wallet_list(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleEvmWalletList {}).await {
Ok(wallets) => WalletListResult::Wallets(WalletList {
wallets: wallets
.into_iter()
.map(|(id, address)| WalletEntry {
address: address.to_vec(),
id,
id: id.to_raw(),
})
.collect(),
}),
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ async fn handle_wallet_list(
}
async fn handle_grant_list(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleGrantList {}).await {
Ok(grants) => EvmGrantListResult::Grants(EvmGrantList {
grants: grants
@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ async fn handle_grant_list(
}
async fn handle_grant_create(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: EvmGrantCreateRequest,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let basic = req
.shared
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing shared grant settings"))?
@@ -164,9 +164,9 @@ async fn handle_grant_create(
}
async fn handle_grant_delete(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: EvmGrantDeleteRequest,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor
.ask(HandleGrantDelete {
grant_id: req.grant_id,
@@ -190,9 +190,9 @@ async fn handle_grant_delete(
}
async fn handle_sign_transaction(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: ProtoSignTransactionRequest,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let request = req
.request
.ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("Missing sign transaction request"))?;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
use crate::{
actors::proposal_manager::{Error as ProposalError, ProposalKind, VoteOutcome},
peers::operator::{
OperatorSession,
session::handlers::{HandleCastVote, HandleCreateProposal, HandleQueryPending},
},
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::operator::{
governance::{
self as proto_gov, CreateProposalRequest, QueryPendingRequest, QueryPendingResponse,
VoteOutcome as ProtoVoteOutcome, create_proposal_request::Kind as ProtoKind,
request::Payload as GovRequestPayload, response::Payload as GovResponsePayload,
},
operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::warn;
const fn wrap(payload: GovResponsePayload) -> OperatorResponsePayload {
OperatorResponsePayload::Governance(proto_gov::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
}
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: proto_gov::Request,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let Some(payload) = req.payload else {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Missing governance request payload",
));
};
match payload {
GovRequestPayload::Create(req) => handle_create(actor, req).await,
GovRequestPayload::Vote(req) => handle_vote(actor, req).await,
GovRequestPayload::Query(QueryPendingRequest {}) => handle_query(actor).await,
}
}
async fn handle_create(
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: CreateProposalRequest,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let kind = match req.kind {
Some(ProtoKind::ApproveSdkClient(p)) => ProposalKind::ApproveSdkClient {
client_id: p.client_id,
},
Some(ProtoKind::GrantWalletAccess(p)) => ProposalKind::GrantWalletAccess {
wallet_id: p.wallet_id,
client_id: p.client_id,
},
Some(ProtoKind::ApproveServerUpdate(_)) => ProposalKind::ApproveServerUpdate,
Some(ProtoKind::ReplaceOperator(p)) => ProposalKind::ReplaceOperator {
old_operator_id: p.old_operator_id,
new_pubkey: p.new_pubkey,
},
Some(ProtoKind::UpdateShamirParameters(p)) => ProposalKind::UpdateShamirParameters {
#[expect(
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::as_conversions,
reason = "new_n is always a small operator count"
)]
new_n: p.new_n as u8,
},
Some(ProtoKind::ApprovePersistentGrant(p)) => {
use prost::Message as _;
ProposalKind::ApprovePersistentGrant {
payload_bytes: p.encode_to_vec(),
}
}
Some(ProtoKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction(p)) => {
use prost::Message as _;
ProposalKind::ApproveOneOffTransaction {
payload_bytes: p.encode_to_vec(),
}
}
None => return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing proposal kind")),
};
let ttl_secs = req.ttl_secs.map(i64::from);
let proposal_id = actor
.ask(HandleCreateProposal { kind, ttl_secs })
.await
.map_err(|e| {
warn!(?e, "create_proposal failed");
Status::internal("Failed to create proposal")
})?;
Ok(Some(wrap(GovResponsePayload::Created(
proto_gov::CreateProposalResponse { proposal_id },
))))
}
async fn handle_vote(
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: proto_gov::CastVoteRequest,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = actor
.ask(HandleCastVote {
proposal_id: req.proposal_id,
approve: req.approve,
signature: req.signature,
})
.await;
let outcome = match result {
Ok(VoteOutcome::Pending) => ProtoVoteOutcome::Pending,
Ok(VoteOutcome::QuorumApproved) => ProtoVoteOutcome::Approved,
Ok(VoteOutcome::QuorumRejected) => ProtoVoteOutcome::Rejected,
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::AlreadyVoted)) => {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Already voted on this proposal"));
}
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::InvalidSignature)) => {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Invalid vote signature"));
}
Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(ProposalError::ProposalNotFound)) => {
return Err(Status::not_found("Proposal not found"));
}
Err(e) => {
warn!(?e, "cast_vote failed");
return Err(Status::internal("Failed to cast vote"));
}
};
Ok(Some(wrap(GovResponsePayload::Voted(
proto_gov::VoteResponse {
outcome: outcome.into(),
},
))))
}
async fn handle_query(
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let summaries = actor.ask(HandleQueryPending {}).await.unwrap_or_default();
let proposals = summaries
.into_iter()
.map(|s| proto_gov::ProposalSummary {
id: s.id,
kind: s.kind,
initiator_id: s.initiator_id,
expires_at: s.expires_at.0.timestamp(),
approve_count: s.approve_count,
reject_count: s.reject_count,
})
.collect();
Ok(Some(wrap(GovResponsePayload::Pending(
QueryPendingResponse { proposals },
))))
}

View File

@@ -1,26 +1,25 @@
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use arbiter_proto::proto::evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
SpecificGrant as ProtoSpecificGrant, TokenTransferSettings as ProtoTokenTransferSettings,
TransactionRateLimit as ProtoTransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit as ProtoVolumeRateLimit,
specific_grant::Grant as ProtoSpecificGrantType,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::user_agent::sdk_client::{
WalletAccess, WalletAccessEntry as SdkClientWalletAccess,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, TimeZone, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use tonic::Status;
use crate::db::models::{CoreEvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess};
use crate::grpc::Convert;
use crate::{
db::models::{CoreEvmWalletAccess, EvmWalletId, NewEvmWalletAccess},
evm::policies::{
SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit, ether_transfer,
token_transfers,
},
grpc::TryConvert,
grpc::{Convert, TryConvert},
};
use arbiter_proto::{
proto::evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
SpecificGrant as ProtoSpecificGrant, TokenTransferSettings as ProtoTokenTransferSettings,
TransactionRateLimit as ProtoTransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit as ProtoVolumeRateLimit,
specific_grant::Grant as ProtoSpecificGrantType,
},
proto::operator::sdk_client::{WalletAccess, WalletAccessEntry as SdkClientWalletAccess},
};
use alloy::primitives::{Address, U256};
use chrono::{DateTime, TimeZone, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use tonic::Status;
fn address_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Address, Status> {
if bytes.len() != 20 {
@@ -150,7 +149,7 @@ impl Convert for WalletAccess {
fn convert(self) -> Self::Output {
NewEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: self.wallet_id,
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(self.wallet_id),
client_id: self.sdk_client_id,
}
}
@@ -165,7 +164,7 @@ impl TryConvert for SdkClientWalletAccess {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("Missing wallet access entry"));
};
Ok(CoreEvmWalletAccess {
wallet_id: access.wallet_id,
wallet_id: EvmWalletId::from_raw(access.wallet_id),
client_id: access.sdk_client_id,
id: self.id,
})

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
use crate::{
db::models::EvmWalletAccess,
evm::policies::{SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit},
grpc::Convert,
};
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
evm::{
EtherTransferSettings as ProtoEtherTransferSettings, SharedSettings as ProtoSharedSettings,
@@ -5,17 +10,12 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
TransactionRateLimit as ProtoTransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit as ProtoVolumeRateLimit,
specific_grant::Grant as ProtoSpecificGrantType,
},
user_agent::sdk_client::{WalletAccess, WalletAccessEntry as ProtoSdkClientWalletAccess},
operator::sdk_client::{WalletAccess, WalletAccessEntry as ProtoSdkClientWalletAccess},
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use prost_types::Timestamp as ProtoTimestamp;
use crate::{
db::models::EvmWalletAccess,
evm::policies::{SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit},
grpc::Convert,
};
impl Convert for DateTime<Utc> {
type Output = ProtoTimestamp;
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ impl Convert for EvmWalletAccess {
Self::Output {
id: self.id,
access: Some(WalletAccess {
wallet_id: self.wallet_id,
wallet_id: self.wallet_id.to_raw(),
sdk_client_id: self.client_id,
}),
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
use crate::{
db::models::NewEvmWalletAccess,
grpc::Convert,
peers::operator::{
OperatorSession, OutOfBand,
session::handlers::{
HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess, HandleListWalletAccess, HandleNewClientApprove,
HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess, HandleSdkClientList,
},
},
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn;
use arbiter_proto::proto::{
shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientMetadata,
user_agent::{
operator::{
operator_response::Payload as OperatorResponsePayload,
sdk_client::{
self as proto_sdk_client, ConnectionCancel as ProtoSdkClientConnectionCancel,
ConnectionRequest as ProtoSdkClientConnectionRequest,
@@ -13,32 +24,21 @@ use arbiter_proto::proto::{
request::Payload as SdkClientRequestPayload,
response::Payload as SdkClientResponsePayload,
},
user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
},
shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientMetadata,
};
use kameo::actor::ActorRef;
use tonic::Status;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::{
actors::user_agent::{
OutOfBand, UserAgentSession,
session::connection::{
HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess, HandleListWalletAccess, HandleNewClientApprove,
HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess, HandleSdkClientList,
},
},
db::models::NewEvmWalletAccess,
grpc::Convert,
};
const fn wrap_sdk_client_response(payload: SdkClientResponsePayload) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
UserAgentResponsePayload::SdkClient(proto_sdk_client::Response {
const fn wrap_sdk_client_response(payload: SdkClientResponsePayload) -> OperatorResponsePayload {
OperatorResponsePayload::SdkClient(proto_sdk_client::Response {
payload: Some(payload),
})
}
pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> OperatorResponsePayload {
match oob {
OutOfBand::ClientConnectionRequest { profile } => wrap_sdk_client_response(
SdkClientResponsePayload::ConnectionRequest(ProtoSdkClientConnectionRequest {
@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
}
pub(super) async fn dispatch(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: proto_sdk_client::Request,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let Some(payload) = req.payload else {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument(
"Missing SDK client request payload",
@@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ pub(super) async fn dispatch(
}
async fn handle_connection_response(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
resp: ProtoSdkClientConnectionResponse,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let pubkey = authn::PublicKey::try_from(resp.pubkey.as_slice())
.map_err(|()| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid ML-DSA public key"))?;
@@ -108,14 +108,14 @@ async fn handle_connection_response(
}
async fn handle_list(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let result = match actor.ask(HandleSdkClientList {}).await {
Ok(clients) => ProtoSdkClientListResult::Clients(ProtoSdkClientList {
clients: clients
.into_iter()
.map(|(client, metadata)| ProtoSdkClientEntry {
id: client.id,
id: client.id.to_raw(),
pubkey: client.public_key.clone(),
info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
name: metadata.name,
@@ -144,9 +144,9 @@ async fn handle_list(
}
async fn handle_grant_wallet_access(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: ProtoSdkClientGrantWalletAccess,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
let entries: Vec<NewEvmWalletAccess> = req.accesses.into_iter().map(Convert::convert).collect();
match actor.ask(HandleGrantEvmWalletAccess { entries }).await {
Ok(()) => {
@@ -161,9 +161,9 @@ async fn handle_grant_wallet_access(
}
async fn handle_revoke_wallet_access(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
req: ProtoSdkClientRevokeWalletAccess,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
match actor
.ask(HandleRevokeEvmWalletAccess {
entries: req.accesses,
@@ -182,8 +182,8 @@ async fn handle_revoke_wallet_access(
}
async fn handle_list_wallet_access(
actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
actor: &ActorRef<OperatorSession>,
) -> Result<Option<OperatorResponsePayload>, Status> {
match actor.ask(HandleListWalletAccess {}).await {
Ok(accesses) => Ok(Some(wrap_sdk_client_response(
SdkClientResponsePayload::ListWalletAccess(ListWalletAccessResponse {

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