feat(integrity): introduce sealed provenance markers for Verified

feat(integrity): derive-like macro VerifiedFields that allows to inherit Verified<T> type's provenance to all fields of T
feat(server): unify integrity API and propagate verified IDs through auth/EVM flows
2026-04-15 19:45:59 +02:00 · 2026-04-11 03:53:25 +02:00 · 2026-04-07 21:12:36 +02:00
60 changed files with 2064 additions and 1474 deletions
--- a/IMPLEMENTATION.md
+++ b/IMPLEMENTATION.md
@@ -67,14 +67,18 @@ The `program_client.nonce` column stores the **next usable nonce** — i.e. it i
 ## Cryptography

 ### Authentication
- **Client protocol:** ML-DSA
+- **Client protocol:** ed25519

 ### User-Agent Authentication

 User-agent authentication supports multiple signature schemes because platform-provided "hardware-bound" keys do not expose a uniform algorithm across operating systems and hardware.

- **Supported schemes:** ML-DSA
- **Why:** Secure Enclave (MacOS) support them natively, on other platforms we could emulate while they roll-out
+- **Supported schemes:** RSA, Ed25519, ECDSA (secp256k1)
+- **Why:** the user agent authenticates with keys backed by platform facilities, and those facilities differ by platform
+- **Apple Silicon Secure Enclave / Secure Element:** ECDSA-only in practice
+- **Windows Hello / TPM 2.0:** currently RSA-backed in our integration
+
+This is why the user-agent auth protocol carries an explicit `KeyType`, while the SDK client protocol remains fixed to ed25519.

 ### Encryption at Rest
 - **Scheme:** Symmetric AEAD — currently **XChaCha20-Poly1305**
--- a/server/Cargo.lock
+++ b/server/Cargo.lock
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "ruint",
 "rustc-hash",
 "serde",
- "sha3 0.10.8",
+ "sha3",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "proc-macro-error2",
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "sha3 0.10.8",
+ "sha3",
 "syn 2.0.117",
 "syn-solidity",
 ]
@@ -680,9 +680,9 @@ name = "arbiter-client"
 version = "0.1.0"
 dependencies = [
 "alloy",
- "arbiter-crypto",
 "arbiter-proto",
 "async-trait",
+ "ed25519-dalek",
 "http",
 "rand 0.10.0",
 "rustls-webpki",
@@ -692,29 +692,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "tonic",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "arbiter-crypto"
-version = "0.1.0"
-dependencies = [
- "alloy",
- "base64",
- "chrono",
- "hmac",
- "memsafe",
- "ml-dsa",
- "rand 0.10.0",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "arbiter-macros"
-version = "0.1.0"
-dependencies = [
- "arbiter-crypto",
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn 2.0.117",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "arbiter-proto"
 version = "0.1.0"
@@ -748,8 +725,6 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 dependencies = [
 "alloy",
 "anyhow",
- "arbiter-crypto",
- "arbiter-macros",
 "arbiter-proto",
 "arbiter-tokens-registry",
 "argon2",
@@ -767,8 +742,10 @@ dependencies = [
 "insta",
 "k256",
 "kameo",
- "ml-dsa",
+ "macro_rules_attribute",
+ "memsafe",
 "mutants",
+ "paste",
 "pem",
 "proptest",
 "prost",
@@ -776,13 +753,14 @@ dependencies = [
 "rand 0.10.0",
 "rcgen",
 "restructed",
+ "rsa",
 "rstest",
 "rustls",
 "secrecy",
 "serde_with",
 "sha2 0.10.9",
 "smlang",
- "spki 0.7.3",
+ "spki",
 "strum 0.28.0",
 "subtle",
 "test-log",
@@ -1473,12 +1451,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "cc",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "cmov"
-version = "0.5.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3f88a43d011fc4a6876cb7344703e297c71dda42494fee094d5f7c76bf13f746"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "console"
 version = "0.15.11"
@@ -1509,12 +1481,6 @@ version = "0.9.6"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "c2459377285ad874054d797f3ccebf984978aa39129f6eafde5cdc8315b612f8"

-[[package]]
-name = "const-oid"
-version = "0.10.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "a6ef517f0926dd24a1582492c791b6a4818a4d94e789a334894aa15b0d12f55c"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "const_format"
 version = "0.2.35"
@@ -1636,15 +1602,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "hybrid-array",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "ctutils"
-version = "0.4.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7d5515a3834141de9eafb9717ad39eea8247b5674e6066c404e8c4b365d2a29e"
-dependencies = [
- "cmov",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "curve25519-dalek"
 version = "4.1.3"
@@ -1783,17 +1740,8 @@ version = "0.7.10"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e7c1832837b905bbfb5101e07cc24c8deddf52f93225eee6ead5f4d63d53ddcb"
 dependencies = [
- "const-oid 0.9.6",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "der"
-version = "0.8.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "71fd89660b2dc699704064e59e9dba0147b903e85319429e131620d022be411b"
-dependencies = [
- "const-oid 0.10.2",
+ "const-oid",
+ "pem-rfc7468",
 "zeroize",
 ]

@@ -1936,7 +1884,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "9ed9a281f7bc9b7576e61468ba615a66a5c8cfdff42420a70aa82701a3b1e292"
 dependencies = [
 "block-buffer 0.10.4",
- "const-oid 0.9.6",
+ "const-oid",
 "crypto-common 0.1.7",
 "subtle",
 ]
@@ -2000,13 +1948,13 @@ version = "0.16.9"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "ee27f32b5c5292967d2d4a9d7f1e0b0aed2c15daded5a60300e4abb9d8020bca"
 dependencies = [
- "der 0.7.10",
+ "der",
 "digest 0.10.7",
 "elliptic-curve",
 "rfc6979",
 "serdect",
 "signature 2.2.0",
- "spki 0.7.3",
+ "spki",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -2015,6 +1963,7 @@ version = "3.0.0-rc.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "c6e914c7c52decb085cea910552e24c63ac019e3ab8bf001ff736da9a9d9d890"
 dependencies = [
+ "serde",
 "signature 3.0.0-rc.10",
 ]

@@ -2027,6 +1976,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "curve25519-dalek 5.0.0-pre.6",
 "ed25519",
 "rand_core 0.10.0",
+ "serde",
 "sha2 0.11.0-rc.5",
 "subtle",
 "zeroize",
@@ -2065,7 +2015,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "ff",
 "generic-array",
 "group",
- "pkcs8 0.10.2",
+ "pkcs8",
 "rand_core 0.6.4",
 "sec1",
 "serdect",
@@ -2612,7 +2562,6 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "8655f91cd07f2b9d0c24137bd650fe69617773435ee5ec83022377777ce65ef1"
 dependencies = [
 "typenum",
- "zeroize",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -3010,16 +2959,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "cpufeatures 0.2.17",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "keccak"
-version = "0.2.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9e24a010dd405bd7ed803e5253182815b41bf2e6a80cc3bfc066658e03a198aa"
-dependencies = [
- "cfg-if",
- "cpufeatures 0.3.0",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "keccak-asm"
 version = "0.1.5"
@@ -3035,6 +2974,9 @@ name = "lazy_static"
 version = "1.5.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "bbd2bcb4c963f2ddae06a2efc7e9f3591312473c50c6685e1f298068316e66fe"
+dependencies = [
+ "spin",
+]

 [[package]]
 name = "leb128fmt"
@@ -3117,6 +3059,22 @@ dependencies = [
 "syn 2.0.117",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "macro_rules_attribute"
+version = "0.2.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "65049d7923698040cd0b1ddcced9b0eb14dd22c5f86ae59c3740eab64a676520"
+dependencies = [
+ "macro_rules_attribute-proc_macro",
+ "paste",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "macro_rules_attribute-proc_macro"
+version = "0.2.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "670fdfda89751bc4a84ac13eaa63e205cf0fd22b4c9a5fbfa085b63c1f1d3a30"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "matchers"
 version = "0.2.0"
@@ -3233,34 +3191,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "ml-dsa"
-version = "0.1.0-rc.8"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f5b2bb0ad6fa2b40396775bd56f51345171490fef993f46f91a876ecdbdaea55"
-dependencies = [
- "const-oid 0.10.2",
- "ctutils",
- "hybrid-array",
- "module-lattice",
- "pkcs8 0.11.0-rc.11",
- "rand_core 0.10.0",
- "sha3 0.11.0",
- "signature 3.0.0-rc.10",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "module-lattice"
-version = "0.2.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "164eb3faeaecbd14b0b2a917c1b4d0c035097a9c559b0bed85c2cdd032bc8faa"
-dependencies = [
- "hybrid-array",
- "num-traits",
- "zeroize",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "multimap"
 version = "0.10.1"
@@ -3302,6 +3232,23 @@ dependencies = [
 "num-traits",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "num-bigint-dig"
+version = "0.8.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e661dda6640fad38e827a6d4a310ff4763082116fe217f279885c97f511bb0b7"
+dependencies = [
+ "lazy_static",
+ "libm",
+ "num-integer",
+ "num-iter",
+ "num-traits",
+ "rand 0.8.5",
+ "serde",
+ "smallvec",
+ "zeroize",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "num-conv"
 version = "0.2.0"
@@ -3317,6 +3264,17 @@ dependencies = [
 "num-traits",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "num-iter"
+version = "0.1.45"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "1429034a0490724d0075ebb2bc9e875d6503c3cf69e235a8941aa757d83ef5bf"
+dependencies = [
+ "autocfg",
+ "num-integer",
+ "num-traits",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "num-traits"
 version = "0.2.19"
@@ -3486,6 +3444,15 @@ dependencies = [
 "serde_core",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "pem-rfc7468"
+version = "0.7.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "88b39c9bfcfc231068454382784bb460aae594343fb030d46e9f50a645418412"
+dependencies = [
+ "base64ct",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "percent-encoding"
 version = "2.3.2"
@@ -3545,24 +3512,25 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "8b870d8c151b6f2fb93e84a13146138f05d02ed11c7e7c54f8826aaaf7c9f184"

+[[package]]
+name = "pkcs1"
+version = "0.7.5"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c8ffb9f10fa047879315e6625af03c164b16962a5368d724ed16323b68ace47f"
+dependencies = [
+ "der",
+ "pkcs8",
+ "spki",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "pkcs8"
 version = "0.10.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "f950b2377845cebe5cf8b5165cb3cc1a5e0fa5cfa3e1f7f55707d8fd82e0a7b7"
 dependencies = [
- "der 0.7.10",
- "spki 0.7.3",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "pkcs8"
-version = "0.11.0-rc.11"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "12922b6296c06eb741b02d7b5161e3aaa22864af38dfa025a1a3ba3f68c84577"
-dependencies = [
- "der 0.8.0",
- "spki 0.8.0",
+ "der",
+ "spki",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -4202,6 +4170,28 @@ dependencies = [
 "rustc-hex",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "rsa"
+version = "0.9.10"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "b8573f03f5883dcaebdfcf4725caa1ecb9c15b2ef50c43a07b816e06799bb12d"
+dependencies = [
+ "const-oid",
+ "digest 0.10.7",
+ "num-bigint-dig",
+ "num-integer",
+ "num-traits",
+ "pkcs1",
+ "pkcs8",
+ "rand_core 0.6.4",
+ "serde",
+ "sha2 0.10.9",
+ "signature 2.2.0",
+ "spki",
+ "subtle",
+ "zeroize",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "rsqlite-vfs"
 version = "0.1.0"
@@ -4441,9 +4431,9 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d3e97a565f76233a6003f9f5c54be1d9c5bdfa3eccfb189469f11ec4901c47dc"
 dependencies = [
 "base16ct",
- "der 0.7.10",
+ "der",
 "generic-array",
- "pkcs8 0.10.2",
+ "pkcs8",
 "serdect",
 "subtle",
 "zeroize",
@@ -4637,17 +4627,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "75872d278a8f37ef87fa0ddbda7802605cb18344497949862c0d4dcb291eba60"
 dependencies = [
 "digest 0.10.7",
- "keccak 0.1.6",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "sha3"
-version = "0.11.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "be176f1a57ce4e3d31c1a166222d9768de5954f811601fb7ca06fc8203905ce1"
-dependencies = [
- "digest 0.11.2",
- "keccak 0.2.0",
+ "keccak",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -4700,10 +4680,6 @@ name = "signature"
 version = "3.0.0-rc.10"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "7f1880df446116126965eeec169136b2e0251dba37c6223bcc819569550edea3"
-dependencies = [
- "digest 0.11.2",
- "rand_core 0.10.0",
-]

 [[package]]
 name = "simd-adler32"
@@ -4763,6 +4739,12 @@ dependencies = [
 "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "spin"
+version = "0.9.8"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "6980e8d7511241f8acf4aebddbb1ff938df5eebe98691418c4468d0b72a96a67"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "spki"
 version = "0.7.3"
@@ -4770,17 +4752,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d91ed6c858b01f942cd56b37a94b3e0a1798290327d1236e4d9cf4eaca44d29d"
 dependencies = [
 "base64ct",
- "der 0.7.10",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "spki"
-version = "0.8.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1d9efca8738c78ee9484207732f728b1ef517bbb1833d6fc0879ca898a522f6f"
-dependencies = [
- "base64ct",
- "der 0.8.0",
+ "der",
 ]

 [[package]]
--- a/server/Cargo.toml
+++ b/server/Cargo.toml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ tokio = { version = "1.50.0", features = ["full"] }
 ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-pre.6", features = ["rand_core"] }
 chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
 rand = "0.10.0"
-rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"], default-features = false }
+rustls = { version = "0.23.37", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
 smlang = "0.8.0"
 thiserror = "2.0.18"
 async-trait = "0.1.89"
@@ -45,6 +45,3 @@ spki = "0.7"
 prost = "0.14.3"
 miette = { version = "7.6.0", features = ["fancy", "serde"] }
 mutants = "0.0.4"
-ml-dsa = { version = "0.1.0-rc.8", features = ["zeroize"] }
-base64 = "0.22.1"
-hmac = "0.12.1"
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-client/Cargo.toml
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-client/Cargo.toml
@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ evm = ["dep:alloy"]

 [dependencies]
 arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
-arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
 alloy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 tonic.workspace = true
 tonic.features = ["tls-aws-lc"]
 tokio.workspace = true
 tokio-stream.workspace = true
+ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
 thiserror.workspace = true
 http = "1.4.0"
 rustls-webpki = { version = "0.103.10", features = ["aws-lc-rs"] }
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-client/src/auth.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-client/src/auth.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, SigningKey, format_challenge};
 use arbiter_proto::{
-    ClientMetadata,
+    ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
    proto::{
        client::{
            ClientRequest,
@@ -15,6 +14,7 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
        shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientInfo,
    },
 };
+use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;

 use crate::{
    storage::StorageError,
@@ -54,14 +54,14 @@ fn map_auth_result(code: i32) -> AuthError {
 async fn send_auth_challenge_request(
    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
    metadata: ClientMetadata,
-    key: &SigningKey,
+    key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
 ) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
    transport
        .send(ClientRequest {
            request_id: next_request_id(),
            payload: Some(ClientRequestPayload::Auth(proto_auth::Request {
                payload: Some(AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(AuthChallengeRequest {
-                    pubkey: key.public_key().to_bytes(),
+                    pubkey: key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
                    client_info: Some(ProtoClientInfo {
                        name: metadata.name,
                        description: metadata.description,
@@ -95,14 +95,11 @@ async fn receive_auth_challenge(

 async fn send_auth_challenge_solution(
    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
-    key: &SigningKey,
+    key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
    challenge: AuthChallenge,
 ) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
    let challenge_payload = format_challenge(challenge.nonce, &challenge.pubkey);
-    let signature = key
-        .sign_message(&challenge_payload, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
-        .map_err(|_| AuthError::UnexpectedAuthResponse)?
-        .to_bytes();
+    let signature = key.sign(&challenge_payload).to_bytes().to_vec();

    transport
        .send(ClientRequest {
@@ -143,7 +140,7 @@ async fn receive_auth_confirmation(
 pub(crate) async fn authenticate(
    transport: &mut ClientTransport,
    metadata: ClientMetadata,
-    key: &SigningKey,
+    key: &ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
 ) -> std::result::Result<(), AuthError> {
    send_auth_challenge_request(transport, metadata, key).await?;
    let challenge = receive_auth_challenge(transport).await?;
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-client/src/client.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-client/src/client.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
 use arbiter_proto::{
    ClientMetadata, proto::arbiter_service_client::ArbiterServiceClient, url::ArbiterUrl,
 };
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ impl ArbiterClient {
    pub async fn connect_with_key(
        url: ArbiterUrl,
        metadata: ClientMetadata,
-        key: SigningKey,
+        key: ed25519_dalek::SigningKey,
    ) -> Result<Self, Error> {
        let anchor = webpki::anchor_from_trusted_cert(&url.ca_cert)?.to_owned();
        let tls = ClientTlsConfig::new().trust_anchor(anchor);
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-client/src/storage.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-client/src/storage.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::SigningKey;
 use arbiter_proto::home_path;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

@@ -12,7 +11,7 @@ pub enum StorageError {
 }

 pub trait SigningKeyStorage {
-    fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<SigningKey, StorageError>;
+    fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError>;
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
@@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ pub struct FileSigningKeyStorage {
 }

 impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
-    pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ml_dsa.key";
+    pub const DEFAULT_FILE_NAME: &str = "sdk_client_ed25519.key";

    pub fn new(path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
        Self { path: path.into() }
@@ -31,7 +30,7 @@ impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
        Ok(Self::new(home_path()?.join(Self::DEFAULT_FILE_NAME)))
    }

-    fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
+    fn read_key(path: &Path) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
        let bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
        let raw: [u8; 32] =
            bytes
@@ -40,12 +39,12 @@ impl FileSigningKeyStorage {
                    expected: 32,
                    actual: v.len(),
                })?;
-        Ok(SigningKey::from_seed(raw))
+        Ok(ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&raw))
    }
 }

 impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
-    fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<SigningKey, StorageError> {
+    fn load_or_create(&self) -> std::result::Result<ed25519_dalek::SigningKey, StorageError> {
        if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
        }
@@ -54,8 +53,8 @@ impl SigningKeyStorage for FileSigningKeyStorage {
            return Self::read_key(&self.path);
        }

-        let key = SigningKey::generate();
-        let raw_key = key.to_seed();
+        let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+        let raw_key = key.to_bytes();

        // Use create_new to prevent accidental overwrite if another process creates the key first.
        match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
@@ -104,7 +103,7 @@ mod tests {
            .load_or_create()
            .expect("second load_or_create should read same key");

-        assert_eq!(key_a.to_seed(), key_b.to_seed());
+        assert_eq!(key_a.to_bytes(), key_b.to_bytes());
        assert!(path.exists());

        std::fs::remove_file(path).expect("temp key file should be removable");
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-client/src/wallets/evm.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-client/src/wallets/evm.rs
@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ pub struct ArbiterEvmWallet {
 }

 impl ArbiterEvmWallet {
+    #[expect(
+        dead_code,
+        reason = "constructor may be used in future extensions, e.g. to support wallet listing"
+    )]
    pub(crate) fn new(transport: Arc<Mutex<ClientTransport>>, address: Address) -> Self {
        Self {
            transport,
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-crypto/.gitignore
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-crypto/.gitignore
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-/target
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-crypto/Cargo.toml
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-crypto/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "arbiter-crypto"
-version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2024"
-
-[dependencies]
-ml-dsa = {workspace = true, optional = true }
-rand = {workspace = true, optional = true}
-base64 = {workspace = true, optional = true }
-memsafe = {version = "0.4.0", optional = true}
-hmac.workspace = true
-alloy.workspace = true
-chrono.workspace = true
-
-[lints]
-workspace = true
-
-[features]
-default = ["authn", "safecell"]
-authn = ["dep:ml-dsa", "dep:rand", "dep:base64"]
-safecell = ["dep:memsafe"]
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/authn/mod.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/authn/mod.rs
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-pub mod v1;
-pub use v1::*;
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/authn/v1.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/authn/v1.rs
@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-use base64::{Engine as _, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
-use hmac::digest::Digest;
-use ml_dsa::{
-    EncodedVerifyingKey, Error, KeyGen, MlDsa87, Seed, Signature as MlDsaSignature,
-    SigningKey as MlDsaSigningKey, VerifyingKey as MlDsaVerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _,
-};
-
-pub static CLIENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_client";
-pub static USERAGENT_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"arbiter_user_agent";
-
-pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
-    concat_form.into_bytes()
-}
-
-pub type KeyParams = MlDsa87;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct PublicKey(Box<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>>);
-
-impl crate::hashing::Hashable for PublicKey {
-    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-        hasher.update(self.to_bytes());
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct Signature(Box<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>>);
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct SigningKey(Box<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>>);
-
-impl PublicKey {
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
-    }
-
-    pub fn verify(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> bool {
-        self.0.verify_with_context(
-            &format_challenge(nonce, &self.to_bytes()),
-            context,
-            &signature.0,
-        )
-    }
-}
-
-impl Signature {
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.0.encode().0.to_vec()
-    }
-}
-
-impl SigningKey {
-    pub fn generate() -> Self {
-        Self(Box::new(KeyParams::key_gen(&mut rand::rng())))
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_seed(seed: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
-        Self(Box::new(KeyParams::from_seed(&Seed::from(seed))))
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_seed(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
-        self.0.to_seed().into()
-    }
-
-    pub fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
-        self.0.verifying_key().into()
-    }
-
-    pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
-        self.0
-            .signing_key()
-            .sign_deterministic(message, context)
-            .map(Into::into)
-    }
-
-    pub fn sign_challenge(&self, nonce: i32, context: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
-        self.sign_message(
-            &format_challenge(nonce, &self.public_key().to_bytes()),
-            context,
-        )
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>> for PublicKey {
-    fn from(value: MlDsaVerifyingKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
-        Self(Box::new(value))
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>> for Signature {
-    fn from(value: MlDsaSignature<KeyParams>) -> Self {
-        Self(Box::new(value))
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>> for SigningKey {
-    fn from(value: MlDsaSigningKey<KeyParams>) -> Self {
-        Self(Box::new(value))
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for PublicKey {
-    type Error = ();
-
-    fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for PublicKey {
-    type Error = ();
-
-    fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let encoded = EncodedVerifyingKey::<KeyParams>::try_from(value).map_err(|_| ())?;
-        Ok(Self(Box::new(MlDsaVerifyingKey::decode(&encoded))))
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for Signature {
-    type Error = ();
-
-    fn try_from(value: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::try_from(value.as_slice())
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&'_ [u8]> for Signature {
-    type Error = ();
-
-    fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        MlDsaSignature::try_from(value)
-            .map(|sig| Self(Box::new(sig)))
-            .map_err(|_| ())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, signature::Keypair as _};
-
-    use super::{CLIENT_CONTEXT, PublicKey, Signature, SigningKey, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn public_key_round_trip_decodes() {
-        let key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-        let encoded = PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()).to_bytes();
-
-        let decoded = PublicKey::try_from(encoded.as_slice()).expect("public key should decode");
-
-        assert_eq!(decoded, PublicKey::from(key.verifying_key()));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn signature_round_trip_decodes() {
-        let key = SigningKey::generate();
-        let signature = key
-            .sign_message(b"challenge", CLIENT_CONTEXT)
-            .expect("signature should be created");
-
-        let decoded =
-            Signature::try_from(signature.to_bytes().as_slice()).expect("signature should decode");
-
-        assert_eq!(decoded, signature);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn challenge_verification_uses_context_and_canonical_key_bytes() {
-        let key = SigningKey::generate();
-        let public_key = key.public_key();
-        let nonce = 17;
-        let signature = key
-            .sign_challenge(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
-            .expect("signature should be created");
-
-        assert!(public_key.verify(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
-        assert!(!public_key.verify(nonce, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn signing_key_round_trip_seed_preserves_public_key_and_signing() {
-        let original = SigningKey::generate();
-        let restored = SigningKey::from_seed(original.to_seed());
-
-        assert_eq!(restored.public_key(), original.public_key());
-
-        let signature = restored
-            .sign_challenge(9, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
-            .expect("signature should be created");
-
-        assert!(restored.public_key().verify(9, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature));
-    }
-}
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/lib.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-crypto/src/lib.rs
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-#[cfg(feature = "authn")]
-pub mod authn;
-pub mod hashing;
-#[cfg(feature = "safecell")]
-pub mod safecell;
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-macros/Cargo.toml
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-macros/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "arbiter-macros"
-version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2024"
-
-[lib]
-proc-macro = true
-
-[dependencies]
-proc-macro2 = "1.0"
-quote = "1.0"
-syn = { version = "2.0", features = ["derive", "fold", "full", "visit-mut"] }
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-arbiter-crypto = { path = "../arbiter-crypto" }
-
-[lints]
-workspace = true
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/hashable.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/hashable.rs
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream, TokenTree};
-use quote::quote;
-use syn::parse_quote;
-use syn::spanned::Spanned;
-use syn::{DataStruct, DeriveInput, Fields, Generics, Index};
-
-use crate::utils::{HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH, HMAC_DIGEST_PATH};
-
-pub(crate) fn derive(input: &DeriveInput) -> TokenStream {
-    match &input.data {
-        syn::Data::Struct(struct_data) => hashable_struct(input, struct_data),
-        syn::Data::Enum(_) => {
-            syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable can currently be derived only for structs")
-                .to_compile_error()
-        }
-        syn::Data::Union(_) => {
-            syn::Error::new_spanned(input, "Hashable cannot be derived for unions")
-                .to_compile_error()
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn hashable_struct(input: &DeriveInput, struct_data: &syn::DataStruct) -> TokenStream {
-    let ident = &input.ident;
-    let hashable_trait = HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH.to_path();
-    let hmac_digest = HMAC_DIGEST_PATH.to_path();
-    let generics = add_hashable_bounds(input.generics.clone(), &hashable_trait);
-    let field_accesses = collect_field_accesses(struct_data);
-    let hash_calls = build_hash_calls(&field_accesses, &hashable_trait);
-
-    let (impl_generics, ty_generics, where_clause) = generics.split_for_impl();
-
-    quote! {
-        #[automatically_derived]
-        impl #impl_generics #hashable_trait for #ident #ty_generics #where_clause {
-            fn hash<H: #hmac_digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
-                #(#hash_calls)*
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn add_hashable_bounds(mut generics: Generics, hashable_trait: &syn::Path) -> Generics {
-    for type_param in generics.type_params_mut() {
-        type_param.bounds.push(parse_quote!(#hashable_trait));
-    }
-
-    generics
-}
-
-struct FieldAccess {
-    access: TokenStream,
-    span: Span,
-}
-
-fn collect_field_accesses(struct_data: &DataStruct) -> Vec<FieldAccess> {
-    match &struct_data.fields {
-        Fields::Named(fields) => {
-            // Keep deterministic alphabetical order for named fields.
-            // Do not remove this sort, because it keeps hash output stable regardless of source order.
-            let mut named_fields = fields
-                .named
-                .iter()
-                .map(|field| {
-                    let name = field
-                        .ident
-                        .as_ref()
-                        .expect("Fields::Named(fields) must have names")
-                        .clone();
-                    (name.to_string(), name)
-                })
-                .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-            named_fields.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0));
-
-            named_fields
-                .into_iter()
-                .map(|(_, name)| FieldAccess {
-                    access: quote! { #name },
-                    span: name.span(),
-                })
-                .collect()
-        }
-        Fields::Unnamed(fields) => fields
-            .unnamed
-            .iter()
-            .enumerate()
-            .map(|(i, field)| FieldAccess {
-                access: {
-                    let index = Index::from(i);
-                    quote! { #index }
-                },
-                span: field.ty.span(),
-            })
-            .collect(),
-        Fields::Unit => Vec::new(),
-    }
-}
-
-fn build_hash_calls(
-    field_accesses: &[FieldAccess],
-    hashable_trait: &syn::Path,
-) -> Vec<TokenStream> {
-    field_accesses
-        .iter()
-        .map(|field| {
-            let access = &field.access;
-            let call = quote! {
-                #hashable_trait::hash(&self.#access, hasher);
-            };
-
-            respan(call, field.span)
-        })
-        .collect()
-}
-
-/// Recursively set span on all tokens, including interpolated ones.
-fn respan(tokens: TokenStream, span: Span) -> TokenStream {
-    tokens
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|tt| match tt {
-            TokenTree::Group(g) => {
-                let mut new = proc_macro2::Group::new(g.delimiter(), respan(g.stream(), span));
-                new.set_span(span);
-                TokenTree::Group(new)
-            }
-            mut other => {
-                other.set_span(span);
-                other
-            }
-        })
-        .collect()
-}
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/lib.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/lib.rs
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-use syn::{DeriveInput, parse_macro_input};
-
-mod hashable;
-mod utils;
-
-#[proc_macro_derive(Hashable)]
-pub fn derive_hashable(input: proc_macro::TokenStream) -> proc_macro::TokenStream {
-    let input = parse_macro_input!(input as DeriveInput);
-    hashable::derive(&input).into()
-}
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/utils.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-macros/src/utils.rs
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-pub struct ToPath(pub &'static str);
-
-impl ToPath {
-    pub fn to_path(&self) -> syn::Path {
-        syn::parse_str(self.0).expect("Invalid path")
-    }
-}
-
-macro_rules! ensure_path {
-    ($path:path) => {{
-        #[cfg(test)]
-        #[expect(unused_imports)]
-        use $path as _;
-        ToPath(stringify!($path))
-    }};
-}
-
-pub const HASHABLE_TRAIT_PATH: ToPath = ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable);
-pub const HMAC_DIGEST_PATH: ToPath = ensure_path!(::arbiter_crypto::hashing::Digest);
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-proto/Cargo.toml
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-proto/Cargo.toml
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ url = "2.5.8"
 miette.workspace = true
 thiserror.workspace = true
 rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
-base64.workspace = true
+base64 = "0.22.1"
 prost-types.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
 async-trait.workspace = true
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/lib.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-proto/src/lib.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 pub mod transport;
 pub mod url;

+use base64::{Engine, prelude::BASE64_STANDARD};
+
 pub mod proto {
    tonic::include_proto!("arbiter");

@@ -82,3 +84,8 @@ pub fn home_path() -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, std::io::Error> {

    Ok(arbiter_home)
 }
+
+pub fn format_challenge(nonce: i32, pubkey: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let concat_form = format!("{}:{}", nonce, BASE64_STANDARD.encode(pubkey));
+    concat_form.into_bytes()
+}
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/Cargo.toml
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/Cargo.toml
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ diesel-async = { version = "0.8.0", features = [
    "sqlite",
    "tokio",
 ] }
+ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
+ed25519-dalek.features = ["serde"]
 arbiter-proto.path = "../arbiter-proto"
-arbiter-crypto.path = "../arbiter-crypto"
-arbiter-macros.path = "../arbiter-macros"
 tracing.workspace = true
 tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
 tonic.workspace = true
@@ -37,15 +37,21 @@ dashmap = "6.1.0"
 rand.workspace = true
 rcgen.workspace = true
 chrono.workspace = true
+memsafe = "0.4.0"
 zeroize = { version = "1.8.2", features = ["std", "simd"] }
 kameo.workspace = true
+x25519-dalek.workspace = true
 chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.10.1", features = ["std"] }
 argon2 = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["zeroize"] }
 restructed = "0.2.2"
 strum = { version = "0.28.0", features = ["derive"] }
 pem = "3.0.6"
+k256.workspace = true
+k256.features = ["serde"]
+rsa.workspace = true
+rsa.features = ["serde"]
 sha2.workspace = true
-hmac.workspace = true
+hmac = "0.12"
 spki.workspace = true
 alloy.workspace = true
 prost-types.workspace = true
@@ -55,10 +61,8 @@ anyhow = "1.0.102"
 serde_with = "3.18.0"
 mutants.workspace = true
 subtle = "2.6.1"
-ml-dsa.workspace = true
-ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
-x25519-dalek.workspace = true
-k256.workspace = true
+macro_rules_attribute = "0.2.2"
+paste = "1.0.15"

 [dev-dependencies]
 insta = "1.46.3"
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-14-171124-0000_init/up.sql
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/migrations/2026-02-14-171124-0000_init/up.sql
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ create table if not exists useragent_client (
    id integer not null primary key,
    nonce integer not null default(1), -- used for auth challenge
    public_key blob not null,
-    key_type integer not null default(1),
+    key_type integer not null default(1), -- 1=Ed25519, 2=ECDSA(secp256k1)
    created_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now')),
    updated_at integer not null default(unixepoch ('now'))
 ) STRICT;
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/auth.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/auth.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT};
 use arbiter_proto::{
-    ClientMetadata,
+    ClientMetadata, format_challenge,
    transport::{Bi, expect_message},
 };
 use chrono::Utc;
@@ -9,6 +8,7 @@ use diesel::{
    dsl::insert_into, update,
 };
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl as _;
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
 use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
 use tracing::error;

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use crate::{
        flow_coordinator::{self, RequestClientApproval},
        keyholder::KeyHolder,
    },
-    crypto::integrity::{self, AttestationStatus},
+    crypto::integrity::{self, Verified, verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor},
    db::{
        self,
        models::{ProgramClientMetadata, SqliteTimestamp},
@@ -62,20 +62,17 @@ pub enum ApproveError {
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub enum Inbound {
    AuthChallengeRequest {
-        pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+        pubkey: VerifyingKey,
        metadata: ClientMetadata,
    },
    AuthChallengeSolution {
-        signature: authn::Signature,
+        signature: Signature,
    },
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub enum Outbound {
-    AuthChallenge {
-        pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
-        nonce: i32,
-    },
+    AuthChallenge { pubkey: VerifyingKey, nonce: i32 },
    AuthSuccess,
 }

@@ -83,9 +80,9 @@ pub enum Outbound {
 /// Returns `None` if the pubkey is not registered.
 async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
    db: &db::DatabasePool,
-    pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
+    pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
 ) -> Result<Option<(i32, i32)>, Error> {
-    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
+    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();
    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
@@ -102,53 +99,14 @@ async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
        })
 }

-async fn verify_integrity(
-    db: &db::DatabasePool,
-    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
-    })?;
-
-    let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?.ok_or_else(|| {
-        error!("Client not found during integrity verification");
-        Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-    })?;
-
-    let attestation = integrity::verify_entity(
-        &mut db_conn,
-        keyholder,
-        &ClientCredentials {
-            pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
-            nonce,
-        },
-        id,
-    )
-    .await
-    .map_err(|e| {
-        error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
-        Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
-    })?;
-
-    if attestation != AttestationStatus::Attested {
-        error!("Integrity attestation unavailable for client {id}");
-        return Err(Error::IntegrityCheckFailed);
-    }
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 /// Atomically increments the nonce and re-signs the integrity envelope.
 /// Returns the new nonce, which is used as the challenge nonce.
 async fn create_nonce(
    db: &db::DatabasePool,
    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
+    pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
 ) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
-    let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
+    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec();

    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
@@ -157,7 +115,6 @@ async fn create_nonce(

    conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
        let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
-        let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
        Box::pin(async move {
            let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(program_client::table)
                .filter(program_client::public_key.eq(&pubkey_bytes))
@@ -170,7 +127,7 @@ async fn create_nonce(
                conn,
                &keyholder,
                &ClientCredentials {
-                    pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
+                    pubkey: *pubkey,
                    nonce: new_nonce,
                },
                id,
@@ -179,7 +136,8 @@ async fn create_nonce(
            .map_err(|e| {
                error!(?e, "Integrity sign failed after nonce update");
                Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-            })?;
+            })?
+            .drop_verification_provenance();

            Ok(new_nonce)
        })
@@ -213,11 +171,10 @@ async fn approve_new_client(
 async fn insert_client(
    db: &db::DatabasePool,
    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
+    pubkey: &VerifyingKey,
    metadata: &ClientMetadata,
-) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+) -> Result<Verified<i32>, Error> {
    use crate::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
-    let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
    let metadata = metadata.clone();

    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
@@ -227,7 +184,6 @@ async fn insert_client(

    conn.exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
        let keyholder = keyholder.clone();
-        let pubkey = pubkey.clone();
        Box::pin(async move {
            const NONCE_START: i32 = 1;

@@ -243,7 +199,7 @@ async fn insert_client(

            let client_id = insert_into(program_client::table)
                .values((
-                    program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()),
+                    program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.as_bytes().to_vec()),
                    program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
                    program_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
                ))
@@ -252,11 +208,11 @@ async fn insert_client(
                .get_result::<i32>(conn)
                .await?;

-            integrity::sign_entity(
+            let verified_id = integrity::sign_entity(
                conn,
                &keyholder,
                &ClientCredentials {
-                    pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
+                    pubkey: *pubkey,
                    nonce: NONCE_START,
                },
                client_id,
@@ -265,9 +221,10 @@ async fn insert_client(
            .map_err(|e| {
                error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new client key");
                Error::DatabaseOperationFailed
-            })?;
+            })?
+            .unqualify_origin();

-            Ok(client_id)
+            Ok(verified_id)
        })
    })
    .await
@@ -346,17 +303,14 @@ async fn sync_client_metadata(

 async fn challenge_client<T>(
    transport: &mut T,
-    pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+    pubkey: VerifyingKey,
    nonce: i32,
 ) -> Result<(), Error>
 where
    T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + ?Sized,
 {
    transport
-        .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge {
-            pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
-            nonce,
-        }))
+        .send(Ok(Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce }))
        .await
        .map_err(|e| {
            error!(error = ?e, "Failed to send auth challenge");
@@ -373,15 +327,20 @@ where
        Error::Transport
    })?;

-    if !pubkey.verify(nonce, CLIENT_CONTEXT, &signature) {
+    let formatted = format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes());
+
+    pubkey.verify_strict(&formatted, &signature).map_err(|_| {
        error!("Challenge solution verification failed");
-        return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
-    }
+        Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
+    })?;

    Ok(())
 }

-pub async fn authenticate<T>(props: &mut ClientConnection, transport: &mut T) -> Result<i32, Error>
+pub async fn authenticate<T>(
+    props: &mut ClientConnection,
+    transport: &mut T,
+) -> Result<Verified<i32>, Error>
 where
    T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
 {
@@ -389,16 +348,34 @@ where
        return Err(Error::Transport);
    };

+    // fixme! triage needed: probable regretion since in match->Some get_current_nonce_and_id called only once instead of twice
    let client_id = match get_current_nonce_and_id(&props.db, &pubkey).await? {
-        Some((id, _)) => {
-            verify_integrity(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
-            id
+        Some((nonce, id)) => {
+            let mut db_conn = props.db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
+                error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
+                Error::DatabasePoolUnavailable
+            })?;
+
+            integrity::verify_entity(
+                &mut db_conn,
+                &props.actors.key_holder,
+                ClientCredentials { pubkey, nonce },
+                id,
+            )
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
+                Error::IntegrityCheckFailed
+            })?
+            .inherit()
+            .entity_id
+            .unqualify_origin()
        }
        None => {
            approve_new_client(
                &props.actors,
                ClientProfile {
-                    pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
+                    pubkey,
                    metadata: metadata.clone(),
                },
            )
@@ -407,7 +384,7 @@ where
        }
    };

-    sync_client_metadata(&props.db, client_id, &metadata).await?;
+    sync_client_metadata(&props.db, *client_id, &metadata).await?;
    let challenge_nonce = create_nonce(&props.db, &props.actors.key_holder, &pubkey).await?;
    challenge_client(transport, pubkey, challenge_nonce).await?;

--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/mod.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/mod.rs
@@ -1,23 +1,21 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn;
 use arbiter_proto::{ClientMetadata, transport::Bi};
 use kameo::actor::Spawn;
 use tracing::{error, info};

 use crate::{
    actors::{GlobalActors, client::session::ClientSession},
-    crypto::integrity::Integrable,
+    crypto::integrity::{Integrable, hashing::Hashable},
    db,
 };

 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct ClientProfile {
-    pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+    pub pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
    pub metadata: ClientMetadata,
 }

-#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
 pub struct ClientCredentials {
-    pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+    pub pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
    pub nonce: i32,
 }

@@ -25,6 +23,13 @@ impl Integrable for ClientCredentials {
    const KIND: &'static str = "client_credentials";
 }

+impl Hashable for ClientCredentials {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self.pubkey.as_bytes());
+        self.nonce.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
+
 pub struct ClientConnection {
    pub(crate) db: db::DatabasePool,
    pub(crate) actors: GlobalActors,
@@ -43,9 +48,7 @@ pub async fn connect_client<T>(mut props: ClientConnection, transport: &mut T)
 where
    T: Bi<auth::Inbound, Result<auth::Outbound, auth::Error>> + Send + ?Sized,
 {
-    let fut = auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport);
-    println!("authenticate future size: {}", std::mem::size_of_val(&fut));
-    match fut.await {
+    match auth::authenticate(&mut props, transport).await {
        Ok(client_id) => {
            ClientSession::spawn(ClientSession::new(props, client_id));
            info!("Client authenticated, session started");
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/session.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/client/session.rs
@@ -5,23 +5,25 @@ use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};

 use crate::{
    actors::{
-        GlobalActors,
        client::ClientConnection,
        evm::{ClientSignTransaction, SignTransactionError},
        flow_coordinator::RegisterClient,
        keyholder::KeyHolderState,
    },
-    db,
+    crypto::integrity::Verified,
    evm::VetError,
 };

+#[cfg(test)]
+use crate::{actors::GlobalActors, db};
+
 pub struct ClientSession {
    props: ClientConnection,
-    client_id: i32,
+    client_id: Verified<i32>,
 }

 impl ClientSession {
-    pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: i32) -> Self {
+    pub(crate) fn new(props: ClientConnection, client_id: Verified<i32>) -> Self {
        Self { props, client_id }
    }
 }
@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ impl ClientSession {
            .actors
            .evm
            .ask(ClientSignTransaction {
-                client_id: self.client_id,
+                client_id: *self.client_id,
                wallet_address,
                transaction,
            })
@@ -92,11 +94,12 @@ impl Actor for ClientSession {
 }

 impl ClientSession {
+    #[cfg(test)]
    pub fn new_test(db: db::DatabasePool, actors: GlobalActors) -> Self {
        let props = ClientConnection::new(db, actors);
        Self {
            props,
-            client_id: 0,
+            client_id: Verified::new_unchecked(0),
        }
    }
 }
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/evm/mod.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/evm/mod.rs
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use rand::{SeedableRng, rng, rngs::StdRng};

 use crate::{
    actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Decrypt, KeyHolder},
-    crypto::integrity,
+    crypto::integrity::{self, Integrable, Verified, hashing::Hashable},
    db::{
        DatabaseError, DatabasePool,
        models::{self},
@@ -21,16 +21,42 @@ use crate::{
            ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
        },
    },
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
 };
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};

 pub use crate::evm::safe_signer;

+/// Hashable structure for wallet integrity protection.
+/// Binds the encrypted private key to the wallet address using HMAC.
+pub struct EvmWalletIntegrity {
+    pub address: Vec<u8>,       // 20-byte Ethereum address
+    pub aead_encrypted_id: i32, // Reference to encrypted key material
+}
+
+impl Hashable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(&self.address);
+        hasher.update(self.aead_encrypted_id.to_be_bytes());
+    }
+}
+
+impl Integrable for EvmWalletIntegrity {
+    const KIND: &'static str = "evm_wallet";
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum SignTransactionError {
    #[error("Wallet not found")]
    WalletNotFound,

+    #[error("Wallet integrity check failed")]
+    WalletIntegrityCheckFailed,
+
+    #[error(
+        "Decrypted key does not correspond to wallet address (CRITICAL: possible key substitution attack)"
+    )]
+    KeyAddressMismatch,
+
    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
    Database(#[from] DatabaseError),

@@ -45,6 +71,9 @@ pub enum SignTransactionError {

    #[error("Policy error: {0}")]
    Vet(#[from] evm::VetError),
+
+    #[error("Integrity error: {0}")]
+    Integrity(#[from] integrity::Error),
 }

 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -88,7 +117,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
 #[messages]
 impl EvmActor {
    #[message]
-    pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
+    pub async fn generate(&mut self) -> Result<(Verified<i32>, Address), Error> {
        let (mut key_cell, address) = safe_signer::generate(&mut self.rng);

        let plaintext = key_cell.read_inline(|reader| SafeCell::new(reader.to_vec()));
@@ -100,7 +129,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
            .map_err(|_| Error::KeyholderSend)?;

        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        let wallet_id = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
+        let wallet_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::evm_wallet::table)
            .values(&models::NewEvmWallet {
                address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
                aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
@@ -110,7 +139,17 @@ impl EvmActor {
            .await
            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;

-        Ok((wallet_id, address))
+        // Sign integrity envelope to bind encrypted key to wallet address
+        let wallet_integrity = EvmWalletIntegrity {
+            address: address.as_slice().to_vec(),
+            aead_encrypted_id: aead_id,
+        };
+        let verified_wallet_id =
+            integrity::sign_entity(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, &wallet_integrity, wallet_id)
+                .await?
+                .unqualify_origin();
+
+        Ok((verified_wallet_id, address))
    }

    #[message]
@@ -136,7 +175,7 @@ impl EvmActor {
        &mut self,
        basic: SharedGrantSettings,
        grant: SpecificGrant,
-    ) -> Result<i32, Error> {
+    ) -> Result<integrity::Verified<i32>, Error> {
        match grant {
            SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(settings) => self
                .engine
@@ -158,14 +197,28 @@ impl EvmActor {
    }

    #[message]
-    pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(
-        &mut self,
-        grant_id: i32,
-    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        self.engine
-            .revoke_grant(grant_id)
-            .await
-            .map_err(Error::from)
+    pub async fn useragent_delete_grant(&mut self, _grant_id: i32) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        // let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+        // let keyholder = self.keyholder.clone();
+
+        // diesel_async::AsyncConnection::transaction(&mut conn, |conn| {
+        //     Box::pin(async move {
+        //         diesel::update(schema::evm_basic_grant::table)
+        //             .filter(schema::evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
+        //             .set(schema::evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp::now()))
+        //             .execute(conn)
+        //             .await?;
+
+        //         let signed = integrity::evm::load_signed_grant_by_basic_id(conn, grant_id).await?;
+
+        //         diesel::result::QueryResult::Ok(())
+        //     })
+        // })
+        // .await
+        // .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
+
+        // Ok(())
+        todo!()
    }

    #[message]
@@ -193,9 +246,23 @@ impl EvmActor {
            .optional()
            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
            .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
+
+        // Verify wallet integrity envelope
+        let wallet = integrity::verify_entity(
+            &mut conn,
+            &self.keyholder,
+            EvmWalletIntegrity {
+                address: wallet.address.clone(),
+                aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
+            },
+            wallet.id,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::WalletIntegrityCheckFailed)?;
+
        let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
            .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.entity_id))
            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
            .first(&mut conn)
            .await
@@ -228,9 +295,23 @@ impl EvmActor {
            .optional()
            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
            .ok_or(SignTransactionError::WalletNotFound)?;
+
+        // Verify wallet integrity envelope to ensure encrypted key is bound to address
+        let wallet = integrity::verify_entity(
+            &mut conn,
+            &self.keyholder,
+            EvmWalletIntegrity {
+                address: wallet.address.clone(),
+                aead_encrypted_id: wallet.aead_encrypted_id,
+            },
+            wallet.id,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| SignTransactionError::WalletIntegrityCheckFailed)?;
+
        let wallet_access = schema::evm_wallet_access::table
            .select(models::EvmWalletAccess::as_select())
-            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.id))
+            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::wallet_id.eq(wallet.entity_id))
            .filter(schema::evm_wallet_access::client_id.eq(client_id))
            .first(&mut conn)
            .await
@@ -249,6 +330,12 @@ impl EvmActor {

        let signer = safe_signer::SafeSigner::from_cell(raw_key)?;

+        // Verify that the decrypted key's derived address matches the wallet address
+        // This prevents an attacker from substituting one wallet's key with another's even if they compromised the DB
+        if signer.address() != wallet_address {
+            return Err(SignTransactionError::KeyAddressMismatch);
+        }
+
        self.engine
            .evaluate_transaction(wallet_access, transaction.clone(), RunKind::Execution)
            .await?;
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/keyholder/mod.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/keyholder/mod.rs
@@ -9,17 +9,22 @@ use kameo::{Actor, Reply, messages};
 use strum::{EnumDiscriminants, IntoDiscriminant};
 use tracing::{error, info};

-use crate::crypto::{
+use crate::{
+    crypto::{
        KeyCell, derive_key,
        encryption::v1::{self, Nonce},
        integrity::v1::HmacSha256,
+    },
+    safe_cell::SafeCell,
 };
-use crate::db::{
+use crate::{
+    db::{
        self,
        models::{self, RootKeyHistory},
        schema::{self},
+    },
+    safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
 };
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};

 #[derive(Default, EnumDiscriminants)]
 #[strum_discriminants(derive(Reply), vis(pub), name(KeyHolderState))]
@@ -395,8 +400,10 @@ mod tests {

    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;

-    use crate::db::{self};
-    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+    use crate::{
+        db::{self},
+        safe_cell::SafeCell,
+    };

    use super::*;

--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/auth.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/auth.rs
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn;
 use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
 use tracing::error;

 use crate::actors::user_agent::{
-    UserAgentConnection,
+    AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection,
    auth::state::{AuthContext, AuthStateMachine},
 };
+
 mod state;
 use state::*;

 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub enum Inbound {
    AuthChallengeRequest {
-        pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+        pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
        bootstrap_token: Option<String>,
    },
    AuthChallengeSolution {
@@ -30,17 +30,26 @@ pub enum Error {
 }

 impl Error {
-    fn internal(details: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
-        Self::Internal {
-            details: details.into(),
-        }
+    #[track_caller]
+    pub(super) fn internal(details: impl Into<String>, err: &impl std::fmt::Debug) -> Self {
+        let details = details.into();
+        let caller = std::panic::Location::caller();
+        error!(
+            caller_file = %caller.file(),
+            caller_line = caller.line(),
+            caller_column = caller.column(),
+            details = %details,
+            error = ?err,
+            "Internal error"
+        );
+
+        Self::Internal { details }
    }
 }

 impl From<diesel::result::Error> for Error {
    fn from(e: diesel::result::Error) -> Self {
-        error!(?e, "Database error");
-        Self::internal("Database error")
+        Self::internal("Database error", &e)
    }
 }

@@ -71,7 +80,7 @@ fn parse_auth_event(payload: Inbound) -> AuthEvents {
 pub async fn authenticate<T>(
    props: &mut UserAgentConnection,
    transport: T,
-) -> Result<authn::PublicKey, Error>
+) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Error>
 where
    T: Bi<Inbound, Result<Outbound, Error>> + Send,
 {
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/auth/state.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/auth/state.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, USERAGENT_CONTEXT};
 use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl, update};
 use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
@@ -10,24 +9,24 @@ use crate::{
    actors::{
        bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
        keyholder::KeyHolder,
-        user_agent::{UserAgentConnection, UserAgentCredentials, auth::Outbound},
+        user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentCredentials, auth::Outbound},
    },
    crypto::integrity,
    db::{DatabasePool, schema::useragent_client},
 };

 pub struct ChallengeRequest {
-    pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+    pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
 }

 pub struct BootstrapAuthRequest {
-    pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+    pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
    pub token: String,
 }

 pub struct ChallengeContext {
    pub challenge_nonce: i32,
-    pub key: authn::PublicKey,
+    pub key: AuthPublicKey,
 }

 pub struct ChallengeSolution {
@@ -39,25 +38,26 @@ smlang::statemachine!(
    custom_error: true,
    transitions: {
        *Init + AuthRequest(ChallengeRequest) / async prepare_challenge = SentChallenge(ChallengeContext),
-        Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(authn::PublicKey),
-        SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(authn::PublicKey),
+        Init + BootstrapAuthRequest(BootstrapAuthRequest) / async verify_bootstrap_token = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
+        SentChallenge(ChallengeContext) + ReceivedSolution(ChallengeSolution) / async verify_solution = AuthOk(AuthPublicKey),
    }
 );

 /// Returns the current nonce, ready to use for the challenge nonce.
 async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
    db: &DatabasePool,
-    key: &authn::PublicKey,
+    key: &AuthPublicKey,
 ) -> Result<(i32, i32), Error> {
-    let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::internal("Database unavailable")
-    })?;
+    let mut db_conn = db
+        .get()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
    db_conn
        .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
            Box::pin(async move {
                useragent_client::table
-                    .filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(key.to_bytes()))
+                    .filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(key.to_stored_bytes()))
+                    .filter(useragent_client::key_type.eq(key.key_type()))
                    .select((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
                    .first::<(i32, i32)>(conn)
                    .await
@@ -65,10 +65,7 @@ async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
        })
        .await
        .optional()
-        .map_err(|e| {
-            error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
-            Error::internal("Database operation failed")
-        })?
+        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?
        .ok_or_else(|| {
            error!(?key, "Public key not found in database");
            Error::UnregisteredPublicKey
@@ -78,16 +75,16 @@ async fn get_current_nonce_and_id(
 async fn verify_integrity(
    db: &DatabasePool,
    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
+    pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
 ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::internal("Database unavailable")
-    })?;
+    let mut db_conn = db
+        .get()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;

    let (id, nonce) = get_current_nonce_and_id(db, pubkey).await?;

-    let _result = integrity::verify_entity(
+    let attestation_status = integrity::check_entity_attestation(
        &mut db_conn,
        keyholder,
        &UserAgentCredentials {
@@ -97,36 +94,39 @@ async fn verify_integrity(
        id,
    )
    .await
-    .map_err(|e| {
-        error!(?e, "Integrity verification failed");
-        Error::internal("Integrity verification failed")
-    })?;
+    .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Integrity verification failed", &e))?;

-    Ok(())
+    use integrity::AttestationStatus as AS;
+    // SAFETY (policy): challenge auth must work in both vault states.
+    // While sealed, integrity checks can only report `Unavailable` because key material is not
+    // accessible. While unsealed, the same check can report `Attested`.
+    // This path intentionally accepts both outcomes to keep challenge auth available across state
+    // transitions; stricter verification is enforced in sensitive post-auth flows.
+    match attestation_status {
+        AS::Attested | AS::Unavailable => Ok(()),
+    }
 }

 async fn create_nonce(
    db: &DatabasePool,
    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
+    pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
 ) -> Result<i32, Error> {
-    let mut db_conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::internal("Database unavailable")
-    })?;
+    let mut db_conn = db
+        .get()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;
    let new_nonce = db_conn
        .exclusive_transaction(|conn| {
            Box::pin(async move {
                let (id, new_nonce): (i32, i32) = update(useragent_client::table)
-                    .filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes()))
+                    .filter(useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_stored_bytes()))
+                    .filter(useragent_client::key_type.eq(pubkey.key_type()))
                    .set(useragent_client::nonce.eq(useragent_client::nonce + 1))
                    .returning((useragent_client::id, useragent_client::nonce))
                    .get_result(conn)
                    .await
-                    .map_err(|e| {
-                        error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
-                        Error::internal("Database operation failed")
-                    })?;
+                    .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?;

                integrity::sign_entity(
                    conn,
@@ -138,10 +138,8 @@ async fn create_nonce(
                    id,
                )
                .await
-                .map_err(|e| {
-                    error!(?e, "Integrity signature update failed");
-                    Error::internal("Database error")
-                })?;
+                .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database error", &e))?
+                .drop_verification_provenance();

                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(new_nonce)
            })
@@ -153,13 +151,14 @@ async fn create_nonce(
 async fn register_key(
    db: &DatabasePool,
    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
-    pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
+    pubkey: &AuthPublicKey,
 ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_bytes();
-    let mut conn = db.get().await.map_err(|e| {
-        error!(error = ?e, "Database pool error");
-        Error::internal("Database unavailable")
-    })?;
+    let pubkey_bytes = pubkey.to_stored_bytes();
+    let key_type = pubkey.key_type();
+    let mut conn = db
+        .get()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database unavailable", &e))?;

    conn.transaction(|conn| {
        Box::pin(async move {
@@ -169,26 +168,37 @@ async fn register_key(
                .values((
                    useragent_client::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),
                    useragent_client::nonce.eq(NONCE_START),
+                    useragent_client::key_type.eq(key_type),
                ))
                .returning(useragent_client::id)
                .get_result(conn)
                .await
-                .map_err(|e| {
-                    error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
-                    Error::internal("Database operation failed")
-                })?;
+                .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Database operation failed", &e))?;

-            let entity = UserAgentCredentials {
+            if let Err(e) = integrity::sign_entity(
+                conn,
+                keyholder,
+                &UserAgentCredentials {
                    pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
                    nonce: NONCE_START,
-            };
-
-            integrity::sign_entity(conn, keyholder, &entity, id)
+                },
+                id,
+            )
            .await
-                .map_err(|e| {
-                    error!(error = ?e, "Failed to sign integrity tag for new user-agent key");
-                    Error::internal("Failed to register public key")
-                })?;
+            {
+                match e {
+                    integrity::Error::Keyholder(
+                        crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped,
+                    ) => {
+                        // IMPORTANT: bootstrap-token auth must work before the vault has a root key.
+                        // We intentionally allow creating the DB row first and backfill envelopes
+                        // after bootstrap/unseal to keep the bootstrap flow possible.
+                    }
+                    other => {
+                        return Err(Error::internal("Failed to register public key", &other));
+                    }
+                }
+            }

            Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
        })
@@ -242,7 +252,7 @@ where
    async fn verify_bootstrap_token(
        &mut self,
        BootstrapAuthRequest { pubkey, token }: BootstrapAuthRequest,
-    ) -> Result<authn::PublicKey, Self::Error> {
+    ) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
        let token_ok: bool = self
            .conn
            .actors
@@ -251,10 +261,7 @@ where
                token: token.clone(),
            })
            .await
-            .map_err(|e| {
-                error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
-                Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
-            })?;
+            .map_err(|e| Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token", &e))?;

        if !token_ok {
            error!("Invalid bootstrap token provided");
@@ -290,13 +297,35 @@ where
            key,
        }: &ChallengeContext,
        ChallengeSolution { solution }: ChallengeSolution,
-    ) -> Result<authn::PublicKey, Self::Error> {
-        let signature = authn::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
-            error!("Failed to decode signature in challenge solution");
+    ) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, Self::Error> {
+        let formatted = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(*challenge_nonce, &key.to_stored_bytes());
+
+        let valid = match key {
+            AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(vk) => {
+                let sig = solution.as_slice().try_into().map_err(|_| {
+                    error!(?solution, "Invalid Ed25519 signature length");
                    Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
                })?;
-
-        let valid = key.verify(*challenge_nonce, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, &signature);
+                vk.verify_strict(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
+            }
+            AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(vk) => {
+                use k256::ecdsa::signature::Verifier as _;
+                let sig = k256::ecdsa::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+                    error!(?solution, "Invalid ECDSA signature bytes");
+                    Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
+                })?;
+                vk.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
+            }
+            AuthPublicKey::Rsa(pk) => {
+                use rsa::signature::Verifier as _;
+                let verifying_key = rsa::pss::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha256>::new(pk.clone());
+                let sig = rsa::pss::Signature::try_from(solution.as_slice()).map_err(|_| {
+                    error!(?solution, "Invalid RSA signature bytes");
+                    Error::InvalidChallengeSolution
+                })?;
+                verifying_key.verify(&formatted, &sig).is_ok()
+            }
+        };

        match valid {
            true => {
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/mod.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/mod.rs
@@ -1,13 +1,22 @@
 use crate::{
    actors::{GlobalActors, client::ClientProfile},
    crypto::integrity::Integrable,
-    db,
+    db::{self, models::KeyType},
 };
-use arbiter_crypto::authn;

-#[derive(Debug, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
+/// Abstraction over Ed25519 / ECDSA-secp256k1 / RSA public keys used during the auth handshake.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub enum AuthPublicKey {
+    Ed25519(ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey),
+    /// Compressed SEC1 public key; signature bytes are raw 64-byte (r||s).
+    EcdsaSecp256k1(k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey),
+    /// RSA-2048+ public key (Windows Hello / KeyCredentialManager); signature bytes are PSS+SHA-256.
+    Rsa(rsa::RsaPublicKey),
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct UserAgentCredentials {
-    pub pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+    pub pubkey: AuthPublicKey,
    pub nonce: i32,
 }

@@ -15,11 +24,67 @@ impl Integrable for UserAgentCredentials {
    const KIND: &'static str = "useragent_credentials";
 }

+impl AuthPublicKey {
+    /// Canonical bytes stored in DB and echoed back in the challenge.
+    /// Ed25519: raw 32 bytes. ECDSA: SEC1 compressed 33 bytes. RSA: DER-encoded SPKI.
+    pub fn to_stored_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        match self {
+            AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(k) => k.to_bytes().to_vec(),
+            // SEC1 compressed (33 bytes) is the natural compact format for secp256k1
+            AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(k) => k.to_encoded_point(true).as_bytes().to_vec(),
+            AuthPublicKey::Rsa(k) => {
+                use rsa::pkcs8::EncodePublicKey as _;
+                #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
+                k.to_public_key_der()
+                    .expect("rsa SPKI encoding is infallible")
+                    .to_vec()
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn key_type(&self) -> KeyType {
+        match self {
+            AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(_) => KeyType::Ed25519,
+            AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(_) => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
+            AuthPublicKey::Rsa(_) => KeyType::Rsa,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<(KeyType, Vec<u8>)> for AuthPublicKey {
+    type Error = &'static str;
+
+    fn try_from(value: (KeyType, Vec<u8>)) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        let (key_type, bytes) = value;
+        match key_type {
+            KeyType::Ed25519 => {
+                let bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| "invalid Ed25519 key length")?;
+                let key = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&bytes)
+                    .map_err(|_e| "invalid Ed25519 key")?;
+                Ok(AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(key))
+            }
+            KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => {
+                let point =
+                    k256::EncodedPoint::from_bytes(&bytes).map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
+                let key = k256::ecdsa::VerifyingKey::from_encoded_point(&point)
+                    .map_err(|_e| "invalid ECDSA key")?;
+                Ok(AuthPublicKey::EcdsaSecp256k1(key))
+            }
+            KeyType::Rsa => {
+                use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePublicKey as _;
+                let key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from_public_key_der(&bytes)
+                    .map_err(|_e| "invalid RSA key")?;
+                Ok(AuthPublicKey::Rsa(key))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 // Messages, sent by user agent to connection client without having a request
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub enum OutOfBand {
    ClientConnectionRequest { profile: ClientProfile },
-    ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: authn::PublicKey },
+    ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey },
 }

 pub struct UserAgentConnection {
@@ -38,3 +103,18 @@ pub mod session;

 pub use auth::authenticate;
 pub use session::UserAgentSession;
+
+use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
+
+impl Hashable for AuthPublicKey {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        hasher.update(self.to_stored_bytes());
+    }
+}
+
+impl Hashable for UserAgentCredentials {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.pubkey.hash(hasher);
+        self.nonce.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/session.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/session.rs
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn;
-
 use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashMap};

 use arbiter_proto::transport::Sender;
 use async_trait::async_trait;
+use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
 use kameo::{Actor, actor::ActorRef, messages};
 use thiserror::Error;
 use tracing::error;
@@ -13,6 +12,7 @@ use crate::actors::{
    flow_coordinator::{RegisterUserAgent, client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalController},
    user_agent::{OutOfBand, UserAgentConnection},
 };
+
 mod state;
 use state::{DummyContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStateMachine};

@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ impl Error {
 }

 pub struct PendingClientApproval {
-    pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
    controller: ActorRef<ClientApprovalController>,
 }

@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ pub struct UserAgentSession {
    state: UserAgentStateMachine<DummyContext>,
    sender: Box<dyn Sender<OutOfBand>>,

-    pending_client_approvals: HashMap<Vec<u8>, PendingClientApproval>,
+    pending_client_approvals: HashMap<VerifyingKey, PendingClientApproval>,
 }

 pub mod connection;
@@ -119,13 +118,8 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
            return;
        }

-        self.pending_client_approvals.insert(
-            client.pubkey.to_bytes(),
-            PendingClientApproval {
-                pubkey: client.pubkey,
-                controller,
-            },
-        );
+        self.pending_client_approvals
+            .insert(client.pubkey, PendingClientApproval { controller });
    }
 }

@@ -164,18 +158,14 @@ impl Actor for UserAgentSession {
        let cancelled_pubkey = self
            .pending_client_approvals
            .iter()
-            .find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(k.clone()));
+            .find_map(|(k, v)| (v.controller.id() == id).then_some(*k));

-        if let Some(pubkey_bytes) = cancelled_pubkey {
-            let Some(approval) = self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey_bytes) else {
-                return Ok(std::ops::ControlFlow::Continue(()));
-            };
+        if let Some(pubkey) = cancelled_pubkey {
+            self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey);

            if let Err(e) = self
                .sender
-                .send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel {
-                    pubkey: approval.pubkey,
-                })
+                .send(OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey })
                .await
            {
                error!(
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/session/connection.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/actors/user_agent/session/connection.rs
@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
 use std::sync::Mutex;

 use alloy::{consensus::TxEip1559, primitives::Address, signers::Signature};
-use arbiter_crypto::{
-    authn,
-    safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
-};
 use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, SelectableHelper};
 use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
@@ -14,26 +10,89 @@ use kameo::prelude::Context;
 use tracing::{error, info};
 use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};

-use crate::actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer;
 use crate::actors::keyholder::KeyHolderState;
 use crate::actors::user_agent::session::Error;
-use crate::actors::{
+use crate::db::models::{
+    EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
+};
+use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
+use crate::safe_cell::SafeCell;
+use crate::{
+    actors::flow_coordinator::client_connect_approval::ClientApprovalAnswer,
+    crypto::integrity::{self, Verified},
+};
+use crate::{
+    actors::{
        evm::{
            ClientSignTransaction, Generate, ListWallets, SignTransactionError as EvmSignError,
-        UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentListGrants,
+            UseragentCreateGrant, UseragentDeleteGrant, UseragentListGrants,
        },
        keyholder::{self, Bootstrap, TryUnseal},
        user_agent::session::{
            UserAgentSession,
            state::{UnsealContext, UserAgentEvents, UserAgentStates},
        },
+        user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentCredentials},
+    },
+    db::schema::useragent_client,
+    safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _,
 };
-use crate::db::models::{
-    EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmWalletAccess, ProgramClient, ProgramClientMetadata,
-};
-use crate::evm::policies::{Grant, SpecificGrant};
+
+fn is_vault_sealed_from_evm<M>(err: &SendError<M, crate::actors::evm::Error>) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        err,
+        SendError::HandlerError(crate::actors::evm::Error::Keyholder(
+            keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped
+        )) | SendError::HandlerError(crate::actors::evm::Error::Integrity(
+            crate::crypto::integrity::Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
+        ))
+    )
+}

 impl UserAgentSession {
+    async fn backfill_useragent_integrity(&self) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let mut conn = self.props.db.get().await?;
+        let keyholder = self.props.actors.key_holder.clone();
+
+        conn.transaction(|conn| {
+            Box::pin(async move {
+                let rows: Vec<(i32, i32, Vec<u8>, crate::db::models::KeyType)> =
+                    useragent_client::table
+                        .select((
+                            useragent_client::id,
+                            useragent_client::nonce,
+                            useragent_client::public_key,
+                            useragent_client::key_type,
+                        ))
+                        .load(conn)
+                        .await?;
+
+                for (id, nonce, public_key, key_type) in rows {
+                    let pubkey = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, public_key)).map_err(|e| {
+                        Error::internal(format!("Invalid user-agent key in db: {e}"))
+                    })?;
+
+                    integrity::sign_entity(
+                        conn,
+                        &keyholder,
+                        &UserAgentCredentials { pubkey, nonce },
+                        id,
+                    )
+                    .await
+                    .map_err(|e| {
+                        Error::internal(format!("Failed to backfill user-agent integrity: {e}"))
+                    })?
+                    .drop_verification_provenance();
+                }
+
+                Result::<_, Error>::Ok(())
+            })
+        })
+        .await?;
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
    fn take_unseal_secret(&mut self) -> Result<(EphemeralSecret, PublicKey), Error> {
        let UserAgentStates::WaitingForUnsealKey(unseal_context) = self.state.state() else {
            error!("Received encrypted key in invalid state");
@@ -191,6 +250,7 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
            .await
        {
            Ok(_) => {
+                self.backfill_useragent_integrity().await?;
                info!("Successfully unsealed key with client-provided key");
                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
                Ok(())
@@ -252,6 +312,7 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
            .await
        {
            Ok(_) => {
+                self.backfill_useragent_integrity().await?;
                info!("Successfully bootstrapped vault with client-provided key");
                self.transition(UserAgentEvents::ReceivedValidKey)?;
                Ok(())
@@ -297,7 +358,9 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
 #[messages]
 impl UserAgentSession {
    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(&mut self) -> Result<(i32, Address), Error> {
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_evm_wallet_create(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<(Verified<i32>, Address), Error> {
        match self.props.actors.evm.ask(Generate {}).await {
            Ok(address) => Ok(address),
            Err(SendError::HandlerError(err)) => Err(Error::internal(format!(
@@ -325,12 +388,15 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
 #[messages]
 impl UserAgentSession {
    #[message]
-    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, Error> {
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_grant_list(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, GrantMutationError> {
        match self.props.actors.evm.ask(UseragentListGrants {}).await {
            Ok(grants) => Ok(grants),
+            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
            Err(err) => {
                error!(?err, "EVM grant list failed");
-                Err(Error::internal("Failed to list EVM grants"))
+                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
            }
        }
    }
@@ -340,7 +406,7 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
        &mut self,
        basic: crate::evm::policies::SharedGrantSettings,
        grant: crate::evm::policies::SpecificGrant,
-    ) -> Result<i32, GrantMutationError> {
+    ) -> Result<Verified<i32>, GrantMutationError> {
        match self
            .props
            .actors
@@ -349,6 +415,7 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
            .await
        {
            Ok(grant_id) => Ok(grant_id),
+            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
            Err(err) => {
                error!(?err, "EVM grant create failed");
                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
@@ -361,21 +428,22 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
        &mut self,
        grant_id: i32,
    ) -> Result<(), GrantMutationError> {
-        // match self
-        //     .props
-        //     .actors
-        //     .evm
-        //     .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant { grant_id })
-        //     .await
-        // {
-        //     Ok(()) => Ok(()),
-        //     Err(err) => {
-        //         error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
-        //         Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
-        //     }
-        // }
-        let _ = grant_id;
-        todo!()
+        match self
+            .props
+            .actors
+            .evm
+            .ask(UseragentDeleteGrant {
+                _grant_id: grant_id,
+            })
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(()) => Ok(()),
+            Err(err) if is_vault_sealed_from_evm(&err) => Err(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed),
+            Err(err) => {
+                error!(?err, "EVM grant delete failed");
+                Err(GrantMutationError::Internal)
+            }
+        }
    }

    #[message]
@@ -475,10 +543,10 @@ impl UserAgentSession {
    pub(crate) async fn handle_new_client_approve(
        &mut self,
        approved: bool,
-        pubkey: authn::PublicKey,
+        pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
        ctx: &mut Context<Self, Result<(), Error>>,
    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        let pending_approval = match self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey.to_bytes()) {
+        let pending_approval = match self.pending_client_approvals.remove(&pubkey) {
            Some(approval) => approval,
            None => {
                error!("Received client connection response for unknown client");
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/encryption/v1.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/encryption/v1.rs
@@ -59,8 +59,10 @@ mod tests {
    use std::ops::Deref as _;

    use super::*;
-    use crate::crypto::derive_key;
-    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+    use crate::{
+        crypto::derive_key,
+        safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+    };

    #[test]
    pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs
@@ -1,22 +1,34 @@
 use crate::actors::keyholder;
-use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
 use hmac::Hmac;
 use sha2::Sha256;
+use std::future::Future;
+use std::ops::Deref;
+use std::pin::Pin;

 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, dsl::insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
 use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
 use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, error::SendError};
 use sha2::Digest as _;

+pub mod hashing;
+pub mod verified;
+use self::hashing::Hashable;
+
 use crate::{
    actors::keyholder::{KeyHolder, SignIntegrity, VerifyIntegrity},
    db::{
        self,
-        models::{IntegrityEnvelope, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
+        models::{IntegrityEnvelope as IntegrityEnvelopeRow, NewIntegrityEnvelope},
        schema::integrity_envelope,
    },
 };

+pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
+pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
+
+pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
+pub use self::verified::{Nested, Root, VerificationOrigin, Verified};
+
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum Error {
    #[error("Database error: {0}")]
@@ -45,71 +57,90 @@ pub enum Error {
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[must_use]
 pub enum AttestationStatus {
    Attested,
    Unavailable,
 }

-pub const CURRENT_PAYLOAD_VERSION: i32 = 1;
-pub const INTEGRITY_SUBKEY_TAG: &[u8] = b"arbiter/db-integrity-key/v1";
-
-pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
-
 pub trait Integrable: Hashable {
    const KIND: &'static str;
    const VERSION: i32 = 1;
 }

-fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
-    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
-    payload.hash(&mut hasher);
-    hasher.finalize().into()
+impl<T: Integrable> Integrable for &T {
+    const KIND: &'static str = T::KIND;
+    const VERSION: i32 = T::VERSION;
 }

-fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
-    out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
-    out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
-}
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct EntityId(Vec<u8>);

-fn build_mac_input(
-    entity_kind: &str,
-    entity_id: &[u8],
-    payload_version: i32,
-    payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
-) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
-    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
-    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
-    out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
-    out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
-    out
-}
+impl Deref for EntityId {
+    type Target = [u8];

-pub trait IntoId {
-    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8>;
-}
-
-impl IntoId for i32 {
-    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        &self.0
    }
 }

-impl IntoId for &'_ [u8] {
-    fn into_id(self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_vec()
+impl From<i32> for EntityId {
+    fn from(value: i32) -> Self {
+        Self(value.to_be_bytes().to_vec())
    }
 }

-pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
+impl From<&'_ [u8]> for EntityId {
+    fn from(bytes: &'_ [u8]) -> Self {
+        Self(bytes.to_vec())
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn lookup_verified<E, Id, C, F, Fut>(
+    conn: &mut C,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    entity_id: Id,
+    load: F,
+) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error>
+where
+    C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+    E: Integrable,
+    Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
+    F: FnOnce(&mut C) -> Fut,
+    Fut: Future<Output = Result<E, db::DatabaseError>>,
+{
+    let entity = load(conn).await?;
+    verify_entity(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id).await
+}
+
+pub async fn lookup_verified_from_query<E, Id, C, F>(
+    conn: &mut C,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    load: F,
+) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error>
+where
+    C: AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite> + Send,
+    E: Integrable,
+    Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone,
+    F: for<'a> FnOnce(
+        &'a mut C,
+    ) -> Pin<
+        Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<(Id, E), db::DatabaseError>> + Send + 'a>,
+    >,
+{
+    let (entity_id, entity) = load(conn).await?;
+    verify_entity(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id).await
+}
+
+pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
    entity: &E,
-    entity_id: impl IntoId,
-) -> Result<(), Error> {
-    let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
+    as_entity_id: Id,
+) -> Result<Verified<Id, Nested<E>>, Error> {
+    let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);

-    let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
+    let entity_id = as_entity_id.clone().into();

    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, E::VERSION, &payload_hash);

@@ -124,7 +155,7 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
    insert_into(integrity_envelope::table)
        .values(NewIntegrityEnvelope {
            entity_kind: E::KIND.to_owned(),
-            entity_id,
+            entity_id: entity_id.to_vec(),
            payload_version: E::VERSION,
            key_version,
            mac: mac.to_vec(),
@@ -143,19 +174,19 @@ pub async fn sign_entity<E: Integrable>(
        .await
        .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;

-    Ok(())
+    Ok(Verified::<Id, Nested<E>>::new(as_entity_id))
 }

-pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
+pub async fn check_entity_attestation<E: Integrable>(
    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
    entity: &E,
-    entity_id: impl IntoId,
+    entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
 ) -> Result<AttestationStatus, Error> {
-    let entity_id = entity_id.into_id();
-    let envelope: IntegrityEnvelope = integrity_envelope::table
+    let entity_id = entity_id.into();
+    let envelope: IntegrityEnvelopeRow = integrity_envelope::table
        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
-        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&entity_id))
+        .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id))
        .first(conn)
        .await
        .map_err(|err| match err {
@@ -173,7 +204,7 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
        });
    }

-    let payload_hash = payload_hash(&entity);
+    let payload_hash = payload_hash(entity);
    let mac_input = build_mac_input(E::KIND, &entity_id, envelope.payload_version, &payload_hash);

    let result = keyholder
@@ -196,126 +227,93 @@ pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable>(
    }
 }

-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
-    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-    use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, crate::VerifiedFields!)]
+#[repr(C)]
+pub struct Entity<E, Id> {
+    pub entity: E,
+    pub entity_id: Id,
+}

-    use crate::{
-        actors::keyholder::{Bootstrap, KeyHolder},
-        db::{self, schema},
-    };
-    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+impl<E, Id> Deref for Entity<E, Id> {
+    type Target = E;

-    use super::{Error, Integrable, sign_entity, verify_entity};
-    #[derive(Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
-    struct DummyEntity {
-        payload_version: i32,
-        payload: Vec<u8>,
-    }
-    impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
-        const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
-    }
-
-    async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<KeyHolder> {
-        let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
-        actor
-            .ask(Bootstrap {
-                seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
-            })
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        actor
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
-
-        let entity = DummyEntity {
-            payload_version: 1,
-            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        };
-
-        sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
-            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
-            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
-            .count()
-            .get_result(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
-        verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
-
-        let entity = DummyEntity {
-            payload_version: 1,
-            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        };
-
-        sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
-            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
-            .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
-            .set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_err();
-        assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-
-        const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
-
-        let entity = DummyEntity {
-            payload_version: 1,
-            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
-        };
-
-        sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let tampered = DummyEntity {
-            payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
-            ..entity
-        };
-
-        let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_err();
-        assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        &self.entity
    }
 }
+
+pub async fn verify_entity<E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
+    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    entity: E,
+    entity_id: Id,
+) -> Result<Verified<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
+    match check_entity_attestation(conn, keyholder, &entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
+        AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<Entity<E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(Entity {
+            entity,
+            entity_id,
+        })),
+        AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)),
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn verify_entity_ref<'e, E: Integrable, Id: Into<EntityId> + Clone>(
+    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+    keyholder: &ActorRef<KeyHolder>,
+    entity: &'e E,
+    entity_id: Id,
+) -> Result<Verified<Entity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>, Error> {
+    match check_entity_attestation(conn, keyholder, entity, entity_id.clone()).await? {
+        AttestationStatus::Attested => Ok(Verified::<Entity<&'e E, Id>, Nested<E>>::new(Entity {
+            entity,
+            entity_id,
+        })),
+        AttestationStatus::Unavailable => Err(Error::Keyholder(keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)),
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn delete_envelope<E: Integrable>(
+    conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
+    entity_id: impl Into<EntityId>,
+) -> Result<usize, Error> {
+    let entity_id = entity_id.into();
+
+    let affected = diesel::delete(
+        integrity_envelope::table
+            .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq(E::KIND))
+            .filter(integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(&*entity_id)),
+    )
+    .execute(conn)
+    .await
+    .map_err(db::DatabaseError::from)?;
+
+    Ok(affected)
+}
+
+fn payload_hash(payload: &impl Hashable) -> [u8; 32] {
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    payload.hash(&mut hasher);
+    hasher.finalize().into()
+}
+
+fn build_mac_input(
+    entity_kind: &str,
+    entity_id: &[u8],
+    payload_version: i32,
+    payload_hash: &[u8; 32],
+) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + entity_kind.len() + entity_id.len() + 32);
+    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_kind.as_bytes());
+    push_len_prefixed(&mut out, entity_id);
+    out.extend_from_slice(&payload_version.to_be_bytes());
+    out.extend_from_slice(payload_hash);
+    out
+}
+
+fn push_len_prefixed(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) {
+    out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+    out.extend_from_slice(bytes);
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests;
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/hashing.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/hashing.rs
@@ -1,17 +1,13 @@
-pub use hmac::digest::Digest;
+use hmac::digest::Digest;
 use std::collections::HashSet;

 /// Deterministically hash a value by feeding its fields into the hasher in a consistent order.
-#[diagnostic::on_unimplemented(
-    note = "for local types consider adding `#[derive(arbiter_macros::Hashable)]` to your `{Self}` type",
-    note = "for types from other crates check whether the crate offers a `Hashable` implementation"
-)]
 pub trait Hashable {
    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H);
 }

 macro_rules! impl_numeric {
-    ($($t:ty),*) => {
+($($t:ty),*) => {
    $(
        impl Hashable for $t {
            fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
@@ -19,7 +15,7 @@ macro_rules! impl_numeric {
            }
        }
    )*
-    };
+};
 }

 impl_numeric!(u8, u16, u32, u64, i8, i16, i32, i64);
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/tests.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/tests.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl};
+use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
+use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
+use sha2::Digest;
+
+use crate::{
+    actors::keyholder::{Bootstrap, KeyHolder},
+    db::{self, schema},
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
+};
+
+use super::hashing::Hashable;
+use super::{
+    Error, Integrable, check_entity_attestation, lookup_verified, lookup_verified_from_query,
+    sign_entity, verify_entity,
+};
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+struct DummyEntity {
+    payload_version: i32,
+    payload: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl Hashable for DummyEntity {
+    fn hash<H: Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.payload_version.hash(hasher);
+        self.payload.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
+impl Integrable for DummyEntity {
+    const KIND: &'static str = "dummy_entity";
+}
+
+async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<KeyHolder> {
+    let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
+    actor
+        .ask(Bootstrap {
+            seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    actor
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn sign_writes_envelope_and_verify_passes() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-7";
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    let count: i64 = schema::integrity_envelope::table
+        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
+        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
+        .count()
+        .get_result(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(count, 1, "envelope row must be created exactly once");
+    let _ = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn tampered_mac_fails_verification() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-11";
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    diesel::update(schema::integrity_envelope::table)
+        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_kind.eq("dummy_entity"))
+        .filter(schema::integrity_envelope::entity_id.eq(ENTITY_ID))
+        .set(schema::integrity_envelope::mac.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
+        .execute(&mut conn)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn changed_payload_fails_verification() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-21";
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    let tampered = DummyEntity {
+        payload: b"payload-v1-but-tampered".to_vec(),
+        ..entity
+    };
+
+    let err = check_entity_attestation(&mut conn, &keyholder, &tampered, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, Error::MacMismatch { .. }));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn strict_verify_fails_closed_while_sealed() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: &[u8] = b"entity-id-41";
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+    drop(keyholder);
+
+    let sealed_keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
+
+    let err = verify_entity(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(
+        err,
+        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
+    ));
+
+    let err = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| async {
+        Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
+            payload_version: 1,
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(
+        err,
+        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
+    ));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn lookup_verified_supports_loaded_aggregate() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 77;
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    let verified = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| async {
+        Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
+            payload_version: 1,
+            payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn extension_trait_lookup_verified_required_works() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 79;
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    let verified = lookup_verified(&mut conn, &keyholder, ENTITY_ID, |_| {
+        Box::pin(async {
+            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>(DummyEntity {
+                payload_version: 1,
+                payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+            })
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn lookup_verified_from_query_helpers_work() {
+    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
+    let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
+    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
+
+    const ENTITY_ID: i32 = 80;
+
+    let entity = DummyEntity {
+        payload_version: 1,
+        payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+    };
+
+    sign_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &entity, ENTITY_ID)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
+
+    let verified = lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &keyholder, |_| {
+        Box::pin(async {
+            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>((
+                ENTITY_ID,
+                DummyEntity {
+                    payload_version: 1,
+                    payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+                },
+            ))
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(verified.entity.payload, b"payload-v1".to_vec());
+
+    drop(keyholder);
+    let sealed_keyholder = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
+
+    let err = lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &sealed_keyholder, |_| {
+        Box::pin(async {
+            Ok::<_, db::DatabaseError>((
+                ENTITY_ID,
+                DummyEntity {
+                    payload_version: 1,
+                    payload: b"payload-v1".to_vec(),
+                },
+            ))
+        })
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap_err();
+
+    assert!(matches!(
+        err,
+        Error::Keyholder(crate::actors::keyholder::Error::NotBootstrapped)
+    ));
+}
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/verified.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1/verified.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+use std::ops::Deref;
+
+use super::Integrable;
+
+mod private {
+    pub trait Sealed {}
+}
+
+/// Marker trait for type-level verification provenance.
+///
+/// This trait is intentionally sealed so external code cannot invent arbitrary
+/// provenance tags and bypass the intended type-level guarantees.
+pub trait VerificationOrigin: private::Sealed {
+    type Origin: VerificationOrigin;
+}
+
+/// Root provenance marker for values directly produced by integrity APIs.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Default)]
+pub struct Root;
+
+/// Nested provenance marker carrying the source integrable type and previous
+/// provenance marker in the chain.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+pub struct Nested<From, P: VerificationOrigin = Root>(core::marker::PhantomData<(From, P)>);
+
+impl private::Sealed for Root {}
+impl VerificationOrigin for Root {
+    type Origin = Self;
+}
+
+impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> private::Sealed for Nested<T, P> {}
+impl<T, P: VerificationOrigin> VerificationOrigin for Nested<T, P> {
+    type Origin = P;
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[repr(transparent)]
+#[must_use = "Verified<T> is a proof-bearing wrapper; use self.drop_verification_provenance() to explicitly discard integrity provenance when needed"]
+pub struct Verified<T, O: VerificationOrigin = Root> {
+    inner: T,
+    origin: core::marker::PhantomData<O>,
+}
+
+impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> AsRef<Verified<T, O>> for Verified<&T, O> {
+    fn as_ref(&self) -> &Verified<T, O> {
+        // SAFETY: `Verified<T>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so `&T`
+        // and `&Verified<T>` have identical layout.
+        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<T, Verified<T, O>>(self.inner) }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T, U: Integrable, O: VerificationOrigin> Deref for Verified<T, Nested<U, O>> {
+    type Target = Verified<T, O::Origin>;
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        // SAFETY: `Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`, so `&Verified<T, Nested<U, O>>`
+        // and `&Nested<U, O>` have identical layout.
+        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<Self, Verified<T, O::Origin>>(self) }
+    }
+}
+impl<T> Deref for Verified<T, Root> {
+    type Target = T;
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        &self.inner
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T, O: VerificationOrigin> Verified<T, O> {
+    /// Unwraps the verified value, discarding the integrity provenance.
+    ///
+    /// The name is intentionally verbose — call sites where provenance is
+    /// dropped should be easy to find and audit.
+    pub fn drop_verification_provenance(self) -> T {
+        self.inner
+    }
+
+    /// Downgrades the origin provenance to any lower nestedness level,
+    /// e.g. `Verified<T, Nested<Other>>` to `Verified<T, Root>`.
+    pub fn unqualify_origin<Target: VerificationOrigin>(self) -> Verified<T, Target>
+    where
+        O: VerificationOrigin<Origin = Target>,
+    {
+        Verified {
+            inner: self.inner,
+            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Constructs a `Verified<T>` by wrapping a `T`.
+    pub(super) fn new(value: T) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            inner: value,
+            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Constructs a `Verified<T>` from a raw value without performing any
+    /// integrity check. Only available in test builds; use the integrity
+    /// module's functions to obtain a `Verified<T>` in production code.
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) fn new_unchecked(value: T) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            inner: value,
+            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Reinterprets `&T` as `&Verified<T>`.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub(super) fn from_ref(from: &T) -> &Self {
+        // SAFETY: `Self` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`.
+        unsafe { reinterpret_layout_ref::<T, Self>(from) }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Bit-copies `value: From` into a `To`, suppressing the source destructor so
+/// the destination owns the bytes.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// The caller must guarantee that `From` and `To` have identical in-memory
+/// layout — the raw bytes that encode a valid `From` must also encode a valid
+/// `To`.
+///
+/// A `union` is used instead of [`std::mem::transmute`] because `transmute`
+/// rejects generic source/destination types at the call site even when their
+/// sizes are provably equal at monomorphization time.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+#[inline]
+pub const unsafe fn reinterpret_layout<From, To>(value: From) -> To {
+    const {
+        assert!(
+            ::std::mem::size_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::size_of::<To>(),
+            "reinterpret_layout: source and destination must have identical size"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            ::std::mem::align_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::align_of::<To>(),
+            "reinterpret_layout: source and destination must have identical alignment"
+        );
+    }
+    union Reinterpret<A, B> {
+        from: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop<A>,
+        to: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop<B>,
+    }
+    // SAFETY: caller guarantees layout equivalence (see fn docs). The union
+    // write-read copies the raw bytes of `value` into a `To` slot, and
+    // `ManuallyDrop` on the source side suppresses its destructor so the
+    // destination owns the bytes unambiguously — no double-drop is possible.
+    unsafe {
+        ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop::into_inner(
+            Reinterpret {
+                from: ::std::mem::ManuallyDrop::new(value),
+            }
+            .to,
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+/// Reinterprets `&From` as `&To` via a layout-preserving pointer cast.
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Same invariants as [`reinterpret_layout`].
+#[inline]
+pub const unsafe fn reinterpret_layout_ref<From, To>(value: &From) -> &To {
+    const {
+        assert!(
+            ::std::mem::size_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::size_of::<To>(),
+            "reinterpret_layout_ref: source and destination must have identical size"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            ::std::mem::align_of::<From>() == ::std::mem::align_of::<To>(),
+            "reinterpret_layout_ref: source and destination must have identical alignment"
+        );
+    }
+    // SAFETY: caller guarantees layout equivalence (see fn docs). A reference
+    // cast between identically-laid-out types produces a reference with the
+    // same address and lifetime, which is sound.
+    unsafe { &*(value as *const From as *const To) }
+}
+
+/// Implemented on `Verified<T>` by [`VerifiedFields!`], exposing the field-wise counterpart.
+///
+/// ## Disclaimer
+/// Do not implement this trait manually. It is intended to be implemented only
+/// by the `VerifiedFields!` macro, which generates the necessary layout
+/// guarantees for sound pointer casts.
+///
+/// ## Soundness
+/// When [`verify_entity`][crate::crypto::integrity::verify_entity] attests an
+/// entity, it returns `Verified<T>` — an aggregate proof over the whole value.
+/// This trait converts that wrapper into `Counterpart` (e.g.
+/// `VerifiedMyStruct`), where every field is individually wrapped in
+/// [`Verified`], allowing verified data to flow into functions that require
+/// `Verified<FieldType>` without re-verifying.
+///
+/// ## Safety
+/// The conversion is a zero-cost reinterpretation — no copying (beyond a
+/// bitwise move in the owned variant) or HMAC work occurs. Soundness rests on
+/// identical memory layout between `Verified<T>` and `Counterpart`:
+///
+/// - `T` carries `#[repr(C)]` (enforced by `@require_repr` in the macro).
+/// - `T` does **not** carry `packed` (enforced by `@reject_packed`).
+/// - `Counterpart` also carries `#[repr(C)]`, with the same fields in the same
+///   order.
+/// - Each `Verified<F>` field is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, so its size
+///   and alignment match `F` exactly.
+/// - `Verified<T>` itself is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `T`.
+///
+/// As an additional machine-checked guard, [`reinterpret_layout`] and
+/// [`reinterpret_layout_ref`] assert size/align equality of the two types at
+/// monomorphization time.
+///
+/// The trait is implemented directly on `Verified<T>` (not on `T`), so no
+/// `Deref`-coercion or auto-ref stripping is needed at call sites — the impl
+/// is unambiguous.
+pub trait VerifiedFieldsAccessor {
+    /// The field-wise verified counterpart, e.g. `VerifiedMyStruct`.
+    type Counterpart;
+
+    /// Reinterprets `&self` as `&Counterpart` via a layout-preserving pointer cast.
+    ///
+    /// No data is copied and no re-verification occurs. The returned reference
+    /// borrows from `self` and has the same lifetime.
+    fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart;
+
+    /// Consumes `self` and returns `Counterpart` via a layout-preserving
+    /// bitwise move.
+    ///
+    /// The original `Verified<T>` is moved without running its destructor
+    /// (there is none — `Verified` is a transparent wrapper with no heap
+    /// allocation), and the returned counterpart owns the original bytes. No
+    /// re-verification occurs.
+    fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart;
+}
+
+// todo! rewrite macro_rules to derive crate
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! VerifiedFields {
+    // --- Entry point (no source generics) ---
+    (
+        $(#$attr:tt)*
+        $vis:vis struct $name:ident
+        {
+            $(
+                $field_vis:vis $field_name:ident : $field_ty:ty
+            ),* $(,)?
+        }
+    ) => {
+        // Attribute-list checks run in isolation — they only receive the attrs,
+        // not the struct body.
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$(#$attr)*]);
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$(#$attr)*]);
+
+        paste::paste! {
+            #[doc = concat!(
+                "Field-wise verified counterpart of [`", stringify!($name), "`]."
+            )]
+            //
+            // `#[repr(C)]` is required for the pointer casts in `inherit_ref`
+            // and `inherit` to be sound. Both the source struct (enforced by
+            // `@require_repr`) and this counterpart carry `#[repr(C)]`, which
+            // guarantees matching field offsets. Combined with each
+            // `Verified<F>` being `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, the two
+            // structs have identical memory layout.
+            //
+            // `#[repr(transparent)]` is not usable here because it only permits
+            // a single non-ZST field; multi-field structs would fail to compile.
+            #[repr(C)]
+            $vis struct [<Verified $name>]<P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
+            {
+                $(
+                    $field_vis $field_name : $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$field_ty, P>
+                ),*
+            }
+
+            impl<P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
+                $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor
+                for $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$name, P>
+            {
+                type Counterpart = [<Verified $name>]<P>;
+
+                fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart {
+                    // SAFETY: `Self` is `Verified<T>` (transparent over
+                    // `T #[repr(C)]`) and `Self::Counterpart` is `#[repr(C)]`
+                    // with the same fields in the same order, each wrapped in
+                    // a `#[repr(transparent)]` `Verified<F>`. The two types
+                    // therefore have identical memory layout, which
+                    // `reinterpret_layout_ref` re-checks as size/align
+                    // equality at monomorphization.
+                    unsafe {
+                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout_ref::<
+                            Self,
+                            Self::Counterpart,
+                        >(self)
+                    }
+                }
+
+                fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart {
+                    // SAFETY: identical layout — see `inherit_ref`. The owned
+                    // helper additionally suppresses the source destructor so
+                    // the returned counterpart owns the original bytes (no
+                    // double-drop is possible).
+                    unsafe {
+                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout::<
+                            Self,
+                            Self::Counterpart,
+                        >(self)
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    };
+
+    // --- Entry point (source has generics) ---
+    (
+        $(#$attr:tt)*
+        $vis:vis struct $name:ident <$($gen:tt),*>
+        {
+            $(
+                $field_vis:vis $field_name:ident : $field_ty:ty
+            ),* $(,)?
+        }
+    ) => {
+        // Attribute-list checks run in isolation — they only receive the attrs,
+        // not the struct body.
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$(#$attr)*]);
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$(#$attr)*]);
+
+        paste::paste! {
+            #[doc = concat!(
+                "Field-wise verified counterpart of [`", stringify!($name), "`]."
+            )]
+            //
+            // `#[repr(C)]` is required for the pointer casts in `inherit_ref`
+            // and `inherit` to be sound. Both the source struct (enforced by
+            // `@require_repr`) and this counterpart carry `#[repr(C)]`, which
+            // guarantees matching field offsets. Combined with each
+            // `Verified<F>` being `#[repr(transparent)]` over `F`, the two
+            // structs have identical memory layout.
+            //
+            // `#[repr(transparent)]` is not usable here because it only permits
+            // a single non-ZST field; multi-field structs would fail to compile.
+            #[repr(C)]
+            $vis struct [<Verified $name>]<$($gen),*, P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
+            {
+                $(
+                    $field_vis $field_name : $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$field_ty, P>
+                ),*
+            }
+
+            impl<$($gen),*, P: $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerificationOrigin>
+                $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor
+                for $crate::crypto::integrity::Verified<$name<$($gen),*>, P>
+            {
+                type Counterpart = [<Verified $name>]<$($gen),*, P>;
+
+                fn inherit_ref(&self) -> &Self::Counterpart {
+                    // SAFETY: `Self` is `Verified<T>` (transparent over
+                    // `T #[repr(C)]`) and `Self::Counterpart` is `#[repr(C)]`
+                    // with the same fields in the same order, each wrapped in
+                    // a `#[repr(transparent)]` `Verified<F>`. The two types
+                    // therefore have identical memory layout, which
+                    // `reinterpret_layout_ref` re-checks as size/align
+                    // equality at monomorphization.
+                    unsafe {
+                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout_ref::<
+                            Self,
+                            Self::Counterpart,
+                        >(self)
+                    }
+                }
+
+                fn inherit(self) -> Self::Counterpart {
+                    // SAFETY: identical layout — see `inherit_ref`. The owned
+                    // helper additionally suppresses the source destructor so
+                    // the returned counterpart owns the original bytes (no
+                    // double-drop is possible).
+                    unsafe {
+                        $crate::crypto::integrity::v1::verified::reinterpret_layout::<
+                            Self,
+                            Self::Counterpart,
+                        >(self)
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    };
+
+    // --- @require_repr: ensure `#[repr(C)]` appears in the attribute list ---
+    (@require_repr [#[repr(C)] $($rest:tt)*]) => {};
+    (@require_repr [#$other:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@require_repr [$($rest)*]);
+    };
+    (@require_repr []) => {
+        ::std::compile_error!(
+            "VerifiedFields requires `#[repr(C)]` on the struct to guarantee field layout"
+        );
+    };
+
+    // --- @reject_packed: walk attrs and reject any `#[repr(..., packed, ...)]`.
+    //
+    // Without this, a packed struct would still fail at monomorphization via
+    // the const assertions inside the `reinterpret_layout*` helpers, but the
+    // diagnostic would be much harder to read. `align(N)` is *not* rejected
+    // here because const assertions catch alignment mismatches cleanly, and
+    // forbidding it would be unnecessarily restrictive.
+    (@reject_packed [#[repr($($inner:tt)*)] $($rest:tt)*]) => {
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed_inner [$($inner)*]);
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$($rest)*]);
+    };
+    (@reject_packed [#$other:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed [$($rest)*]);
+    };
+    (@reject_packed []) => {};
+
+    (@reject_packed_inner [packed $($rest:tt)*]) => {
+        ::std::compile_error!(
+            "VerifiedFields does not support packed layouts; the generated \
+             counterpart would not share layout with the source struct"
+        );
+    };
+    (@reject_packed_inner [$first:tt $($rest:tt)*]) => {
+        $crate::VerifiedFields!(@reject_packed_inner [$($rest)*]);
+    };
+    (@reject_packed_inner []) => {};
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
+    #[repr(C)]
+    #[derive(Default, Clone)]
+    pub struct MyStruct<T> {
+        pub field1: String,
+        pub field2: T,
+    }
+
+    fn verify<T>(t: T) -> Verified<T> {
+        Verified {
+            inner: t,
+            origin: core::marker::PhantomData,
+        }
+    }
+
+    // --- inherit_ref ---
+
+    // Verifies that `inherit_ref` returns a reference to the same memory
+    // address, confirming that no copy is made and the cast is purely a
+    // reinterpretation.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_ref_is_same_address() {
+        let v = verify(MyStruct {
+            field1: "hello".into(),
+            field2: 42u32,
+        });
+        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
+        assert_eq!(
+            &v as *const _ as *const u8, fields as *const _ as *const u8,
+            "inherit_ref must return a pointer to the same memory, not a copy"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Verifies that field values are correctly accessible after `inherit_ref`.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_ref_field_values() {
+        let v = verify(MyStruct {
+            field1: "hello".into(),
+            field2: 99u32,
+        });
+        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
+        assert_eq!(*fields.field1, "hello");
+        assert_eq!(*fields.field2, 99u32);
+    }
+
+    // Verifies that casting the counterpart back to `Verified<T>` via a raw
+    // pointer lands on the original address — confirms the round-trip is a
+    // pure reinterpretation.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_ref_cast_roundtrip() {
+        let v = verify(MyStruct {
+            field1: "x".into(),
+            field2: 7u32,
+        });
+        let fields: &VerifiedMyStruct<u32, Root> = v.inherit_ref();
+        let back_ptr =
+            fields as *const VerifiedMyStruct<u32, Root> as *const Verified<MyStruct<u32>>;
+        assert_eq!(
+            back_ptr as *const u8, &v as *const _ as *const u8,
+            "cast of counterpart must point back to the same Verified<T>"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // ZST fields must still produce a counterpart with identical layout — the
+    // const asserts in `reinterpret_layout_ref` guard this at monomorphization.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_ref_with_zst_field() {
+        #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
+        #[repr(C)]
+        struct WithZst {
+            pub unit: (),
+            pub val: u64,
+        }
+
+        let v = Verified::<WithZst>::new_unchecked(WithZst { unit: (), val: 777 });
+        let fields = v.inherit_ref();
+        assert_eq!(*fields.val, 777);
+        assert_eq!(*fields.unit, ());
+    }
+
+    // --- inherit ---
+
+    // Verifies that `inherit` preserves field values in the owned counterpart.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_field_values() {
+        let v = verify(MyStruct {
+            field1: "world".into(),
+            field2: 1234u64,
+        });
+        let VerifiedMyStruct { field1, field2 } = v.inherit();
+        assert_eq!(*field1, "world");
+        assert_eq!(*field2, 1234u64);
+    }
+
+    // Verifies that `inherit` does not double-drop the inner value.
+    // If `ManuallyDrop` handling is wrong, running under Miri or with a drop
+    // counter catches a double-free.
+    #[test]
+    fn inherit_no_double_drop() {
+        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+
+        static DROP_COUNT: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
+
+        struct DropCounter;
+        impl Drop for DropCounter {
+            fn drop(&mut self) {
+                DROP_COUNT.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+            }
+        }
+
+        #[derive(VerifiedFields!)]
+        #[repr(C)]
+        struct WithDrop {
+            pub val: DropCounter,
+        }
+
+        DROP_COUNT.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
+        {
+            let v = Verified::<WithDrop>::new_unchecked(WithDrop { val: DropCounter });
+            let _ = v.inherit();
+        }
+        assert_eq!(
+            DROP_COUNT.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
+            1,
+            "DropCounter must be dropped exactly once"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // --- Verified::from_ref ---
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_ref_is_same_address() {
+        let val = 42u32;
+        let verified: &Verified<u32> = Verified::from_ref(&val);
+        assert_eq!(
+            &val as *const u32 as *const u8, verified as *const _ as *const u8,
+            "from_ref must alias the original reference, not copy the value"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_ref_value_preserved() {
+        let val = String::from("test");
+        let verified: &Verified<String> = Verified::from_ref(&val);
+        assert_eq!(**verified, "test");
+    }
+
+    // --- AsRef<Verified<T>> for Verified<&T> ---
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verified_ref_as_ref_is_same_address() {
+        let val = 99u32;
+        let vref: Verified<&u32> = Verified::new_unchecked(&val);
+        let v: &Verified<u32> = vref.as_ref();
+        assert_eq!(
+            &val as *const u32 as *const u8, v as *const _ as *const u8,
+            "AsRef<Verified<T>> for Verified<&T> must alias the referent, not copy it"
+        );
+    }
+}
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use rand::{
    rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
 };

-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};

 pub mod encryption;
 pub mod integrity;
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ mod tests {
        derive_key,
        encryption::v1::{Nonce, generate_salt},
    };
-    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
+    use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};

    #[test]
    pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/models.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/db/models.rs
@@ -72,6 +72,40 @@ pub mod types {
            Ok(SqliteTimestamp(datetime))
        }
    }
+
+    /// Key algorithm stored in the `useragent_client.key_type` column.
+    /// Values must stay stable — they are persisted in the database.
+    #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, FromSqlRow, AsExpression, strum::FromRepr)]
+    #[diesel(sql_type = Integer)]
+    #[repr(i32)]
+    pub enum KeyType {
+        Ed25519 = 1,
+        EcdsaSecp256k1 = 2,
+        Rsa = 3,
+    }
+
+    impl ToSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
+        fn to_sql<'b>(
+            &'b self,
+            out: &mut diesel::serialize::Output<'b, '_, Sqlite>,
+        ) -> diesel::serialize::Result {
+            out.set_value(*self as i32);
+            Ok(IsNull::No)
+        }
+    }
+
+    impl FromSql<Integer, Sqlite> for KeyType {
+        fn from_sql(
+            mut bytes: <Sqlite as diesel::backend::Backend>::RawValue<'_>,
+        ) -> diesel::deserialize::Result<Self> {
+            let Some(SqliteType::Long) = bytes.value_type() else {
+                return Err("Expected Integer for KeyType".into());
+            };
+            let discriminant = bytes.read_long();
+            KeyType::from_repr(discriminant as i32)
+                .ok_or_else(|| format!("Unknown KeyType discriminant: {discriminant}").into())
+        }
+    }
 }
 pub use types::*;

@@ -210,6 +244,7 @@ pub struct UseragentClient {
    pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
    pub created_at: SqliteTimestamp,
    pub updated_at: SqliteTimestamp,
+    pub key_type: KeyType,
 }

 #[derive(Models, Queryable, Debug, Insertable, Selectable)]
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/mod.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/mod.rs
@@ -1,35 +1,29 @@
 pub mod abi;
 pub mod safe_signer;

-use alloy::primitives::Address;
 use alloy::{
    consensus::TxEip1559,
    primitives::{TxKind, U256},
 };
 use chrono::Utc;
-use diesel::{
-    ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, SelectableHelper,
-    insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite, update,
-};
+use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, QueryResult, insert_into, sqlite::Sqlite};
 use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection, RunQueryDsl};
 use kameo::actor::ActorRef;

 use crate::{
    actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
-    crypto::integrity,
+    crypto::integrity::{self, Verified, VerifiedEntity, verified::VerifiedFieldsAccessor},
    db::{
        self, DatabaseError,
        models::{
-            EvmBasicGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrant, EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget,
-            EvmEtherTransferLimit, EvmTokenTransferGrant, EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit,
-            EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
+            EvmBasicGrant, EvmWalletAccess, NewEvmBasicGrant, NewEvmTransactionLog, SqliteTimestamp,
        },
        schema::{self, evm_transaction_log},
    },
    evm::policies::{
        CombinedSettings, DatabaseID, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Grant, Policy,
-        SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, VolumeRateLimit,
-        ether_transfer::EtherTransfer, token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
+        SharedGrantSettings, SpecificGrant, SpecificMeaning, ether_transfer::EtherTransfer,
+        token_transfers::TokenTransfer,
    },
 };

@@ -159,12 +153,39 @@ impl Engine {
    {
        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;

-        let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
+        let verified_settings =
+            match integrity::lookup_verified_from_query(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, |conn| {
+                let context = context.clone();
+                Box::pin(async move {
+                    let grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, conn)
+                        .await
+                        .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
+                        .ok_or_else(|| DatabaseError::from(diesel::result::Error::NotFound))?;
+
+                    Ok::<_, DatabaseError>((grant.common_settings_id, grant.settings))
+                })
+            })
+            .await
+            {
+                Ok(verified) => verified,
+                Err(integrity::Error::Database(DatabaseError::Connection(
+                    diesel::result::Error::NotFound,
+                ))) => return Err(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant),
+                Err(err) => return Err(PolicyError::Integrity(err)),
+            };
+
+        let mut grant = P::try_find_grant(&context, &mut conn)
            .await
            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?
            .ok_or(PolicyError::NoMatchingGrant)?;

-        integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &self.keyholder, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
+        // IMPORTANT: policy evaluation uses extra non-integrity fields from Grant
+        // (e.g., per-policy ids), so we currently reload Grant after the query-native
+        // integrity check over canonicalized settings.
+        grant.settings = verified_settings
+            .inherit()
+            .entity
+            .drop_verification_provenance();

        let mut violations = check_shared_constraints(
            &context,
@@ -220,7 +241,7 @@ impl Engine {
    pub async fn create_grant<P: Policy>(
        &self,
        full_grant: CombinedSettings<P::Settings>,
-    ) -> Result<i32, DatabaseError>
+    ) -> Result<Verified<i32>, DatabaseError>
    where
        P::Settings: Clone,
    {
@@ -264,169 +285,23 @@ impl Engine {

                    P::create_grant(&basic_grant, &full_grant.specific, conn).await?;

+                    let verified_entity_id =
                        integrity::sign_entity(conn, &keyholder, &full_grant, basic_grant.id)
                            .await
                            .map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;

-                    QueryResult::Ok(basic_grant.id)
+                    QueryResult::Ok(verified_entity_id)
                })
            })
            .await?;

-        Ok(id)
-    }
-
-    pub async fn revoke_grant(
-        &self,
-        basic_grant_id: i32,
-    ) -> Result<(), DatabaseError> {
-        let mut conn = self.db.get().await.map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;
-        let keyholder = self.keyholder.clone();
-
-        conn.transaction(|conn| {
-            Box::pin(async move {
-                use crate::db::schema::{
-                    evm_basic_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant, evm_ether_transfer_grant_target,
-                    evm_ether_transfer_limit, evm_token_transfer_grant,
-                    evm_token_transfer_volume_limit,
-                };
-
-                update(evm_basic_grant::table)
-                    .filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(basic_grant_id))
-                    .set(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq(SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now())))
-                    .execute(conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-                let basic_grant: EvmBasicGrant = evm_basic_grant::table
-                    .filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(basic_grant_id))
-                    .select(EvmBasicGrant::as_select())
-                    .first(conn)
-                    .await?;
-
-                let shared = SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?;
-
-                if let Some(ether_grant) = evm_ether_transfer_grant::table
-                    .filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(basic_grant_id))
-                    .select(EvmEtherTransferGrant::as_select())
-                    .first(conn)
-                    .await
-                    .optional()?
-                {
-                    let target_rows: Vec<EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget> =
-                        evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::table
-                            .filter(evm_ether_transfer_grant_target::grant_id.eq(ether_grant.id))
-                            .select(EvmEtherTransferGrantTarget::as_select())
-                            .load(conn)
-                            .await?;
-                    let targets: Vec<Address> = target_rows
-                        .into_iter()
-                        .filter_map(|target| {
-                            let arr: [u8; 20] = target.address.try_into().ok()?;
-                            Some(Address::from(arr))
-                        })
-                        .collect();
-
-                    let limit: EvmEtherTransferLimit = evm_ether_transfer_limit::table
-                        .filter(evm_ether_transfer_limit::id.eq(ether_grant.limit_id))
-                        .select(EvmEtherTransferLimit::as_select())
-                        .first(conn)
-                        .await?;
-
-                    let settings = CombinedSettings {
-                        shared: shared.clone(),
-                        specific: crate::evm::policies::ether_transfer::Settings {
-                            target: targets,
-                            limit: VolumeRateLimit {
-                                max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(
-                                    |err| {
-                                        diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
-                                    },
-                                )?,
-                                window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
-                            },
-                        },
-                    };
-
-                    integrity::sign_entity(conn, &keyholder, &settings, basic_grant_id)
-                        .await
-                        .map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
-
-                    return QueryResult::Ok(());
-                }
-
-                if let Some(token_grant) = evm_token_transfer_grant::table
-                    .filter(evm_token_transfer_grant::basic_grant_id.eq(basic_grant_id))
-                    .select(EvmTokenTransferGrant::as_select())
-                    .first(conn)
-                    .await
-                    .optional()?
-                {
-                    let volume_limit_rows: Vec<EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit> =
-                        evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::table
-                            .filter(evm_token_transfer_volume_limit::grant_id.eq(token_grant.id))
-                            .select(EvmTokenTransferVolumeLimit::as_select())
-                            .load(conn)
-                            .await?;
-                    let volume_limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = volume_limit_rows
-                        .into_iter()
-                        .map(|row| {
-                            Ok(VolumeRateLimit {
-                                max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&row.max_volume).map_err(
-                                    |err| {
-                                        diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
-                                    },
-                                )?,
-                                window: chrono::Duration::seconds(row.window_secs as i64),
-                            })
-                        })
-                        .collect::<QueryResult<Vec<_>>>()?;
-
-                    let target: Option<Address> = match token_grant.receiver {
-                        None => None,
-                        Some(bytes) => {
-                            let arr: [u8; 20] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
-                                diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
-                                    "Invalid receiver address length".into(),
-                                )
-                            })?;
-                            Some(Address::from(arr))
-                        }
-                    };
-
-                    let token_contract: [u8; 20] =
-                        token_grant.token_contract.clone().try_into().map_err(|_| {
-                            diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(
-                                "Invalid token contract address length".into(),
-                            )
-                        })?;
-
-                    let settings = CombinedSettings {
-                        shared,
-                        specific: crate::evm::policies::token_transfers::Settings {
-                            token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
-                            target,
-                            volume_limits,
-                        },
-                    };
-
-                    integrity::sign_entity(conn, &keyholder, &settings, basic_grant_id)
-                        .await
-                        .map_err(|_| diesel::result::Error::RollbackTransaction)?;
-
-                    return QueryResult::Ok(());
-                }
-
-                Err(diesel::result::Error::NotFound)
-            })
-        })
-        .await
-        .map_err(DatabaseError::from)
+        Ok(id.unqualify_origin())
    }

    async fn list_one_kind<Kind: Policy, Y>(
        &self,
        conn: &mut impl AsyncConnection<Backend = Sqlite>,
-    ) -> Result<impl Iterator<Item = Grant<Y>>, ListError>
+    ) -> Result<Vec<Grant<Y>>, ListError>
    where
        Y: From<Kind::Settings>,
    {
@@ -434,16 +309,32 @@ impl Engine {
            .await
            .map_err(DatabaseError::from)?;

-        // Verify integrity of all grants before returning any results
-        for grant in &all_grants {
-            integrity::verify_entity(conn, &self.keyholder, &grant.settings, grant.id).await?;
+        let mut verified_grants = Vec::with_capacity(all_grants.len());
+
+        // Verify integrity of all grants before returning any results.
+        for grant in all_grants {
+            let VerifiedEntity {
+                entity: verified_settings,
+                entity_id: _,
+            } = integrity::verify_entity(
+                conn,
+                &self.keyholder,
+                grant.settings,
+                grant.common_settings_id,
+            )
+            .await?
+            .inherit();
+
+            verified_grants.push(Grant {
+                id: grant.id,
+                common_settings_id: grant.common_settings_id,
+                settings: verified_settings
+                    .drop_verification_provenance()
+                    .generalize(),
+            });
        }

-        Ok(all_grants.into_iter().map(|g| Grant {
-            id: g.id,
-            common_settings_id: g.common_settings_id,
-            settings: g.settings.generalize(),
-        }))
+        Ok(verified_grants)
    }

    pub async fn list_all_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<Grant<SpecificGrant>>, ListError> {
@@ -502,15 +393,11 @@ impl Engine {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use alloy::primitives::{Address, Bytes, U256, address};
-    use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
    use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
    use diesel::{SelectableHelper, insert_into};
    use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-    use kameo::{actor::ActorRef, prelude::Spawn};
    use rstest::rstest;

-    use crate::actors::keyholder::{Bootstrap, KeyHolder};
-    use crate::crypto::integrity;
    use crate::db::{
        self, DatabaseConnection,
        models::{
@@ -518,10 +405,8 @@ mod tests {
        },
        schema::{evm_basic_grant, evm_transaction_log},
    };
-    use crate::evm::policies::ether_transfer::EtherTransfer;
    use crate::evm::policies::{
-        CombinedSettings, EvalContext, EvalViolation, Policy, SharedGrantSettings,
-        TransactionRateLimit, VolumeRateLimit,
+        EvalContext, EvalViolation, SharedGrantSettings, TransactionRateLimit,
    };

    use super::check_shared_constraints;
@@ -553,7 +438,6 @@ mod tests {
            chain: CHAIN_ID,
            valid_from: None,
            valid_until: None,
-            revoked_at: None,
            max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
            max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
            rate_limit: None,
@@ -756,111 +640,4 @@ mod tests {
            assert!(violations.is_empty());
        }
    }
-
-    async fn bootstrapped_keyholder(db: &db::DatabasePool) -> ActorRef<KeyHolder> {
-        let actor = KeyHolder::spawn(KeyHolder::new(db.clone()).await.unwrap());
-        actor
-            .ask(Bootstrap {
-                seal_key_raw: SafeCell::new(b"integrity-test-seal-key".to_vec()),
-            })
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-        actor
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn revoke_grant_preserves_revoked_integrity() {
-        use crate::db::schema::evm_basic_grant;
-        use diesel::ExpressionMethods as _;
-
-        let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
-        let keyholder = bootstrapped_keyholder(&db).await;
-        let engine = super::Engine::new(db.clone(), keyholder.clone());
-
-        let full_grant = CombinedSettings {
-            shared: SharedGrantSettings {
-                wallet_access_id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
-                chain: CHAIN_ID,
-                valid_from: None,
-                valid_until: None,
-                revoked_at: None,
-                max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
-                max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
-                rate_limit: None,
-            },
-            specific: crate::evm::policies::ether_transfer::Settings {
-                target: vec![RECIPIENT],
-                limit: VolumeRateLimit {
-                    max_volume: U256::from(100u64),
-                    window: Duration::hours(1),
-                },
-            },
-        };
-
-        let grant_id = engine
-            .create_grant::<EtherTransfer>(full_grant)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        engine.revoke_grant(grant_id).await.unwrap();
-
-        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-        diesel::update(evm_basic_grant::table)
-            .filter(evm_basic_grant::id.eq(grant_id))
-            .set(evm_basic_grant::revoked_at.eq::<Option<SqliteTimestamp>>(None))
-            .execute(&mut conn)
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let wallet_access = EvmWalletAccess {
-            id: WALLET_ACCESS_ID,
-            wallet_id: 10,
-            client_id: 20,
-            created_at: SqliteTimestamp(Utc::now()),
-        };
-        let context = EvalContext {
-            target: wallet_access,
-            chain: CHAIN_ID,
-            to: RECIPIENT,
-            value: U256::ONE,
-            calldata: Bytes::new(),
-            max_fee_per_gas: 1,
-            max_priority_fee_per_gas: 1,
-        };
-
-        let grant = crate::evm::policies::ether_transfer::EtherTransfer::try_find_grant(
-            &context, &mut conn,
-        )
-        .await
-        .unwrap()
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let result =
-            integrity::verify_entity(&mut conn, &keyholder, &grant.settings, grant.id).await;
-
-        assert!(matches!(
-            result,
-            Err(crate::crypto::integrity::Error::MacMismatch { .. })
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn shared_settings_hash_changes_when_revoked_at_changes() {
-        use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
-        use sha2::Digest;
-
-        let active = shared_settings();
-        let revoked = SharedGrantSettings {
-            revoked_at: Some(Utc::now()),
-            ..shared_settings()
-        };
-
-        let mut active_hash = sha2::Sha256::new();
-        active.hash(&mut active_hash);
-
-        let mut revoked_hash = sha2::Sha256::new();
-        revoked.hash(&mut revoked_hash);
-
-        assert_ne!(active_hash.finalize(), revoked_hash.finalize());
-    }
 }
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies.rs
@@ -127,26 +127,25 @@ pub enum SpecificMeaning {
    TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Meaning),
 }

-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
 pub struct TransactionRateLimit {
    pub count: u32,
    pub window: Duration,
 }

-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
 pub struct VolumeRateLimit {
    pub max_volume: U256,
    pub window: Duration,
 }

-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
 pub struct SharedGrantSettings {
    pub wallet_access_id: i32,
    pub chain: ChainId,

    pub valid_from: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
    pub valid_until: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
-    pub revoked_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,

    pub max_gas_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
    pub max_priority_fee_per_gas: Option<U256>,
@@ -161,7 +160,6 @@ impl SharedGrantSettings {
            chain: model.chain_id as u64, // safe because chain_id is stored as i32 but is guaranteed to be a valid ChainId by the API when creating grants
            valid_from: model.valid_from.map(Into::into),
            valid_until: model.valid_until.map(Into::into),
-            revoked_at: model.revoked_at.map(Into::into),
            max_gas_fee_per_gas: model
                .max_gas_fee_per_gas
                .map(|b| utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&b))
@@ -202,7 +200,7 @@ pub enum SpecificGrant {
    TokenTransfer(token_transfers::Settings),
 }

-#[derive(Debug, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct CombinedSettings<PolicyGrant> {
    pub shared: SharedGrantSettings,
    pub specific: PolicyGrant,
@@ -221,3 +219,38 @@ impl<P: Integrable> Integrable for CombinedSettings<P> {
    const KIND: &'static str = P::KIND;
    const VERSION: i32 = P::VERSION;
 }
+
+use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
+
+impl Hashable for TransactionRateLimit {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.count.hash(hasher);
+        self.window.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
+
+impl Hashable for VolumeRateLimit {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.max_volume.hash(hasher);
+        self.window.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
+
+impl Hashable for SharedGrantSettings {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.wallet_access_id.hash(hasher);
+        self.chain.hash(hasher);
+        self.valid_from.hash(hasher);
+        self.valid_until.hash(hasher);
+        self.max_gas_fee_per_gas.hash(hasher);
+        self.max_priority_fee_per_gas.hash(hasher);
+        self.rate_limit.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
+
+impl<P: Hashable> Hashable for CombinedSettings<P> {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.shared.hash(hasher);
+        self.specific.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/ether_transfer/mod.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/ether_transfer/mod.rs
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
 }

 // A grant for ether transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct Settings {
    pub target: Vec<Address>,
    pub limit: VolumeRateLimit,
@@ -61,6 +61,15 @@ impl Integrable for Settings {
    const KIND: &'static str = "EtherTransfer";
 }

+use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
+
+impl Hashable for Settings {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.target.hash(hasher);
+        self.limit.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
+
 impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
    fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
        SpecificGrant::EtherTransfer(val)
@@ -101,7 +110,8 @@ async fn check_rate_limits(
    let mut violations = Vec::new();
    let window = grant.settings.specific.limit.window;

-    let past_transaction = query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.id, window, db).await?;
+    let past_transaction =
+        query_relevant_past_transaction(grant.common_settings_id, window, db).await?;

    let window_start = chrono::Utc::now() - grant.settings.specific.limit.window;
    let prospective_cumulative_volume: U256 = past_transaction
@@ -240,21 +250,20 @@ impl Policy for EtherTransfer {
            })
            .collect();

-        let settings = Settings {
-            target: targets,
-            limit: VolumeRateLimit {
-                max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume)
-                    .map_err(|err| diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err)))?,
-                window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
-            },
-        };
-
        Ok(Some(Grant {
            id: grant.id,
            common_settings_id: grant.basic_grant_id,
            settings: CombinedSettings {
                shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
-                specific: settings,
+                specific: Settings {
+                    target: targets,
+                    limit: VolumeRateLimit {
+                        max_volume: utils::try_bytes_to_u256(&limit.max_volume).map_err(|err| {
+                            diesel::result::Error::DeserializationError(Box::new(err))
+                        })?,
+                        window: chrono::Duration::seconds(limit.window_secs as i64),
+                    },
+                },
            },
        }))
    }
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/ether_transfer/tests.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/ether_transfer/tests.rs
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
        chain: CHAIN_ID,
        valid_from: None,
        valid_until: None,
-        revoked_at: None,
        max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
        max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
        rate_limit: None,
@@ -341,7 +340,7 @@ proptest::proptest! {
    ) {
        use rand::{SeedableRng, seq::SliceRandom};
        use sha2::Digest;
-        use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
+        use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;

        let addrs: Vec<Address> = raw_addrs.iter().map(|b| Address::from(*b)).collect();
        let mut shuffled = addrs.clone();
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/token_transfers/mod.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/token_transfers/mod.rs
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ impl From<Meaning> for SpecificMeaning {
 }

 // A grant for token transfers, which can be scoped to specific target addresses and volume limits
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, arbiter_macros::Hashable)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct Settings {
    pub token_contract: Address,
    pub target: Option<Address>,
@@ -72,6 +72,16 @@ impl Integrable for Settings {
    const KIND: &'static str = "TokenTransfer";
 }

+use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;
+
+impl Hashable for Settings {
+    fn hash<H: sha2::Digest>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+        self.token_contract.hash(hasher);
+        self.target.hash(hasher);
+        self.volume_limits.hash(hasher);
+    }
+}
+
 impl From<Settings> for SpecificGrant {
    fn from(val: Settings) -> SpecificGrant {
        SpecificGrant::TokenTransfer(val)
@@ -276,18 +286,16 @@ impl Policy for TokenTransfer {
            }
        };

-        let settings = Settings {
-            token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
-            target,
-            volume_limits,
-        };
-
        Ok(Some(Grant {
            id: token_grant.id,
            common_settings_id: token_grant.basic_grant_id,
            settings: CombinedSettings {
                shared: SharedGrantSettings::try_from_model(basic_grant)?,
-                specific: settings,
+                specific: Settings {
+                    token_contract: Address::from(token_contract),
+                    target,
+                    volume_limits,
+                },
            },
        }))
    }
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/token_transfers/tests.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/policies/token_transfers/tests.rs
@@ -95,7 +95,6 @@ fn shared() -> SharedGrantSettings {
        chain: CHAIN_ID,
        valid_from: None,
        valid_until: None,
-        revoked_at: None,
        max_gas_fee_per_gas: None,
        max_priority_fee_per_gas: None,
        rate_limit: None,
@@ -420,7 +419,7 @@ proptest::proptest! {
    ) {
        use rand::{SeedableRng, seq::SliceRandom};
        use sha2::Digest;
-        use arbiter_crypto::hashing::Hashable;
+        use crate::crypto::integrity::hashing::Hashable;

        let limits: Vec<VolumeRateLimit> = raw_limits
            .iter()
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/safe_signer.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/evm/safe_signer.rs
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 use std::sync::Mutex;

+use crate::safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 use alloy::{
    consensus::SignableTransaction,
    network::{TxSigner, TxSignerSync},
    primitives::{Address, B256, ChainId, Signature},
    signers::{Error, Result, Signer, SignerSync, utils::secret_key_to_address},
 };
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use k256::ecdsa::{self, RecoveryId, SigningKey, signature::hazmat::PrehashSigner};

--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/client/auth.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/client/auth.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn;
 use arbiter_proto::{
    ClientMetadata,
    proto::{
@@ -23,6 +22,7 @@ use tracing::warn;

 use crate::{
    actors::client::{self, ClientConnection, auth},
+    crypto::integrity::Verified,
    grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
 };

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ impl<'a> AuthTransportAdapter<'a> {
        match response {
            auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => {
                AuthResponsePayload::Challenge(ProtoAuthChallenge {
-                    pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes(),
+                    pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
                    nonce,
                })
            }
@@ -161,7 +161,11 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
                        .await;
                    return None;
                };
-                let Ok(pubkey) = authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey.as_slice()) else {
+                let Ok(pubkey) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(pubkey) else {
+                    let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
+                    return None;
+                };
+                let Ok(pubkey) = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey) else {
                    let _ = self.send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidKey).await;
                    return None;
                };
@@ -171,7 +175,7 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
                })
            }
            AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeSolution(ProtoAuthChallengeSolution { signature }) => {
-                let Ok(signature) = authn::Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) else {
+                let Ok(signature) = ed25519_dalek::Signature::try_from(signature.as_slice()) else {
                    let _ = self
                        .send_auth_result(ProtoAuthResult::InvalidSignature)
                        .await;
@@ -197,7 +201,7 @@ pub async fn start(
    conn: &mut ClientConnection,
    bi: &mut GrpcBi<ClientRequest, ClientResponse>,
    request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
-) -> Result<i32, auth::Error> {
+) -> Result<Verified<i32>, auth::Error> {
    let mut transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
    client::auth::authenticate(conn, &mut transport).await
 }
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/user_agent/auth.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/user_agent/auth.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn;
 use arbiter_proto::{
    proto::user_agent::{
        UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse,
@@ -6,7 +5,8 @@ use arbiter_proto::{
            self as proto_auth, AuthChallenge as ProtoAuthChallenge,
            AuthChallengeRequest as ProtoAuthChallengeRequest,
            AuthChallengeSolution as ProtoAuthChallengeSolution, AuthResult as ProtoAuthResult,
-            request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload, response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
+            KeyType as ProtoKeyType, request::Payload as AuthRequestPayload,
+            response::Payload as AuthResponsePayload,
        },
        user_agent_request::Payload as UserAgentRequestPayload,
        user_agent_response::Payload as UserAgentResponsePayload,
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ use tonic::Status;
 use tracing::warn;

 use crate::{
-    actors::user_agent::{UserAgentConnection, auth},
+    actors::user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, auth},
+    db::models::KeyType,
    grpc::request_tracker::RequestTracker,
 };

@@ -140,9 +141,28 @@ impl Receiver<auth::Inbound> for AuthTransportAdapter<'_> {
            AuthRequestPayload::ChallengeRequest(ProtoAuthChallengeRequest {
                pubkey,
                bootstrap_token,
-                key_type: _,
+                key_type,
            }) => {
-                let Ok(pubkey) = authn::PublicKey::try_from(pubkey.as_slice()) else {
+                let Ok(key_type) = ProtoKeyType::try_from(key_type) else {
+                    warn!(
+                        event = "received request with invalid key type",
+                        "grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
+                    );
+                    return None;
+                };
+                let key_type = match key_type {
+                    ProtoKeyType::Ed25519 => KeyType::Ed25519,
+                    ProtoKeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1 => KeyType::EcdsaSecp256k1,
+                    ProtoKeyType::Rsa => KeyType::Rsa,
+                    ProtoKeyType::Unspecified => {
+                        warn!(
+                            event = "received request with unspecified key type",
+                            "grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
+                        );
+                        return None;
+                    }
+                };
+                let Ok(pubkey) = AuthPublicKey::try_from((key_type, pubkey)) else {
                    warn!(
                        event = "received request with invalid public key",
                        "grpc.useragent.auth_adapter"
@@ -168,7 +188,7 @@ pub async fn start(
    conn: &mut UserAgentConnection,
    bi: &mut GrpcBi<UserAgentRequest, UserAgentResponse>,
    request_tracker: &mut RequestTracker,
-) -> Result<authn::PublicKey, auth::Error> {
+) -> Result<AuthPublicKey, auth::Error> {
    let transport = AuthTransportAdapter::new(bi, request_tracker);
    auth::authenticate(conn, transport).await
 }
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/user_agent/evm.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/user_agent/evm.rs
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ async fn handle_wallet_create(
 ) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
    let result = match actor.ask(HandleEvmWalletCreate {}).await {
        Ok((wallet_id, address)) => WalletCreateResult::Wallet(WalletEntry {
-            id: wallet_id,
+            id: wallet_id.drop_verification_provenance(),
            address: address.to_vec(),
        }),
        Err(err) => {
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ async fn handle_grant_list(
                })
                .collect(),
        }),
+        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed)) => {
+            EvmGrantListResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::VaultSealed.into())
+        }
        Err(err) => {
            warn!(error = ?err, "Failed to list EVM grants");
            EvmGrantListResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::Internal.into())
@@ -147,7 +150,7 @@ async fn handle_grant_create(
        .try_convert()?;

    let result = match actor.ask(HandleGrantCreate { basic, grant }).await {
-        Ok(grant_id) => EvmGrantCreateResult::GrantId(grant_id),
+        Ok(grant_id) => EvmGrantCreateResult::GrantId(grant_id.drop_verification_provenance()),
        Err(kameo::error::SendError::HandlerError(GrantMutationError::VaultSealed)) => {
            EvmGrantCreateResult::Error(ProtoEvmError::VaultSealed.into())
        }
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/user_agent/inbound.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/user_agent/inbound.rs
@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ impl TryConvert for ProtoSharedSettings {
                .valid_until
                .map(ProtoTimestamp::try_convert)
                .transpose()?,
-            revoked_at: None,
            max_gas_fee_per_gas: self
                .max_gas_fee_per_gas
                .as_deref()
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/user_agent/sdk_client.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/grpc/user_agent/sdk_client.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::authn;
 use arbiter_proto::proto::{
    shared::ClientInfo as ProtoClientMetadata,
    user_agent::{
@@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
    match oob {
        OutOfBand::ClientConnectionRequest { profile } => wrap_sdk_client_response(
            SdkClientResponsePayload::ConnectionRequest(ProtoSdkClientConnectionRequest {
-                pubkey: profile.pubkey.to_bytes(),
+                pubkey: profile.pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
                info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
                    name: profile.metadata.name,
                    description: profile.metadata.description,
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ pub(super) fn out_of_band_payload(oob: OutOfBand) -> UserAgentResponsePayload {
        ),
        OutOfBand::ClientConnectionCancel { pubkey } => wrap_sdk_client_response(
            SdkClientResponsePayload::ConnectionCancel(ProtoSdkClientConnectionCancel {
-                pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes(),
+                pubkey: pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec(),
            }),
        ),
    }
@@ -90,8 +89,10 @@ async fn handle_connection_response(
    actor: &ActorRef<UserAgentSession>,
    resp: ProtoSdkClientConnectionResponse,
 ) -> Result<Option<UserAgentResponsePayload>, Status> {
-    let pubkey = authn::PublicKey::try_from(resp.pubkey.as_slice())
-        .map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid ML-DSA public key"))?;
+    let pubkey_bytes = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(resp.pubkey)
+        .map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid Ed25519 public key length"))?;
+    let pubkey = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey_bytes)
+        .map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("Invalid Ed25519 public key"))?;

    actor
        .ask(HandleNewClientApprove {
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ async fn handle_list(
                .into_iter()
                .map(|(client, metadata)| ProtoSdkClientEntry {
                    id: client.id,
-                    pubkey: client.public_key.to_vec(),
+                    pubkey: client.public_key,
                    info: Some(ProtoClientMetadata {
                        name: metadata.name,
                        description: metadata.description,
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/lib.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/lib.rs
@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
-#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
 use crate::context::ServerContext;

+#[macro_use]
+extern crate macro_rules_attribute;
+
 pub mod actors;
 pub mod context;
 pub mod crypto;
 pub mod db;
 pub mod evm;
 pub mod grpc;
+pub mod safe_cell;
 pub mod utils;

 pub struct Server {
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/safe_cell.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/safe_cell.rs
@@ -105,11 +105,6 @@ impl<T> SafeCellHandle<T> for MemSafeCell<T> {

 fn abort_memory_breach(action: &str, err: &memsafe::error::MemoryError) -> ! {
    eprintln!("fatal {action}: {err}");
-    // SAFETY: Intentionally cause a segmentation fault to prevent further execution in a compromised state.
-    unsafe {
-        let unsafe_pointer = std::ptr::null_mut::<u8>();
-        std::ptr::write_volatile(unsafe_pointer, 0);
-    }
    std::process::abort();
 }

--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/utils.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/src/utils.rs
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+use std::ops::Deref;
+
 struct DeferClosure<F: FnOnce()> {
    f: Option<F>,
 }
@@ -14,3 +16,19 @@ impl<F: FnOnce()> Drop for DeferClosure<F> {
 pub fn defer<F: FnOnce()>(f: F) -> impl Drop + Sized {
    DeferClosure { f: Some(f) }
 }
+
+/// A trait for casting between two transparently wrapped types with identical memory layouts.
+///
+/// [`ReinterpretWrapper`] enables zero-cost conversions between two types (`Self` and `Counterpart`)
+/// that wrap the same underlying data but differ in how that data is presented. Both types must
+/// transparently wrap the same "deref target" and provide bidirectional `AsRef` conversions.
+pub trait ReinterpretWrapper<Counterpart>
+where
+    Self: Deref<Target = Self::Inner> + AsRef<Counterpart>,
+    Counterpart: Deref<Target = Self::Inner> + AsRef<Self>,
+{
+    /// The shared target type that both `Self` and `Counterpart` transparently wrap.
+    type Inner;
+    /// Reinterprets `Self` as `Counterpart`.
+    fn reinterpret(self) -> Counterpart;
+}
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/client/auth.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/client/auth.rs
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::{
-    authn::{self, CLIENT_CONTEXT, format_challenge},
-    safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
-};
 use arbiter_proto::ClientMetadata;
 use arbiter_proto::transport::{Receiver, Sender};
 use arbiter_server::{
@@ -12,10 +8,11 @@ use arbiter_server::{
    },
    crypto::integrity,
    db::{self, schema},
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
 };
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, NullableExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl as _, insert_into};
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, SigningKey, VerifyingKey, signature::Keypair as _};
+use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;

 use super::common::ChannelTransport;

@@ -30,7 +27,7 @@ fn metadata(name: &str, description: Option<&str>, version: Option<&str>) -> Cli
 async fn insert_registered_client(
    db: &db::DatabasePool,
    actors: &GlobalActors,
-    pubkey: VerifyingKey<MlDsa87>,
+    pubkey: ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey,
    metadata: &ClientMetadata,
 ) {
    use arbiter_server::db::schema::{client_metadata, program_client};
@@ -48,7 +45,7 @@ async fn insert_registered_client(
        .unwrap();
    let client_id: i32 = insert_into(program_client::table)
        .values((
-            program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.encode().to_vec()),
+            program_client::public_key.eq(pubkey.to_bytes().to_vec()),
            program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
        ))
        .returning(program_client::id)
@@ -56,36 +53,21 @@ async fn insert_registered_client(
        .await
        .unwrap();

-    integrity::sign_entity(
+    let _ = integrity::sign_entity(
        &mut conn,
        &actors.key_holder,
-        &ClientCredentials {
-            pubkey: pubkey.into(),
-            nonce: 1,
-        },
+        &ClientCredentials { pubkey, nonce: 1 },
        client_id,
    )
    .await
    .unwrap();
 }

-fn sign_client_challenge(
-    key: &SigningKey<MlDsa87>,
-    nonce: i32,
-    pubkey: &authn::PublicKey,
-) -> authn::Signature {
-    let challenge = format_challenge(nonce, &pubkey.to_bytes());
-    key.signing_key()
-        .sign_deterministic(&challenge, CLIENT_CONTEXT)
-        .unwrap()
-        .into()
-}
-
 async fn insert_bootstrap_sentinel_useragent(db: &db::DatabasePool) {
    let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
-    let sentinel_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng())
+    let sentinel_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng())
        .verifying_key()
-        .encode()
+        .to_bytes()
        .to_vec();

    insert_into(schema::useragent_client::table)
@@ -125,11 +107,11 @@ pub async fn test_unregistered_pubkey_rejected() {
        connect_client(props, &mut server_transport).await;
    });

-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());

    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
            metadata: metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
        })
        .await
@@ -145,7 +127,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
    let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;

-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());

    insert_registered_client(
        &db,
@@ -165,7 +147,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
    // Send challenge request
    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
            metadata: metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0")),
        })
        .await
@@ -185,7 +167,8 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
    };

    // Sign the challenge and send solution
-    let signature = sign_client_challenge(&new_key, challenge.1, &challenge.0);
+    let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge.1, challenge.0.as_bytes());
+    let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);

    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
@@ -211,7 +194,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
 pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
    let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
    let requested = metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0"));

    insert_registered_client(&db, &actors, new_key.verifying_key(), &requested).await;
@@ -226,7 +209,7 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {

    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
            metadata: requested,
        })
        .await
@@ -237,7 +220,7 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
        auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
        other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
    };
-    let signature = sign_client_challenge(&new_key, nonce, &pubkey);
+    let signature = new_key.sign(&arbiter_proto::format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes()));
    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
        .await
@@ -268,7 +251,7 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_unchanged_does_not_append_history() {
 pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
    let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;
-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());

    insert_registered_client(
        &db,
@@ -288,7 +271,7 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {

    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
            metadata: metadata("client", Some("new"), Some("2.0.0")),
        })
        .await
@@ -299,7 +282,7 @@ pub async fn test_metadata_change_appends_history_and_repoints_binding() {
        auth::Outbound::AuthChallenge { pubkey, nonce } => (pubkey, nonce),
        other => panic!("Expected AuthChallenge, got {other:?}"),
    };
-    let signature = sign_client_challenge(&new_key, nonce, &pubkey);
+    let signature = new_key.sign(&arbiter_proto::format_challenge(nonce, pubkey.as_bytes()));
    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution { signature })
        .await
@@ -356,7 +339,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch() {
    let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
    let actors = spawn_test_actors(&db).await;

-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
    let requested = metadata("client", Some("desc"), Some("1.0.0"));

    {
@@ -374,7 +357,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch() {
            .unwrap();
        insert_into(program_client::table)
            .values((
-                program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().encode().to_vec()),
+                program_client::public_key.eq(new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec()),
                program_client::metadata_id.eq(metadata_id),
            ))
            .execute(&mut conn)
@@ -391,7 +374,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch() {

    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key(),
            metadata: requested,
        })
        .await
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/common/mod.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/common/mod.rs
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 use arbiter_proto::transport::{Bi, Error, Receiver, Sender};
 use arbiter_server::{
    actors::keyholder::KeyHolder,
    db::{self, schema},
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
 };
-
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use diesel::QueryDsl;
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/concurrency.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/concurrency.rs
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};

-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 use arbiter_server::{
    actors::keyholder::{CreateNew, Error, KeyHolder},
    db::{self, models, schema},
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
 };
-
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::sql_query};
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
 use kameo::actor::{ActorRef, Spawn as _};
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/lifecycle.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/lifecycle.rs
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 use arbiter_server::{
    actors::keyholder::{Error, KeyHolder},
    crypto::encryption::v1::{Nonce, ROOT_KEY_TAG},
    db::{self, models, schema},
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
 };
-
 use diesel::{QueryDsl, SelectableHelper};
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;

--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/storage.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/keyholder/storage.rs
@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
 use std::collections::HashSet;

-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 use arbiter_server::{
    actors::keyholder::Error,
    crypto::encryption::v1::Nonce,
    db::{self, models, schema},
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
 };
-
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, SelectableHelper, dsl::update};
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;

--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent/auth.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent/auth.rs
@@ -1,37 +1,21 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::{
-    authn::{self, USERAGENT_CONTEXT, format_challenge},
-    safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
-};
-
 use arbiter_proto::transport::{Receiver, Sender};
 use arbiter_server::{
    actors::{
        GlobalActors,
        bootstrap::GetToken,
        keyholder::Bootstrap,
-        user_agent::{UserAgentConnection, UserAgentCredentials, auth},
+        user_agent::{AuthPublicKey, UserAgentConnection, UserAgentCredentials, auth},
    },
    crypto::integrity,
    db::{self, schema},
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
 };
 use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, QueryDsl, insert_into};
 use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
-use ml_dsa::{KeyGen, MlDsa87, SigningKey, signature::Keypair as _};
+use ed25519_dalek::Signer as _;

 use super::common::ChannelTransport;

-fn sign_useragent_challenge(
-    key: &SigningKey<MlDsa87>,
-    nonce: i32,
-    pubkey_bytes: &[u8],
-) -> authn::Signature {
-    let challenge = format_challenge(nonce, pubkey_bytes);
-    key.signing_key()
-        .sign_deterministic(&challenge, USERAGENT_CONTEXT)
-        .unwrap()
-        .into()
-}
-
 #[tokio::test]
 #[test_log::test]
 pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
@@ -53,10 +37,10 @@ pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
        auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
    });

-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+            pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
            bootstrap_token: Some(token),
        })
        .await
@@ -79,7 +63,7 @@ pub async fn test_bootstrap_token_auth() {
        .first::<Vec<u8>>(&mut conn)
        .await
        .unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(stored_pubkey, new_key.verifying_key().encode().to_vec());
+    assert_eq!(stored_pubkey, new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec());
 }

 #[tokio::test]
@@ -95,10 +79,10 @@ pub async fn test_bootstrap_invalid_token_auth() {
        auth::authenticate(&mut props, server_transport).await
    });

-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+            pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
            bootstrap_token: Some("invalid_token".to_string()),
        })
        .await
@@ -131,8 +115,8 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
        .await
        .unwrap();

-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().encode().to_vec();
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();

    {
        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -149,13 +133,14 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
            &mut conn,
            &actors.key_holder,
            &UserAgentCredentials {
-                pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+                pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
                nonce: 1,
            },
            id,
        )
        .await
-        .unwrap();
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
    }

    let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
@@ -167,7 +152,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {

    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+            pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
            bootstrap_token: None,
        })
        .await
@@ -185,11 +170,12 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth() {
        Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
    };

-    let signature = sign_useragent_challenge(&new_key, challenge, &pubkey_bytes);
+    let formatted_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge, &pubkey_bytes);
+    let signature = new_key.sign(&formatted_challenge);

    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
-            signature: signature.to_bytes(),
+            signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
        })
        .await
        .unwrap();
@@ -220,8 +206,8 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed()
        .await
        .unwrap();

-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().encode().to_vec();
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();

    {
        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -244,7 +230,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_integrity_tag_mismatch_when_unsealed()

    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+            pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
            bootstrap_token: None,
        })
        .await
@@ -269,8 +255,8 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
        .await
        .unwrap();

-    let new_key = MlDsa87::key_gen(&mut rand::rng());
-    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().encode().to_vec();
+    let new_key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
+    let pubkey_bytes = new_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();

    {
        let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
@@ -287,13 +273,14 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
            &mut conn,
            &actors.key_holder,
            &UserAgentCredentials {
-                pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+                pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
                nonce: 1,
            },
            id,
        )
        .await
-        .unwrap();
+        .unwrap()
+        .drop_verification_provenance();
    }

    let (server_transport, mut test_transport) = ChannelTransport::new();
@@ -305,7 +292,7 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {

    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeRequest {
-            pubkey: new_key.verifying_key().into(),
+            pubkey: AuthPublicKey::Ed25519(new_key.verifying_key()),
            bootstrap_token: None,
        })
        .await
@@ -323,11 +310,12 @@ pub async fn test_challenge_auth_rejects_invalid_signature() {
        Err(err) => panic!("Expected Ok response, got Err({err:?})"),
    };

-    let signature = sign_useragent_challenge(&new_key, challenge + 1, &pubkey_bytes);
+    let wrong_challenge = arbiter_proto::format_challenge(challenge + 1, &pubkey_bytes);
+    let signature = new_key.sign(&wrong_challenge);

    test_transport
        .send(auth::Inbound::AuthChallengeSolution {
-            signature: signature.to_bytes(),
+            signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
        })
        .await
        .unwrap();
--- a/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent/unseal.rs
+++ b/server/crates/arbiter-server/tests/user_agent/unseal.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use arbiter_crypto::safecell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _};
 use arbiter_server::{
    actors::{
        GlobalActors,
@@ -9,8 +8,8 @@ use arbiter_server::{
        },
    },
    db,
+    safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _},
 };
-
 use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInPlace, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::KeyInit};
 use kameo::actor::Spawn as _;
 use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
CleverWild	694c569c08	feat(integrity): introduce sealed provenance markers for `Verified` Some checks failed ci/woodpecker/pr/server-audit Pipeline failed Details ci/woodpecker/pr/server-vet Pipeline failed Details ci/woodpecker/pr/server-lint Pipeline failed Details ci/woodpecker/pr/server-test Pipeline failed Details	2026-04-15 19:45:59 +02:00
CleverWild	bec82e036e	feat(integrity): derive-like macro VerifiedFields that allows to inherit `Verified<T>` type's provenance to all fields of `T` Some checks failed ci/woodpecker/pr/server-audit Pipeline was successful Details ci/woodpecker/pr/server-lint Pipeline was successful Details ci/woodpecker/pr/server-vet Pipeline failed Details ci/woodpecker/pr/server-test Pipeline was successful Details	2026-04-11 03:53:25 +02:00
CleverWild	763058b014	feat(server): unify integrity API and propagate verified IDs through auth/EVM flows Some checks failed ci/woodpecker/pr/server-audit Pipeline was successful Details ci/woodpecker/pr/server-vet Pipeline failed Details ci/woodpecker/pr/server-lint Pipeline was successful Details ci/woodpecker/pr/server-test Pipeline was successful Details	2026-04-07 21:12:36 +02:00