refactor(server): separate crypto by purpose and moved outside of actor into separate module
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77
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs
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77
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs
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@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
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use crate::{crypto::KeyCell, safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _};
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use chacha20poly1305::Key;
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use hmac::Mac as _;
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pub const USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_DERIVE_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/useragent/integrity-key/v1".as_bytes();
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pub const USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/useragent/pubkey-entry/v1".as_bytes();
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/// Computes an integrity tag for a specific domain and payload shape.
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pub fn compute_integrity_tag<'a, I>(
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integrity_key: &mut KeyCell,
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purpose_tag: &[u8],
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data_parts: I,
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) -> [u8; 32]
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where
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I: IntoIterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
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{
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type HmacSha256 = hmac::Hmac<sha2::Sha256>;
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let mut output_tag = [0u8; 32];
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integrity_key.0.read_inline(|integrity_key_bytes: &Key| {
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let mut mac = <HmacSha256 as hmac::Mac>::new_from_slice(integrity_key_bytes.as_ref())
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.expect("HMAC key initialization must not fail for 32-byte key");
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mac.update(purpose_tag);
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for data_part in data_parts {
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mac.update(data_part);
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}
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output_tag.copy_from_slice(&mac.finalize().into_bytes());
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});
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output_tag
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use crate::{crypto::{derive_key, encryption::v1::generate_salt}, safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}};
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use super::{compute_integrity_tag, USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG};
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#[test]
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pub fn integrity_tag_deterministic() {
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let salt = generate_salt();
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let mut integrity_key = derive_key(SafeCell::new(b"password".to_vec()), &salt);
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let key_type = 1i32.to_be_bytes();
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let t1 = compute_integrity_tag(
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&mut integrity_key,
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USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
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[key_type.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
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);
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let t2 = compute_integrity_tag(
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&mut integrity_key,
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USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
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[key_type.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
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);
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assert_eq!(t1, t2);
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}
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#[test]
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pub fn integrity_tag_changes_with_payload() {
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let salt = generate_salt();
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let mut integrity_key = derive_key(SafeCell::new(b"password".to_vec()), &salt);
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let key_type_1 = 1i32.to_be_bytes();
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let key_type_2 = 2i32.to_be_bytes();
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let t1 = compute_integrity_tag(
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&mut integrity_key,
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USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
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[key_type_1.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
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);
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let t2 = compute_integrity_tag(
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&mut integrity_key,
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USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
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[key_type_2.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
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);
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assert_ne!(t1, t2);
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}
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}
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