refactor(server): separate crypto by purpose and moved outside of actor into separate module
This commit is contained in:
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pub mod v1;
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111
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/encryption/v1.rs
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111
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/encryption/v1.rs
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use argon2::password_hash::Salt as ArgonSalt;
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use rand::{
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Rng as _, SeedableRng,
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rngs::{StdRng, SysRng},
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};
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pub const ROOT_KEY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/seal/v1".as_bytes();
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pub const TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/private-key/v1".as_bytes();
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pub const NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
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#[derive(Default)]
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pub struct Nonce(pub [u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
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impl Nonce {
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pub fn increment(&mut self) {
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for i in (0..self.0.len()).rev() {
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if self.0[i] == 0xFF {
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self.0[i] = 0;
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} else {
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self.0[i] += 1;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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self.0.to_vec()
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}
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}
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impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for Nonce {
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type Error = ();
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fn try_from(value: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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if value.len() != NONCE_LENGTH {
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return Err(());
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}
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let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LENGTH];
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nonce.copy_from_slice(value);
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Ok(Self(nonce))
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}
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}
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pub type Salt = [u8; ArgonSalt::RECOMMENDED_LENGTH];
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pub fn generate_salt() -> Salt {
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let mut salt = Salt::default();
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#[allow(
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clippy::unwrap_used,
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reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
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)]
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let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
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rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
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salt
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use std::ops::Deref as _;
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use super::*;
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use crate::{crypto::derive_key, safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}};
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#[test]
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pub fn derive_seal_key_deterministic() {
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static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
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let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
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let password2 = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
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let salt = generate_salt();
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let mut key1 = derive_key(password, &salt);
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let mut key2 = derive_key(password2, &salt);
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let key1_reader = key1.0.read();
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let key2_reader = key2.0.read();
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assert_eq!(key1_reader.deref(), key2_reader.deref());
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}
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#[test]
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pub fn successful_derive() {
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static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
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let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
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let salt = generate_salt();
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let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
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let key_reader = key.0.read();
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let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
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assert_ne!(key_ref.as_slice(), &[0u8; 32][..]);
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}
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#[test]
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// We should fuzz this
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pub fn test_nonce_increment() {
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let mut nonce = Nonce([0u8; NONCE_LENGTH]);
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nonce.increment();
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assert_eq!(
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nonce.0,
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[
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
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]
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);
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}
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}
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1
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/mod.rs
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1
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/mod.rs
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pub mod v1;
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77
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs
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77
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/integrity/v1.rs
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@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
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use crate::{crypto::KeyCell, safe_cell::SafeCellHandle as _};
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use chacha20poly1305::Key;
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use hmac::Mac as _;
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pub const USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_DERIVE_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/useragent/integrity-key/v1".as_bytes();
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pub const USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG: &[u8] = "arbiter/useragent/pubkey-entry/v1".as_bytes();
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/// Computes an integrity tag for a specific domain and payload shape.
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pub fn compute_integrity_tag<'a, I>(
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integrity_key: &mut KeyCell,
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purpose_tag: &[u8],
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data_parts: I,
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) -> [u8; 32]
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where
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I: IntoIterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
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{
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type HmacSha256 = hmac::Hmac<sha2::Sha256>;
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let mut output_tag = [0u8; 32];
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integrity_key.0.read_inline(|integrity_key_bytes: &Key| {
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let mut mac = <HmacSha256 as hmac::Mac>::new_from_slice(integrity_key_bytes.as_ref())
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.expect("HMAC key initialization must not fail for 32-byte key");
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mac.update(purpose_tag);
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for data_part in data_parts {
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mac.update(data_part);
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}
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output_tag.copy_from_slice(&mac.finalize().into_bytes());
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});
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output_tag
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use crate::{crypto::{derive_key, encryption::v1::generate_salt}, safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}};
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use super::{compute_integrity_tag, USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG};
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#[test]
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pub fn integrity_tag_deterministic() {
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let salt = generate_salt();
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let mut integrity_key = derive_key(SafeCell::new(b"password".to_vec()), &salt);
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let key_type = 1i32.to_be_bytes();
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let t1 = compute_integrity_tag(
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&mut integrity_key,
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USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
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[key_type.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
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);
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let t2 = compute_integrity_tag(
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&mut integrity_key,
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USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
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[key_type.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
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);
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assert_eq!(t1, t2);
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}
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#[test]
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pub fn integrity_tag_changes_with_payload() {
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let salt = generate_salt();
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let mut integrity_key = derive_key(SafeCell::new(b"password".to_vec()), &salt);
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let key_type_1 = 1i32.to_be_bytes();
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let key_type_2 = 2i32.to_be_bytes();
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let t1 = compute_integrity_tag(
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&mut integrity_key,
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USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
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[key_type_1.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
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);
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let t2 = compute_integrity_tag(
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&mut integrity_key,
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USERAGENT_INTEGRITY_TAG,
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[key_type_2.as_slice(), b"pubkey".as_ref()],
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);
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assert_ne!(t1, t2);
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}
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}
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153
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs
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153
server/crates/arbiter-server/src/crypto/mod.rs
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@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
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use std::ops::Deref as _;
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use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2};
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use chacha20poly1305::{
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AeadInPlace, Key, KeyInit as _, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce,
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aead::{AeadMut, Error, Payload},
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};
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use rand::{Rng as _, SeedableRng as _, rngs::{StdRng, SysRng}};
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use crate::{safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}};
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pub mod encryption;
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pub mod integrity;
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use encryption::v1::{Nonce, Salt};
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pub struct KeyCell(pub SafeCell<Key>);
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impl From<SafeCell<Key>> for KeyCell {
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fn from(value: SafeCell<Key>) -> Self {
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Self(value)
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<SafeCell<Vec<u8>>> for KeyCell {
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type Error = ();
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fn try_from(mut value: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let value = value.read();
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if value.len() != size_of::<Key>() {
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return Err(());
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}
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let cell = SafeCell::new_inline(|cell_write: &mut Key| {
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cell_write.copy_from_slice(&value);
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});
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Ok(Self(cell))
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}
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}
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impl KeyCell {
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pub fn new_secure_random() -> Self {
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let key = SafeCell::new_inline(|key_buffer: &mut Key| {
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#[allow(
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clippy::unwrap_used,
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reason = "Rng failure is unrecoverable and should panic"
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)]
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let mut rng = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng).unwrap();
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rng.fill_bytes(key_buffer);
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});
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key.into()
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}
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pub fn encrypt_in_place(
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&mut self,
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nonce: &Nonce,
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associated_data: &[u8],
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mut buffer: impl AsMut<Vec<u8>>,
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) -> Result<(), Error> {
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let key_reader = self.0.read();
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let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
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let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
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let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
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let buffer = buffer.as_mut();
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cipher.encrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
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}
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pub fn decrypt_in_place(
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&mut self,
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nonce: &Nonce,
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associated_data: &[u8],
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buffer: &mut SafeCell<Vec<u8>>,
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) -> Result<(), Error> {
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let key_reader = self.0.read();
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let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
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let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
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let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
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let mut buffer = buffer.write();
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let buffer: &mut Vec<u8> = buffer.as_mut();
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cipher.decrypt_in_place(nonce, associated_data, buffer)
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}
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pub fn encrypt(
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&mut self,
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nonce: &Nonce,
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associated_data: &[u8],
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plaintext: impl AsRef<[u8]>,
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) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
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let key_reader = self.0.read();
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let key_ref = key_reader.deref();
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let mut cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key_ref);
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let nonce = XNonce::from_slice(nonce.0.as_ref());
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let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(
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nonce,
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Payload {
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msg: plaintext.as_ref(),
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aad: associated_data,
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},
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)?;
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Ok(ciphertext)
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}
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}
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/// User password might be of different length, have not enough entropy, etc...
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/// Derive a fixed-length key from the password using Argon2id, which is designed for password hashing and key derivation.
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pub fn derive_key(mut password: SafeCell<Vec<u8>>, salt: &Salt) -> KeyCell {
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#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
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let params = argon2::Params::new(262_144, 3, 4, None).unwrap();
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let hasher = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
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let mut key = SafeCell::new(Key::default());
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password.read_inline(|password_source| {
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let mut key_buffer = key.write();
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let key_buffer: &mut [u8] = key_buffer.as_mut();
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#[allow(
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clippy::unwrap_used,
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reason = "Better fail completely than return a weak key"
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)]
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hasher
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.hash_password_into(password_source.deref(), salt, key_buffer)
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.unwrap();
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});
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key.into()
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use crate::{safe_cell::{SafeCell, SafeCellHandle as _}};
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use super::{derive_key, encryption::v1::{Nonce, generate_salt}};
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#[test]
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pub fn encrypt_decrypt() {
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static PASSWORD: &[u8] = b"password";
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let password = SafeCell::new(PASSWORD.to_vec());
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let salt = generate_salt();
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let mut key = derive_key(password, &salt);
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let nonce = Nonce(*b"unique nonce 123 1231233"); // 24 bytes for XChaCha20Poly1305
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let associated_data = b"associated data";
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let mut buffer = b"secret data".to_vec();
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key.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
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.unwrap();
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assert_ne!(buffer, b"secret data");
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let mut buffer = SafeCell::new(buffer);
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key.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, associated_data, &mut buffer)
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.unwrap();
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let buffer = buffer.read();
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assert_eq!(*buffer, b"secret data");
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}
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}
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