fix(bootstrap): keep the token valid until the vault is bootstrapped

This commit is contained in:
CleverWild
2026-09-07 17:40:15 +02:00
parent 5ade05d475
commit 2b02d4a9b1
13 changed files with 700 additions and 109 deletions

View File

@@ -4,28 +4,43 @@ use arbiter_proto::{BOOTSTRAP_PATH, home_path};
use diesel::QueryDsl;
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use kameo::{Actor, messages};
use rand::{RngExt, distr::Alphanumeric, make_rng, rngs::StdRng};
use rand::{
distr::{Alphanumeric, SampleString as _},
make_rng,
rngs::StdRng,
};
use std::path::Path;
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq as _;
use thiserror::Error;
const TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 64;
pub async fn generate_token() -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let rng: StdRng = make_rng();
pub async fn generate_token(home: &Path) -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let mut rng: StdRng = make_rng();
let token = rng.sample_iter(Alphanumeric).take(TOKEN_LENGTH).fold(
String::default(),
|mut accum, char| {
accum += char.to_string().as_str();
accum
},
);
// `Alphanumeric` samples raw `u8` ASCII codes, not `char`s -- `SampleString::sample_string`
// is `rand`'s own documented way to turn that into an actual TOKEN_LENGTH-character string
// (see the "Passwords" example on `Alphanumeric`'s docs). A prior version of this function
// called `.to_string()` on the sampled `u8` directly, which stringifies the numeric byte
// value (e.g. `65` instead of `'A'`) rather than the character it represents, silently
// producing a variable-length, all-decimal-digit string instead of a real token.
let token = Alphanumeric.sample_string(&mut rng, TOKEN_LENGTH);
tokio::fs::write(home_path()?.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
tokio::fs::write(home.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), token.as_str()).await?;
Ok(token)
}
/// A token file is only trustworthy if it looks like something `generate_token` could have
/// produced. Anything else -- empty (a crash between the file's truncate and write), foreign
/// content, or a trailing newline added by an editor -- must not be adopted as a live
/// credential: an empty file would make every empty-string token verify, and mismatched
/// content would silently lock out every operator holding the real, already-printed token.
#[must_use]
fn is_valid_token(candidate: &str) -> bool {
candidate.len() == TOKEN_LENGTH && candidate.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
}
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Database error: {0}")]
@@ -44,31 +59,77 @@ pub struct Bootstrapper {
}
impl Bootstrapper {
/// Production constructor: resolves the real `~/.arbiter` directory and delegates.
pub async fn new(db: &DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let row_count: i64 = {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
schema::operator::table
.count()
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await?
};
let token = if row_count == 0 {
let token = generate_token().await?;
Some(token)
} else {
None
};
Ok(Self { token })
let home = home_path()?;
Self::new_in(db, &home).await
}
}
#[messages]
impl Bootstrapper {
#[message]
pub fn is_correct_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
/// Carries all of `new`'s logic, parameterized on the directory the token file lives in.
/// `new` resolves the real home directory and calls this; tests call it directly with a
/// throwaway temp directory so they never touch the real `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token`.
pub async fn new_in(db: &DatabasePool, home: &Path) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let mut conn = db.get().await?;
let bootstrapped: bool = schema::arbiter_settings::table
.select(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
.first::<Option<i32>>(&mut conn)
.await?
.is_some();
if bootstrapped {
return Ok(Self { token: None });
}
let any_operator_registered: bool = schema::operator_identity::table
.count()
.get_result::<i64>(&mut conn)
.await?
> 0;
if !any_operator_registered {
// Nobody has used the current token yet, so there is nothing to preserve across a
// restart: generate a fresh one, exactly as on a first run. Reusing an old file
// here would let a token survive a database reset, silently reviving trust in
// whoever still held it.
return Ok(Self {
token: Some(generate_token(home).await?),
});
}
// At least one operator has already registered with the current token: every other
// declared operator still needs that same token, including across a restart, so an
// existing file is reused rather than replaced -- but only if it still looks like a
// real token. A truncated, foreign, or corrupted file must not become a live
// credential (see `is_valid_token`).
let path = home.join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH);
let token = match tokio::fs::read_to_string(&path).await {
Ok(existing) if is_valid_token(&existing) => existing,
Ok(_) => {
// Replacing the file invalidates whatever token the already-registered
// operators were handed, so it must not happen quietly. The content itself is
// a credential and stays out of the log; the path is enough to act on.
tracing::warn!(
?path,
"Bootstrap token file is not a well-formed token; replacing it"
);
generate_token(home).await?
}
Err(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => generate_token(home).await?,
Err(err) => return Err(Error::Io(err)),
};
Ok(Self { token: Some(token) })
}
/// Drops the token from memory. Called once the vault is bootstrapped: from then on,
/// operators are added through governance rather than through the token.
pub(crate) fn forget_token(&mut self) {
self.token = None;
}
#[must_use]
fn is_correct_token(&self, token: &str) -> bool {
self.token.as_ref().is_some_and(|expected| {
let expected_bytes = expected.as_bytes();
let token_bytes = token.as_bytes();
@@ -77,15 +138,28 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
bool::from(choice)
})
}
}
#[messages]
impl Bootstrapper {
/// Checks the token without retiring it: every operator in a declared committee
/// authenticates with the same token during bootstrap.
#[message]
pub fn consume_token(&mut self, token: String) -> bool {
if self.is_correct_token(token) {
self.token = None;
true
} else {
false
}
#[must_use]
pub fn verify_token(&self, token: String) -> bool {
self.is_correct_token(&token)
}
}
impl kameo::prelude::Message<crate::actors::vault::events::Bootstrapped> for Bootstrapper {
type Reply = ();
async fn handle(
&mut self,
_msg: crate::actors::vault::events::Bootstrapped,
_ctx: &mut kameo::prelude::Context<Self, Self::Reply>,
) -> Self::Reply {
self.forget_token();
}
}
@@ -96,3 +170,150 @@ impl Bootstrapper {
self.token.clone()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, insert_into, update};
/// A multi-operator committee registers every member with the same token, so verifying it
/// must not consume it. Only a completed bootstrap retires the token.
#[tokio::test]
async fn token_verifies_repeatedly_until_bootstrap_completes() {
let mut bootstrapper = Bootstrapper {
token: Some("test-token".to_owned()),
};
assert!(bootstrapper.verify_token("test-token".to_owned()));
assert!(bootstrapper.verify_token("test-token".to_owned()));
assert!(!bootstrapper.verify_token("wrong-token".to_owned()));
bootstrapper.forget_token();
assert!(!bootstrapper.verify_token("test-token".to_owned()));
assert!(bootstrapper.get_token().is_none());
}
/// Once the vault is bootstrapped, `Bootstrapper::new_in` must return with no token -- and
/// it must do so from `arbiter_settings.root_key_id` alone, taking the early return before
/// `home` is ever consulted. Uses `new_in` with a throwaway temp directory (never the
/// production `new`, which unconditionally resolves the real home directory before this
/// method even runs) so this test cannot touch the real filesystem regardless of outcome.
#[tokio::test]
async fn new_returns_no_token_once_the_vault_is_bootstrapped() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
let root_key_history_id: i32 = insert_into(schema::root_key_history::table)
.values(&db::models::NewRootKeyHistory {
ciphertext: vec![0u8; 32],
tag: vec![0u8; 16],
root_key_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
data_encryption_nonce: vec![0u8; 24],
schema_version: 1,
salt: vec![0u8; 16],
})
.returning(schema::root_key_history::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
update(schema::arbiter_settings::table)
.set(schema::arbiter_settings::root_key_id.eq(root_key_history_id))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home.path()).await.unwrap();
assert!(bootstrapper.get_token().is_none());
}
/// The file-reuse path (an operator has already registered, so bootstrap is unfinished)
/// must not adopt a corrupted token file as a live credential: it must reject it and
/// generate a fresh one instead. This is the Critical from the review, now reachable
/// safely because `new_in` takes a throwaway temp directory instead of the real home.
#[tokio::test]
async fn new_in_rejects_and_replaces_a_corrupted_token_file() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
// At least one operator must have registered, or `new_in` would regenerate
// unconditionally regardless of the file (Important 2) and never exercise validation.
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
tokio::fs::write(home.path().join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), "")
.await
.unwrap();
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home.path()).await.unwrap();
let token = bootstrapper
.get_token()
.expect("a fresh token must be generated");
assert!(is_valid_token(&token));
// The replacement must also have landed on disk, not just in memory, so a restart
// reads back the same (now valid) token rather than the corrupted one again.
let on_disk = tokio::fs::read_to_string(home.path().join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH))
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(on_disk, token);
}
/// The second defect the task exists to fix: a restart between the first registration and
/// the completed bootstrap must not invalidate the token the other declared operators were
/// already given. With an operator registered and a well-formed file on disk, `new_in` has
/// to hand back exactly what it read instead of generating a replacement.
#[tokio::test]
async fn new_in_reuses_a_valid_token_file_across_a_restart() {
let db = db::create_test_pool().await;
let mut conn = db.get().await.unwrap();
// Without a registered operator, `new_in` regenerates unconditionally (Important 2 of
// the round-2 review) and never reaches the reuse path this test is about.
insert_into(schema::operator_identity::table)
.values(schema::operator_identity::public_key.eq(vec![0u8; 32]))
.execute(&mut conn)
.await
.unwrap();
drop(conn);
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
// Stands in for the token a previous run wrote and printed to the console.
let handed_out = "Zq7Z2rXaB90kLmNpQwErTyUiOpAsDfGhJkLzXcVbNmQwErTyUiOpAsDfGhJkLzXc";
assert!(is_valid_token(handed_out));
tokio::fs::write(home.path().join(BOOTSTRAP_PATH), handed_out)
.await
.unwrap();
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home.path()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(bootstrapper.get_token().as_deref(), Some(handed_out));
}
/// An empty file must not be adopted as a live credential: `is_correct_token`'s
/// `is_some_and` would enter its closure for `Some(String::new())`, and comparing two empty
/// byte slices is true, so an unauthenticated `Some("")` from the wire would otherwise
/// verify. Also pins the other corrupted-content shapes `is_valid_token` must reject.
#[test]
fn is_valid_token_rejects_anything_that_is_not_a_real_token() {
assert!(!is_valid_token(""));
assert!(!is_valid_token("too-short"));
assert!(!is_valid_token(&"a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH - 1)));
assert!(!is_valid_token(&"a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH + 1)));
// A trailing newline (e.g. from an editor) must not be silently accepted either.
assert!(!is_valid_token(&format!("{}\n", "a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH))));
assert!(!is_valid_token(&"!".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH)));
assert!(is_valid_token(&"a".repeat(TOKEN_LENGTH)));
}
}

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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use crate::{
flow_coordinator::FlowCoordinator,
operator_registry::OperatorRegistry,
proposal_manager::{ProposalManager, events::ProposalApproved},
vault::Vault,
vault::{Vault, events},
vault_coordinator::VaultCoordinator,
},
db,
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ use kameo_actors::{
message_bus::{MessageBus, Register},
};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::error;
pub mod bootstrap;
pub mod evm;
@@ -54,6 +55,26 @@ impl GlobalActors {
}
pub async fn spawn(db: db::DatabasePool) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?;
Self::spawn_with_bootstrapper(db, bootstrapper).await
}
/// Test-facing: threads an explicit directory through to `Bootstrapper` instead of letting
/// it resolve the real home directory, so a test spawning a full `GlobalActors` can never
/// reach (let alone write to) the real `~/.arbiter/bootstrap_token`. Mirrors `spawn`
/// exactly, aside from where the token file lives.
pub async fn spawn_in(
db: db::DatabasePool,
home: &std::path::Path,
) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::new_in(&db, home).await?;
Self::spawn_with_bootstrapper(db, bootstrapper).await
}
async fn spawn_with_bootstrapper(
db: db::DatabasePool,
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper,
) -> Result<Self, SpawnError> {
let message_bus = Self::spawn_message_bus();
let key_holder = Vault::spawn(Vault::new(db.clone(), message_bus.clone()).await?);
let operator_registry = OperatorRegistry::spawn(OperatorRegistry::default());
@@ -62,6 +83,7 @@ impl GlobalActors {
db.clone(),
key_holder.clone(),
));
let bootstrapper = Bootstrapper::spawn(bootstrapper);
// Approved proposals are executed by whoever owns the kind, not by ProposalManager.
for recipient in [
evm.clone().recipient::<ProposalApproved>(),
@@ -70,9 +92,23 @@ impl GlobalActors {
] {
let _ = message_bus.tell(Register(recipient)).await;
}
// The token guards bootstrap only: once the vault reports success, it must be retired.
// A dropped registration would leave the token valid forever with nothing else to
// notice, so a failure here is logged rather than silently discarded.
if let Err(err) = message_bus
.tell(Register(
bootstrapper.clone().recipient::<events::Bootstrapped>(),
))
.await
{
error!(
?err,
"Failed to register Bootstrapper for the Bootstrapped event"
);
}
Ok(Self {
bootstrapper: Bootstrapper::spawn(Bootstrapper::new(&db).await?),
bootstrapper,
proposal_manager: ProposalManager::spawn(ProposalManager::new(db, message_bus.clone())),
vault: key_holder,
vault_coordinator,

View File

@@ -222,7 +222,9 @@ impl Vault {
});
info!("Vault bootstrapped successfully");
let _ = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await;
if let Err(err) = self.events.tell(Publish(events::Bootstrapped)).await {
error!(?err, "Failed to publish Bootstrapped event");
}
Ok(())
}

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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
//! Typed bindings for the SQLite scalar functions used in Diesel expressions.
use diesel::sql_types::{Integer, Text};
use diesel::sql_types::Text;
diesel::define_sql_function! {
/// SQLite `unixepoch(modifier)` -- seconds since the Unix epoch.

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@@ -101,12 +101,17 @@ fn initialize_database(url: &str) -> Result<(), DatabaseSetupError> {
/// # Panics
/// Panics if the database path is not valid UTF-8.
pub async fn create_pool(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<DatabasePool, DatabaseSetupError> {
let database_url = url.map(String::from).unwrap_or(
database_path()?
// Matched rather than `unwrap_or`, whose argument is evaluated even when `url` is `Some`:
// `database_path` resolves the real home directory and creates `~/.arbiter` as a side
// effect, so an eager call reaches the developer's home from every test that passes an
// explicit temp path, and fails outright wherever no home directory is writable.
let database_url = match url {
Some(url) => url.to_owned(),
None => database_path()?
.to_str()
.expect("database path is not valid UTF-8")
.to_owned(),
);
};
initialize_database(&database_url)?;

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@@ -3,15 +3,18 @@ use super::{
Error,
};
use crate::{
actors::bootstrap::ConsumeToken,
db::{DatabasePool, schema::operator_identity},
actors::bootstrap::VerifyToken,
db::{
DatabasePool,
schema::{arbiter_settings, operator_identity},
},
peers::operator::auth::Outbound,
};
use arbiter_crypto::authn::{self, AuthChallenge, SigningContext};
use arbiter_proto::transport::Bi;
use diesel::{ExpressionMethods as _, OptionalExtension as _, QueryDsl};
use diesel_async::RunQueryDsl;
use diesel_async::{AsyncConnection as _, RunQueryDsl};
use tracing::error;
pub(crate) struct ChallengeRequest {
@@ -63,17 +66,32 @@ async fn register_key(db: &DatabasePool, pubkey: &authn::PublicKey) -> Result<i3
Error::internal("Database unavailable")
})?;
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(operator_identity::table)
.values((operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),))
.returning(operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut conn)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(error = ?e, "Database error");
Error::internal("Database operation failed")
})?;
conn.transaction(async move |conn| {
// The database is authoritative on whether bootstrap has completed: `Vault::bootstrap`
// commits `root_key_id` before it publishes `events::Bootstrapped`, and `Bootstrapper`
// only learns of that two mailbox hops later. Re-checking it here, in the same
// transaction as the insert, closes that window deterministically instead of trusting
// a token that verified against `Bootstrapper`'s possibly-stale in-memory state.
let already_bootstrapped: bool = arbiter_settings::table
.select(arbiter_settings::root_key_id)
.first::<Option<i32>>(&mut *conn)
.await?
.is_some();
Ok(id)
if already_bootstrapped {
error!("Bootstrap token used to register after the vault was already bootstrapped");
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
let id: i32 = diesel::insert_into(operator_identity::table)
.values((operator_identity::public_key.eq(pubkey_bytes),))
.returning(operator_identity::id)
.get_result(&mut *conn)
.await?;
Ok(id)
})
.await
}
pub(super) struct AuthContext<'a, T: ?Sized> {
@@ -151,20 +169,20 @@ where
return Err(Error::InvalidChallengeSolution);
}
// Resolve client id: bootstrap (consume token + register) or lookup
// Resolve client id: bootstrap (verify token, then register) or lookup
let id = match bootstrap_token {
Some(token) => {
let token_ok: bool = self
.conn
.actors
.bootstrapper
.ask(ConsumeToken {
.ask(VerifyToken {
token: token.clone(),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error!(?e, "Failed to consume bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to consume bootstrap token")
error!(?e, "Failed to verify bootstrap token");
Error::internal("Failed to verify bootstrap token")
})?;
if !token_ok {
@@ -176,7 +194,21 @@ where
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
register_key(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await?
match register_key(&self.conn.db, pubkey).await {
Ok(id) => id,
// `register_key` refuses a token that verified here but lost the race
// against bootstrap. Reported to the peer exactly like the refusal above,
// so that operator sees a protocol error rather than a handshake that
// stops with nothing on the wire.
Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken) => {
self.transport
.send(Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken))
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Transport)?;
return Err(Error::InvalidBootstrapToken);
}
Err(err) => return Err(err),
}
}
None => get_client_id(&self.conn.db, pubkey)
.await?